EPICUREA

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CHARTS

1. Test of Truth

[∇]	**τὰ Διημαρτημένα**	Misinterpretations
		can result from
[Δ+]	**τὸ Προσδοξαζόμενον**	The Addition Of Judgement
		while
{Δ}	**Ἐξαιτιολογῶν**	Fully Reasoning Into The Causes
[Δ●]	**ἡ Ἐπιβλητικὴ Δόξα**	Objective Judgment
		is used for
[θ]	**τὸ Θεωρούμενον**	What Is Observed
		including
	τὸ Παρόν	What Is Present
	τὸ Ὁρατόν	What Is Seen
	τὸ Δῆλον	What Is Clear
	τὸ Λαμβανόμενον	What Is Comprehended
		and therefore is
[Θ]	**τὸ Μὴ Προσμένον**	What Is Not Pending [a basis in direct observation]
[Δ○]	**ἡ Θεωρητικὴ Δόξα**	Speculative Judgement
		is used for
[0]	**τὸ Μὴ Θεωρούμενον**	What Is Not Observed
		including
	τὸ Μὴ Παρόν	What Is Not Present
	τὸ Ἀόρατον	What Is Unseen
	τὸ Ἄδηλον	What Is Unclear
	τὸ Μὴ Λαμβανόμενον	What Is Not Comprehended
		and therefore
{Mo}	**τὸ Ἐπιμαρτυρηθησόμενον**	What Is To Be Attested
		which is
[O]	**τὸ Προσμένον**	What Is Pending [illegible]
	τὰ Κριτήρια	The Criteria
		for
[α]	**τὸ Ἀληθές**	What Is True
		are all
[A]	**αἱ Αἰσθήσεις**	Sensations
		including
[Π]	**τὰ Πάθη**	Experiences *(i.e., feelings)*
		and
[•Λ]	**αἱ Προλήψεις**	Anticipations *(what is mentally perceived before active consideration)*
		and
[B']	**ἡ Ἐπιβολή**	Attention
		to
[E]	**ἡ Ἐνάργεια**	Perceivable Reality
		including
[B'δ]	**ἡ Ἐπιβολὴ τῆς Διανοίας**	Attention To Mental Perception
[Δ]	**ἡ Δόξα**	A Judgement
		is
(¬α)	**Οὐκ Ἀληθές**	Not True

		if
{¬M}	**Μὴ Ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ**	It Is Not Attested
		or
{W}	**Ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ**	It Is Contested
		by
[A]	**ἡ Αἴσθησις**	*sensation*
[Δ]	**ἡ Δόξα**	A Judgement
		is
(α)	**Ἀληθές**	True
		if
{M}	**Ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ**	It Is Attested
		or
{¬W}	**Μὴ Ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ**	It Is Not Contested
		by
[A]	**ἡ Αἴσθησις**	*sensation*

2. Attestation & Contestation

ATTESTED		CONTESTED		
(M) **ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον** attested *being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation*	V or	(¬W) **μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον** not contested *not being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation*	⇒	(α) TRUE
(¬M) **μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον** not attested *not being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment as long as there continues to be no attestation*	Λ and		⇒	(O) **προσμένον** pending *(no evidence → unknown)*
	V or	(W) **ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον** contested *being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment long as there continues to be no attestation*	⇒	(-α) FALSE
(M) **ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον** attested	Λ and		⇒	(O) **προσμένον** pending *(conflicting evidence → more observation needed)*

3. Judgments

ὁ Ἐπιλογισμός	[the act of] inductive consideration	[Δ•] **ἡ Ἐπιβλητικὴ Δόξα**	Objective Judgment
distinguishes *(-κ) specific characteristics* *(unnecessary qualities, i.e., "symptoms")* *from* *(κ) universal characteristics* *(necessary qualities, i.e., "properties")*		*judgement of directly sensible* *(-κ) specific characteristics* *truth-value tested by* *(M) attestation and (W) contestation* *from direct practical circumstances*	
only (κ) universal characteristics provide a valid basis for			

ὁ ἀναλογισμός	[the act of] analogical consideration	
considers the unseen by analogy to the seen		

[Δ◌] **ἡ Θεωρητικὴ Δόξα**	Speculative Judgement
judgement of conceivable (κ) universal characteristics	
truth-value tested by (M) attestation and (W) contestation from indirect practical consequences	

4. Ideas

AN IDEA IS CORRECT IF IT MATCHES THE ENVIRONMENT		
{Δ●} **κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον**	in an objective way *[tests impressions, externally focusing]*	**ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being thrown upon*
OR IN		
{Δ◌} **θεωρητικῶς**	in a speculative way *[tests mental observability]*	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of [mentally] observing*
[Δ+] **τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον**	an addition of judgement	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of addition to seeming*
THAT INCLUDES		
[∇] **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	misinterpretations	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *fully missing the mark*
RESULTS IN A		
[∇+] **ψευδὴς Δόξα**	a false Judgment	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
WHICH IS A JUDGMENT THAT NOT MATCH THE ENVIRONMENT:		
{¬Δ●} **κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον**	not in an objective way	
AND IN ANY		
{¬Δ◌} **οὐ θεωρητικῶς**	not a speculative way	

5. Qualities

ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
αἱ ποιότητες περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους	qualities of the atoms	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
τὸ βάρος **τὰ βάρη**	weight	**ΒΑΡΟΣ** *heavy*
ἡ χώρας ποιότης	quality of space	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
ἀναφής *(ές)*	intangible	**ΑΝΑΦΗΣ** *not touchable*

Beyond the qualities of void and the atoms themselves, everything is an emergent and transforming quality of their mixture. *Qualities are either necessary or unnecessary for an object's existence*		
τὰ συμβεβηκότα **CONIUNCTA**	*Necessary Qualities:* **"PROPERTIES"**	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΤΑ** *to have walked together*
Weight to stone, Heat to fire, Liquidity to water *i.e, characteristics that are (κ) universal to the object*		
τὰ συμπτώματα **ĒVENTA**	*Unnecessary Qualities:* **"SYMPTOMS"**	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
Slavery or Freedom, Poverty or Riches, Peace or War *i.e., characteristics that are (-κ) not universal to the object*		
This outline is specific to Epicurus. For example, Aristotle uses **τὰ συμβεβηκότα***, with the sense of* **τὰ συμπτώματα**		

6. Active Pleasures

flavor	**sapor**	**ὁ χυλός**	**ΧΥΛΟΣ** *juice*	*"tasting"*
Aphrodisian activities	**res Veneriae**	**τὰ Ἀφροδίσια**	**ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΑ** *foam of god*	*"touching"*
listening	**audītus**	**τὸ ἄκροαμα** **τὰ ἀκροάματα**	**ΑΚΡΟΑΜΑ** *hearing*	*"hearing"*
shape	**fōrma**	**ἡ μορφή**	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*	*"seeing"*

7. Vices

vices		**ἡ κακία**	**ΚΑΚΙΑ** *evil*	Karneîskos (U4)
desire	**cupīdo**	**ἡ ἐπιθυμία**	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*	*SV 71* *On Nature 25.7* *On Nature 34.3*
fear	**timor**	**ὁ φόβος**	**ΦΟΒΟΣ** *fleeing*	*in multis locis*
pride	**superbia**	**ἡ ὕβρις**		
crudeness	**spurcitia**	**ἡ ἀσέλγεια**		*Athenaeus, 12.531D*
insolence	**petulantia**	**ἡ ἀναίδεια**		
idleness	**dēsidia** from dē-sedeō, "to sit apart / be inactive"	**ἡ ῥαθυμία**		
excess	**lūxus**	**ἡ τρυφή**		*Athenaeus, 12.531D*

8. Trifold Classification of Desires

Φυσικαὶ Ἀναγκαῖαι	**Φυσικαὶ Οὐκ Ἀναγκαῖαι**	**Οὔτε Φυσικαὶ Οὐκ Ἀναγκαῖαι**
Natural & Necessary	Natural & Not Necessary	Neither Natural, Nor Necessary

naturally based desires needed for health and wellbeing	*naturally based desires not needed for health and wellbeing*	*desires coming from convention, and not needed for health and wellbeing*
Diogenes Laertius, 10.149		
Drinking when Thirsty	*Expensive Foods*	*Crowns and the Dedication of Statues*
Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends 1.45		
"the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense"	*"natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount"*	*"the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered"*

9. Kinetic vs. Established Pleasure

ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή	*pleasure from movement*	**ἡ καταστηματικὴ ἡδονή**	*established pleasure*
"kinetic pleasure" *"active pleasure"*		*"static pleasure"* *"satisfied pleasure"*	
*joy (**ἡ χαρά**)* *merriment (**ἡ εὐφροσύνη**)*		*undisturbedness (**ἡ ἀταραξία**)* *non-suffering (**ἡ ἀπονία**)*	

10. Ways of Thinking

ΟΙ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ			
OBJECTIVE [Δ●]			
ὁ ἐπιβλητικὸς τρόπος	the objective way	**ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being thrown upon*	*focuses on evidence from sensation*
φανταστικῶς	in an appearance-based way	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of appearance*	*focuses on appearances*
ὁ πραγματικός τρόπος	the practical way	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of result of doing / affair*	*focuses on immediate surroundings*
ὁ νουθετητικὸς τρόπος	the instructive way	**ΝΟΥΘΕΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of setting mind*	*focuses on correcting a mental error that could turn into a negative practical consequence*
ὁ ἐπανορθωτικὸς τρόπος	the corrective way	**ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of straight upright again upon*	*focuses on correcting a practical error that has occurred*
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the affected way	**ΠΑΘΗΤΟΣ** *experiencing*	*focuses on how one is affected by external influences*
SPECULATIVE [Δ○]			

ὁ μοναχὸς τρόπος	the singular way	**ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ** *single multiplicity*	*focuses on the single viable theory about primary qualities that fits with what is apparent*
ὁ πλεοναχὴς τρόπος	the manifold way	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΗΣ** *more multiplicity*	*focuses on multiple viable theories about emergent qualities that fit with what is apparent*
θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of [mentally] observing*	*focuses on conceivability*
ὁ διαληπτικὸς τρόπος	the distinguishing way	**ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of taking hold between*	*focuses distinguishing what is conceivabile*
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around*	*focuses on inconceivability*
ὁ ἐμπεριληπτικὸς τρόπος	⁂ the completely comprehensible way [of thinking] within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around in*	*focuses on internal inconceivability*
ὁ ταπινὸς τρόπος	the humble way	**ΤΑΠΙΝΟΣ** *low*	*focuses on the opportunity for direct observation*
ἀνεπιλογίστως	in a way without inductive consideration	**ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ** *not reasoning action upon*	
LOGICAL [Δ]			
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	**ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning*	*thinking about conclusions based on given premises or evidence*
ὁ ἀντιποιητικὸς τρόπος	the contradictory way	**ΑΝΤΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of gathering against*	*thinking about the errors in an argument*
ὁ αἰτιολογικὸς τρόπος	the way relating to the study of causes	**ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning about blame / cause*	*thinking about the causes of movement*
ὁ παθολογικὸς τρόπος	the way relating to the study of experiences	**ΠΑΘΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning about experience*	*thinking about our own feelings and experiences*
ὁ ἀναλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the analogistic way	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of action of reasoning back/again*	*thinking about what is beyond perception*
ὁ ὁμοιοτικὸς τρόπος	the way by similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being similar*	*thinking about similarities (of the visible to the non-visible)*
ὁ διαφορικὸς τρόπος	the way by difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of carrying apart*	*thinking on differences (of the visible to the non-visible)*
ὁ ἐπιλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the inductive way	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of action of reasoning upon*	*thinking based on empirical data*

ὁ συλλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the inferential way	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of action of reasoning together*	*thinking about logical deduction and structured argumentation*
OTHER			
ὁὁδήποτε τρόπος	whichever way	**ΟΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite which*	*relates to any way of thinking*
ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διαστήματος τρόπος	the way [arising] from the same separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*	*relates to thinking about ourselves as only atoms and void vs. ourselves as compositions with emergent properties*

11. Key Terms

The Standard		
ὁ κανών **οἱ κανόνες**	standard	**ΚΑΝΩΝ** *measuring stick (ruler)*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] evidence	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	[α] true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*
τἀληθές = **τὸ ἀληθές** **τὰ ἀληθῆ**	[α] what is true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not hidden*
ἡ ἀλήθεια **αἱ ἀλήθειαι**	truth	**ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ** *not hidden*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
τὸ ἡδόμενον **τὰ ἡδόμενα**	what pleases	**ἩΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *sweet*
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *sensed pain*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** *pain*
τὸ λυπούμενον **τὰ λυπούμενα**	what distresses	**ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *vexation*
Natural Science		
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
τὸ σύμπαν **τὰ σύμπαντα**	the entirety	**ΣΥΜΠΑΝ** *all together*

τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
	Ethics	
ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια αἱ αὐτάρκειαι	self-sufficiency	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ *state of self-sufficing*
ἡ εὐπορία αἱ εὐπορίαι	resourcefulness	ΕΥΠΟΡΙΑ *good passage*
ἡ ἐκχώρησις αἱ ἐκχωρήσεις	withdrawal	ΕΚΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ *process of location out*
ἡ ἡσυχία αἱ ἡσυχίαι	tranquillity	῾ΗΣΥΧΙΑ *stillness*
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	῾ΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ *taking*
ἡ δίωξις αἱ διώξεις	pursuit	ΔΙΩΞΙΣ *chasing*
ἡ φυγή αἱ φυγαί	avoidance	ΦΥΓΗ *fleeing*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	[process of] reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *action of collecting*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ἡ ἀσφάλεια αἱ ἀσφάλειαι	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ *not stumbling*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *beautiful*
δικαίως	justly	ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ *custom / right*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ὁ ἄσωτος οἱ ἄσωτοι	a degenerate	ΑΣΩΤΟΣ *not saving*
ἡ ὄχλησις αἱ ὀχλήσεις	[feeling of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ *process of a crowd of people*

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
λαμβάνειν **τὴν ἰδέαν**	*"to comprehend* *an idea"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 2a)*
λαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	comprehended	**ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasping*
Πᾶν [Β'δ] **κατ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν** [δ] **λαμβανόμενον** **τῇ διανοίᾳ** [α] **ἀληθές ἐστι**	*"Everything* [δ] *comprehended* [Β'δ] *through our attention* *to mental perception* *is* [α] *true"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.62b*
λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	comprehending	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
τοῦ τέλους μνήμην **λαμβάνον**	*"comprehending the* *memory of fulfillment"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 col. 12 (fr. B 34)*
λαβεῖν	to comprehend [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*
Ἔστι μίαν λαβεῖν **φορὰν τὴν ἄνω... καὶ** **μίαν τὴν κάτω**	*"It is possible to* *comprehend one* *transmission that is* *above... and one that* *is below"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.60b*
τὸ λαμβανόμενον **τὰ λαμβανόμενα**	what is comprehended	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *grasping*
ἡ λῆψις ***αἱ λῆψεις***	*☘ comprehension*	***ΛΗΨΙΣ*** *taking hold*
λήψεσθαι	to comprehend for oneself [in the future]	**ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ** *taking hold*
Ληψόμεθα **τίς ὁ κανὼν**	☘ *"We will comprehend* *what the rule is"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1191 fr. 121/122*
ληπτέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be comprehended	**ΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ** *taking hold*
ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου **Ληπτέον φοράν τινα**	*"It is necessary to* *comprehend some* *transmission from an* *original source"*	Epicurus On Nature, Book 11 P.Herc. 1042 col. 9 (column 41)
εἰλημμένος *(η, ον)*	[intellectually] having been comprehended, [generally] having been acquired	**ΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasped*
Φεύγεις τὸν βίον **ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν** **εἰλημμένον**	*"You flee the lifestyle* *acquired by the public"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1479, fr. L (col. 5)*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	**ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping away from*
ἡ ἀπόληψις **αἱ ἀπολήψεις**	intake	**ἈΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold* *away from*
LSJ and Hicks render this word at 105b as "imprisonment," *Bailey as "caught up," and Young as "penetrating"*		
ἀπειληφέναι	to have fully acquired	**ΑΠΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ** *grasped away from*
ἡ ὑπὲρ τούτων Χρεία **ἀκρίβειαν** **ἀπειληφέναι**	*"[our] use regarding* *these things has fully* *acquired precision"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.80b*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping separation*

ἀμφότερα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ Συμπτώματα	*"both Symptoms concerning the soul are distinguished"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.67b*
διαλήψεσθαί	going to distinguish	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ** *taking hold separation*
Οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαί τι	*"We suspected we were going to distinguish something"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.58b*
ἡ διάληψις **αἱ διαλήψεις**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold separation*
διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν	*"differentiation of parts"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.58a*
ἡ ἀδιαληψία **αἱ ἀδιαληψίαι**	indiscrimination	**ΑΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΑ** *not taking hold separation*
ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀδιαληψία	*"the indiscrimination of words vs. [practical] situations"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 2 inf.)*
διαληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] distinguishing	**ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of taking hold between*
λαμβάνειν τινὰ ἑτερότητα τῶν ἀτόμων κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν	*"to comprehend a certain difference of the atoms in a certain [mentally] distinguishing way"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.3 (B 39)*
διειλημμένος	having been distinguished	**ΔΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasped through*
ὁ διειλημμένος ἡμῖν Χρόνος	*"the time that has been distinguished by us"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Possibly Book 10* *P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 47*
εὐλαβούμενος *(η, ον)*	carefully comprehending	**ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *properly grasped*
οὐκ εὐλαβούμενος τοῦτο	*"not carefully comprehending this"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup.)*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *thoroughly grasping*
προκαταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly anticipate	**ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *before thoroughly grasping*
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [already]	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ**
καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ	*"to thoroughly comprehend with the mind"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.78b*
ἡ κατάληψις ***αἱ καταλήψεις***	*[Stoic Term]* *thorough comprehension*	***ΚΑΤΑΛΗΨΙΣ*** *thoroughly taking hold*
μεταληπτός *(ή, όν)*	substitutable	**ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *taken hold change*
μεταληπτέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be substituted	**ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ** *change ought to be taken hold*
μεταληπτέον	it is necessary to substitute	
οὔτε διαλέκτους ὡς βελτίους Μεταληπτέον	*"Nor is it necessary to substitute ways of speaking as [though they are] better*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.72b*

περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around*
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον **τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα**	[intellectually] what is completely comprehended, [generally] what is completely encompassed	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *grasping around*
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου	*"what is completely comprehended [directly] from the original source"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature Book 11* *P.Herc. 1042 col. 8 (column 40)*
συμπεριλαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	completely comprehended together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasping around together*
τὸ συμπεριλαμβανόμενον	what is completely comprehended together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ**
τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγω ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβανόμενον	*"what is completely comprehended together from a descent into [our] reasoning"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 15* *P.Herc. 1151 fr. 26*
ἡ περίληψις **αἱ περιλήψεις**	complete comprehension	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold around*
ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων	*"in [our] complete comprehension of what is aggregated"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.56b*
τὸ περιληπτόν **τὰ περιληπτά**	what is completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ** *taken hold around*
ἐπινοεῖν ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς	*"to objectively conceive analogously to what is completely comprehensible"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.40b*
τὸ περιειλημμένον **τὰ περιειλημμένα**	what has been completely comprehended	**ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of being grasped around*
τὰ αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιειλημμένα	*"what has been completely comprehended about their [atomic] shapes"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.42b*
περιληπτῶς	with complete comprehension	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ** *taken hold around*
ἐπινοεῖν περιληπτῶς	*"to objectively conceive with complete comprehension"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.40b*
περιληπτός *(ή, όν)*	completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *taken hold around*
τό μῆκος περιληπτὸν	*"a completely comprehensible length"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.46b*
περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around*
τῶν ἐν περιληπτικῷ τρόπω διανοήσεων	*"...of mental perceptions in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible..."*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.2)*
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around*

πολλοῖς ἂν Δόξειε... περιληπτικῶς...	*"it might have seemed to many in a completely comprehensible way..."*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 6 inf.)*
ἀπεριλήπτως	without complete comprehension	**ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ** *not taken hold around*
ἀπεριλήπτως Προσδοξάζουσιν	*"They add judgment without complete comprehension"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)*
ἀπερίληπτος *(ος, ον)*	not completely comprehensible	**ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *not taken hold around*
ἀπεριλήπτοις Προσδοξάζουσιν	*"They add judgment to [what is] not completely comprehensible"*	*idem supra* *On Nature Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)*
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely comprehend within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around in*
καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἐμπεριλαμβάνων	*"completely comprehending one [idea] after another within"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 2)*
ἐμπεριληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	completely comprehensible way within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around in*
ὁ ἐμπεριληπτικός τρόπος	*"the completely comprehensible way [of thinking] within"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 5)*
ἐμπεριειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	completely comprehended within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *being grasped around in*
κατόψεται... ἐμπεριειλημμένα	*"to inspect... what is completely comprehended within"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.68a*
προλαμβάνειν	to anticipate	**ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping before*
ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•Λ] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
ἡ βλεπομένη παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πρόληψις	*"the anticipation seen by us"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus* *Laertius 10.72a*
εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττειν	*"to fit into the anticipation"*	ΚΔ 37
τοῦ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέροντος ἡ πρόληψις	*"the anticipation of benefit in regards to justice"*	ΚΔ 37
μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν	*"not fitting the anticipation"*	ΚΔ 38
"τοῦ θυμωθήσεσθαι" ἡ πρόληψις	*"the anticipation of 'becoming angry'"*	*Philodemus* *On Anger* *P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45*
κατὰ τὴν κοινοτέραν πρόληψιν	*"according to the more common anticipation"*	*Philodemus* *On Anger* *P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45*
τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότροπον πρόληψιν νοούμενον	*"What is conceived according to a particular type of anticipation"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Possibly Book 10* *P.Herc. 1413/1416* *fragment 38*
ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἡ τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψις	*"the anticipation of the cause on the basis of our own [movement]"*	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110*

τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν πρόληψεων γιγνόμενον	"what is produced upon the anticipations [i.e. error]"	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 3)*
καθάπερ ὁρίζεται Χρόνος εἶναι πρόληψιν	"just as Time is distinguished to exist as an anticipation"	*Philodemus* *On Piety* *1.66A.1887*
"πρόληψιν" – id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem	"that is, some information in the mind obtained before [thinking]"	Cicero De Natura Deorum, 1.16.43
προειληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	anticipated [i.e., prior to active thinking]	**ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ** *before having grasped*
μοχθηρί εἰσι Τύποι προειληφότες	"anticipated Impressions in a wretched [state]"	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1191 fr. 114*
προειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	having already been anticipated	**ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *being having grasped before*
τὸ προειλημμένον τὰ προειλημμένα	[•^] what has already been anticipated	**ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ** *being having grasped before*
τὸ προειλημμένον κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα	"what has already been anticipated according to a particular word"	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Possibly Book 10* *P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 11*
συμμεταλαμβάνειν	to partake [lit. "to take a share together"]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping change together*
τὸ μέρος συμμεταλαμβάνει	[*one's soul*] partakes in a part [*of the motion that surrounds it*]	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1634 fr. 2 (A 18)*
συλλαμβάνειν	to comprehend together	**ΣΥΛΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping together*
συλλαβεῖν	to comprehend together *[already]*	**ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped together*
συλλαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	comprehending together *[already]*	
ὃ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα Προσαγορεύομεν	*⁂ "which we refer to while comprehending together in accordance with the aggregated body"*	*Epicurus* *Letter to Herodotus,* *Laertius 10.70b*
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping under*
σοφώτερον ὑπελάμβανέ τι	"He supposed something [was] wiser"	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 28* *P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)*
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	**ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold under*
ἡ ἐναπολήψις αἱ ἐναπολήψεις	integration	**ΕΝΑΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold from within*

13. Cult

Sacrifice	*Burnt Offerings*	**θυσίαι**	public	*On Piety 1453* *Athenaeus. 5.179D* *Plutarch, Cont. Beat. 1102B* *Plut. Cont. Beat 1102C* *Plut. Adv. Col. 1112C* *Porphyry, De Abst. 1.7-12*

	Offering to the Dead	**ἐναγίσματα**	private	*On Piety 818*
Attendance of Local Calendrical Festivals	*Jug Drinking Day*	**Χοαί**	public	*On Piety 806 & 1398*
	Anthesteria, generally	**Ἀνθεστήρια**	public	*On Piety 865*
Festivities	*Feasting*	**εὐωχία**	private	*On Piety 819* *D.L. 10.18*
Dedication	*Votive Offerings*	**ἀναθήματα**	public	*D.L. 10.120*
Initiation	*Attic Eleusinian Mysteries*	**τὰ Ἐλευσίνια Μυστήρια**	public *(restricted)*	*On Piety 557 & 808 & 1397*
Adoration	*Honorific Statues, Commemorative Images*	**ἀγάλματα**	public	*On Piety 910* *Cicero De Nat. Deorum 1.58* *Origen Contr. Cels. 7.66* *Cicero De Fin. 5.3*
Confession	*Declaration of Faults*	**μηνύειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας**	private	*U160*

14. Madmen

Οἱ Μεμηνότες	*"Μεμήναισι δ᾽ οὗτοι"*		
Timocrates of Lampsacus	(fl. c. 290 BCE)	*brother of Metrodorus: broke with Epicurus and publicly criticized him.*	*D.L. 10.6*
Timon of Phlius	(fl.c. 280 BCE)	*Athenian Comic:*	*D.L. 10.3*
Posidonius the Stoic	(fl. c. 140 BCE)	Politician and Celtologist: *criticized Epicurean philosophy*	*D.L. 10.4*
Diotimus the Stoic	(fl. c. 100 BCE)	*Plagiarist: accused Epicurus of vice by forging and spreading fifty obscene letters*	*D.L. 10.3*
Dionysius of Halicarnassus	(fl. c. 20 BCE)	*Rhetorician and Historian: rejected Epicurean literary theory*	*D.L. 10.4*
Nicolaus of Damascus	(fl. c. 10 CE)	*Court Historian of Herod the Great: who attacked Epicurean teachings*	*D.L. 10.4*
Sotion	(fl. c. 30 CE)	*Teacher of Seneca: dismissed Epicureanism in favor of eclecticism*	*D.L. 10.4*

15. Mocking Epithets

the Clatterers	**οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν** *followers of Pythagoras* (c. 530 BCE onward)	Lēkythismoí	**οἱ Ληκυθισμοί** *action of a lekythos*

*A **lekythos** is a clay oil flask – an empty one makes a hollow, clattering noise.*

Pythagorean teachings were steeped in secret symbols and the esoteric jargon of mystical numerology.

The adherents of Pythagoras spoke with words empty of meaning: both the flask and the students make noise but have no actual content.

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the Agitator

Ἡράκλειτος
Heraclitus
of Ephesus
(fl. 500 BCE)

Kykētḗs

ὁ Κυκητής
wheel

Heraclitus was fundamentally a skeptic, saying: "let us not hazard guesses about the most important matters" (Laertius 9.73)

Plato mocked the Heracliteans and their theory of fiery flux by calling them **οἱ ῥέοντες** *"the fluxing ones"* (Theaetetus 180c)

"The Stoics together with Heraclitus say that matter is wholly and completely changeable and alterable and mutable and fluid." (Aëtius 1.9.2)

Epicurus escalates the irony: not just calling Heraclitus a "Fluxor" – but an "Agitator."

*Epicurus' term alludes to Heraclitus' own metaphor of the **kykeōn** (a mixed barley drink) which will separate if not stirred* (DK B125)

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the Basketbearer

Πρωταγόρας
Protagoras
(fl. 450 BCE)

Phormophóros

ὁ Φορμοφόρος
wicker basket carrying

According to Athenaeus: "in the same letter [On Occupations], Epicurus also says that Protagoras, the sophist, from first being a basket-carrier and firewood-carrier, he later became Democritus' scribe (with Protagoras having been admired by Democritus for some particular invention for carrying firewood)" (Deipnosophists, 8.50, 354C)

According to Laertius: "Protagoras was the first to invent the so-called 'Tyle' (on which people carry burdens)" (9.53)

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the Thickskulls

οἱ περὶ
Πρωταγόραν
followers of
Protagoras

Baryengképhaloi

οἱ Βαρυεγκέφαλοι
heavy head

Protagoras was a student of Democritus – even though Democritus was about 30 years younger.

Epicurus highlights Protagoras' humble origins as a manual laborer, his late start in philosophy, and his misapplication of Democritus' science in founding the "profession" of sophistry.

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the Pretenders

οἱ περὶ
Σωκράτη
followers of
Socrates
(430 BCE onward)

Alazoneîai

αἱ Ἀλαζονεῖαι
vagrant / boaster

Socrates took the skepticism that was rampant in physical science and applied it to human life.

The term "Pretenders" applied to followers of Socrates as a jab at their public posturing and affected ignorance.

For example Phaedo of Elis, a close student, and the main speaker in Plato's "Phaedo." Phaedo later returned to his hometown and founded the Elean School of philosophy (teaching that virtue is knowledge, the mind is the sole source of the good, and the soul is immortal).

Cicero reports that Epicurus "foully slandered Phaedo [of Elis], the disciple of Socrates" (DND 1.93)

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the Arbiter of Absurdities

Δημόκριτος
Democritus
(fl. 420 BCE)

Lērókritos

ὁ Ληρόκριτος
judge of nonsense

Democritus was an eliminative materialist (believing that only the atoms and the void really exist) and extreme skeptic, saying: "men know nothing, for truth is in an abyss" (Laertius 9.72) *and he denied that any criterion of knowledge exists, holding that "none of the apparent things is a criterion"*(9.106)

Democritus thought that the gods deliberately communicate with men via the films, and he thought the films have their own perception.

Democritus also took a particular interest in zombies. According to Proclus (Commentary on the Republic, 2.113.6) *"Stories of people who appeared to have died and then came back to life were collected by many of the ancients including the scientist Democritus in his writings..."*

the Golden One	**Πλάτων** *Plato* **Ἀριστοκλῆς** *Aristocles* (fl. c 388 BCE)	Chrysoûs	**ὁ Χρυσοῦς** *shining*

Born at the end of the golden age – during the great plague of Athens – Plato eventually "created a synthesis of the doctrines of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates." (Laertius 3.8)

Plato is fundamentally a Skeptic, leaving truth "to the gods" and only hoping for "probable explanations." (Laertius 9.72, Timaeus 29c)

the Manslayers	**οἱ περὶ** **Ἡρακλείδην** *followers of* *Heracleides* *of Aenus*	Androphoníai	**αἱ Ἀνδροφονίαι** *man slaying*

A pupil of Plato, Heracleides of Aenus took part in the assassination of the King Cotys I of Thrace around 360 BCE

the Dionysus-Flatterers	**οἱ περὶ** **Πλάτωνα** *followers of* *Plato*	Dionysokólakes	**οἱ Διονυσοκόλακες** *Dionysus flatterer*

A reference to King Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. Epicurus is ridiculing the Academy's sycophantic pursuit of political influence: especially Plato's own ill-fated attempt to tutor King Dionysius II – who ultimately detained Plato against his will.

the Enemies of Greece	**οἱ Κυζικηνοί** *the Cyzicenes* (350 BCE onward)	Echthroì tês Helládos	**οἱ Ἐχθροὶ** **τῆς Ἑλλάδος** *hating*

the Cyzicenes here refers to the students of Eudoxus of Cnidos (**Κνίδος**), *the mathematical astronomer and associate of Plato. Eudoxus taught at Cyzicus* (**Κύζικος**) *and set up a school there. (Cyzicus is on the Sea of Marmara about 35 miles east of Lampsacus.) Eudoxus' teachings on pleasure were similar to Epicurus. Eudoxus died right around when Epicurus was born, but he left many influential pupils in Cyzicus, who also spread their influence from there to Athens.*

the Degenerate	**Ἀριστοτέλης** *Aristotle* (fl. 344 BCE)	Ásōtos	**ὁ Ἄσωτος** *not saving*

Aristotle wasted his inheritance and then turned to military service and selling drugs – presumably in connection with his peddling of remedies, we also hear of Aristotle: "bathing in a bath of warm oil and then selling the oil." (Laertius 5.16)

the Grand Wreckers	**οἱ Διαλεκτικοί** *Dialecticians*	Polýphthoroi	**οἱ Πολύφθοροι** *having damaged much*

Epicurus grouped together the Aristotelians, Academic Skeptics, Megarian logicians, and Stoics as purveyors of fruitless debate that could be destructive to living well.

By dubbing all dialecticians "the Grand Wreckers," Epicurus highlighted the deep rift between his philosophy and the logic-oriented approach of the builders of false systems such as the Aristotelians and of the outright destructive skepticism of the Megarians such as Diodorus Cronus.

the Groaners	**οἱ περὶ** **Θεόφραστον** *followers of* *Theophrastus* ⁂	Barýstonoi	**οἱ Βαρύστονοι** *heavy tone*

∴ *This application to Theophrastus only is by process of elimination.*
***barýstonoi** was colloquial slang for actors who utter deep tragic groans.*
possibly parodying Theophrastean style as long-winded,
emotionally burdensome, or affectedly serious.

the Wood-Giver	**Ἀντίδωρος** *Antidorus* (fl.c 330 BCE)	Sannídōros	**ὁ Σαννίδωρος** *gift of penis / plank*

We know that Epicurus wrote a two book series on Antidorus.
(Possibly Antidorus of Cyme the grammarian)

the Altar-Beggars	**οἱ περὶ Ἱππαρχίαν** *followers of Hipparchia of Maroneia* (fl.c. 325 BCE)	Bōmolochíai	**αἱ Βωμολοχίαι** *ambushing [i.e., begging at] the altar*
the Courtesanry		Hetairéseis	**αἱ Ἑταιρήσεις** *process of being a courtesan*

Hipparchia (whose name means "ruler of horses") was the wife of Crates of Thebes
and a student of Diogenes of Sinope.
Calling the students of Diogenes "altar-beggars" was likely literally true,
and calling his female adherents "the courtesanry" was humorous
because it ironically elevated their status.

stupid	**Πύρρων** *Pyrrho* (fl. 320 BCE)	Amathés	**ὁ Ἀμαθής** *not learning*
uneducated		Apaídeutos	**ὁ Ἀπαίδευτος** *not educated*

Pyrrho was an extreme relativist, saying "for each assertion, there is an opposing assertion" (9.74)
and "each thing is no more this, then that."

He was also an extreme skeptic, Pyrrho and his followers "themselves determined nothing, not even [that they determined nothing]. and consequently they even rejected not determining" (9.74) while holding that "the senses deceive, and reason is inconsistent." (9.95)

Pyrrho and his followers employed logical puzzles in
"rejecting all demonstration, criterion, sign, cause, motion, learning, coming into being –
and the idea that anything is good or bad by nature." (9.90)

*His school maintained a famous list of 10 ways (**τρόποι**)*
in which sensation and certainty are undermined.

Despite all this, Pyrrho also served as a high priest at the Temple of Zeus at Olympia.

Jellyfish *literally, "(sea) lungs"*	**Ναυσιφάνης** *Nausiphanes* (fl.c. 310 BCE)	Pleúmones	**οἱ Πλεύμονες** *sides / lungs*
illiterate		Agrámmatos	**Ἀγράμματος** *not the result of writing*
swindler		Apateṓn	**ὁ Ἀπατεών** *deceiving agent*
prostitute		Pórnē	**ἡ Πόρνη** *selling*

Epicurus used the term "Jellyfish" to specifically indicate insensitivity and senselessness.
(Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians, 1.4)

Nausiphanes was a student of Pyrrho. In support of skepticism, Nausiphanes is known to have said:
"Of those things which appear to exist, nothing exists more than it does not exist."

Nausiphanes took some of his science from Democritus (through texts or tradition). In support of his 'science-based political rhetoric,' Philodemus quotes Nausiphanes as saying, "honor depends on winning a reputation for cleverness in politics… the wise man is he who can persuade his hearers – and this power of persuasion belongs to the man of science."

16. Grades

ὁ ᾠκειωμένος	he who is familiar	ΩΙΚΕΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ *made comfortable dwelling*
ὁ προβεβηκώς	he who has advanced	ΠΡΟΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ *to have walked forward*
ὁ ἀποτελούμενος	he who is fully completing [for himself]	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *completing out*
ὁ τετελεσιουργημένος	he who has accomplished [for himself]	ΤΕΤΕΛΕΣΙΟΥΡΓΗΜΕΝΟΣ *completed work*
ὁ σοφός	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*

PRINCIPLE JUDGMENTS
Κύριαι Δόξαι

ΚΔ 1. Contentment & Indestructibility

To ma-ká-ri-on kai á-phthar-ton oú-te au-to prág-ma-ta é-chei ¬ oú-te ál-lǭ pa-ré-chei:
hṓ-ste oú-te or-gaîs oú-te chá-ri-si sy-né-che-tai – en as-the-neî gar Pân to toi-oû-ton

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει ¬ οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει: ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται – ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ Πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον

What is blessed and indestructible neither holds onto situations itself ¬ nor gives [*them*] over to someone else: and therefore is not kept united with moods or with favors – for everything like this is in [*a state of*] weakness

One who is content and indestructible does not retain problems and does not cause problems for others – and therefore is not wrapped up in moods or partialities.

κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ *greatness*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
ἄφθαρτος *(ον)*	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ *not decaying*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
παρέχειν	to yield [here, "to give over"]	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
ἡ ὀργή αἱ ὀργαί	mood	ΟΡΓΗ *reaching out*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	favor [here, "grace"]	ΧΑΡΙΣ *charming / gracious*
συνέχειν	to keep united	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ *holding together*
ἀσθενής *(ές)*	weak	ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ *not strength*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	ΠΑΝ *all*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Ἀποκολοκύντωσις Divi Claudii, 8

Ἐπικούρειος Θεὸς non potest esse: οὔτε Αὐτὸς πρᾶγμα ἔχει τι ¬ οὔτε ἄλλοις παρέχει

> an Epicurean God he cannot be: for He himself neither holds onto any situation ¬ nor pours [*one*] onto others

Seneca partially preserves an alternative version of this **Κύρια Δόξα**, *while speaking mockingly of Claudius.*

τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*

The Example of the Gods

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), De Rerum Natura 1.48

ómnis énim per sē dī́vum Nātū́ra necéssest
indeed, it must be by its own ability that the entire Nature of the gods

immortā́l[ī] ǽvō súmmā cum pā́ce fruā́tur
enjoys unending time with the greatest peace,

sēmṓt[a] ab nóstrīs rḗbus sēiū́nctaque lóngē;
removed from our issues and far separated

nam, prīvā́ta dolṓr[e] ómnī, prīvā́ta perī́clīs,
for, deprived from all pain, deprived from risks,

ípsa súīs póllēns ópibus, níhil índiga nóstrī,
itself powerful in its own resources, wanting nothing from us,

nec béne prōméritīs cápitur nec tángitur ī́rā
it is neither agreeably captured by good deeds, nor touched by anger

Human Weakness

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On The Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 152, fr. 9 (87)

...χρειωδῶν ἡ συμφυλία π[ρὸς τὴν] συνανα[σ]τροφὴν αὐτῆι τὰ πάθη παρ[αδί]δωσιν. ού γὰρ δυνατὸν ἔχειν τὴν συμφυλίαν ἄνε[υ] πάσης ἐπιμειξίας ὄντας. ἀμέλει δὲ κ(αὶ) ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ἀσθενῶν κ(αὶ) πρ(οσ)δεγομένων πρ[ὸς τ]ὰ [χρ]ειώδη τ[ῆς] φιλίας *[ούκ ἔτι φτω τὸ λοι[πὸν ὑ]ποβλ[ ]ισ[ ]τας]*...

...χρειωδῶν ἡ Συμφυλία πρὸς τὴν συναναστροφὴν αὐτῇ τὰ πάθη παραδίδωσιν: οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν Ἔχειν τὴν συμφυλίαν ἄνευ πάσης ἐπιμειξίας, ὄντας

> ...the similarity [*arising*] from necessities, in regards to association, gives the feelings over to [*that similarly*]: for maintaining similarity, while existing [*together*], is not possible without any mixture [*of feelings*]

ἀμέλει δὲ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τῶν ἀσθενῶν καὶ προσδεομένων πρὸς τὰ χρειώδη τῆς φιλίας...

> indeed, certainly for us, who are weak and have further need for the necessary things of friendship...

*Regarding imperfection, Philodemus directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship (***ἡ συμφυλία***) he says that generosity is necessary.*

ἡ συμφυλία αἱ συμφυλίαι	similarity	ΣΥΜΦΥΛΙΑ *race / tribe* *together*

ΚΔ 2. The Limit of Life

ho Thá-na-tos ou-den pros hē-mâs: To gar di-a-ly-then a-nais-thē-teî – To d'a-nais-thē-toûn ou-den pros hē-mâs

ὁ Θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς: Τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ – Τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς

Death is nothing to us: because What has been fully dissolved lacks sensation – and What has no sensation is nothing to us

ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *through dissolve*
τὸ διαλυθὲν τὰ διαλυθέντα	what has been fully dissolved	ΔΙΑΛΥΘΕΝ *through dissolve*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
ἀναισθητεῖν	to lack sensation	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ *not sensing*
τὸ ἀναισθητοῦν τὰ ἀναισθητοῦντα	what has no sensation	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΥΝ *not sensing*

Death is Nothing to Us

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), De Rerum Natura 3.830

nīl *ígi*tur Mors est ad nos *néque* pértinet hī́lum

therefore Death is nothing to us and it does not pertain to us at all

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Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus 2.100

Mortem nihil ad nōs pertinēre: Quod enim dissolūtum sit – Id esse sine sēnsū. Quod, autem, sine sēnsū sit – Id nihil ad nōs pertinēre omnīnō

Death in no way concerns us: What has been dissolved – That is without sensation. What, however, is without sensation – That pertains to us in no way at all

ΚΔ 3. The Limit of Pleasure

Hó-ros toû me-gé-thous tôn hē-do-nôn hē pan-tos toû al-goûn-tos Hy-pe-xaí-re-sis

Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Ὑπεξαίρεσις

the Limit of the extension of pleasures is the Removal away of all that causes pain

hó-pou d'an To hē-dó-me-non e-nê – kath' hon an chró-non ê: ouk és-ti To al-goûn ē ly-poú-me-non ¬ ē To sy-nam-phó-te-ron

ὅπου δ'ἂν Τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ – καθ' ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ: ουκ ἔστι Τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ¬ ἢ Τὸ συναμφότερον

wherever What pleases is present – during that time it exists: there is neither What pains or distresses ¬ or What does both

Pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any particular point in the body.

Epicurus is, in part, responding to the teachings of the Cyrenaics, who viewed the removal of pain as a state of calm to which pleasure could then be added.

*Epicurus is also responding to Plato who argued for the existence of mixed pleasures (**μικταί ἡδοναί**) – which Plato imagined contained an aspect of pain.*

ὁ ὅρος **οἱ ὅροι**	limit	**ὍΡΟΣ** *outline, definition*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
τὸ ἡδόμενον **τὰ ἡδόμενα**	what pleases	**ἩΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *sweet*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	**ΑΛΓΕΙΝ** *pain*
ἀλγῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	feeling pain	
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *sensed pain*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** *pain*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*
ἡ ὑπεξαίρεσις **αἱ ὑπεξαιρέσεις**	taking out from underneath	**ὙΠΕΞΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *taking out from under*
ἡ ἀπαλλαγή **αἱ ἀπαλλαγαί**	deliverance	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *other away*
ἡ ἄφοδος **αἱ ἀφόδοι**	departure	**ΑΦΟΔΟΣ** *path away*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
λυπηρός *(ά, όν)*	distressing	**ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ** *vexation*
λυπεῖν	to distress	**ΛΥΠΕΙΝ** *vexation*
τὸ λυπούμενον **τὰ λυπούμενα**	what distresses	**ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *vexation*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is on both sides*
τὸ συναμφότερον **τὰ συναμφότερα**	both [together]	**ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ** *both of the two together*

"The Good" *is* Escaping "The Bad"

Metrodorus, quoted by Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse 1091 A

Τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι: τὸ Φυγεῖν τὸ κακόν – ἔνθα γὰρ τεθήσεται τἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅταν Μηθὲν ἔτι ὑπεξίῃ μήτε ἀλγεινὸν μήτε λυπηρόν

This very thing is the good: Escaping the bad – because it is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere, when Nothing painful or distressing is further withdrawing

It is common for people to consider the elimination of pain as the onset of pleasure. In fact, the absence of pain, and the resulting state of painlessness, is precisely what constitutes pleasure.

Full physical contentment is consistently and naturally achieved through our body's internal processes when we have the necessary provisions of food and shelter.

Similarly, full mental contentment can be maintained by recognizing the ease with which physical contentment can be obtained and by cultivating gratitude for this success.

ΚΔ 4. The Limit of Pain

ou chronízei To algoûn synechôs en tę̄ sarkí: alla to men Ákron ton eláchiston chrónon páresti – To de mónon hyperteînon to hēdómenon kata sárka ou pollas hēméras symbaînei

οὐ χρονίζει Τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν Ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι – Τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει

What causes pain does not linger continuously in the flesh: but the highest Point is present for the most minuscule time – and That which merely exceeds what pleases in relation to the body does not endure for many days

hai de Polychrónioi tôn arrōstiôn pleonázon échousi to hēdómenon en tę̄ sarki ē̂per to algoûn

αἱ δὲ Πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν

and the Long-lasting symptoms of illnesses have what pleases exceeding in the body over the painful

The significance of pain in life is often overestimated – in fact our body's sensory areas generally experience natural pleasure when free from disturbance.

Pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any specific point in the body – nevertheless, of course, some parts of the body may experience pain while other parts of the body do not feel pain.

ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
χρονίζειν	to linger	**ΧΡΟΝΙΖΕΙΝ**
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
πολυχρόνιος *(ον)*	long-lasting	**ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΣ** *much time*
ἡ πολυχρόνιος **αἱ πολυχρόνιοι**	long-lasting symptoms	**ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΣ** *much time*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** *pain*
συνεχῶς	continuously	**ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ** *holding together*
ἡ σάρξ **αἱ σάρκες**	flesh	**ΣΑΡΞ** *flesh*
τὸ ἄκρον **τὰ ἄκρα**	the highest point	**ΑΚΡΟΝ** *highest*
τὸ ἐλάχιστον **τὰ ἐλάχιστα**	the minimum *(the smallest thing)*	**ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ** *small*
ἐλαχύς	minuscule	**ΕΛΑΧΥΣ** *small*
ἐλάχιστος *(ἐλαχίστη, ἐλάχιστον)*	most minuscule	
ἐνεῖναι	to implant	**ΕΝΕΙΝΑΙ** *being inside*

παρεῖναι	to be present	**ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ** *being beside*
τείνειν	to extend	**ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending*
ὑπερτείνων	exceeding	**ΎΠΕΡΤΕΙΝΩΝ** *extending over*
τὸ ἡδόμενον **τὰ ἡδόμενα**	what pleases	**ἩΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *sweet*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
συμβαίνειν	to endure	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
ἡ ἀρρωστία **αἱ ἀρρωστίαι**	illness	**ΑΡΡΩΣΤΙΑ** *weakness*
τὸ πλέον **τὰ πλέω**	the greater	**ΠΛΕΟΝ** *more*
πλεονάζειν	to exceed	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΖΕΙΝ** *more*
πλεονάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	exceeding	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΖΩΝ** *more*

ΚΔ 5. Practical Virtues

ouk és-tin hē-dé-ōs Zên á-neu toû phro-ní-mōs kai ka-lôs kai di-kaí-ōs – ou-de phro-ní-mōs kai ka-lôs kai di-kaí-ōs á-neu toû hē-dé-ōs:

οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως Ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ¬ οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως

it is not possible to live pleasantly without [*living*] prudently and correctly and justly ¬ nor [*is it possible to live*] prudently and correctly and justly without [*living*] pleasantly

hó-tō̧ de Toû-to mē hy-pár-chei, oukh é-sti Toû-ton hē-dé-ōs zên

ὅτῳ δὲ Τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει: οὐχ ἔστι Τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν

when This is does not exist for someone: it is not possible that He is living pleasantly

The manuscripts have the second instance of **φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως** *moved towards the end of the sentence. Most editors keep this as a third instance of* **φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως** *and also add it back to its original position in brackets.*

ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	**ἩΔΕΩΣ** *sweet*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	**ΒΙΟΥΝ** *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
ἡ φροντίς **αἱ φροντίδες**	consideration	**ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ** *mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	**ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ** *mind*
φρονίμως	prudently	**ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ** *mind*
καλός *(ή, όν)*	correct / beautiful	**ΚΑΛΟΣ** *lovely*
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*

δικάζειν	to judge	ΔΙΚΑΖΕΙΝ
δικαίως	justly	ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ *custom / right*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	῾ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning* *under (before)*

ΚΔ 6. Good Relations

hé-ne-ka toû thar-reîn ex an-thrṓ-pōn: Ȇn, ka-ta phý-sin, a-ga-thón – ex hôn án po-te toûth' Hoî-ós t'ệ pa-ra-skeu-á-zes-thai

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ανθρώπων: Ἦν, κατὰ φύσιν, ἀγαθόν – ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦθ' Οἷός τ' ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι

for the sake of deriving confidence from people: [*Anything*], according to nature, is able to be a good – from which at any time Anyone may be able to provide this for themselves

Any means of obtaining protection is a natural good.

ἕνεκα ἕνεκεν	for the sake of	ἝΝΕΚΑ ἝΝΕΚΕΝ
θαρρεῖν	to be confident	ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ *taking courage*
τὸ θαρρεῖν	being confident [here, "deriving confidence"]	
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάζεσθαι	to provide for oneself	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ *preparing alongside*

ΚΔ 7. Respect & Popularity

én-do-xoi kai pe-rí-blep-toí Ti-nes e-bou-lḗ-thē-san ge-nés-thai – tēn ex an-thrṓ-pōn as-phá-lei-an hoû-tō no-mí-zon-tes pe-ri-poi-é-ses-thai,

ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί Τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι – τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι

Some people want to become respected and popular – thinking to preserve for themselves stability from people in this way

hṓs-te, ei men as-pha-lēs ho tôn toi-oú-tōn Bí-os: A-pé-la-bon to tēs phý-se-ōs a-ga-thón

ὥστε, εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων Βίος: Ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν

so that, if the Life of those like this is stable: They fully acquire the good of nature

– ei de mē as-pha-lēs ¬ ouk É-chou-sin hoû hé-ne-ka, ex ar-chēs, ka-ta to tēs phý-se-ōs oi-keî-on, ō-réch-thē-san

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλὴς ¬ οὐκ Ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον, ὠρέχθησαν

but if it is not stable ¬ They do not possess [*that*] for the sake of which, from the beginning, according to what is naturally compatible, they craved

Power and popularity benefits only as much as they can be used to provide security.

Having either obviously harms mental and personal health to the extent they cause one to be exposed to stress and dangers.

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἔνδοξος *(ον)*	respected	ΕΝΔΟΞΟΣ *seeming "in"*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*
περίβλεπτος *(ον)*	popular	ΠΕΡΙΒΛΕΠΤΟΣ *looking around*
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ *wishing*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [here, "to become"]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἡ ἀσφάλεια αἱ ἀσφάλειαι	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ *not stumbling*
ἀσφαλής *(ής, ές)*	stable	ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ *not stumbling*
νομίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	thinking	ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ *custom*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made	ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ *gathering*
περιποιεῖσθαι	to acquire for oneself	ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ *gathering around*
	Part 2	
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping away from*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
	Part 3	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *appropriate*
ὀρέγειν	to grasp for	ΟΡΕΓΕΙΝ *reaching*

ΚΔ 8. Practical Consequences

ou-de-mí-a Hē-do-nē kath' he-au-tēn ka-kón – al-la Ta ti-nôn hē-do-nôn poi-ē-ti-ka pol-lap-la-sí-ous e-pi-phé-rei tas och-lḗ-seis tôn hē-do-nôn

οὐδεμία Ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν – ἀλλὰ Τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν

not even one Pleasure in itself is bad – but Those things that are productive of some pleasures bring multiple times more disturbances than pleasures

οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*

κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἀντιποιητικός *(ή, όν)*	contradictory	**ΑΝΤΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of gathering against*
ποιητικός *(ή, όν)*	productive, [or] poetic	**ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of gathering*
τὸ ποιητικόν **τὰ ποιητικά**	what is productive	
πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
πολλαπλασίως	in many ways	**ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΩΣ** *many fold*
πολλαπλάσιος *(α, ον)*	multiple times more	
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	**ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing upon*
ὁ ὄχλος **οἱ ὄχλοι**	crowd	**ΟΧΛΟΣ** *crowd of people*
τό ὄχλημα **τά ὀχλήματα**	[cause of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of a crowd of people*
ἡ ὄχλησις **αἱ ὀχλήσεις**	[feeling of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of a crowd of people*

ΚΔ 9. Variance of Pleasures

ei ka-te-pyk-noû-to pâ-sa Hē-do-nē kai chró-nọ kai pe-ri hó-lon to áth-rois-ma hy-pêr-chen

(ē ta ky-ri-ṓ-ta-ta mé-rē tês phý-se-ōs) – ouk án po-te di-é-phe-ron al-lḗ-lōn hai Hē-do-naí

εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα Ἡδονὴ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν (ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως) – οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ Ἡδοναί

if every Pleasure was fully concentrated both in time and existed in the whole organism (or in the most essential parts of its nature) – then Pleasures would never differ from one another

A counterfactual argument.

This statement is in part a response to the view of the Cyrenaics – a general grouping of philosophers following Aristippos ("the best-horse") of Kyrḗnē (an ancient city in what is now Libya). Aristippos, who himself was originally a follower of Socrates, thought that:

(1) pleasures do not differ from one another
(2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and
(3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged

This incorrect understanding leads to indiscrimination in choosing pleasures.

In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.

ἡ πύκνωσις **αἱ πυκνώσεις**	a concentrating	**ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ** *action of compacting*
τὸ πύκνωμα **τὰ πυκνώματα**	a concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ** *the result of compacting*
καταπυκνοῦν	to fully concentrate	**ΚΑΤΑΠΥΚΝΟΥΝ** *thoroughly compacting*

τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	essential	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
κυριώτατος *(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)*	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical / valid*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing through*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*

ΚΔ 10. Practical Benefits

ei ta Poi-ē-ti-ka tôn pe-ri tous a-só-tous hē-do-nôn é-ly-e tous phó-bous tês di-a-noí-as (toús te pe-ri me-te-ṓ-rōn kai tha-ná-tou kai al-gē-dó-nōn – é-ti te to pé-ras tôn e-pi-thy-mi-ôn kai tôn al-gē-dó-nōn e-dí-das-ken:

εἰ τὰ Ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας (τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων – ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ἐδίδασκεν:

> if what produces those pleasures among degenerates released the fears of mental perception (those about meteorological phenomena and death and pains) and they further taught the limit of desires and of pains:

ouk án po-te Eí-cho-men hó ti Mem-psaí-me-tha au-toîs – pan-ta-chó-then ek-plē-rou-mé-nois tôn hē-do-nôn

οὐκ ἄν ποτε Εἴχομεν ὅ τι Μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς – πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν

> then we would not ever have had any thing we would blame them for – being fully filled in every place with pleasures

kai ou-da-mó-then oú-te to al-goûn oú-te to ly-poú-me-non é-chou-sin – Hó-per es-ti to ka-kón

καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν – Ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν

> and in no place would they have either what is in pain or what is distressed – the very thing which is what is bad

Another counterfactual argument. Epicurus implies that degenerate levels of pleasure are blameworthy on a practical level because they do not remove fear and do not teach the natural limits of desire – but instead lead to pain or distress.

τὸ ποιητικόν τὰ ποιητικά	what produces	ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΝ *characteristic of gathering*
ὁ ἄσωτος οἱ ἄσωτοι	a degenerate	ΑΣΩΤΟΣ *not saving*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*

ἀθάνατος	immortal	ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *not dying*
θνητός *(ή, όν)*	mortal	ΘΝΗΤΟΣ *died*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *sensed pain*
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *extremity*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ *teaching*
μέμφεσθαι	to blame	ΜΕΜΦΕΣΘΑΙ *finding fault with*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides [here, "in every place"]	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ *from all places*
οὐδαμόθεν	in no place	ΟΥΔΑΜΟΘΕΝ *not any places*
πλήρης *(ες)*	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ *quality from filling*
ἐκπληροῦν	to fully fill	ΕΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ *filling out*
ἐκπληρούμενος *(η, ον)*	being fully filled	ΕΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *filling out*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	ΑΛΓΕΙΝ *pain*
ἀλγῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	feeling pain	ΑΛΓΩΝ *pain*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν τὰ ἀλγοῦντα	what causes pain	ΑΛΓΟΥΝ *being in pain*
λυπεῖν	to distress	ΛΥΠΕΙΝ *vexation*
λυπούμενος *(η, ον)*	being distressed	ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *vexation*
τὸ λυπούμενον τὰ λυπούμενα	what is distressed	ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *vexation*
ὅσπερ *(ἥπερ, ὅπερ)*	the very thing which	ὉΣΠΕΡ *relative pronoun* *emphatic particle*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
τὸ κακόν τὰ κακά	what is bad	ΚΑΚΟΝ

ΚΔ 11. The Reason for Study

ei mē-then hē-mâs ai tôn me-te-ṓ-rōn Hy-pop-sí-ai ē-nṓch-loun – kai ai pe-ri tha-ná-tou (mḗ-po-te pros hē-mâs ê ti) ¬ é-ti te to Mē Ka-ta-no-eîn tous hó-rous tôn al-gē-dó-nōn kai tôn e-pi-thy-mi-ôn: ouk án Pro-se-de-ó-me-tha phy-si-o-lo-gí-as

εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων Ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν – καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου (μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι) ¬ ἔτι τε τὸ Μὴ Κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: οὐκ ἄν Προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας

if in no way suspicions of meteorological phenomena disturbed us – and those regarding death (although it would never be anything to us) ¬ and not understanding the limits of pains and of desires: then we would not also be in need of natural science

τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
ἡ ὑποψία αἱ ὑποψίαι	suspicion	ὙΠΟΨΙΑ *looking under*

ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	**ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ** *in a crowd of people*
ἀθάνατος	immortal	**ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *not dying*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*
ὁ ὅρος **οἱ ὅροι**	limit	**ὉΡΟΣ** *outline, definition*
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *sensed pain*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *needing in addition to*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*

ΚΔ 12. The Benefit of Study

ouk ên to pho-boú-me-non Lý-ein hy-per tôn ky-ri-ō-tá-tōn mē ka-tei-dó-ta tís hē toû sým-pan-tos Phý-sis (all' hy-pop-teú-on-tá ti tôn ka-ta tous mý-thous) – hṓ-ste ouk ên, á-neu phy-si-o-lo-gí-as, a-ke-raí-ous tas hē-do-nas A-po-lam-bá-nein

οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον Λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος Φύσις (ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους) – ὥστε οὐκ ἦν, ἄνευ φυσιολογίας, ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς Ἀπολαμβάνειν

It is not possible to dissolve what is feared about the most essential issues while not understanding what the nature of the entirety is (but instead suspected some of those things according to the myths) – therefore it is not possible, without natural science, to fully acquire undiluted pleasures

Epicurus emphasizes that a fundamental understanding of how the universe operates is essential to avoid living in uncertainty and fear.

φοβούμενος *(η, ον)*	fearing	**ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *fleeing*
τὸ φοβούμενον **τὰ φοβούμενα**	what is feared	**ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *fleeing*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	essential	**ΚΥΡΙΟΣ** *critical / valid*
κυριώτατος *(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)*	most essential	**ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *most critical / valid*
κατειδώς *(υῖα, ός)*	"having mentally inspected" ∴ understanding	**ΚΑΤΕΙΔΩΣ** *thoroughly seen*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
σύμπας *(ασα, αν)*	entire	**ΣΥΜΠΑΣ** *all together*

τὸ σύμπαν **τὰ σύμπαντα**	the entirety	**ΣΥΜΠΑΝ** *all together*
ὑποπτεύειν	to suspect	**ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ** *looking [suspiciously] under*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*
κεραννύναι	to dilute	**ΚΕΡΑΝΝΥΝΑΙ** *mixing*
ἀκέραιος *(ον)*	undiluted	**ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΣ** *not mixing*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	**ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping away from*

ΚΔ 13. Mental Security

ou-then ó-phe-los ên tēn ka-ta an-thrṓ-pous as-phá-lei-an Pa-ra-skeu-á-zes-thai tôn á-nō-then hy-póp-tōn ka-the-stṓ-tōn – kai tôn hy-po gês – kai hap-lôs tôn en tộ a-peí-rọ

οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν Παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων – καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς – καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ

It is in no way a benefit to provide for oneself stability in regards to people when the things above have been established as suspicions – and the things under the earth – and the things absolutely in the infinite

> *We get nothing by getting protection from others if we still fear the general operations of the universe.*
>
> *The things above (**τὰ ἄνωθεν**) and the things under the earth (**τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς**) are all things in our cosmos (**κόσμος**) that are difficult for us to closely observe and study – whereas the things in the infinite (**τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ**) are the things in other cosmoi (**κόσμοι**) and in the spaces between.*

οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
οὐδέν	in no way	**ΟΥΔΕΝ** *not even one*
τὸ ὄφελος **τὰ ὀφέλη**	benefit	**ΟΦΕΛΟΣ** *helping*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ἡ ἀσφάλεια **αἱ ἀσφάλειαι**	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	**ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ** *not stumbling*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάζεσθαι	to provide for oneself	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *preparing alongside*
ἄνωθεν	from above	**ΑΝΩΘΕΝ** *from above*
τὸ ἄνωθεν **τὰ ἄνωθεν**	what is above	
ὑποπτεύειν	to suspect	**ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ** *looking [suspiciously] under*

ὁ ὑπόπτος οἱ ὕποπτοι	suspicion	ὙΠΟΠΤΟΣ *looking under*
ἱστάναι	to stand	ἹΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing*
καθίστημι	to establish	ΚΑΘΙΣΤΗΜΙ *thoroughly standing*
καθεστώς *(ῶσα)*	having been established	ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΣ *thoroughly standing*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ἁπλοῦς *(ῆ, οῦν)*	simple	ἉΠΛΟΥΣ *one fold*
ἁπλῶς	absolutely	ἉΠΛΩΣ *one fold*
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ *not limited*

ΚΔ 14. Personal Stability

tês as-pha-leí-as tês ex an-thrṓ-pōn ge-no-mé-nēs mé-chri ti-nos dy-ná-mei te e-xe-rei-sti-kḗ kai eu-po-rí-ạ – ei-li-kri-nes-tá-tē gí-ne-tai hē ek tês hē-sy-chí-as kai ek-chō-ré-se-ōs tôn pol-lôn As-phá-lei-a

τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ – εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν Ἀσφάλεια

> although stability is produced from people to some extent by a resistant force and resourcefulness – the purest stability is produced from tranquillity and a withdrawal from the many

ἡ ἀσφάλεια αἱ ἀσφάλειαι	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ *not stumbling*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced [often gnomic, "becoming"]	ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *come into being*
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ *until*
μέχρι τινὸς	to some extent	
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*
ἐρείδειν	to prop [cause to lean]	ΕΡΕΙΔΕΙΝ *supporting*
ὁ ἐπερεισμός	impingement	ΕΠΕΡΕΙΣΜΟΣ *action pushing against*
ἐξερειστικός *(ή, όν)*	resistent	ΕΞΕΡΕΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of pushing action out*
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ *passage across*
ἡ εὐπορία αἱ εὐπορίαι	resourcefulness	ΕΥΠΟΡΙΑ *good passage*
κρίνειν	to distinguish	ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *separating*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ἩΛΙΟΣ *sunshine*
εἰλικρινής *(ές)*	pure	ΕΙΛΙΚΡΙΝΗΣ *separated by sunshine*
εἰλικρινεστάτος *(η, ον)*	purest	ΕΙΛΙΚΡΙΝΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ *most separated by sunshine*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

ἡ ἡσυχία αἱ ἡσυχίαι	tranquillity	ἩΣΥΧΙΑ *stillness*
ἡ χώρα αἱ χῶραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ *location*
ἡ ἐκχώρησις αἱ ἐκχωρήσεις	withdrawal	ΕΚΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ *process of location out*

ΚΔ 15. The Limit of Needs

ho tês phý-se-ōs Ploû-tos kai hṓ-ri-stai kai eu-pó-ris-tós es-tin – ho de tôn ke-nôn do-xôn eis á-pei-ron ek-píp-tei

ὁ τῆς φύσεως Πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν – ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει

the wealth of nature is limited and well acquirable – but the [*wealth*] of empty judgments falls out into infinity

To achieve complete and full satisfaction, our nature only requires a finite and specific set of accommodations. These accommodations are limited and fully attainable ¬ but the requirements to satisfy desires not grounded in nature have no inherent limits.

ὁ πλοῦτος οἱ πλοῦτοι	wealth	ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ *flowing*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
εὔκτητος *(ος, ον)*	well procurable	ΕΥΚΤΗΤΟΣ *acquiring easily*
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
εὐπόριστος *(ον)*	well acquirable	ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ *easily piercing*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
ἡ ἀπειρία αἱ ἀπειρίαι	infinity	
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling out*

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος	The wealth from nature
Ὁ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πλοῦτος	The wealth from empty judgements

ΚΔ 16. The Limit of Chance

bra-ché-a, so-phô Tý-chē pa-rem-píp-tei ¬ ta de mé-gis-ta kai ky-ri-ó-ta-ta, ho Lo-gis-mos di-ṓ-kē-ke – kai ka-ta ton sy-ne-chê chró-non toû bí-ou di-oi-keî kai di-oi-kḗ-sei

βραχέα, σοφῷ Τύχη παρεμπίπτει ¬ τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα, ὁ Λογισμὸς διῴκηκε – καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει

in a few things, Chance intrudes upon the wise man ¬ but the greatest and most principle things, Reasoning has managed – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage

βραχύς (εῖα, ύ)	short / few	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ *brief*
τὰ βραχέα	a few things	ΒΡΑΧΥ *brief*
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
παρεμπίπτειν	to intrude [in/upon]	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *beside in falling*
τὸ μέγα τὰ μεγάλα	what is great	ΜΕΓΑ *large*
τὸ μέγιστον τὰ μέγιστα	what is the greatest	
κύριος (α, ον)	principle	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
κυριώτατος (κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)	most principle	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical / valid*
τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	what is most principle	
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	[process of] reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *action of collecting*
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομίαι	operation	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ *managing the home*
οἰκονομεῖν	to manage [the household]	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΕΙΝ *managing the home*
διοικεῖν	to manage	ΔΙΟΙΚΕΙΝ *the home*
διῴκηκε	*3rd person singular perfect active indicative*	
διοικήσει	*3rd person singular future active indicative*	
συνεχής (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*

ΚΔ 17. Social & Personal Wellbeing

ho Dí-kai-os a-ta-rak-tó-ta-tos ¬ ho d'Á-di-kos pleís-tēs ta-ra-chês gé-mōn

ὁ Δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος ¬ ὁ δ' Ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων

the Just person is the most undisturbed ¬ but the Unjust is full of the greatest disturbance

δίκαιος (ᾱ, ον)	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
ἄδικος (ον)	unjust	ΑΔΙΚΟΣ *not custom / right*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος (ον)	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ *without agitating*

ἀταρακτότατος (ον)	most undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΤΑΤΟΣ *most without agitating*
ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ *agitating*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
γέμειν	to be full of	ΓΕΜΕΙΝ *filling*
γήμων (ον)	full of	ΓΗΜΩΝ *filling*

ΚΔ 18. Practical Satisfaction

ouk a-paú-xe-ti en tê sar-ki hē Hē-do-né e-pei-dan há-pax to ka-t'én-dei-an Al-goûn e-xai-re-thê – al-la mó-non poi-kíl-le-tai

οὐκ ἀπαύξετι ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ Ἡδονὴ ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἔνδειαν Ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ ¬ ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται

Pleasure is not increased further in the flesh as soon as what Hurts due to deficiency is removed ¬ but it only diversifies

tês de di-a-noí-as to pé-ras to ka-ta tēn hē-do-nēn a-pe-gén-nē-sen hḗ te (toú-tōn au-tôn) Ek-ló-gi-sis (kai tôn ho-mo-ge-nôn toú-tois – Hó-sa tous me-gís-tous phó-bous pa-res-keú-a-ze tê di-a-noí-ā)

τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ τε (τούτων αὐτῶν) Ἐκλόγισις (καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις – Ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ)

and rational Consideration (of these things and things of the same kind as those – as many things as used to arrange the greatest fears for our mental perception) fully produces the mind's limit in regards to pleasure

The point where the amount of pleasure is at its maximum in the body is the painless state reached by removing the pains of natural and necessary needs. Wealth can only vary the means by which we can achieve the very same natural pleasure that a non-wealthy life achieves.

It a common misconception to think that wealth and luxury increase pleasure. Wealth does not increase pleasure. Attempts to increase pleasure beyond this maximum point will always fail, and will often involve the introduction of unnecessary pain and troubles.

αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ *increasing*
ἀπαυξάνειν	to increase further	ΑΠΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ *increasing away*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἐπειδὰν = ἐπειδὴ ἄν	whenever	ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ *since if*
ἅπαξ	once	ἉΠΑΞ *one all one*
ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ	as soon as	
ἡ ἔνδεια αἱ ἔνδειαι	lack [here "deficiency"]	ΕΝΔΕΙΑ *deficiency*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	ΑΛΓΕΙΝ *pain*
ἀλγῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	feeling pain	ΑΛΓΩΝ *pain*

ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking out*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
ποικίλως	in diverse ways	ΠΟΙΚΙΛΩΣ *intricate*
ποικίλλειν	to diversify	ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛΕΙΝ *intricate*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating out*
τό διαλόγισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning through action*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ἡ ἐκλόγισις αἱ ἐκλογίσεις	[faculty of] rational consideration	ΕΚΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ *collecting (reasoning) action out*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	ὉΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ *same born*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*

ἥ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις	the rational examination of these things

The study of the pains arising from the limited natural needs of our body and the corresponding complete pleasures after these needs are met

ΚΔ 19. Fulfillment of Time

ho á-pei-ros Chró-nos í-sēn é-chei tēn hē-do-nēn kai ho pe-pe-ras-mé-nos – e-án Tis au-tês ta pé-ra-ta ka-ta-me-tré-sę tộ lo-gis-mộ

ὁ ἄπειρος Χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος – ἐάν Τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ

infinite and finite time have equal pleasure – if one fully measures its limits by reasoning

Because no pleasure is greater than the absence of bodily and mental pain, complete pleasure is attained by our natural state when not in pain.

More time cannot produce a greater pleasure than this complete pleasure.

ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ἴσος *(η, ον)*	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	**ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of having finished*
πεπερασμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly measure*
ὁ λογισμός **οἱ λογισμοί**	[process of] reasoning	**ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *action of collecting*

ΚΔ 20. The Experience of Time

hē men Sarx a-pé-la-be ta pé-ra-ta tês hē-do-nês á-pei-ra, kai á-pei-ros au-tēn Chró-nos pa-re-skeú-a-sen

ἡ μὲν Σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν Χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν

the flesh fully acquires the limit of pleasure as infinite, and the Time as infinite that provides it

hē de Di-á-noi-a, toû tês sar-kos té-lous kai pé-ra-tos la-boû-sa ton e-pi-lo-gis-mon – kai tous hy-per toû ai-ō-nos phó-bous ek-lý-sa-sa – ton pan-te-lê bi-on pa-re-skeú-a-se: kai ou-then é-ti toû a-peí-rou chró-nou pro-se-de-é-thē

ἡ δὲ Διάνοια, τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν – καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα – τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασε: καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη

but mental Perception, grasping the inductive consideration of the fulfillment and limit of the flesh – and dispelling fears about eternity – arranges the complete life: and in no way is it still also in need of infinite time

all' oú-te é-phy-ge tēn hē-do-nēn – ou-d'hē-ní-ka tēn e-xa-gō-gēn ek toû zên ta Prág-ma-ta pa-re-skeú-a-zen hōs el-leí-pou-sá ti toû a-rís-tou bí-ou ka-té-strep-sen

ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονὴν ¬ οὐδ’ (ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ Πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν) ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεψεν

yet [*our mental perception*] does not avoid pleasure ¬ nor (when Situations provide the departure from living) does it overturn as though it were leaving behind something of the best life

The complete pleasure of being pain free has been frequently achieved throughout our lives, and having a longer life does not allow us to increase the complete pleasure that we have already experienced.

Understanding this, we are pleased to continue living our full and complete life. But because our life is full and complete, we understand that continuing to live cannot improve our lives.

ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping away from*
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
	Part 2	
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*
λαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΛΑΒΩΝ *grasped*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ὁ αἰών οἱ αἰῶνες	eternity	ΑΙΩΝ *being forever*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *fully loosening*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening away*
ἐκλύειν	to dispel	ΕΚΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening out*
ἐκλύσας *(ασα, αν)*	dispelling	ΕΚΛΥΣΑΣ *loosening out*
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ *all completing*
παντελής	absolutely complete	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗΣ *all completing*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ *needing in addition to*
	Part 3	
φεύγειν	to avoid	ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ *fleeing*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἡνίκα	when	
ἡ ἐπαγωγή αἱ ἐπαγωγαί	reference [to observation]	ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ *result of going toward*
ἡ ἀγωγή αἱ ἀγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ *going*

ἡ ἐξαγωγή **αἱ ἐξαγωγαί**	departure	**ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗ** *going out*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	**ΒΙΟΥΝ** *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing* *alongside*
λείπειν	to leave	**ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving*
ἐλλείπειν	leaving behind	**ΕΛΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving in*
ἄριστος *(η, ον)*	best	**ΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *most fit*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *thoroughly turning*

ΚΔ 21. Conflicts

ho ta pé-ra-ta toû bí-ou Ka-tei-dōs oî-den hōs eu-pó-ris-tón es-ti to al-goûn
ka-t'én-dei-an E-xai-roûn kai to ton hó-lon bí-on pan-te-lê Ka-this-tán – hṓs-te ou-den
pros-deî-tai prag-má-tōn a-gô-nas kek-tē-mé-nōn

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ Καθιστάν – ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων

He who understands the limits of life knows how well acquirable is that which Removes what causes pain due to lack and that which Establishes the entire life as absolutely complete – so that in no way does he also have need of situations involving conflicts

As long as we are not in an environment hostile to human life, we do not need to engage in competitive struggles against others in order gain all our natural needs.

τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	life / lifestyle	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
κατειδώς *(υῖα, ός)*	"having mentally inspected" ∴ understanding	**ΚΑΤΕΙΔΩΣ** *thoroughly seen*
ὁ κατειδώς	he who understands	**ΚΑΤΕΙΔΩΣ**
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen* ∴ "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
οἶδεν	3rd person singular perfect indicative active *"he has mentally seen"* ∴ *"he knows"*	
εὐπόριστος *(ον)*	well acquirable	**ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *easily piercing*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** *being in pain*
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ΕΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*
ἐξαιρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	removing	

ὅλος (η, ον)	entire	ὍΛΟΣ whole
παντελής (ές)	absolutely complete	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗΣ all completing
καθιστάναι	to establish	ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ thoroughly standing
καθιστάς (ᾶσα, άν)	establishes	ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΣ thoroughly standing
οὐδείς (οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ not even one
οὐδέν	in no way	ΟΥΔΕΝ not even one
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ needing in addition to
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ result of doing / affair
ἡ ἀγωγή αἱ ἀγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ going
ὁ ἀγών οἱ ἀγῶνες	conflict	ΑΓΩΝ going
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ acquiring
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	possessing [here, "involving"]	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ acquired

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδὼς	He who knows life's limits well
τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν	What removes pain due to need

ΚΔ 22. Managing Evidence

to hy-phes-tē-kos Deî té-los e-pi-lo-gí-zes-thai kai pâ-san tēn e-nár-gei-an (e-ph'hēn ta do-xa-zó-me-na A-ná-go-men) ¬ ei de mē, Pán-ta ak-ri-sí-as kai ta-ra-chês és-tai mes-tá

τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς Δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν (ἐφ' ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα Ἀνάγομεν) ¬ εἰ δὲ μή, Πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά

the established fulfilment is necessary to inductively consider as well as all detectible reality (to which we refer the things that are judged) ¬ otherwise, Everything will be full of indistinction and disturbance

> *Epicurus transitions from ethics to epistemology in this* **κύρια δόξα**.
>
> *Unless our conclusions (***τὰ δοξαζόμενα***) are tested in reference to external sensations (***αἰσθήσεις***) and internal sensations (***τὰ πάθη***) we will go about our lives with added opinions (***προσδοξαζόμενα***) that do not correspond to reality.*

ὑφιστάναι	to be established	ὙΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ standing under
ὑφεστηκώς (υῖα, ός)	established	ὙΦΕΣΤΗΚΩΣ standing under
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ needing
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ goal
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ process of reasoning action upon

πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole [here, "all"]	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
τὸ δοξαζόμενον **τὰ δοξαζόμενα**	[A] what is judged	**ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of seeming*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*
ἀνάγειν	to refer	**ΑΝΑΓΕΙΝ**
ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
ἡ ἀκρισία **αἱ ἀκρισίαι**	indistinction	**ΑΚΡΙΣΙΑ** *not dividing*
ἡ ταραχή **αἱ ταραχαί**	disturbance	**ΤΑΡΑΧΗ** *agitating*
μεστός *(ή, όν)*	full of	**ΜΕΣΤΟΣ** *filled*

τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς τέλος **Ἐπιλογίζεσθαι**	to inductively consider the established goal
πᾶσα ἡ Ἐνάργεια (ἐφ' ἣν τὰ Δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν)	all detectible Reality (to which we refer the things that are judged)

ΚΔ 23. Doubting All Sensations

ei Ma-chȩ̂ pá-sais taîs ais-thḗ-se-sin: oukh Hé-xeis ou-d'has an Phȩ̂s au-tôn di-e-pseûs-thai

pros tí poi-oú-me-nos tēn a-gō-gēn Krí-nȩ̄s

εἰ Μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: οὐχ Ἕξεις οὐδ' (ἃς ἂν Φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι) πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν Κρίνῃς

> if You contend against all sensations: then You not will have anything (which You could even assert has thoroughly given a false report about themselves) You could judge while bringing up a reference to something

To address the extreme position of some skeptics that all sensations are untrustworthy, Epicurus argues that if someone rejects all sensations, there is no other standard of judgment to rely on.

Anyone who claims to use logic as a standard for judgment fails to recognize that the relationship between their logic and reality is inherently based on their own observations.

μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
ψεύδεσθαι	to give a false report	**ΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ** *deceiving*
καταψεύδεσθαι	to give a false report against	**ΚΑΤΑΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ** *deceiving against*
διαψεύδεσθαι	to thoroughly give a false report about	**ΔΙΑΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ** *deceiving through*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ποιούμενος *(η, ον)*	making	**ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *gathering*

ἡ ἀγωγή αἱ ἀγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ *going*
κρίνειν	to distinguish	ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *separating*

ΚΔ 24. Judging Sensations

ei ti-n'Ek-ba-leîs hap-lôs aís-thē-sin – kai mē Di-ai-ré-seis to dox-a-zó-me-non ka-ta to pros-mé-non kai to pa-ron é-dē ka-ta tēn aís-thē-sin kai ta pá-thē kai pâ-san phan-tas-ti-kēn e-pi-bo-lēn tês di-a-noí-as: Syn-ta-rá-xeis kai tas loi-pas ais-thé-seis tê ma-taí-ō dóx-ē – hṓs-te to kri-té-ri-on há-pan Ek-ba-leîs

εἰ τιν' Ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν – καὶ μὴ Διαιρήσεις [Δ] τὸ δοξαζόμενον [Ο] κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ [Θ] τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ [Α] τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ [Π] τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν [Β'δ] φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας: Συνταράξεις καὶ [Λ] τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ – ὥστε [Κ] τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν Ἐκβαλεῖς

> if You will absolutely throw out any sensation – and You will not differentiate [Δ] what is judged [Ο] about what is still pending versus [Θ] what is actually present according to [Α] sensation, [Π] experiences, and the whole [Β'δ] appearance-based attention of mental perception: then You will confuse [Λ] the remaining sensations with pointless judgment – and thus You will throw out [Κ] the criteria all together

ei, de, Be-bai-ṓ-seis kai to pros-mé-non há-pan en taîs dox-as-ti-kaîs en-noí-ais kai to mē tēn e-pi-mar-tý-rē-sin: ouk Ek-leíp-seis to di-e-pseus-mé-non – hōs te-tē-rē-kōs É-sē pâ-san am-phis-bḗ-tē-sin ka-ta pâ-san krí-sin toû or-thôs ē mē or-thôs

εἰ, δὲ, Βεβαιώσεις καὶ [Ο] τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ [Θ] τὸ μὴ [Μ] τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν: οὐκ Ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον – ὡς τετηρηκὼς Ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς

> also, if You affirm [Ο] what is still pending [*attestation*] all together in internal conceptions that pertain to judgement along with [*affirming*] [Θ] what is not [*still pending*] [Μ] attestation: then You will not throw out what thoroughly gives a false report – since You will have preserved all mutual opposition regarding all distinction of what is right or not right

If you do not distinguish between your ideas and your sensations and you reject even one sensation as false, you are rejecting the criteria that you have to understand the world.

Sensations are true per se, but ideas are only true if they accurately reflect our repeated sensations.

The fact that the tower appears to have rounded edges when viewed from various distances is accurately demonstrated by the senses.

*The sensation of a round tower is a real sensation. However, after seeing the tower more closely and from other angles, the issue of its shape changes from what is pending confirmation (**τὸ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν**) to what is not pending confirmation (**τὸ μὴ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν**).*

ἐκβάλλειν	to throw out	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing out*
ἁπλῶς	absolutely	ἉΠΛΩΣ *one fold*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[Α] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping through*
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον τὰ προσδοξαζόμενα	[Δ+] an addition of judgement [i.e., "a theory"]	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of addition to seeming*
τὸ δοξαζόμενον τὰ δοξαζόμενα	[Δ] what is judged	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of seeming*

τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	[O] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ *remaining further*
τὸ παρόν τὰ παρόντα	[Θ] what is present	ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ *existing alongside*
ἤδη	actually	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of appearing*
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating together*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ *folly*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	ἍΠΑΣ *all together*
	Part 2	
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ *firm standing*
τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	[O] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ *remaining further*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
δοξαστικός *(ή, όν)*	pertaining to judgement	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of seeming*
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ *seeing in*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	[M] attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ *action of testifying upon*
ἐγλείπειν = ἐκλείπειν	to disappear [or, of the sun & moon] to be eclipsed	ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *leaving out*
διαψεύδεσθαι	to thoroughly give a false report about	ΔΙΑΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ *deceiving through*
τὸ διεψευσμένον τὰ διεψευσμένα	what thoroughly gives a false report	ΔΙΕΨΕΥΣΜΕΝΟΝ *deceived through*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting*
τετηρηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having preserved	ΤΕΤΗΡΗΚΩΣ *having protected*
τετηρηκώς ἔσῃ	*2nd person singular future perfect periphrastic*	
ἡ σβέσις = ἡ σβέσις	extinguishing	ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ ΣΒΕΣΙΣ *cancelling*
ἀμφισβητεῖν	to mutually oppose	ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΝ *cancelling both [sides]*

ἀμφισβητῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	mutually opposing	
ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν **οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες**	mutual opponent	**ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΩΝ** *cancelling both [sides]*
ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις **αἱ ἀμφισβητήσεις**	mutual opposition	**ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΗΣΙΣ** *action of cancelling both [sides]*
ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
τὸ ὀρθῶς [*εἶναι*]	what [*exists*] rightly = what is right	

τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ…	what is judged regarding…
τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς Ἐννοίαις	what is still pending [*attestation*] all together in internal conceptions that pertain to judgement

ἡ πᾶσα φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας — the whole appearance-based attention of mental perception
*Because all true thought is based upon impressions from external sources, the use of "appearance-based (**φανταστική**)" here is only further explaining the object (i.e., basis) of mental focus.* *The whole phrase is therefore equivalent to the attention of mental perception (**ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας**)" alone, which Lucretius translates (2.740) as "a casting out of the mind (**animī iniectus**)."* *The paraphrases **animī iniectus** and **ἡ επιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας** therefore are equivalent to our modern use of "attention" or "focus."*

ΚΔ 25. Remember the Goal

ei mē pa-ra pán-ta kai-ron E-pa-noí-seis hé-kas-ton tôn prat-to-mé-nōn e-pi to té-los tês phý-se-ōs – al-la Pro-ka-ta-strép-seis (eí-te phy-gēn eí-te dí-ō-xin poi-oú-me-nos) eis ál-lo ti: ouk é-son-taí soi toîs ló-gois hai Práx-eis a-kó-lou-thoι

εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν Ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως ¬ ἀλλὰ Προκαταστρέψεις (εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος) εἰς ἄλλο τι: οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ Πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι

if You will not on every opportunity refer each of the things being accomplished back again to the fulfillment of your nature ¬ but beforehand you overturn (when making an avoidance or pursuit) into something else: then your Activities will not be consistent with your reasonings

*If you stop short and turn to some other fulfillment (**τέλος**) before considering the fulfillment of nature (**τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως**), then the natural goal of mental tranquillity (**ἡ ἡσυχία**) is forgotten and is replaced by some other goal that is either natural but not necessary (**φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι**) or neither natural or necessary (**οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖαι**).*

πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "every"]	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
ὁ καιρός **οἱ καιροί**	opportunity	**ΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *time*

φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
ἐπαναφέρειν	to refer back again	ΕΠΑΝΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing toward again*
ἐπανοίσειν	to refer back again [in the future]	ΕΠΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΝ *will bring toward again*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ *each*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
πραττόμενος *(η, ον)*	being accomplished	ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ *doing / affair*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *thoroughly turning*
προκαταστρέφειν	to overturn beforehand	ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *thoroughly turning before*
ἡ φυγή αἱ φυγαί	avoidance	ΦΥΓΗ *fleeing*
ἡ δίωξις αἱ διώξεις	pursuit	ΔΙΩΞΙΣ *chasing*
ποιούμενος *(η, ον)*	making	ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *gathering*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ πρᾶξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ *action*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	

ΚΔ 26. Unnecessary Desires

tôn e-pi-thy-mi-ôn, Hó-sai mē e-p'al-goûn e-pa-ná-gou-sin e-an mē sym-plē-rô-sin – ouk ei-sin a-nan-kaî-ai ¬ al-l'eu-di-á-chy-ton tēn ó-rex-in é-chou-sin (hó-tan dys-po-rís-tōn é blá-bēs a-per-gas-ti-kai dó-xō-sin eî-nai)

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν,Ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρῶσιν – οὐκ εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι ¬ ἀλλ' εὐδιάχυτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν (ὅταν δυσπορίστων ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι)

of the desires, as many as do not lead back to feeling pain if they are not fulfilled – they do not exist as necessary ¬ instead they have an impulse that is well dispersible (whenever they seem to be hard to obtain or productive of harm)

ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *sensed pain*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	ΑΛΓΕΙΝ *pain*
ἀλγῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	feeling pain	ΑΛΓΩΝ *pain*
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ *going on/over*

ἐπανάγειν	to lead back	**ΕΠΑΝΑΓΕΙΝ** *going toward again*
πλήρης (ες)	full	**ΠΛΗΡΗΣ** *quality from filling*
ἐκπληροῦν	to fully fill	**ΕΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ** *filling out*
συμπληροῦν	to fulfill	**ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ** *filling together*
ἀναγκαῖος (α, ον)	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
ἡ χύσις **αἱ χύσεις**	flow	**ΧΥΣΙΣ** *pouring*
εὐδιάχυτος (ον)	well dispersible	**ΕΥΔΙΑΧΥΤΟΣ** *pouring through well*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
ἡ ὄρεξις **αἱ ὀρέξεις**	impulse	**ΟΡΕΞΙΣ** *impulse*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
δυσμνημόνευτος (ον)	hard to remember	**ΔΥΣΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΟΣ** *hard thinking*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
δύσποριστος (ον)	hard to obtain	**ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *hard to pierce*
βλάπτειν	to harm	**ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *hindering*
βλαβησόμενος (η, ον)	will be harmed	**ΒΛΑΒΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *will hinder*
ἡ βλάβη **αἱ βλάβαι**	harm	**ΒΛΑΒΗ** *hindering*
ἡ κατεργασία **αἱ κατεργασίαι**	outflow	**ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work thoroughly*
οὐ ἀπεργαστικός (ή, όν)	unproductive	**ΟΥ ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *not characteristic of working away*
ἀπεργαστικός (ή, όν)	productive	**ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of working away*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*

ΚΔ 27. Benefit of Friendship

hôn hē so-phí-a pa-ra-skeu-á-ze-tai eis tēn toû hó-lou bí-ou ma-ka-ri-ó-tē-ta – po-ly mé-gis-tón es-tin hē tês phi-lí-as Ktê-sis

ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα – πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας Κτῆσις

Of the things that Wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life – by far the greatest thing is the Possession of friendship

ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ἡ σοφία **αἱ σοφίαι**	wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΑ** *knowledge*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
ὅλος (η, ον)	entire / whole	**ΌΛΟΣ** *whole*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	life / lifestyle	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*

ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
φιλεῖν	to love	ΦΙΛΕΙΝ *loving*
οἱ συμφιλοσοφοῦντες	those who philosophize together	ΣΥΜΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥΝΤΕΣ *loving knowledge together*
ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
ἡ κτῆσις αἱ κτήσεις	possession	ΚΤΗΣΙΣ *acquiring*

ΚΔ 28. Stability from Friendship

hē au-tē Gnṓ-mē thar-reîn te e-poí-ē-sen hy-per toû mē-then ai-ṓ-ni-on eî-nai dei-non ¬ mē-de po-ly-chró-ni-on – kai tēn en au-toîs toîs hō-ris-mé-nois as-phá-lei-an phi-lí-ais má-li-sta ka-teî-de syn-te-lou-mé-nēn

ἡ αὐτὴ Γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν ¬ μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον – καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίαις μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην

the same Discernment that made [us] confident regarding what is terrible being in no way perpetual ¬ nor even long-lasting – also thoroughly sees that stability in those limited things themselves is altogether fulfilled especially by friendships

We only require nature's finite list of necessary desires – and the ability to access to what satisfies this list is more secure while maintaining positive social relationships.

ἡ γνώμη αἱ γνῶμαι	discernment	ΓΝΩΜΗ *distinguishing*
θαρρεῖν	to be confident	ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ *taking courage*
ποιῆσαι	to make [already]	ΠΟΙΗΣΑΙ *gathered*
ἐποίησεν	3rd person singular aorist active indicative	
μηδείς *(μηδεμία, μηδέν)*	no one [modal]	ΜΗΔΕΙΣ *not one*
αἰώνιος *(αἰωνία, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ *characterized by being forever*
δεινός *(ή, όν)*	terrible	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ *terrifying*
ἡ πολυχρόνιος αἱ πολυχρόνιοι	long-lasting symptoms	ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΣ *characterized by much time*
πολυχρόνιος *(ον)*	long-lasting	
τὸ ὅριον τὰ ὅρια	boundary	ὉΡΙΟΝ *separating*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
ὡρισμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	ὩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *separating*
ἡ ἀσφάλεια αἱ ἀσφάλειαι	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ *not stumbling*

ἡ φιλία **αἱ φιλίαι**	friendship	**ΦΙΛΙΑ** *loving*
μάλιστα	especially	**ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ** *very*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
καθορᾶν	to inspect [here, "to thoroughly see"]	**ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ** *thoroughly looking*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing together*
συντελούμενος *(η, ον)*	altogether fulfilled	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *completing together*

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.68

"eādem," inquit, "Scientia cōnfirmāvit animum nē quod aut sempiternum aut diūtūrnum timeret malum – quae perspexit in hōc ipsō vītae spatiō amīcitiae praesidium esse firmissimum"

"[*it is*] the same Knowledge" [*Epicurus*] says "that strengthened the mind so that it did not fear an eternal or prolonged evil – which thoroughly saw that within this very span of life, the support of friendship is the strongest"

ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις *"in those limited things themselves" – referring to what is terrible (***τὸ δεινὸν***) which is limited by being in no way perpetual (***μηθὲν αἰώνιον***) and in no way long-lasting (***μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον***) – and therefore meaning "in the midst of life's limited evils."*

*In contrast to this interpretation, Cicero understood it as a reference to life in general (which is limited by death) – "within this very span of life (***in hōc ipsō vītae spatiō***)"*

ΚΔ 29. Trifold Classification of Desires

tôn E-pi-thy-mi-ôn, Hai mén ei-si phy-si-kai kai ‹a-nan-kaî-ai – Hai de phy-si-kai kai› ouk a-nan-kaî-ai – Hai de oú-te phy-si-kai oú-te a-nan-kaî-ai (al-la pa-ra ke-nēn dó-xan gi-nó-me-nai)

τῶν Ἐπιθυμιῶν, Αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ‹ἀναγκαῖαι – Αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ› οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι – Αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι (ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι)

of the Desires, Some are natural and necessary – Some are natural and not necessary – and Some are neither natural nor necessary (but created from empty judgement)

ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*

Φυσικαὶ	**Ἀναγκαῖαι**	**Φυσικαὶ**	**Οὐκ Ἀναγκαῖαι**	**Οὔτε Φυσικαὶ**	**Οὐκ Ἀναγκαῖαι**

Natural & Necessary	Natural & Not Necessary	Neither Natural, Nor Necessary
naturally based desires needed for health and wellbeing	*naturally based desires not needed for health and wellbeing*	*desires coming from convention, and not needed for health and wellbeing*
Diogenes Laertius, 10.149		
Drinking when Thirsty	*Expensive Foods*	*Crowns and the Dedication of Statues*
Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends 1.45		
"the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense"	*"natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount"*	*"the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered"*

Examples

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.149

φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνος ἀπολυούσας – ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψους

natural and necessary Epicurus supposes are those [*desires*] which release away pain – such as drink for thirst

φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν ¬ μὴ ὑπεξαιρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα – ὡς πολυτελῆ σιτία

but natural and not necessary are those which merely diversify pleasure ¬ but without removing away pain – such as extravagant foods

οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαίας – ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις

but neither natural nor necessary – such as wreaths [*of honor*] and the dedication of statues

ἡγεῖσθαι	to suppose	**ἩΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *leading*
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *sensed pain*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	**ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening away*
τὸ ποτόν **τὰ ποτά**	a drink	**ΠΟΤΟΝ** *drinking*
ἡ δίψα **αἱ δίψαι**	thirst	**ΔΙΨΑ** *dry / parched*
	Part 2	
ποικίλλειν	to diversify	**ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛΕΙΝ** *intricate*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*
ἡ ὑπεξαίρεσις **αἱ ὑπεξαιρέσεις**	the removal away	**ὙΠΕΞΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *taking out from under*

ὑπεξαιρεῖν	to remove away	ὙΠΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking out from under*
ὑπεξαιρούμενος (η, ον)	removing away	
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	[experience of] pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *sensed pain*
τὸ ἄλγημα τὰ ἄλγηματα	[instance of] pain	
ἡ πολυτέλεια αἱ πολυτέλειαι	extravagance	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ *much completing*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ *much completing*
πολυτελής (ές)	extravagant	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ *much completing*
τὸ σιτίον τὰ σιτία	food	ΣΙΤΙΟΝ *grain / provisions*
	Part 3	
ὁ στέφανος οἱ στέφανοι	wreath	ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ *encircling*
ὁ ἀνήρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ *man*
ὁ ἀνδριάς οἱ ἀνδριάντες	statue	ΑΝΔΡΙΑΣ *statue of a man*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ ἀνάθεσις αἱ ἀναθέσεις	dedication	ΑΝΑΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*

ΚΔ 30. Natural & Unnecessary Desires

en haîs tôn phy-si-kôn e-pi-thy-mi-ôn mē ep'al-goûn de e-pa-na-gou-sôn e-an mē syn-te-les-thô-sin – hy-pár-chei hē Spou-dē sýn-to-nos: pa-ra ke-nēn dó-xan Haû-tai gí-non-tai ¬ kai ou para tēn he-au-tôn phý-sin ou di-a-ché-on-tai, al-la pa-ra tēn toû an-thrṓ-pou ke-no-do-xí-an

ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μὴ ἐπ' ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν – ὑπάρχει ἡ Σπουδὴ σύντονος: παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν Αὗται γίνονται ¬ καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν

in those natural desires not leading back to feeling pain if not altogether fulfilled – when intense Eagerness exists: These [*desires*] are produced from empty judgement ¬ and not because of their own nature that they are not scattered, but because empty judgment of man

οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν *"not because of their own nature" – when we develop intense desires for what not necessary (***οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον***) and also not easy to get (***οὐκ εὐπόριστον***) – we have a problem that arises completely from our thoughts and not from any actual need.*

In ΚΔ 26, Epicurus pointed out that all desires that do not bring pain when unfulfilled, are unnecessary.

*In ΚΔ 29, he distinguished between desires that are natural and not necessary (***φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι***) versus those that are neither not natural and not necessary (***οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖαι***).*

Now he reminds us that it is foolish to pursue even natural desires if they are not necessary and also difficult to attain.

φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*

ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ἀλγῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	feeling pain	ΑΛΓΩΝ *pain*
ἐπανάγειν	to lead back	ΕΠΑΝΑΓΕΙΝ *going toward again*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ῩΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἡ σπουδή αἱ σπουδαί	eagerness	ΣΠΟΥΔΗ *being eager*
σύντονος *(ον)*	intense	ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ *stretching together*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἡ χύσις αἱ χύσεις	flow	ΧΥΣΙΣ *pouring*
διαχεῖν	to scatter	ΔΙΑΧΕΙΝ *pouring through*
ἐκλύειν	to dispel	ΕΚΛΥΕΙΝ *dissolving out*
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ *scatter through*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ἡ κενοδοξία αἱ κενοδοξίαι	empty judgment	ΚΕΝΟΔΟΞΙΑ *empty judgment*

ἡ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος κενοδοξία	The empty judgment of man

ΚΔ 31. Natural Justice

to tês phý-se-ōs Dí-kai-ón es-ti sým-bo-lon toû sym-phé-ron-tos eis to mē bláp-tein al-lé-lous – mē-de bláp-tes-thai

τὸ τῆς φύσεως Δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους – μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι

what is just by nature exists as what is of mutual interest among what mutually benefits in not harming each other – and not being harmed

ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
τὸ δίκαιον τὰ δίκαια	what is just	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[Bʹ] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
τὸ σύμβολον τὰ σύμβολα	what is of mutual interest	ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ *throwing together*

συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing together*
συμφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	mutually benefiting	
τὸ συμφέρον **τὰ συμφέροντα**	what mutually benefits	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ** *bringing together*
ἡ βλάβη **αἱ βλάβαι**	harm	**ΒΛΑΒΗ** *hindering*
βλάπτειν	to harm	**ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *hindering*
βλάπτεσθαι	to be harmed	
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*

ΚΔ 32. Nonaggression Agreements

Hó-sa tôn Zṓ-ōn mē e-dý-na-to syn-thḗ-kas poi-eîs-thai (tas hy-per toû mē bláp-tein ál-lē-la mē-de bláp-tes-thai) – pros taû-ta, ou-then ên dí-kai-on ou-de á-di-kon

Ὅσα τῶν Ζῴων μὴ ἐδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι (τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι) – πρὸς ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον

As many among the Living beings as do not have the ability to make mutual agreements for themselves (those regarding not harming one other and not being harmed) – in regards to these things, in no way are they just nor unjust

hō-saú-tōs de kai tôn Eth-nôn Hó-sa mē e-dý-na-to ḗ mē e-boú-le-to tás syn-thḗ-kas poi-eîs-thai (tas hy-per toû mē bláp-tein mē-de bláp-tes-thai)

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐθνῶν Ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι (τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι)

and likewise also As many among the Ethnicities as do not have the ability or do not want to make mutual agreements for themselves (those regarding not harming and not being harmed)

Justice does not exist between tribes that do not maintain a mutual agreement to neither harm or be harmed.

ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many... ...as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*
τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to have the ability"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
ἡ ὑποθήκη **αἱ ὑποθῆκαι**	precepts	**ὙΠΟΘΗΚΗ** *placing under*
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
ἡ συνθήκη **αἱ συνθῆκαι**	mutual agreement	**ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ** *placing together*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made / to make for themselves	**ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *gathering*
ἡ βλάβη **αἱ βλάβαι**	harm	**ΒΛΑΒΗ** *hindering*
βλάπτειν	to harm	**ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *hindering*
βλάπτεσθαι	to be harmed	
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*

ἄδικος *(ον)*	unjust	**ΑΔΙΚΟΣ** *not custom / right*
ὡσαύτως	likewise	**ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ** *as self*
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	**ΕΘΝΟΣ** *accustomed*
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	**ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ** *wishing*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *wishing*

<u>ΚΔ 33. Practical Justice</u>

ouk ên ti ka-th'he-au-to Di-kai-o-sý-nē – al-l' en taîs me-t'al-lé-lōn sys-tro-phaîs kath'
ho-pē-lí-kous: dḗ-po-te a-ei tó-pous Syn-thḗ-kē tis hy-per toû mē bláp-tein ḗ bláp-tes-thai

οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ Δικαιοσύνη ¬ ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ' ὁπηλίκους: δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους Συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι

Justice is not something in itself ¬ but instead in the assemblages with each other of any magnitude: in whatever locations there is always some mutual Agreement regarding not harming or being harmed

Justice does not exist per se and is not metaphysical or universal. Rather, it exists only among those who are both able and willing to establish and uphold agreements that serve mutual interests.

δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
τὸ δίκαιον τὰ δίκαια	what is just	
ἡ εὐφροσύνη αἱ εὐφροσύναι	merriment	**ΕΥΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of good mind*
ἡ δικαιοσύνη αἱ δικαιοσύναι	justice	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of custom / right*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	**ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ** *twisting together*
ὁπηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of any magnitude	**ὉΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ** *which extent*
ὁπωσδήποτε	in any way	**ὉΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite in what way*
δήποτε	whatever	**ΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite*
ἀΐδιος *(ος, ον)*	eternal *(static, singular)*	**ΑΪΔΙΟΣ** *characterized by forever [heavenly]*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
ἡ συνθήκη αἱ συνθῆκαι	mutual agreement	**ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ** *placing together*
βλάπτειν	to harm	**ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *hindering*
βλάπτεσθαι	to be harmed	

<u>ΚΔ 34. Practical Injustice</u>

hē A-di-kí-a ou ka-th'he-au-tēn ka-kón ¬ al-l'en tō̂ ka-ta tēn hy-pop-sí-an phó-bō̧ ei mē Lḗ-sei
tous hy-per tôn toi-oú-tōn e-phe-stē-kó-tas ko-las-tás

ἡ Ἀδικία οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὴν κακόν ¬ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ εἰ μὴ Λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς

Injustice is not in itself what is bad ¬ but in the fear from the suspicion that one will not evade notice from those instituted as punishers regarding such things

What is bad about injustice lies in the constant worry about facing retribution.

ἡ δικαιοσύνη **αἱ δικαιοσύναι**	justice	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of custom / right*
ἡ ἀδικία **αἱ ἀδικίαι**	injustice	**ΑΔΙΚΙΑ** *not custom / right*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
τὸ κακόν **τὰ κακά**	what is bad	**ΚΑΚΟΝ** *harmful*
ἡ ὑποψία **αἱ ὑποψίαι**	suspicion	**ΎΠΟΨΙΑ** *looking under*
ὁ φόβος **οἱ φόβοι**	fear	**ΦΟΒΟΣ** *fleeing*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	**ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *to be hidden*
λήσειν	to evade notice [in the future]	**ΛΗΣΕΙΝ** *will be hidden*
λήσει	3rd person singular future active indicative one will evade notice [from]	
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
στῆναι	to stand [already]	**ΣΤΗΝΑΙ** *standing*
καταστηματικός *(ή, όν)*	established	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly standing*
ἐφιστάναι	to institute	**ΕΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing upon*
ἐφεστηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	instituted	**ΕΦΕΣΤΗΚΩΣ** *stood upon*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ὁ σοφιστής **οἱ σοφισταί**	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ** *considered to have knowledge*
ὁ κολαστής **οἱ κολασταί**	punisher	**ΚΟΛΑΣΤΗΣ** *agent of striking*

ΚΔ 35. Consequence of Secrecy

ouk És-ti ton lá-thrē ti Poi-oûn-ta (hôn Sy-né-then-to pros al-lḗ-lous eis to mē bláp-tein mē-de bláp-tes-thai) pis-teú-ein hó-ti Lḗ-sei – kán my-ri-á-kis e-pi toû pa-rón-tos La-thá-nē – mé-chri gar ka-tas-tro-phês, á-dē-lon ei kai Lḗ-sei

οὐκ Ἔστι τὸν λάθρῃ τι Ποιοῦντα (ὧν Συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι) πιστεύειν ὅτι Λήσει – κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος Λαθάνῃ – μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ Λήσει

It is not possible for one who evasively brings about something (among those things that they mutually agreed with one another in not harming and not being harmed) to believe that he will evade notice – even if he evades thousands of times up to the present – for until his overturning, it is unclear if he will still evade notice

It is impossible for someone who secretly breaks an agreement to be confident they will avoid detection. This state of anxiety persists until death or exposure – so the moral and psychological consequences of breaking such a compact are significant.

λανθάνειν	to evade notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *to be hidden*
λάθρῃ	evasively	ΛΑΘΡΗΙ *hidden*
λήσει	3rd person singular future active indicative one will evade notice [from]	
λαθάνῃ	3rd person singular aorist active subjunctive one may evade notice [from]	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ποιοῦν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making	ΠΟΙΟΥΝ *gathering*
ὁ ποιοῦν οἱ ποιοῦντες	one who brings about	
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing together*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*
βλάπτειν	to harm	ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ *hindering*
βλάπτεσθαι	to be harmed	
μυρίος *(α, ον)*	innumerable	ΜΥΡΙΟΣ *ants*
μυριάκις	innumerable times	
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ *to be beside*
τὸ παρόν τὰ παρόντα	[θ] what is present	ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ *existing alongside*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
ἡ καταστροφή αἱ καταστροφαί	overturning	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting thoroughly*
ἄδηλος *(ον)*	(0) unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΣ

ΚΔ 36. General Uniformity of Justice

ka-ta men to koi-non – pâ-si to Dí-kai-on to au-tó: sym-phé-ron gár Ti ên en tê pros al-lé-lous koi-nō-ní-ą

κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν – πᾶσι τὸ Δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό: συμφέρον γάρ Τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ

according to what is general – for all [*people*] what is just is the same: because Something is mutually benefiting in the partnership with one another

ka-ta de to í-di-on chố-ras kai hó-sōn dḗ-po-te ai-tí-ōn – ou pâ-si Sy-né-pe-tai to au-to Dí-kai-on eî-nai

κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων – οὐ πᾶσι Συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ Δίκαιον εἶναι

but according to what is particular of a location and of however many reasons – it does not follow for all [*people*] that what is just exists as the same

Although what is just is always based in mutual benefit – it will differ due to specific regional characteristics.

κοινός (ή, όν)	general	**ΚΟΙΝΟΣ** *common*
τὸ κοινόν **τὰ κοινά**	what is general	
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "all"]	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
δίκαιος (ᾱ, ον)	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
τὸ δίκαιον **τὰ δίκαια**	what is just	
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing together*
συμφέρων (ουσα, ον)	mutually benefiting	
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
πρὸς ἀλλήλους	with one another	
ἡ κοινότης **αἱ κοινότητες**	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
ἡ κοινωνία **αἱ κοινωνίαι**	partnership	**ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ** *common*
ἡ ὁμιλία **αἱ ὁμιλίαι**	association	**῾ΟΜΙΛΙΑ** *company*
	Part 2	
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
τὸ ἴδιον **τὰ ἴδια**	what is particular	
ἡ χώρα **αἱ χῶραι**	space [here, "location"]	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*
ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	**῾ΟΣΟΣ** *however great*
δήποτε	whatever	**ΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite*
ὅσος δήποτε	however many	
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause [here, "reason"]	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἕπεσθαι	to follow	**῾ΕΠΕΣΘΑΙ** *supporting*
συνέπεσθαι	to mutually follow	**ΣΥΝΕΠΕΣΘΑΙ** *supporting together*

ΚΔ 37. Pragmatic Justice

to men E-pi-mar-ty-roú-me-non hó-ti sym-phé-rei en taîs chreí-ais tês pros al-lḗ-lous koi-nō-ní-as (tôn no-mis-thén-tōn eî-nai di-kaí-ōn) é-chei toû di-kaí-ou cha-rak-tê-ra – e-án te to au-to pâ-si gé-nē-tai e-án te mē to au-tó

τὸ μὲν Ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας (τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων) ἔχει τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτῆρα – ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό

What is attested as being mutually beneficial in the uses of partnership with one another (among the things thought to be just) does have the character of what is just – whether it comes to be the same thing for all or not the same thing

e-an de nó-mon thê-taí Tis ¬ mē A-po-baí-nẹ̄ de ka-ta to sym-phé-ron tês pros al-lḗ-lous koi-nō-ní-as: ou-ké-ti toû-to tēn toû dí-kai-ou phý-sin é-chei

ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί Τις ¬ μὴ Ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας: οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δίκαιου φύσιν ἔχει

then if Someone sets up a law ¬ but it does have a result in accordance with what mutually benefits in partnership with one another: this no longer has the nature of what is just

kan me-ta-píp-tē to ka-ta to dí-kai-on Sym-phé-ron – chró-non dé ti-na eis tēn pró-lēp-sin e-nar-mót-tē: ou-den êt-ton – e-keî-non ton chró-non – ên dí-kai-on toîs mē phō-naîs ke-naîs he-au-tous syn-ta-rát-tou-sin (al-l'eis ta prág-ma-ta blé-pou-sin)

κἂν *μεταπίπτῃ* τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον Συμφέρον ¬ χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ: οὐδὲν ἧττον – ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον – ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν (ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν)

even if that which mutually benefits in regards to what is just *shifts* ¬ yet for a certain time it fits into the anticipation: then nevertheless – for that time – it is just to those not confusing themselves with empty statements (but to those looking into the situation)

If a law or action brings mutual benefit: then it is just, regardless of uniformity ¬ if it does not bring mutual benefit, it is not just.

No ordinance or decree makes a law just, but only the fact that it results in a practical and mutual benefit.

Even if circumstances change so that what was once advantageous according to justice is no longer so – it was still just when it was advantageous.

τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα**	[W] what is contested	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of testifying against*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα**	[M] what is attested	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of testifying upon*
τὸ συμφέρον **τὰ συμφέροντα**	what mutually benefits	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ** *bringing together*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing together*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
τὸ χρεών **τὰ χρεών**	what must happen [i.e., "the inevitable"]	**ΧΡΕΩΝ** *necessary*
ἡ χρῆσις **αἱ χρήσεις**	usage	**ΧΡΗΣΙΣ** *the process of necessary*
ἡ χρεία **αἱ χρεῖαι**	use	**ΧΡΕΙΑ** *necessary*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
ἡ κοινότης **αἱ κοινότητες**	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
ἡ κοινωνία **αἱ κοινωνίαι**	partnership	**ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ** *common*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
τὸ νομισθέν **τὰ νομισθέντα**	what is thought	**ΝΟΜΙΣΘΕΝ** *custom*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
τὸ δίκαιον **τὰ δίκαια**	what is just	
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*

ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ *engraving*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
	Part 2	
ὁ νόμος οἱ νόμοι	law	ΝΟΜΟΣ *allotting*
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
θεῖναι	to put [here, "to set up"] [already]	ΘΕΙΝΑΙ *placed*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
ἀποβαίνειν	to result [here, "to have a result"]	ΑΠΟΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking away*
τὸ συμφέρον τὰ συμφέροντα	what mutually benefits	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ *bringing together*
οὐκέτι	no longer	
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
	Part 3	
μεταπίπτειν	to shift	ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling differently*
τὸ συμφέρον τὰ συμφέροντα	what mutually benefits	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ *bringing together*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
ἐναρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ *adapting into*
ἐναρμόττειν	to fit into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΕΙΝ *adapting into*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ἥττων *(ον)*	worse	῾ΗΤΤΟΝ *inferior*
οὐδὲν ἧττον	then nevertheless	
ἐκεῖνος *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ *that there*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating*
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating together*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*
βλέπειν	to see [here, "to look"]	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*

ΚΔ 38. Contextual Justice

én-tha – mē kai nôn ge-no-mé-nōn tôn pe-ri-es-tṓ-tōn prag-má-tōn – a-ne-fá-nē mē har-mót-ton-ta eis tēn pró-lēp-sin ta No-mis-thén-ta dí-kai-a e-p'au-tôn tôn ér-gōn: ouk ên taû-ta dí-kai-a

ἔνθα – μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων – ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ Νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων: οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια

whenever – without the surrounding situations becoming new – the things thought to be just in the tasks themselves *display that* they not to fit with the anticipation: then it is not possible that they are just

én-tha de – kai-nôn ge-no-mé-nōn tôn prag-má-tōn – ou-ké-ti sy-né-phe-re ta au-ta dí-kai-a

Keí-me-na:

ἔνθα δὲ – καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων – οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια Κείμενα:

but whenever – with the situations becoming new – the same things set up as just are no longer mutually beneficial:

en-taû-tha, dē tó-te men ên dí-kai-a (hó-te sy-né-phe-ren eis tēn pros al-lé-lous koi-nō-ní-an tôn sym-po-li-teu-o-mé-nōn) ¬ hý-ste-ron d'ouk ên é-ti dí-kai-a (hó-te mē sy-né-phe-ren)

ἐνταῦθα, δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια (ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων) ¬ ὕστερον δ', οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια (ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν)

in this respect, indeed while at that time they are just (when they are mutually beneficial in the partnership of fellow-citizens with one another) ¬ but afterwards, it is not possible that they are still just (when they are not mutually beneficial)

If what was once considered just does not fit with our anticipation of justice – then what was once considered just was not truly just.

When circumstances do change – actions that were once beneficial and just can become unjust if they no longer provide mutual benefit.

ἐπειδὰν = **ἐπειδὴ ἄν**	whenever	**ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ** *since if*
ἔνθα	at that point	**ΕΝΘΑ**
νεωστὶ	just now	**ΝΕΩΣΤΙ** *recent*
καινός *(ή, όν)*	new	**ΚΑΙΝΟΣ** *newly-invented*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced [often gnomic, "becoming"]	**ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into being*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	having become	**ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into being*
στῆναι	to stand [already]	**ΣΤΗΝΑΙ** *standing*
ἵστασθαι	to be placed upright	**ἹΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing*
περιίστασθαι	to place around	**ΠΕΡΙΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing around*
περιεστώς	having been placed around ∴ surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΣΤΩΣ** *stood around*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
ἀναφαίνειν	to display	**ΑΝΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining out*
ἐναρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting into	**ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting into*
ἁρμόττειν	to fit	
ἁρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting	**ἉΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting*

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•^] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
νομισθείς	[already] thought	ΝΟΜΙΣΘΕΙΣ *custom*
τὸ νομισθέν τὰ νομισθέντα	what is thought	
ἡ δικαιοσύνη αἱ δικαιοσύναι	justice	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ *condition of custom / right*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	an activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ *result of working within*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*
	Part 2	
οὐκέτι	no longer	ΟΥΚΕΤΙ *not still*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together*
καταστηματικός *(ή, όν)*	established	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of thoroughly standing*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting*
τὸ κείμενον τὰ κείμενα	what set up	ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ *setting*
	Part 3	
ἐνταῦθα	in this [respect]	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ *in this*
τότε	at that time	ΤΟΤΕ *the then*
μὲν… δέ…	while… yet…	
ὕστερον	afterwards	῾ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
δὴ τότε μὲν… ὕστερον δέ…	indeed while at that time… but afterwards…	
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*
πρὸς ἀλλήλους	with one another	
ἡ κοινωνία αἱ κοινωνίαι	partnership	ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ *common*
συμπολιτεύεσθαι	to be a fellow-citizen	ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ *participating in a polity together*
ὁ συμπολιτευόμενος οἱ συμπολιτευόμενοι	fellow-citizen	
ὕστερον	afterwards	῾ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together*

ΚΔ 39. Relationship Management

Ho to mē thar-roûn a-po tôn é-xō-then á-ris-ta sys-tē-sá-me-nos:

Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος:

He who has best composed himself regarding his lack of confidence from external circumstances:

Hoû-tos ta men dy-na-ta ho-mó-phy-la ka-tes-keu-á-sa-to ¬ ta de mē dy-na-ta, ouk al-ló-phy-lá

Οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο ¬ τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατά, οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά

is this person who made what is possible of the same kind ¬ but what is not possible, not of a different kind

ge hó-sa de mē-de toû-to dy-na-tos ên: a-ne-pí-meik-tos e-gé-ne-to (kai ex-ē-reí-sa-to hó-sa toû-t'e-ly-si-té-lei prát-tein)

γε ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν: ἀνεπίμεικτος ἐγένετο (καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα τοῦτ' Ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν)

and with as many things as he could not even to do this: he made himself unmixed (and removed as many things as it was profitable to accomplish this)

τὰ ὁμόφυλα & **οἱ ὁμόφυλοι**	things & people of the same kind	*we enjoy them for their own sake*
τὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά & **οἱ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλοι**	things & people not of a different kind	*we enjoy them for mutual benefit*
τὰ ἀνεπίμεικτα & **οἱ ἀνεπίμεικτοι**	unmixed things & people	*we enjoy not interacting with them*

He who best composes himself against external threats makes what he can of the same type as himself ¬ but what he cannot make of the same type, he does not treat as alien ¬ yet from what is not even possible to not treat as alien, he does keep unmixed, removing whatever is beneficial to remove.

θαρρεῖν	to be confident	**ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ** *taking courage*
τὸ θαρρεῖν	being confident	
τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν	not being confident	
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
τὸ ἔξω **τὰ ἔξω**	external object	**ΕΞΩ** *outside*
τὸ ἔξωθεν **τὰ ἔξωθεν**	an external source [here, "external circumstance"]	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἄριστος *(η, ον)*	best	**ΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *most fit*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
συνστῆσαι **συστῆσαι**	to compose [already]	**ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ** *stood together*
συστησάμενος	composed himself [regarding]	
	Part 2	
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**ὉΥΤΟΣ** *this*
τό δυνατόν **τὰ δυνατά**	what is possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ** *power*
ἡ συμφυλία **αἱ συμφυλίαι**	similarity	**ΣΥΜΦΥΛΙΑ** *race / tribe together*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	**ὉΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ** *same born*

ὁμόφυλος (η, ον)	of the same kind	**ὉΜΟΦΥΛΟΣ** *same race / tribe*
ἀλλόφυλος (η, ον)	of a different kind	**ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΟΣ** *other race / tribe*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
κατασκευάζειν	to construct [here, "to make"]	**ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *thoroughly preparing*
	Part 3	
ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
μηδὲ x δυνατὸς ἦν	he cannot do x	
ἐπιτήδειος (α, ον)	suitable	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ** *towards this here*
ἀνεπιτήδειος (ος, ον)	unsuitable	**ΑΝΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ** *not towards this here*
ἀνεπίμικτος **ἀνεπίμεικτος** (ον)	unmixed	**ΑΝΕΠΙΜΙΚΤΟΣ** **ΑΝΕΠΙΜΕΙΚΤΟΣ** *not towards mixing*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *came into being*
ἐγένετο	3rd person singular gnomic aorist mid. ind. "he makes himself"	
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*
ἡ λύσις **αἱ λύσεις**	solution [i.e., explanation]	**ΛΥΣΙΣ** *the process of loosening*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
λυσιτελεῖν	to be profitable	**ΛΥΣΙΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *the process of loosening completing*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*

ΚΔ 40. The Complete Life

Hó-soi tēn dý-na-min És-chon toû to thar-reîn má-lis-ta ek tôn ho-mor-roú-tōn pa-ra-skeu-á-sa-sthai (hoû-tō kai e-bí-ō-san me-t'al-lḗ-lōn hḗ-dis-ta) to be-bai-ó-ta-ton pís-tō-ma é-chon-tes

Ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορρούντων παρασκευάσασθαι (οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετ' ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα) τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες

As many people as have the force of providing for themselves the greatest security from those bordering (and in this way also live their life among one another most pleasantly) have the most affirmed assurance

kai (plē-res-tá-tēn oi-kei-ó-tē-ta a-po-la-bón-tes) ouk ō-dý-ran-to, hōs pros é-le-on, tēn toû te-leu-tḗ-san-tos pro-ka-tas-tro-phḗn

καὶ (πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες) οὐκ ὠδύραντο, ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον, τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν

and (having fully acquired the fullest compatibility) they do not mourn, as though with pity, the prior demise of he who died

Those who are able to create and maintain secure and pleasant relationships with others live more contentedly in the reassurance and comfort of these bonds.

Yet such people also do not experience deep mourning or regret when a friend passes away – because the strength and joy of their relationship provides continued pleasure that outweighs the sorrow of loss.

ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
θαρρεῖν	to be confident	ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ *taking courage*
τὸ θαρρεῖν	being confident	
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
ὁ ὅρος οἱ ὅροι	limit	ὉΡΟΣ *outline, definition*
τὸ ὅριον τὰ ὅρια	boundary	ὉΡΙΟΝ *separating*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
ὁμορρεῖν	to neighbor	ὉΜΟΡΡΕΙΝ *the same* *separating*
ὁ ὁμορρῶν οἱ ὁμορροῦντες	neighbor [the one bordering]	ὉΜΟΡΡΩΝ *the same* *separating*
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing* *alongside*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	ΒΙΟΥΝ *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	ἩΔΕΩΣ *sweet*
ἥδιον	more pleasantly	ἩΔΙΟΝ *more sweet*
ἥδιστα	most pleasantly	ἩΔΙΣΤΑ *most sweet*
βέβαιος *(α, ον)*	affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ *certain*
βεβαιότερος	more affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more certain*
βεβαιότατος *(η, ον)*	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ *most certain*
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief [based on experience]	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ *trust*
ἡ ἀπιστία αἱ ἀπιστίαι	distrust	ΑΠΙΣΤΙΑ *no trust*
τὸ πίστωμα τὰ πιστώματα	assurance	ΠΙΣΤΩΜΑ *the result of* *trust*
	Part 2	
πλήρης *(ες)*	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ *quality from filling*

πληρέστερος	fuller	**ΠΛΗΡΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ** *more filling*
πληρέστατος	fullest	**ΠΛΗΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *most filling*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἡ οἰκειότης **αἱ οἰκειότητες**	compatibility	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΣ** *appropriate*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	**ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping away from*
ἀπολαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	fully acquired	
ὀδύρεσθαι	to morn	**ΟΔΥΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *lamenting*
ὁ ἔλεος **οἱ ἔλεοι**	pity	**ΕΛΕΟΣ** onomatopoeic *"ἐλελεῦ"*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
τελευταῖος *(α, ον)*	final	**ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟΣ** *terminating*
τελευτᾶν	to die	**ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΝ** *terminating*
ὁ τελευτήσας **οἱ τελευτήσαντες**	he who died	**ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΑΣ** *terminating*
διαστρόφος *(ος, ον)*	distorted	**ΔΙΑΣΤΡΟΦΟΣ** *twisting*
ἡ καταστροφή **αἱ καταστροφαί**	overturning	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗ** *twisting thoroughly*
ἡ προκαταστροφή **αἱ προκαταστροφαί**	prior demise	**ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΟΦΗ**

VATICAN SAYINGS
Sententiae Vaticanae

Also called **Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum** *and* **Ἐπικούρου Γνωμολογία** *and* **Ἐπικούρου Προσφώνησεις**.

"The Vatican Sayings" is a collection of 81 short sayings – mainly from Epicurus but also from later Epicureans, likely compiled between the 3rd and 5th centuries AD.

It survives in a 14th-century manuscript in the Vatican Library. *(Vaticanus Graecus 1950)*

The Vatican Sayings that have an equivalent in the **Κύριαι Δόξαι** *(Essential Judgments) are not included here.*

VS 4. Perception of Pain

Pâ-sa al-gē-dōn eu-ka-ta-phró-nē-tos: hē gar sýn-to-non, é-chou-sa to po-noûn, sýn-to-mon é-chei ton chró-non ¬ hē de chro-ní-zou-sa pe-ri tēn sár-ka a-blē-chron é-chei ton pó-non

Πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος: ἡ γὰρ σύντονον, ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν, σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον ¬ ἡ δὲ χρονίζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον

All pain is well able to be disregarded: because the intense [pain], having what suffers, has concise time ¬ but the long enduring [pain] in the body has non-severe suffering

πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν τὰ ἀλγοῦντα	what causes pain	ΑΛΓΟΥΝ *being in pain*
τὸ ἀλγεινόν τὰ ἀλγεινά	what is painful	ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΝ *pain*
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *the state pain*
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
καταφρονεῖν *+ gen*	to disregard	ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind* *down / against*
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες	he who considers well	ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ *good mind*
εὐκαταφρόνητος (ον)	well able to be disregarded	ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΣ *good mind* *down upon*
συντείνειν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *stretching together*
σύντονος (ον)	intense	ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ *stretching together*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἔχων (ουσα, ον)	has	ΕΧΩΝ *holding*
ἐπίπονος (ος, ον)	tedious	ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ *upon toil*
ἡ ἀπονία αἱ ἀπονίαι	non-suffering	ΑΠΟΝΙΑ *no toil*
τό πονοῦν τὰ πονοῦντα	what suffers	ΠΟΝΟΥΝ *being in toil*
ὁ πόνος οἱ πόνοι	suffering	ΠΟΝΟΣ *toil*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
σύντομος (ος, ον)	concise	ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ *cut together*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
χρονίζειν	to linger	ΧΡΟΝΙΖΕΙΝ *[seizing]*
χρονίζων (ουσα, ον)	linger	ΧΡΟΝΙΖΩΝ *[seizing]*
ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*
ἀβληχρός (ή, όν)	non-severe	ΑΒΛΗΧΡΟΣ *not bitter*

VS 7. Folly of Concealment

A-di-koûn-ta, la-theîn men dý-sko-lon ¬ pís-tin de la-beîn hy-per toû la-theîn a-dý-na-ton

Ἀδικοῦντα, λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον ¬ πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον

for one being unjust, to evade notice is discontenting ¬ but to gain confidence about evading notice is impossible

This is a summary of ΚΔ 35 "It is not possible for one who evasively brings about something (among those things that they mutually agreed with one another in not harming and not being harmed) to believe that he will evade notice – even if he evades thousands of times up to the present – for until his overturning, it is unclear if he will still evade notice."

ἡ δικαιοσύνη αἱ δικαιοσύναι	justice	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ *condition of custom / right*
ἡ ἀδικία αἱ ἀδικίαι	injustice	ΑΔΙΚΙΑ *not custom / right*
ἀδικεῖν	to be unjust	ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ *not custom / right*
ἀδικοῦν *(οῦσα)*	being unjust	
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *to be hidden*
λαθεῖν	to evade notice [already]	ΛΑΘΕΙΝ *hidden*
τὸ δυσχερές τὰ δυσχερῆ	what is difficult	ΔΥΣΧΕΡΕΣ *hard hand*
δύσκολος	discontenting	ΔΥΣΚΟΛΟΣ *hard bile*
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief [based on experience]	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ *trust*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ *grasped*
ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *not powerful*

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Epistles 9.13

Pōtest nocentī contingere ut lateat – latendī Fidēs nōn potest

It is possible for a wrongdoer to happen to go unnoticed – but Confidence of concealment cannot exist

VS 9. No Need to Live in Need

ka-kon A-nán-kē ¬ all' ou-de-mí-a a-nán-kē zên me-ta a-nán-kēs

κακὸν Ἀνάγκη ¬ ἀλλ' οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης

Necessity is bad ¬ but there is not any necessity to live with necessity

κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against constraint*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	ΒΙΟΥΝ *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*

VS 10. Infinite Success

Attributed to Metrodorus.

Mé-mnē-so hó-ti (thnē-tós hṓn tệ phý-sei, kai la-bṓn chró-non hō-ris-mé-non) A-né-bēs toîs pe-ri phý-se-ōs di-a-lo-gis-moîs – he-pi tēn a-pei-rí-an kai ton ai-ô-na – kai Ka-teî-des:

"tá t'e-ón-ta, tá t'es-só-me-na, pró t'e-ón-ta"

Μέμνησο ὅτι (θνητός ὢν τῇ φύσει, καὶ λαβών χρόνον ὡρισμένον) Ἀνέβης τοῖς περὶ φύσεως διαλογισμοῖς – ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα – καὶ Κατεῖδες: "τά τ᾿ ἐόντα, τά τ᾿ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ᾿ ἐόντα"

Recall that (while being mortal by nature, and having finite time) you ascended with thorough reasonings about nature – regarding infinity and eternity – and have looked upon: "the things existing, the things that will exist, and the things existing before"

*"declaring the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before (**εἰρεῦσαι τά τ᾿ ἐόντα τά τ᾿ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾿ ἐόντα**)" is a quote of line 38 of Hesiod's Theogony.*

μιμνήσκειν	to recall	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *thinking "again"*
μέμνησο	2nd person singular perfect middle imperative recall	**ΜΕΜΝΗΣΟ** *thought*
ἄφθαρτος *(ον)*	indestructible	**ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ** *not decaying*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
ἀθάνατος	immortal	**ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *not dying*
θνητός *(ή, όν)*	mortal	**ΘΝΗΤΟΣ** *died*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
λαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[generally] acquired [here, "having"]	**ΛΑΒΩΝ** *grasped*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ὡρισμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	**ὩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *separating*
διαβαίνειν	pass through	**ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking through*
ἀναβαίνειν	to ascend	**ΑΝΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking* *up against*
ἀνέβης	2nd person singular aorist active indicative you ascended	**ΑΝΕΒΗΣ** *walked* *up against*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning* *through action*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ἡ ἀπειρία **αἱ ἀπειρίαι**	infinity	
αἰώνιος *(αἰωνία, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	**ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ** *characterized by* *being forever*
ὁ αἰών **οἱ αἰῶνες**	eternity	**ΑΙΩΝ** *being forever*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
καθορᾶν	to look upon	**ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ** *looking* *thoroughly*
κατεῖδες	2nd person singular aorist active indicative you looked upon	**ΚΑΤΕΙΔΕΣ** *thoroughly saw*
	Quotation	

εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ *being*
τὸ ὄν τὰ ὄντα	what is existing	ΟΝ *being*
τὸ ἐσσόμενον τὰ ἐσσόμενα	what will exist	ΕΣΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ *will be*
πρό	before	ΠΡΟ *in front of*

Context of Quote from Hesiod

Hesiod (fl.c. 700 BCE), Theogony, 36-40

Τύνη – Μουσάων Ἀρχώμεθα, ταὶ Διὶ πατρὶ
You – with the Muses let us begin, who to Zeus their father

ὑμνεῦσαι, τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου,
while siging, they delight his great mind within Olympus,

εἰρεῦσαι τά τ᾽ ἐόντα, τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα,
while telling of the things existing, the things that will exist, and the things existing before

φωνῇ ὁμηρεῦσαι: τῶν δ᾽ ἀκάματος ῥέει Αὐδὴ
with a voice they speak the same way: and from them flows their untiring Account

ἐκ στομάτων ἡδεῖα:
sweet from their mouths:

Alternative Version

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Stromata, 5.138

Μητροδώρου τε καίτοι Ἐπικουρείου γενομένου – ἐνθέως ταῦτά γε εἰρηκότος: "Μέμνησο, Μενέστρατε, διότι (θνητὸς φὺς, καὶ λαβὼν βίον ὡρισμένον, ἀναβὰς τῇ ψυχῇ ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων) Κατεῖδες καὶ: 'τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ᾽ ἔοντα'"

> although Metrodorus indeed became an Epicurean – he said these things piously: "Menestratus, recall that (although having naturally come to exist as mortal, and having received a finite life, and having ascended with your soul up to the eternity and infinity of situations) you have seen also: 'the things that will exist, and the things existing before.'"

Μενέστρατος	Menestratus	ΜΕΝΕΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ *enduring* *for the army*
διότι	since	
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	ΦΥΕΙΝ *producing*
φὺς (φῦσα, φῦν)	having naturally come to exist	
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἕως ἐπὶ	up to	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*

VS 11. Tranquil Activity

tôn pleís-tōn an-thrṓ-pōn: to men hē-sy-chá-zon Nar-kậ ¬ to de ki-noú-me-non Lyt-tậ

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων: τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον Ναρκᾷ ¬ τὸ δὲ κινούμενον Λυττᾷ

with most people: what is tranquil becomes numb ¬ but what moves itself becomes frantic

This is a reminder to always hold in mind the goal of tranquil activity.

We want to be tranquil without becoming listless, and we want to be active without becoming agitated.

πλεῖστος (η, ον)	the greatest [the most]	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ἡ ἡσυχία **αἱ ἡσυχίαι**	tranquillity	**ἩΣΥΧΙΑ** *stillness*
ἡσυχάζειν	to be tranquil	**ἩΣΥΧΑΖΕΙΝ**
ἡσυχάζων (ουσα, ον)	being tranquil	
τὸ ἡσυχάζον **τὰ ἡσυχάζοντα**	what is tranquil	
ναρκᾶν	to become numb	**ΝΑΡΚΑΝ** *stiffening*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
κινεῖν	to move	**ΚΙΝΕΙΝ** *moving*
κινούμενος (η, ον)	being moved	**ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *moving*
τὸ κινούμενον **τὰ κινούμενα**	what is moved by itself	
λυττᾶν	to become frantic	**ΛΥΤΤΑΝ** *raging*

VS 14. No Second Life

Ge-gó-na-men há-pax – dis de ouk és-ti ge-nés-thai: Deî de, ton ai-ô-na, mē-ké-ti eî-nai

Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ ¬ δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: Δεῖ δὲ, τὸν αἰῶνα, μηκέτι εἶναι

We have been produced once ¬ but twice it is not possible to be produced: it is necessary, for eternity, to no longer exist

Sy, de, ouk ôn tês aú-ri-on Ký-ri-os – a-na-bál-lę to chaî-ron?

Σὺ, δὲ, οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον Κύριος ¬ ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ χαῖρον?

You, however, not being Master of tomorrow ¬ postpone what is joyful?

ho de Bí-os mel-lēs-mô pa-ra-pól-ly-tai – kai heîs Hé-kas-tos hē-môn, as-cho-loú-me-nos, a-po-thnḗs-kei

ὁ δὲ Βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται – καὶ εἷς Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει

Life is frittered away by procrastination – and each one of us, while being occupied, passes away

We should prepare for our future – while still enjoying cheer and rest.

γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *came into being*
ἅπαξ	once	**ἉΠΑΞ** *one all one*

δίς	twice	ΔΙΣ *two*
μηκέτι	no longer	ΜΗΚΕΤΙ *not still*
αἰώνιος *(αἰωνίᾱ, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ *characterized by being forever*
ὁ αἰών οἱ αἰῶνες	eternity	ΑΙΩΝ *being forever*
	Part 2	
αὔριον	tomorrow	ΑΥΡΙΟΝ *dawn*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
ὁ κύριος οἱ κύριοι	principle	
βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing*
ἀναβάλλειν	to postpone	ΑΝΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ
χαῖρων *(ουσα, ον)*	rejoicing	ΧΑΙΡΩΝ *being cheerful*
τὸ χαῖρον	what is joyful	ΧΑΙΡΟΝ *joy*
	Part 3	
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
μέλλειν	to be about to do [here, "will be"]	ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ *going to*
ὁ μελλησμός οἱ μελλησμοί	procrastination	ΜΕΛΛΗΣΜΟΣ *result of "going to"*
ἀπολλύναι	to dissolve away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΝΑΙ *destroying away*
παραπόλλυσθαι	to be frittered away	ΠΑΡΑΠΟΛΛΥΣΘΑΙ *destroying in passing*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ *each*
ἡ σχολή αἱ σχολαί	school	ΣΧΟΛΗ *leisure*
ἡ ἀσχολία αἱ ἀσχολίαι	occupation	ΑΣΧΟΛΙΑ *not leisure*
ἀσχολούμενος *(η, ον)*	being occupied	ΑΣΧΟΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *not leisure*
ἀποθνήσκειν	to pass away	ΑΠΟΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ ΑΠΟΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ *died away*

Alternative Version 1

Plutarch, Non Posse, 27, 1104E

ᾗ καὶ προεπισφάττουσιν, Οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες" "ἅπαξ ἄνθρωποι Γεγόναμεν ¬ δὶς δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: Δεῖ δὲ, τὸν αἰῶνα, μηκέτι εἶναι"

by which they slaughter [*us*] in advance, those who say these things: "We have been produced as human once ¬ but twice it is not possible to be produced: it is necessary, for eternity, to no longer exist"

καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ὡς μικρὸν (μᾶλλον δὲ μηδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν) πρὸς τὰ σύμπαν ἀτιμάσαντες: ἀναπόλαυστον Προΐενται, καὶ Ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ πράξεως – οἷον ἐξαθυμοῦντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐφημέρων καὶ ἀβεβαίων καὶ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἀξιόλογον γεγονότων

for they too, having dishonored the present as small (or rather, as nothing at all) in comparison to the whole: they let it go unenjoyed, and they make light of virtue and action – as if disheartened and scorning themselves, as ephemeral and unstable and born for nothing worthy

Alternative Version 2

Stobaeus (fl. 450 CE), Florilegium 16.28

Ἐπικούρου "Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ ¬ δὶς οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι. Δεῖ δὲ, τὸν αἰῶνα, μκέτ' εἶναι. Σὺ, δὲ, τῆς αὔριον οὐκ ὢν Κύριος, ἀναβάλλῃ τὸν καιρόν! ὁ δὲ πάντων Βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει"

Of Epicurus "We have been produced once ¬ but twice it is not possible to be produced: it is necessary, for eternity, to no longer exist. You, however, not being tomorrow's Master, postpone cheer! The life of all is frittered away by procrastination – and because of this, each of us, while being occupied, passes away"

Harvest the Day

Horatius, Carmina 1.11

Tū – nē quaesíerīs – scī́re néfās! quem míhi, quem tíbī
You – do not seek – it is not to be found! What to me, what to you

fī́nem Dī déderint, Λευκονοή. Nec Babylṓniōs
the Gods will give as an end, Leuconoë. Nor with Babylonian

temptā́ris númerōs. ut mélius (quídquid érit) pátī,
numbers should you tamper. How much better (whatever will be) to endure,

seu plū́rīs Híemēs seu tríbuit Iúppiter últimam,
whether more winters Jupiter grants or the last,

(quae nunc oppósitīs dēbílitat pūmícibus máre
(which now with opposing pumice disables the Sea

Tyrrhḗnum). Sápiās: vī́na líquēs et spátiō brévī
of Tyrrhenia). Be wise: you should filter the wine and in short time

spem lóngam résecēs! dum lóquimur, fū́gerit ínvida
you should cut back long hope! While we speak, in envy will have fled

ǽtās: cárpe díem quam mínimum crḗdula pósterō
the age: harvest the day which expects the least in tomorrow

VS 15. Appreciating Others

É-thē hṓs-per ta hē-môn au-tôn í-di-a Ti-mô-men – án te chrē-sta É-chō-men, kai hy-po tôn an-thró-pōn Zē-lṓ-me-tha ¬ án te mḗ: hoú-tō Chrē kai ta tôn pé-las – an e-pi-ei-keîs Ô-sin

Ἤθη ὥσπερ τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια Τιμῶμεν – ἄν τε χρηστὰ Ἔχωμεν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων Ζηλώμεθα ¬ ἄν τε μή: οὕτω Χρὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν πέλας – ἂν ἐπιεικεῖς Ὦσιν

[our] dispositions we honor just as things particular to us ourselves – whether we possess useful ones, and we are admired by people ¬ or not: thus it is necessary also [to honor] the [dispositions] of those nearby – if they are fitting

τὸ ἦθος **τὰ ἤθη**	disposition	**ΗΘΟΣ** *custom*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἡ τιμή **αἱ τιμαί**	honor	**ΤΙΜΗ** *value*
τιμᾶν	to honor	**ΤΙΜΑΝ** *value*

χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
χρηστός (ή, όν)	useful	
χρῆναι	to be necessary	ΧΡΗΝΑΙ
χρὴ	it is necessary	ΧΡΗ *necessary*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ζηλοῦν	to admire	ΖΗΛΟΥΝ *envying*
πέλας	nearby	ΠΕΛΑΣ *approaching*
ὁ πέλας οἱ πέλας	he who is nearby	
ἡ εἰκών αἱ εἰκόνες	image	ΕΙΚΩΝ *portraying*
ἐπιεικής (ές)	fitting	ΕΠΙΕΙΚΗΣ *portraying upon*
ὦσιν	3rd person plural present subjunctive of εἰμί they may be, [if] they are	

Horatius, Satires, 1.3.29-37

Īrācúndior est paúlō – minus aptus acūtīs
More quick-tempered he is by a little – less suited to the critical

nā́ribus hṓrum hóminum: rīdḗrī póssit éō quod
observations [lit. sharp noses] of these men: it is possible to laugh at him because

rustícius tṓnsō, Toga dēfluit et mále lāxus
in a more rustic way his [hair] is cut, the toga slips and badly loose

in péde Cálceus haeret. at est bónus: ut mélior vir
on his foot his shoe clings. but he is good: as a better man

nōn álius quisquam – at tíbi amī́cus – at ingénium íngēns
there is no other – but he is a friend to you – but a great genius

incúltō látet hoc sub córpore. dēnique tē ípsum
lies under this unrefined body. finally, you yourself

cóncute, númqua tíbī vitiṓrum insḗverit ṓlim
shake, whether at any time in you any vices [ ] has planted

Nātū́ra aut étiam Consuetū́dō mála. namque
nature or even bad habit. for

negléctīs urénda fílix innā́scitur ágrīs.
in neglected fields, the fern that must be burned grows.

VS 16. Harmful Temptation

Ou-deis, blé-pōn to ka-kon, hai-reî-tai au-tó – al-la, de-le-as-theis hōs a-ga-thô pros to meî-zon au-toû ka-kon, e-thē-reú-thē

Οὐδεὶς, βλέπων τὸ κακὸν, αἱρεῖται αὐτό ¬ ἀλλὰ, δελεασθεὶς ὡς ἀγαθῷ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον αὐτοῦ κακὸν, ἐθηρεύθη

No one, seeing what is harmful, chooses it ¬ but, lured as if by a good towards his greater harm, he is caught

οὐδείς (οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*

βλέπων *(ουσα, ον)*	seeing	
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
τὸ κακόν τὰ κακά	what is bad [here, "what is harmful"]	ΚΑΚΟΝ
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
δελεάζειν	to lure	ΔΕΛΕΑΖΕΙΝ *baiting*
δελεασθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	lured	ΔΕΛΕΑΣΘΕΙΣ *baiting*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
θηρεύειν	to catch	ΘΗΡΕΥΕΙΝ *hunting*

VS 17. Harbor of Old Age

ou Né-os ma-ka-ris-tos ¬ al-la Gé-rōn be-bi-ō-kōs ka-lôs:

οὐ Νέος μακαριστὸς ¬ ἀλλὰ Γέρων βεβιωκὼς καλῶς:

it is not the young who is considered blessed ¬ but the old man who has lived correctly:

ho gar Né-os, ak-mẹ́ po-lys hy-po tês tý-chēs (he-te-ro-phro-nôn) plá-ze-tai ¬

ὁ γὰρ Νέος, ἀκμῇ πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης (ἑτεροφρονῶν) πλάζεται ¬

for the young man, in his prime (while holding opposing opinions) is molded greatly by fortune ¬

ho de Gé-rōn, ka-thá-per en li-mé-ni, tộ gḗ-rạ ka-thṓr-mi-ken: ta pró-te-ron dy-sel-pis-toú-me-na tôn a-ga-thôn as-pha-leî ka-ta-kleí-sas chá-ri-ti

ὁ δὲ Γέρων, καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι, τῷ γήρᾳ καθώρμικεν: τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι

but the old man, just as in a harbor, has fully anchored in old age: while fully enclosing with stable charm those things formerly hard to hope for among the goods

ἡ νεότης αἱ νεότητες	youth	ΝΕΟΤΗΣ *new*
νέος *(α, ον)*	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
μακαριστός *(ή, όν)*	considered blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ *considered to have greatness*
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ *old*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*

βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	ΒΙΟΥΝ *living*
βεβιωκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having lived	ΒΕΒΙΩΚΩΣ *having lived*
καλός *(ή, όν)*	correct / beautiful	ΚΑΛΟΣ *lovely*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *lovely*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἀκμή αἱ ἀκμαί	prime	ΑΚΜΗ *peak*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
φρονεῖν	to consider	ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind*
ἑτεροφρονεῖν	to hold opposing opinions	῾ΗΤΕΡΟΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *different mind*
πλάττειν	to mold	ΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *forming*
	Part 3	
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
ὁ λιμήν οἱ λιμένες	harbour	ΛΙΜΗΝ *dockyard*
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ *old*
ὁ συγκαταγεγηρακώς οἱ συγκαταγεγηρακότες	he who has fully grown old together	ΣΥΓΚΑΤΑΓΕΓΗΡΑΚΩΣ *fully having grown old together*
τὸ γῆρας τὰ γήρα	old age	ΓΗΡΑΣ *grown old*
καθορμίζειν	to fully anchor	ΚΑΘΟΡΜΙΖΕΙΝ *completely anchoring*
καθώρμικεν	3rd person singular perfect active indicative he has fully anchored	
πρότερον	earlier	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ *more before*
τὸ πρότερον τὰ πρότερον	what is former	
δυσμνημόνευτος *(ον)*	hard to remember	ΔΥΣΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΟΣ *hard thinking*
ἡ ἐλπίς αἱ ἐλπίδες	hope	ΕΛΠΙΣ *expecting*
δυσελπιστειν	to hard to hope for	ΔΥΣΕΛΠΙΣΤΕΙΝ *expecting hard*
δυσελπιστούμενος *(η, ον)*	hard to hope for	
τὸ δυσελπιστούμενον τὰ δυσελπιστούμενα	what is hard to hope for	
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
ἀσφαλής *(ής, ές)*	stable	ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ *not stumbling*
κλεῖειν	to enclose	ΚΛΕΙΕΙΝ *shutting*
κατακλείειν	to fully enclose	ΚΑΤΑΚΛΕΙΕΙΝ *completely shutting*
κατακλείσας *(ασα, αν)*	fully enclosing	
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ *being cheerful*

χαρίζειν	to give favor	ΧΑΡΙΖΕΙΝ *action of being cheerful*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	favor [here, "charm"]	ΧΑΡΙΣ *charming / gracious*

VS 18. Disenchantment from Eros

a-phai-rou-mé-nēs pro-só-pse-ōs – kai ho-mi-lí-as – kai sy-na-na-stro-phês: ek-lý-e-tai to e-rō-ti-kon Pá-thos

ἀφαιρουμένης προσόψεως – καὶ ὁμιλίας – καὶ συναναστροφῆς: ἐκλύεται τὸ ἐρωτικὸν Πάθος

with visual presence removed – and association – and intimate acquaintance: the erotic feeling is dispelled

The desire for a specific person is dispelled by removing all exposure to them.

ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping away*
ἀφαιρούμενος *(η, ον)*	removed	ΑΦΑΙΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *grasping away*
ἡ ὑποψία αἱ ὑποψίαι	suspicion	῾ΥΠΟΨΙΑ *looking under*
ἡ πρόσοψις αἱ προσοψεῖς	visual presence	ΠΡΟΣΟΨΙΣ *toward looking*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλίαι	association	῾ΟΜΙΛΙΑ *company*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
ἡ συναναστροφή αἱ συναναστροφαί	intimate acquaintance	ΣΥΝΑΝΑΣΤΡΟΦΗ *mutually twisting together*
ἡ συνουσία αἱ συνουσίαι	intercourse	ΣΥΝΟΥΣΙΑ *being together*
ἐκλύειν	to dispel	ΕΚΛΥΕΙΝ *dissolving out*
ἐκλύεται	3rd person singular present passive indicative it is dispelled	
ἡ ἐρωμένη αἱ ἐρωμέναι	mistress [i.e., female lover]	ΕΡΩΜΕΝΗ *having been loving*
ἐρωτικός *(ή, όν)*	erotic	ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of loving*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*

VS 19. Regenerating Gratitude

toû ge-go-nó-tos a-mné-mōn a-ga-thoû – gé-rōn té-me-ron Ge-gé-nē-tai

τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ – γέρων τήμερον Γεγένηται

when not remembering the good that has come to be – on that day he has come to be an old man

γεγονώς (υῖα, ός)	has been produced [here, "has come to be"]	ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ came into being
μιμνῄσκειν	to recall	ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ thinking "again"
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ "addition to" thinking
ἀμνημονεῖν	to not remember	ΑΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΙΝ not "addition to" thinking
ἀμνήμων (ον)	not remembering	
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ great
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ old
τήμερον [indeclinable adverb]	on that day	ΤΗΜΕΡΟΝ on the day = τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
γεγενῆσθαι	to have been produced [here, "has come to be"]	ΓΕΓΕΝΗΣΘΑΙ came into being

VS 21. Persuading Our Nature

ou Bi-as-té-on tēn phý-sin ¬ al-la, Peis-té-on:

οὐ Βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ¬ ἀλλὰ, Πειστέον:

One must not force nature ¬ but instead, must persuade:

Peí-so-men de tas a-nan-kaí-as e-pi-thy-mí-as ek-plē-roûn-tes – tás te phy-si-kas, an mē Bláp-tō-si ¬ tas de bla-be-ras pik-rôs e-léng-khon-tes

Πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες – τάς τε φυσικάς, ἂν μὴ Βλάπτωσι ¬ τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες

We will persuade by fully fulfilling the necessary desires – and also the natural, if they do not harm ¬ but by sharply refuting the harmful ones

βιάζειν	to force	ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ violence
βιαστέον	one must force	ΒΙΑΣΤΕΟΝ violence
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ producing
πείθειν	to persuade	ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ convincing
πειστέον	one must persuade	ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ
	Part 2	
πείσομεν	future active indicative 1st person plural we will persuade	
ἀναγκαῖος (α, ον)	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ necessity
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ toward spirit
πλήρης (ες)	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ quality from filling

ἐκπληροῦν	to fully fill	ΕΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ *full out*
ὁ φυσικός οἱ φυσικοί	naturalist	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*
βλάπτειν	to harm	ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ *hindering*
ἡ βλάβη αἱ βλάβαι	harm	ΒΛΑΒΗ *hindering*
βλαβερός *(ή, όν)*	harmful	ΒΛΑΒΕΡΟΣ
πικρός *(ή, όν)*	sharp	ΠΙΚΡΟΣ *pointed / keen*
πικρῶς	sharply	ΠΙΚΡΩΣ *pointed / keen*
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ *confuting* *[with contrary proof]*

VS 23. Advantages of Friendship

pâ-sa Phi-lí-a di' he-aut-ēn hai-re-tḗ ¬ ar-chēn de eí-lē-phen a-po tês ō-phe-leí-as

πᾶσα Φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἱρετή ¬ ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας

every friendship in itself is worth choosing ¬ but it has acquired its foundation from benefit

πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole [here, "all"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
αἱρετός *(ή, όν)*	worth choosing	ἉΙΡΕΤΟΣ *taking*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
εἰληφέναι	[generally] to have acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ *grasped*
ἡ ὠφέλεια αἱ ὠφέλειαι	benefit	ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ *helping*

VS 24. Source of Dreams

E-nýp-ni-a ouk é-la-che phý-sin theí-an – ou-de man-ti-kēn dý-na-min – al-la gí-ne-tai ka-ta émp-tō-sin ei-dṓ-lōn

Ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν – οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν ¬ ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδώλων

Dreams do not possess a nature that is divine – nor prophetic power ¬ but they are produced in accordance with the collision of images

ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ὙΠΝΟΣ *sleep*

τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὰ ἐνύπνια	dream	ΕΝΥΠΝΙΟΝ *in sleep*
λαγχάνειν	to obtain (by lot)	ΛΑΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *obtaining by lot*
ἔλαχε	3rd person singular used for neuter plural aorist active indicative "they obtained" ∴ "they possess"	ΕΛΑΧΕ *obtained by lot*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ὁ θεός οἱ θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ *[divine entity]*
θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	ΘΕΙΟΣ *[divine entity]*
ὁ μάντις οἱ μάντεις	prophet	ΜΑΝΤΙΣ *oracle*
μαντικός *(ή, όν)*	prophetic	ΜΑΝΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of an oracle*
τό δυνατόν τὰ δυνατά	what is possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ *power*
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force [here, "power"]	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ περίπτωσις αἱ περιπτώσεις	incident	ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling around*
ἡ ἀντίπτωσις αἱ ἀντιπτώσεις	contrary occurrence	ΑΝΤΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling against*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling into*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*

VS 25. Natural Abundance

hē Pe-ní-a – me-trou-mé-nē tō̂ tē̂s phý-se-ōs té-lei – mé-gas es-ti Ploû-tos:

ἡ Πενία – μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει – μέγας ἐστὶ Πλοῦτος:

Poverty – when measured by the fulfillment of nature – is great Wealth:

Ploû-tos de – mē ho-ri-zó-me-nos – me-gá-lē es-ti Pe-ní-a

Πλοῦτος δὲ – μὴ ὁριζόμενος – μεγάλη ἐστὶ Πενία

but Wealth – when not limited – is great Poverty

ἡ πενία αἱ πενίαι	poverty	ΠΕΝΙΑ *need*
μετρεῖν	to measure	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *measuring*
μετρούμενος *(η, ον)*	measured	ΜΕΤΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *measuring*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	ΜΕΓΑΣ *large*

ὁ πλοῦτος οἱ πλοῦτοι	wealth	ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ *flowing*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
ὁρίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	setting a limit [defining]	ὉΡΙΖΩΝ *separating*
ὁριζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being limited	ὉΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ *separating*

VS 26. Functional Equivalence

Deî di-a-la-beîn hó-ti kai ho polys ló-gos kai ho bra-chys eis to au-to syn-teí-nei

Δεῖ διαλαβεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ πολὺς λόγος καὶ ὁ βραχὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνει

It is necessary to distinguish that both the long argument and the short contribute to the same thing

δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping* *separation*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning [here, "argument"]	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
βραχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ *brief*
τείνειν	to extend	ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *extending*
συντείνειν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *stretching* *together*

VS 27. Pleasure in Learning

e-pi men tôn ál-lōn e-pi-tē-deu-má-tōn, mó-lis te-lei-ō-theî-sin ho Kar-pos ér-che-tai – e-pi de phi-lo-so-phí-as, syn-tré-chei tē̂ gnṓ-sei to Terp-nón:

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, μόλις τελειωθεῖσιν ὁ Καρπὸς ἔρχεται ¬ ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας, συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ Τερπνόν:

for the other occupations, the fruit comes with difficulty from them when they are completed ¬ but for philosophy, what is delightful runs alongside with knowledge:

ou gar me-ta má-thē-sin A-pó-lau-sis – al-la ha-ma Má-thē-sis kai A-pó-lau-sis

οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν Ἀπόλαυσις ¬ ἀλλὰ ἅμα Μάθησις καὶ Ἀπόλαυσις

for the enjoyment is not after learning ¬ but the learning and the benefiting are simultaneous

ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
ἐπιτηδεύειν	to be trained	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΕΙΝ *pursuing* *towards*
τό ἐπιτήδευμα τά ἐπιτηδεύματα	occupation	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΜΑ *pursuing* *towards*

τὸ μάθημα τὰ μαθήματα	profession	ΜΑΘΗΜΑ *the result of learning*
μόλις	with difficulty	ΜΟΛΙΣ *with exertion*
τελεῖν	to fulfill [process-focused]	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
τελεσθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	fulfilled	
τελειοῦν	to complete [result-focused]	ΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΝ *completing*
τελειωθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	completed [already]	
ὁ καρπός οἱ καρποί	fruit	ΚΑΡΠΟΣ *harvest*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ *loving knowledge*
συντρέχειν	to run alongside	ΣΥΝΤΡΕΧΕΙΝ *running together*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	
τέρπειν	to delight	ΤΕΡΠΕΙΝ *satisfying*
τερπνός *(ή, όν)*	delightful	ΤΕΡΠΝΟΣ *satisfying*
τὸ τερπνόν τὰ τερπνά	what is delightful	τερπνόν
	Part 2	
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously [here, "simultaneous"], [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
μανθάνειν	to learn	ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *thinking*
ἡ μάθησις αἱ μαθήσεις	[the act of] learning	
ἀπολαύειν	to enjoy +gen	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΕΙΝ *profiting from*
ἡ ἀπόλαυσις αἱ ἀπολαύσεις	enjoyment	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ *process of profiting from*

VS 28. Friendship Moderation

oú-te tous pro-cheí-rous eis phi-lí-an oú-te tous ok-nē-rous Do-ki-mas-té-on:

οὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς Δοκιμαστέον:

One must approve neither of those overly eager for friendship nor of those hesitant:

Deî de kai pa-ra-kin-dy-neû-sai chá-rin phí-li-as

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινδυνεῦσαι χάριν φίλιας

but it is indeed necessary to take some risk on account of friendship

ἡ χείρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ *hand*
χείρων *(ων, ον)*	worse	ΧΕΙΡΩΝ *[work done by]* *hand*
πρόχειρος *(ον)*	overly eager	ΠΡΟΧΕΙΡΟΣ *before* *[work done by]* *hand*
ὁ πρόχειρος οἱ πρόχειροι	the overly eager [man/men]	
ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*
ὀκνηρός *(ά, όν)*	hesitant	ΟΚΝΗΡΟΣ *having the quality* *of sluggish*
ὁ ὀκνηρός οἱ ὀκνηροί	the hesitant [man/men]	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
δοκιμάζειν	to approve of	ΔΟΚΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ *examining*
δοκιμαστέον	one must approve of	ΔΟΚΙΜΑΣΤΕΟΝ *examining*
κινδυνεύειν	to take a risk	ΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΥΕΙΝ *making a venture*
παρακινδυνεύειν	to take some risk	ΠΑΡΑΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΥΕΙΝ *partially* *making a venture*
παρακινδυνεῦσαι	to have taken some risk [here, gnomic "to take some risk"]	
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
χάριν	on account of prepositional use (with genitive)	ΧΑΡΙΝ *being cheerful*

VS 29. Honesty Over Popularity

par-rhē-sí-ā, gar É-gō-ge, chrṓ-me-nos – phy-si-o-lo-gôn – chrēs-mọ̄-deîn ta sym-phé-ron-ta pâ-sin an-thrṓ-pois mâl-lon an bou-loí-mēn (kan Mē-deis mél-lẹ̄ sy-nḗ-sein) – ē, syn-ka-ta-ti-thé-me-nos taîs dó-xais, par-poûs-thai ton pyk-non pa-ra-píp-ton-ta pa-ra tôn pol-lôn é-pai-non

παρρησίᾳ, γὰρ Ἔγωγε, χρώμενος – φυσιολογῶν – χρησμῳδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἂν βουλοίμην (κἂν Μηδεὶς μέλλῃ συνήσειν) ¬ ἤ, συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις, παρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον

for, using frankness, indeed I – while studying nature – would more wish to chant out oracles about what is mutually benefiting to all people (even if no one is going to put it together) ¬ rather than, while fully assenting to *[their]* judgments, to attend to the dense praise that happens to fall from the many

ἡ παρρησία αἱ παρρησίαι	frankness	ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ *state of being* *said alongside*
ἔγωγε	I indeed	ΕΓΩΓΕ *myself*
χρῆναι	to be necessary	ΧΡΗΝΑΙ *necessary*

χρώμενος (η, ον)	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *necessary*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning of producing*
φυσιολογεῖν	to study nature	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ
φυσιολογῶν	studying nature	
ὁ χρησμός οἱ χρησμοί	oracle [oracular response]	ΧΡΗΣΜΟΣ *oracle*
χρησμῳδεῖν	to chant out oracles about	ΧΡΗΣΜΩΔΕΙΝ *oracle song*
τὸ συμφέρον τὰ συμφέροντα	what is mutually benefiting	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ *bringing together*
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "all"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ *very*
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ *wishing*
μηδείς (μηδεμία, μηδέν)	no one [modal]	ΜΗΔΕΙΣ *not one*
μέλλειν	to be about to do [here, "is going"]	ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ *going to*
συνιέναι	to put it together [i.e. understand]	ΣΥΝΙΕΝΑΙ *sending together*
συνήσειν	to put it together [in the future]	ΣΥΝΗΣΕΙΝ *will send together*
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
συνκατατίθεσθαι	to fully assent	ΣΥΝΚΑΤΑΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ *thoroughly placing together*
συνκατατιθέμενος (η, ον)	fully assenting	
τὸ δοξαζόμενον τὰ δοξαζόμενα	[Δ] what is judged	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of seeming*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
παρεῖναι	to be present	ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ *being beside*
παρποῦσθαι = παροῦσθαι	to be for oneself [i.e., to attend]	
πυκνός (ή, όν)	dense	ΠΥΚΝΟΣ *compacting*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
παραπίπτειν	to happen to fall	ΠΑΡΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling beside*
παραπίπτων (ουσα, ον)	happens to fall	
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
Πολύαινος	Polyaenus	ΠΟΛΥΑΙΝΟΣ *much praise*
ὁ ἔπαινος οἱ ἔπαινοι	praise	ΕΠΑΙΝΟΣ *praise upon*

VS 30. Deadly Remedy of Birth

Attributed to Metrodorus.

he-toi-má-zon-taí Ti-nes dia bí-ou ta pros ton bí-on – ou sy-no-rôn-tes hōs pâ-sin hē-mîn tha-ná-si-mon en-ké-chy-tai to tēs ge-né-se-ōs phár-ma-kon

ἑτοιμάζονταί Τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ¬ οὐ συνορῶντες ὡς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν θανάσιμον ἐγκέχυται τὸ τῆς γενέσεως φάρμακον

Some people make ready through life the things for their life ¬ not fully seeing that for all of us the remedy of creation that had been poured in is deadly

"Some people make ready through life the things for their life" i.e., fully preparing and having things while alive ¬ but not fully using and enjoying those things while alive.

ἑτοῖμος *(ίμη, ῖμον)*	made ready	
ἑτοιμάζειν	to make ready	**ἙΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*
συνορῶν *(ῶσα)*	fully seeing [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ** *seen together*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
θανάσιμος *(ον)*	deadly	**ΘΑΝΑΣΙΜΟΣ**
ἐγχεῖν	to pour in	**ΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *pouring in*
ἐγκέχυται	perfect passive indicative 3rd singular had been poured in	**ΕΓΚΕΧΥΤΑΙ** *poured into*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
τὸ φάρμακον **τὰ φάρμακα**	remedy	**ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΝ** *drug*

VS 31. Defenseless Against Death

pros men tâl-la, Dy-na-ton as-phá-lei-an po-rí-sas-thai ¬ chá-rin de tha-ná-tou, pán-tes Án-thrō-poi pó-lin a-teí-chis-ton oi-koû-men

πρὸς μὲν τἆλλα, Δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι ¬ χάριν δὲ θανάτου, πάντες Ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον Οἰκοῦμεν

in regards to other things, it is possible to bring about stability for oneself ¬ but on account of death, we humans inhabit a city without walls

ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
τἆλλα = **τὰ ἄλλα**	the other things	
ἡ ἀσφάλεια **αἱ ἀσφάλειαι**	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	**ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ** *not stumbling*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
πορίζειν	to bring about	**ΠΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *piercing*
πορίσασθαι	to bring about for oneself	**ΠΟΡΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ** *piercing*
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	grace	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *being cheerful*

χάριν	on account of prepositional use (with genitive)	**ΧΑΡΙΝ** *being cheerful*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
ἡ πόλις **αἱ πόλεις**	city	**ΠΟΛΙΣ** *fortified high place / city*
τὸ τεῖχος **τὰ τείχη**	wall	
ἀτείχιστος *(ον)*	without walls	**ΑΤΕΙΧΙΣΤΟΣ** *absolutely no walls*
ἡ οἰκονομία **αἱ οἰκονομίαι**	household management	**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ** *managing the home*
οἰκεῖν	to inhabit	**ΟΙΚΕΙΝ** *the home*

VS 32. Benefit of Veneration

ho toû so-phoû Se-bas-mos a-ga-thon mé-ga tō̂ se-bo-mé-nō es-tí

ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ Σεβασμὸς ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί

the Veneration of a wise man is a great good for the venerator

ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
σέβεσθαι	to venerate	**ΣΕΒΕΣΘΑΙ** *revering*
ἡ σέβασις **αἱ σεβάσεις**	venerating	**ΣΕΒΑΣΙΣ** *revering*
ὁ σεβασμός **οἱ σεβασμοί**	veneration	**ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΣ** *result of revering*
ὁ σεβόμενος **οἱ σεβόμενοι**	venerator	**ΣΕΒΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *agent of revering*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	**ΜΕΓΑΣ** *large*

VS 33. Zeus' Wellbeing

sar-kos Phō-nē "to mē pei-nên, to mē dip-sên, to mē rhi-goûn!" – taû-ta gar é-chōn Tis (kai el-pí-zōn hé-xein) kan Di-i hy-per eu-dai-mo-ní-as ma-ché-sai-to

σαρκὸς Φωνὴ "τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν!" – ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων Τις (καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν) κἂν Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο

the statement of the flesh is "not craving, not thirsting, not being cold!" – for someone having (and hoping to have) these things could contend even with Zeus in regard to wellbeing

ἡ σάρξ **αἱ σάρκες**	flesh	**ΣΑΡΞ** *flesh*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
πεινᾶν	to crave	**ΠΕΙΝΑΝ** *hungering*
τὸ πεινᾶν	craving	

ἡ δίψα **αἱ δίψαι**	thirst	**ΔΙΨΑ** *dry / parched*
διψῆν	to be thirsty	**ΔΙΨΗΝ** *dry / parched*
τὸ διψῆν	thirsting	
τὸ ῥῖγος **τὰ ῥίγη**	[the state of] being cold	**ῬΙΓΟΣ** *shivering*
ῥιγοῦν	to be cold	**ῬΙΓΟΥΝ** *shivering*
τὸ ῥιγοῦν	[the act of] being cold	
ἡ ἐλπίς **αἱ ἐλπίδες**	hope	**ΕΛΠΙΣ** *expecting*
ἐλπίζειν	to hope	**ΕΛΠΙΖΕΙΝ** *expecting*
ἐλπίζων	hoping	
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἕξειν	to have [in the future]	**ἙΞΕΙΝ** *will hold*
ὁ Ζεύς (**τοῦ διός**)	Zeus	**ΖΕΥΣ** *sky god / day*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*

VS 34. Use of Friends

oukh oú-tōs chreí-an É-cho-men tês chreí-as tês pa-ra tôn phí-lōn – hōs tês pís-te-ōs tês pe-ri tês chreí-as

οὐχ οὕτως χρείαν Ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας τῆς παρὰ τῶν φίλων – ὡς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρείας

we do not so much have use for the use of friends – as much as for the belief in regards to their use

ἡ χρεία **αἱ χρεῖαι**	use	**ΧΡΕΙΑ** *necessary*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ὁ φίλος **οἱ φίλοι**	friend	**ΦΙΛΟΣ** *loving*
ἡ πίστις **αἱ πίστεις**	belief [based on experience]	**ΠΙΣΤΙΣ** *trust*

VS 35. Gratitude Over Desire

ou Deî ly-maí-nes-thai ta pa-rón-ta tôn a-pón-tōn e-pi-thy-mí-ạ̄ – all' e-pi-lo-gí-zes-thai hó-ti kai taû-ta tôn euk-taî-ōn ên

οὐ Δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμίᾳ ¬ ἀλλ' ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν

It is not necessary to ruin what is present by the desire for what is absent ¬ but instead to inductively consider that these things also were among what was wished-for

δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*

ἡ λύμη αἱ λύμαι	ruin	ΛΥΜΗ *quality of loosening*
λυμαίνεσθαι	to ruin + acc. thing / to bring ruin to + dat. person	ΛΥΜΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *quality of loosening*
πάρειναι	to be present	ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ *to be beside*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ *to be beside*
ἄπειναι	to be absent	ΑΠΕΙΝΑΙ *to be away*
ἀπών *(οὖσα, όν)*	absent	ΑΠΩΝ
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning action upon*
εὔχεσθαι	to wish for	ΕΥΧΕΣΘΑΙ *praying for good*
εὐκταῖος *(α, ον)*	wished-for	ΕΥΚΤΑΙΟΣ *praying for good*

VS 36. A Model Life

ho E-pi-koú-rou Bí-os, toîs tôn ál-lōn syn-kri-nó-me-nos – hé-ne-ken hē-me-ró-tē-tos kai au-tar-kei-as – mŷ-thos án no-mis-theí-ē

ὁ Ἐπικούρου Βίος, τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος – ἕνεκεν ἡμερότητος καὶ αὐταρκείας – μῦθος ἄν νομισθείη

the life of Epicurus, when compared with those of others – because of his gentleness and self-sufficiency – might be considered a myth

Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ *running toward [to assist]*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
ἐπικρίνειν	to discriminate	ΕΠΙΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *dividing upon*
συγκρίνειν	to compare	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *dividing together*
συγκρινόμενος *(η, ον)*	[being] compared	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *dividing together*
χάριν	on account of prepositional use (with genitive)	ΧΑΡΙΝ *being cheerful*
ἕνεκεν	because of	ἩΝΕΚΕΝ *[unknown]*
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ *day*
ἡ ἡμερότης αἱ ἡμερότητες	gentleness	ἩΜΕΡΟΤΗΣ *condition from soft / tame*
αὐτοτελῶς	independently	ΑΥΤΟΤΕΛΩΣ *self-goal*

αὐτάρκης *(ες)*	self-sufficient	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ** *self-sufficing*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια **αἱ αὐτάρκειαι**	self-sufficiency	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ** *state of self-sufficing*
μυθώδης *(ης, ες)*	mythical	**ΜΥΘΩΔΗΣ** *full of speech / word*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
νομισθείη	3rd singular aorist optative passive might be considered	

VS 37. Natural Vulnerability

as-the-nēs hē Phý-sis es-ti pros to ka-kón – ou pros to a-ga-thón: hē-do-naîs men gar sṓ-ze-tai ¬ al-gē-dó-si de di-a-lý-e-tai

ἀσθενὴς ἡ Φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ κακόν – οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν: ἡδοναῖς μὲν γὰρ σῴζεται ¬ ἀλγηδόσι, δὲ, διαλύεται

Nature is weak towards what is bad – not towards what is good: for by pleasures it is saved ¬ by pains, however, it is fully dissolved

ἀσθενής *(ές)*	weak	**ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ** *not strength*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
τὸ κακόν **τὰ κακά**	what is bad	**ΚΑΚΟΝ** *harmful*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
τὸ ἀγαθόν **τὰ ἀγαθά**	what is good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΝ** *great*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	**ἩΔΕΩΣ** *sweet*
ἡδύς *(ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)*	pleasant	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
διασῴζειν	to preserve	**ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ** *fully saving*
σῴζειν	to save	**ΣΩΖΕΙΝ** **ΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ** *saving*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** *being in pain*
τὸ ἀλγεινόν **τὰ ἀλγεινά**	what is painful	**ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΝ** *pain*
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *the state pain*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	**ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ** *fully dissolving*

VS 38. Appreciating Life

mik-ros pan-tá-pa-sin – hô pol-lai Ai-tí-ai eú-lo-goi eis e-xa-gō-gēn bí-ou

μικρὸς παντάπασιν – ᾧ πολλαὶ Αἰτίαι εὔλογοι εἰς ἐξαγωγὴν βίου

he is small in all respects – for whom there are many reasonable causes for life's departure

μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
τὸ σύμπαν **τὰ σύμπαντα**	the entirety	**ΣΥΜΠΑΝ** *all together*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	**ἍΠΑΣ** *all together*
παντάπασιν	in all respects	**ΠΑΝΤΑΠΑΣΙΝ** *all together all*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning [here, "argument"]	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
εὔλογος *(ον)*	reasonable	**ΕΥΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning well*
ἡ ἐπαγωγή **αἱ ἐπαγωγαί**	reference [to observation]	**ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ** *result of going toward*
ἡ ἀγωγή **αἱ ἀγωγαί**	guidance	**ΑΓΩΓΗ** *going*
ἡ ἐξαγωγή **αἱ ἐξαγωγαί**	departure	**ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗ** *going out*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	life / lifestyle	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*

VS 39. Balanced Support

oúth' Ho tēn chreí-an e-pi-zē-tôn di-a pan-tos phí-los – oúth' Ho mē-dé-po-te sy-náp-tōn:

οὔθ' Ὁ τὴν χρείαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος ¬ οὔθ' Ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων:

neither he who always pursues help is a friend ¬ nor he who never connects:

Ho men gar ka-pē-leú-ei tệ chá-ri-ti tēn a-moi-bēn – Ho de a-po-kóp-tei tēn pe-ri toû mél-lon-tos eu-el-pis-tí-an

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν – Ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν

for the one barters *[your]* grace for a payment – but the other cuts off the good hopefulness about the future

ἡ χρῆσις **αἱ χρήσεις**	usage	**ΧΡΗΣΙΣ** *the process of necessary*
ἡ χρεία **αἱ χρεῖαι**	use [here, "help"]	**ΧΡΕΙΑ** *necessary*
ἐπιζητεῖν	to pursue	**ΕΠΙΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seek after*
ἐπιζητῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	pursuing	
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole [here, "all"]	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
διὰ παντὸς	always	
ὁ φίλος **οἱ φίλοι**	friend	**ΦΙΛΟΣ** *loving*

μηδέποτε	never	**ΜΗΔΕΠΟΤΕ** *but not ever*
συνάπτειν	to connect	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening together*
	Part 2	
ὁ/ἡ **κάπηλος** οἱ/αἱ **κάπηλοι**	retail dealer	**ΚΑΠΗΛΟΣ** *huckster*
καπηλεύειν	to barter [dative] for [accusative]	**ΚΑΠΗΛΕΥΕΙΝ** *huckster*
χαῖρων *(ουσα, ον)*	rejoicing	**ΧΑΙΡΩΝ** *being cheerful*
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	grace	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *being cheerful*
ἡ ἀμοιβή **αἱ ἀμοιβαί**	payment	**ΑΜΟΙΒΗ** *exchanging back*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating against*
ἀποκόπτειν	to cut off	**ΑΠΟΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating away*
μέλλειν	to be about to do	**ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *going to*
μέλλων *(οῦσα, ον)*	being about to do	
τὸ μέλλον **τὰ μέλλοντα**	the future [lit. "what is about to happen"]	
ἡ ἐλπίς **αἱ ἐλπίδες**	hope	**ΕΛΠΙΣ** *expecting*
ἡ εὐελπιστία **αἱ εὐελπιστίαι**	good hopefulness	**ΕΥΕΛΠΙΣΤΙΑ** *expecting good*

VS 40. Irony of Determinism

Ho lé-gōn pán-ta kat' a-nán-kēn gí-nes-thai, ou-den en-ka-leîn é-chei tộ lé-go-nti mē pán-ta kat' a-nán-kēn gí-nes-thai – au-to gar Toû-tó, phē-si, kat' a-nán-kēn gí-nes-thai

Ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι – αὐτὸ γὰρ Τοῦτό, φησι, κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι

He who says that all things are produced by necessity, has nothing to accuse the one who says that all things are not produced by necessity – for this very thing, he asserts, is produced by necessity

λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
λέγων *(ουσα, ον)*	saying	**ΛΕΓΩΝ** *speaking*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	**ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning out*
ἐγκαλεῖν	to accuse	**ΕΓΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning in*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*

VS 41. Balanced Living

ge-lân há-ma Deî kai phi-lo-so-pheîn kai oi-ko-no-meîn kai toîs loi-poîs oi-kei-ṓ-ma-si
chrês-thai – kai mē-da-mê lé-gein – tas ek tês or-thês phi-lo-so-phí-as phō-nas a-phi-én-tas

γελᾶν ἅμα Δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι – καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν – τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας

It is necessary simultaneously to laugh, and to philosophize, and to manage the household, and to use our remaining faculties – and not in any way to stop – while emitting the statements from the right philosophy

γελᾶν	to laugh	**ΓΕΛΑΝ** *deriding*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	**ἉΜΑ** *at once*
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ** *loving knowledge*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ** *loving knowledge*
ἡ οἰκονομία **αἱ οἰκονομίαι**	household management	**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ** *managing the home*
οἰκονομεῖν	to manage the household	**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΕΙΝ** *managing the home*
τὸ οἰκείωμα **τὰ οἰκειώματα**	faculty	**ΟΙΚΕΙΩΜΑ** *result of the home*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
οὐδέν	in no way	**ΟΥΔΕΝ** *not even one*
οὐθαμῇ = **οὐθαμεῖ** = **οὐδαμοῦ**	nowhere	**ΟΥΘΑΜΗΙ** *not in any place*
μηδαμῇ	not in any way	**ΜΗΔΑΜΗ** **ΜΗΔΑΜΗΙ** *but not one*
ἀπολήγειν	to stop from	**ΑΠΟΛΗΓΕΙΝ** *leaving off away from*
λήγειν	to stop	**ΛΗΓΕΙΝ** *leaving off*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	**ΟΡΘΟΣ** *straight upright*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
ἀφιέναι	to emit	**ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ** *send away*
ἀφίων	emitting	**ΑΦΙΩΝ** *send away*

VS 42. Pleasure is the Removal of Pain

ho au-tos Chró-nos kaí ge-né-se-ōs toû me-gís-tou a-ga-thoû kaí a-po-lý-se-ōs ‹toû ka-koû›

ὁ αὐτὸς Χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως ‹τοῦ κακοῦ›

the time of the creation of the greatest good and of the release away of the bad is the same

This statement seems to be a critique of Plato's Philebus, which presents pleasure as **ἡ γένεσις** *(process of creation) and therefore accepts the existence of pleasures that are mixed.*

ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of* *being born*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	**ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ** *biggest*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
ἡ λύσις **αἱ λύσεις**	solution [i.e., explanation]	**ΛΥΣΙΣ** *the process of* *loosening*
ἡ διάλυσις **αἱ διαλύσεις**	dissolution	**ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ** *fully loosening*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	**ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening away*
ἡ ἀπόλυσις **αἱ ἀπολύσεις**	release away	**ΑΠΟΛΥΣΙΣ** *loosening away*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*

VS 43. Greed is Always Unsuitable

Phi-lar-gy-reîn á-di-ka men a-se-bés – dí-kai-a de ais-chrón:

Φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδικα μὲν ἀσεβές ¬ δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν:

To love money from unjust means is impious ¬ but from just means is disgraceful:

a-pre-pes gar rhy-pa-rôs pheí-des-thai – kai me-ta toû di-kaí-ou

ἀπρεπὲς γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς φείδεσθαι – καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου

for it is unsuitable to be filthily sparing – even with what is just

ἡ φιλία **αἱ φιλίαι**	friendship	**ΦΙΛΙΑ** *loving*
ὁ ἄργυρος **οἱ ἄργυροι**	silver / money	**ΑΡΓΥΡΟΣ** *silver* *["shining white"]*
ὁ φιλάργυρος **οἱ φιλάργυροι**	the lover of money	**ΦΙΛΑΡΓΥΡΟΣ** *loving silver*
φιλαργυρεῖν	to love money	**ΦΙΛΑΡΓΥΡΕΙΝ** *loving silver*
ἄδικος *(ον)*	unjust	**ΑΔΙΚΟΣ** *not* *custom / right*
τὸ ἄδικον **τὰ ἄδικα**	what is unjust	
ἄδικα	from unjust means	
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
δίκαια	from just means	
σέβεσθαι	to venerate	**ΣΕΒΕΣΘΑΙ** *revering*
ὁ σεβασμός **οἱ σεβασμοί**	veneration	**ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΣ** *result of* *revering*

ἀσεβής *(ές)*	impious	ΑΣΕΒΗΣ *not revering*
τὸ αἶσχος τὰ αἴσχη	disgrace	ΑΙΣΧΟΣ *base / ugly*
αἰσχρός *(ά, όν)*	disgraceful	ΑΙΣΧΡΟΣ *base / ugly*
μεγαλοπρεπής *(ές)*	magnificent	ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΡΕΠΗΣ *appearing proper* *[for one who is] great*
πρέπειν	to be suitable	ΠΡΕΠΕΙΝ *appearing proper*
ἀπρεπής	unsuitable	ΑΠΡΕΠΗΣ *not appearing proper*
ῥυπαρός	filthy	ῬΥΠΑΡΟΣ *dirty*
ῥυπαρῶς	filthily	ῬΥΠΑΡΩΣ *in a dirty way*
φείδεσθαι	to be sparing	ΦΕΙΔΕΣΘΑΙ *refraining*
ἡ δικαιοσύνη αἱ δικαιοσύναι	justice	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ *condition of custom / right*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
τὸ δίκαιον τὰ δίκαια	what is just	

VS 44. Self-Sufficiency

Ho so-phos, eis ta a-nan-kaî-a syn-kri-theis, mâl-lon e-pís-ta-tai me-ta-di-dó-nai ē me-ta-lam-bán-ein – tē-li-koû-ton au-tar-keí-as heû-re thē-sau-rón

Ὁ σοφός, εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκριθείς, μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν – τηλικοῦτον αὐταρκείας εὗρε θησαυρόν

The wise man, having adjusted himself with the necessary things, understands more how to give a share than to take a share – so great a treasure of self-sufficiency he discovered

σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ *necessity*
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ ἀναγκαῖα	what is necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ *necessity*
συγκρίνειν	to compare	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *dividing together*
συγκρινόμενος *(η, ον)*	[being] compared	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *dividing together*
συγκριθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	[having been] compared [here, "having adjusted himself"]	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ *dividing together*
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ *very*
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ *standing upon*
διδόναι	to give	ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving*
μεταδιδόναι	to give a share	ΜΕΤΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving*
συμμεταλαμβάνειν	to partake [lit. "to take a share together"]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping change together*

μεταλαμβάνειν	to take a share	**ΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping change*
τηλικοῦτος *(η, ον)*	of [such a] magnitude	**ΤΗΛΙΚΟΥΤΟΣ** *extent*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια **αἱ αὐτάρκειαι**	self-sufficiency	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ** *state of self-sufficing*
εὑρίσκειν	to discover	**ΈΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *finding*
ὁ θησαυρός **οἱ θησαυροί**	treasure	**ΘΗΣΑΥΡΟΣ** *vault / repository*

VS 45. Quiet Confidence

ou kom-pous, ou-de phō-nês er-gas-ti-kous, ou-de tēn pe-ri-má-chē-ton pa-ra toîs pol-loîs pai-deí-an en-dei-kny-mé-nous Phy-si-ol-o-gí-a pa-ras-keu-áz-ei – al-la so-ba-rous kai au-tár-keis kai e-pi toîs i-dí-ois a-ga-thoîs – ouk e-pi toîs tôn prag-má-tōn mé-ga phro-noûn-tas

οὐ κομποὺς, οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικοὺς, οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν ἐνδεικνυμένους Φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει ¬ ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς – οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονοῦντας

Natural science provides neither men who are boasters, nor productive of discourse, nor showing themselves to be involved in the education that is much-contested among the public ¬ but rather serious and also self-sufficient in their own particular goods – while not greatly considering things among the [*current*] situations

ὁ κόμπος **οἱ κόμποι**	boaster	**ΚΟΜΠΟΣ** *noise*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement [here, "discourse"]	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of working within*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
ἐργαστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	**ΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of work*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
περιμάχητος *(ον)*	much-contested	**ΠΕΡΙΜΑΧΗΤΟΣ** *combating around*
τὸ παιδίον **τὰ παιδία**	child	**ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ** *child*
ἡ παιδεία **αἱ παιδεῖαι**	education	**ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ** *child*
δείκνυναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ** *showing in*
ἐνδεικνύμενος	indicated in [here, middle, "showing oneself to be involved in"]	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *showing in*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
σοβαρός *(ά, όν)*	serious	**ΣΟΒΑΡΟΣ** *weighty / grave*

ἡ αὐτάρκεια αἱ αὐτάρκειαι	self-sufficiency	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ *state of* *self-sufficing*
αὐτάρκης *(ες)*	self-sufficient	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ *self-sufficing*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*
ἑτεροφρονεῖν	to hold opposing opinions	ἩΤΕΡΟΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *different mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind*
φρονῶν	considering	ΦΡΟΝΩΝ *mind*

VS 46. Chase Away Base Habits

tas phaú-las sy-nē-theí-as – hṓs-per án-dras po-nē-rous po-lyn chró-non mé-ga
bláp-san-tas – te-leí-ōs Ek-di-ṓ-ko-men

τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας – ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντας – τελείως Ἐκδιώκομεν

base habits – just as troublesome men who for a long time have greatly harmed [*us*] – we chase away completely

φαῦλος *(η, ον)*	base	ΦΑΥΛΟΣ *common / easy*
ἡ εὐήθεια αἱ εὐήθειαι	sincerity (naivety)	ΕΥΗΘΕΙΑ *good character*
ἡ συνήθεια αἱ συνήθειαι	habit	ΣΥΝΗΘΕΙΑ *character* *together*
ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ *engraving*
ὁ ἀνήρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ *man*
ἡ ἀπονία αἱ ἀπονίαι	non-suffering	ΑΠΟΝΙΑ *no toil*
τό πονοῦν τὰ πονοῦντα	what suffers	ΠΟΝΟΥΝ *being in toil*
ὁ πόνος οἱ πόνοι	suffering	ΠΟΝΟΣ *toil*
πονηρός *(ά, όν)*	troublesome	ΠΟΝΗΡΟΣ *toil*
δύσκολος	discontenting	ΔΥΣΚΟΛΟΣ *hard bile*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	ΜΕΓΑΣ *large*
βλάπτειν	to harm	ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ *hindering*
ἡ βλάβη αἱ βλάβαι	harm	ΒΛΑΒΗ *hindering*
βλάψας *(ασα, αν)*	[having] harmed	ΒΛΑΨΑΣ *hindered*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*

τελείως	completely	
ἐκδιώκειν	chase away	ΕΚΔΙΩΚΕΙΝ *chasing away*

VS 47. Defiance of Chance

Attributed to Metrodorus.

Pro-ka-teí-lēm-maí se – Ô Tý-chē! – kai pâ-san sēn pa-reís-dy-sin e-né-phra-xa

Προκατείλημμαί σε – ὦ Τύχη! – καὶ πᾶσαν σὴν παρείσδυσιν ἐνέφραξα

I have thoroughly anticipated you – O Chance! – and I obstructed all your infiltration

kai oú-te soi oú-te al-lệ ou-de-mí-ạ pe-ri-stá-sei Dố-so-men he-au-tous ek-dó-tous – all' hó-tan hē-mâs to Chre-ōn e-xá-gē:

καὶ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε ἀλλῇ οὐδεμίᾳ περιστάσει Δώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδότους ¬ ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμᾶς τὸ Χρεὼν ἐξάγη:

and neither to you nor to any other circumstance will we give ourselves as given up ¬ but whenever what must happen leads us out:

mé-ga pros-ptú-san-tes tộ zên kai toîs au-tộ ke-nôs pe-ri-plat-to-mé-nois – Á-pi-men ek toû zên me-ta ka-loû pai-ô-nos, e-pi-phō-noûn-tes hōs [eû] hē-mîn be-bí-ō-tai!

μέγα προσπτύσαντες τῷ ζῆν καὶ τοῖς αὐτῷ κενῶς περιπλαττομένοις –Ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος, ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς [εὖ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται!

having greatly spat on living and on those who are enwrapped in it in vain – we go out of living with a correct song, exclaiming that it has been lived [*well*] for us!

Version in the Vaticanus Graecus 1950 Manuscript

–Ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ πλείονος, ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς [εὖ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται

– we go out of life with more [of the] good, exclaiming that it has been lived [*well*] for us

καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly grasping*
προλαμβάνειν	to anticipate	ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping before*
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
προκαταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly anticipate	ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly grasping before*
προκατειληφέναι	to have thoroughly anticipated	ΠΡΟΚΑΤΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ *thoroughly grasped before*
εὐτυχεῖν	to be prosperous	ΕΥΤΥΧΕΙΝ *happening well*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
τὸ τυχόν τὰ τυχόντα	what happens [to come] to be	ΤΥΧΟΝ *coming to be*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
σός (*σή, σόν*)	your	ΣΟΣ *you*

ἡ παρείσδυσις αἱ παρεισδύσεις	infiltration	ΠΑΡΕΙΣΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking beside into*
ἐμφρᾶσαι	to obstruct [already]	ΕΜΦΡΑΣΑΙ *blocked in*
	Part 2	
οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [here, "any one"]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἡ περίστασις αἱ περιστάσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing around*
διδόναι	to give	ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving*
ἐκδοτός *(ή, όν)*	given up	ΕΚΔΟΤΟΣ *given out*
τὸ χρεών τὰ χρεών	what must happen [i.e., "the inevitable"]	ΧΡΕΩΝ *necessary*
ἐξάγειν	to lead out	ΕΞΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going out*
	Part 3	
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	ΜΕΓΑΣ *large*
μέγα	greatly	
προσπτύειν	spit on	ΠΡΟΣΠΤΥΕΙΝ *[onomatopoeic] upon*
τὸ ζῆν	[the act of] living	
κενῶς	in vain	ΚΕΝΩΣ *emptiness*
πλάττειν	to mold	ΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *forming*
περιπλάττειν	to enwrap	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *forming around*
περιπλαττόμενος *(η, ον)*	enwrapped	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ *forming around*
ἀπιέναι	to go way	ΑΠΙΕΝΑΙ *going away*
καλός *(ή, όν)*	correct / beautiful	ΚΑΛΟΣ *lovely*
ὁ παιών οἱ παιῶνες	song	ΠΑΙΩΝ *hymn*
ἐπιφωνεῖν	to exclaim	ΕΠΙΦΩΝΕΙΝ *speaking over*
βεβιωκέναι	to have lived [already]	ΒΕΒΙΩΚΕΝΑΙ *lived*

VS 48. Improving Life's Journey

pei-râs-thai tēn hy-sté-rān tês pro-té-ras kreít-tō poi-eîn – hé-ōs an en ho-dô Ô-men:

πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑστέρᾱν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιεῖν – ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ Ὦμεν:

[*it is necessary*] to attempt to make the later more advantageous than the former – as long as we are on the course:

e-pei-dan d' e-pì pé-ras Él-thō-men – ho-ma-lôs eu-phraí-nes-thai

ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπὶ πέρας Ἔλθωμεν – ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι

but whenever we come to the end – to rejoice evenly

πειρᾶσθαι	to attempt	ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ *trail / attempt*
ὕστερος *(α, ον)*	after	῾ΥΣΤΕΡΟΣ *next*

ὕστερον *(ᾱ, ον)*	afterwards	**ὝΣΤΕΡΟΝ** *next*
ὕστερος *(ᾱ, ον)*	the latter [lit. "the afterwards"]	substantive use here feminine, agreeing with **ὁδός**
κρατεῖν	to prevail	**ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ** *power*
κρείττων *(ων, ον)*	more advantageous	**ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ** *powerful*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἕως	as long as	**ἝΩΣ** *until*
ἡ ὁδός **αἱ ὁδοί**	course	**ΟΔΟΣ** *road*
ἐπειδὰν = **ἐπειδὴ ἄν**	whenever	**ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ** *since if*
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit [here, "the end"]	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	**ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	even	**ὉΜΑΛΟΣ** *same* *floor / ground*
ὁμαλῶς	evenly	
εὐφραίνειν	to become glad	**ΕΥΦΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *good mind*

VS 51. Managing Passion

Pyn-thá-no-maí, sou, tēn ka-ta sár-ka kí-nē-sin aph-tho-nṓ-te-ron di-a-keîs-thai pros tēn tōn A-phro-di-sí-ōn én-teu-xin

Πυνθάνομαί, σου, τὴν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀφροδισίων ἔντευξιν

I learn that, for you, the movement according to the flesh is more abundantly disposed toward an encounter with Aphrodisian activities

Su de, hó-tan mḗ-te tous nó-mous ka-ta-lý-ēs ¬ mḗ-te ta ka-lôs é-thē keî-me-na ki-nęs ¬ mḗ-te tōn plē-sí-on ti-na lu-pęs ¬ mḗ-te tēn sár-ka ka-ta-xaí-nęs ¬ mḗ-te ta a-nang-kaî-a ka-ta-na-lís-kęs: Khrô, hōs Boú-lei, tę̂ se-au-toû pro-ai-ré-sei

Σὺ δὲ, ὅταν μήτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύῃς ¬ μήτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθη κείμενα κινῇς ¬ μήτε τῶν πλησίον τινὰ λυπῇς ¬ μήτε τὴν σάρκα καταξαίνῃς ¬ μήτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκῃς: Χρῶ, ὡς Βούλει, τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει

but you, whenever you neither overturn the laws ¬ nor move the customs that are correctly established ¬ nor distress any of those nearby ¬ nor wear down the flesh ¬ nor totally expend the necessary things: use, as you want, your own choice

a-mḗ-cha-non, mén-toi ge, To mē ouch he-ní gé ti-na toú-tōn su-né-ches-thai: A-phro-dí-si-a gar ou-dé-po-te ṓ-nē-sen ¬ a-ga-pē-ton de, mē é-blap-sen

ἀμήχανον, μέντοι γε, Τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἑνί γέ τινα τούτων συνέχεσθαι: Ἀφροδίσια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν ¬ ἀγαπητὸν δὲ μὴ ἔβλαψεν

nevertheless, it is unmanageable that certain of these are not constricted by even a single thing: for Aphrodisian activities never benefited ¬ but they are welcome if they do not harm

μανθάνειν	to learn	**ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *thinking*
πυνθάνεσθαι	to learn [by asking]	**ΠΥΝΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *learning*

ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
ἡ ἀφθονία αἱ ἀφθονίαι	lack of scarcity [i.e., abundance]	ΑΦΘΟΝΙΑ *not scarcity / rarity*
ἄφθονος *(ον)*	abundant	ΑΦΘΟΝΟΣ *not scarcity / rarity*
ἀφθονώτερος *(α, ον)*	more abundant	ΑΦΘΟΝΩΤΕΡΟΣ *more not scarcity / rarity*
ἀφθονώτερον	more abundantly	
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting*
ὑπόκεισθαι	to underlie	῾ΥΠΟΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting under*
διακεῖσθαι	to be disposed [towards]	ΔΙΑΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting through*
ἀφροδίσιος	Aphrodisian	ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΟΣ *of Aphrodite*
τὰ ἀφροδίσια	Aphrodisian activities	ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΑ *of Aphrodite*
ἡ ἔντευξις αἱ ἐντεύξεις	encounter	ΕΝΤΕΥΞΙΣ *meeting within*
	Part 2	
ὁ νόμος οἱ νόμοι	law	ΝΟΜΟΣ *allotting*
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *fully dissolving*
καταλύειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΛΥΕΙΝ *thoroughly dissolving*
καλός *(ή, όν)*	correct / beautiful	ΚΑΛΟΣ *lovely*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *lovely*
εἰθισμένος *(η, ον)*	accustomed	ΕΙΘΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *accustomed action*
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ *accustomed action*
ἐθίζειν	to accustom	ΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action*
τὸ ἔθος τὰ ἔθη	custom	ΕΘΟΣ *accustomed*
κείμενος	situated / lying [here, "established"]	ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated*
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ *moving*
πλησίον	nearby	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ *near*
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
ὁ πλησίον οἱ πλησίον	the one nearby	
τὸ λυπούμενον τὰ λυπούμενα	what distresses	ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *vexation*
λυπεῖν	to distress	ΛΥΠΕΙΝ *vexation*

καταξαίνειν	to wear down	ΚΑΤΑΞΑΙΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly scraping*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ *necessity*
καταναλίσκειν	to totally expend	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ *in the state of taking thoroughly up / away*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ *wishing*
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ *wishing*
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping before*
προαιρεῖσθαι	to choose [for oneself]	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ *grasping before*
ἡ προαίρεσις αἱ προαιρέσεις	choice	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ *grasping before*
	Part 3	
μηχανᾶσθαι	to construct	ΜΗΧΑΝΑΣΘΑΙ *device*
ἀμηχανεῖν	to have no means	ΑΜΗΧΑΝΕΙΝ *no device*
ἀμήχανος *(ον)*	unmanageable	ΑΜΗΧΑΝΟΣ *no device*
μέντοι	never-the-less	ΜΕΝΤΟΙ *indeed surely*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	῾ΕΙΣ ΜΙΑ ῾ΕΝ *one*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	῾ΟΥΤΟΣ *this*
συνέχειν	to keep united	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ *holding together*
συνέχεσθαι	to be constricted	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *holding together*
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ *not even at some point*
ὠνεῖν	to benefit	ΩΝΕΙΝ *profiting*
ἀγαπητός *(ή, όν)*	welcome	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ *beloved / dear*
ἡ βλάβη αἱ βλάβαι	harm	ΒΛΑΒΗ *hindering*
βλάπτειν	to harm	ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ *hindering*

VS 52. Joy of Friendship

hē Philía perichoreúei tēn oikouménēn, kērúttousa dē pâsin hēmîn egeíresthai epì tòn makarismón

ἡ Φιλία περιχορεύει τὴν οἰκουμένην, κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν

Friendship dances around the inhabited world, proclaiming indeed to all of us to be awakened to the hailing toward blessing

ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*

περιχορεύειν	to dance around	ΠΕΡΙΧΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *chorus dance around*
οἰκονομεῖν	to manage the household	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΕΙΝ *managing the home*
οἰκεῖν	to inhabit	ΟΙΚΕΙΝ *the home*
ἡ οἰκουμένη αἱ οἰκουμέναι	inhabited world	ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΗ *having been the home*
κηρύττειν	to proclaim	ΚΗΡΥΤΤΕΙΝ *heralding*
ἐγείρειν	to awaken	ΕΓΕΙΡΕΙΝ *rousing / raising*
ἐγείρεσθαι	to be awakened	ΕΓΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ *rousing / raising*
μακαρίζειν	to bless	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΖΕΙΝ *greatness action*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ *greatness*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
μακαριστός *(ή, όν)*	considered blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ *considered to have greatness*
ὁ μακαρισμός οἱ μακαρισμοί		ΜΑΚΑΡΙΣΜΟΣ *considered to have greatness*

VS 53. Futility of Resentment

oudenì Phthonētéon: Agathoì gàr ouk áxioi phthónou – Ponēroì dè, hósǭ an mâllon eutychôsi – tosoútǭ mâllon hautoîs lymaínontai

οὐδενὶ Φθονητέον: Ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιοι φθόνου ¬ Πονηροὶ δὲ, ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον εὐτυχῶσι – τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὑτοῖς λυμαίνονται

One ought to bear resentment towards no one: for the good are not deserving of resentment ¬ but the troublesome, in as much as they may be more prosperous – by so much the greater they bring ruin to themselves

οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἄφθονος *(ον)*	abundant	ΑΦΘΟΝΟΣ *not envy*
ἀφθονώτερος *(α, ον)*	more abundant	ΑΦΘΟΝΩΤΕΡΟΣ *more not envy*
φθονεῖν	to have resentment [towards]	ΦΘΟΝΕΙΝ *scarcity / rarity*
φθονητέος *(α, ον)*	one ought to have resentment [towards]	ΦΘΟΝΗΤΕΟΣ *scarcity / rarity*
ὁ φθόνος οἱ φθόνοι	resentment	ΦΘΟΝΟΣ *scarcity / rarity*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
ὁ πόνος οἱ πόνοι	suffering	ΠΟΝΟΣ *toil*

πονηρός (ά, όν)	troublesome	ΠΟΝΗΡΟΣ toil
ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ however great
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ very
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ happening
εὐτυχεῖν	to be prosperous	ΕΥΤΥΧΕΙΝ happening well
τοσοῦτος (τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)	so long (so great)	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ this so much
αὐτοτελῶς	independently	ΑΥΤΟΤΕΛΩΣ self-goal
ἑαυτός (ή, όν)	oneself	ἙΑΥΤΟΣ own self
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ loosening
ἡ λύμη αἱ λύμαι	ruin	ΛΥΜΗ quality of loosening
λυμαίνεσθαι	to ruin + acc. thing / to bring ruin to + dat. person	ΛΥΜΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ quality of loosening

VS 54. Authentic Pursuit of Wisdom

ou prospoieîsthai Deî philosopheîn ¬ all' óntōs philosopheîn: ou gàr Prosdeómetha toû dokeîn hygiaínein – allà toû kat' alḗtheian hygiaínein

οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι Δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν ¬ ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν: οὐ γὰρ Προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν – ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν

It is necessary to not pretend to philosophize ¬ but to really philosophize: for we are not also in need of seeming to be healthy – but of being healthy in truth

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
προσποιεῖν	to attach to	ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering in addition
προσποιεῖσθαι	to pretend	ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ gathering in addition
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ loving knowledge
ὄντως	really [adverb]	ΟΝΤΩΣ existing
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ needing
δεῖσθαι	to need	ΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ needing
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ needing in addition to
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ seeming
ὑγιαίνειν	to be healthy	ὙΓΙΑΙΝΕΙΝ making good life
ὁ Φιλαληθέστατος	most truth-loving man	ΦΙΛΑΛΗΘΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ most loving what is not hidden
τἀληθές = τὸ ἀληθές τὰ ἀληθῆ	what is true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ not hidden

ἡ ἀλήθεια αἱ ἀλήθειαι	truth	ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ *not hidden*

VS 55. Gratitude for the Unalterable Past

Therapeutéon tàs symphoràs têi tôn apollyménōn chárìti – kaì tô ginṓskein hóti ouk éstin áprakton poiêsai tò gegonós

Θεραπευτέον τὰς συμφορὰς τῇ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων χάριτι – καὶ τῷ γινώσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπρακτον ποιῆσαι τὸ γεγονός

One must cure misfortunes by the grace of those things dissolving away – and by coming to know that it is not possible to make what has been happened undone

ἡ θεραπεία αἱ θεραπείαι	therapy	ΘΕΡΑΠΕΙΑ *healing*
θεραπεύειν	to cure	ΘΕΡΑΠΕΥΕΙΝ *healing*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἡ συμφορά αἱ συμφοραί	misfortune	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΑ *carrying* *[events]* *together*
ἀπολλύναι	to dissolve away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΝΑΙ *destroying away*
τὸ ἀπολλύμενον τὰ ἀπολλύμενα	what is dissolving away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΜΕΝΟΝ *destroying away*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ *being cheerful*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having* *distinguished*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
τὸ πράγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*
ἄπρακτος *(ον)*	undone	ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ *no doing / affair*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τὸ γεγονός τὰ γεγονότα	what has happened	ΓΕΓΟΝΟΣ *came into being*

VS 56. Loyalty & Shared Pain

algeî mèn ho Sophòs, ou mâllon strebloúmenos ‹è strebloúménou toû phílou – kaì hypèr autoû tethnéxetai

ἀλγεῖ μὲν ὁ Σοφός, οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος ‹ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου – καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήξεται

the wise man feels pain, not more when being tortured than when his friend is being tortured – and he will die on behalf of him

ei gàr proésetai tòn phílon – ho bíos autoû pâs di' apistían synchythésetai kaì anakechaitisménos éstai

εἰ γὰρ προήσεται› τὸν φίλον – ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται

for if he abandons his friend – his whole life will be mixed up through distrust, and he will have been completely thrown off

ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	ΑΛΓΕΙΝ *pain*
σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ *very*
στρεβλοῦν	to torture	ΣΤΡΕΒΛΟΥΝ *twisting*
στρεβλούμενος *(η, ον)*	being tortured	ΣΤΡΕΒΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *twisting*
ὁ φίλος οἱ φίλοι	friend	ΦΙΛΟΣ *loving*
θνῄσκειν	to die	ΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ *died*
	Part 2	
προϊέναι προιέναι	to go forward [here, "to abandon"]	ΠΡΟΙΕΝΑΙ *going forward*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief [based on experience]	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ *trust*
ἡ ἀπιστία αἱ ἀπιστίαι	distrust	ΑΠΙΣΤΙΑ *no trust*
ἐγχεῖν	to pour in	ΕΓΧΕΙΝ *pouring in*
συγχεῖν	to mix up	ΣΥΓΧΕΙΝ *pouring together*
συγχυθήσεσθαι	to be mixed up [in the future]	ΣΥΓΧΥΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ *will be poured together*
χαιτίζειν	to pull by the mane	ΧΑΙΤΙΖΕΙΝ *action [of pulling] mane*
ἀναχαιτίζειν	to completely throw off	ΑΝΑΧΑΙΤΙΖΕΙΝ *action of pulling mane back [i.e., rearing up]*
ἀνακεχαιτισμένος *(η, ον)*	having completely thrown off	ΑΝΑΚΕΧΑΙΤΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *action of having pulled mane back [i.e., reared up]*

VS 58. Release from Prison

Eklytéon heautoùs ek toû perì tà enkýklia kaì politikà desmōtēríou

Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου

People must release themselves out from the prison of general and political affairs

ἐκλύειν	to dispel [here, "release out"]	ΕΚΛΥΕΙΝ *dissolving out*
ἑαυτός *(ή, όν)*	oneself	ἙΑΥΤΟΣ *own self*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*

ἐγκύκλιος (α, ον)	general	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΣ pertaining to in circular
τὸ ἐγκύκλιον τὰ ἐγκύκλια	general [affairs]	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΝ pertaining to in circular
ἡ πόλις αἱ πόλεις	city	ΠΟΛΙΣ fortified high place / city
πολιτικός (ή, όν)	political	ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of city
τὸ πολιτικόν τὰ πολιτικά	political [affairs]	
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ instrument of dividing
τὸ δεσμωτήριον τὰ δεσμωτήρια	prison	ΔΕΣΜΩΤΗΡΙΟΝ instrument of binding

VS 59. Misconception of Insatiability

áplēston ou Gastḗr (hṓsper hoi Polloí phasin) ¬ all' hē Dóxa pseudḕs hypèr toû ‹tês› gastròs aorístou plērṓmatos

ἄπληστον οὐ Γαστήρ (ὥσπερ οἱ Πολλοί φασιν) ¬ ἀλλ' ἡ Δόξα ψευδὴς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ‹τῆς› γαστρὸς ἀορίστου πληρώματος

it is not the belly that is insatiable (as the many assert) ¬ but the false judgment concerning the undefined fullness of the belly

πλήρης (ες)	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ quality from filling
ἄπληστος (ον)	insatiable	ΑΠΛΗΣΤΟΣ not filling
τὸ πλήρωμα τὰ πληρώματα	fullness	ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ result of filling
ἡ γαστήρ αἱ γαστέρες	belly	ΓΑΣΤΗΡ instrument of eating
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ much
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ speaking
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ seeming
ψευδής (ής, ές)	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ deceiving
ἀόριστος (ος, ον)	undefined	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ no border

VS 60. Life's Brief Journey

Pâs – hṓsper árti gegonṑs – ek toû zên apérchetai

Πᾶς – ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς – ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται

Everyone – just as having only just been produced – departs from living

πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "everyone"]	ΠΑΣ all
ἄρτι	only just	ΑΡΤΙ fitting

γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γεγονώς (υῖα, ός)	has been produced	ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ *came into being*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
τὸ ζῆν	[the act of] living	
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ἀπέρχεσθαι	to depart	ΑΠΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving away*

VS 61. Beautiful Harmony

kallístē kaì hē tỗn plēsíon Ópsis – tēs prṓtēs syngenéseōs homonooúsēs ḕ kaì pollḕn eis toûto poioumérēs spoudḗn

καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίον Ὄψις – τῆς πρώτης συγγενήσεως ὁμονοούσης ἢ καὶ πολλὴν εἰς τοῦτο ποιουμένης σπουδήν

most beautiful is even the appearance of those nearby – when our primary kinship has the same views or is also making much eagerness toward this

καλός (ή, όν)	correct / beautiful	ΚΑΛΟΣ *lovely*
κάλλιστος	most beautiful	ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΣ *most lovely*
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
ὁ πλησίον οἱ πλησίον	the one nearby	
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision [here, "appearance"]	ΟΨΙΣ *eye*
πρῶτος (η, ον)	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	[process of] creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ *action of being born*
ἡ συγγένησις αἱ συγγενήσεις	kinship	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΝΗΣΙΣ *action of being born together*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	῾ΟΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *same reasoning*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ὁμονοεῖν	to have the same views	῾ΟΜΟΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing the same*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ποιούμενος (η, ον)	making	ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *gathering*
σπουδαῖος (α, ον)	eager	ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΣ *being eager*
ἡ σπουδή αἱ σπουδαί	eagerness	ΣΠΟΥΔΗ *being eager*

VS 62. Avoiding Escalation

ei gàr, katà tò déon, Órgai gínontai toîs gennḗsasi pròs tà ékgona ¬ mátaion dḗpouthen ésti tò antiteínein – kaì mē paraiteîsthai syngnṓmēs tycheîn

εἰ γὰρ, κατὰ τὸ δέον, Ὀργαὶ γίνονται τοῖς γεννήσασι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα ¬ μάταιον δήπουθέν ἐστι τὸ ἀντιτείνειν – καὶ μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμης τυχεῖν

for if, according to what needed, moods are produced in the parents toward their offspring ¬ then presumably pushing back is pointless – as well as not excusing oneself [*in order to*] to come to a mutual understanding

ei dè mē katà tò déon, allà alogṓteron ¬ geloîon pân tò pròs ékklēsin ‹ekkaleîn› tḕn alogían thumộ katékhonta – kaì mē zēteîn metatheînai kat’ állous trópous, eugnomonoûnta

εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ δέον, ἀλλὰ ἀλογώτερον ¬ γελοῖον πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἔκκλησιν ‹ἐκκαλεῖν› τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμῷ κατέχοντα – καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν μεταθεῖναι κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους, εὐγνωμονοῦντα

but if [*a negative mood is produced in the parents*] not according to what is needed, but according to what is rather irrational ¬ then it is wholly laughable to call out their irrationality in calling [*them*] out while [*you yourself are*] firmly holding onto [*it*] in anger – and not to seek to change [*it*] in other ways, while having good sense

δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
τό δέον **τὰ δέοντα**	what is needed	**ΔΕΟΝ** *needing*
ἡ ὀργή **αἱ ὀργαί**	mood	**ΟΡΓΗ** *reaching out*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
γεννᾶν	to generate	**ΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating*
γεννήσας	having generated [already]	**ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ** *generating*
οἱ γεννήσαντες	the parents [lit. "those who have generated"]	
τό ἔκγονον **τὰ ἔκγονα**	offspring	**ΕΚΓΟΝΟΝ** *generated out*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	**ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ** *folly*
δήπουθεν	presumably	**ΔΗΠΟΥΘΕΝ** *from somewhere indeed*
ἀντιτείνειν	to push back	**ΑΝΤΙΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending against*
τὸ ἀντιτείνειν	[the] pushing back	
αἰτεῖν	to beg	**ΑΙΤΕΙΝ** *responsibility*
αἰτεῖσθαι	to beg [for oneself]	
παραιτεῖσθαι	to excuse oneself	**ΠΑΡΑΙΤΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *responsibility beside*
τὸ μὴ **παραιτεῖσθαι**	[the] not excusing oneself	
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	**ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ** *distinguishing*
ἡ γνώμη **αἱ γνῶμαι**	discernment	**ΓΝΩΜΗ** *distinguishing*
ἡ συγγνώμη **αἱ συγγνῶμαι**	mutual understanding	**ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΗ** *distinguishing together*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
	Part 2	
ἄλογος *(ον)*	unreasoning	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*

ἀλογώτερος (α, ον)	more unreasoning [here, "rather irrational"]	ΑΛΟΓΩΤΕΡΟΣ *more not reasoning*
ἡ ἀλογία αἱ ἀλογίαι	irrationality	ΑΛΟΓΙΑ *non reasoning*
γελᾶν	to laugh	ΓΕΛΑΝ *deriding*
γελοῖος	laughable	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΣ *deriding*
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning*
ἡ ἐκκλησία αἱ ἐκκλησίαι	*calling out	ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ *summoning out*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning out*
ὁ θυμός οἱ θυμοί	anger	ΘΥΜΟΣ *spirit*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ *seeking*
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing change*
ἄλλος (η, ο)	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ γνώμη αἱ γνῶμαι	discernment	ΓΝΩΜΗ *distinguishing*
εὐγνωμονεῖν	to have good sense	ΕΥΓΝΩΜΟΝΕΙΝ *distinguishing well*
εὐγνωμονῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	having good sense	

VS 63. Balance

és-ti kai en lep-tó-tē-ti ka-tha-ri-ó-tēs – hês ho A-ne-pi-ló-gis-tos, pa-ra-plé-si-ón ti pás-chei tô di'-a-o-ris-tí-an ek-píp-ton-ti

ἔστι καὶ ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης – ἧς ὁ Ἀνεπιλόγιστος, παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι

there is indeed a clarity in subtlety [*i.e., in simple living*] – he who does not fully inductively consider this, experiences something nearly equivalent to he who falls out through indefiniteness [*i.e., to one who falls into the limitlessness of extravagant living*]

[Long and Sedley] There can be refinement even on slender means, and one who fails to take account of it is in a similar position to someone who goes astray through ignoring limits.

[Peter Saint-Andre] There is an elegance in simplicity, and one who is thoughtless resembles one whose feelings run to excess.

*The manuscript's reading (which appears to be "***ἐν λεπτότητι καθάριος***") is somewhat difficult – which has led many editors to make changes. Usener changed* "**ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης**" (a purity in subtlety) to "**ἐν λιτότητι μεθόριος**" (a boundary in simplicity).

In *The Double Indictment* Lucian has Zeus complain "I myself have to do any number of tasks that are almost impossible to carry out on account of their subtlety (**ὑπὸ λεπτότητος**)." (*Double Indictment*, section 2)

[Bailey] Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in like case with him who errs through excess.

[Inwood and Gerson] There is also a proper measure for parsimony, and he who does not reason it out is as badly off as he who goes wrong by total neglect of limit.

λεπτομερής (ές)	of a subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *fine/thin part*
ἡ λεπτομέρεια **αἱ λεπτομέρειαι**	subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ** *fine/thin part*
ἡ λεπτότης **αἱ λεπτότητες**	subtlety	**ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being fine/thin*
καθαρός (ά, όν)	clear	**ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ** *cleaning*
ἡ κάθαρσις **αἱ καθάρσεις**	clarification	**ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ** *cleansing*
ἡ καθαριότης **αἱ καθαριότητες**	clarity	**ΚΑΘΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ** *cleaning*
ἐπιλογίσασθαι	to inductively consider	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ἀνεπιλόγιστος (ον)	not inductively considering	**ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΟΣ** *not reasoning action upon*
ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος **οἱ ἀνεπιλόγιστοι**	he who does not inductively consider	
ὁ πλησίος **οἱ πλησίοι**	neighbor	**ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ** *near*
παραπλήσιος (α, ον)	nearly equivalent	**ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ** *near alongside*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
πάσχειν	to experience	**ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ** *enduring*
ἀόριστος (ος, ον)	undefined	**ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *no border*
ἡ ἀοριστία **αἱ ἀοριστίαι**	indefiniteness	**ΑΟΡΙΣΤΙΑ** *no border*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	**ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling out*
ἐκπίπτων	falling out	**ΕΚΠΙΠΤΩΝ** *falling out*
ὁ ἐκπίπτων **οἱ ἐκπίπτοντες**	he who falls out	

VS 64. Prioritize Self-Improvement

a-ko-lou-theîn Deî ton pa-ra tôn ál-lōn É-pai-non au-tó-ma-ton – Hē-mâs de ge-nés-thai pe-ri tēn hē-môn i-a-treí-an

ἀκολουθεῖν Δεῖ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἔπαινον αὐτόματον – Ἡμᾶς δὲ γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἰατρείαν

It is necessary that the Praise from others follows as automatic – while we become [*involved*] about our own healing

ἡ ἀκολουθία αἱ ἀκολουθίαι	conformity	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΙΑ *following*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
Πολύαινος	Polyaenus	ΠΟΛΥΑΙΝΟΣ *much praise*
ὁ ἔπαινος οἱ ἔπαινοι	praise	ΕΠΑΙΝΟΣ *praise upon*
ἑαυτός *(ή, όν)*	oneself	῾ΕΑΥΤΟΣ *own self*
τὸ αὐτόματον τὰ αὐτόματα	what is automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ *self thinking*
αὐτόματος *(η, ον)*	automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ *self thinking*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ὁ ἰατρός οἱ ἰατροί	doctor	ΙΑΤΡΟΣ *curing*
ἡ ἰατρική αἱ ἰατρικαί	medicine	ΙΑΤΡΙΚΗ *characteristic of curing*
ἡ ἰατρεία αἱ ἰατρεῖαι	healing	ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ *curing*

VS 65. Self-Reliance

má-tai-ón es-ti pa-ra the-ôn Ai-teîs-thai há Tis he-au-tô cho-rē-gê-sai hi-ka-nós es-ti

μάταιόν ἐστι παρὰ θεῶν Αἰτεῖσθαι ἃ Τις ἑαυτῷ χορηγῆσαι ἱκανός ἐστι

it is pointless to beg from the gods for what One is sufficiently [*able*] to supply for oneself

ματαΐζειν	to speak vainly	ΜΑΤΑΙΖΕΙΝ *vain action*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ *folly*
θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	ΘΕΙΟΣ *[divine entity]*
ὁ θεός οἱ θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ *[divine entity]*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
αἰτεῖν	to beg	ΑΙΤΕΙΝ *responsibility*
αἰτεῖσθαι	to beg [for oneself]	
ἑαυτός *(ή, όν)*	oneself	῾ΕΑΥΤΟΣ *own self*
χορηγεῖν	to supply [lit. "to lead a chorus"]	ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΝ *chorus leading*
χορηγῆσαι	to supply [already]	
ἱκανῶς	sufficiently	῾ΙΚΑΝΩΣ *fitting / proper*
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	῾ΙΚΑΝΟΣ *fitting / proper*

VS 66. Supportive Consideration

Sym-pa-thô-men toîs phí-lois – ou thrē-noûn-tes al-la phron-tíz-on-tes

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις ¬ οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες

Let us sympathize with friends ¬ not by lamenting but by being considerate

τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
πάσχειν	to experience	**ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ** *enduring*
συμπαθεῖν	to sympathize	
ὁ φίλος **οἱ φίλοι**	friend	**ΦΙΛΟΣ** *loving*
θρηνεῖν	to lament	**ΘΡΗΝΕΙΝ** *wailing*
θρηνῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	lamenting	**ΘΡΗΝΩΝ** *wailing*
καταφρονεῖν *+ gen*	to disregard	**ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ** *mind* *down / against*
φιλοφρονούμενος *(η, ον)*	affectionate	**ΦΙΛΟΦΡΟΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *loving mind*
ὁ εὔφρονοῦν **οἱ εὔφρονοῦντες**	he who considers well	**ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ** *good mind*
ἡ φροντίς **αἱ φροντίδες**	consideration	**ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ** *mind*
φρονίμως	prudently	**ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ** *mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	**ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ** *mind*
φροντίζειν	to be considerate	**ΦΡΟΝΤΙΖΕΙΝ** *mind action*

VS 67. A Free Life

e-leú-the-ros Bí-os ou dý-na-tai ktḗ-sas-thai chrḗ-ma-ta pol-la – dia to to prâg-ma mē rhą́-di-on eî-nai chō-rìs thē-teí-as óch-lōn ē dy-nas-tôn (al-là sy-ne-cheî da-psi-leí-ą pán-ta kék-tē-tai)

ἐλεύθερος Βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλὰ – διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ‹μὴ› ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων ἢ δυναστῶν (ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ δαψιλείᾳ πάντα κέκτηται)

a free life is not able to procure many possessions – because of the fact that this situation does not easily exist without the service to crowds or masters (although it does procure all things in continuous lavishness)

an dé pou kai Tý-chēi chrē-má-tōn pol-lôn – kai taû-ta rhą-dí-ōs an eis tēn toû plē-sí-on eú-noi-an di-a-me-trḗ-sai

ἂν δέ που καὶ Τύχῃ χρημάτων πολλῶν – καὶ ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὔνοιαν διαμετρήσαι

but if perhaps he should also happen upon much property – even these things he could easily measure out onto the good-will of his neighbor

ἡ ἐλευθερία **αἱ ἐλευθερίαι**	freedom	**ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ** *from a tribe* *(with the rights and responsibilities of a free man)*
ἐλεύθερος *(α, ον)*	free	**ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ**
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	life / lifestyle	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*

κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ *necessary*
τὸ χρῆμα τὰ χρήματα	property [here, "possession"]	ΧΡΗΜΑ *necessary*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ *state of* *the result of* *doing / affair*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*
ῥᾳδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ *easily*
ῥᾴδιος ῥαιδιος *(α, ον)*	easy	ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ *easily*
ἡ χώρα αἱ χῶραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ *location*
χωρὶς	apart from, without	ΧΩΡΙΣ *location*
ἡ θητεία αἱ θητεῖαι	service	ΘΗΤΕΙΑ *serving*
τό ὄχλημα τά ὀχλήματα	[cause of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΜΑ *result of* *a crowd of people*
ἡ ὄχλησις αἱ ὀχλήσεις	[feeling of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ *process of* *a crowd of people*
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ *crowd of people*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
ὁ δυναστής οἱ δυνασταί	master	ΔΥΝΑΣΤΗΣ *power*
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ	continuity	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΣ *holding together*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
ἡ δαψιλεία αἱ δαψιλεῖαι	lavishness	ΔΑΨΙΛΕΙΑ *abundant, lavish*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
	Part 2	
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
τὸ χρῆμα τὰ χρήματα	property	ΧΡΗΜΑ *necessary*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ῥᾴδιος ῥαιδιος *(α, ον)*	easy	ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ *easily*
ῥᾳδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ *easily*
πλησίον	nearby	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ *near*
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*

ὁ πλησίον οἱ πλησίον	the one nearby	
ἡ εὔνοια αἱ εὐνοίαι	good will	ΕΥΝΟΙΑ *seeing well* *[looking upon positively]*
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly measure*
μετρεῖν	to measure	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *measuring*
διαμετρεῖν	to measure out [i.e., to distribute]	ΔΙΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *measuring across*

VS 68. Insatiability's Trap

Ou-den hi-ka-non – hộ o-lí-gon to Hi-ka-nón

Οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν – ᾧ ὀλίγον τὸ Ἱκανόν

Nothing is sufficient – for him to whom what is sufficient is little

οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	ἹΚΑΝΟΣ *fitting / proper*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ *little*

VS 69. Ingratitude's Trap

to tês psy-khês a-chá-ris-ton lích-non e-poí-ē-se to zō̂-on eis á-pei-ron tôn en di-aí-tē poi-kil-má-tōn

τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον Λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῷον εἰς ἄπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων

the ungrateful greed of the soul makes the living being [*go*] into an infinity of diverse things in the way living

ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
ἀχάριστος *(ον)*	ungrateful	ΑΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ *not being cheerful*
λίχνος *(ον)*	greedy	ΛΙΧΝΟΣ *licking up*
τὸ λίχνον τὰ λίχνα	what is greedy [here, "greed"]	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ἐποίησε	3rd singular gnomic aorist active indicative	
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
εἰς ἄπειρον	into infinity	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*

ἡ δίαιτα αἱ δίαιται	way of living	ΔΙΑΙΤΑ *through the responsibility*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ποικίλως	in diverse ways	ΠΟΙΚΙΛΩΣ *intricate*
ποικίλλειν	to diversify	ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛΕΙΝ *intricate*
τὸ ποίκιλμα τὰ ποικίλματα	diverse things	

VS 70. Live As Though You Are Seen

Mē-dén soi en bí-ō prach-theí-ē Ho phó-bon pa-ré-xei soi ei gnōs-thḗ-se-tai tō̢ plē-sí-on

Μηδέν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθείη῞Ο φόβον παρέξει σοι εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον

Let nothing be accomplished by you in life which will yield fear to you if it will come to be known to one nearby

οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
μηδείς *(μηδεμία, μηδέν)*	no one [modal]	ΜΗΔΕΙΣ *not one*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	life / lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
πραχθείη	3rd singular gnomic aorist passive optative	
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
γνωσθήσεται	3rd singular future passive indicative will come to be known	
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
ὁ πλησίον οἱ πλησίον	the one nearby	

VS 71. Interrogate Your Desires

pros pá-sas tas e-pi-thy-mí-as Pro-sak-té-on to e-pe-rṓ-tē-ma toú-to:

πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας Προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο:

One must apply this interrogation to all the desires:

Tí moi ge-né-se-tai – an te-les-thē̂ To ka-ta e-pi-thy-mí-an e-pi-zē-toú-me-non; kai Tí ¬ ean mē te-les-thē̂;

Τί μοι γενήσεται – ἂν τελεσθῇ Τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ Τί ¬ ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;

What will be produced for me – while that which is pursued according to desire might be fulfilled? and What ¬ if it might not be fulfilled?

ὁ θυμός οἱ θυμοί	anger	ΘΥΜΟΣ *spirit*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
προσακτεῖν	to apply	ΠΡΟΣΑΚΤΕΙΝ *applying towards*
προσακτέον	one must apply	
τὸ ἐπερώτημα τὰ ἐπερώτηματα	interrogation	ΕΠΕΡΩΤΗΜΑ *asking toward*
	Part 2	
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γενήσεται	3rd singular future middle indicative it will be produced	
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
τελεσθῇ	3rd singular aorist passive subjunctive might be fulfilled	
ἐπιζητεῖν	to pursue	ΕΠΙΖΗΤΕΙΝ *seek after*
τὸ ἐπιζητούμενον τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα	that which is pursued	

VS 73. Learning from Pain

kai to Ge-nés-thai ti-nas al-gē-dó-nas peri sô-ma ly-si-te-leî pros phy-la-kēn tôn ho-mo-ei-dôn

καὶ τὸ Γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν

even the production of some pains around the body is profitable for the guarding of others that appear the same

γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
τὸ γίνεσθαι	the production	
τὸ ἀλγεινόν τὰ ἀλγεινά	what is painful	ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΝ *pain*
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *the state pain*
σωματικός *(ή, όν)*	corporeal	ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of body*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
λυσιτελεῖν	to be profitable	ΛΥΣΙΤΕΛΕΙΝ *the process of loosening completing*
ἡ φυλακή αἱ φυλακαί	guarding	ΦΥΛΑΚΗ *watching*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	῾ΟΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ *same born*
ὁμοειδής *(ές)*	appearing the same	῾ΟΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*

VS 74. Learning from Errors

en phi-lo-ló-gō sy-zē-té-sei: pleî-on é-ny-sen ho Hēt-tē-theis – kath' ho pro-sé-ma-then

ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει: πλεῖον ἤνυσεν ὁ Ἡττηθεὶς – καθ' ὃ προσέμαθεν

in a discussion devoted to study: the one overcome accomplishes more – in accordance with that which he also learned

ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ** *loving knowledge*
φιλόλογος *(ον)*	devoted to study	**ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΟΣ** *loving reasoning*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ἡ συζήτησις **αἱ συζητήσεις**	discussion	**ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ** *action of* *seeking together*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ἀνύειν	to accomplish	**ΑΝΥΕΙΝ** *completing*
ἤνυσεν	3rd singular aorist active indicative	
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
ἥττων *(ον)*	worse	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
ἡττᾶσθαι	to be overcome	
ἡττηθείς	overcome	**ἩΤΤΗΘΕΙΣ** *inferior*
μανθάνειν	to learn	**ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *thinking*
προσμανθάνειν	to also learn	**ΠΡΟΣΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *thinking in addition*

VS 75. Gratitude for Past Fortune

eis ta pa-rō-chē-kó-ta a-ga-tha a-khá-ris-tos Phō-nē hē lé-gou-sa:
"té-los Hó-ra mak-roû bí-ou"

εἰς τὰ παρῳχηκότα ἀγαθὰ ἀχάριστος Φωνὴ ἡ λέγουσα:
"τέλος Ὅρα μακροῦ βίου"

the ungrateful statement toward the good things that have passed by is the one saying: "Look at the fulfillment of a long life"

ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go	**ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving*
παρέρχεσθαι	to pass by	**ΠΑΡΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving beyond*
παρωχηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	passed by	**ΠΑΡΩΙΧΗΚΩΣ** **ΠΑΡΩΧΗΚΩΣ** *moved beyond*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
ἀχάριστος *(ον)*	ungrateful	**ΑΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *not being* *cheerful*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*

λέγων (ουσα, ον)	saying	**ΛΕΓΩΝ** *speaking*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ὁρᾶν	to see [here, "to look at"]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
μακρός (ά, όν)	distant [here, "long"]	**ΜΑΚΡΟΣ** *long-reaching*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	life / lifestyle	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*

VS 76. Individual Benefit

toi-oû-tos Eî, gē-rá-skōn, ho-poî-on E-gō pa-rai-nô – kaì Di-ég-nō-kas ho-poî-on esti to he-au-tộ phi-lo-so-phê-sai ¬ kai hoî-on to tệ Hel-lá-di: Syn-chaí-rō soi

τοιοῦτος Εἶ, γηράσκων, ὁποῖον Ἐγὼ παραινῶ – καὶ Διέγνωκας ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἑαυτῷ φιλοσοφῆσαι ¬ καὶ οἷον τὸ τῇ Ἑλλάδι: Συγχαίρω σοι

You are, while growing old, just as the kind I advise – and you have come to thoroughly know the kind of thing it is to philosophize for oneself ¬ and what it is to [*do so*] for Greece: I rejoice together with you

τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this [here, "just as"]	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
εἶναι	to be	**ΕΙΝΑΙ** *being*
εἶ	2nd person singular present indicative active you are	
συγκαταγηράσκειν	to fully grow old together	**ΣΥΓΚΑΤΑΓΗΡΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *fully growing old together*
γηράσκειν	to grow old	**ΓΗΡΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *growing old*
γηράσκων (ουσα, ον)	growing old	
ὁποῖος	the kind of [thing]	**ὉΠΟΙΟΣ** *that gathering*
ἐπαινεῖν	to praise	**ΕΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *praising upon*
παραινεῖν	to advise	**ΠΑΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *praising alongside*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
διαγιγνώσκειν	to come to thoroughly know	**ΔΙΑΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished through*
διέγνωκας	2nd person singular perfect indicative active you have come to thoroughly know	**ΔΙΕΓΝΩΚΑΣ**
ἑαυτός (ή, όν)	oneself	**ἙΑΥΤΟΣ** *own self*
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ** *loving knowledge*
οἷος (οἷα, οἷον)	such as ["what"]	**ὉΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
ἡ Ἑλλάς	Greece	**ἙΛΛΑΣ** *Greek*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*
χαίρων (ουσα, ον)	rejoicing	**ΧΑΙΡΩΝ** *being cheerful*

τὸ χαῖρον τὰ χαῖροντα	what is joyful	ΧΑΙΡΟΝ *being cheerful*
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	joy	ΧΑΡΑ *being cheerful*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
ἀχάριστος *(ον)*	ungrateful	ΑΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΣ *not being cheerful*
χαρίζειν	to give favor	ΧΑΡΙΖΕΙΝ *action of being cheerful*
συγχαίρειν	to rejoice together	ΣΥΓΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ *joy together*

VS 77. Freedom of Self-Sufficiency

tês au-tar-keí-as Kar-pos mé-gis-tos E-leu-the-rí-a

τῆς αὐταρκείας Καρπὸς μέγιστος Ἐλευθερία

the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom

ἡ αὐτάρκεια αἱ αὐτάρκειαι	self-sufficiency	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ *state of self-beginning*
ὁ καρπός οἱ καρποί	fruit	ΚΑΡΠΟΣ *harvest*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
ἡ ἐλευθερία αἱ ἐλευθερίαι	freedom	ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ

VS 78. Noble Priorities

Ho gen-naî-os pe-ri so-phí-an kaì phi-lí-an má-lis-ta gíg-ne-tai – hôn, to men esti thnē-ton a-ga-thón, to de a-thá-na-ton

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται – ὧν, τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον

the noble man comes to be especially about wisdom and friendship – of which, the one is a mortal good ¬ but the other is immortal

γεννᾶν	to generate	ΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating*
γεννήσας	having generated [already]	ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ *generating*
οἱ γεννήσαντες	the parents	
γενναῖος	noble	ΓΕΝΝΑΙΟΣ *belonging to generating* *[i.e., with lineage]*
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ἡ σοφία αἱ σοφίαι	wisdom	ΣΟΦΙΑ *knowledge*
ὁ φίλος οἱ φίλοι	friend	ΦΙΛΟΣ *loving*
ἡ φιλία αἱ φιλίαι	friendship	ΦΙΛΙΑ *loving*
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

θνητός (ή, όν)	mortal	ΘΝΗΤΟΣ *died*
ἀθάνατος	immortal	ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *not dying*
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*

VS 79. Be a Peaceful Presence

Ho a-tá-ra-chos he-au-tǭ – kai he-té-rǭ a-ó-chlē-tos

Ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ – καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος

He who is undisturbed within himself – is also not irritating to another

ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ *agitating*
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος (ος, ον)	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ *without agitating*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ *crowd of people*
ἀόχλητος (ον)	not irritating	ΑΟΧΛΗΤΟΣ *without a crowd of people*

VS 80. Guard Against Desires

né-ǭ, sō-tē-rí-as Moî-ra tês hē-li-kí-as tḗ-rē-sis – kai phy-la-kē tôn pán-ta mo-ly-nón-tōn kata tàs e-pi-thy-mí-as tas oi-strṓ-deis

νέῳ, σωτηρίας Μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις – καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις

to a young man, a Portion of salvation is the preservation of that stage of life – and the guarding from all that is defiling according to the desires that are raging

νέος (α, ον)	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
ὁ νέος οἱ νέοι	young man	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
ἡ ἀσωτία αἱ ἀσωτίαι	degeneracy	ΑΣΩΤΙΑ *not saving*
ἡ σωτηρία αἱ σωτηρίαι	salvation	ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑ *saving*
τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	a portion [as part of a whole]	ΜΟΡΙΟΝ *receiving one's portion*
ἡ μοῖρα αἱ μοῖραι	a portion [as assigned share]	ΜΟΙΡΑ *receiving one's portion*
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age *(stage of life)*	ἩΛΙΚΙΑ *comrade*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting / watching*
ἡ τήρησις αἱ τηρήσεις	the preservation	ΤΗΡΗΣΙΣ *action of protecting / watching*

ἡ φυλακή αἱ φυλακαί	guarding	ΦΥΛΑΚΗ *watching*
μολύνειν	to defile	ΜΟΛΥΝΕΙΝ *polluting*
μολύνων *(ουσα, ον)*	defiling	
τὸ μολῦνον τὰ μολῦνοντα	what is defiling	
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ *quality of result of breathing*
οἰστρώδης *(ες)*	raging	ΟΙΣΤΡΩΔΗΣ *quality of being frenzied*

VS 81. Futility of Wealth & Praise

ou lý-ei tēn tês psy-chês ta-ra-chēn (ou-de tēn a-xi-ó-lo-gon a-po-gen-nâ kha-ran) oú-te Ploû-tos hy-pár-chōn ho mé-gis-tos ¬ oú-th' hē pa-ra tois pol-loîs Ti-mē kaì Pe-rí-blep-sis – oút' ál-lo Ti tôn pa-ra tàs a-di-o-rís-tous ai-tí-as

οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν (οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν) οὔτε Πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος ¬ οὔθ' ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς Τιμὴ καὶ Περίβλεψις – οὔτ' ἄλλο Τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας

the greatest Wealth that exits does not dissolve the disturbance of the soul (or fully generate joy that is notable) ¬ nor does Honor among the many or Admiration – nor any other thing among those from the undefined causes

λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ *agitating*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
φιλόλογος *(ον)*	devoted to study	ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΟΣ *loving reasoning*
ἀξιόλογος *(ον)*	notable	ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ *counterbalancing reasoning*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating out*
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	joy	ΧΑΡΑ *being cheerful*
ὁ πλοῦτος οἱ πλοῦτοι	wealth	ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ *flowing*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	ʽΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
τιμᾶν	to honor	ΤΙΜΑΝ *value*
ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	honor	ΤΙΜΗ *value*

ἡ ἐπιβλέψις **αἱ ἐπιβλέψεις**	observation	**ΕΠΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ** *looking upon*
ἡ περίβλεψις **αἱ περιβλέψεις**	admiration	**ΠΕΡΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ** *looking around*
ἀόριστος *(ος, ον)*	undefined	**ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *no border*
ἀδιόριστος *(ον)*	undefined	**ΑΔΙΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *no border* *through*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

34b. Hello Herodotus

Ἐπίκουρος Ἡροδότῳ, Χαίρειν!

Epicurus to Herodotus, Hello!

Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	**ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ** *running toward* *[to assist]*
διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*
Ἡρόδοτος	Herodotos	**ἩΡΟΔΟΤΟΣ** *given by Hera*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*

35a. Abridgment

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἐξακριβοῦν ¬ μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν: ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς Παρεσκεύασα – ἵνα παρ᾽ ἑκάστους τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς Δύνωνται, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν Ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας)

for those who are not able, Herodotus, to examine each of the things written out by us about nature ¬ nor inspect the larger books of what has been organized: I prepared a summary of the whole effort for retaining the memory of the most comprehensive judgements sufficiently for themselves – so that on each occasion, They might be able to provide help for themselves on the most decisive [*judgements*], to the extent that They engage with the observation of nature

[Bailey] For those who are unable, Herodotus, to work in detail through all that I have written about nature, or to peruse the larger books which I have composed, I have already prepared at sufficient length an epitome of the whole system, that they may keep adequately in mind at least the most general principles in each department, in order that as occasion arises they may be able to assist themselves on the most important points, in so far as they undertake the study of nature.

ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written out	**ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ** *written again*
ἡ βίβλος **αἱ βίβλοι**	book	**ΒΙΒΛΟΣ** *papyrus*
αἱ μείζονες βίβλοι	larger books	
τὰ συντεταγμένα	things organized	**ΣΥΝΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ** *having arranged together*
αἱ μείζονες τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλοι	larger books of the things organized	
ἡ ἐπιτομή **αἱ ἐπιτομαί**	summary	**ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗ** *to cut upon*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ πραγματεία **αἱ πραγματεῖαι**	effort	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ** *state of the result of doing / affair*

ἡ ἐπιτομή τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	summary of the whole effort	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	most decisive thing	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ *most lordly, masterly*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of envisioning*
ἡ περὶ φύσεως θεωρία	observation of nature	

35b. Prioritizing Summaries

καὶ Τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβλέψει, τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ μνημονεύειν – τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν Δεόμεθα ¬ τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως

and Those who have advanced sufficiently in the observation of the whole, must remember the impression of the whole work that has been reduced [to the fundamentals] – for We frequently have need [B'] of attention for the aggregate ¬ but not similarly [B'] of [attention] for [the details of] each part

[Bailey] But those also who have made considerable progress in the survey of the main principles ought to bear in mind the scheme of the whole system set forth in its essentials. For we have frequent need of the general view, but not so often of the detailed exposition.

A summary is more often needed than the details. Fix in your mind on the main points of the whole subject more frequently than you review the specific details.

ὁ προβεβηκώς οἱ προβεβηκότες	he who has advanced	ΠΡΟΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ *to have walked forward*
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
ἡ ἐπιβλέψις αἱ ἐπιβλέψεις	observation	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ *looking upon*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
ὁ τύπος τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	imprint of the whole effort	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιβολή	our attention for [the details of] each part	
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ *in groups*
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	aggregate	

36a. Focused Memory

Βαδιστέον, μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα συνεχῶς: ἐν δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτο Ποιητέον – ἀφ᾽οὗ ἥ τε κυριωτάτη Ἐπιβολὴ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος Ἀκρίβωμα πᾶν ἐξευρήσεται, τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων τύπων εὖ περιειλημμένων καὶ μνημονευομένων

additionally, It is necessary to proceed, of course, towards those [observations of the condensed system] continuously: and It is necessary make this much [effort] in memory – from which [your] most principle Attention will exist for [your] situations: and then every precise Detail for [the details of] each part [of your observations] will be discovered, with the most comprehensive impressions well understood and remembered

[Bailey] Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to lx in one's memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth. And in fact the accurate knowledge of details will be fully discovered, if the general principles in the various departments are thoroughly grasped and borne in mind;

We should return continually to the main principles – and memorize them to gain a solid understanding of the facts. We have a greater ability to discover details accurately once the general outlines are well understood.

ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	**ΚΥΡΙΟΣ** *critical / valid*
ἡ κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολὴ	most essential attention	
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ ἀκρίβεια **αἱ ἀκρίβειαι**	precision	**ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ** *state of pointed*
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα **τὰ ἀκριβώματα**	precise detail	**ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ** *result of pointed*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα	precise detail for each part	
ὁλοσχερής *(ές)*	comprehensive	**ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ** *to hold the whole*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*
οἱ ὁλοσχερώτατοι τύποι	most comprehensive impressions	

36b. Elementary Mastery

ἐπεὶ καὶ, τῷ τετελεσιουργημένῳ, τοῦτο Κυριώτατον τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος γίνεται: τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι ἑκάστων πρὸς ἁπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωνὰς συναγομένων

since, for the one who is accomplished, this is the most important Thing produced by total accuracy: to be able to quickly use [our] attentions with each thing referenced by simple component principles and statements

[Bailey] for even in the case of one fully initiated the most essential feature in all accurate knowledge is the capacity to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension, and this can be done if everything is summed up in elementary principles and formulae.

Simplicity is a feature of a mature student. Being able to reference elementary facts helps keep a clear view of what we know.

ὁ τετελεσιουργημένος	he who has accomplished	**ΤΕΤΕΛΕΣΙΟΥΡΓΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *completed work*
τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὀξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι	the ability to quickly use attentions	

γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἁπλοῦς *(ῆ, οῦν)*	simple	ἉΠΛΟΥΣ *one fold*
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ *result of a row (in a series)*
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ *instance of a row (in a series)*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
ἁπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωναί	simple elementary principle and statements	

36c. A Structured View

οὐ γὰρ Οἷόν τε τὸ πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας εἰδέναι – μὴ δυνάμενον διὰ βραχεῶν φωνῶν ἅπαν ἐμπεριλαβεῖν ἐν αὑτῷ (τὸ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν)

for It is not possible to know the concentration of a continuous full course of the whole – when [that concentration] is not able to encompass in short statements everything within it (which would also be a precise detail for each part)

[Bailey] For it is not possible for anyone to abbreviate the complete course through the whole system, if he cannot embrace in his own mind by means of short formulae all that might be set out with accuracy in detail.

We need to be able to remember the basics of all our studies in organized and simple terms – this enables us to understand all the details more accurately.

ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ *action of compacting*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
ἡ περιοδεία αἱ περιοδεῖαι	[making] a full course	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΙΑ *process around the path*
ἡ συνεχής τῶν ὅλων περιοδεία	[making] a continuous full course of the whole	
τὸ πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας	concentration of a continuous full course of the whole	
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing*
βραχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ *brief*
αἱ βραχεῖαι φωναί	short statements	
τὸ ἐξακριβωθέν τὰ ἐξακριβωθέντα	precise detail	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΩΘΕΝ *fully pointed*
τὸ ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν	would be a precise detail precise	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for each part	

37a. Purpose of Study

ὅθεν, δὴ πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ᾠκειωμένοις φυσιολογίᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ, (παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων τῷ βίῳ) Ἐποίησά σοι καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐπιτομὴν καὶ στοιχείωσιν τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν

therefore, certainly since such a course is useful to all who are familiar with natural science, I (while recommending continuous activity in natural science and pacifying myself particularly with such a life) have also made for you such a type of summary and elementary-exposition of all judgements

[Bailey] Wherefore since the method I have described is valuable to all those who are accustomed to the investigation of nature, I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and I find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine

Epicurus advises that we always pursue our studies – but with a sense of tranquillity.

ὁ ᾠκειωμένος	he who is familiar	**ΩΙΚΕΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *made comfortable dwelling*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*
ἡ ὁδός **αἱ ὁδοί**	course	**ΟΔΟΣ** *road*
ἡ τοιαύτη ὁδός	such a course	**ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ ΟΔΟΣ**
τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of working within*
τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα	continuous activity	
ἐγγαληνίζειν	to pacify oneself	**ΕΓΓΑΛΗΝΙΖΕΙΝ** *causing calm within*
This verb is only used by Epicurus, and only used here – but we can understand the general meaning because it clearly comes from the noun:		
ἡ γαλήνη	peace	**ΓΑΛΗΝΗ**
ἡ τοιαύτη τις ἐπιτομή	such a type of summary	
ἡ στοιχείωσις τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν	elementary exposition of all judgments	

37b. Clarity in Language

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, Δεῖ εἰληφέναι: ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα Ἔχωμεν, εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν ¬ καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα Πάντα ἡμῖν ‹ἴῃ› – εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν, ἢ κενοὺς φθόγγους Ἔχωμεν

first of all, Herodotus, It is necessary to understand what is assigned to expressions: in order that, We may have what is judged, investigated, or uncertain to test by referring to these [*expressions*] ¬ so that Everything does not go untested by us – leading into infinity, or Us having empty expressions [*i.e., using meaningless words*]

[Bailey] First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or refection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.

We must understand the meaning of words to test opinions, inquiries, or problems – always ensuring our proofs are meaningful and not endlessly unverified.

τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα	what is assigned *(subordinated things)*	**ΥΠΟΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ** *having arranged under*
ὁ φθόγγος **οἱ φθόγγοι**	[verbal] expression	**ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ** *uttering*
τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις	what is assigned to expressions	
τὰ δοξαζόμενα	what is judged *(our understanding of information)*	**ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΑ** *to seem*
τὰ ζητούμενα	what is investigated *(difficulty with getting information)*	**ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΑ** *to search*
τὰ ἀπορούμενα	what is uncertain *(difficulty with understanding information)*	**ΑΠΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΑ** *to be confused*

38a. Clear Mental Impressions

ἀνάγκη γὰρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον φθόγγον Βλέπεσθαι, καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ Ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀνάξομεν

Seeing [for ourselves] the primary internal conception for each word, and in no way needing proof, is necessary – if We are to have [something] to which we will refer what is investigated, uncertain, or judged

[Bailey] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.

We need to be able to mentally visualize exactly what we are talking about. If we ensure that the primary meaning of each term is clear – then we have a solid foundation for evaluating problems, opinions, and inquiries.

τὸ ἐννόημα **τὰ ἐννοήματα**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ** *result of seeing within*
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα	the primary thought	
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα βλέπειν	seeing the primary thought	
ἡ ἀπόδειξις **αἱ ἀποδείξεις**	proof	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ** *from pointing out*

38b. Tools for Interpretation

ἔτι τε, [A] τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως Τηρεῖν: καὶ ἁπλῶς [Β'] τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς (εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ [Π] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη – ὅπως ἂν καὶ [O] τὸ προσμένον καὶ [0] τὸ ἄδηλον Ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα

also, Preserving [A] the sensations in every way is necessary: and absolutely [*preserving*] [B'] the present attentions (whether of [mental] perception or of any of the criteria) and likewise [Π] the existing experiences [i.e., our current feelings] – so that We may also have signs by which we will interpret both [O] what is still pending [further attestation] and [0] what is unclear

[Bailey] And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

Sensations are the basis of understanding. We need to focus on our immediate senses and feelings as our basis of understanding, in order to further understand what is unclear or unseen.

ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ἡ ἐπίνοια **αἱ ἐπινοίαι**	[objective] concept	**ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ** *seeing upon*
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί διανοίας	present attentions of perception	
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί ὅτου τῶν κριτηρίων	present attentions of any of the standards	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* **ὑπάρχοντες** *(ουσαι, οντα)*	existing [already]	**ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη	already existing experiences	
τὸ προσμένον **τὰ προσμένοντα**	[O] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	**ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *remaining further*
τὸ ἄδηλον **τὰ ἄδηλα**	[0] what is unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΝ** *not clear*

38c. Foundation of Existence

ταῦτα Δεῖ διαλαβόντας συνορᾶν ἤδη [0] **περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων: πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι Οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: Πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ᾽ ἄν – σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον**

after [*we*] have grasped these things, It is now necessary to fully [*mentally*] see [0] what is unclear: first then, that Nothing is produced from what does not exist: for Everything would be produced from everything – and would in no way also need seeds

[Bailey] Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds.

First and foremost: nothing can come from something that does not exist. If matter could arise from nonexistence, anything could come from nothing.

ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ looking
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ looking together
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	[0] the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ not looking
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ not clear
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
τὸ μὴ ὂν τὰ μὴ ὄντα	what does not exist	ΜΗ ΟΝ not existing

39a. Perishability

καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ Ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν: πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ Πράγματα – οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο

and if what Disappears was also destroyed into what does not exist: all Things would have perished – without [anything] existing into which they could fully dissolve

[Bailey] And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist.

Matter cannot disintegrate into nonexistence. If something disappearing were completely destroyed into nonexistence, then everything would ultimately perish

τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον τὰ ἀφανιζόμενα	what disappears	ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of not appearing*
This refers to objects that are completely destroyed to the point that the matter composing them is no longer visible – such as sugar dissolving in water.		

39b. Universal Consistency

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν – οἷον νῦν ἐστι – καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται: Οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ: παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν Οὐθέν ἐστιν (ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὸν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιτο)

and indeed, the Universe has always been such – as it is now – and it will always be such: for there is Nothing into which it can transform: because there is Nothing outside of the universe (which could enter into it and make a transformation)

[Bailey] Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

The universe is consistent in its ultimate composition because there is nothing outside of everything that could enter everything and cause it to change.

τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	ΠΑΝ *all*
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in change*

39c. Atomism

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ* Φησι κατ᾽ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ά *Περὶ Φύσεως*} τὸ Πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν: σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ᾽ ἣν, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ Ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον

but indeed {He also says this in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature*} the Universe exists as bodies and as void: that bodies exist, Sensation itself in all [cases] testifies – using this [sensation], the Unseen must be inferred by reasoning

[Bailey] Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.

For what we cannot directly sense, we infer with reasoning from what we can directly sense. Our sensations are the toolkit our reason uses to function.

The universe is fundamentally matter and void. Everything that exists is made up of bodies and space. We know bodies exist because we can see and feel them, and we must use our senses to understand things we cannot directly see, such as the void.

40a. Necessity of Void

Τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν 'κενὸν' καὶ 'χώραν' καὶ 'ἀναφῆ φύσιν' Ὀνομάζομεν – οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ Σώματα ὅπου ἦν, οὐδὲ δι᾽ οὗ ἐκινεῖτο: καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα

but if the location did not exist, which We call 'void' 'space' and 'intangible nature' – Bodies would not have anywhere to be, or [anything] through which they move: just as they are seen moving

[Bailey] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move.

ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
ἡ χώρα **αἱ χῶραι**	space	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*
ἀναφής *(ές)*	intangible	**ΑΝΑΦΗΣ** *not touchable*
ἡ ἀναφὴς φύσις	intangible nature	

40b. Qualities: Symptoms vs. Properties

παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται (οὔτε περιληπτῶς οὔτε ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς) ὡς καθ᾽ ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα, καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τούτων "συμπτώματα" ἢ "συμβεβηκότα" λεγόμενα

beyond these things, Nothing at all is able to be objectively conceived (either with complete comprehension or analogously to what is completely comprehensible) as being comprehend according to whole natures, and not as what are called the "symptoms" of these or "properties"

[Bailey] And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences.

Beyond atoms and void, nothing is able to be conceived that has a wholly complete nature in-and-of-itself. Everything else is an emergent characteristic that comes to exist from arrangements of atoms and void.

The inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are permanent. The inseparable qualities of a compound exist as long as the compound exists. The separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent. The separable qualities of a compound do not even exist for as long as the compound exists.

περιληπτῶς	with complete comprehension	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ** *taken hold around*
τὸ περιληπτόν **τὰ περιληπτά**	what is completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ** *taken hold around*
ἀναλόγως	analogously	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ** *reasoning again*
ἀναλόγως **τοῖς περιληπτοῖς**	analogously to the comprehensible	
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
λαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	comprehended	**ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasping*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling together*
συμβεβηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having endured	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ** *to have walked together*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*

40c. Atomic or Aggregate

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ᾽ καὶ ιε᾽ καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

[Bailey] Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

Some bodies are combinations of atoms – but some bodies are simply the atoms themselves.

ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
ἡ σύνκρισις = **ἡ σύγκρισις** **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ** **ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
τὰ ἐξ ὧν **αἱ συγκρίσεις** **πεποίηνται**	things from which the compounds are formed	

Ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα: εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει Πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι – ἀλλ᾽ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα: οἷα δὴ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπῃ ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται – ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους Ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις

These [objects] exist as indivisible and non-transformable: if Everything is not going to be destroyed into nonexistence – but to endure, prevailing in the dissolutions of compounds, while existing as full in nature: such that they indeed do not have anywhere or any way they will be fully dissolved – It is therefore necessary that the foundations exist as indivisible physical objects

[Bailey] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the nonexistent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

There are objects that cannot be divided or changed. This must be true because everything has not been permanently destroyed and turned into nothing. These objects are strong enough to remain when objects break apart – because they are totally solid and cannot be dissolved. So, the basic building blocks of everything are physically indivisible.

ἄτομος (ον)	indivisible	**ΑΤΟΜΑ** *not cut*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom ("what is indivisible")	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	**ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ** *not thrown change*
ἰσχύων (ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)	prevailing	**ΙΣΧΥΩΝ** *strength*
πλήρης (ες)	full	**ΠΛΗΡΗΣ** *quality from filling*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	**ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ** *through dissolve*
διαλυθήσεσθαι	to be about to be dissolved	
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*

41b. Space Is Infinite In Extent

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι: Τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει – τὸ δὲ Ἄκρον παρ᾽ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται ‹τὸ δὲ Πᾶν οὐ παρ᾽ ἕτερόν τι θεωρεῖται› ὥστε, οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον, πέρας οὐκ ἔχει – πέρας δὲ οὐκ ἔχον: ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον

but indeed, the Universe is infinite: for What is finite has a highest point – and a Boundary is observed relative to something different, ‹however the Universe is not observed relative to anything different› therefore, not having an boundary, it does not have a limit – and what does not have a limit: would be infinite and not finite

[Bailey] Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

The universe is infinite. Anything finite has an end, and an end is only recognized by comparing it to something else. Since there is nothing else to compare the universe to, it must be boundless and infinite.

ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
τὸ ἄπειρον πᾶν	the infinite universe	
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ *result of having finished*
τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	the highest point	ΑΚΡΟΝ *highest*
ἕτερος (ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἙΤΕΡΟΣ *other*
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*

41c. Matter Is Infinite In Quantity

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῷ πλήθει τῶν σωμάτων – ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ Πᾶν – καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κενοῦ

and indeed, in the number of objects – the Universe is infinite – and in the extension of the void

[Bailey] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void.

πλήρης (ες)	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ *quality from filling*
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ *fullness*
τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων	the number of objects	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κενοῦ	the size of the void	

42a. Limit Effects

εἴ τε γὰρ ἦν τὸ Κενὸν ἄπειρον, τὰ δὲ Σώματα ὡρισμένα: οὐθαμοῦ ἂν ἔμενε τὰ Σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα – οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ὑπερείδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀνακοπάς ¬ εἴ τε τὸ Κενὸν ἦν ὡρισμένον: οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ ἄπειρα Σώματα ὅπου ἐνέστη

* for if the Void were infinite, but Bodies were finite: Bodies would stay nowhere, but would be carried through the infinite void while scattered – not having [other bodies] supporting and arranging [them] through their collisions ¬ if the Void were finite: the infinite Bodies would not have anywhere to be

[Bailey] For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

If the void were infinite and atoms were finite – the atoms would be scattered throughout the infinite void. On the other hand, if the void were finite and bodies were infinite – there would not be enough space for all the atoms to exist.

τὸ ὑπερεῖδον τὰ ὑπερεῖδοντα	what supports	ὙΠΕΡΕΙΔΟΝ *appearing over*
ὑπερείδων (ουσα, ον)	supporting	

τὸ στέλλον **τὰ στέλλοντα**	what arranges	**ΣΤΕΛΛΟΝ** *making ready*
στέλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	arranging	

42b. Finite Variety of Atomic Shapes

πρός τε τούτοις, Τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ Μεστά (ἐξ ὧν καὶ αἱ Συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύονται) ἀπερίληπτά ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων: οὐ γὰρ Δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιειλημμένων

besides these [points], the indivisible and full Things in objects (out of which Compounds are produced and into which they thoroughly dissolve) are not completely comprehensible in the [amount of] differences of their shapes: for It is not possible for so many differences to arise from what HAS been completely comprehended about their [atomic] shapes

[Bailey] Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number.

The amount of different atomic shapes is indefinite (incomprehensibly large) – but not infinite. However the amount of each atomic shape is infinite.

μεστός *(ή, όν)*	full	**ΜΕΣΤΟΣ** *filled*
τὸ μεστόν **τὰ μεστά**	what is full	
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἀπερίληπτος *(ος, ον)*	not completely comprehensible	**ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *not taken hold around*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
τὰ ἀπερίληπτά **ταῖς διαφοραῖς** **τῶν σχημάτων**	what is incomprehensible in the differences of shapes	
τὸ περιειλημμένον **τὰ περιειλημμένα**	what has been completely comprehended	**ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of being grasped around*

42c. Infinite Atoms of Each Shape

καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην δὲ σχημάτισιν: ἁπλῶς ἄπειροί εἰσιν αἱ Ὅμοιαι ¬ ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἄπειροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι

and regarding each shape: the Similar [atoms] are absolutely infinite ¬ but in their differences they are not absolutely infinite, but only incomprehensible

[Bailey] And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite , but only incomprehensible in number.

There is an infinite number of each shape of atom ¬ but the number of different shapes of atoms is not infinite (though it is incalculably large).

{43a. Atomic Size Limit}

{οὐδὲ γάρ Φησιν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, (λέγει) δέ ἐπειδὴ αἱ Ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται – εἰ μέλλει Τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἁπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν}

{for [Epicurus] states that division [of atoms] does not happen further into infinity, even though (as he says) the Qualities are transformed – unless Someone is also going to extend those [atoms] absolutely into infinity in [terms of] size}

This scholion notes that, despite the variety that we see in qualities (including the disappearance of qualities), we should not think that objects can continue to be divided forever (although objects can be divided to the point of no longer being visible). The same line of thinking would also have us posit that atoms are infinitely large.

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ATOMON *not cut*
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	TOMH *cut*

43b. Constant Movement

κινοῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ Ἄτομοι τὸν αἰῶνα {φησὶ δὲ ἐνδοτέρω καὶ ἰσοταχῶς αὐτὰς κινεῖσθαι – τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἶξιν ὁμοίαν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κουφοτάτῃ καὶ τῇ βαρυτάτῃ}

the Atoms move continuously forever {further he says that they move with equal speed – with the void offering the same yielding both to the lightest [atom] and to the heaviest [atom]}

[Bailey] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions.

ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	TOMH *cut*
ἄτομος *(ος, ον)*	indivisible	ATOMA *not cut*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ATOMON *not cut*
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ATOMOΣ *not cut*
ἰσοταχῶς	with equal speed	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΩΣ *equal fast*
ἡ εἶξις	yielding	ΕΙΞΙΣ *giving way*
κοῦφος *(η, ον)*	light	κοῦφος *nimble*
κουφότατος *(η, ον)*	lightest	
ἡ κουφοτάτη [ἄτομος]	the lightest [atom]	
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ *heavy*
βαρύτατος *(η, ον)*	heaviest	ΒΑΡΥΤΑΤΟΣ *heaviest*
ἡ βαρυτάτη [ἄτομος]	the heaviest [atom]	

43c. Atomic Interaction

καὶ, Αἱ μὲν εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων διιστάμεναι ¬ Αἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν παλμὸν ἴσχουσιν (ὅταν τύχωσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλειμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμενοι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν)

* also, Some [atoms] stand apart at a distance from each other – while Others retain their vibration (when they happen to have been enclosed by intertangling or are covered by entangling [atoms])

[Bailey] And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

Atoms move at the same speed, either freely or vibrating in an aggregate. Some atoms move far apart from each other, while others just oscillate in one place when they get entangled or are enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

ὁ παλμός **οἱ παλμοί**	vibration	**ΠΑΛΜΟΣ** *pulse*
ἡ περιπλοκή **αἱ περιπλοκαί**	intertangling	**ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ** *weave around*
κλεῖειν	to enclose	**ΚΛΕΙΕΙΝ** *shutting*
κεκλειμένος (η, ον)	having been enclosed	
στεγαζόμενος (η, ον)	covered	**ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shelter*
πλεκτικός (η, ον)	entangling	**ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of weaving*
ἡ πλεκτική **[ἄτομος]**	tangled atom	

44a. Vibration
(Consequence of Atomic Firmness)

ἥ τε γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ Φύσις, ἡ διορίζουσα ἑκάστην αὐτήν, τοῦτο παρασκευάζει (τὴν ὑπέρεισιν οὐχ οἵα τε οὖσα ποιεῖσθαι) – ἥ τε Στερεότης ἡ ὑπάρχουσα αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ (ἐφ᾽ ὁπόσον ἂν ἡ Περιπλοκὴ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως διδῷ). Ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀιδίων τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσῶν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ

firstly, the Nature of the void, which separates every single [atom], prepares this [atomic movement] (not being able to make [any] support) – secondly, the firmness which already exists in [the atoms] creates a rebound upon [their] mutual impact (to the extent that the Intertangling allows reestablishment from the mutual impact). a [beginning] Foundation of these things does not exist, since the atoms and the void are eternal

[Bailey] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation aner the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

Vibration occurs because there is space between atoms in aggregates – each atom is separated by void, which cannot resist their movement. The solidity of the atom causes it to rebound after a collision (even if only a very short distance), when trapped by a mass of entangling atoms. There is no beginning to this process since both atoms and void exist forever.

ἡ στερεότης **αἱ στερεότητες**	firmness	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ** *condition from making stiff*
ἡ κροῦσις **αἱ κρούσεις**	impact	**ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ** *hitting*
ἡ σύγκρουσις **αἱ συγκρούσεις**	mutual impact	**ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ** *hitting together*
ἡ ὑπέρεισις **αἱ ὑπερέισεις**	support (supportive resistance)	**ὙΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ** *going under*

ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ *weave around*
ὁ παλμός	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ *pulse*
ὁ ἀποπαλμός	rebound	ΑΠΟΠΑΛΜΟΣ *pulsing off*
*one step in the vibration (**ὁ παλμός**) process*		
ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ *weave around*
ἡ ἀποκατάστασις αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reestablishment	ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ *placed thoroughly back*
*another step in the vibration (**ὁ παλμός**) process*		
ἀποπαλμοί καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reboundings and reestablishments	
description of the vibration process		

44b. {Atomic Qualities}

{Φησὶ δ᾽ ἐνδοτέρω, μηδὲ Ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βάρους – τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι, ἐν ταῖς *Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσί* φησι – πᾶν τε Μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι περὶ αὐτάς: οὐδέποτε, γοῦν, Ἄτομος ὤφθη αἰσθήσει}

{He says within [his books], that no Quality at all for the atoms exists except shape, size, and weight – that Color varies with the position of the atoms, he states in the *Twelve Elementary Principles* – and that concerning them every Size does not exist: never, at least, has an Atom ever been perceived by sensation}

Atoms have no qualities except shape, size, and weight. Color varies with the arrangement of the atoms.

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from [asking] what kind*
αἱ ποιότητες περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους	qualities of the atoms	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ *heavy*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ θέσις τῶν ἀτόμων	the position of the atoms	
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ *skin color*

45a. The Basics

ἡ τοσαύτη δὴ Φωνή, τούτων πάντων μνημονευομένων, τὸν ἱκανὸν τύπον ὑποβάλλει τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίαις

such a Statement, with all these things being remembered, establishes a sufficient [*mental*] impression for objective concepts of the nature of existing things

[Bailey] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, a ord a suecient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*

τὸ μνημονευόμενον τὰ μνημονευόμενα	what is remembered	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of "addition to" thinking*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
ὁ ἱκανὸς τύπος	a sufficient imprint	
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίαι	conceptions about the nature of things	

45b. Similar & Dissimilar Cosmoi

ἀλλὰ μὴν, καὶ Κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν: οἵ θ᾽ ὅμοιοι τούτῳ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι – αἵ τε γὰρ Ἄτομοι (ἄπειροι οὖσαι ὡς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη) φέρονται καὶ πορρωτάτω

but indeed, there are also infinite Cosmoi: both those similar to this one and dissimilar – for the Atoms (being infinite as has just been thoroughly shown) move even further on

[Bailey] Furthermore, there are inlnite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being inlnite in number, as was proved already, are borne on far out into space.

Since the number of atoms is infinite they continue to spread out into space and form infinite worlds – some worlds are like ours and other worlds are unlike ours.

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
οἱ κόσμοι ἄπειροί	infinite cosmoi	
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
οἱ ὅμοιοι κόσμοι	similar cosmoi	
ἀνόμοιος *(ον)*	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ *not similar*
οἱ ἀνόμοιοι κόσμοι	dissimilar cosmoi	
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ *not cut*
αἱ ἄπειροι ἄτομοι	infinite atoms	
αἱ ὁμοίαι ἄτομοι	similar atoms	
αἱ ἀνόμοιοι ἄτομοι	dissimilar atoms	

45c. Infinite Cosmoi

οὐ γὰρ κατανήλωνται αἱ τοιαῦται Ἄτομοι ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο κόσμος (ἢ ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν ποιηθείη) ¬ οὔτ᾽ εἰς ἕνα οὔτ᾽ εἰς πεπερασμένους (οὔθ᾽ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι οὔθ᾽ ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις) – ὥστε οὐδὲν τὸ Ἐμποδοστατῆσόν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων

for such Atoms from which a cosmos could come into being (or by which it could be made) would not all have been totally expended ¬ neither in one [cosmos] nor in a finite amount (whether on those alike or on those different from these) – so that in no way does an Obstacle exist for the infinity of cosmoi

[Bailey] For those atoms, which are of such nature that a world could be created out of them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike, or on those which are diferent from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the inlnite number of the worlds.

Nothing prevents the existence of an infinite number of cosmoi.

καταναλίσκειν	to totally expend	**ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *in the state of taking thoroughly up / away*
καταναλωθῆναι	to be consumed	**ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΩΘΗΝΑΙ** *in the state of being taken thoroughly up / away*
τὸ ἐμποδοστατῆσον **τὰ ἐμποδοστατῆσαντα**	obstacle	**ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΗΣΟΝ** *standing in [the way of] foot*

46a. Films: A Particular Type of Impression

καὶ μὴν καὶ, Τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσί ¬ λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων: οὔτε γὰρ Συστάσεις ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι γίνεσθαι τοιαῦται – οὔτ᾽Ἐπιτηδειότητες πρὸς κατεργασίας τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ λεπτοτήτων γίνεσθαι – οὔτε Ἀπόρροιαι τὴν ἑξῆς θέσιν καὶ βάσιν διατηροῦσαι (ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον): τούτους δὲ τοὺς τύπους 'εἴδωλα' Προσαγορεύομεν

and indeed, impressions exist in a similar shape as solid objects ¬ although they are far different from what is apparent in [their] subtlety: for neither are Compositions such as this unable to be produced in the surrounding [air] – nor [are] Supplies [unable] to be produced for an outflow with cavities and subtlety – nor [are] Effluences [unable to be produced] fully preserving [their] position in succession and order (as they also had in the hard objects): these are the impressions which We refer to as 'films'

[Bailey] Moreover, there are images like in shape to the solid bodies, far surpassing perceptible things in their subtlety of texture. For it is not impossible that such emanations should be formed in that which surrounds the objects, nor that there should be opportunities for the formation of such hollow and thin frames, nor that there should be effluences which preserve the respective position and order which they had before in the solid bodies: these images we call idols.

*Impressions (**τύποι**) are emitted by objects – the flow of atoms through an object creates an imprint in the air, which travels thought the air, and can make an impression upon us. Imprints that maintain the same position and order of the object that emitted them are known as films (**εἴδωλα,** idols, phantoms).*

Air is a mix of void and atoms. Atoms continually travel through objects and are released from their surfaces into the air. This forms patterns that persist through the air. When these physical patterns encounter our bodies, they produce various sensations. When these physical patterns produce sensations with continuity, we know they correspond to their source-object.

ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ὁμοιοσχήμων *(ον)*	similar shape	**῾ΟΜΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ** *similar form*
ἡ στερεότης **αἱ στερεότητες**	firmness	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ** *condition from making stiff*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*

ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtlety	**ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being fine/thin*
ἀπέχων (ουσα, ον)	distant / different	**ΑΠΕΧΩΝ** *holding away*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ** *not powerful*
ἡ ἐπιτηδειότης αἱ ἐπιτηδειότητες	supply	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from being suitable towards*
ἡ κατεργασία αἱ κατεργασίαι	outflow	**ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work thoroughly*
τὸ κοίλωμα τὰ κοιλώματα	cavity	**ΚΟΙΛΩΜΑΤΑ** *concave*
ἡ ἀπόρροια αἱ ἀπόρροιαι	effluence	**ΑΠΟΡΡΟΙΑΙ** *flow off*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἝΞΗΣ** *possessing*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
ἡ βάσις αἱ βάσεις	order	**ΒΑΣΙΣ** *process of going*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	**ΤΗΡΕΙΝ** *protecting / watching*
διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	**διατηρειν** *completely protecting / watching*
διατηρῶν (οῦσα, ῶν)	fully preserving	
αἱ διατηροῦσαι ἀπόρροιαι	the preserving effluences	
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*

46b. Total Speed

καὶ μὴν καὶ, ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Φορὰ (κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψόντων γινομένη) πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινοήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ: βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους Ἀντικοπὴ καὶ Οὐκαντικοπὴ ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει

and indeed, the Transmission [of something] through the void (while happening without any clash of something colliding against) altogether fulfills every completely comprehensible length in a non-completely conceivable [amount of] time: for [it is] Collision and Non-collision [that] take on a similarity to slowness and speed

[Hicks] Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

Without any resistance, movement through the void can cover massive distances in an instant.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ *emptiness*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἡ ἀπάντησις αἱ ἀπαντήσεις	clash	ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΙΣ *action against all*
τὸ ἀντικοψόν τὰ ἀντικοψά	what collides against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΨΟΝ *beat against*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τό μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ *length*
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτά	what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ *taken hold around*
περιληπτός *(ή, όν)*	completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ *taken hold around*
ἀπερινόητος *(ον)*	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not capable of seeing around*
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
βραδύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ *slow*
τό βράδος = ἡ βραδύτης αἱ βραδύτητες	slowness	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ *condition of being slow*
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ *swift*
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *beating against*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *not beating against*
τό ὁμοίωμα τὰ ὁμοιώματα	similarity	ὉΜΟΙΩΜΑ *result of [being] similar*

47a. Apparent Instantaneity of Films

οὐ μὴν, οὐδ᾽ ἅμα κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους αὐτὸ τὸ φερόμενον Σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται – ἀδιανόητον γάρ. καὶ Τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δήποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου ¬ οὐκ, ἐξ οὗ ἂν Περιλάβωμεν τὴν φοράν, τόπου Ἔσται ἀφιστάμενον: ἀντικοπῇ γὰρ ὅμοιον Ἔσται (κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀντικόπτον Καταλίπωμεν) – χρήσιμον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο Κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον

however, during the [minute] times observable through reasoning, a Frame [of film] that is being carried does not itself arrive at multiple locations simultaneously – for [*such instantaneity*] is [mentally] imperceptible. although This [frame of film] does indeed arrive as a whole in sensible time from somewhere in infinite [space] ¬ [the frame's location] will not [really] be different from the location from which We would completely comprehend [its] transmission, *{i.e., even if a body moves so fast that it visually appears to arrive at multiple places at once, it is mentally perceivable that a body does not arrive at multiple places at once}*:

because *{being in multiple locations simultaneously}* will be similar to a collision (even if up to this point We leave undisputed the speed of [its] transmission as not colliding) – indeed, it is useful also to hold [in mind] this component [fact]

[Hicks] Not that if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable) – although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if [this motion] changed its direction – that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance (even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight). This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind.

[DeWitt] It certainly must not be thought, however, that the moving mass also arrives at the same time at the greater distances in units of time discernible only by reason, for it is unthinkable, and this [*the moving mass*], arriving suddenly at a perceptible moment out of the infinite [*that is, out of the invisible*], will be inseparable from the spot where we shall first discern the motion, for it [*the fact of its becoming visible*] will be equivalent to retardation, even if down to this point we leave the velocity of the motion unimpeded. It is worth while to grasp this principle too.

Past a certain rate, speeds appear to be similarly instantaneous. However, moving body does not reach more than one place at the same time – this is impossible (and impossible to imagine).

Even if a frame of film moves so fast that it visually appears to arrive at multiple places at once, it is mentally perceivable that it cannot arrive at multiple places at once. Instead, we know the frame will follow a path that is physically viable – and therefore also mentally comprehensible

A moving body cannot occupy multiple places at once when we think about time rationally. However, when considering perceptible time (observable motion), the body moves continuously from some point in the infinite and remains connected to the place from which we can understand its motion. The key point is the continuity and connectedness of the moving body with the space it moves through, making its motion comprehensible. Consider a torch that is brought into a room and fills it with light – the light seems to fill the room instantly, although really it had to fill the room in a physical sequence – nevertheless the source remains the same.

θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ** *envisioning*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	**ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body [here, "frame"]	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	most / greatest	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most filling*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "multiple"]	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *towards arriving*
τὸ νόημα **τὰ νοήματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*

ἀπερινόητος (ον)	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not capable of seeing around*
ἀδιανόητος (ον)	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not capable of seeing through*
διανοητός	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ *capable of seeing through*
συναφικνούμενος (η, ον)	to arrive as a whole	ΣΥΝΑΦΙΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *towards arriving together*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of perceiving*
αἰσθητός (ή, όν)	(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ *perceiving*
ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἀφιστάμενος (η, ον)	different	ΑΦΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ *standing away*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*
ἀντικόπτων (οῦσα, ον)	colliding [against]	
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *beating against*
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *not beating against*
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ *swift*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
χρήσιμος (ον)	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ *necessary*
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ *result of a row (in a series)*
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ *instance of a row (in a series)*

47b. Thinness of Films

εἶθ᾽ ὅτι τὰ Εἴδωλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται Οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων – ὅθεν καὶ τάχη ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει (πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς τῷ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῶν) μηθὲν ἀντικόπτειν (ἢ ὀλίγα ἀντικόπτειν: πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις, εὐθὺς ἀντικόπτειν τι)

accordingly, Nothing among visible things contests that Films are endowed with unsurpassable subtlety – from which [*subtlety, Films*] also have unsurpassable speeds (having every symmetric passageway in relation to [their] infinite nature) colliding against nothing (or colliding against a few things: for among many and infinite [*atoms*], [*films*] are immediately colliding against something)

[Bailey] Next, nothing among perceptible things contradicts the belief that the images have unsurpassable fineness of texture. And for this reason they have also unsurpassable speed of motion, since the movement of all their atoms is uniform, and besides nothing or very few things hinder their emission by collisions, whereas a body composed of many or infinite atoms is at once hindered by collisions.

The extreme subtlety of the films is not contradicted by any observed facts. Because they are so thin, they can move very quickly and easily through void spaces. Their constant flow faces little to no resistance – unlike larger groupings of atoms that encounter much more resistance to their movement.

ἡ λεπτότης **αἱ λεπτότητες**	subtlety	**ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being fine/thin*
ἀνυπέρβλητος *(ον)*	unsurpassable	**ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ** *not thrown over*
ἡ λεπτότης **ἀνυπέρβλητος**	unsurpassable subtlety	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
τὸ τάχος **τὰ τάχη**	speed	**ΤΑΧΟΣ** *swift*
τὸ τάχος **ἀνυπέρβλητον**	unsurpassable speed	
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
πᾶς πόρος **σύμμετρος**	every proportionate passage	
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating against*

48a. Films Move Quickly

πρός τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ Γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει

in addition to these things, the Creation of films occurs simultaneously with conception

[Bailey] Besides this, nothing contradicts the belief that the creation of the idols takes place as quick as thought.

ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	**ἉΜΑ** *at once*
τὸ νόημα **τὰ νόηματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
ἡ ἐπίνοια **αἱ ἐπινοίαι**	[objective] concept	**ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ** *seeing upon*

48b. Films Stream Off Aggregates

καὶ γὰρ Ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχής (οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει, διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν) σῴζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον (εἰ καὶ ἐνίοτε συγχεομένη ὑπάρχει)

for the Flowing [of atoms] from the surface of objects is continuous (not noticeable by shrinking, due to [its] replenishment) preserving the position and arrangement of atoms in the solid [object] for a long time (although indeed sometimes it exists as mixed)

[Bailey] For the flow of atoms from the surface of bodies is continuous, yet it cannot be detected by any lessening in the size of the object because of the constant filling up of what is lost. The flow of images preserves for a long time the position and order of the atoms in the solid body, though it is occasionally confused.

Particles constantly stream off from the surface of objects, but we do not see those objects get smaller because other particles take their place. These particles mostly retain the same position and arrangement as when they were part of the solid body, although sometimes they are altered while traveling.

ἡ ῥεῦσις **αἱ ῥεῦσεις**	flowing	**ΡΕΥΣΙΣ** *action of flowing*
ἡ ἐπιπολή **αἱ ἐπιπολαί**	surface	**ΕΠΙΠΟΛΗ** *being [πέλ] upon*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	**ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ** *holding together*
ἡ συνεχὴς ῥεῦσις	continuous flowing	
ἐπίδηλος *(ον)*	noticeable	**ΕΠΙΔΗΛΟΣ** *shine upon*
ἡ μείωσις **αἱ μείωσεις**	shrinking	**ΜΕΙΩΣΙΣ** *action of reducing*
ἡ ἀνταναπλήρωσις **αἱ ἀνταναπλήρωσεις**	replenishment	**ΑΝΤΑΝΑΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΣ** *action of filling again in place of*
σῴζων *(σῴζουσα, σῷζον)*	preserving	**ΣΩΙΖΩΝ** *saving*
ἡ σῴζουσα ῥεῦσις	preservative flowing	
ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
ἡ τάξις **αἱ τάξεις**	arrangement	**ΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordered*
ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις	position and arrangement	
συγχεόμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	mixed	**ΣΥΓΧΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *together mixed*
ἡ συγχεομένη ῥεῦσις	mixed flowing	

48c. Formation of Films

καὶ Συστάσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὀξεῖαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι (καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ Τρόποι τινὲς γεννητικοὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεων εἰσίν)

and swift Compositions [of films] are produced in the surrounding environment because there is no need for deeply filling all up (and there are also some other Ways that are generative of such natures)

[Bailey] Moreover, compound idols are quickly formed in the air around, because it is not necessary for their substance to be filled in deep inside: and besides there are certain other methods in which existences of this sort are produced.

Films form very quickly in the air because they are created by streaming or reflecting off the surface of objects. Additionally, films can also be formed by passing through the entire object.

ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
τὸ περιέχον **τὰ περιέχοντα**	surrounding environment	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ** *hold around*

ὀξύς *(ὀξεῖ, ὀξύ)*	*[of objects]* swift, *[of people]* keen	**ΟΞΥΣ** *sharp*
τὸ συμπλήρωμα τὰ συμπληρώματα	filling all up	**ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ** *filling together*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

48d. Film Correspondence

Οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται [A] ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: ἂν βλέπῃ Τίς τινα τρόπον [E] τὰς ἐναργείας (ἵνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς) ἀνοίσει

None of these things is contested [A] by the sensations: if Someone sees the certain way [sensation] will bring up [E] detectible realities (and so also the correspondences from external sources towards us)

[Bailey] For not one of these beliefs is contradicted by our sensations, if one looks to see in what way sensation will bring us the clear visions from external objects, and in what way again the corresponding sequences of qualities and movements.

Films preserve a general correspondence between objects and the observer – and it is through a continuity of films that we develop confidence in their accurate correspondence with their source-object.

ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος *(α, ον)*	contested	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ** *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργείαι	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	**ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ** *experience together*
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding environment	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ** *hold around*
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἀνοίσειν	to bring up *(in the future)*	**ΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΝ** *[will carry] up*

49a. Basis Of Sight & Thought

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν Ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι

It is also necessary to think that – by something entering [us] from external sources – We see and [mentally] perceive [their] shapes

[Bailey] Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes.

We are able to see and think about objects and their qualities when films streaming off of external objects contact and enter our bodies.

νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*

49b. Penetrative Impressions

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ Ἔξω τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξὺ ἡμῶν τε κἀκείνων ¬ οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων, ἢ ὡνδήποτε ῥευμάτων ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα παραγινομένων, οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων: ὁμοχρόων τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρμόττον μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὠκέως ταῖς φοραῖς χρωμένων

for external Objects would not imprint inside [us] their own nature of both color and shape through the air that is between us and them ¬ either through rays, or through flows of any kind originating from us to them, nearly so well as with certain impressions entering into us from the situation: [impressions] of the same color and similarly formed [entering us] according to the size that fits into [our] vision or [mental] perception, while quickly using their transmissions

[Bailey] For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any sort which pass from us to them – nearly so well as if models, similar in color and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our sight or into our mind;

External things cannot stamp an impression of their color and shape on us through the air between them merely through rays or flows. Instead, we see and think when actual films from the objects themselves, which match the color and shape of the source-object, enter our senses.

ἐναποσφραγίζειν	to imprint inside	**ΕΝΑΠΟΣΦΡΑΓΙΖΕΙΝ** *seal away within*
τὸ ἔξωθεν **τὰ ἔξωθεν**	what is external	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
τὰ ἔξω	external objects	**ΕΞΩ** *outside*
ἡ ἀκτίς **αἱ ἀκτῖνες**	ray	**ΑΚΤΙΣ** *beam*
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *skin color*
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ ῥεῦσις **αἱ ῥεῦσεις**	flowing	**ῬΕΥΣΙΣ** *action of flowing*
τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**ῬΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*
παραγινόμενος *(η, ον)*	originating from	**ΠΑΡΑΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into* *being alongside*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*

ἐπεισιών (οῦσα, όν)	entering into	ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ *going upon*
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ *state of the result of doing / affair*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
ὁμόχροος (ον)	same color	ὉΜΟΧΡΟΟΣ *same color*
ὁμοιόμορφος (ον)	similarly formed	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ *similar form*
ἐναρμόττων (ουσα, ον)	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ *adapting into*
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ *eye*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
ὠκέως	quickly	ΩΚΕΩΣ *quick*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*

50a. Proportional Impact

εἶτα, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων – καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σῳζόντων – κατὰ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν σύμμετρον ἐπερεισμὸν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεμνίῳ τῶν ἀτόμων πάλσεως

accordingly, because of this, while the [Transmissions] are demonstrating the appearance of a single continuous thing – they are also preserving the correspondence [of qualities] from the original source – according to the symmetric impingement [of the transmissions upon us] from that location, [coming] out of the vibration of the atoms deep in that solid object

[Bailey] moving along swiftly, and so by this means reproducing the image of a single continuous thing and preserving the corresponding sequence of qualities and movements from the original object as the result of their uniform contact with us, kept up by the vibration of the atoms deep in the interior of the concrete body.

Films create a continuous impression because they maintain a connection with their original object. Films move faster than the speed of sight: because these films move very fast, they look like a single continuous object and stay connected to their original object. This happens in part because the atoms inside solid object are constantly vibrating.

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	what appears	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ *process of appearing*
ἀποδιδούς (οῦσα, όν) ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ *giving away*
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ *experience together*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ *result of situated under*
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location (thence)	ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ *from over there*

σύνμετρος = σύμμετρος (ον)	symmetric [in proportion]	ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ *measure together*
ὁ ἐπερεισμός	impingement	ΕΠΕΡΕΙΣΜΟΣ *action pushing against*
ὁ σύμμετρος ἐπερεισμός	proportionate impingement	
ὁ παλμός οἱ παλμοί	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ *pulse*

50b. Film Accuracy

καὶ ἣν ἂν Λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις (εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων) – Μορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου

and that appearance We receive in an objectively focusing way with [our mental] perception or with [our] sense-organs (whether of shape or of properties) – is itself the Form of the hard object, coming about from concentration [of the film] in succession or [mere] residue of the film

[Bailey] And every image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape or the properties of the concrete object, and is produced by the constant repetition of the image or the impression it has left.

We accurately perceive the impressions of films. This is true both for concentrations of films and mere residues of films.

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of perceiving*
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ *form*
ἡ μορφῆς φαντασία	the appearance of form	*i.e., an image*
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ *to have walked together*
ἡ συμβεβηκότων φαντασία	appearance of properties	
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἝΞΗΣ *possessing*
ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ *action of compacting*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα τοῦ εἰδώλου	concentration of the film in succession	
τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα τὰ ἐγκαταλείμματα	[mere] residue	ΕΓΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΜΜΑ *the result of fully thoroughly leaving behind*

τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου	the residue of the film	
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ἡ τοῦ στερεμνίου μορφή	the form of the hard [object]	

50c. Non-Attestation & Contestation

τὸ δὲ Ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ Διημαρτημένον [Δ+] **ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν ‹ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένοντος›** {M} **ἐπιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι ἢ** {-W} **μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι – εἶτ᾽** {-M} **οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρουμένου ‹ἢ** {W} **ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου›**

> [-α] What is false and What is thoroughly mistaken always exist [Δ+] in an addition of judgment ‹regarding what is still pending› {M} to be attested or {-W} not to be contested – and subsequently is {-M} not attested ‹or {W} is contested›
>
> [Bailey] Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to what is waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed or is contradicted.

Errors and miscalculations do not come from sensation, but from judgment. When we affirm facts that need to be checked – and then these facts are later proven wrong or contradicted.

τὸ ψεῦδος **τὰ ψεύδη**	[-α] what is false	**ΨΕΥΔΟΣ** *falsehood / lie*
τὸ διημαρτημένον **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	what is thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *fully missing the mark*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον **τὰ προσδοξαζόμενα**	[Δ+] an addition of judgement [i.e., "a theory"]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of addition to seeming*
προσμένων *(ουσα, ον)*	still pending	**ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ** *remaining further*
τὸ προσμένον **τὰ προσμένοντα**	[O] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	**ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *remaining further*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα**	[M] what is attested	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of testifying upon*
ἐπιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι	{M} to be attested *(in the future)*	
τὸ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον	[-M] what is not attested	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι	{W} to be contested *(in the future)*	
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα**	[W] what is contested	

51a. Image Similarity

ἤ τε γὰρ Ὁμοιότης τῶν φαντασμῶν (οἱονεὶ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένων ἢ καθ᾽ ὕπνους γινομένων ἢ κατ᾽ ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων) οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς 'οὖσί' τε καὶ 'ἀληθέσι' προσαγορευομένοις – εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ Τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἃ Παραβάλλομεν

in fact, the Similarity of what appears (whether comprehend in an image or occurring through sleep or through certain other attentions of [mental] perception or of the rest of the criteria) would never at anytime occur with the things that are referred to as 'existing' and 'true' – unless those very [films] to which We compare also existed

[Bailey] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.

We know things exist because we sense them. Our thoughts and dreams come from impressions of existing objects. The impressions that we see (or dream or imagine) would never look like real and true things unless we had contact with actual objects. The similarity of mental impressions to real and existing things would never arise at any time unless we had those real things for direct comparison.

ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition of being similar*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	what appears	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ *process of appearing*
λαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ *grasping*
ἡ εἰκών αἱ εἰκόνες	image	ΕΙΚΩΝ *portraying*
ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ὙΠΝΟΣ *sleep*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῆς διανοίας	some attentions to perception	
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων	some attentions of the other standards	
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not concealed*
προσαγορευόμενος *(η, ον)*	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *speaking publicly toward*
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in across*

51b. Logical Additions

τὸ δὲ Διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ μὴ Ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς – συνημμένην μὲν τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ ¬ διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν {καθ᾽ ἣν τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται}

What is thoroughly mistaken would not exist if We did not also comprehend a certain other movement in us ourselves – connected to our appearance-based attention ¬ but having a differentiation {*through which* Error *is produced*}

[Bailey] And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it;

Mental impressions are necessary for thinking. Mistakes happen because we feel another kind of movement inside us (thinking) that is linked to, but different from, the impressions we receive from external sources.

τὸ διημαρτημένον **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	what is thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *fully missing the mark*
τὸ κίνημα **τὰ κινήματα**	[specific] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΜΑ** *result of moving*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
τις κίνησις **ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς**	some movement within us ourselves	
συνημμένος *(α, ον)*	connected	**ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *joined together*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός **οἱ φαντασμοί**	what appears	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ** *process of appearing*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
ἡ φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολή	our appearance-based attention	
ἡ διάληψις **αἱ διαλήψεις**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold separation*

51c. Attestation & Non-Contestation

κατὰ δὲ ταύτην, ἐὰν μὲν [-M] μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ [W] ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται ¬ ἐὰν δὲ [M] ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ [-W] μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ἀληθές

and regarding this [mental activity of judgment in us], if it [-M] is not attested or [W] is contested, Falsity is produced ¬ but if it [M] is attested or [-W] is non contested, Truth [is produced]

[Bailey] and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.

[Δ] Opinions about [A] perceptions can be (-α) false, but [A] the perceptions themselves are always true (α) – they must be (α) real because they physically affect us. However, we need to {Δ} think about and judge these "honest" [A] reports of our sensations to figure out the extent that they do, in fact, accurately correspond to [θ] external objects and circumstances.

A [Δα] true opinion is established by the full correspondence of that [Δ] opinion to [θ] external objects and their circumstances. If our [Δ] opinion is {-M} not attested by evidence or is {W} contested by evidence, it is (-α) false; but if our opinion is {M} attested by evidence or at least is {-W} not contested by evidence, (α) it is true.

An example of something {-W} not contested by evidence is the existence of extraterrestrial life – which is rightfully considered (α) to exist, despite {M} not being attested by [θ] direct evidence.

52a. Basis In Reality

καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν Κατέχειν – ἵνα μήτε τὰ Κριτήρια ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας – μήτε τὸ Διημαρτημένον, ὁμοίως βεβαιούμενον, πάντα συνταράττῃ

firmly Maintaining this judgment is indeed very necessary – so that the criteria according to [E] detectible reality are not confuted – and What is thoroughly mistaken would not, while being similarly affirmed, confuse everything

[Bailey] Therefore we must do our best to keep this doctrine in mind, in order that on the one hand the standards of judgment dependent on the clear visions may not be undermined, and on the other error may not be as firmly established as truth and so throw all into confusion.

Ideas not based on sensation have no basis in reality. We must avoid rejecting the clear evidence of our senses and we must reject thoughts not based in our sense – otherwise we will confuse reality with our own ideas.

σφόδρα	very	**ΣΦΟΔΡΑ** *vehement*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	**ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *thoroughly holding*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	**ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping back*
ἀναιρεῖσθαι	to be confuted	
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
τὸ διημαρτημένον **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	what is thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *fully missing the mark*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
βεβαιούμενος *(η, ον)*	being affirmed	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *firm standing*
συνταράττειν	to confuse	**ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *agitating together*

52b. Origin of Sound

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Ἀκούειν γίνεται ῥεύματος φερομένου ἀπὸ τοῦ φωνοῦντος ἢ ἠχοῦντος ἢ ψοφοῦντος ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε ἀκουστικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζοντος

but indeed, Hearing is produced because a flow is carried off of what is speaking or echoing or making noise or in any way producing an auditory experience

[Bailey] Moreover, hearing, too, results when a current is carried o from the object speaking or sounding or making a noise, or causing in any other way a sensation of hearing.

Sound is a current perpetuated through air. Hearing happens when a flow of sound travels from an object to us.

ἀκούειν	to hear	**ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ** *listening*
τὸ ἀκούειν	hearing	
τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**ῬΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	**ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing*
φωνῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	speaking	**ΦΩΝΩΝ** *speaking*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
ἠχῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	echoing	**ΗΧΩΝ** *sound*
ψοφῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making noise	**ΨΟΦΩΝ** *noise*

ὁπωσδήποτε	in any way	ὉΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ *indefinite in what way*
ἀκουστικός *(ή, όν)*	auditory	ἈΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of hearing*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*

52c. Sound Waves

τὸ δὲ Ῥεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα [1] τινὰ διασῴζοντας συμπάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ [2] ἑνότητα ἰδιότροπον, διατείνουσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν καὶ τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν ¬ εἰ δὲ μή γε, τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἔνδηλον παρασκευάζουσαν

this Flow is dispersed into homoioméric [*i.e., similarly composed*] particles, which simultaneously preserves [1] a certain correspondence with one another and [2] a particular type of unity, which extends [back] towards the object that sent [the flow of sound] and [this particular unity] usually makes the focused sensation [of specific sounds] in that [recipient of the flow] ¬ otherwise, it only makes [the presence of] an external source fully clear

[Bailey] Now this current is split up into particles, each like the whole, which at the same time preserve a correspondence of qualities with one another and a unity of character which stretches right back to the object which emitted the sound: this unity it is which in most cases produces comprehension in the recipient, or, if not, merely makes manifest the presence of the external object.

Sound waves are composed of particles. Currents of sound break into tiny particles that have a direct connection with the object that produced the sound. This connection allows us to understand the source of the sound or at least allows us to understand that there is something, external to us, that is making a sound.

τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ *result of flowing*
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαι	homoeomeria	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ *state of similar parts*
ὁμοιομερής *(ές)*	"similarly composed" homoiomeric	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ *similar parts*
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ *bulk*
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ *scatter through*
διασπείρεσθαι	to be dispersed	
διασῴζων *(ουσα, ον)*	preserving	ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΩΝ *fully saving*
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ *experience together*
ἡ ἑνότης αἱ ἑνότητες	unity	ἙΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from oneness*
ἰδιότροπος *(ον)*	particular type of	ἸΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *particular way*
διατείνων *(ουσα, ον)*	extending	ΔΙΑΤΕΙΝΩΝ *stretching across*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ἈΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready away*
ἀποστεῖλας *(α, αν)*	having sent away	
τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν τὰ ἀποστεῖλαντα	the object that sent	ἈΠΟΣΤΕΙΛΑΝ *result of sending away*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑἸΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*

ἡ ἐπαίσθησις **αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις**	focused sensation	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *upon perceiving*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
τὸ αἰσθητήριον **τὰ αἰσθητήρια**	sense-organ	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of perceiving*
ποιῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making	**ΠΟΙΩΝ** *gathering*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
τὸ ἔξωθεν **τὰ ἔξωθεν**	an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(θ) fully clear	**ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear within*
παρασκευάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	providing [here, "makes"]	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΩΝ** *preparing alongside*

53a. Direct Correspondence

ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης τινὸς ἐκεῖθεν συμπαθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἡ τοιαύτη Ἐπαίσθησις

for, without some correspondence being carried back from that location [that made the sound], a focused Sensation such as this would not occur

[Bailey] For without the transference from the object of some correspondence of qualities, comprehension of this nature could not result.

Hearing is based on material transmission from object to observer. Without the transmission of a certain connection between the parts from the object, we could not have the sensation of hearing.

ἀναφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried back	**ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing back*
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location *(thence)*	**ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ** *from over there*
ἡ συμπάθεια **αἱ συμπάθειαι**	correspondence	**ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ** *experience together*
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις **αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις**	focused sensation	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *upon perceiving*

53b. Mechanics of Sound

οὐκ αὐτὸν οὖν Δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν Ἀέρα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι – πολλὴν γὰρ ἔνδειαν ἕξει Τοῦτο πάσχων ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνης ¬ ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς τὴν γινομένην πληγὴν ἐν ἡμῖν (ὅταν φωνὴν Ἀφίωμεν) τοιαύτην ἔκθλιψιν ὄγκων τινῶν ῥεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι (Ἣ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει)

therefore, It is not necessary to think that the air itself is shaped by an emitted statement and [sounds] of the same kind – for this [air] will have a great lack of being affected by that [sound] ¬ but [It is necessary to consider that] the strike produced directly inside us (when We emit a statement) makes such a squeezing out of certain particles that produce a wind-like flow (Which produces an auditory experience in us)

[Bailey] We must not then suppose that the actual air is molded into shape by the voice which is emitted or by other similar sounds – for it will be very far from being so acted upon by it – but that the blow which takes place inside us, when we emit our voice, causes at once a squeezing out of certain particles, which produce a stream of breath, of such a character as to afford us the sensation of hearing.

The void can never affect anything and the void cannot be affected by anything in any way. Air, which is a mixture of atoms and void, can affect and be affected. Nevertheless, we should not think that the air itself is shaped by the voice or sound. Instead, when we make a sound, we make a movement of particles that flow in current. This current producing the sensation of hearing when it contacts an organ that can hear.

νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
προιέμενος *(η, ον)*	emitted	**ΠΡΟΙΕΜΕΝΟΣ** *throw before*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	**ὉΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ** *same born*
σχηματίζειν	to assume a shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *forming*
σχηματίζεσθαι	to be shaped	
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ΕΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*
πάσχων *(ουσα, ον)*	affected [by]	**ΠΑΣΧΩΝ** *suffering*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
ἡ πληγή **αἱ πληγαί**	strike	**ΠΛΗΓΗ** *to hit*
ἀφιέναι	to emit	**ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ** *send away*
ἡ θλῖψις **αἱ θλίψεις**	a crushing	**ΘΛΙΨΙΣ** *process of squeezing*
ἡ ἔκθλιψις **αἱ ἔκθλιψεις**	a squeezing out	**ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ** *process of squeezing out*
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**ῬΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ** *quality of result of breathing*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive [here, "that produce"]	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of completing out*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἀκουστικός *(ή, όν)*	auditory	**ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of hearing*

53c. Smell

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὴν ὀσμὴν Νομιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ Ὄγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι, σύμμετροι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν: οἱ μὲν Τοῖοι τεταραγμένως καὶ ἀλλοτρίως ¬ οἱ δὲ Τοῖοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες

and indeed, It is necessary to think that smell, like sound, would never produce any experience unless certain Particles existed that are carried away from those situations, which are symmetric [*in proportion*] for moving that sense-organ: [*and according to their proportions*] Some [*particles move the sense organ*] with disturbance and in a foreign way ¬ while Others do so without disturbance and compatibly

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must suppose that smell too, just like hearing, could never bring about any sensation, unless there were certain particles carried o from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ, some of them in a manner disorderly and alien to it, others in a regular manner and akin in nature.

Smell, like sound, would not produce any sensation for us, if particles from their source-objects did not reach our nose or ears. Some particles feel strange or disruptive (when they contact a part of our body that can sense the contact), while other particles are calming and comforting (when they contact).

ἡ ὀσμή **αἱ ὀσμαί**	smell	**ΟΣΜΗ** *odor*
ἡ ἀκοή **αἱ ἀκοαί**	sound	**ΑΚΟΗ** *hearing*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἐργάζεσθαι	to be working	**ΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *work*
ἐργάσασθαι	to accomplish	
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἀποφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried away	**ΑΠΟΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing out*
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
τὸ αἰσθητήριον **τὰ αἰσθητήρια**	sense-organ	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of perceiving*
τεταραγμένως	with disturbance	**ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ** *having been agitated*
ἀλλότριος *(ία, ιον)*	foreign	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ** *different other*
ἀλλοτρίως	in a foreign way	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ** *different other*
ἡ ταραχή **αἱ ταραχαί**	disturbance	**ΤΑΡΑΧΗ** *agitating*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ἀτάραχος = **ἀτάρακτος** *(ος, ον)*	undisturbed	**ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ** **ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ** *without agitating*
ἀταράχως	without disturbance	**ΑΤΑΡΑΧΩΣ** *without agitating*
οἰκείως	compatibly	**ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ** *appropriate*

54a. Shape, Size, And Weight

καὶ μὴν καί, τὰς Ἀτόμους Νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους (**καὶ Ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος συμφυῆ ἐστι**)

and indeed, It is not necessary to think that the Atoms bring forward any qualities of what is apparent except shape, weight, size (and However many [qualities] that are necessarily inherent to shape)

[Bailey] Moreover, we must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, and all that necessarily goes with shape.

Atoms do not have any of the qualities except shape, weight, and size, and the properties that come with shape.

ἄτομος *(ον)*	indivisible	**ΑΤΟΜΑ** *not cut*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom *("what is indivisible")*	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
ἡ ἄτομος **αἱ ἄτομοι**	atom	**ΑΤΟΜΟΣ** *not cut*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing as well*
πλὴν	besides	
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τὸ βάρος **τὰ βάρη**	weight	**ΒΑΡΟΣ** *heavy*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
συμφυής *(ές)*	inherent	**ΣΥΜΦΥΗΣ** *growing together*

54b. Dissolutions of Compounds

Ποιότης γὰρ πᾶσα μεταβάλλει ‒ αἱ δὲ Ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσιν: ἐπειδήπερ, δεῖ Τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον (**Ὃ τὰς μεταβολὰς ‒ οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ποιήσεται οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ‒ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις ἐν πολλοῖς, τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους**)

for every Quality transforms ‒ but the Atoms do not transform at all: since indeed, Something must endure firm and indissoluble in the dissolutions of the compounds (Which will make transformations ‒ not into what does not exist or from what does not exist ‒ but mostly through rearrangements, and also through additions and departures [*of the atoms*])

[Bailey] For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes; not changes into the nonexistent or from the non-existent, but changes effected by the shining of position of some particles, and by the addition or departure of others.

All compositions and their qualities are fully changeable, but atoms and their qualities are not changeable. When composite bodies break apart, there must be something solid and unbreakable left behind, which allows for subsequent changes of compositions and qualities. The atoms themselves cannot transform, add or subtract anything from their form.

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from [asking] what kind*
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ *not thrown change*
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in change*
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ *not cut*
ὑπομένειν	to endure	ὙΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying under*
ἡ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution [i.e., explanation]	ΛΥΣΙΣ *the process of loosening*
ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ *fully loosening*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ *condition from making stiff*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ *stiff*
ἀδιάλυτος *(ον)*	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ *not fully loose*
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ *stepping beyond*
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ *threw in a change*
ἡ μετάθεσις αἱ μεταθέσεις	rearrangement	ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ *placing change*
ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ *path toward*
ἡ ἄφοδος αἱ ἀφόδοι	departure	ΑΦΟΔΟΣ *path away*

54c. Permanence of Atoms

ὅθεν, Ἀναγκαῖον τὰ Μετατιθέμενα ἄφθαρτα εἶναι – καὶ τὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα ¬ ὄγκοὺς δὲ καὶ σχηματισμοὺς ἰδίους (Ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν)

therefore, It is necessary that the rearranged Things exist as indestructible – and do not have the nature of what transforms ¬ but [exist as] particles and configurations of their own (for It is necessary that these endure)

[Bailey] For this reason it is essential that the bodies which shin their position should be imperishable and should not possess the nature of what changes, but parts and configuration of their own. For thus much must needs remain constant.

Changes in the emergent qualities of matter do not come from or go into nothingness, but occur through rearranging, adding or removing atoms. These atoms are indestructible and unchangeable, each with its own permanent size and shape.

ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ *necessity*
μετατιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	rearranged	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ *placing change*
τὸ μετατιθέμενον τὰ μετατιθέμενα	what is rearranged	

ἄφθαρτος (ον)	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ not decaying
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing in change
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ throwing in change
τὸ μεταβάλλον τὰ μεταβάλλοντα	what transforms	
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ bulk
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ holding [a form]
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ result of action of forming
ὑπομένειν	to endure	ὙΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ staying under

55a. Permanent Properties

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν μετασχηματιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν περιαίρεσιν, τὸ Σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται – αἱ δὲ Ποιότητες οὐκ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι (ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνο καταλείπεται) ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι ¬ ἱκανὰ οὖν τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα Ταῦτα τὰς τῶν συγκρίσεων διαφορὰς ποιεῖν: ἐπειδήπερ ὑπολείπεσθαί γέ Τινα Ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι

for even in things transfigured in our presence by the stripping away [of their material], a Shape is [still] comprehended as integral – while (in comparison to the way that [a shape] is left undisputed) the Qualities [are] not integral in what transforms but are dissolved away from the whole body ¬ therefore These remaining [atoms] are sufficient to make the differences [of qualities] in [subsequent] compounds: since indeed, It is necessary for certain Things to remain and not to be destroyed into nonexistence

[Bailey] For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent.

The [1] inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are indeed permanent, nevertheless the [2] inseparable qualities of a compound exist only as long as the compound exists and the [3] separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of a compound do not exist for as long as the compound exists – and finally, the [4] separable qualities of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent.

With the destruction of an object, most qualities may all disappear, but the qualities of shape, weight, and form will always remain with the matter that composed that destroyed object.

ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ result of action of forming
τὸ μετασχηματιζόμενον τὰ μετασχηματιζόμενα	what is transfigured	ΜΕΤΑΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ change form
μετασχηματιζόμενος (η, ον)	transfiguring	
ἡ περιαίρεσις αἱ περιαίρεσεις	stripping away	ΠΕΡΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ taking around
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ holding [a form]
ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον) ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ beginning under (before)

ἐνυπάρχων (ουσα, ον) ἐνυπάρχοντα	integral	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under (before) in*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from [asking] what kind*
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ *throwing in change*
τὸ μεταβάλλον τὰ μεταβάλλοντα	what transforms	
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
καταλείπεσθαι	to be left undisputed	
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *fully dissolve*
ἀπολλύναι	to dissolve away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΝΑΙ *destroying away*
ἀπόλλυσθαι	to be dissolved away	
ὑπολειπόμενος (η, ον)	remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ *leave under*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
ὑπολείπειν	to leave remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *leave under*
ὑπολείπεσθαι	to be remaining	
φθείρειν	to destroy	ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ *damaging*
φθείρεσθαι	to be destroyed	

55b. Variations in Atomic Size

ἀλλὰ μὴν, οὐδὲ Δεῖ νομίζειν πᾶν Μέγεθος ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν (ἵνα μὴ τὰ Φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρῇ) Παραλλαγὰς δέ τινας μεγεθῶν Νομιστέον εἶναι: βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ τούτου προσόντος τὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις Γινόμενα ἀποδοθήσεται

however, It is not necessary to think that every Size exists among the atoms (otherwise what is apparent would contest) instead, It is necessary to think that certain Varieties of sizes do exist: for the Things that happen according to experiences and sensations will be demonstrated in a better way with this [size variation] being present

[Bailey] Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.

We should not think that atoms come in every possible size, as this would be contradicted by experience – but we must admit that atoms do have many different sizes.

ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*

ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος *(α, ον)*	contested	
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
βέλτιον	in a better way	
προσών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[being] present	**ΠΡΟΣΩΝ** *existing towards*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
γιγνόμενος *(η, ον)* **γιγνόμενοι** *(αι, α)*	happening	**ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *birthing*
τὸ γιγνόμενον **τὰ γιγνόμενα**	what happens	**ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *birthing*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
ἀποδιδούς *(οῦσα, όν)* **ἀποδιδόντες**	demonstrating	
ἀποδοθήσεσθαι	to about to be demonstrated	**ΑΠΟΔΟΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ** *will be fully given*

56a. Limits in Atomic Size

πᾶν δὲ Μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν οὔτε χρήσιμόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς: ἀφῖχθαί τε ἄμ᾽ Ἔδει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁρατὰς Ἀτόμους – Ὃ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον – οὔθ᾽ ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὁρατὴ Ἄτομος Ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι

but every Size [of atom] existing is also not useful for [producing] the differences of qualities: and It would also at the same time have been necessary for visible Atoms to arrive among us – Which are not observed to be produced – nor is It possible to objectively conceive how a visible Atom would be produced

[Bailey] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

Thinking that atoms exist in every and all sizes is not necessary to explain the differences in qualities of things. If atoms existed in every and all sizes, some atoms would be big enough to see – which is contrary to evidence and also inconceivable.

τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
χρήσιμος *(ον)*	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*

ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *come towards*
ἀφῖχθαί	to have arrived	
ὁρατός *(ή, όν)*	visible	**ὉΡΑΤΟΣ** *seeing*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of* *envisioning*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
ἡ ἄτομος **αἱ ἄτομοι**	atom	**ΑΤΟΜΟΣ** *not cut*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
ἐπινοῆσαι	to think about [already]	

56b. Impossibility of Infinite Divisibility

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οὐ Δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὡρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους Ὄγκους εἶναι ¬ οὐδ᾽ ὁπηλίκους οὖν: ὥστε, οὐ μόνον [1] τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον Τομὴν ἐπὶ τοὔλαττον Ἀναιρετέον (ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῆ Ποιῶμεν, κἀν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν), ἀλλὰ καὶ [2] τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ Νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ὡρισμένοις εἰς ἄπειρον μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὔλαττον

> also regarding these [topics], It is not necessary to think that infinite Particles exist in a finite body ¬ nor [particles] of any magnitude whatsoever: therefore, not only [1] is It necessary to confute the Division into infinity into something smaller (in order that We do not make everything weak, and in [our] complete comprehension of what is aggregated, be forced to totally expend what exists by crushing [it] into non-existence), but also [2] It is not necessary to think that a [spatial] extension is produced within the finite [atoms] into infinity, not into something [ever] smaller

> [Bailey] Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to smaller and smaller parts.

Infinite parts cannot exist in a finite object. We should not think that a finite body can have an infinite number of parts, no matter how small the parts. This means we must reject the idea of dividing things into smaller and smaller parts forever, as it would make everything too weak and destroy atoms, turning them into nothing. We also cannot believe that atoms can transform into nothingness.

νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὡρισμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	**ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *limit*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
ὁπηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of any magnitude	**ὉΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ** *which extent*
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ** *not limited*
εἰς ἄπειρον	into infinity	

ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ *cut*
τοὔλαττον τοὐλάττα	something smaller	ΤΟ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ *light weight*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
ἀσθενής *(ές)*	weak	ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ *not strength*
ποιεῖν	*to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended [in the future]	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ *taking hold*
ἡ περίληψις αἱ περιλήψεις	complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold around*
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ *gathered*
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ *necessary*
ἀναγκάζεσθαι	to be forced	
θλίβειν	to crush	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ *squeezing*
θλίβων *(ουσα, ον)* θλίβοντες	crushing	
καταναλίσκειν	to totally expend	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ *in the state of taking thoroughly up / away*
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ *stepping beyond*
ἡ μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοὔλαττον	extension into infinity into what is smaller	
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ *threw in a change*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

57a. Paradox of Infinite Parts

οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως (ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ Τις εἴπῃ ὅτι ἄπειροι Ὄγκοι ἔν τινι ὑπάρχουσιν, ἢ ὁπηλίκοι οὖν) Ἔστι νοῆσαι ὅπως ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ Μέγεθος: πηλίκοι γάρ τινες δῆλον ὡς οἱ ἄπειροί εἰσιν Ὄγκοι – καὶ οὗτοι ὁπηλίκοι ἄν ποτε ὦσιν – ἄπειρον ἂν ἦν καὶ τὸ Μέγεθος

for in no way (whenever Someone once says that infinite Particles exist in something, or [particles] of any magnitude whatsoever) is It possible to conceive in what way this [thing's] Size might still be finite: for clearly these infinite Particles must be of some magnitude – and any size they may be – the Size [of something composed of them] would also be infinite

[Bailey] For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.)

A finite object cannot have infinite parts. If we say that there are an infinite number of tiny particles in anything, we cannot imagine how it could still be limited in size. An infinite amount of particles, no matter how small they are, would form an aggregate that would be infinitely large.

ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ *bulk*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ὁπηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of any magnitude	ὉΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ *which extent*
πηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of some magnitude	ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ *extent*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ *seeing*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing upon*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ *result of having finished*
πεπερασμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
δῆλον	clearly	
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ *clear within*
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ *not limited*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*

57b. Infinite Boundaries

ἄκρον τε ἔχοντος τοῦ πεπερασμένου διαληπτόν: εἰ μὴ καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν – οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἑξῆς τούτου τοιοῦτον Νοεῖν καὶ οὕτω – κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν βαδίζοντα εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ὑπάρχειν – καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ

because what is finite has a highest point that is [mentally] distinguishable: even if it is not observable by itself – it is impossible not to also Conceive that what is in succession to it [is] of the same kind [*i.e., another boundary*] and therefore – because [our conception of a boundary] proceeds to exist according what is in succession towards what is ahead into infinity – such a [correct view of the infinite] also arrives by internal conception

[Hicks] And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

[Bailey] And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.

Because all finite objects have a discernible boundary, it is impossible not to conceive that whatever bounds the last object must be of a similar nature (being surrounded, in turn, by something else). Proceeding in this manner (with the mind progressing from one boundary to the next, endlessly) brings the concept of infinity to our minds.

τὸ ἄκρον **τὰ ἄκρα**	the highest point	**ΑΚΡΟΝ** *highest*
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	**ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of having finished*
πεπερασμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	
τὸ περιληπτόν **τὰ περιληπτά**	what is completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ** *taken hold around*
διαληπτός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] distinguishable	**ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *taking hold between*
τὸ διαληπτόν **τὰ διαληπτά**	what is distinguishable [mentally]	
θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ** *envisioning*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**῾ΕΞΗΣ** *possessing*
τὸ ἑξῆς **τὰ ἑξῆς**	what is in succession	
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
τοὔμπροσθεν **τἄμπροσθεν**	what is ahead	**ΤΟΥΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ = ΤΟ ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ** *in before*
βαδίζων *(ουσα, ον)* **βαδίζοντες** *(ουσαι, οντα)*	proceeding	**ΒΑΔΙΖΩΝ**
εἰς ἄπειρον	into infinity	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**῾ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *arrive from*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἡ ἐπίνοια **αἱ ἐπινοίαι**	[objective] concept	**ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ** *seeing upon*
ἡ ἔννοια **αἱ ἔννοιαι**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΙΑ** *seeing in*

58a. Unique Quality Of Visual Limits

τό τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει Δεῖ κατανοεῖν: ὅτι οὔτε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον, οὔτε πάντῃ πάντως ἀνόμοιον – ἀλλ᾽ ἔχον μέν τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν, διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον

It is necessary to fully conceive the minimum in sensation: it is neither just like that which [we see] has [spatial] extensions, nor all-in-all dissimilar – because, although it has some general quality of what extends, it does not have differentiation of parts

[Bailey] We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts.

In one way, that smallest thing you can see is like everything else you can see – it has extension (dimension) – but in another way that smallest thing you can see is unlike everything else that you can see because only one single part is visible in the smallest thing – and everything else we can see does have other parts.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον **τὰ ἐλάχιστα**	the minimum *(the smallest thing)*	**ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ** *small*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ἡ μετάβασις **αἱ μεταβάσεις**	[spatial] extension	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ** *stepping beyond*
τὸ μεταβατῶν **τὰ μεταβατῶντα**	what extends	
ἀνόμοιος *(ον)*	dissimilar	**ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ** *not similar*
ἡ κοινότης **αἱ κοινότητες**	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
ἡ μεταβολή **αἱ μεταβολαί**	transformation	**ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ** *threw in a change*
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing in change*
ἡ διάληψις **αἱ διαλήψεις**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold separation*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*

58b. Absolute Visual Limits

ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν, διὰ τὴν τῆς κοινότητος προσεμφέρειαν, Οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαί τι αὐτοῦ – Τὸ μὲν ἐπιτάδε, Τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα – Τὸ ἴσον ἡμῖν δεῖ προσπίπτειν

but, due to this resemblance of this general quality, whenever we believe we were going to distinguish something in it – This here, That there – It must be that What is equal falls upon us

but, due to this resemblance of this general quality [of spatial extension that exists between regular objects and visible minima], whenever we believe we were going to distinguish some [other part] in it [that was considered to the smallest visible unit] – This [part] here, That [part] there – It must be [the case that] What is equal [*to what was considered to be the visible minima*] falls upon us

[Bailey] But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view.

If you are trying to look at the smallest object you can see – and then you see another "part" of that thing – then that part (which will be half of the original object-of-focus) is now the smallest thing you can see. Ultimately, you will see something that has the common resemblance to other objects: extension (dimension) – but cannot be further divided while also staying within your vision!

ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from common*
ἡ προσεμφέρεια αἱ προσεμφέρειαι	resemblance	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΙΑ *bringing in toward*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*
οἰήσασθαι	to have believed	
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold separation*
διαλήψεσθαί	going to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ *taking hold separation*
ἐπιτάδε	here	ΕΠΙΤΑΔΕ *upon these*
ἐπέκεινα	there	ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ *upon those*
ἴσος *(η, ον)*	equal	ΙΣΟΣ *equal*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling toward*

58c. Minimum of Measurement

ἑξῆς τε θεωροῦμεν ταῦτα, ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καταρχόμενοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ – οὐδὲ μέρεσι μερῶν ἁπτόμενα ¬ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἰδιότητι τῇ ἑαυτῶν τὰ μεγέθη καταμετροῦντα – τὰ πλείω πλεῖον καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω ἔλαττον

and We observe these in succession, beginning indeed with the first, and not in the same [space] – nor parts touching [any other] part ¬ but fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity – a greater [amount measuring a] greater [size] and a lesser [amount measuring a] lesser [size]

and We observe these [visible minima] in succession beginning indeed with the first [visible minima], and [we do] not [observe them] in the same [space as another] – nor [do we observe them] touching [any] parts with [any other] part ¬ but [we observe visible minima] fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity [of being visibly indivisible] – a greater [amount of visible minima measuring a] greater [size object] and a lesser [amount of visible minima measuring a] lesser [size object]

[Hicks] In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[Yonge] In this way, we examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves, more as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we consider, the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent

[Bailey] And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a greater body and fewer in a smaller.

Visual limits are only visible in sequence – we see these tiny points one after another, starting from the first, not in the same space or intermixing with each other. Instead, we use their unique quality of indivisible (yet visible) extension as a basis of minute size measurements.

ἑξῆς	in succession	ἝΞΗΣ *possessing*

θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα	the first	ΠΡΩΤΟΝ *first*
καταρχεῖν	to begin	καταρχεῖν
καταρχόμενος (η, ον) καταρχόμενοι (αι, α)	beginning	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἅπτειν	to touch	ἉΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening*
ἁπτόμενος (η, ον) ἁπτόμενοι (αι, α)	touching	
ἡ ἰδιότης αἱ ἰδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ *particular*
ἰδιότροπος (ον)	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *particular way*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly measure*
καταμετρῶν (οῦσα, οῦν) καταμετροῦντες (οῦσαι, οῦντα)	fully measuring	
τὸ πλέον τὰ πλέω	the greater	ΠΛΕΟΝ *more*
τὸ ἐλάττον τὰ ἐλάττω	the lesser	ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ *less*

59a. Analogy for Atomic Limits

ταύτῃ τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ Νομιστέον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεχρῆσθαι – μικρότητι γὰρ Ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὡς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρουμένου ¬ ἀναλογίᾳ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται: ἐπείπερ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἄτομος, κατὰ τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν Κατηγορήσαμεν – μικρόν τι μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβαλόντες

It is necessary to think that the minimum in the atom also follows this analogy – although clearly in minuteness It differs from what is observed by sensation ¬ but it follows the same analogy: since We have also fully indicated that the atom has size, according to the analogy in this respect – we are only extending a small thing a long way

[Bailey] Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness.

The smallest part of an atom follows the same pattern as the the smallest visible units – and supplies a base unit of atomic measurement.

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning back/again*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ *not cut*
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum (the smallest thing)	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ *small*

ἡ μικρότης αἱ μικρότητες	minuteness	ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ *little*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	[θ] clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
δῆλον	clearly	
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing through*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *envisioning*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
ἐνταῦθα	in this [respect]	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ *in this*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly speaking publicly*
κατηγορῆσαι	to fully indicate [already]	
μικρόν *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΝ *little*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
μόνον	only	
μακρὰν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ *long-reaching*
μικρόν τι, μόνος μακρὰν	a small thing, only by a long way	
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in change*
ἐκβάλλειν	to throw out	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing out*
ἐκβαλῶν *(οῦσα, όν)* ἐκβαλόντες *(οῦσαι, όντα)*	throwing out [here, "extending"]	

59b. Units of Subatomic Measurement

ἔτι τε, τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμιγῆ πέρατα δεῖ νομίζειν τῶν μηκῶν – τὸ καταμέτρημα ἐξ αὐτῶν πρώτων τοῖς μείζοσι καὶ ἐλάττοσι παρασκευάζοντα – τῇ, διὰ λόγου, θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων

also, It is necessary to think of [atomic] minima as pure limits of length as well – providing from themselves as primary [units] the full measurement for the larger and for the smaller [atoms] – by observation, through reasoning, of what is unseen

[Bailey] Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum *(the smallest thing)*	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ *small*
ἀμιγής *(ές)*	pure	ΑΜΙΓΗΣ *not mixed*
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ *extent*
τὸ καταμέτρημα τὰ καταμετρήματα	full measurement	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΜΑ *thoroughly measuring*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	providing	
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ *reasoning again*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of envisioning*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	[0] the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ *not looking*
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ *not clear*

59c. Unchangeable Parts of Atoms

ἡ γὰρ Κοινότης ἡ ὑπάρχουσα αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ ἀμετάβολα ἱκανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου συντελέσαι ¬ συμφόρησιν δὲ ἐκ τούτων κίνησιν ἐχόντων οὐχ οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι

for the general Quality [of extension] that exists in those [visible minima] with the untransformables [i.e., atomic minima] is sufficient to altogether fulfil this [comparison of measurement by minima] up to this [point] ¬ but that [atomic minima] are produced by [their] accumulation from them having [any] movement is not possible

[Bailey] For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts of sensible things is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.

The parts of the atoms are unchanging and motionless. Unlike the atoms themselves, the parts of atoms (including their minima) do not have motion and cannot form by accumulation.

ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from common*
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ *stepping beyond*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* ὑπάρχοντες *(ουσαι, οντα)*	existing [already]	ῩΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ *threw in a change*

τὸ ἀμετάβολον τὰ ἀμετάβολα	the untransformable	
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	ἹΚΑΝΟΣ *fitting / proper*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἡ συμφόρησις αἱ συμφόρησεις	accumulation	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΗΣΙΣ *carrying together*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

60a. Relative Direction

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ κατώτατω οὐ Δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω: Ἴσμεν, μέντοι, Τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς (ὅθεν ἂν Στῶμεν) εἰς ἄπειρον ἄγειν – ὄν μηδέποτε φανεῖσθαι Τοῦτο ἡμῖν (ἢ τὸ Ὑποκάτω τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς ἄπειρον) ἅμα ἄνω τε εἶναι καὶ κάτω πρὸς τὸ αὐτό τοῦτο γὰρ Ἀδύνατον διανοηθῆναι

and indeed, It is not necessary to thoroughly indicate what is above or below in the infinite as highest or lowest: We know, nevertheless, that What is overhead (from wherever we may stand) leads into infinity – and It (just like What is below in thought into infinity) will never be apparent to us as existing both above and below in relation to that same [spot we are standing], for [this] is impossible to perceive

[Bailey] Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of 'up' or 'down' as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest – and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us – nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing for it is impossible to think this.

[Hicks] Further, we must not assert 'up' or 'down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time 'up' and 'down' with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable.

[Yonge] Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such or such a point is the highest point of it, or the lowest. For height and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, in reality, that if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our head, this point, whatever it may be, will never appear to us to have the character in question otherwise, that which would be situated above the point so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same moment, and by virtue of its relation to the same point, both high and low; and this is impossible to imagine.

There is no ultimate direction because the universe has no center. We should not describe the infinite as having an ultimate "up" or "down" because these terms do not apply to something without limits. Nevertheless, relative direction does still exists in infinite space.

ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
ἀνωτάτος *(η, ον)*	highest	ΑΝΩΤΑΤΟΣ *the most above*
ἀνωτάτω	highest	

κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
τὸ κάτω τὰ κάτω	what is below	
κατώτατος *(η, ον)*	lowest	ΚΑΤΩΤΑΤΟΣ *the most below*
κατώτατω	lowest	
τὸ κατώτατω τὰ κατώτατω	what is lowest	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly* *speaking publicly*
ἄνω	above	ΑΝΩ *above*
τὸ ἄνω τὰ ἄνω	what is above	
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing*
ἴσμεν	we know	ΙΣΜΕΝ *knowing*
ἡ κεφαλή αἱ κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ *head*
τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τὰ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς	what is overhead	
ἵστασθαι	to be placed upright	ΊΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ *standing*
στῆναι	to stand [already]	ΣΤΗΝΑΙ *standing*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *shining*
φανεῖσθαι	to be apparent [in the future]	
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ὑποκάτω	down below	
τὸ ὑποκάτω τὰ ὑποκάτω	what is [down] below	῾ΥΠΟΚΑΤΩ *under below*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
νοηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* νοηθέντες *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ *seeing*
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ *result of* *seeing within*
ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *not powerful*
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ *saw through*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*

60b. Only Relative Direction Exists

ὥστε, Ἔστι μίαν λαβεῖν φορὰν τὴν ἄνω, νοουμένην εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ μίαν τὴν κάτω – ἂν καὶ μυριάκις πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τῶν ἐπάνω τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν Φερόμενον εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν τόπους ἀφικνῆται – ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν κάτω Φερόμενον. ἡ γὰρ ὅλη Φορὰ: οὐθὲν ἧττον Ἑκατέρα ἑκατέρᾳ ἀντικειμένη ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον νοεῖται

therefore, It is possible to comprehend one transmission that is above and one that is below, [both] conceived into infinity – even if What is brought from us towards the feet of those above arrives innumerable times at the locations above our heads – and [the same for] What is being carried downward from us towards the head of those below. for the whole Motion: Each [direction] is conceived no less contrary into infinity than the other

[Bailey] So that it is possible to consider as one single motion that which is thought of as the upward motion to infinity and as another the downward motion, even though that which passes from us into the regions above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of beings above and that which passes downwards from us at the head of beings below; for none the less the whole motions are thought of as opposed, the one to the other, to infinity.

We can think of two arrows, one going up and one going down, moving in opposite directions forever – despite whatever other relative interactions occur – one arrow can be correctly said to be moving "up" (relative to us), and the other arrow can be correctly said to be moving "down" (relative to us).

εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ** *one*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
τὸ ἄνω **τὰ ἄνω**	what is above	**ΑΝΩ** *above*
νοούμενος *(η, ον)*	conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
εἰς ἄπειρον	into infinity	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
τὸ κάτω **τὰ κάτω**	what is below	**ΚΑΤΩ** *below*
μυρίος *(α, ον)*	innumerable	**ΜΥΡΙΟΣ** *ants*
μυριάκις	innumerable times	
ὁ πούς **οἱ πόδες**	foot	**ΠΟΥΣ** *foot*
ὁ ἐπάνω **οἱ ἐπάνω**	someone above	**ΕΠΑΝΩ** *above upon*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	**ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *spot*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *towards arriving*
τὸ ὑποκάτω **τὰ ὑποκάτω**	what is [down] below	**ὙΠΟΚΑΤΩ** *under below*
ὁ ὑποκάτω **οἱ ὑποκάτω**	someone [down] below	
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	**ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing*

61a. Size Variation

καὶ μὴν καὶ, ἰσοταχεῖς Ἀναγκαῖον τὰς Ἀτόμους εἶναι – ὅταν διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ εἰσφέρωνται μηθενὸς ἀντικόπτοντος: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα θᾶττον οἰσθήσεται τῶν μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, (ὅταν γε δὴ Μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ αὐτοῖς) οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ τῶν μεγάλων – Πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα (ὅταν Μηθὲν μηδὲ ἐκείνοις ἀντικόπτῃ)

and indeed, It is necessary for the atoms to be equally fast – whenever they are carried through the void with nothing colliding against: for in no way will the heavy [Atoms] be carried swifter than the small and light [atoms], (certainly whenever Nothing encounters them) nor [will] the small [Atoms be swifter] than the large ones – All having a symmetric passageway (whenever Nothing also collides against them)

[Bailey] Moreover, the atoms must move with equal speed, when they are borne onwards through the void, nothing colliding with them. For neither will the heavy move more quickly than the small and light, when, that is, nothing meets them nor again the small more quickly than the great, having their whole course uniform, when nothing collides with them either.

When atoms move through empty space without any obstacles, they all travel at the same speed – regardless of their size and weight.

ἰσοταχής *(ής, ές)*	equally fast	**ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ** *equally swift*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
ἡ ἄτομος **αἱ ἄτομοι**	atom	**ΑΤΟΜΟΣ** *not cut*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
εἰσφέρειν	to carry in	**ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing into*
εἰσοίσειν	to carry in [in the future]	**ΕΙΣΟΙΣΕΙΝ** *will carry into*
διαφέρειν	to differ	**ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing through*
ἀντικόπτων *(οῦσα, ον)* **ἀντικόπτοντες** *(οῦσαι, οντα)*	colliding against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΟΝΤΟΣ** strike against
τὸ βαρύ **τὰ βαρέα**	heavy thing	**ΒΑΡΥ** *heavy*
θᾶττον	more swiftly	**ΘΑΤΤΟΝ** *swift*
θάττων *(ουσα, ον)*	swifter	
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
οἴσειν	to carry [in the future]	**ΟΙΣΕΙΝ** *will carry*
οἰσθησθαι	to be carried [in the future]	
τὸ μικρόν **τὰ μικρά**	small thing	**ΜΙΚΡΟΝ** *little*
τὸ κοῦφον **τὰ κοῦφα**	light things	**ΚΟΥΦΟΝ** *nimble*
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	**ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ** *meeting away*
τὸ μέγα **τὰ μεγάλα**	what is great	**ΜΕΓΑ** *large*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great [here, "large"]	**ΜΕΓΑΣ** *large*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*

ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*

61b. Direction Variation

οὔθ᾽ ἡ ἄνω οὔθ᾽ ἡ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων Φορά, οὔθ᾽ ἡ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν: ἐφ᾽ ὁπόσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχῃ Ἑκάτερον – ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φορὰν σχήσει, ἕως ‹ἄν τι› ἀντικόψῃ ἢ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν

neither the upward nor the sideways Transmission from impacts [is swifter], nor is the downward [transmission swifter] through those particular weights [of the atoms]: as far as Each [transmission] fully maintains itself – for so long it maintains its transmission as quick as conception, until Something collides against [it], either from an external source or from its particular [counter] weight against the force of an impact

[Bailey] Nor is the motion upwards or sideways owing to blows quicker, nor again that downwards owing to their own weight. For as long as either of the two motions prevails, so long will it have a course as quick as thought, until something checks it either from outside or from its own weight counteracting the force of that which dealt the blow.

Atoms move at the same rate regardless of their direction. When contact occurs, the natural weight of the atoms plays a role in how they respond to collisions, offsetting the force and influencing their motion.

πλάγιος *(ον)*	sideways	ΠΛΑΓΙΟΣ *oblique*
εἰς τὸ πλάγιον	sideways	
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ *strike*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἰδιότροπος *(ον)*	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *particular way*
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ *heavy*
ὁπόσος *(η, ον)*	as much as	ὉΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain which*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*
κατασχεῖν	to have firmly held	ΣΧΕΙΝ *will hold*
τοσοῦτος *(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)*	so long *(so great)*	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ *this so much*
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
σχεῖν	to hold [here gnomic aorist, "to maintain"]	ΣΧΕΙΝ *will hold*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beats against*
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*

τό πλῆξαν τό πλῆξαν	impact	ΠΛΗΞΑΝ *strike*
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*

62a. Consistent Atomic Speed

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, κατὰ τὰς συγκρίσεις, θάττων Ἑτέρα ἑτέρας φορηθήσεται ¬ τῶν ἀτόμων ἰσοταχῶν οὐσῶν: τῷ ἐφ᾽ ἕνα τόπον φέρεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀθροίσμασιν Ἀτόμους κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῆ χρόνον – εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἕνα, κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, ἀλλὰ πυκνὸν Ἀντικόπτουσιν – ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ Συνεχὲς τῆς φορᾶς γίνηται

but indeed, regarding compounds, One [compound] will be transmitted more swiftly than another [compound] ¬ even though their atoms are equal in speed: as [a result] of the Atoms in the aggregates being carried to one location in the minimum continuous [*i.e., directly perceptible*] time – even if, in the times observable by reasoning, [they are] not [transmitted] to one [single location], but They collide frequently against [each other] – until a Continuity of [their] motion comes to exist within [the realm of] sensation

[Bailey] Moreover, it will be said that in compound bodies too one atom is faster than another, though as a matter of fact all are equal in speed this will be said because even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move towards one place, even though in moments of time perceptible only by thought they do not move towards one place but are constantly jostling one against another, until the continuity of their movement comes under the ken of sensation.

Atoms move at the same rate if they are moving alone in one direction or if they are vibrating in a compound – the atoms that compose a compound are moving at equal speeds in many different directions.

However, in a compound, the atoms collide and change direction so quickly that we can only sense their group movement (or lack of movement). As we can see, compounds can move faster than other compounds (or appear still).

ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
θάττων *(ουσα, ον)*	more swift	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ *swift*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	
φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ *carrying*
φορηθήσεσθαι	to be transmitted [in the future]	ΦΟΡΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ *will be carried*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ *gathered*
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ *not cut*
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum *(the smallest thing)*	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ *small*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ	continuity	

ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ *envisioning*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ *compacting*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

62b. Speed Disparity

[Δ+] τὸ γὰρ Προσδοξαζόμενον περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου – ὡς ἄρα καὶ οἱ διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ Χρόνοι τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς φορᾶς ἕξουσιν – οὐκ ἀληθές [-α] ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων: ἐπεὶ τό γε [δ] θεωρούμενον Πᾶν ἢ [B'δ] κατ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν [δ] λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ [α] ἀληθές ἐστι

for [Δ+] the Addition of judgment concerning the unseen – that the [minute] Times observable through reasoning will indeed also have continuity of transmission [*for compounds and their atoms*] – is not true [-α] in such cases: since Everything [δ] observed or [δ] comprehended [B'δ] through our attention to [mental] perception is [α] true

[Bailey] For the addition of opinion with regard to the unseen, that the moments perceptible only by thought will also contain continuity of motion, is not true in such cases; for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that is true.

*The chief function of the [B'δ]"Attention To Mental Perception" (**ἡ Ἐπιβολὴ τῆς Διανοίας**) must be in the field of memory. If Epicurus were to regard memory as an event purely internal to the mind, the whole empirical foundation of knowledge would crumble, since our memories might be nothing more than our own inventions. The objectivity of memory is rescued by the assurance that the mind, like the sense-organs, draws its images from outside.*

*Of course, the [B'δ]"Attention To Mental Perception" (**ἡ Ἐπιβολὴ τῆς Διανοίας**) is not in itself sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory, for it does not enable us to distinguish acts of memory from acts of mere imagination.*

[Sedley] *"If what Epicurus has stated about the motion of atoms in a moving body is correct, it follows that either appearances deceive when they tell us that the parts of a moving body all move in one direction, or that appearances do not deceive but that in this particular case analogy between the visible and the invisible is invalid."*

Only what we can directly observe with both our senses and mind is always true. The motions of a compound take place in observable time, and the motions of the atoms take place in mentally perceptible time.

Viewing a compound as only an aggregate of atoms is too reductionist. It is contrary to sensation to say that the motion of a compound body is only the sum of the motions of its component atoms – just as it is inconceivable that only the atomic motions in an object alone are real and the motion of the compound object itself is delusion.

The motion (or lack of motion) of compound objects is a reality – even though the compound object itself is determined by the collisions of its component atoms.

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
προσμένων *(ουσα, ον)*	still pending	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ *remaining further*

τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	[0] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	**ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *remaining further*
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον τὰ προσδοξαζόμενα	[Δ+] an addition of judgement [i.e., "a theory"]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of addition to seeming*
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	[0] what is unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΝ** *not clear*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ** *envisioning*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	**ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ** *holding together*
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ	continuity	
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἕξειν	to have [in the future]	**ἙΞΕΙΝ** *will hold*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	**ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *envisioning*
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[Β'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
λαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	comprehended	**ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasping*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*

63a. Soul is Material

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Δεῖ συνορᾶν (ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη – οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιοτάτη Πίστις ἔσται) ὅτι ἡ Ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές, παρ᾽ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι: καὶ, πῇ μὲν, τούτῳ προσεμφερές, πῇ δὲ, τούτῳ

after these things, It is necessary to [mentally] fully see (while referring to the sensations and experiences – for in this way the most affirmed Belief will exist) that the Soul is of a subtle composition, spread out across the whole aggregate, most closely resembling [cool] wind {i.e., pneumatic} that has a certain mixture of heat {i.e., thermal}: indeed, in one way, it is closely resembling to the one, and in another way, [it is closely resembling] to the other

[Bailey] Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings, for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief, you must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat, and in some respects like to one of these and in some to the other.

> *From a reductionist angle, life is only a circumstantial characteristic of certain aggregates. However, we can use our senses and feelings to understand that the soul is a physical (and therefore real) thing made of tiny particles spread throughout the body. The soul has thermal (hot & fast) and pneumatic (cold & slow) characteristics – which can mix and form aerial (moderate) characteristics.*

ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*

συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*
τὸ ἀόρατον **τὰ ἀόρατα**	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
ἀναφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	referring	**ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing back*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
βεβαιοτάτος *(η, ον)*	most affirmed	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ** *most certain*
ἡ πίστις **αἱ πίστεις**	belief [based on experience]	**ΠΙΣΤΙΣ** *trust*
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *fine/thin part*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
παρεσπαρμένος *(η, ον)*	spread out	**ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ** *scatter beside*
τό προσεμφερέστατον **τά προσεμφερέστατα**	what most closely resembling	**ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΝ** *most toward bringing in*
προσεμφερέστατος *(η, ον)*	most closely resembling	
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	**ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ** *toward bringing in*
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
θερμός *(ή, όν)*	hot	**ΘΕΡΜΟΣ** *warm*
ἡ κρᾶσις **αἱ κράσεις**	mixture	**ΚΡΑΣΙΣ** *weaving*
πῇ μὲν… πῇ δὲ	in one way… in another way	**ΠΗΙ** *by which way*

[1] Thermal Element	● **τό Θερμόν**	Calor, Vapor
[2] Pneumatic Element	● **τό Πνευματικόν**	Ventus, Aura
[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	● **τό Ἀερῶδες**	Aer
[3] Unnamed Element	**τό Ἀκατονόμαστον**	Nominis Expers

63b. Finest Part of the Soul

ἔστι δὲ τὸ τρίτον Μέρος, πολλὴν παραλλαγὴν εἰληφὸς τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων – συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἀθροίσματι: τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν αἱ Δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι, καὶ τὰ Πάθη, καὶ αἱ Εὐκινησίαι, καὶ αἱ Διανοήσεις – καὶ ὧν στερόμενοι, Θνήσκομεν

and the third Part exists, having acquired great variety in subtle compositions even [compared to] those [thermal and pneumatic elements] themselves – and because of this [reason, the third part is] more harmonious also with the remaining aggregate: and the Forces of the soul make all this clear, as well as our Experiences, Agilities, and [mental] Perceptions – and when we are deprived of these, We die

[Hicks] But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.

The finest part of the soul is highly sensitive and closely connected to the body. This is shown by our mental abilities, feelings, quick thoughts – all everything else that we lose when we die.

τρίτος *(η, ον)*	third	**ΤΡΙΤΟΣ** *third*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
εἰληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	**ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ** *grasped*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *fine/thin part*
ἡ λεπτομέρεια **αἱ λεπτομέρειαι**	subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ** *fine/thin part*
συμπαθής *(ές)*	harmonious	**ΣΥΜΠΑΘΗΣ** *together experiencing*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
τὸ ἄδηλον **τὰ ἄδηλα**	[0] what is unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΝ** *not clear*
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(θ) fully clear	**ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear within*
δηλοῦν	to make clear	**ΔΗΛΟΥΝ** *clear*
ἡ εὐκινησία **αἱ εὐκινησίαι**	agility	**ΕΥΚΙΝΗΣΙΑ** *good movement*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
στερούμενος *(η, ον)*	deprived	**ΣΤΕΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *deprived*
θνῄσκειν	to die	**ΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** **ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ** *died*

63c. Cause of Sensation

καὶ μὴν, ὅτι ἔχει ἡ Ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν Δεῖ κατέχειν

And indeed, It is necessary to firmly maintain that the Soul is the greatest cause of sensation

[Bailey] Further, you must grasp that the soul possesses the chief cause of sensation.

ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold [here, "to firmly maintain"]	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*

64a. Interrelationship of Body & Soul

οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν ταύτην, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀθροίσματος ἐστεγάζετό πως: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν Ἄθροισμα, παρασκευάσαν ἐκείνῃ τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην, μετείληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιούτου συμπτώματος παρ᾽ ἐκείνης ¬ οὐ, μέντοι, πάντων ὧν ἐκείνη κέκτηται

nevertheless [the Soul] would not have acquired [sensation], unless it was in some way covered by the remaining aggregate: while the remaining Aggregation, having provided that cause [of protection] to that [soul], also itself partook of this same symptom with that [soul] ¬ not, however, of all [symptoms] which that [soul] possesses

[Bailey] yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way enclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in its turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a share in this contingent capacity from the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses.

The soul can exist and operate only because it is enclosed within the body. The body also gets the ability to exist and operate from the soul.

εἰληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ *grasped*
εἰληφέναι	to have acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ *grasped*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ *covering*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	providing	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
μετέχειν	to partake	ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ *hold among*
μετειληφέναι	to have partaken	ΜΕΤΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ *taken among*
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ *to fall together*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ *acquired*

διὸ, ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς Ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν ¬ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ἅμα συγγεγενημένον αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν – Ὃ, διὰ τῆς συντελεσθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως, κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν, σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ – ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμούρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ Εἶπον

therefore, when the Soul has already been removed away [from the body], it does not have sensation: for that [soul] had not possessed this force intrinsically ¬ but provides something different, inherent together with [the body] – Which [existence of the two together], through the force within itself which has altogether fulfilled, in accordance with its movement, directly bringing to fulfillment for itself a perceptible symptom – and fully gives [that symptom] to the [body] in accordance with [its] proximity and correspondence [of movement], just as I said

[Bailey] and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself and this existence, owing to the power now consummated within itself as a result of motion, used spontaneously to produce for itself the capacity of sensation and then to communicate it to the body as well, in virtue of its contact and correspondence of movement, as I have already said.

The soul must mix with the body to produce life and sensation. When the soul leaves the body, the body and the soul both lose the ability to feel – because they never had this power on their own.

ἀπαλλάττειν	to remove away	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing away*
ἀπαλλάξαι	to remove away [already]	
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving* process
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	**ΚΕΚΤΗΙΣΘΑΙ** *acquired*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*
συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	**ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ** *having been born together*
συγγεγενημένος *(η, ον)*	having been inherent	**ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *having been born together*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
συντελεσθείσης	having altogether fulfilled	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΘΕΙΣΗΣ** *completing together*
τὸ κίνημα **τὰ κινήματα**	[specific] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΜΑ** *result of moving*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving* process
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
αἰσθητικός *(ή, όν)*	[directly] perceptible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of perceiving*

ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
ἀποτελοῦν	to bring to fulfillment	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΝ *completing away*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate [here, "fully gives"]	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
ἀποδιδούς *(οῦσα, όν)* ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	
ἡ ὁμούρησις αἱ ὁμουρήσεις	proximity	ΟΜΟΥΡΗΣΙΣ *state of being together with*
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ *experience together*

65a. Soul Requires Body

διὸ, δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἡ Ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητεῖ ¬ ἀλλ᾽ Ἃ ἂν καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος (εἴθ᾽ ὅλου εἴτε καὶ μέρους τινός) – ἐάν περ διαμένῃ, ἕξει τὴν αἴσθησιν

therefore, while also existing within [the body], the Soul never lacks sensation, even when some other part has been removed [along with that part of the body] ¬ but Whatever [portions] of this [soul] might also perish when its [bodily] covering is loosened (whether in whole or also in part) – if [the soul] persists [in the body], it will have sensation

[Bailey] Therefore, so long as the soul remains in the body, even though some other part of the body be lost, it will never lose sensation; nay more, whatever portions of the soul may perish too, when that which enclosed it is removed either in whole or in part, if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation.

[Hicks] Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience.

Life can persist if a part of the body is injured (i.e., loosened in part) or suffers amputation (i.e., loosened in whole).

ἐνυπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* ἐνυπάρχοντα	integral	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under (before) in*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἀπηλλαγμένος *(η, ον)*	having been removed	ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ *removing away from*
ἀναισθητεῖν	to lack sensation	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ *not sensing*
ξυναπολέσθαι	to perish together	ΞΥΝΑΠΟΛΕΣΘΑΙ *being destroyed together*
τὸ στεγάζον τὰ στεγάζοντα	what covers	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΝ *covering*
λυθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	loosened	ΛΥΘΕΙΣ *sever*
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying through*

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν Ἄθροισμα – διαμένον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος – οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου (ὅσον ποτὲ ἐστι) τὸ συντεῖνον τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν

but the remaining Aggregate – although persisting as a whole or in part – does not possess sensation, once it has lost the number of atoms contributing towards the nature of the soul (however many there is)

[Bailey] On the other hand the rest of the structure, though it continues to exist either as a whole or in part, does not retain sensation, if it has once lost that sum of atoms, however small it be, which together goes to produce the nature of the soul.

The rest of the body, even if it remains whole or in part, loses all feeling once the atoms that make up the soul are gone.

λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
διαμένειν	to persist	**ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ** *staying through*
διαμένων	persisting	
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
ἀπηλλαγμένος *(η, ον)*	having been removed	**ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ** *removing away from*
συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*
συντείνων	contributing	
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom *("what is indivisible")*	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
τὸ πλῆθος **τὰ πλήθη**	[large] number	**ΠΛΗΘΟΣ** *fullness*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*

65c. Death

καὶ μὴν καὶ, λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος, ἡ Ψυχὴ διασπείρεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις, οὐδὲ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἴσθησιν κέκτηται

and indeed, when the whole aggregate is dissolved, the Soul is dispersed and no longer possesses the same forces, and no longer moves – therefore it no longer possesses sensation

[Bailey] Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either.

When the entire body is broken up, the soul is scattered and loses its powers and movements, so it cannot feel anymore.

διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	**ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ** *fully dissolving*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
λυόμενος *(η, ον)*	being dissolved	

τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of* *action of [being]* *gathered*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ *scatter through*
διασπείρεσθαι	to be dispersed	
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ *moving*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving* *process*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΙΣΘΑΙ *acquired*

66a. No Sensation Without Body

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε Νοεῖν αὐτὸ αἰσθανόμενον, μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις χρώμενον – ὅταν τὰ Στεγάζοντα καὶ Περιέχοντα μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾖ (ἐν οἷς νῦν οὖσα ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις)

for it is not possible to Conceive of that same [soul] as sensing, while not in that structure and [not] making use of those movements – whenever the Coverings and Surroundings are not the same (in which it now exists while having these movements)

[Hicks] For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

[Bailey] For it is impossible to imagine it with sensation, if it is not in this organism and cannot effect these movements, when what encloses and surrounds it is no longer the same as the surroundings in which it now exists and performs these movements.

A soul cannot feel or sense anything if it is not in the same body it grew up with.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving* *process*
αἰσθανόμενος	sensing	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ *standing* *together*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *necessary*
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ *covering*
στεγάζων *(ουσα, ον)* στεγάζοντες *(ουσαι, οντα)*	covering	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΩΝ *covering*
στεγαζόμενος *(η, ον)*	covered	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shelter*

περιέχων (ουσα, ον)	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ holding around
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding environment	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ hold around

{66b. Irrational & Rational Parts}

{Λέγει, ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων Αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων – πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός: καὶ τὸ μέν Τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι ‒ τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς}

{He says, in other [locations], that the [Soul] is compounded from the smoothest and roundest atoms – by a large measure in a certain respect differing from those of fire: and that a Part of it is unreasoning, which is spread out through the remaining body ‒ but the rational [part is] in the chest, as is clear both from fears and from joy}

[Hicks] [He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms – far superior in both respects to those of fire: that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame – while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our joy

Life is part irrational (feeling) and part rational (thinking). The soul is made of the smoothest and roundest atoms. The irrational part of the soul is spread throughout the body, while the rational part is in the chest, shown by emotions like fear and joy. Sleep happens when the scattered parts of the soul either gather together or escape through the body's pores.

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom ("what is indivisible")	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ not cut
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ setting together
λεῖος (α, ον)	smooth	ΛΕΙΟΣ smooth
λειότατοι (αι, α)	smoothest	ΛΕΙΟΤΑΤΟΙ most smooth
στρογγύλος (η, ον)	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ droplet
στρογγυλωτάτοι (αι, α)	roundest	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΩΤΑΤΟΙ most like a droplet
διαφέρων (ουσα, ον)	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ bringing through
ἀναφέρων (ουσα, ον)	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ bringing back
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ fire
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ collecting (words) [i.e., reasoning]
ἄλογος (ον)	unreasoning	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ not reasoning
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of + gen]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ what is left over
παρεσπάρθαι	to be spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΘΑΙ scatter beside
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ body
λογικός (ή, όν)	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ characteristic of reasoning
ὁ θώραξ οἱ θώρακες	chest	ΘΩΡΑΞ breastplate

δῆλος (η, ον)	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	joy	ΧΑΡΑ *being cheerful*

{66c. Sleep}

{**Ὕπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (τῶν παρ᾽ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένων, ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων) – εἶτα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς ἐπερεισμοῖς: τό τε Σπέρμα ἀφ᾽ ὅλων τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι**}

{[Epicurus also says that] Sleep is produced when the parts of the soul (which are spread out throughout the whole compound, [either] compacted or disseminated) – accordingly fall into each other from their mutual pressing: for Seeds [of the soul] emanate from the entirety of [our] bodies}

[Hicks] that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul (which have been scattered all over the composite organism) are held fast in it or dispersed, and afterwards collide with one another by their impacts. The semen is derived from the whole of the body.]

[Yonge]… for particles emanate from all bodies

Sleep occurs when the parts of the soul, which are spread throughout the body (either gathering together or staying dispersed) eventually fall together.

ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ὙΠΝΟΣ *sleep*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ *scatter beside*
ἐγκατεχόμενος	compacted	ΕΓΚΑΤΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *holding fully in*
διαφέρων (ουσα, ον)	disseminated	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing through*
συμπίπτων (ουσα, ον)	to fall into each other	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ *falling together*
ὁ ἐπερεισμός οἱ ἐπερεισμοί	mutual pressing	ΕΠΕΡΕΙΣΜΟΣ *pressing upon*
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ *seed*

67a. Incorporeal Existence

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, Τόδε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν: ὅ τι "τὸ ἀσώματον" Λέγομεν κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος – ἄν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον, πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ

but indeed, This too must be fully conceived: that which We we call "the incorporeal" in the most [*common*] association of the word [is] applied to what is conceived as intrinsic – while is not possible to conceive the incorporeal as intrinsic, except as void

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must clearly comprehend as well, that the incorporeal in the general acceptation of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existence. Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void.

It is generally agreed that the "incorporeal," although it does not have a physical existence, is something that "exists" independent from objects. However – empty space is the only thing we can think of as truly incorporeal.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing thoroughly*
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ *addition to seeing thoroughly*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ *not body*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most*
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλίαι	association	῾ΟΜΙΛΙΑ *company*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
νοηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* νοηθέντες *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ *seeing*
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ *seeing*
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ *emptiness*

67b. Soul is Material

τὸ δὲ Κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται – ὥστε Οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν Ψυχὴν ματαΐζουσιν – οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη: νῦν δ᾽ ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ Συμπτώματα.

But the Void neither produces nor experiences [anything], but only yields movement through itself to bodies – therefore, Those who claim that the Soul is incorporeal speak vainly – for it would be able to neither produce nor experience [anything] if it were of that sort: but now both these Symptoms concerning the soul are detectibly distinguished*

**i.e., one's soul is observed to initiate its own movement and also to be affected by the environment*

[Bailey] and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies. So that those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking idly. For it would not be able to act or be acted on in any respect, if it were of this nature. But as it is, both these occurrences are clearly distinguished in respect of the soul.

The void can never affect anything and cannot be affected by anything in any way – it just allows objects to move through it. The soul is corporeal: because the soul can both act and be acted upon, which is impossible for empty space.

Acting and being acted upon are "symptoms" (i.e., separable qualities) of the soul, because – although the soul <u>can</u> act and be acted upon – such activities are <u>not necessarily</u> a quality of the soul at any given time.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ *emptiness*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*

κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ *not body*
ἀσώματος *(ον)*	incorporeal	
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ματαΐζειν	to speak vainly	ΜΑΤΑΙΖΕΙΝ *vain action*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ *enduring*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ *result of being within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργείαι	[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ *within clear*
ἐναργῶς	detectibly	ΕΝΑΡΓΩΣ
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ *what is on both sides*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping separation*
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ *to fall together*

68a. Mental Examination

ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων Τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύων τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων: ἱκανῶς κατόψεται, τοῖς τύποις, ἐμπεριειλημμένα – εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ τούτων, ἐξακριβοῦσθαι βεβαίως

therefore, Someone referring all these thorough reasonings about the soul back to [the standards of] the experiences and the sensations, while remembering what was said originally: [He] will, using these [mental] impressions, [be able to] sufficiently mentally inspect [those reasonings that are] completely comprehended within – [in order] to affirmatively be made fully precise from these [mental impressions] according to [the details of] each part

[Bailey] Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation and remembers what was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well.

By linking all reasoning to experiences and sensations – while recalling the foundational points about the atoms – one can examine and confirm details accurately.

λογικός *(ή, όν)*	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of reasoning*
τό διαλόγισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	a thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning through action*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*

ἀνάγων (ουσα, ον)	referring back	ΑΝΑΓΩΝ *leading back*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ *"addition to" thinking*
μνημονεύων (ουσα, ον)	remembering	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΩΝ *"addition to" thinking*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ *in the first order*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ *said*
ῥηθείς (εῖσα, έν) ῥηθέντες (εῖσαι, έντα)	said	ῬΗΘΕΙΣ *said*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
καθορᾶν	to inspect [mentally]	ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ *thoroughly looking*
κατόψεσθαι	to be inspected [in the future]	ΚΑΤΟΨΕΣΘΑΙ *thoroughly will see*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	⁂ to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around in*
ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	⁂completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ *being grasped around in*
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *fully pointed*
ἐξακριβοῦσθαι	to be made fully precise	
βεβαιοτάτος (η, ον)	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ *most certain*
βεβαιούμενος (η, ον)	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *firm standing*
βεβαίως	affirmatively	

68b. Dependent Existence of Qualities

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὰ Σχήματα καὶ τὰ Χρώματα καὶ τὰ Μεγέθη καὶ τὰ Βάρη καὶ Ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται σώματος (ὡσανεὶ συμβεβηκότα ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστά) οὔθ᾽ ὡς καθ᾽ ἑαυτάς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον: οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο

but indeed, Shapes and Colors and Sizes and Weights and Whatever else are attributed to body (as though [those things are] permanent properties either to all [bodies], or [just] to visible [bodies], and are known according to sensation itself) cannot be judged as intrinsically existing natures: for it is not possible to objectively conceive this

[Bailey] Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that)

Shapes, colors, sizes, weights (and other qualities that are known through our senses) do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. However they do exist – even though their physical existence is dependent.

τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *skin color*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
τὸ βάρος **τὰ βάρη**	weight	**ΒΑΡΟΣ** *heavy*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*
κατηγορεῖσθαι	to be attributed	
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*
ὁρατός *(ή, όν)*	visible	**ὉΡΑΤΟΣ** *seeing*
τὸ ὁρατόν **τὰ ὁρατά**	visible thing	
αἰσθητός *(ή, όν)*	[A] sensible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ** *perceiving*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	**ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ** *distinguishing*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
δοξαστός *(ή, όν)*	able to be judged	**ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ** *seeming*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*

69a. Physical Existence of Qualities

οὔτε ὅλως ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν – οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἕτερ᾽Ἄττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα – οὔθ᾽ ὡς μόρια τούτου: ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ ὅλον Σῶμα [K] καθόλου ἐκ τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον

nor [can it be judged] that those [qualities] entirely do not exist – nor as if [they could be] Some different incorporeal [quality] inherent to that [body] – nor as portions of that [body]: but as the whole Body [K] universally possessing its nature in a way that lasts from all these things

[Hicks] nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them,

[Bailey] *Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that)* nor that they absolutely do not exist. (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them.

Qualities are physical manifestations of bodies. The whole body gets its enduring nature from its enduring qualities – such as a stone from weight, fire from heat, and water from liquidity. Although these qualities do not have an independent existence separate from atoms and void – they nevertheless do have an existence.

ἄττα	some	**ΑΤΤΑ** *is an alternative form of* **ΤΙΝΑ**
τινά	certain	
ἕτερος (*ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον*)	different [other / another]	**ΈΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ΎΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ὑπάρχων (*ουσα, ον*) **ὑπάρχοντες** (*ουσαι, οντα*)	existing [already]	**ΎΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
προσυπάρχων (*ουσα, ον*) **προσυπάρχοντες** (*ουσαι, οντα*)	inherent	**ΠΡΟΣΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *addition to / toward beginning under (before)*
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	**ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ** *not body*
ἡ μοῖρα αἱ μοῖραι	a portion [as assigned share]	**ΜΟΙΡΑ** *receiving one's portion*
τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	a portion [as part of a whole]	**ΜΟΡΙΟΝ** *receiving one's portion*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
καθόλου	(κ) universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
ἀίδιος (*ἀιδία, ἀίδιον*)	lasting	**ΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *always*
ἀίδιον	in a way that lasts	
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*

–69b. Formation of Properties

οὐχ οἷον δὲ εἶναι συμπεφορημένον – ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄγκων μεῖζον Ἄθροισμα συστῇ (ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδέ τινος ἐλαττόνων) – ἀλλὰ μονον, ὡς Λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἁπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον

nor is it such a thing that has been put together – in the same way as when a larger Aggregate is composed from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] of this whole particular [aggregate]) – but only, as I say, having its lasting nature from all of these

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is such a thing that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is composed from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] {i.e., atoms} or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] in that particular whole [aggregation]) – but only, as I say, having its lasting nature from all of these [particles that have come together]

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is such a thing that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is set together from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] {i.e., atoms} or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] of this whole particular [aggregation]) – but only, as I say, having its enduring nature from all of these

[Bailey] nor that they are some other kind of incorporeal existence accompanying body, nor that they are material parts of body, rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together to form it.

[Hicks] nor to be some other and incorporeal entities cleaving to body, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them
Though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature.

A compound's enduring nature comes from its inseparable qualities (qualities that are permanent to that body because they are a necessary quality of that body – such as weight to stone, heat to fire, liquidity to water).

However, these qualities are not formed by simply assembling them from "smaller pieces of other qualities." (e.g., "particles of heat" do not form fire, "particles of liquidity" do not form water). These inseparable qualities are not separate entities, or even parts of the compound – but these inseparable qualities come about when the compound is formed (e.g., when a compound of water is formed, it has the inseparable quality of liquidity).

φορεῖν	to transmit	**ΦΟΡΕΙΝ** *carrying*
συμφορεῖν	to put together	**ΣΥΜΦΟΡΕΙΝ** *carrying together*
συμπεφορημένος *(η, ον)*	having been put together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *carried together*
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	**ΜΕΙΖΩΝ** *greater*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
τὸ πρῶτον **τὰ πρῶτα**	the first	**ΠΡΩΤΟΝ** *first*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
συνστῆσαι	to compose [already]	**ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ** *stood together*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *lesser*
ἀίδιος *(ἀίδία, ἀίδιον)*	lasting	**ΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *always*

καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίας πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ διαλήψεις: συμπαρακολουθοῦντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀθρόου καὶ οὐθαμῇ ἀποσχιζομένου ¬ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σώματος κατηγορίαν εἰληφότος

and all these [inseparable qualities] indeed have [their] own particular attention *{i.e., mode of being perceived}* and differentiation: as long as the Aggregate follows along together [with the qualities] and is nowhere detached ¬ but rather having acquired a full [categorial] indication of a body according to [our] aggregated internal conception

[Hicks] They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

[Bailey] All these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished, provided always that the aggregate body goes along with them and is never wrested from them, but in virtue of its comprehension as an aggregate of qualities acquires the predicate of body.

Different qualities are perceived separately and through different senses. These qualities can only be perceived and identified along with the whole object they belong to, never separately. The complete idea of the object comes from the combination of all these perceptions.

τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*
ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἡ διάληψις **αἱ διαλήψεις**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold separation*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
συμπαρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along together	**ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following alongside together*
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΣ** *in groups*
τὸ ἀθρόον **τὰ ἀθρόα**	aggregate	
οὐθαμῇ = **οὐθαμεῖ** = **οὐδαμοῦ**	nowhere	**ΟΥΘΑΜΗΙ** *not in any place*
ἀποσχίζειν	to detach	**ΑΠΟΣΧΙΖΕΙΝ** *splitting away*
ἀποσχιζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being detached	
τὸ ἀθρόον **τὰ ἀθρόα**	what is aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΝ** *gathered*
ἡ ἐπίνοια **αἱ ἐπινοίαι**	[objective] concept	**ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ** *seeing upon*
ἡ ἔννοια **αἱ ἔννοιαι**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΙΑ** *seeing in*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*
ἡ κατηγορία **αἱ κατηγορίαι**	full [categorial] indication	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*

εἰληφώς (υῖα, ός)	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ grasped

70a. Formation of Symptoms

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῖς σώμασι συμπίπτει πολλάκις – καὶ οὐκ ἀΐδιον παρακολουθεῖν… οὔτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις καὶ οὔτε ἀσώματα

> and indeed, [there are also separable qualities] that are often symptomatic to bodies – although not [always] also following along [with bodies] as lasting… either in the unseen *{i.e., the atoms}* or in the incorporeal *{i.e., the void}*
>
> [Bailey] Furthermore, there often happen to bodies and yet do not permanently accompany them accidents: of which we must suppose neither that they (1)do not exist at all, nor that they (2)have the nature of a whole body, nor that (3)they can be classed among unseen things, nor as (4)incorporeal.
>
> [Hicks] Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal.
>
> [Yonge] Bodies often possess other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the incorporeal and invisible things.

Objects often have temporary qualities that are not permanent parts of them. These characteristics do exist, but they are not like whole bodies, invisible things, or incorporeal entities.

τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling together*
συμπίπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	to fall into each other	
πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
ἀΐδιος *(ἀΐδία, ἀΐδιον)*	lasting	**ΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *always*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
συμπαρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along together	**ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following alongside together*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	**ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following beside*
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	**ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ** *not body*

70b. Perception of Symptoms

ὥστε δὴ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φορὰν τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμενοι φανερὰ Ποιοῦμεν τὰ συμπτώματα: οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν (ὃ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα Προσαγορεύομεν) – οὔτε τὴν τῶν ἀΐδιον παρακολουθούντων (ὧν ἄνευ Σῶμα οὐ δυνατὸν νοεῖσθαι) ¬ κατ᾽ ἐπιβολάς, δ᾽ ἄν τινας παρακολουθοῦντος τοῦ ἀθρόου ἕκαστα προσαγορευθείη

therefore, by using this word in accordance with the most extensive transmission {i.e., by using "symptoms" with its most common meaning}, We make the symptoms evident: they do not have [1] the nature of the whole (which We refer to while comprehending together in accordance with the aggregated body) – nor [do symptoms have] [2] the lasting [nature] of those [properties] that follow along together {always with that type of body} (without which a Body is not able to be conceived) ¬ but according to our attentions, certain things could be called by this name [of "symptoms"], while the aggregate is following along [with that symptom]

[Hicks] Hence, using the term 'accidents' in the commonest sense, we say plainly that 'accidents' have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

[Bailey] So that when according to the most general usage we employ this name, we make it clear that accidents have neither [1]the nature of the whole, which we comprehend in its aggregate and call body, nor [2]that of the qualities which permanently accompany it, without which a given body cannot be conceived. But as the result of certain acts of apprehension, provided the aggregate body goes along with them, they might each be given this name

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not permanent constituents an object – these temporary qualities do not have the nature of the whole body or its properties (inseparable qualities).

πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest *[the most]*	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	**ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
φανερὸς *(ὰ, ὸν)*	evident	**ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ** *appearing*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality *(characteristic)*	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from gathering*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*
συλλαβεῖν	to comprehend together *[already]*	**ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped together*
συλλαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	comprehending together *[already]*	
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΣ** *in groups*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
προσαγορευθῆναι	to be referred to *[already]*	
ἀίδιος *(ἀιδία, ἀίδιον)*	lasting	**ΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *always*

συμπαρακολουθῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ *following alongside together*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following beside*
παρακολουθῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	following along	
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing*
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*

71a. Properties vs. Symptoms

ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δήποτε Ἕκαστα συμβαίνοντα θεωρεῖται – οὐκ ἀίδιον τῶν Συμπτωμάτων παρακολουθούντων: καὶ οὐκ Ἐξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος [E] ταύτην τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει [1] τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν (ᾧ συμβαίνει – ὃ δὴ καὶ "σῶμα" Προσαγορεύομεν) οὐδὲ [2] τὴν τῶν ἀίδιον παρακολουθούντων

but [*only*] whenever Each of those [*symptoms*] is observed enduring [with its compound] – because Symptoms do not follow along in a way that lasts: [but] It is not necessary to expel [E] this detectible reality from what exists, [just] because [the symptom] does not have [1] the nature of the whole (with which [the symptom] endures – which indeed We refer to as "a body") nor [does the symptom have] [2] that [nature] of those [properties] that follow along [with the body] in a way that lasts

[Hicks] But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole--by us called body--to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole.

[Bailey] , but only on occasions when each one of them is seen to occur, since accidents are not permanent accompaniments. And we must not banish this clear vision from the realm of existence because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it is joined nor that of the permanent accompaniments,

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not essential constituents of body – they are temporary characteristics that are only occasionally part of the body. Nevertheless, these qualities are real – as they are physically based in a body. Even though they are not permanent parts of that body or among its essential properties.

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ *to have walked together*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
συμβαίνων (ουσα, ον)	enduring [with its compound]	
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
ἀίδιος (ἀιδία, ἀίδιον)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ *ever*
ἀίδιον	in a way that lasts	
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ *to fall together*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following beside*

παρακολουθῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	following along	
ἐξελαύνειν	to expel	ΕΞΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ *driving out of*
ἐναργής (ές)	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ *result of being within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργείαι	[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ *within clear*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *speaking publicly toward*

71b. Neither Intrinsic nor Extrinsic

οὐδ᾽, αὖ, καθ᾽ αὐτὰ νομιστέον – οὐδὲ γὰρ Τοῦτο διανοητὸν: οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτων οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀίδιον συμβεβηκότων – ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται, Συμπτώματα πάντα ‹κατὰ› τὰ σώματα νομιστέον, καὶ οὐκ ἀίδιον παρακολουθοῦντα, οὐδ᾽ αὖ φύσεως καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ τάγμα ἔχοντα· ἀλλ᾽ ὃν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις τὴν ἰδιότητα ποιεῖ θεωρεῖται

nor, again, is It necessary to think that [Qualities exist] intrinsically – for this is not mentally perceptible: neither for these [symptoms] nor for the properties [existing] in a way that lasts [with the compound] – but just as they appear, all Symptoms must be thought of according to the bodies, and not following along [with the body] in a way that lasts [as permanent accompaniments], nor having an intrinsic arrangement of nature *{i.e., having of independent existence}*: but [those Qualities] are observed [to exist exactly] in the way that Sensation itself gathers [each's] particularity

[Bailey] nor must we suppose that such contingencies exist independently (for this is inconceivable both with regard to them and to the permanent properties), but, just as it appears in sensation, we must think of them all as accidents occurring to bodies, and that not as permanent accompaniments, or again as having in themselves a place in the ranks of material existence; rather they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be.

Qualities do not have an independent existence – they do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. Separable qualities are temporary characteristics of bodies (and may not last as long as long as their source-object).

Separable qualities (symptoms) are not part of the body's essential nature – in contrast to inseparable qualities (properties) which last as long as the source-object lasts.

We can understand qualities as they appear through our senses, recognizing their role as attributes of bodies. Qualities are neither intrinsic (they do not exist in-and-of-themselves) nor extrinsic (they cannot be separated from their source-object and still exist).

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ *saw through*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
διανοητὸς (ή, όν)	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ *saw through*
ἀίδιος (ἀιδία, ἀίδιον)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ *always*
ἀίδιον	in a way that lasts	
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*

συμβαίνων *(ουσα, ον)*	enduring [with its compound]	
συμβεβηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having endured	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ** *to have walked together*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*
φανεῖσθαι	to be apparent [in the future]	
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	**ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following beside*
παρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along	
τὸ τάγμα **τὰ τάγματα**	arrangement	**ΤΑΓΜΑ** *ordering*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ ἰδιότης **αἱ ἰδιότητες**	particularity	**ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ** *particular*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality *(characteristic)*	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from gathering*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*

–72a. Investigating Time

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τόδε γε Δεῖ προσκατανοῆσαι σφοδρῶς: τὸν γὰρ δὴ Χρόνον οὐ ζητητέον ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπά (ὅσα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ Ζητοῦμεν, ἀνάγοντες ἐπὶ τὰς βλεπομένας παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς [•A] προλήψεις): ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ Ἐνάργημα, καθ᾽ ὃ τὸν "πολὺν" ἢ "ὀλίγον" χρόνον Ἀναφωνοῦμεν, συγγενικῶς τοῦτο περιφέροντες ἀναλογιστέον

and indeed, It is necessary to also fully conceive this very thing attentively: Time should not to be sought in the same way as the other [qualities] (which We investigate in [their] original source, while referring back to the [•A] anticipations seen by us for those [qualities]): but the [E] detectible Fact itself, according to which We declare time as "long" or "short," ought to be analogized by us congenitally linking this *[attribute of duration with time]*

[Bailey] Moreover, you must firmly grasp this point as well: we must not look for time, as we do for all other things which we look for in an object (by referring them to the general conceptions which we perceive in our own minds) ¬ but we must take the direct intuition, in accordance with which we speak of 'a long time' or 'a short time' and examine it, applying our intuition to time as we do to other things.

[Hicks] There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connection this attribute of duration. {{linking this attribute of duration to [time] in intimate connection}}

Time is a characteristic of movement. We cannot investigate time by perceiving it directly – therefore we cannot investigate time in the same way we investigate other qualities, which we seek in their source-object (i.e., we look for red in an object that has the quality of red), but we must investigate time as a quality of movement itself.

We must realize that time is not something we can investigate in the same way we investigate other qualities that we can experience as characteristics of objects (and which we can refer to what we already know). Rather, we should pay attention to how we actually sense time in everyday life and reference these direct observations of motion as an analogy for the nature of time for use applications in scientific considerations.

νοεῖν	to conceive	**NOEIN** *seeing*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**KATANOEIN** *seeing thoroughly*
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	**ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *addition to seeing thoroughly*
σφοδρός *(ά, όν)*	attentive	**ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ** *intense*
σφοδρῶς	attentively	**ΣΦΟΔΩΣ** *intensely*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ζητητός *(ή, όν)*	sought	**ΖΗΤΗΤΟΣ** *sought*
ζητητέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be sought	**ΖΗΤΗΤΕΟΣ** *should be sought*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of situated under*
ἀνάγων *(ουσα, ον)*	referring back	**ΑΝΑΓΩΝ** *leading back*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
βλεπόμενος *(η, ον)*	seen	**ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *having been looking*
ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•Λ] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
ἡ βλεπομένη πρόληψις	the seen anticipation	
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ** *within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα **τὰ ἐναργήματα**	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ἡ ἀναφωνήσις **αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις**	declaration	**ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ** *speaking up*
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	**ΑΝΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking up*
συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	**ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ** *having been born together*
συγγεγενημένος *(η, ον)*	having been inherent	**ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *having been born together*
συγγενής *(ές)*	akin	**ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ** *born with*

συγγενικῶς	congenitally	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of born with*
διαφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing through*
ἀναφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing back*
περιφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	linking making known	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing around*
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *reasoning action again*
ἀναλόγως	analogously	
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning back/again*
ἀναλογικός *(ή, όν)*	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being reasoned again*
ἀναλογιστέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ *ought to be reasoning action again*
	[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]	

72b. Indicating Time

καὶ οὔτε διαλέκτους ὡς βελτίους Μεταληπτέον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐταῖς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ Χρηστέον – οὔτε ἄλλο τι κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ Κατηγορητέον (ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος τῷ ἰδιώματι τούτῳ, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσί Τινες) ¬ ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ Συμπλέκομεν τὸ ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ Παραμετροῦμεν μάλιστα Ἐπιλογιστέον

and It is also not necessary to substitute ways of speaking as [*though they are*] better, but It is necessary to use the existing [*ways of speaking*] about [*time*] – nor is It necessary to fully indicate anything else about [*time*] (as though [*anything else*] has the same existence as this idiom *{i.e., the word "time"}*, for Some people indeed do this) – but It is most necessary to inductively consider only [the phenomena] with which We entangle the particular feature [of time duration] and comparatively measure it

[Hicks] We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it – nor need we predicate anything else of time (as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word 'time,' for this also is done by some) ¬ We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

[Bailey] Neither must we search for expressions as likely to be better, but employ just those which are in common use about it. Nor again must we predicate of time anything else as having the same essential nature as this special perception, as some people do, but we must turn our thoughts particularly to that only with which we associate this peculiar perception and by which we measure it.

We should use the common expressions for time and not invent new ones. This is because we must not attribute other qualities to time that it does not have – but focus on understanding and measuring it as it is commonly perceived. It is important to focus on the specific way we inherently understand and describe time, rather than trying to add anything else to its meaning.

ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ *speaking across*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*

μεταληπτός (ή, όν)	substitutable	**ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *taken hold change*
μεταληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be substituted	**ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ** *change ought to be taken hold*
μεταληπτέον	it is necessary to substitute	
ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον) **ὑπάρχοντες** (ουσαι, οντα)	existing [already]	**ΎΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
χρηστός (ή, όν)	useful	
χρηστέος (α, ον)	ought to be used	
χρηστέον	it is necessary to use	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*
κατηγορητέον	it is necessary to fully indicate	
ἡ οὐσία **αἱ οὐσίαι**	existence	**ΟΥΣΙΑ** *being*
ἡ ἰδιότης **αἱ ἰδιότητες**	particularity	**ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ** *particular*
τὸ ἰδίωμα **τὰ ἰδιώματα**	idiom	**ΙΔΙΩΜΑ** *particular*
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
πλεκτικός (η, ον)	entangling	**ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of weaving*
συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly measure*
παραμετρεῖν	to comparatively measure	**ΠΑΡΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring alongside*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action together*
τό διαλόγισμα **τὰ διαλογίσματα**	a thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning through action*
ἀναλογιστέος (α, ον)	ought to be analogized	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be reasoning action again*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπιλογιστέος (α, ον)	out to be inductively considered	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be action upon reasoning*
ἐπιλογιστέον	it is necessary to inductively consider	

73a. Considering Time

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες καθ᾽ ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This is not also in need of proof, but [only] of inductive consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We are internalizing, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] according to which We use the word "Time" {He also says this in the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Bailey] For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time.

Only observation and reflection are needed to understand time. We recognize time by associating it with our experiences of the day progressing and by movement.

ἡ ἀπόδειξις **αἱ ἀποδείξεις**	proof	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ** *from pointing out*
δεῖ	it is necessary	**ΔΕΙ** *needing*
δεῖσθαι	to need	
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *needing in addition to*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
ἡ νύξ **αἱ νύκτες**	night	**ΝΥΞ** *night*
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ ἀπάθεια **αἱ ἀπάθειαι**	absence of experience	**ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ** *not experiencing*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	**ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing within*

ἐννοῶν (ἐννοῦσα, ἐννοῦν) ἐννοοῦντες (ἐννοοῦσαι, ἐννοοῦντα)	internalizing	ΕΝΝΟΩΝ
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *speaking publicly toward*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ *naming*

73b. Cosmoi – Dissolution of Compounds

ἐπί τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους Δεῖ (καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην τὸ ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρουμένοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσαν) νομίζειν γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου: πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων (καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων) – καὶ, πάλιν, διαλύεσθαι Πάντα (τὰ μὲν θᾶττον, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον – καὶ, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε) τοῦτο πάσχοντα

moreover, in addition to what has been previously mentioned, It is necessary that the Cosmoi (as well as every [other] finite compound [which] has the same appearance as what is frequently observed) be considered to have come into being from the infinite: because all of these (both larger and smaller) had been distinguished [out of the infinite] by particular conglomer assemblages [of atoms] – and, in turn, [It is necessary for] all [these compound] Things to be dissolved (some more swiftly, others more slowly – indeed, some things by some specific [causes], and other things by other specific [causes]) [because they are all] affected by this [dissolution]

[Bailey] And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

Worlds (as well as every other compound) emerge out of the indistinct infinite void and infinite amount of atoms as distinct and finite aggregates. They are formed from groups of atoms and will eventually break apart due to various different causes – some quickly and some very slowly.

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ *spoke*
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	
προειρημένος (η, ον)	previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ *spoke before*
τὸ προειρημένον τὰ προειρημένα	what has been previously mentioned	
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
ἡ διάκρισις αἱ διακρίσεις	separating apart	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing apart*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*

τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ *result of having finished*
πεπερασμένος (η, ον)	finite	
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ *toward bringing in*
ἀνόμοιος (ον)	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ *not similar*
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
ὁμοιομερής (ές)	"similarly composed" homoiomeric	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ *similar parts*
ὁμοιόμορφος (ον)	similarly formed	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ *similar form*
ὁμοειδής (ές)	appearing the same	ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*
τὸ ὁμοειδές	same appearance	
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	observed	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *envisioning*
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ *compacting*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ *not limited*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἀποκεκριμένος (η, ον)	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ *divided away from*
μείζων (ον)	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
ἐλάττων (ων, ον)	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *through dissolve*
διαλύεσθαι	to be dissolved	
ταχύς (εῖα, ύ)	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ *swift*
θάττων (ουσα, ον)	swifter	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ *swifter*
θᾶττον	more swiftly	
βραδύς (εῖα, ύ)	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ *slow*
βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
πάσχων (ουσα, ον)	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ *suffering*

73c. {Perishability of Cosmoi}

{δῆλον, οὖν, ὡς καὶ φθαρτούς Φησι τοὺς Κόσμους – μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν: καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τὴν Γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι}

{[it is] clear, therefore, He states that the Cosmoi [are] also perishable – because [their] parts are transforming: and in other [places in his books he says that] the Earth is carried along by the air}

Worlds are perishable because their parts can change. Epicurus also mentions that our cosmos is carried through space by the air. The air in space is filled with "oceans" of atoms (and the waves and wakes that originate when objects pass through such atomic "oceans"). Our earth (as well as all the planets in our cosmos) is supported by, and carried along in, this atomic ocean.

δῆλος (η, ον)	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
φθαρτός	perishable	ΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ *being destroyed*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in change*
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ *throwing in change*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ὁ ἀήρ (τοῦ ἀέρος)	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
ὁ ὄχος οἱ ὄχοι	carriage, cart, chariot	ΟΧΟΣ *riding*
ὀχεῖν	to carry	ΟΧΕΙΝ *riding*
ἐποχεύειν	to carry upon	ΕΠΟΧΕΥΕΙΝ *riding upon*
ἐποχεῖσθαι	to be carried along	

74a. Shapes of Cosmoi

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης Δεῖ νομίζειν ἕνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς {ἐν τῇ ιβʹ *Περὶ Φύσεως* Αὐτός φησιν: οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ᾠοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέρους – οὐ, μέντοι, πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν ¬ οὐδὲ ζῷα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου}

yet also, It should not necessarily be thought that the Cosmoi have [just] one configuration ¬ but they are also different {in the 12th book *On Nature*, He himself says: some are spherical, others egg-shaped, and others differently shaped – they do not, however, have every shape ¬ nor are [the Cosmoi] living beings that are distinguished from the infinite}

[Bailey] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape.

Cosmoi are spherical, oval, and very many other shapes – nevertheless they are not formed in every possible shape.

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against constraint*
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
εἷς μία ἕν (ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)	one	ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ *one*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*

ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of forming*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
διάφορος *(ον)*	different	
δώδεκα	twelve	ΔΩΔΕΚΑ *two* *(and)* *ten*
ιβʹ	12	ΙΒʹ *ten* *(and)* *two*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ὁμοειδής *(ές)*	similarly formed	ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*
σφαιροειδής *(ές)*	spherical	ΣΦΑΙΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing sphere*
ᾠοειδής *(ές)*	oval	ΩΙΟΕΙΔΗΣ *egg appearing*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
ἀλλοιοσχήμων *(ον)*	differently shaped	ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ *holding differently [form]*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ἡ σύνκρισις = ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἀποκεκριμένος *(η, ον)*	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ *divided away from*
ἀποκριθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	distinguished [already]	ΑΠΟΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ *dividing away from*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*

74b. Composition of Cosmoi

[...] **οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδείξειεν Οὐδείς ὡς ‹ἐν› μὲν τῷ τοιούτῳ (καὶ οὐκ ἂν Ἐμπεριελήφθη) τὰ τοιαῦτα Σπέρματα ἐξ ὧν ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ‹τὰ› θεωρούμενα συνίσταται ¬ ἐν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη {ὡσαύτως, δὲ καὶ ἐντραφῆναι τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς Νομιστέον}**

> [*furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and all the other things that we see produced in this world*] for Nobody could fully prove (nor could it be completely comprehended within) that in one particular [world there are] the particular Seeds from which living beings, plants, and all other [*mentally*] observed things are composed ¬ whereas in another similar [world], [similar seeds] would not have the force [to exist] {likewise, It is necessary to consider [those similar living beings, plants, and all other observed things] being nourished in the same way as on earth}
>
> [Bailey] *Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world;* for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

Some worlds have a composition like ours, other worlds have a composition unlike ours. In worlds similar to ours, there are similar living creatures, plants, and everything else that exists in our world. The seeds needed for those living beings and plants to form and grow are not only found in just one world, but in all others similar to it. Those living beings and plants are nourished in the same way as they are on Earth.

δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing*
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing away*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς (οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἐμπεριλαβεῖν	to completely comprehended within [already]	
ἐμπεριληφθῆναι	to be completely comprehended within [already]	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΦΘΗΝΑΙ *grasped around in*
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ *seed*
τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτά	plant	ΦΥΤΟΝ *growing*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	[mentally] observed	
συνστῆσαι	to compose [already]	ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ *stood together*
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
συνίστασθαι	to be composed	
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
δυνηθῆναι	to have the force [already]	
τρέφειν	to nurture	ΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *raising*
ἐντρέφεσθαι	to be nurtured in	ΕΝΤΡΕΦΕΣΘΑΙ *raising in*
ἐντραφῆναι	to be nurtured in [already]	ΕΝΤΡΑΦΗΝΑΙ *raised in*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*

75a. Adaptive Learning

ἀλλὰ μὴν, Ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν Φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι – τὸν δὲ Λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισὶ θᾶττον, ἐν δὲ τισὶ βραδύτερον – καὶ ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις ‹μείζους λαμβάνειν ἐπιδόσεις›, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους

but indeed, It is also necessary to suppose that [human] Nature is taught numerous and diverse things by the situations themselves and that it is also forced [to do many things] – and that [human] Reasoning afterwards further makes more precise and elaborates the things already recommended by these [situations], in some cases more swiftly, in others more slowly – and in some periods and times [human reasoning] acquires larger advancements, but also smaller [advancements] in other [periods]

[Bailey] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others.

Human nature is shaped by events and circumstances – afterwards, reasoning fine-tunes this nature. Humans learn and adapt through experiences, with reason developing and expanding on these lessons. The speed of this progress varies over time.

ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	⁂ to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around in*
ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	⁂completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ *being grasped around in*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ *teaching*
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ *necessary*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *reasoning action together*
τό διαλόγισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	a thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning through action*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	[process of] reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *action of collecting*
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΥΑΝ *sending a message across*
παρεγγυηθείς (εῖσα, έν)	recommended [already]	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΗΘΕΙΣ *sending a message across*
ὕστερον	afterwards	῞ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *fully pointed*
ἐπακριβοῦν	to make more precise	ΕΠΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *pointed upon*
εὑρίσκειν	to discover	῾ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ *finding*
προσεξευρίσκειν	to elaborate	ΠΡΟΣΕΞΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ *finding in addition from*
ταχύς (εῖα, ύ)	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ *swift*
θάττων (ουσα, ον)	swifter	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ *swifter*
θᾶττον	more swiftly	
βραδύς (εῖα, ύ)	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ *slow*
βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ *result around the path*

ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
ἡ ἐπίδοσις αἱ ἐπιδόσεις	advancements	ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΣ *giving in addition*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*

75b. Natural Word Formation

ὅθεν καὶ τὰ Ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι ¬ ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὰς τὰς Φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πάσχουσας πάθη – καὶ ἰδία λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως – τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων (ὡς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν Διαφορὰ ᾖ)

and so [It is necessary to fundamentally comprehend that] Words were also not produced from the beginning by [purposeful] positioning ¬ but rather the very Natures of people according to each ethnicity were affected by particular experiences – and comprehending particular mental impression in a particular way – [human nature] emitted the air brought up by each of [their] experiences and [their] mental impressions (as there may also be a Difference depending on the locations of the ethnicities)

[Bailey] And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.

Words and names for things were not created on purpose or by agreement but arose by natural human impulse. Primitive people made sounds based on their feelings and experiences, and these sounds varied depending on the region and culture they lived in.

τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ *in the first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position [here, "positioning"]	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ *accustomed*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἰδίως	in a particular way	
πάσχων *(ουσα, ον)*	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ *suffering*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	comprehending	
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	what appears	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ *process of appearing*
τὸ φάντασμα τὰ φαντάσματα	mental impression	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ *result of appearing*
ἰδίως	particularly	ΙΔΙΩΣ *particular*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying out*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready away*
στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready*
στελλόμενον	being sent	ΣΤΕΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of making ready*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*

76a. Purposeful Word Formation

ὕστερον, δὲ κοινῶς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ Ἴδια τεθῆναι – πρὸς τὸ τὰς Δηλώσεις ἧττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας: τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνορώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς Συνειδότας, παρεγγυῆσαί τινας φθόγγους – ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἑλομένους – κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἑρμηνεῦσαι

afterwards, [*It is necessary to fundamentally comprehend that*] particular Things were generally established according to each ethnicity – so that [*their*] Clarifications might become less ambiguous to one another and more concisely clear: and Those who knew well [*how to clarify with their expressions*] also introduced certain situations that [*were*] not [*mentally*] fully seen, while recommending certain expressions [*for the situations they introduced*] – they were [*sometimes*] compelled to declare [*certain expressions*] but [*other times*] they chose [*expressions*] by reasoning – interpreting [*situations*] in that way according to [*their*] greatest cause [*i.e., according to their primary purpose of communicating clearly*]

[Bailey] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

Although many words arose naturally, some were invented for precision, and others for newly discerned mental concepts.

Different races automatically created their specific words to make communication clearer and more concise among themselves. Afterward, educated people introduced – either instinctively or logically – new terms for things that were not previously understood.

ὕστερον	afterwards	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from common*
κοινῶς	generally	
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ *accustomed*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
ἡ δήλωσις αἱ δηλώσεις	clarification	ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ *action of making clear*
ἀμφίβολος *(ος, ον)*	ambiguous	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΟΣ *throwing both*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
συντομός	concise	συντομός *cut together*
συντομωτέρως	more concisely	
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
δηλούμενος *(η, ον)*	clarified	
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*
συνορώμενος *(η, ον)*	fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *seen together*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
ἀναφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried back	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing back*
εἰσφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	introducing	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing into*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing*
συνειδώς *(υῖα, ός)*	knowing well	ΣΥΝΕΙΔΩΣ *seen together*
ὁ συνειδώς οἱ συνειδότες	he who knew well	
παρεγγυᾶν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΑΝ *entrust besides*
παρεγγυῆσαί	to recommend [already]	
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ *uttering*
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ *necessary*
ἀναγκάσαι	to force [already]	
ἀναγκασθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	forced [here, "compelled"]	
ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ *speaking up*
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	[process of] reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *action of collecting*

αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
ἑλόμενος *(η, ον)*	chosen [already]	ἙΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ *took*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἑρμηνεύειν	to interpret	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΥΕΙΝ *Hermes nod,* *interpreting sign*
ἑρμηνεῦσαι	to interpret [already]	

76b. Autonomous Motion

καὶ μὴν ‹καὶ, τὴν› ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν καὶ ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις – μήτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν Δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος, ἢ διατάξοντος – καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ᾽ ἀφθαρσίας

and indeed, [regarding] the transmission in meteorological phenomena, and the turning, and disappearance, and rising, and setting, and components related to these – It is necessary to think that they are produced neither by someone who is administrating and who is [currently] arranging, nor [by someone] who will [in the future] be arranging [those components of meteorological phenomena] – [all] while also simultaneously possessing total blessedness in accordance with [their] indestructibility

[Bailey] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality.

Just as matter is not created – events are not controlled. All evidence demonstrates that meteorological events like star movements, solstices, and eclipses happen naturally, without the control or command of any being. Also, it is not possible to imagine any being that, while controlling all the events in the universe, is also relaxed and at ease.

τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ *diverting*
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ *leaving out*
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ *process of* *sinking*
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ *result of a row* *(in a series)*
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ *instance of a row* *(in a series)*
τὸ σύστοιχον τὰ σύστοιχα	related component	ΣΥΣΤΟΙΧΟΝ *together* *in a row*
λειτουργεῖν	to administrate [to serve the state]	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΕΙΝ *council-room* *worker*
λειτουργῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	administrating	

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
διατάττειν	to arrange	ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ *ordering across*
διατάττων *(ουσα, ον)*	arranging	
διατάξων *(ουσα, ον)*	will be arranging	ΔΙΑΤΑΞΩΝ *will order across*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ *not destroyed*

77a. Dependent Emotions

οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν [1ext.] Πραγματεῖαι καὶ [1int.] Φροντίδες καὶ [2] Ὀργαὶ καὶ [3] Χάριτες μακαριότητι – ἀλλ' ἐν [1] ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ [2] φόβῳ καὶ [3] προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον Ταῦτα γίγνεται ¬ μήτε, αὖ, πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον, τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα, κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν

for [1ext.] Efforts, [1int.] Considerations, [2] Moods, and [3] Graces do not harmonize with blessedness – but these Things arise in [1] weakness, [2] fear, and [3] additional need from those nearby ¬ nor, once more, as they are only entangled fire, [should we believe that meteorological phenomena], while possessing blessedness, acquire [their] movements voluntarily

[Bailey] (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements.

[Usener] **μήτε, αὖ, πυρὸς Ἀνάμματα συνεστραμμένου**

nor, once more, [should we believe that] Conflagrations of entangled fire

Emotions such as concern, anxiety, anger, and kindness are signs of weakness, fear, and dependence – all such feelings do not fit with a state of contentment befitting a god.
Celestial bodies, which are just masses of fire, do not experience awareness or feelings – nor do they move by their own will.
From one possible interpretation Epicurus is connecting: (1) external efforts with (physical) weakness as well as internal concerns with (mental) weakness – connecting (2) moods with fear – and connecting (3) Favors with additional need from those nearby.

ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ *speaking together*
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ *state of the result of doing / affair*
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
ἡ ὀργή αἱ ὀργαί	mood	ΟΡΓΗ *reaching out*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*

ἡ ἀσθένεια αἱ ἀσθένειαι	weakness	ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΑ *not strong*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἡ δέησις αἱ δεήσεις	a need	ΔΕΗΣΙΣ *to be necessary*
ἡ προσδεήσις αἱ προσδεήσεις	an additional need	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΗΣΙΣ *to be necessary in addition*
πλησίον	nearby	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ *near*
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
ὁ ὁμορρῶν οἱ ὁμορροῦντες	neighbor [the one bordering]	ὉΜΟΡΡΩΝ *the same separating*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
τὸ ἀνάμμα τὰ ἀνάμματα	conflagration	ΑΝΑΜΜΑ *lighting up*
συνεστραμμένος (η, ον)	entangled	ΣΥΝΕΣΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ *having twisted together*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ *wishing*
κατὰ βούλησιν	voluntarily	
τὸ κίνημα τὰ κινήματα	[specific] movement	ΚΙΝΗΜΑ *result of moving*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*

77b. Maintaining Reverence

ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας – ἵνα μηδ᾽ ὑπεναντίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ‹γένωνται› τῷ σεμνώματι Δόξαι: εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτὴ ἡ Ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει

but [It is necessary] to preserve all the reverence being carried by every word toward such internal conceptions [as contentment and indestructibility] – so Judgments that are contrary to this reverence do not ‹arise› from those [words]: if not, the Contradiction itself will provide the greatest disturbance in [our] souls

[Bailey] But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men's souls.

We must maintain the complete profound significance of terms such as "content" and "immortality" to avoid creating conflicting conceptions – because these contradictory notions and principles can greatly trouble our minds. Holding conflicting conceptions regarding the meanings of words ruins our clear mental access to what they indicate.

σεμνοῦν	to revere	ΣΕΜΝΟΥΝ *august / exalted*
τὸ σέμνωμα τὰ σεμνώματα	reverence	

διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	διατηρειν *completely protecting / watching*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting / watching*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ *seeing in*
ὑπεναντίος *(α, ον)*	contrary	῾ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *over against*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ *agitating*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ ὑπεναντιότης αἱ ὑπεναντιότητες	contradiction	῾ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΤΗΣ *over against*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάσειν	to be going to provide	

77c. Systemic Planetary Mechanics

ὅθεν, δὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει Δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι

therefore, certainly, It is necessary to judge that both the natural necessity [of meteorological phenomena] and a completion of a full course [of their regular movements] are mutually fulfilled according to the integrations of these [meteorological] assemblages from the beginning during the creation of [our] cosmos

[Bailey] Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

Astronomical phenomena occur based on the interaction of masses that were integrated during the formation of our cosmos. This initial organization established the patterns of movement in our cosmos that still govern meteorological bodies today.

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ λῆψις αἱ λῆψεις	*comprehension*	*ΛΗΨΙΣ taking hold*
ἡ ἐναπολήψις αἱ ἐναπολήψεις	integration	ΕΝΑΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ *will grasp from within*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	[process of] creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ *action of being born*

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against* *constraint*
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ *result around* *the path*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing* *together*
συντελεῖσθαι	to be altogether fulfilled	

78a. Examining Causes

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὸ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι Δεῖ νομίζειν – καὶ τὸ Μακάριον ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναι: καὶ ἐν τῷ τίνες Φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί, καὶ Ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν

and indeed, It is necessary to consider that making the cause about the most essential things fully precise is the task of natural science – and What is blessed in this respect has already settled: both in regard to [understanding] what the [essential] Natures that are observed in these meteorological phenomena, and Whatever else contributes towards precision in this [examination]

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must believe that to discover accurately the cause of the most essential facts is the function of the science of nature, and that blessedness for us in the knowledge of celestial phenomena lies in this and in the understanding of the nature of the existences seen in these celestial phenomena, and of all else that is akin to the exact knowledge requisite for our happiness.

The proper role natural philosophy is to thoroughly understand the fundamental causes of natural phenomena (the atoms and the void). We have a basis of contentment and security in our knowledge of these fundamental causes.

We must differentiate between fundamental and general essential causes verses particular specific causes for all phenomena we see. While we investigate how a particular phenomenon can occur with various specific causes, it is most important that we understand the essential causes behind such a phenomenon.

κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
κυριώτατος *(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)*	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical /* *valid*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *fully pointed*
ἐξακριβῶσαι	to make fully precise [already]	
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning* *of producing*
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	an activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ *result of* *working within*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *greatness*

μακάριος (α, ον)	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is blessed	
ἐνταῦθα	in this [respect]	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ *in this*
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ *to fall together*
πεπτωκέναι	to have settled	ΠΕΠΤΩΚΕΝΑΙ *fallen*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of envisioning*
θεωρητός (ή, όν)	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	observed	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *envisioning*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
συντείνειν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *stretching together*
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ *result of pointed*
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ *state of pointed*

78b. Certainty for Essential Causes

ἔτι τε, οὐ Τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι, καὶ τὸ Ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ¬ ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν: καὶ Τοῦτο Καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἶναι

also, [*It is necessary to consider that*] What exists in several ways does not exist in such [essential] things, nor the Possibility of also being in some other way ¬ but that nothing of what suggests [any] separating apart or [any] disturbance is included absolutely in an indestructible and blessed nature: and to thoroughly Comprehend with the mind that This [reality] exists is absolutely possible

[Bailey] in knowing too that what occurs in several ways or is capable of being otherwise has no place here but that nothing which suggests doubt or alarm can be included at all in that which is naturally immortal and blessed. Now this we can ascertain by our mind is absolutely the case.

πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
πλέων (ων, ον)	more	ΠΛΕΩΝ *flowing*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
τὸ πλεοναχῶς τὰ πλεοναχῶς	what exists in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
ἐνδεχόμενος (η, ον)	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *accepting in*
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα	possibility [of]	
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ *not destroyed*
ἀφθαρτός (ός, όν)	indestructible	
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ *greatness*
μακάριος (α, ον)	blessed	

ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ *fully loosening*
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold* *separation*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἡ διάκρισις αἱ διακρίσεις	separating apart	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing apart*
βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing*
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in change*
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in across*
ὑποβάλλειν	to suggest	῝ΥΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing under*
ὑποβάλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	suggesting	
ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ *agitating*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly grasping*
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [already]	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ *thoroughly grasped*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
ἔστιν ἁπλῶς εἶναι	it is absolutely possible	*"absolutely it is [possible] to exist"*

Specific meteorological phenomena can have multiple possible explanations because their general causes vary – in contrast, the most fundamental causes (the atoms and the void) are consistent and certain.

Similarly, the essential natures of contentment and indestructibility are consistent and certain – they cannot allow for the inclusion or mixing of anything foreign while still existing as those essential natures .

79a. Uncertainly for Particular Causes

τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ Πεπτωκός τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως – καὶ ῞Οσα συγγενῆ τούτοις – μηθὲν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τὰς γνώσεις συντείνειν

but [It is necessary to consider that] What has fallen within the examination of a setting, rising, turning, or an eclipse – or Whatever else is akin to these – contributes nothing further to what is blessed of knowledge

[Bailey] But what falls within the investigation of risings and settings and turnings and eclipses, and all that is akin to this, is no longer of any value for the happiness which knowledge brings.

Studying the movement of specific meteorological phenomena does not further contribute to the contentment already gained from studying the essential atomic causes of such phenomena.

ἡ ἱστορία αἱ ἱστορίαι	examination	῾ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ *inquiring*

πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
πεπτωκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having fallen	ΠΕΠΤΩΚΩΣ *fell*
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking*
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	a rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ *lifting up*
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ *diverting*
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ *leaving out*
συγγενής *(ές)*	akin	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ *born with*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is blessed	
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ *distinguishing*
συντείνειν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *stretching together*

79b. Precision for Essential Causes

ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν, τοὺς ταῦτα Κατειδότας, τίνες δ᾽ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι – καὶ εἰ μὴ Προσῄδεισαν ταῦτα – τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους: ὅταν τὸ Θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προσκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν

but likewise, [It is necessary to consider that] People who understand these [specific meteorological phenomena], but do not also know what their [fundamental] natures are as well as what their most essential causes are, [still] have those fears in the same way – just as if They were not already familiar with these [specific meteorological phenomena] – perhaps even greater [fears]: when [their] Amazement from the additional full conception of these things is not able to comprehend the solution and operation of the most essential things

[Bailey] but persons who have perceived all this, but yet do not know what are the natures of these things and what are the essential causes, are still in fear, just as if they did not know these things at all indeed, their fear may be even greater, since the wonder which arises out of the observation of these things cannot discover any solution or realize the regulation of the essentials.

People who know about (and even those who can predict) risings, settings, eclipses and other meteorological events – but do not understand the fundamental workings of nature (the essential causes) – may feel as much fearful uncertainty as those who do not even consider such investigations. Unless their investigations also explain the underlying reasons for these phenomena, their fearful uncertainty might even be greater. They may, for example, instead consider these events to be the work of gods.

ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*

καθορᾶν	to inspect [mentally]	ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ *thoroughly looking*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen* ∴ "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *seen*
κατειδέναι	"to have mentally inspected" ∴ to understand	ΚΑΤΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *thoroughly seen*
κατειδώς *(υῖα, ός)*	"having mentally inspected" ∴ understanding	
ὁ κατειδώς οἱ κατειδότες	he who understands	
προσειδέναι	"to also have mentally seen" ∴ to also be familiar with	ΠΡΟΣΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing in addition*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ *not distinguishing*
ἀγνοῶν *(ἀγνοοῦσα, ἀγνοοῦν)*	not knowing	
τὸ νόημα τὰ νοήματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ *result of seeing within*
ἡ κατανόησις αἱ κατανοήσεις	full conception	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ *thoroughly seeing*
ἡ προσκατανόησις αἱ προσκατανοήσεις	additional full conception	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ *addition to thoroughly seeing*
κυριώτατος *(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)*	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical / valid*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
τάχα	perhaps	ΤΑΧΑ *quickly*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
τὸ θάμβος τὰ θάμβη	amazement	ΘΑΜΒΟΣ *astonishing*
ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ *fully loosening*
ἡ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution [i.e., explanation]	ΛΥΣΙΣ *the process of loosening*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομίαι	operation	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ *managing the home*

79c, 80a. Imprecision for Specific Causes

διὸ δὴ κἂν πλείους αἰτίας Εὑρίσκωμεν τροπῶν καὶ δύσεων καὶ ἀνατολῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεων καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων – ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος γινομένοις: ἣν οὐ Δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων Χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι (Ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει)

therefore indeed, We may even discover more causes of turnings, settings, risings, eclipses, and such things – just as [we find] in the [writings we] produced for [the details of] each part: [nevertheless] It is not necessary to think that [our] need regarding these things has not fully acquired precision (as Much as contributes to what is undisturbed and blessed)

[Bailey] And for this very reason, even if we discover several causes for turnings and settings and risings and eclipses and the like, as has been the case already in our investigation of detail. we must not suppose that our inquiry into these things has not reached sufficient accuracy to contribute to our peace of mind and happiness.

We can give (1) essential explanations for a specific cause, but in some cases we cannot give (2) specific explanations for a specific cause. Even when the specific causes for a phenomenon remain uncertain, the essential causes for that phenomenon can be fully understood.

ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
εὑρίσκειν	to discover	**ΈΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *finding*
ἡ τροπή **αἱ τροπαί**	turning	**ΤΡΟΠΗ** *diverting*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	a rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
ἡ ἔκλειψις **αἱ ἐκλείψεις**	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	**ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ** *leaving out*
τὸ τοιουτοτρόπος **τὰ τοιουτοτρόπα**	such a thing	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *such a kind of way*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
χρήσιμος *(ον)*	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
ἡ χρεία **αἱ χρεῖαι**	use	**ΧΡΕΙΑ** *necessary*
ἡ ἀκρίβεια **αἱ ἀκρίβειαι**	precision	**ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ** *state of pointed*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	**ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping away from*
ἀπειληφέναι	to have fully acquired	**ΑΠΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ** *grasped away from*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ἀτάραχος = **ἀτάρακτος** *(ος, ον)*	undisturbed	**ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ** **ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ** *without agitating*
τὸ ἀτάραχον **τὰ ἀτάραχα**	what is undisturbed	
ἡ μακαριότης **αἱ μακαριότητες**	blessedness	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from greatness*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
τὸ μακάριον **τὰ μακάρια**	what is blessed	

συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*

80b. Essential vs. Specific Causes

ὥστε, παραθεωροῦντας ποσαχῶς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τὸ Ὅμοιον γίνεται – Αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου: καταφρονοῦντας τῶν οὔτε [1a] τὸ μοναχῶς ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον γνωριζόντων, οὔτε [1b] τὸ πλεοναχῶς συμβαῖνον – [2] τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων φαντασίαν παριδόντων – ἔτι τε ἀγνοούντων καὶ [3a] ἐν ποίοις οὐκ Ἔστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι ‹καὶ [3b] ἐν ποίοις ὁμοίως ἀταρακτῆσαι›

thus, while we are investigating how a Similar [specific phenomenon] among us occurs in several ways – It is necessary to reason into the [essential] causes regarding [such] meteorological phenomena as well as [0] everything unclear: while we disregard those who do not acknowledge [the difference between] [1a] what exists or is produced in only one way, versus [1b] what endures in several ways – while they [also] overlook [2] [the fact that] the appearance [of such astrological phenomena] arises out of the distance [between the phenomena and ourselves] – and also [those who] do not know [3a] in which things It is *not* possible to be undisturbed ‹and [3b] in which things similarly [it *is* possible] to be undisturbed›

[Bailey] So we must carefully consider in how many ways a similar phenomenon is produced on earth, when we reason about the causes of celestial phenomena and all that is imperceptible to the senses; and we must despise those persons who do not recognize either what exists or comes into being in one way only, or that which may occur in several ways in the case of things which can only be seen by us from a distance, and further are not aware under what conditions it is impossible to have peace of mind.

When investigating the causes of meteorological phenomena, we should consider how similar events happen on Earth. We should disregard people who cannot distinguish between events with multiple possible causes and events with only one cause – as we should disregard people who do not appreciate the nuances of viewing objects from a distance – just as we should also disregard people who do not understand what investigations provide a basis for fostering peace of mind.

παραβάλλειν	to compare	**ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing in across*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
παραθεωρεῖν	to investigate	**ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *observing alongside*
ποσαχῶς	in various ways	**ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ** *how many ways*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
αἰτιολογεῖν	to reason into the [essential] causes	**ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *collecting blame*
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	**ΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear*
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(θ) fully clear	**ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear within*
ἄδηλος *(ον)*	(0) unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΣ** *not clear*

τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ *not clear*
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind*
καταφρονεῖν *+ gen*	to disregard	ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind* *down / against*
μοναχῶς	in only one way	ΜΟΝΑΧΩΣ *one manner*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having* *distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	
γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ *causing knowing*
πλέων *(ων, ον)*	more	ΠΛΕΩΝ *flowing / more*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ *to have walked* *together*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
συμβαίνων *(ουσα, ον)*	enduring [with its compound]	
τὸ συμβαῖνον τὰ συμβαίνοντα	what endures	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ *standing together*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ *seen*
παριδεῖν	to overlook [already]	ΠΑΡΙΔΕΙΝ *seen across*
παριδών *(οῦσα, όν)*	overlooking [already]	
ὁ παριδών οἱ παριδόντες	those who overlook [already]	
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ *not distinguishing*
ἀγνοῶν *(ἀγνοοῦσα, ἀγνοοῦν)*	not knowing	
ὁ ἀγνοῶν οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες	those who do not know	
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος *(ος, ον)*	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ *without agitating*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ἀταρακτεῖν	to be undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΕΙΝ *without agitating*
ἀταρακτῆσαι	to be undisturbed [already]	

ἂν, οὖν, Οἰώμεθα καὶ ὡδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι ‹καὶ ἐν οἵοις ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀταρακτῆσαι› – **αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς γίνεται γνωρίζοντες: ὥσπερ κἂν ὅτι ὡδί πως γίνεται εἴδωμεν, ἀταρακτήσομεν**

therefore, even if we believe that [a specific phenomenon] is possible to be produced in some particular way ‹and [it is] among the things where it is equally possible to be undisturbed› – then when we acknowledge that it is produced in several ways: we will be undisturbed, just as if we were to see that it is produced in some particular way

[Hicks] If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way … out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

We need to accept the reality that there are varied possibilities for causes of a specific phenomenon. If we understand that a phenomenon can happen in multiple ways, and that any of these ways do not cause us fear, we will be just as calm as if we knew the exact cause of a particular phenomenon.

Accepting this uncertainty for specific causes promotes mental well-being just as much as our foundational certainty for essential causes.

οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
ὡδί πως	in some particular way	**ΩΔΙ ΠΩΣ** *manner like somehow*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
πλέων *(ων, ον)*	more	**ΠΛΕΩΝ** *flowing / more*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ** *more multiplicity*
γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	**ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *distinguishing [transformation]*
γνωρίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	acknowledging	
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**῾ΟΡΑΝ** *looking*
ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	**ΙΔΕΙΝ** *seen*
ἀταρακτεῖν	to be undisturbed	**ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΕΙΝ** *without agitating*
ἀταρακτήσειν	to be undisturbed [in the future]	

81a. The Gods

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις, ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκεῖνο Δεῖ κατανοεῖν: ὅτι Τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταῦτά τε μακάρια δοξάζειν ‹εἶναι› καὶ ἄφθαρτα ¬ καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτῳ βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας

and in addition to these things, It is entirely necessary for all to fully conceive this: that the most essential Disturbance in human souls is produced by [people] judging these [astrological phenomena themselves] to be blessed and indestructible ¬ and at the same time [thinking that these astrological phenomena] have intentions, activities, and causes contrary to this

[Bailey] And besides all these matters in general we must grasp this point, that the principal disturbance in the minds of men arises because they think that these celestial bodies are blessed and immortal, and yet have wills and actions and motives inconsistent with these attributes.

Humans feel the greatest anxiety by not understanding how natural phenomena relate to fundamental questions, such as question regarding the gods – often incorrectly believing that meteorological phenomena are gods, or are signs from gods.

Many people mix up their concepts by incorrectly assigning other thoughts and actions to the gods that contradict their divine natures of total contentedness and indestructibility.

νοεῖν	to conceive	**NOEIN** *seeing*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**KATANOEIN** *seeing thoroughly*
ὁ τάραχος **οἱ τάραχοι**	disturbance	**τάραχος** *agitating*
κυριώτατος (κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)	most essential	**ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *most critical / valid*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ἀνθρώπινος (η, ον)	human (adj.)	
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
μακάριος (α, ον)	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	
ἄφθαρτος (ον)	indestructible	**ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ** *not decaying*
ὑπεναντίος (α, ον)	contrary	**ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *over against*
ἡ βούλησις **αἱ βουλήσεις**	intention	**ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ** *wishing*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

81b. Natural Limits to what is Terrible

καὶ ἐν τῷ [1] αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεύειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους – εἴ τε καὶ [2] αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι φοβουμένους, ὥσπερ οὖσαν κατ᾽ αὐτούς – καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀλόγῳ γέ τινι παραστάσει: ὅθεν, μὴ ὁρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν – τὴν ἴσην ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα

and [the most essential Disturbance in human souls is produced] in always suspecting or being concerned by [1] some perpetual terrible thing according to the myths – even if they also fear [2] the very lack of sensation in having died, as if [sensation] existed for them [when dead] – and by [them] experiencing these things not through judgement, but rather through a certain unreasoning representation: therefore, because they do not set a limit to what is terrible – they acquire the same or even more extended trouble [compared] to someone who is randomly judging these things

[Bailey] and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends – or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves – and, again, because they are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational representation (and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain – they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive than if they had reached this belief by opinion.

Great anxiety is caused by [1] the fear of an eternally terrible existence (as some religions and myths predict) and [2] the fear of nonexistence. These fears arise from irrational and conflicting beliefs rather than reasoned understanding – but looking into such topics without a conviction in essential causes may result in more anxiety than never looking into the causes and explanations of meteorological phenomena at all.

αἰώνιος (αἰωνιᾱ, αἰώνιον)	perpetual (moving, multiple)	**ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ** *characterized by being forever*
δεινός (ή, όν)	terrible	**ΔΕΙΝΟΣ** *terrifying*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ** *seeming*
ὑποπτεύειν	to suspect	**ΎΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ** *looking [suspiciously] under*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ ἀναισθησία **αἱ ἀναισθησίαι**	lack of sensation	**ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΑ**
θνῄσκειν	to die	**ΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** **ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ** *died*
τεθνάναι	to have died [already]	**ΤΕΘΝΑΝΑΙ** *died*
φοβεῖν	to frighten	**ΦΟΒΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
φοβούμενος (η, ον)	fearing	**ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *fleeing*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἄλογος (ον)	unreasoning	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἡ ἀποκατάστασις **αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις**	reestablishment	**ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed thoroughly back*
ἡ παράστασις **αἱ παραστάσεις**	representation	**ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed next to*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ΌΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ὁρίζων (ουσα, ον)	setting a limit	
δεινός (ή, όν)	terrible	**ΔΕΙΝΟΣ** *terrifying*
τὸ δεινόν **τὰ δεινά**	what is terrible	
ἴσος (η, ον)	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
τείνειν	to extend	**ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending*
ἐπιτεταμένος (η, ον)	[more] extended	**ΕΠΙΤΕΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *toward stretched*
ἡ ταραχή **αἱ ταραχαί**	disturbance	**ΤΑΡΑΧΗ** *agitating*

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
εἰκαῖος (α, ον)	random	ΕΙΚΑΙΟΣ *haphazardly*
εἰκαίως	randomly	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
δοξαστός (ή, όν)	able to be judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ *seeming*
δοξάζων (ουσα, ον)	judging	ΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ *seeming*

82a. Undisturbedness, defined

ἡ δὲ Ἀταραξία [1] τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν [2a] τῶν ὅλων καὶ [2b] κυριωτάτων

Undisturbedness is [1] being released away from all those [*fears of unending terrible experiences*] and having a continuous memory [2a] of the whole and [2b] of most essential things

[Yonge] And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them.

[Bailey] But peace of mind is being delivered from all this, and having a constant memory of the general and most essential principles.

*Mental tranquillity (**ἡ ἡσυχία**) comes from being free from such fears as endless suffering and ceasing to exist (as well as being from the need to explain specific explanations for specific causes) – through always being mindful of our essential explanations of the general operation of the entire universe as a whole as well as through our general understanding of the universe's fundamental essential causes.*

ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ *fully loosening*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening away*
ἀπολελύσθαι	to have been released away	ΑΠΟΛΕΛΥΣΘΑΙ *loosened away*
συνεχής (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
κυριώτατος (κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical / valid*

82b. Adhering to Sensations

ὅθεν, [Π] τοῖς πάθεσι Προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ [Α] ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι – κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις – καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καθ' ἕκαστον [Κ] τῶν κριτηρίων [Ε] ἐναργείᾳ, ἂν γὰρ τούτοις Προσέχωμεν: τὸ ὅθεν ὁ τάραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγίνετο Ἐξαιτιολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς – καὶ Ἀπολύσομεν (ὑπέρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογοῦντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων) ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως

therefore, It is necessary to pay attention [Π] to the experiences that are present and [A] to the sensations – [paying attention] to general [experiences and sensations] for general [causes], and to [our] particular [experiences and sensations] for [our] particular [causes] – indeed [it is necessary to pay attention] to all present [E] detectible reality according to each [K] of the criteria, for if We pay attention to these: We will rightly fully reason into the causes from where disturbance and fear were being produced – and (by us reasoning into the causes concerning meteorological phenomena and the remaining things that are always intruding) We will release away whatever extremely frightens the rest [of the public]

therefore, It is necessary to pay attention [Π] to the experiences that are present and [A] to the sensations – to general for the general, and to the particular for the particular – and indeed to all present [E] detectible reality according to each [K] of the criteria, for if We pay attention to these: We will rightly fully reason into the causes from where disturbance and fear were being produced – and (by us reasoning into the causes concerning meteorological phenomena and the remaining things that are always intruding) We will release away whatever extremely frightens the rest

[Bailey] Wherefore we must pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, according as the subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgment. For if we pay attention to these, we shall rightly trace the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and fear, and, by learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men.

We must pay close attention to our [Π] feelings and [A] sense perceptions – both general and individual – and consider all [E] clear evidence from our [K] standards of truth. By doing this, we can {α} correctly {Δ} identify and eliminate the causes of disturbance and fear, understand celestial phenomena, and free ourselves from the fears that trouble most people.

ὅθεν	therefore	**ΌΘΕΝ** *from which*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	**ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *thoroughly holding*
μετέχειν	to partake	**ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold among*
προσέχειν	to pay attention	**ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold towards*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ κοινότης **αἱ κοινότητες**	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
κοινῶς	generally	
κοινός *(ή, όν)*	general	
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ** *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα **τὰ ἐναργήματα**	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
τὸ ὅθεν	where from	

ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	τάραχος *agitating*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
φοβεῖν	to frighten	ΦΟΒΕΙΝ *fleeing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
αἰτιολογεῖν	{Δ} to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *collecting blame*
αἰτιολογῶν	reasoning into the [essential] causes	
ἐξαιτιολογεῖν	{Δ} to fully reason into the [essential] causes	ΕΞΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *fully collecting blame*
ἐξαιτιολογήσειν	{Δ} to fully reason into the [essential] causes [in the future]	ΕΞΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΕΙΝ *will be fully collecting blame*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	ΟΡΘΩΣ *straight upright*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening away*
ἀπολελύσθαι	to have been released away	ΑΠΟΛΕΛΥΣΘΑΙ *loosened away*
ἀπολύσειν	to release away [in the future]	ΑΠΟΛΥΣΕΙΝ *will loosen away*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling in*
παρεμπίπτειν	to intrude [in/upon]	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *beside in falling*
παρεμπίπτων	intruding	
ἔσχατος *(ἐσχάτη, ἔσχατον)*	extreme	ΕΣΧΑΤΟΣ *last*
ἐσχάτως	extremely	

82c. Goodbye Herodotus

Ταῦτά, σοι ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἔστι κεφαλαιωδέστατα ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως: ἐπιτετμημένα – ὥστ᾽ ἐὰν γένηται δυνατὸς ὁ Λόγος οὗτος κατασχεθεὶς μετ᾽ ἀκριβείας

These things are, for you Herodotus, the most pivotal concerning the nature of the whole: although they are cut short – so that this Reasoning is made able to be firmly maintained with precision

[Bailey] Here, Herodotus, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.

κεφαλαιώδης	pivotal	ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΔΗΣ *quality of being head-like*

κεφαλαιωδέστατος	most pivotal	ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΔΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ *most related to head-like*
τὸ κεφαλαιωδέστατον τὰ κεφαλαιωδέστατα	what is most pivotal	
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἐπιτέμνειν	to cut short	ΕΠΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ *cutting upon*
ἐπιτετμημένος *(η, ον)*	cut short	
τὸ ἐπιτετμημένον τὰ ἐπιτετμημένα	what has been cut short	
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
γενέσθαι δυνατός	to be made able [already]	
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*
κατασχεθῆναι	to be firmly maintained [already]	ΚΑΤΑΣΧΕΘΗΝΑΙ *thoroughly held*
κατασχεθείς *[εῖσα, έν]*	firmly maintained [already]	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ *state of pointed*

83a. Clear View

Οἶμαι ἐὰν μὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα βαδίσῃ Τις τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβωμάτων ¬ ἀσύμβλητον αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους ἁδρότητα Λήψεσθαι: καὶ γὰρ καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ Ποιήσει πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐξακριβουμένων (κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν ἡμῖν) – καὶ αὐτὰ Ταῦτα, ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα, συνεχῶς βοηθήσει

I believe that even if someone is not proceeding towards all these [most pivotal topics] through the precise details according to each part ¬ He will [nevertheless] acquire unmatched fullness in comparison to the rest of humanity: for indeed He will also by himself make many of the fully precise details clear according to each part (in accordance with our whole effort) – and these [Topics] themselves, when they are placed in memory, will continuously provide support

[Bailey] I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him.

Even if someone is not exploring every exact detail relating to the topics mentioned in this letter – just by keeping the general ideas above in mind, one nevertheless can understand these topics better than most people. Although Epicurus explained these ideas more fully in his books, students can also figure out many further details on their own just from the basis of this letter.

οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*

βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ *walking*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ *state of pointed*
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ *result of pointed*
ἐξακριβούμενος (η, ον)	[made] fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *fully pointed*
τὸ ἐξακριβωθέν τὰ ἐξακριβωθέντα	fully precise detail	
ἀσύμβλητος (ος, ον)	unmatched	ΑΣΥΜΒΛΗΤΟΣ *not thrown in together*
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἡ ἁδρότης αἱ ἁδρότητες	fullness	ἉΔΡΟΤΗΣ *condition from fullness*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
λήψεσθαι	to be acquired	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ *will grasp*
Καθαρός (ά, όν)	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ *cleaning*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ποιήσειν	going to make	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ *state of the result of doing / affair*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
βοηθεῖν	to provide support	ΒΟΗΘΕΙΝ *helping*
βοηθήσειν	going to provide support	

83b. Comprehensive Insight

τοιαῦτα γάρ Ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἤδη ἐξακριβοῦντας ἱκανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως: εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀναλύοντας ἐπιβολάς τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιοδειῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι ¬ Ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἰσίν: ἐκ τούτων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων τρόπον – τὴν, ἅμα νοήματι, περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμὸν ποιοῦνται

for these [Topics] are like this, that even those who are already sufficiently or even completely making each part fully precise: in such resolving attentions, they make for themselves many full-courses into the whole of nature ¬ but Those who are not absolutely completely among those who are fully completing: from these things and in this way without [*verbal*] expressions – they make for themselves, along with [their] conception, the full-courses of what is most essential in regards to pacification

for these [most pivotal topics] are such, that even those [students] who are already sufficiently or even completely making each part fully precise: in such resolving attentions [*i.e., by their problem-solving focus on these topics*], they make for themselves more full-courses into the whole of nature ¬ but Those [students] who are not absolutely completely among those who are fully produced [*as a mature student*]: from these things [that are covered in this letter] and in this way without [*verbal*] expressions [*i.e., through personal reading and not through lectures*] – they [still] make for themselves, along with [their] conception, the [completion of] full-courses of what is most essential in regards to pacification

[Bailey] For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, ~~some of them~~ can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

Our tranquillity is supported upon the confident foundation that is our understanding of the fundamental realities of nature. The principles of these fundamental truths, which are contained in this letter, are useful for everyone: those who are already well-versed in the details can use this survey of the principles to review their understanding of physical science – while those less experienced can quickly grasp the main ideas in this survey to form this foundation of peace of mind for themselves.

The topics of natural science in this letter are so crucial that even those who are already very precise (or even completely accurate) in every necessary detail still use their problem-solving focus to make many full journeys into the entire universe using their understanding of the fundamental realities of nature. However, even those who are not fully complete in their studies can still make the same journey – through personal reading (rather than group lectures).

Through these readings – and through our understanding of these readings – we can achieve the confidence and security that is the foundation for peace of mind.

τὸ τοιοῦτον **τὰ τοιαῦτα**	what is like this *(such a thing)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *this of this sort*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια **αἱ ἀκρίβειαι**	precision	**ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ** *state of pointed*
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	**ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ** *fully pointed*
ἐξακριβῶν *(ῶσα, οῦν)*	making fully precise	
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
τελείως	completely	
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	**ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ** *all completing*
τελεῖν	to fulfill [process-focused]	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
τελειοῦν	to fulfill [result-focused]	**ΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΝ** *completing*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
ἀποτελούμενος *(η, ον)*	being fully produced	
ὁ ἀποτελούμενος	he who is fully completing	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *completing out*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	**ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ** *fully loosening*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	**ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening away*

ἀναλύειν	to resolve	ΑΝΑΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening again*
ἀναλύων	resolving	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
ἡ ὁδός αἱ ὁδοί	course	ΟΔΟΣ *road*
ἡ περιοδεία αἱ περιοδεῖαι	[making] a full course	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΙΑ *process around the path*
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ *result around the path*
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ *uttering*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
κυριώτατος *(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)*	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ *most critical / valid*
τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	what is most essential	
ἐγγαληνίζειν	to pacify oneself	ΕΓΓΑΛΗΝΙΖΕΙΝ *causing stillness within*
ἡ γαλήνη αἱ γαληναί	peace	ΓΑΛΗΝΗ *stillness [of the sea]*
ὁ γαληνισμός οἱ γαληνισμοί	pacification	ΓΑΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ *result of stillness [of the sea]*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*

TO PYTHOCLES

The Summary about Astronomical Phenomena
ἢ περὶ Μετεώρων Ἐπιτομή

83d. Hello Pythocles

Ἐπίκουρος Πυθοκλεῖ, Χαίρειν!

Epicurus to Pythocles, Hello!

Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	**ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ** *running toward [to assist]*
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς	Empedocles	**ΕΜΠΕΔΟΚΛΗΣ** *steadfast glory*
Πυθοκλῆς	Pythocles	**ΠΥΘΟΚΛΗΣ** *Pythian glory* i.e., *Apollo's fame*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*

84a. Letter delivered by Cleon

ἤνεγκέ μοι Κλέων ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ: ἐν ᾗ φιλοφρονούμενός τε περὶ ἡμᾶς Διετέλεις (ἀξίως τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ σεαυτὸν σπουδῆς)

Cleon brought me a letter from you: in which You continued to be affectionate toward us (deservedly for our eagerness concerning you)

[Bailey] Cleon brought me a letter from you in which you continue to express a kindly feeling towards me, which is a just return for my interest in you,

φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
ἐνεγκεῖν	to carry [already]	**ΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ** *brought*
Κλέων	Cleon	**ΚΛΕΩΝ** *glory*
ἡ ἐπιστολή **αἱ ἐπιστολαί**	letter *[i.e., a sent message]*	**ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping upon*
ὁ φιλόσοφος **οἱ φιλόσοφοι**	philosopher	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ** *loving knowledge*
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν **οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες**	he who considers well	**ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ** *good mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	**ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ** *mind*
φιλοφρονούμενος *(η, ον)*	affectionate	**ΦΙΛΟΦΡΟΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *loving mind*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
διατελεῖν	to continue	**ΔΙΑΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *thoroughly completing*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	**ΑΞΙΟΣ** *counterbalancing*
ἀξίως	deservedly	
σπουδαῖος *(α, ον)*	eager	**ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΣ** *being eager*
σπουδαίως	eagerly	**ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΣ**
ἡ σπουδή **αἱ σπουδαί**	eagerness	**ΣΠΟΥΔΗ** *being eager*

84b. Reflections for a Blessed Life

καὶ οὐκ ἀπιθάνως Ἐπειρῶ μνημονεύειν τῶν εἰς μακάριον βίον συντεινόντων διαλογισμῶν

and You were not unpersuasively trying to remember the thorough reasoning contributing to the blessed life

Ἐδέου τε σεαυτῷ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων σύντομον καὶ εὐπερίγραφον διαλογισμὸν ἀποστεῖλαι – ἵνα ῥᾳδίως Μνημονεύῃς

and also You needed to send out for a concise and well outlined thorough reasoning concerning meteorological phenomena for yourself – so that You might easily remember

and you attempt with some success to recall the arguments which lead to a life of blessedness. You ask me to send you a brief argument about the phenomena of the sky in a short sketch, that you may easily recall it to mind.

πιθανός *(ή, όν)*	persuasive	**ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ** *probable*
ἀπιθάνως	unpersuasively	**ΑΠΙΘΑΝΩΣ** *not probable*
πειρᾶν	to try	**ΠΕΙΡΑΝ** *experiment*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*
τό διαλόγισμα **τὰ διαλογίσματα**	a thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning through action*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning through action*
	Part 2	
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
ἐδέου	you were in need	
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*
σύντομος *(ος, ον)*	concise	**ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ** *cut together*
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
εὐπερίγραφος *(ον)*	well outlined	**ΕΥΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΦΟΣ** *writing around well*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away [here, "to send out"]	**ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready away*
ῥᾴδιος **ῥαίδιος** *(α, ον)*	easy	**ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *easily*
ῥᾳδίως **ῥαιδίως**	easily	**ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ** *easily*

84c. In Response to Your Request

τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν γεγραμμένα δυσμνημόνευτα εἶναι καίτοι ὡς Ἔφης (συνεχῶς αὐτὰ Βαστάζεις) ¬ Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἡδέως τέ σου τὴν δέησιν ἀπεδεξάμεθα, καὶ ἐλπίσιν ἡδείαις Συνεσχέθημεν

for indeed you say that the things written by us in other places are hard to remember (even though You continuously carry them) ¬ but We pleasantly accepted your request, and We were kept united by pleasant hopes

[Bailey] For you say that what I have written in my other works is hard to remember, even though, as you state, you constantly have them in your hands. I was glad to receive your request and felt constrained to answer it by pleasant expectations for the future

ἀναγεγραμμένος (η, ον)	having been written out	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ *written again*
γεγραμμένος	having been written	ΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ *written*
τὸ μνημονευόμενον τὰ μνημονευόμενα	what is remembered	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of "addition to" thinking*
δυσμνημόνευτος (ον)	hard to remember	ΔΥΣΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΟΣ *hard thinking*
καίτοι	and indeed	ΚΑΙΤΟΙ
συνεχῶς	continuously	ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ *holding together*
βαστάζειν	to carry	ΒΑΣΤΑΖΕΙΝ *lifting*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	ἩΔΕΩΣ *sweet*
ἡδύς (ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)	pleasant	ἩΔΥΣ *sweet*
δέεσθαι	to be in need	ΔΕΕΣΘΑΙ *needing*
ἡ δέησις αἱ δεήσεις	request	ΔΕΗΣΙΣ *needing*
δέχεσθαι	to recieve	ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting*
ἀποδέχεσθαι	to accept	ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting from away*
ἡ ἐλπίς αἱ ἐλπίδες	hope	ΕΛΠΙΣ *expecting*
συνέχειν	to keep united	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ *holding together*

85a. Useful to Many

γράψαντες, οὖν, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, Συντελοῦμεν ἅπερ Ἠξίωσας:

having written, then, all that [*was*] remaining, We will altogether fulfill the very things You expected:

πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοις ἐσόμενα χρήσιμα τὰ διαλογίσματα ταῦτα – καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς νεωστὶ φυσιολογίας γνησίου γευομένοις – καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἀσχολίας βαθυτέρας τῶν ἐγκυκλίων τινὸς ἐμπεπλεγμένοις

these thorough reasonings will be useful to many others as well – and especially to those who are just now having a taste of genuine natural science – and to those entangled in the deeper occupations of some type of general affairs

[Bailey] Therefore, as I have finished all my other writings I now intend to accomplish your request, feeling that these arguments will be of value to many other persons as well, and especially to those who have but recently tasted the genuine inquiry into nature, and also to those who are involved too deeply in the business of some regular occupation

γράφειν	to compose	ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ *writing*
γράψας (ασα, αν)	having written	ΓΡΑΨΑΣ *wrote*
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of + gen]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*

συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἄξιος (α, ον)	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
ἀξιοῦν	to expect	ΑΞΙΟΥΝ *counterbalancing*
	Part 2	
ἐσόμενος (η, ον)	[about] to be	ΕΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ *will be*
χρήσιμος (ον)	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ *necessary*
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα	an inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning action upon*
τό διαλόγισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	a thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning through action*
νεωστὶ	just now	ΝΕΩΣΤΙ *new*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning of producing*
γνήσιος (α, ον)	genuine	ΓΝΗΣΙΟΣ *belonging to one's race (i.e. legitimate)*
γεύεσθαι	to have a taste of	ΓΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ *feeding*
γευόμενος	having a test of	ΓΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *feeding*
ἡ σχολή αἱ σχολαί	school	ΣΧΟΛΗ *leisure*
ἡ ἀσχολία αἱ ἀσχολίαι	occupation	ΑΣΧΟΛΙΑ *not leisure*
ἡ βαθύτης αἱ βαθύτητες	deepness	ΒΑΘΥΤΗΣ *deep*
τὸ βάθος τὰ βάθη	depth	ΒΑΘΟΣ *deep*
βαθύς (εῖα, ύ)	deep	ΒΑΘΥΣ *deep*
βαθύτερος	deeper	ΒΑΘΥΤΕΡΟΣ *deep*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
ἐγκύκλιος (α, ον)	general	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΣ *pertaining to in circular*
τὸ ἐγκύκλιον τὰ ἐγκύκλια	general [affairs]	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΝ *pertaining to in circular*
πλεκτικός (η, ον)	entangling	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of weaving*
πεπλεγμένος (η, ον)	entangled	ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΟΣ *wove*
ἐμπεπλεγμένος (η, ον)	entangled in	ΕΜΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΟΣ *wove in*

85b. Memorize & Review

καλῶς, δὴ, αὐτὰ Διάλαβε – καὶ, διὰ μνήμης ἔχων: ὀξέως αὐτὰ Περιόδευε μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἐν τῇ Μικρᾷ Ἐπιτομῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον Ἀπεστείλαμεν

indeed, correctly Distinguish them now – and, having them in memory: Review them keenly along with the rest of the things We sent in the Small Summary to Herodotos

[Bailey] Therefore lay good hold on it, keep it in mind, and go through it all keenly, together with the rest which I sent in the small epitome to Herodotus.

καλός (ή, όν)	correct / beautiful	**ΚΑΛΟΣ** *lovely*
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping separation*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
ὀξύς (ὀξεῖ, ὀξύ)	[of objects] swift, [of people] keen	**ΟΞΥΣ** *sharp*
περιοδεύειν	review	**ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΥΕΙΝ** *going around*
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
μικρός (ά, όν)	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ἡ ἐπιτομή **αἱ ἐπιτομαί**	summary	**ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗ** *to cut upon*
Ἡρόδοτος	Herodotos	**ἩΡΟΔΟΤΟΣ** *given by Hera*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	**ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready away*

85c. Our Goal is Undisturbedness

πρῶτον μὲν, οὖν, μὴ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως (εἴτε κατὰ συναφὴν λεγομένων εἴτε αὐτοτελῶς) νομίζειν εἶναι ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον – καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν

first of all, then, [*it is necessary*] not to think that the fulfillment from the knowledge concerning meteorological phenomena (whether in union with what is spoken or independently) to be anything other than undisturbedness and affirmed belief – just as in the case of the remaining [*topics*] also

[Bailey] First of all then we must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena of the sky, whether they are dealt with in connection with other doctrines or independently, than peace of mind and a sure confidence, just as in all other branches of study.

τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*
ἡ γνῶσις **αἱ γνώσεις**	knowledge	**ΓΝΩΣΙΣ** *distinguishing*
ἡ συναφή **αἱ συναφαί**	union	**ΣΥΝΑΦΗ** *joining together*
αὐτοτελῶς	independently	**ΑΥΤΟΤΕΛΩΣ** *self-goal*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ἡ πίστις **αἱ πίστεις**	belief [based on experience]	**ΠΙΣΤΙΣ** *trust*

βεβαιότατος (η, ον)	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ most certain
βέβαιος (α, ον)	affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ certain
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ just as thoroughly
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of + gen]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ what is left over

86a. Speculative Certainty – The Unique Agreement

μήτε τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι ¬ μήτε ὁμοίαν κατὰ πάντα τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχειν:

[*it is necessary*] also not to distort what is impossible ¬ nor [*is it necessary*] to have a similar observation in all respects:

[Bailey] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning

ἢ τοῖς περὶ βίων λόγοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν προβλημάτων κάθαρσιν: οἷον ὅτι [1] τὸ Πᾶν σῶμα καὶ ἀναφὴς φύσις ἐστίν, ἢ ὅτι [2]Ἄτομα στοιχεῖα – καὶ πάντα τὰ Τοιαῦτα δὴ ὅσα μοναχὴν ἔχει τοῖς φαινομένοις συμφωνίαν

either with the reasonings about lifestyles, or according to the clarification of the other natural problems: such as that [1] the Universe exists as body and intangible nature, or that [2] Atoms are elements – and all such Things indeed as have singular agreement with what appears

either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that 'the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,' or that 'the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena.

ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ not powerful
παραβιάζεσθαι	to distort	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ violence alongside
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ similar
τὸ θεώρημα τὰ θεωρήματα	[a mental] observation	ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ result of envisioning
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	[the act of mental] observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ act of envisioning
	Part 2	
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ life
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ collecting (words) [i.e., reasoning]
φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ characteristic of producing
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ producing
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing upon
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ not thrown change
τὸ πρόβλημα τὰ προβλήματα	problem	ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑ thrown before
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ cleansing

ἡ κάθαρσις **αἱ καθάρσεις**	clarification	**ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ** *cleansing*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body [here, "frame"]	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἀναφής *(ές)*	intangible	**ΑΝΑΦΗΣ** *not touchable*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom *("what is indivisible")*	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row* *(in a series)*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**ὍΣΟΣ** *however great*
μοναχός *(ή, όν)*	singular	**ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ** *single multiplicity*
ἀποφαινόμενος *(ομένη, όμενον)*	representing	**ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining away*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking together*
τὸ σύμφωνον **τὰ σύμφωνα**	agreement [with]	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ** *speaking together*
ἡ συμφωνία **αἱ συμφωνίαι**	agreement	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ** *speaking together*

86b. Speculative Uncertainty – Multiple Causes

Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων οὐχ ὑπάρχει ¬ ἀλλὰ Ταῦτά γε πλεοναχὴν ἔχει: καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν – καὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι σύμφωνον, κατηγορίαν

the very Thing [*i.e., speculative certainty*] which does not exist concerning the meteorological phenomena ¬ but These indeed have a multiplicity: both in their cause of creation – and in the full indication of their existence, that is in harmony with sensations

[Bailey] For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being – and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

ὅσπερ *(ἥπερ, ὅπερ)*	the very thing which	**ὍΣΠΕΡ** *relative pronoun* *emphatic particle*
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
τὸ πλέον **τὰ πλέω**	the greater	**ΠΛΕΟΝ** *more*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ** *more multiplicity*
τὸ πλεοναχῶς **τὰ πλεοναχῶς**	what exists in several ways	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ** *more multiplicity*
ἡ πλεοναχή **αἱ πλεοναχαί**	multiplicity	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΗ** *more multiplicity*

ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	[process of] creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ *action of being born*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ *being*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
σύμφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking together*
ἡ κατηγορία αἱ κατηγορίαι	full [categorial] indication	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ *thoroughly speaking publicly*

86c. The Call for a Sensible Basis

οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομοθεσίας Φυσιολογητέον ¬ ἀλλ’ ὡς Τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται

for One ought not to study nature according to empty axioms and conventional rules ¬ but as apparent things call out

[Bailey] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena:

ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
ἀξιοῦν	to expect	ΑΞΙΟΥΝ *counterbalancing*
τὸ ἀξίωμα τὰ ἀξιώματα	axiom [i.e., assumption]	ΑΞΙΩΜΑ *counterbalancing*
ὁ νόμος οἱ νόμοι	law	ΝΟΜΟΣ *allotting*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ νομοθεσία αἱ νομοθεσίαι	conventional rules	ΝΟΜΟΘΕΣΙΑ *convention place*
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ *result of being accustomed*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning of producing*
φυσιολογεῖν	to study nature	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ
φυσιολογητέον	one ought to study nature	
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning out*

87a. Living Without Disturbance

οὐ γὰρ ἤδη ἀλογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ Βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρείαν ¬ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθορύβως Ἡμᾶς ζῆν

for our Lifestyle no longer has a use for irrationality and for empty judgment ¬ but for us to live without disturbance

[Bailey] for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ ἀλογία αἱ ἀλογίαι	irrationality	ΑΛΟΓΙΑ *non reasoning*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ *necessary*
ὁ θόρυβος οἱ θόρυβοι	uproar	ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ *noise*
ἀθορύβως	without disturbance	ΑΘΟΡΥΒΩΣ *no noise*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	ΒΙΟΥΝ *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*

87b. Accepting Multiple Explanations

Πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνεται ἀσείστως κατὰ πάντων κατὰ πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ¬ ἐκκαθαιρομένων συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις – ὅταν Τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δεόντως καταλίπῃ

Everything indeed goes on unshakably for each thing in accordance the manifold way [*of thinking about multiple explanations*] ¬ as long as they are made fully clear harmoniously with what is apparent – whenever Someone fittingly leaves undisputed what is persuasively argued about them

[Bailey] Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them.

[Hicks] All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them.

τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	ΠΑΝ *all*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἀσείστως	unshakably	ΑΣΕΙΣΤΩΣ *not shaking*
τὸ πλέον τὰ πλέω	the greater	ΠΛΕΟΝ *more*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
πλεοναχός *(ή, όν)*	several [here, "manifold"]	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΟΣ *more multiplicity*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ κάθαρσις αἱ καθάρσεις	clarification	ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ *cleansing*
ἡ καθαριότης αἱ καθαριότητες	clarity	ΚΑΘΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *cleaning*
καθαρός *(ά, όν)*	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ *cleaning*
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleansing*

προσεκκαθαίρειν	*to further make fully clear	**ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleaning further out*
παρεκκαθαίρειν	*to make fully clear as well	**ΠΑΡΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing out alongside*
ἐκκαθαίρειν	*to make fully clear	**ΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleaning out*
ἐκκαθαιρόμενος *(η, ον)*	*being made fully clear	**ΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *cleaning out*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking together*
τὸ σύμφωνον **τὰ σύμφωνα**	in harmony [with]	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ** *speaking together*
συμφώνως	harmoniously	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩΣ** *speaking together*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
πιθανός *(ή, όν)*	persuasive	**ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ** *probable*
ἀπιθάνως	unpersuasively	**ΑΠΙΘΑΝΩΣ** *not probable*
πιθανολογεῖν	to persuasively argue	**ΠΙΘΑΝΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *probable reasoning*
τὸ πιθανολογούμενον **τὰ πιθανολογούμενα**	the thing being persuasively argued	**ΠΙΘΑΝΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *probable reasoning*
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
δεόντως	fittingly	**ΔΕΟΝΤΩΣ** *needing*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*

87c. Avoiding Inconsistent Rejection of Theories

ὅταν δέ Τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπῃ τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλῃ – ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὂν τῷ φαινομένῳ: δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος ¬ ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ

but whenever someone leaves an [explanation] undisputed but throws out another – even though it is likewise in harmony with what is apparent: it is clear that he falls away from every scientific proposition ¬ and sinks down into myth

[Bailey] But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.

καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
ἐκβάλλειν	to throw out	**ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing out*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
σύμφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ** *speaking together*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	**ΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	**ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling out*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning of producing*

τό φυσιολόγημα τὰ φυσιολογήματα	scientific proposition	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΗΜΑ *result of reasoning of producing*
ὁ μῦθος οἱ μῦθοι	myth	ΜΥΘΟΣ *speech / word*
ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις	flowing	ῬΕΥΣΙΣ *action of flowing*
καταρρεῖν	sinks into [here "sinks down"]	ΚΑΤΑΡΡΕΙΝ *flowing down*

87d. Full Observations Are Not Always Possible

Σημεῖα δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις συντελουμένων φέρει τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν τινα φαινομένων – ἅ θεωρεῖται, ᾗ ὑπάρχει:

Signs for what is altogether fulfilled in the meteorological phenomena carry some of what is apparent among us – which ARE observed, in so far as they exist:

[Bailey] Now we can obtain indications of what happens above from some of the phenomena on earth: for we can observe how they come to pass,

[Hicks] Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see how the former really take place,

καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετώροις Φαινόμενα – Ταῦτα γὰρ Ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς γίνεσθαι

but not what is apparent in meteorological phenomena – for it is possible for these to be produced in several ways

[Bailey] though we cannot observe the phenomena in the sky: for they may be produced in several ways.

[Hicks] but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for their occurrence may possibly be due to a variety of causes.

τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ *state of indication*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
τὸ συντελούμενον τὰ συντελούμενα	what is altogether fulfilled	
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ᾗ	insofar as	ῌ *in/for which*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
	Part 2	
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*

πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

88a. Not Contesting Viable Theories

τὸ, μέντοι, φάντασμα ἑκάστου Τηρητέον ¬ καὶ, ἐπὶ τὰ συναπτόμενα τούτῳ Διαιρετέον, Ἃ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν γινομένοις πλεοναχῶς συντελεῖσθαι

the mental impression of each, nevertheless, one must preserve ¬ and, in regards to the [*theories*] connected with it, one must differentiate those that are not contested by what is produced among us to be altogether fulfilled in several ways

[Bailey] Yet we must never desert the appearance of each of these phenomena, and further, as regards what is associated with it, must distinguish those things whose production in several ways is not contradicted by phenomena on earth.

μέντοι	never-the-less	ΜΕΝΤΟΙ *indeed surely*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of appearing*
φανταστός *(ή, όν)*	capable of appearing	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΟΣ *appearing*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
τὸ φάντασμα τὰ φαντάσματα	mental impression	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ *result of appearing*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ *each*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting / watching*
τηρητέον	one must preserve	
συνάπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	connecting	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΩΝ *fastening together*
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping through*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*

88b. Cosmos, defined

Κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα – οὗ λυομένου Πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σύγχυσιν λήψεται

a Cosmos is a certain surrounding of sky, that surrounds celestial bodies and earth and all apparent things – and when [a cosmos] is dissolved all the things in it will come to have disorder

A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion:

ἀποτομὴν ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου, καὶ καταλήγουσα ἐν πέρατι: ἢ ἀραιῷ ἢ πυκνῷ ¬ καὶ ἢ ἐν περιαγομένῳ ἢ ἐν στάσιν ἔχοντι – καὶ στρογγύλην ἢ τρίγωνον ἢ οἵαν δήποτε [ἔχουσα] περιγραφήν

having a cut-off from the infinite, and completely stopping in a limit: either in one rarefied or dense ¬ and either in a revolving one or in one having a stationary position – and [having] a round or triangular or whatever sort of outline

it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or three cornered, or any kind of shape.

ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἡ περιοχή **αἱ περιοχαί**	the surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΟΧΗ** *holding around*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
οὐρανομήκης *(ες)*	sky-high	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΜΗΚΗΣ** *extent of heaven*
ὁ οὐρανός **οἱ οὐρανοί**	sky	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ** *heaven*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἡ τομή **αἱ τομαί**	division	**ΤΟΜΗ** *cut*
ἡ ἀποτομή **αἱ ἀποτομαί**	separation	**ΑΠΟΤΟΜΗ** *cut away*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
καταλήγειν	to completely stop	
καταλήγων	completely stopping	
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
ἀραιός *(ά, όν)*	rarefied	**ΑΡΑΙΟΣ** *spread out thin*
πυκνός *(ή, όν)*	dense	**ΠΥΚΝΟΣ** *compacting*
	Part 2	
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
λυόμενος *(η, ον)*	being dissolved	
ἐγχεῖν	to pour in	**ΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *pouring in*
συγχεῖν	to mix up	**ΣΥΓΧΕΙΝ** *pouring together*

ἡ χύσις αἱ χύσεις	flow	ΧΥΣΙΣ *pouring*
διαχεῖν	to scatter	ΔΙΑΧΕΙΝ *pouring through*
ἡ σύγχυσις αἱ σύγχυσεις	disorder	ΣΥΓΧΥΣΙΣ *pouring together*
λήψεσθαι	to be acquired [here, "come to have"]	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ *will grasp*
περιάγειν	to revolve	ΠΕΡΙΑΓΕΙΝ *going around*
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing*
ἔχων *(ουσα, ον)*	has	ΕΧΩΝ *holding*
στρογγύλος *(η, ον)*	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ *droplet*
τὸ τρίγωνον τὰ τρίγωνα	triangle	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ *three corner*
τρίγωνος	triangular	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΣ *three corner*
οἷος *(οἵα, οἷον)*	such as ["what"]	ʽΟΙΟΣ *of this sort*
δήποτε	whatever	ΔΗΠΟΤΕ *indefinite*
γράφειν	to compose	ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ *writing*
εὐπερίγραφος *(ον)*	well outlined	ΕΥΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΦΟΣ *writing around well*
ἡ περιγραφή αἱ περιγραφαί	outline	ΠΕΡΙΓΡΑΦΗ *writing around*

88c. Incomplete Perception of our own Cosmos

πανταχῶς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται: τῶν γὰρ φαινομένων Οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ – ἐν ᾧ λῆγον οὐκ ἔστι καταλαβεῖν

for this [*variety in the types of endings of the cosmos*] is possible in all ways: for Nothing of what is apparent contests for this cosmos here – in which it is not possible to thoroughly perceive a stopping

[Bailey] For all such conditions are possible, seeing that no phenomenon is evidence against this in our world, in which it is not possible to perceive an ending.

All these alternatives are possible: they are contradicted by none of the facts in this world, in which an extremity can nowhere be discerned.

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ *from all places*
πανταχῶς	in all ways	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΩΣ *from all*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
λήγειν	to stop	ΛΗΓΕΙΝ *leaving off*

λήγων *(ουσα, ον)*	stopping	**ΛΗΓΩΝ** *leaving off*
τὸ λῆγον **τὰ λήγοντα**	a stopping	**ΛΗΓΟΝ** *leaving off*
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [here, "to thoroughly perceive"]	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *thoroughly grasped*

89a. Infinite Cosmoi and the Intermundia

ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτοι Κόσμοι εἰσὶν ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος ἔστι καταλαβεῖν

that Cosmoi such as this are also infinite in number is able to be thoroughly comprehended

καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δύναται Κόσμος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ μετακοσμίῳ – ὃ Λέγομεν μεταξὺ κόσμων διάστημα: ἐν πολυκένῳ τόπῳ ¬ καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγάλῳ εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ κενῷ (καθάπερ Τινές φασιν)

and that such a Cosmos also has the force to be produced both in a cosmos and in the intermundia – which we say is the separation intervening between cosmoi: in a location with much void ¬ but not in a large [*location that is totally*] pure and empty (as some people say)

[Bailey] And that such worlds are infinite in number we can be sure, and also that such a world may come into being both inside another world and in an interworld, by which we mean a space between worlds; it will be in a place with much void, and not in a large empty space quite void,

τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
τὸ πλῆθος **τὰ πλήθη**	[large] number	**ΠΛΗΘΟΣ** *fullness*
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [already]	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *thoroughly grasped*
	Part 2	
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
κατακοσμεῖν	to arrange	**ΚΑΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ** *thoroughly order*
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	**ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ** *beyond/ change order*
τὸ μετακόσμιον	the intermundia	**ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΙΟΝ** *change/ beyond order*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
μεταξύ	intervening [between]	**ΜΕΤΑΞΥ** *among with*
τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*

πολυκενός	with much void *[not totally void – i.e., also with some matter]*	ΠΟΛΥΚΕΝΟΣ *much emptiness*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great [here, "large"]	ΜΕΓΑΣ *large*
εἰλικρινής *(ές)*	pure	ΕΙΛΙΚΡΙΝΗΣ *separated by sunshine*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*

89b. Formation of a Cosmos

ἐπιτηδείων τινῶν σπερμάτων ῥυέντων ἀφ' ἑνὸς κόσμου ἢ μετακοσμίου – ἢ ἀπὸ πλειόνων:

with certain suitable seeds flowing from one cosmos or the intermundia – or from several [*cosmoi*]:

[Bailey] this occurs when seeds of the right kind have rushed in from a single world or interworld, or from several:

κατὰ μικρὸν προσθέσεις τε καὶ διαρθρώσεις καὶ μεταστάσεις ποιούντων ἐπ' ἄλλον τόπον – ἐὰν οὕτω Τύχῃ – καὶ ἐπαρδεύσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων ἐπιτηδείως ¬ ἕως τελειώσεως καὶ διαμονῆς (ἐφ' ὅσον τὰ ὑποβληθέντα Θεμέλια τὴν προσδοχὴν δύναται ποιεῖσθαι)

little by little making additions and joinings and transpositions to another location – as it may happen in this way – and irrigations from what suitably possess [*seeds*] ¬ as long as there is perfection and continuance (for as long as its foundations that have been laid down have the force to gather the reception [*of the seeds*])

[Bailey] little by little they make junctions and articulations, and cause changes of position to another place, as it may happen, and produce irrigations of the appropriate matter until the period of completion and stability, which lasts as long as the underlying foundations are capable of receiving additions.

ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ *seed*
ῥεῖν	to flow	ῬΕΙΝ *flowing*
ῥυείς *(ῥυεῖσα, ῥυέν)*	flowing	ῬΥΕΙΣ *flowing*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ *one*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
τὸ μετακόσμιον	the intermundia	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΙΟΝ *change/ beyond order*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "several"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
	Part 2	
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*

κατὰ μικρόν **κατὰ μεικρόν**	little by little	
τιθέναι	to put	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
ἡ μετάθεσις **αἱ μεταθέσεις**	rearrangement	**ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *placing change*
ἡ πρόσθεσις **αἱ προσθέσεις**	addition	**ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ** *placing toward*
ἡ διάρθρωσις **αἱ διαρθρώσεις**	joining	**ΔΙΑΡΘΡΩΣΙΣ** *action of joint through*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ μετάστασις **αἱ μεταστάσεις**	transposition	**ΜΕΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *change standing*
ποιῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making	**ΠΟΙΩΝ** *gathering*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἡ ἐπάρδευσις **αἱ ἐπαρδεύσεις**	irrigation	**ΕΠΑΡΔΕΥΣΙΣ** *process of watering upon*
ἔχων *(ουσα, ον)*	has	**ΕΧΩΝ** *holding*
τὰ ἔχοντα **τὸ ἔχον**	what possesses	
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ** *towards this here*
ἐπιτηδείως	suitably	
ἕως	as long as	**ἙΩΣ** *until*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
ἡ τελείωσις **αἱ τελειώσεις**	perfection	**ΤΕΛΕΙΩΣΙΣ** *result of the process of completing*
μένειν	to remain	**ΜΕΝΕΙΝ** *staying*
ἡ μονή **αἱ μονα**	[state of] remaining [in a position]	**ΜΟΝΗ** *staying*
ἡ διαμονή **αἱ διαμονα**	continuance	**ΔΙΑΜΟΝΗ** *staying through*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*
τὸ πρόβλημα **τὰ προβλήματα**	problem	**ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑ** *thrown before*
ὑποβάλλειν	to suggest	**ὙΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing under*
ὑποβληθείς	suggested / laid down [already]	**ὙΠΟΒΛΗΘΕΝ** *thrown under*
ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*

τὸ θεμέλιον τὰ θεμέλια	foundation [in space]	ΘΕΜΕΛΙΟΝ *placing base*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
δεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	ΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *accepting*
ἡ παραδοχή αἱ παραδοχαί	reception	ΠΑΡΑΔΟΧΗ *accepted across*
ἡ προσδοχή αἱ προσδοχαί	reception	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΧΗ *accepted before*
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to gather"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*

90a. Against Cosmic Origin and Expansion due to Determinism

οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον γενέσθαι οὐδὲ δῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐνδέχεται κόσμον γίνεσθαι κενῷ ¬ κατὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον, "ἐξ ἀνάγκης," αὔξεσθαί τε ἕως ἂν ἑτέρῳ προσκρούσῃ – καθάπερ τῶν φυσικῶν καλουμένων φησί Τις (Τοῦτο γὰρ μαχόμενόν ἐστι τοῖς φαινομένοις)

for it is not only necessary that an aggregation or a whirl is produced in which it is possible for a cosmos to be produced in the void ¬ according to what is judged, "by necessity," and then it would be increased until it strikes against another [*cosmos*] – as one of the so-called naturalists says (for this is contending with what is apparent)

[Bailey] For it is not merely necessary for a gathering of atoms to take place, nor indeed for a whirl and nothing more to be set in motion, as is supposed, by necessity, in an empty space in which it is possible for a world to come into being, nor can the world go on increasing until it collides with another world, as one of the so- called physical philosophers says. For this is a contradiction of phenomena.

[Hicks] For it is not enough that there should be an aggregation or a vortex in the empty space in which a world may arise, as the necessitarians hold, and may grow until it collide with another, as one of the so- called physicists says. For this is in conflict with facts.

ὁ ἀθροισμός οἱ ἀθροισμοί	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of [being] gathered*
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
μόνον	only	
γενέσθαι	to be produced	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ *came into being*
ἡ δίνησις αἱ δινήσεις	a whirling	ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ *process of vortex*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*

δοξαζόμενος (η, ον)	being judged	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ seeming
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ up against constraint
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ increasing
ἕως	as long as	ἝΩΣ until
ἕτερος (ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἝΤΕΡΟΣ other
προσκρούειν	to strike against	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ bumping towards
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ just as thoroughly
φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ characteristic of producing
ὁ φυσικός οἱ φυσικοί	naturalist	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ characteristic of producing
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ summoning
καλούμενος (η, ον)	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ summoning
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ speaking
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ combating
μαχόμενος	contending	ΜΑΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ combating
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ shining
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ result of shining

90b. Formation of Stars

Ἥλιός τε καὶ Σελήνη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ Ἄστρα ‹οὐ›, καθ' ἑαυτὰ γενόμενα, ὕστερον ἐμπεριελαμβάνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου ‹καὶ ὅσα γε δὴ Σῴζει› ¬ ἀλλ' εὐθὺς διεπλάττετο καὶ αὔξησιν ἐλάμβανεν

the Sun and the Moon and the remaining celestial Bodies were not, having been produced by themselves, afterwards completely taken within by the cosmos ‹together with as many [*stars*] as indeed [*the cosmos*] preserves› ¬ but they were thoroughly molded and received their increase directly [*from the cosmos*]

[Bailey] Sun and moon and the other stars were not created by themselves and subsequently taken in by the world, but were fashioned in it from the first and gradually grew in Size

[Hicks] The sun and moon and the stars generally were not of independent origin and later absorbed within our world, [such parts of it at least as serve at all for its defence]; but they at once began to take form and grow

‹ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Γῆ καὶ Θάλαττα› κατὰ προσκρίσεις καὶ δινήσεις λεπτομερῶν τινων φύσεων: ἤτοι πνευματικῶν ἢ πυροειδῶν ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον – καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα οὕτως ἡ Αἴσθησις ὑποβάλλει

‹and similarly the Earth and the Sea› according to accretions and whirlings of certain natures of a subtle composition: either in a windy way or in a fiery way or both together – for Sensation suggests these things in this way

[Bailey] by the aggregations and whirlings of bodies of minute parts, either windy or fiery or both, for this is what our sensation suggests.

[Hicks] [and so too did earth and sea] by the accretions and whirling motions of certain substances of finest texture, of the nature either of wind or fire, or of both; for thus sense itself suggests.

ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ἩΛΙΟΣ *sunshine*
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελῆναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ *shining light*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
ἑαυτός *(ή, όν)*	oneself	ἙΑΥΤΟΣ *own self*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *come into being*
ὕστερον	afterwards	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	⁂ to completely comprehend within [here, "to completely take within"]	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around in*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
σώζειν	to preserve	ΣΩΖΕΙΝ *saving*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
πλάττειν	to mold	ΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *forming*
διαπλάττειν	to thoroughly mold	ΔΙΑΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *forming through*
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ *increasing*
ἡ αὔξησις αἱ αὐξήσεις	increase	ΑΥΞΗΣΙΣ *process of increasing*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire [here, "to receive"]	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
	Part 2	
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ἡ θάλαττα αἱ θάλατται	sea	ΘΑΛΑΤΤΑ *salt / sea*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἡ διάκρισις αἱ διακρίσεις	separating apart	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing apart*
ἡ πρόσκρισις αἱ προσκρίσεις	accretion [i.e., growth by assimilation]	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing in addition*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*
ἡ δίνησις αἱ δινήσεις	a whirling	ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ *process of vortex*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ *fine/thin part*

ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἤτοι	either	ΗΤΟΙ *or you*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ *quality of* *result of breathing*
πνευματικός *(ή, όν)*	windy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of* *result of breathing*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ἡ πυραμίς αἱ πυραμίδες	pyramid	ΠΥΡΑΜΙΣ *fire-shaped*
ὁμοειδής *(ές)*	appearing the same	ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*
πυροειδής *(ές)*	fiery	ΠΥΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ *fire appearing*
τὸ συναμφότερον τὰ συναμφότερα	both [together]	ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ *both of the two* *together*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
ὑποβάλλειν	to suggest	ὙΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing under*

91.a The Size of the Sun

τὸ δὲ Μέγεθος ἡλίου, τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων, [1] **κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται…** * **…**[2] **κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ: ἤτοι** [2a] **μεῖζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ** [2b] **μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ** [2c] **τηλικοῦτον τυγχάνει**

the Size of the sun, and of the remaining celestial bodies, is as big as it appears to be in magnitude [1] according to what relates to us… * …but [2] according to what it is in-and-of-itself: [the Size of the sun] happens to be either [2a] larger than what is seen, or [2b] slightly smaller, or [2c] of the magnitude [it appears]

οὕτω, γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, Πυρά, ἐξ ἀποστήματος, θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρεῖται

Fires, when they are considered according to perception from a distance, are observed in the same way for us

[Bailey] The size of sun (and moon) and the other stars is for us what it appears to be; and in reality it is either (slightly) greater than what we see or slightly less or the same size: for so too fires on earth when looked at from a distance seem to the senses. And every objection at this point will easily be dissipated, if we pay attention to the clear vision, as I show in my books about nature.

τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ἩΛΙΟΣ *sunshine*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
πηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of some magnitude	ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ *extent*
ὁπηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of any magnitude	ὉΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ *which extent*
τηλικοῦτος *(η, ον)*	of [such a] magnitude	ΤΗΛΙΚΟΥΤΟΣ *extent*

ἡλίκος	as big as	ἩΛΙΚΟΣ *extent*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	

91.b Scholion: Sun's Proportional Diminishment in Size and Brilliancy

{ **Τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια᾽ *Περὶ Φύσεως*, "εἰ γάρ" Φησί "τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει: πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χρόαν – ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον Διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι"** }

This is also in the 11th book of *On Nature*, He says "if [*the sun*] had lost its size due to the space in-between: then [*it would have lost*] its coloring [*i.e., brilliancy*] even more – for [some] other [*larger or smaller*] Space in-between is in no way more symmetric [*in proportion*] to this [*mutual diminishment in brightness and size*]"

βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing*
ἐκβάλλειν	to throw out	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing out*
ἀποβάλλειν	to throw off [here, "to lose"]	ΑΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing away*
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ *skin color*
ἡ χρόα αἱ χρόαι	coloring	ΧΡΟΑ *skin color*
σύνμετρος = σύμμετρος *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ *measure together*
συμμετρότερος *(α, ον)*	more symmetric [in proportion]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more measured together*

92a. Igniting and Extinguishing

Ἀνατολὰς καὶ Δύσεις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων καὶ κατὰ ἄναψιν γίνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ κατὰ σβέσιν ¬ τοιαύτης οὔσης περιστάσεως καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκατέρους τοὺς τόπους – ὥστε τὰ Προειρημένα ἀποτελεῖσθαι: Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φαινομένων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ

[*It is possible that*] the Risings and the Settings of the sun, and of the moon, and of the other celestial bodies have the force to be produced both by igniting and by extinguishing ¬ with circumstances such as this also existing in accordance with each one of the locations – so that the previously mentioned things are fully produced: for None of what is apparent contests [*this*]

[Bailey] The risings and settings of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies may be due to kindling and extinction, the composition of the surrounding matter at the places of rising and setting being such as to lead to these results: for nothing in phenomena is against it.

And the rising and setting of the sun, moon, and stars may be due to kindling and quenching, provided that the circumstances are such as to produce this result in each of the two regions, east and west: for no fact testifies against this.

‹καὶ› κατ' ἐκφάνειάν τε ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ πάλιν ἐπιπροσθέτησιν τὸ Προειρημένον δύναιτ' ἂν συντελεῖσθαι: Οὐδὲ γάρ Τι τῶν φαινομένων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ

and the previously mentioned [*rising and settings of celestial bodies*] would have the force to be mutually fulfilled in accordance with their appearing out above the earth and then in turn by the additional interposition [*of the earth in front of them*]: for Nothing of what is apparent contests [*this other theory*]

[Bailey] Or again, the effect in question might be produced by their appearance over the top of the earth, and again the interposition of the earth in front of them: for once more nothing in phenomena is against it.

ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	a rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
λοιπός (*ή, όν*)	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*
ἅπτειν	to touch	**ἉΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening*
ἀνάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	**ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *thoroughly fastening*
ἡ ἄναψις **αἱ ἄναψεις**	igniting	**ΑΝΑΨΙΣ** *intertwining up*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
ἡ σβένσις = **ἡ σβέσις**	extinguishing	**ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ** **ΣΒΕΣΙΣ** *cancelling*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὤν (*οὖσα, ὄν*)	being	**ΩΝ** *being*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
ἑκάτερος (*ἑκατέρα, ἑκάτερον*)	each one	**ἙΚΑΤΕΡΟΣ**
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
προειρημένος (*η, ον*)	previously mentioned	**ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *spoke before*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *completing out*
οὐθείς = **οὐδείς** (*οὐδεμία, οὐδέν*)	no one [factual]	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*

ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
Part 2		
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
ἡ ἐκφάνεια αἱ ἐκφάνειαι	appearing out	ΕΚΦΑΝΕΙΑ *shining out*
ὑπὲρ	above	ὙΠΕΡ *over / beyond*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
ἡ ἐπιπροσθέτησις αἱ ἐπιπροσθετήσεις	additional interposing	ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΤΗΣΙΣ *process of setting upon in addition*
προειρημένος (η, ον)	previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ *spoke before*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
συντελεῖσθαι	to be altogether fulfilled [here, "to be mutually fulfilled"]	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*

92b. Rotation: of the Sky or of Celestial Bodies

τάς τε κινήσεις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου οὐρανοῦ δίνην ¬

[*it is*] not impossible for the movements of those [*celestial bodies*] to be produced from the rotation of the whole sky ¬

ἢ τούτου μὲν στάσιν – αὐτῶν δὲ δίνην ¬ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου ἀνάγκην, ἀπογεννηθεῖσαν ἐπ' ἀνατολῇ:

or alternatively with a stationary position of this [*sky*] – and from the rotation of [*the celestial bodies*] themselves ¬ according to [*natural*] necessity from the beginning at genesis of the world, that was fully generated toward rising:

εἶτα τῇ θερμασίᾳ, κατά τινα ἐπινέμησιν τοῦ πυρὸς ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἑξῆς τόπους ἰόντος

then [*they continue to rise*] by heat, from a certain allotment of fire which is going on always to those successive places

[Bailey] Their motions may not impossibly be due to the revolution of the whole heaven, or else it may remain stationary, and they may revolve owing to the natural impulse towards the east, which was produced at the beginning of the world by an excessive heat owing to a spreading of the fire which is always moving on to the regions nearest in succession.

[Hicks] And their motions may be due to the rotation of the whole heaven, or the heaven may be at rest and they alone rotate according to some necessary impulse to rise, implanted at first when the world was made and this through excessive heat, due to a certain extension of the fire which always encroaches upon that which is near it

ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*

ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *not powerful*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὅλος (η, ον)	entire / whole	**ὋΛΟΣ** *whole*
ὁ οὐρανός **οἱ οὐρανοί**	sky	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ** *heaven*
ὁ δῖνος **οἱ δῖνοι**	whirl	**ΔΙΝΟΣ** *vortex*
ἡ δίνησις **αἱ δινήσεις**	a whirling	**ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *process of vortex*
ἡ δίνη **αἱ δίναι**	rotation	**ΔΙΝΗ** *vortex*
	Part 2	
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	**ὉΥΤΟΣ** *this*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἀπογεννηθῆναι	to be fully generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *generating out*
ἀπογεννηθείς (εῖσα, έν)	fully [been] generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΕΙΣ** *generating out*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	a rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
	Part 3	
εἶτα	next	**ΕΙΤΑ** *hereafter*
θερμός (ή, όν)	hot	**ΘΕΡΜΟΣ** *warm*
ἡ θερμασία **αἱ θερμασίαι**	heat	**ΘΕΡΜΑΣΙΑ** *state of warm*
ἡ ψυχρασία **αἱ ψυχρασίαι**	coldness	**ΨΥΧΡΑΣΙΑ** *state of cold*
προσνέμειν	to allot	**ΠΡΟΣΝΕΜΕΙΝ** *assigning upon*
ἡ ἐπινέμησις **αἱ ἐπινέμησεις**	allotment	**ΕΠΙΝΕΜΗΣΙΣ** *process of assigning upon*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἙΞΗΣ** *possessing*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*

93a. Changes in the Location of the Sun and Moon

τροπὰς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης Ἐνδέχεται μὲν γίνεσθαι κατὰ λόξωσιν οὐρανοῦ – οὕτω τοῖς χρόνοις κατηναγκασμένου

It is possible for the shifting courses of the sun and moon to be produced from the tilting of the sky – with [*the sky*] being forced back in this way in its times [*i.e., slating in different directions in different seasons*]

[Bailey] The tropics of sun and moon may be caused owing to an obliquity of the whole heaven, which is constrained into this position in the successive seasons;

ἰέναι	to go	**ΙΕΝΑΙ** *going*
ἰών	going	**ΙΩΝ** *going*
ἡ τροπή **αἱ τροπαί**	[the action of] shifting course	**ΤΡΟΠΗ** *turning*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ λόξωσις **αἱ λοξώσεις**	tiling	**ΛΟΞΩΣΙΣ** *process of slating*
ὁ οὐρανός **οἱ οὐρανοί**	sky	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ** *heaven*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ** *necessary*
καταναγκάζειν	to force back	**ΚΑΤΑΝΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ** *necessary against*
κατηναγκασμένος	having been forced back	**ΚΑΤΗΝΑΓΚΑΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary against*

93b. Air, Fire, or Spiral

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ ἀέρος Ἀντέξωσιν – ἢ καὶ ὕλης ἀεὶ ἐπιτηδείας ἐχομένοις ἐμπιπραμένης ¬ τῆς δὲ καταλιπούσης

similarly, they would hold firm by air – or also with them having always suitable material that is ignited ¬ but that stays remaining

[Bailey] or equally well by an outward impulsion of a current of air, or because the appropriate material successively catches fire, as the former fails;

[Hicks] Again, they may equally be due to the contrary pressure of the air or, it may be, to the fact that either the fuel from time to time necessary has been consumed in the vicinity or there is a dearth of it.

ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιαύτην δίνην κατειληφῆναι τοῖς ἄστροις τούτοις: ὥσθ' οἷόν τιν' ἕλικα κινεῖσθαι

or also [*it is possible*] that from the beginning such a rotation to have been thoroughly acquired by these celestial bodies: so as to be moved in a certain such kind of spiral

[Bailey] or again, from the beginning this particular form of revolution may have been assigned to these stars, so that they move in a kind of spiral.

[Hicks] Or even because such a whirling motion was from the first inherent in these stars so that they move in a sort of spiral.

ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*

ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἀντέχειν	to hold firm	ΑΝΤΕΧΕΙΝ *holding against*
ἀντέξωσιν	3rd plural aorist subjunctive active They would hold firm	
ἡ ὕλη αἱ ὕλαι	material	ὙΛΗ *forest, wood* › *raw material* › *matter*
ἀεὶ	always	ΑΕΙ *forever*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἐχόμενος *(η, ον)*	holding on to	ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *holding*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ἐμπιμπράναι	to ignite	ΕΜΠΙΜΠΡΑΝΑΙ *kindling into*
ἐμπιπραμένος	being ignited	ΕΜΠΙΠΡΑΜΕΝΟΣ *kindling into*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/ undisputed *[here, "to stay remaining"]	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*
ἡ δίνη αἱ δίναι	rotation	ΔΙΝΗ *vortex*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend [here, "to thoroughly acquire"]	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly* *grasping*
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
ὁ ἕλιξ οἱ ἕλικες	spiral	ἩΛΙΞ *coil*
κινεῖσθαι	to be moved	ΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *moving*

93c. Multiple Agreements with What Is Evident

πάντα γὰρ Τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ Τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐναργημάτων διαφωνεῖ – ἐάν, Τις ἀεὶ, ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων μερῶν, ἐχόμενος τοῦ δυνατοῦ, εἰς τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις ἕκαστον τούτων δύναται ἐπάγειν ¬ μὴ φοβούμενος τὰς ἀνδραποδώδεις ἀστρολόγων τεχνιτείας

for all such things and those akin to these disagree with none of the detectible facts – as long as, regarding parts [*of the cosmos*] such as this, someone always, while holding on to what is possible, is able to bring in each of these into harmony with what is apparent ¬ while not fearing the slavish contrivances of astrologers

[Bailey] For all these and kindred explanations are not at variance with any clear-seen facts, if one always clings in such departments of inquiry to the possible and can refer each point to what is in agreement with phenomena without fearing the slavish artifices of the astronomers.

[Hicks] For all such explanations and the like do not conflict with any clear evidence, if only in such details we hold fast to what is possible, and can bring each of these explanations into accord with the facts, unmoved by the servile artifices of the astronomers.

πᾶς (*πᾶσα, πᾶν*)	whole [here, "all"]	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
οὗτος (*αὕτη, τοῦτο*)	this	**ΟΥΤΟΣ** *this*
συγγενής (*ές*)	akin	**ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ** *born with*
οὐδείς (*οὐδεμία, οὐδέν*)	no one	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
τὸ ἐνάργημα **τὰ ἐναργήματα**	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking together*
διαφωνεῖν	to disagree	**ΔΙΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking apart*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἐχόμενος (*η, ον*)	holding on to	**ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *holding*
δυνατός (*ή, όν*)	able / possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
τό δυνατόν **τὰ δυνατά**	what is possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ** *power*
σύμφωνος (*ος, ον*)	in harmony	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ** *speaking together*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἕκαστος (*η, ον*)	each (*with plural verb*)	**ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	**ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ** *going on/over*
φοβούμενος (*η, ον*)	fearing	**ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *fleeing*
τὸ ἀνδράποδον **τὰ ἀνδράποδα**	slave	**ΑΝΔΡΑΠΟΔΟΝ** *man-footed*
Andrápodon is generally used in contrast with Tetrápodon, "quadruped" (i.e., livestock)		
ἀνδραποδώδης (*ες*)	slavish	**ΑΝΔΡΑΠΟΔΩΔΗΣ** *man-footed*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ ἀστρολόγος οἱ ἀστρολόγοι	astrologer	ΑΣΤΡΟΛΟΓΟΣ *star reasoning*
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ *state of* *the result of* *doing / affair*
ἡ τέχνη αἱ τέχναι	art	ΤΕΧΝΗ *technique*
ἡ τεχνιτεία αἱ τεχνιτεῖαι	contrivance	ΤΕΧΝΙΤΕΙΑ *state of* *technique / art*

94a. Phases of the Moon

Κενώσεις τε σελήνης καὶ, πάλιν, Πληρώσεις καὶ κατὰ στροφὴν τοῦ σώματος τούτου δύναιντ' ἂν γίνεσθαι – καὶ κατὰ σχηματισμοὺς ἀέρος ὁμοίως ¬ ἔτι τε καὶ κατὰ προσθετήσεις

Emptyings [*i.e., wanings*] of the moon and, in turn, its Fillings [*i.e., waxings*] would also be able to be produced from the twisting of its body – and similarly from configurations of air ¬ and also from interposings [*of other bodies*]

[Bailey] The wanings of the moon and its subsequent waxings might be due to the revolution of its own body, or equally well to successive conformations of the atmosphere, or again to the interposition of other bodies;

καὶ κατὰ πάντας τρόπους καθ' οὓς καὶ Τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν φαινόμενα ἐκκαλεῖται εἰς τὰς τούτου τοῦ εἴδους ἀποδόσεις

and in all ways [*of thinking*] by which the things apparent among us are called out for the explanations of this appearance

[Bailey] they may be accounted for in all the ways in which phenomena on earth invite us to such explanations of these phases;

[Hicks] In short, it may happen in any of the ways in which the facts within our experience suggest such an appearance to be explicable.

κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ἡ κένωσις αἱ κενώσεις	emptying	ΚΕΝΩΣΙΣ *process of* *emptiness*
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελῆναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ *shining light*
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
πλήρης *(ες)*	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ *quality from filling*
τὸ πλήρωμα τὰ πληρώματα	fullness	ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ *result of filling*
ἡ πλήρωσις αἱ πληρώσεις	filling	ΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΣ *process of filling*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *thoroughly turning*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting together*
ἡ στροφή αἱ στροφαί	twisting	ΣΤΡΟΦΗ *twisting*
ὁ ἕλιξ οἱ ἕλικες	spiral	῾ΗΛΙΞ *coil*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*

ἡ δίνησις αἱ δινήσεις	a whirling	ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ *process of vortex*
ἡ δίνη αἱ δίναι	rotation	ΔΙΝΗ *vortex*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὋΥΤΟΣ *this*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of* *action of forming*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
ἡ ἐπιπροσθέτησις αἱ ἐπιπροσθετήσεις	additional interposing	ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΤΗΣΙΣ *process of setting* *upon in addition*
ἡ προσθέτησις αἱ προσθετήσεις	interposing	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΤΗΣΙΣ *setting addition*
	Part 2	
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole [here, "every"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning out*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὋΥΤΟΣ *this*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form [here, "appearance"]	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
ἡ ἐπίδοσις αἱ ἐπιδόσεις	advancements	ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΣ *given in addition*
ἡ διάδοσις αἱ διάδοσεις	exchange	ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΣ *given through*
ἡ δόσις αἱ δόσεις	gift / inheritance	ΔΟΣΙΣ *given*
ἡ ἀπόδοσις αἱ ἀποδόσεις	explanation	ΑΠΟΔΟΣΙΣ *given away*

94b. Observing the Limits of Observation

ἐὰν μή Τις, τὸν μοναχῆ τρόπον κατηγαπηκώς: τοὺς ἄλλους κενῶς ἀποδοκιμάζῃ ¬ οὐ τεθεωρηκὼς τί δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τί ἀδύνατον – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατα θεωρεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν

unless Someone, having fully welcomed a way [*of thinking*] in singularity, in vain disapproves of the others ¬ not having observed what is possible for a person to observe and what is impossible – and because of this desiring to observe what is impossible [*to observe*]

[Bailey] provided only one does not become enamoured of the method of the single cause and groundlessly put the others out of court, without having considered what it is possible for a man to observe and what is not, and desiring therefore to observe what is impossible.

[Hicks] But one must not be so much in love with the explanation by a single way as wrongly to reject all the others from ignorance of what can, and what cannot, be within human knowledge, and consequent longing to discover the indiscoverable

μόνος (η, ον)	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ single
μοναχός (ή, όν)	singular	ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ single multiplicity
μοναχῇ	in singularity	ΜΟΝΑΧΗ ΜΟΝΑΧΗΙ single multiplicity
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ manner / direction
ἀγαπητός (ή, όν)	welcome	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ beloved / dear
καταγαπᾶν	to fully welcome	ΚΑΤΑΓΑΠΑΝ thoroughly beloved / dear
κατηγαπηκώς (υῖα, ός)	having fully welcomed	ΚΑΤΗΓΑΠΗΚΩΣ thoroughly beloved / dear
ἄλλος (η, ο)	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ another
κενῶς	in vain	ΚΕΝΩΣ emptiness
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ seeming
δοκιμάζειν	to approve of	ΔΟΚΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ examining
ἀποδοκιμάζειν	to disapprove of	ΑΠΟΔΟΚΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ examining away
τεθεωρηκώς (υῖα, ός)	observed	ΤΕΘΕΩΡΗΚΩΣ envisioned
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ envisioning
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ power
ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ not powerful
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ man face
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ toward spirit
ἐπιθυμεῖν	to desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΕΙΝ toward spirit
ἐπιθυμῶν	desiring	

94c-5a. Moonlight

ἔτι τε, Ἐνδέχεται ‹μὲν› τὴν σελήνην ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἔχειν τὸ φῶς ¬ Ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου

further, it is possible for the moon to have light from herself ¬ but it is also possible [*that the moon gets its light*] from the sun

[Bailey] Next the moon may have her light from herself or from the sun.

καὶ γὰρ, παρ' ἡμῖν θεωρεῖται Πολλὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα ¬ πολλὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρων

for indeed, among us, many things are observed having [*light*] out of themselves ¬ and many things [*are observed to have their source of light*] from other things

[Bailey] For on earth too we see many things shining with their own, and many with reflected light.

[Hicks] for in our own experience we see many things which shine by their own light and many also which shine by borrowed light.

ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελῆναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ *shining light*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
τὸ φῶς τὰ φῶτα	light	ΦΩΣ *shine*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ἩΛΙΟΣ *sunshine*
	Part 2	
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἑαυτός *(ή, όν)*	oneself	ἙΑΥΤΟΣ *own self*
ἔχων *(ουσα, ον)*	has	ΕΧΩΝ *holding*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	ἙΤΕΡΟΣ *other*

95b. The Manifold Way

καὶ Οὐθὲν ἐμποδοστατεῖ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φαινομένων – ἐάν Τις τοῦ πλεοναχοῦ τρόπου ἀεὶ μνήμην ἔχῃ – καί, τὰς ἀκολούθους αὑτοῖς ὑποθέσεις, ἅμα, καὶ αἰτίας συνθεωρῇ:

and nothing of what is apparent among meteorological things stands in the way [*of these explanations*] – if one always keeps the memory of the manifold way [*of thinking*] – and, at the same time, he mutually observes the hypotheses consistent with them and the causes:

[Bailey] Nor is any celestial phenomenon against these explanations, if one always remembers the method of manifold causes and investigates hypotheses and explanations consistent with them,

[Hicks] And none of the celestial phenomena stand in the way, if only we always keep in mind the method of plural explanation and the several consistent assumptions and causes

καὶ μὴ ἀναβλέπων εἰς τὰ ἀνακόλουθα ταῦτ᾽ ὀγκοῖ ματαίως – καὶ καταρρέπῃ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπὶ τὸν μοναχὸν τρόπον

and he does not look toward what [*hypotheses*] do not follow [*what is apparent*] while pointlessly puffing these up – and then sink down at another time in another way into the singular way [*of thinking*]

[Bailey] and does not look to inconsistent notions and emphasize them without cause and so fall back in different ways on different occasions on the method of the single cause.

[Hicks] instead of dwelling on what is inconsistent and giving it a false importance so as always to fall back in one way or another upon the single explanation.

τὸ ἀνδράποδον τὰ ἀνδράποδα	slave	ΑΝΔΡΑΠΟΔΟΝ *man-footed*
ἱστάναι	to stand	ἹΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing*

ἐνποδίζειν = ἐμποδίζειν	to hinder	ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ *in foot*
ἐμποδοστατεῖν	to stand in the way	ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΕΙΝ *standing in [the way of] foot*
κωλύειν	to prevent	ΚΩΛΥΕΙΝ *preventing*
ἰσχάνειν	to restrain	ΙΣΧΑΝΕΙΝ *restraining*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
μετέωρος *(ον)*	meteorological	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ *rising beyond*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
πλεοναχής *(ές)*	manifold	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΗΣ *more multiplicity*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἀεὶ	always	ΑΕΙ *forever*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἔχῃ	3rd sg present subjunctive active "[if] one keeps"	
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ ὑπόθεσις αἱ ὑποθέσεις	hypothesis	ὙΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ *placing under*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning together*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*
ἀναβλέπειν	to look toward	ΑΝΑΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking up*
ἀναβλέπων *(ουσα, ον)*	looking toward	
	Part 2	
ἀνακόλουθος	not following	ΑΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΣ *not following*
τὸ ἀνακόλουθον τὰ ἀνακόλουθα	what does not follow	ΑΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΝ
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ *bulk*
ὀγκοῦν	to puff up	ΟΓΚΟΥΝ *bulk*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ *folly*

ματαίως	pointlessly	ΜΑΤΑΙΩΣ *folly*
ῥέπειν	to sink	ῬΕΠΕΙΝ *collapsing*
καταρρέπειν	to sink down	ΚΑΤΑΡΡΕΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly collapsing*
ἄλλος (η, ο)	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
ἄλλοτε	at anther time	ΑΛΛΟΤΕ *another*
ἄλλως	in another way	ΑΛΛΩΣ *another*
μοναχός (ή, όν)	singular	ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ *single multiplicity*

95c. Appearance of the Moon

ἡ δὲ Ἔμφασις τοῦ προσώπου ἐν αὐτῇ δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ παραλλαγὴν μερῶν καὶ κατ' ἐπιπροσθέτησιν – καὶ ὅσοι ποτ' ἂν Τρόποι θεωροῖντο τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις κεκτημένοι

and the Presentation of the surface on the [*moon*] is able to be produced both according to the variety of its parts and according to interposition [*of what is between the moon and us*] – and whatever Ways might be observed as having an accord with what is apparent

[Bailey] The impression of a face in the moon may be due to the variation of its parts or to interposition or to any one of many causes which might be observed, all in harmony with phenomena.

ἡ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀποφάσεις	assertion	ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ *affirming out*
ἡ ἔμφασις αἱ ἐμφάσεις	presentation	ΕΜΦΑΣΙΣ *affirming in*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
τὸ πρόσωπον τὰ πρόσωπα	surface	ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΝ *towards the eye*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ *changing across*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἡ πρόσθεσις αἱ προσθέσεις	addition	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing toward*
ἡ ἐπιπρόσθεσις αἱ ἐπιπροσθέσεις	interposition	ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing toward upon*
ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
σύμφωνος (ος, ον)	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking together*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*

κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*

96a. Tracking the Detectible Facts

ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν μετεώρων, τὴν τοιαύτην ἴχνευσιν οὐ προετέον:

regarding all meteorological things, [*investigative*] tracking such as this [*i.e., using the manifold way of thinking*] must not be abandoned:

[Bailey] For in the case of all celestial phenomena this process of investigation must never be abandoned

[Hicks] For in all the celestial phenomena such a line of research is not to be abandoned; for, if you fight against clear evidence, you never can enjoy genuine peace of mind

ἢν γάρ Τις ᾖ μαχόμενος τοῖς ἐναργήμασιν ¬ οὐδέποτε μὴ δυνήσεται ἀταραξίας γνησίου μεταλαβεῖν

for if someone is contending with detectible facts ¬ he will never be able to take a share of genuine undisturbedness

[Bailey] for if one is in opposition to clear-seen facts, he can never have his part in true peace of mind.

πᾶς (*πᾶσα, πᾶν*)	whole [here, "everyone"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
μετέωρος (ον)	meteorological	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ *rising beyond*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἡ ἴχνευσις αἱ ἰχνεύσεις	[investigative] tracking	ΙΧΝΕΥΣΙΣ *process of footprint*
προϊέναι προιέναι	to go forward [here, "to abandon"]	ΠΡΟΙΕΝΑΙ *going forward*
προετέον	must be abandoned	ΠΡΟΕΤΕΟΝ *going forward*
	Part 2	
ἢν = ἐάν	if	ΗΝ ΕΑΝ
εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ *being*
ᾖ	3rd singular present subjunctive	
μαχόμενος	contending	ΜΑΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *combating*
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ *result of being within clear*
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ *not even at some point*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
γνήσιος (α, ον)	genuine	ΓΝΗΣΙΟΣ *belonging to one's race (i.e. legitimate)*
μεταλαμβάνειν	to take a share	ΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping change*

96b. Eclipses & Simultaneous Concurrences

Ἔκλειψις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ σβένσιν – καθάπερ καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν Τοῦτο θεωρεῖται γιγνόμενον

an Eclipse of the sun and of the moon is able to be produced also by extinguishing – just as This is also observed being produced among us

καὶ ἤδη καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιπροσθέτησιν ἄλλων τινῶν: ἢ γῆς ¬ ἢ ἀοράτου τινὸς ἑτέρου τοιούτου

and furthermore [*an eclipse can be produced*] also by the additional interposing of certain other things: either of the Earth ¬ or of something else unseen like it

καὶ, ὧδε, τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους Συνθεωρητέον καὶ τὰς ἅμα συγκυρήσεις τινῶν – ὅτι οὐκ Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι

and, in this way, One must also mutually observe the ways compatible to each and the simultaneous concurrences of certain things – [*understanding*] that it is not impossible [*for those concurrences*] to be produced

ἡ ἔκλειψις **αἱ ἐκλείψεις**	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an "eclipse"]	**ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ** *leaving out*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἭΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ σβένσις = **ἡ σβέσις**	extinguishing	**ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ** **ΣΒΕΣΙΣ** *cancelling*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as* *thoroughly*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	[being] produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
	Part 2	
ἤδη	actually	
ἡ πρόσθεσις **αἱ προσθέσεις**	addition	**ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing toward*
ἡ ἐπιπρόσθεσις **αἱ ἐπιπροσθέσεις**	interposition	**ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing toward upon*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ὁ οὐρανός **οἱ οὐρανοί**	sky	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ** *heaven*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [here "else"]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it *(such as this/it)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
	Part 3	
ὧδε	in this way	**ὩΔΕ** *this*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another [here, "each"]	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*

ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning together*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἍΜΑ *at once*
κυρεῖν	to happen upon	ΚΥΡΕΙΝ *happening*
ἡ συγκύρησις αἱ συγκυρήσεις	concurrence	ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΣΙΣ *process of happening together*
ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *not powerful*

96c. Scholion on Eclipses

{ ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβʹ Περὶ Φύσεως ταῦτα Λέγει – καὶ πρός "Ἥλιον ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἐπισκοτούσης, Σελήνην δὲ τοῦ τῆς γῆς σκιάσματος ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ κατʹ ἀναχώρησιν"

{ [*Epicurus*] also says these things in the 12th [*book*] On Nature – and additionally [*he says there that*] "the Sun is eclipsed by the occulting moon, and the Moon [*is eclipsed*] by the earth's shadow ¬ but also in accordance with its withdrawal"

τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Διογένης ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῇ αʹ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων }

and Diogenes the Epicurean [*cited*] this in the first book of his Epilecta }

ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ *leaving out*
ἐγλείπειν = ἐκλείπειν	to disappear [or, of the sun & moon] to be eclipsed	ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *leaving out*
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελῆναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ *shining light*
ἐπισκοτῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	occulting	ΕΠΙΣΚΟΤΩΝ *darkness upon*
τὸ σκίασμα τὰ σκιάσματα	shadow	ΣΚΙΑΣΜΑ *result of reflected image*
ἡ ἀναχώρησις αἱ ἀναχωρήσεις	withdrawal	ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ *process of place / location back*
	Part 2	
Διογένης	Diogenes	ΔΙΟΓΕΝΗΣ *born from Zeus*
Ἐπικούρειος *(α, ον)*	Epicurean	ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΣ *running toward [to assist]*
ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ *speaking across*
τὰ Ἐπιλέκτα	Epilecta i.e., "The Selections"	ΕΠΙΛΕΚΤΑ *speaking upon*

97a. Regular Orbital Periods

ἔτι τε Τάξις περιόδου καθάπερ Ἔνια καὶ παρʹ ἡμῖν τῶν τυχόντων γίνεται λαμβανέσθω

further, let the [*ordered*] Arrangement of [*the completion of*] a full course be comprehended in the same way as even some of the things that happen among us are produced

[Bailey] Next the regularity of the periods of the heavenly bodies must be understood in the same way as such regularity is seen in some of the events that happen on earth.

ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ *ordered*
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ *result around the path*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ *one*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
τὸ τυχόν τὰ τυχόντα	what happens [to come] to be	ΤΥΧΟΝ *coming to be*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*

97b. No Burden on the Gods

καὶ ἡ θεία Φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῇ προσαγέσθω ¬ ἀλλ', ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι

and the divine Nature is not in any way to be brought forward into these matters ¬ rather, let it be preserved free from administration and in all blessedness

[Bailey] And do not let the divine nature be introduced at any point into these considerations, but let it be preserved free from burdensome duties and in entire blessedness

It appears that Pythocles was very eager to dismiss the gods from the workings of nature (as Epicurus recommends) – but went too far by dismissing the existence of the gods (as Epicurus does not recommend).

In response to the issue of atheism, Epicurus wrote the so-called "Radiant Letter" to Leonteus (radiant in the sense of light-giving) – and the topic started with the issue of Pythocles' questioning the existence of the gods (U152)

θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	ΘΕΙΟΣ *[divine entity]*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
μηδαμῇ	not in any way	ΜΗΔΑΜΗ ΜΗΔΑΜΗΙ *but not one*
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ *going on/over*
προσάγειν	to bring forward	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΕΙΝ *going toward*
λειτουργεῖν	to administrate [to serve the state]	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΕΙΝ *council-room worker*
ἀλειτούργητος *(ον)*	free from administration	ΑΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΗΤΟΣ *not council-room worker*

διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	ΔΙΑΤΗΡΕΙΝ *completely protecting / watching*
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "all"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*

97c. The Error of Throwing Out Possibilities

ὡς εἰ Τοῦτο μὴ πραχθήσεται: ἅπασα ἡ τῶν μετεώρων Αἰτιολογία ματαία ἔσται

for if this [*manifold way of thinking*] will not be accomplished: the whole reasoning into the causes of meteorological things will be pointless

[Bailey] For if this principle is not observed, the whole discussion of causes in celestial phenomena is in vain

καθάπερ τισὶν ἤδη ἐγένετο: οὐ δυνατοῦ τρόπου ἐφαψαμένοις, εἰς δὲ τὸ μάταιον ἐκπεσοῦσι – τῷ καθ' ἕνα τρόπον μόνον οἰέσθαι γίνεσθαι ¬ τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τοὺς κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἐκβάλλειν

just as has actually happened to some: who, not having taken hold of a possible way, fall out into what is pointless – by believing it to be produced in only one way ¬ and by throwing out all the other ways which are in accordance with what is possible

[Bailey] as it has already been for certain persons who have not clung to the method of possible explanations, but have fallen back on the useless course of thinking that things could only happen in one way, and of rejecting all other ways in harmony with what is possible,

εἴς τε τὸ ἀδιανόητον φερομένους καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἃ δεῖ σημεῖα ἀποδέχεσθαι μὴ δυναμένους συνθεωρεῖν

but with those [*who only allow for a single theory*] being carried into what is [*mentally*] imperceptible and not being able to mutually observe the apparent things which are necessary to accept as signs

[Bailey] being driven thus to what is inconceivable and being unable to compare earthly phenomena, which we must accept as indications.

πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
πραχθήσεται	3rd person singular future passive indicative will be accomplished	
ἅπας (ασα, αν)	all together	ἍΠΑΣ *all together*
μετέωρος (ον)	meteorological	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ *rising beyond*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning of producing*
αἰτιολογεῖν	to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *collecting blame*
ἡ αἰτιολογία αἱ αἰτιολογίαι	reasoning into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ
μάταιος (α, ον)	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ *folly*
εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ *being*
ἔσται	3rd person singular future middle active	
Part 2		

καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
ἤδη	actually	
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced [here, "to happen"]	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἅπτειν	to touch	ἉΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening*
ἐφάπτειν	to take hold of	ΕΦΑΠΤΕΙΝ *intertwining upon*
ἐφαψάμενος *(η, ον)*	taken hold of	
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling out*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ *one*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole [here, "all"]	ΠΑΣ *all*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *accepting in*
ἐκβάλλειν	to throw out	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing out*
	Part 3	
ἀδιανόητος *(ον)*	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not capable of seeing through*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ *state of indication*
ἀποδέχεσθαι	to accept	ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting from away*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force [here, "being able"]	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ *power*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning together*

98a. Seasonal Variation in Day Length

Μήκη νυκτῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν παραλλάττοντα καὶ παρὰ τὸ ταχείας ἡλίου κινήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ, πάλιν, βραδείας ὑπὲρ γῆς –

the varying Lengths of nights and days [*can happen*] even from the production of the sun's swift movements and, in turn, slow [*movements*] over the earth –

i.e., the sun may move at different speeds at different times of the year

[Hicks] The variations in the length of nights and days may be due to the swiftness and again to the slowness of the sun's motion in the sky, ~~owing to the variations in the length of spaces traversed~~

[Bailey] The successive changes in the length of nights and days may be due to the fact that the sun's movements above the earth become fast and then slow again ~~because he passes across regions of unequal length~~

‹καὶ› παρὰ τὸ μήκη τόπων παραλλάττοντα καὶ τόπους τινὰς περαιοῦν τάχιον ἢ καὶ βραδύτερον (ὡς καὶ παρὰ ἡμῖν Τινα θεωρεῖται) – οἷς συμφώνως Δεῖ λέγειν ἐπὶ τῶν μετεώρων

and also [*can happen*] from the varying lengths of locations and [*the sun*] comes over certain places more quickly or even more slowly (as some things are observed also among us) – with these [*observations*] it is necessary to speak harmoniously about meteorological matters

i.e., the sun may move at the same rate, but travels over various distances at different times of the year

[Hicks] and to his accomplishing some distances more swiftly or more slowly, as happens sometimes within our own experience; and with these facts our explanation of celestial phenomena must agree

[Bailey] or because he traverses some regions more quickly or more slowly, (or again to the quicker or slower gathering of the fires that make the sun), as we observe occurs with some things on earth, with which we must be in harmony in speaking of celestial phenomena.

τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *length*
ἡ νύξ **αἱ νύκτες**	night	**ΝΥΞ** *night*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
ἀπαλλάττειν	to remove away	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing away*
παραλλάττειν	to vary	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing across*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
παραλλάττων *(ουσα, ον)*	varying	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *changing across*
ταχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	swift	**ΤΑΧΥΣ** *swift*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *came into being*
τὸ γίνεσθαι	the production	
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	**ΠΑΛΙΝ** *back*
βραδύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	slow	**ΒΡΑΔΥΣ** *slow*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
διιέναι		
	Part 2	
τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *extent*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
περαιοῦν	to come over	**ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ** *boundary*

βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
βραδύτερον	more slowly	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
σύμφωνος (ος, ον)	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking together*
συμφώνως	harmoniously	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩΣ *speaking together*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
μετέωρος (ον)	meteorological	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ *rising beyond*

98b. Limits of Observation

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἓν λαμβάνοντες τοῖς τε φαινομένοις μάχονται – καὶ τὸ ᾗ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρῆσαι διαπεπτώκασιν

but those who take "the one" [*i.e., a single explanation*] fight with the things that appear – and have fallen away from the extent to which it is possible for a human to observe

[Bailey] But those who assume one cause fight against the evidence of phenomena and fail to ask whether it is possible for men to make such observations.

λαμβάνων (ουσα, ον)	comprehending	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ *grasping*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ *combating*
ᾗ	insofar as [here, "extent to which"]	ῌΙ *in/for which*
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling out*
διαπίπτειν	to fall away from	ΔΙΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling through*

98c-9a. Changes in the Weather

Ἐπισημασίαι δύνανται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ συγκυρήσεις καιρῶν – καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμφανέσι παρ' ἡμῖν ζῴοις –

Indications [*of the change in weather*] can happen even from concurrences of opportunities – just as in living beings revealed among us –

[Bailey] Signs of the weather may occur owing to the coincidence of occasions, as happens with animals we can all see on earth,

[Hicks] The signs in the sky which betoken the weather may be due to mere coincidence of the seasons, as is the case with signs from animals seen on earth

καὶ παρ' ἑτεροιώσεις ἀέρος καὶ μεταβολάς – ἀμφότερα γὰρ Ταῦτα οὐ μάχεται τοῖς φαινομένοις

and from alterations and transformations of air – for both these do not contend with what is apparent

[Bailey] and also through alterations and changes in the atmosphere. For both these are in accordance with phenomena.

[Hicks] or they may be caused by changes and alterations in the air. For neither the one explanation nor the other is in conflict with facts,

ἐπὶ δὲ ποίοις – παρὰ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο – τὸ Αἴτιον γίνεται οὐκ ἔστι συνιδεῖν

but concerning what kind of [*circumstances*] the cause is produced – beyond this or that – it is not possible to fully see

[Bailey] But under what circumstances the cause is produced by this or that, we cannot perceive.

τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
ἡ ἐπισημασία **αἱ ἐπισημασίαι**	indication	**ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ** *indication upon*
this word is used in the plural with the meaning of "indications [of the change in weather]"		
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced [here, "to happen"]	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
κυρεῖν	to happen upon	**ΚΥΡΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἡ συγκύρησις **αἱ συγκυρήσεις**	concurrence	**ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *process of happening together*
ὁ καιρός **οἱ καιροί**	opportunity	**ΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *time*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as thoroughly*
ἐμφαίνειν	to reveal	**ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining in*
ἐμφανής *(ές)*	revealed	**ΕΜΦΑΝΗΣ** *shining in*
τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
Part 2		
ὁμοίως	similarly	**῾ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρα, ἕτερον)*	different [here "else"]	**῾ΕΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
ἡ ἑτεροίωσις **αἱ ἑτεροιώσεις**	alteration	**῾ΕΤΕΡΟΙΩΣΙΣ** *process of different*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ μεταβολή **αἱ μεταβολαί**	transformation	**ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ** *threw in a change*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is on both sides*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
Part 3		
ποῖος *(α, ον)*	what kind of	**ΠΟΙΟΣ** *gathering*

τὸ αἴτιον τὰ αἴτια	what is the cause	ΑΙΤΙΟΝ *responsibility*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*

99b. Clouds

Νέφη δύναται γίνεσθαι καὶ συνίστασθαι καὶ παρὰ πιλήσεις ἀέρος πνευμάτων συνώσει – καὶ παρὰ περιπλοκὰς ἀλληλούχων ἀτόμων καὶ ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τὸ τοῦτο τελέσαι ¬ καὶ κατὰ ῥευμάτων συλλογὴν ἀπό τε γῆς καὶ ὑδάτων

Clouds are able to pe produced and to be composed even from condensations of air through the compression of [*cool*] winds – and from intertanglings of interconnected atoms that are also suitable to fulfill this ¬ and also from a gathering of flows from both earth and waters

[Bailey] Clouds may be produced and formed both by the condensation of the atmosphere owing to compression by winds and by the interlacing of atoms clinging to one another and suitable for producing this result, and again by the gathering of streams from earth and the waters:

τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
ἡ πίλησις αἱ πιλήσεις	condensation	ΠΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of felting*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ *quality of result of breathing*
πνευματικός *(ή, όν)*	windy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of result of breathing*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
συνωθεῖν	to compress	ΣΥΝΩΘΕΙΝ *pushing together*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*
ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	an intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ *weave around*
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ *holding each other*
ἀλληλοῦχος *(ος, ον)*	interconnected	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΟΣ *holding each other*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
ἀνεπιτήδειος *(ος, ον)*	unsuitable	ΑΝΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *not towards this here*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις	flowing	ῬΕΥΣΙΣ *action of flowing*
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ *result of flowing*

ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *reasoning action together*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ συλλογή αἱ συλλογαί	a gathering	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΗ *collecting together*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ὙΔΩΡ *rain / water*

99c/100a. Rain

καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείους, αἱ τῶν τοιούτων Συστάσεις οὐκ ἀδυνατοῦσι συντελεῖσθαι

and according to several other ways, the Compositions of such things [*i.e., clouds*] are not unable to be altogether produced

[Bailey] and there are several other ways in which the formation of such things may not impossibly be brought about.

ἤδη δ', ἀπ' αὐτῶν – ᾗ μὲν θλιβομένων ᾗ δὲ μεταβαλλόντων – Ὕδατα δύναται συντελεῖσθαι

actually, from [*clouds*] – insofar as they are being crushed and insofar as they are transforming – Rains are able to be altogether produced

[Bailey] And from them again rain may be produced if they are squeezed in one part or changed in another,

ἔτι τε, πνευμάτων καταφορᾷ ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδείων τόπων, καὶ δι' ἀέρος κινουμένου, βιαιοτέρας ἐπαρδεύσεως γινομένης ἀπό τινων ἀθροισμάτων ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιπέμψεις

or also, by descent of winds from suitable locations, and through moving air, with a more forceful irrigation being produced from certain suitable aggregates, into such downpours

ἔτι τε (πνευμάτων καταφορᾷ ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδείων τόπων καὶ δι' ἀέρος κινουμένου) βιαιοτέρας ἐπαρδεύσεως γινομένης ἀπό τινων ἀθροισμάτων ἐπιτηδείων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιπέμψεις

or also (by descent of winds from suitable locations and through moving air) with a more forceful irrigation being produced from certain suitable aggregates into such downpours

[Bailey] or again by a downward current of wind moving through the atmosphere from appropriate places, a more violent shower being produced from certain conglomerations of atoms suited to create such downfalls.

ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "several"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it *(such as this/it)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*

ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ *not powerful*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill [here "to altogether produce"]	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
	Part 2	
ἤδη	actually	
ᾗ	insofar as [here, "extent to which"]	ἙΙ *in/for which*
θλίβειν	to crush	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ *squeezing*
θλιβόμενος *(η, ον)*	being crushed	ΘΛΙΒΟΜΕΝΟΣ *squeezing*
μεταβάλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ *throwing in change*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water [here, "rain"]	ὙΔΩΡ *rain / water*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
	Part 3	
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ἡ καταφορά αἱ καταφοραί	descent	ΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying thoroughly / down*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
κινούμενος *(η, ον)*	being moved	ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *moving*
παραβιάζεσθαι	to distort	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ *violence alongside*
βιάζειν	to force	ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ *violence*
βίαιος	forceful	ΒΙΑΙΟΣ *violence*
βιαιότερος *(α, ον)*	more forceful	ΒΙΑΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more violence*
ἡ ἐπάρδευσις αἱ ἐπαρδεύσεις	irrigation	ΕΠΑΡΔΕΥΣΙΣ *process of watering upon*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying out*
πέμπειν	to send	ΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying*
ἡ ἐπιπέμψις αἱ ἐπιπέμψεις	*downpour	ΕΠΙΠΕΜΨΙΣ *process of conveying upon*

100b. Thunder

Βροντὰς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πνεύματος ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασι τῶν νεφῶν ἀνείλησιν – καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἀγγείοις

Thunders may be produced even from a rolling back of wind in the cavities of the clouds – just as in our vessels

[Bailey] Thunder may be produced by the rushing about of wind in the hollows of the clouds, as happens in vessels on earth,

καὶ παρὰ πυρὸς, πεπνευματωμένου, βόμβον ἐν αὐτοῖς

and from fire when, having been filled with air, there is a blasting out in them

[Bailey] or by the reverberation of fire filled with wind inside them, or by the rending and tearing of clouds

καὶ κατὰ ῥήξεις δὲ νεφῶν καὶ διαστάσεις – καὶ κατὰ παρατρίψεις νεφῶν καὶ κατάξεις πῆξιν εἰληφότων κρυσταλλοειδῆ

and [*thunders may be produced*] from ruptures and expansions of clouds – and also from friction and scrapings of clouds having acquired an ice-like coagulation

[Bailey] or by the friction and bursting of clouds when they have been congealed into a form like ice:

ἡ βροντή **αἱ βρονταί**	thunder	**ΒΡΟΝΤΗ** *roaring*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
τὸ κοίλωμα **τὰ κοιλώματα**	cavity	**ΚΟΙΛΩΜΑΤΑ** *concave*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
εἰλεῖν *or* **εἴλειν**	to roll up	**ΕΙΛΕΙΝ** *rolling up*
ἡ ἀνείλησις **αἱ ἀνειλήσεις**	a rolling back	**ΑΝΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of* *rolling back up*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as thoroughly*
ἡμέτερος	our	**ἩΜΕΤΕΡΟΣ** *belong to us*
τὸ ἀγγεῖον **τὰ ἀγγεῖα**	vessel	**ΑΓΓΕΙΟΝ** *instrument of* *going / carrying*
	Part 2	
τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*
πνευματικός *(ή, όν)*	windy	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of* *result of breathing*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ** *quality of* *result of breathing*
πνευματοῦν	to fill with air	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΥΝ** *result of breathing*
πεπνευματωμένος *(η, ον)*	[having been] filled with air	**ΠΕΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *result of having* *breathed*
ὁ βόμβος **οἱ βόμβοι**	blasting out	**ΒΟΜΒΟΣ** *booming*

Part 3		
ἡ ῥῆξις αἱ ῥήξεις	a rupture	ῬΗΞΙΣ *wreaking*
ἡ διάστασις αἱ διαστάσεις	expansion	ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing across*
ἐνδιατρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	ΕΝΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ *rubbing through in*
ἡ παρατρίψις αἱ παρατρίψεις	friction	ΠΑΡΑΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing beside*
ἡ κατάξις αἱ καταξεις	scraping	ΚΑΤΑΞΙΣ *fracture*
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
εἰληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ *grasped*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
κρυσταλλοειδής *(ές)*	ice-like	ΚΡΥΣΤΑΛΛΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing crystal / ice*

100c. The Call of What is Apparent

καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος πλεοναχῶς γίνεσθαι λέγειν ἐκκαλεῖται τὰ Φαινόμενα

What is apparent calls out to say that both the whole [*topic of meteorological occurrences*] and this part [*on the topic of thunder*] are produced in several ways

[Bailey] phenomena demand that we should say that this department of celestial events, just like them all, may be caused in several ways.

ὅλος *(η, ον)*	entire / whole	ὉΛΟΣ *whole*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ *more multiplicity*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ *summoning out*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*

101a. Lightning – Friction and Impact

καὶ Ἀστραπαὶ δ' ὡσαύτως γίνονται κατὰ πλείους τρόπους:

and Lightnings likewise are produced in several ways:

[Bailey] And lightnings too are produced in several ways:

καὶ γὰρ, κατὰ παράτριψιν καὶ σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν ὁ, πυρὸς ἀποτελεστικὸς, Σχηματισμὸς, ἐξολισθαίνων, ἀστραπὴν γεννᾷ

for indeed, from friction and the mutual impact of clouds, a Configuration which is productive of fire, while sliding out, generates lightning

[Bailey] for both owing to the friction and collision of clouds a conformation of atoms which produces fire slips out and gives birth to the lightning;

ὁ ἀστρολόγος οἱ ἀστρολόγοι	astrologer	ΑΣΤΡΟΛΟΓΟΣ *star reasoning*
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ *eye*
ἡ ἀστραπή αἱ ἀστραπαί	lightning	ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ *star viewing*
ὡσαύτως	likewise	ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ *as self*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "several"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
	Part 2	
ἡ παρατρίψις αἱ παρατρίψεις	friction	ΠΑΡΑΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing beside*
ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ *hitting together*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of forming*
ἐξολισθαίνων *(ουσα, ον)*	sliding	ΕΞΟΛΙΣΘΑΙΝΩΝ *slipping out*
γεννᾶν	to generate	ΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating*

101b. Lightning – Crushing and Squeezing

καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκριπισμὸν ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν – ὑπὸ πνευμάτων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων ἃ τὴν λαμπηδόνα ταύτην παρασκευάζει

and [*lighting may be produced*] by a blowing-out from the clouds – from winds of such bodies which produce this flash

[Bailey] and owing to wind bodies which give rise to this flash are dashed from the clouds:

καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκπιασμόν, θλίψεως τῶν νεφῶν γινομένης εἴθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων – εἴθ᾽ ὑπὸ πνευμάτων

and by a squeezing-out, with a crushing of the clouds being produced either by each [other] – or by winds

[Bailey] or compression may be the cause, when clouds are squeezed either by one another or by the wind.

ὁ ἐκριπισμός οἱ ἐκριπισμοί	blowing out	ΕΚΡΙΠΙΣΜΟΣ *fan / agitate out*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it (such as this/it)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*

τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body [here, "frame"]	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
λαμπρός *(ά, όν)*	radiant	ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ *shining*
ἡ λαμπηδών αἱ λαμπηδόνες	a flash	ΛΑΜΠΗΔΩΝ *shining*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
	Part 2	
ὁ ἐκπιασμός οἱ ἐκπιασμοί	squeezing out	ΕΚΠΙΑΣΜΟΣ *pressing out*
θλίβειν	to crush	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ *squeezing*
ἡ θλῖψις αἱ θλίψεις	a crushing	ΘΛΙΨΙΣ *process of squeezing*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another [here, "each"]	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*

101c. Lightning – from the Stars through the Clouds

καὶ κατ᾽ ἐμπερίληψιν δὲ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων κατεσπαρμένου φωτός – εἶτα συνελαυνομένου ὑπὸ τῆς κινήσεως νεφῶν τε καὶ πνευμάτων – καὶ διεκπίπτοντος διὰ τῶν νεφῶν

and also [*lighting may be produced*] by an envelopment of the light thoroughly scattered from the celestial bodies – then being driven together by the movement of clouds and winds – and then falling out through the clouds

[Bailey] Or again it may be that the light scattered abroad from the heavenly bodies is taken in by the clouds, and then is driven together by the movement of the clouds and wind, and falls out through the clouds;

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
ἡ περίληψις αἱ περιλήψεις	complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold around*
ἡ ἐμπερίληψις αἱ ἐμπεριλήψεις	envelopment	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold around in*
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ *scatter through*
κατεσπαρμένος *(η, ον)*	thoroughly scattered	ΚΑΤΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ *thoroughly scatter*
τὸ φῶς τὰ φῶτα	light	ΦΩΣ *shine*
εἶτα	next	ΕΙΤΑ *hereafter*
ἐξελαύνειν	to expel	ΕΞΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ *driving out of*
συνελαύνειν	to drive together	ΣΥΝΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ *driving together*
συνελαυνόμενος *(η, ον)*	being driven together	συνελαυνόμενος *driving together*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*

τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	**ΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling out*
διεκπίπτειν	to fall out through	**ΔΙΕΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling out through*
διεκπίπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	falling out through	**ΔΙΕΚΠΙΠΤΩΝ** *falling out through*

101d. Lightning – Filtration and Tension

ἢ κατὰ διήθησιν ‹διὰ› τῶν νεφῶν τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου φωτός – ᾗ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς Νέφη συνειλέχθαι (καὶ τὰς βροντὰς ἀποτελεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τούτου κίνησιν)

or [*lighting may be produced*] by a filtration of the most subtle light through the clouds – insofar as the clouds have been rolled up together from the fire (and thunders are fully produced according to the movement [*of the fire*])

[Bailey] or else light composed of most subtle particles may filter through the clouds, whereby the clouds may be set on fire by the flame and thunder produced by the movement of the fire.

καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκπύρωσιν – τὴν γινομένην διά τε συντονίαν φορᾶς καὶ διὰ σφοδρὰν κατείλησιν

and [*lighting may be produced*] by the wind's ignition – which is produced both through the tension of transmission and through a thoroughly intense rolling

[Bailey] Or the wind may be fired owing to the strain of motion and its violent rotation,

ἡ διήθησις **αἱ διηθήσεις**	filtration	**ΔΙΗΘΗΣΙΣ** *process of sieving through*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *fine/thin part*
λεπτομερέστατος *(η, ον)*	of a most subtle composition	**ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *fine/thin part*
τὸ φῶς **τὰ φῶτα**	light	**ΦΩΣ** *shine*
ᾗ	insofar as	**ἩΙ** *in/for which*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
εἰλεῖν *or* **εἴλειν**	to roll up	**ΕΙΛΕΙΝ** *rolling up*
συνειλέχθαι	to have been rolled up together	**ΣΥΝΕΙΛΕΧΘΑΙ** *rolling up together*
ἡ βροντή **αἱ βρονταί**	thunder	**ΒΡΟΝΤΗ** *roaring*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *completing out*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
	Part 2	
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
ἡ ἐκπύρωσις **αἱ ἐκπυρώσεις**	ignition	**ΕΚΠΥΡΩΣΙΣ** *process of fire out*
ἡ ἀτονία **αἱ ἀτονίαι**	laziness	**ΑΤΟΝΙΑ** *not vigorous*

ἡ συντονία αἱ συντονίαι	tension	ΣΥΝΤΟΝΙΑ *vigorous together*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
σφοδρῶς	attentively	ΣΦΟΔΩΣ *intensely*
σφοδρός (ά, όν)	attentive [here, "intense"]	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ *intense*
εἰλεῖν or εἴλειν	to roll up	ΕΙΛΕΙΝ *rolling up*
ἡ κατείλησις αἱ κατειλήσεις	a thorough rolling up	ΚΑΤΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of thoroughly rolling up*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*

102a. Lighting – Ruptures and Emission

καὶ κατὰ ῥήξεις δὲ νεφῶν ὑπὸ πνευμάτων – ἔκπτωσίν τε πυρὸς ἀποτελεστικῶν ἀτόμων – καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀστραπῆς φάντασμα ἀποτελουσῶν

and [*lighting may be produced*] by ruptures of clouds due to the winds – and by emission of atoms productive of fire – with [*that emission*] also fully producing the impression of lightning

[Bailey] or clouds may be rent by wind and atoms fall out which produce fire and cause the appearance of lightning.

καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ πλείους τρόπους ῥᾳδίως ἔσται καθορᾶν – ἐχόμενον ἀεὶ τῶν φαινομένων – καὶ τὸ τούτοις ὅμοιον δυνάμενον συνθεωρεῖν

and by several other ways it will be easy to inspect – while one always holds on to what is apparent – and is able to mutually observe what is similar to these things

[Bailey] And several other methods may easily be observed, – if one clings always to phenomena and can compare what is akin to these things.

ἡ ῥῆξις αἱ ῥήξεις	a rupture	ῬΗΞΙΣ *wreaking*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling into*
ἡ ἔκπτωσις αἱ ἐκπτώσεις	emission	ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling out*
ἡ ἐκβολή αἱ ἐκβολαί	expulsion	ΕΚΒΟΛΗ *throwing out*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ἀποτελεστικός (ή, όν)	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom ("what is indivisible")	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
ἡ ἀστραπή αἱ ἀστραπαί	lightning	ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ *star viewing*
τὸ φάντασμα τὰ φαντάσματα	mental impression [here, just "the impression"]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ *result of appearing*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing out*
ἀποτελῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	fully produces	

Part 2		
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "several"]	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ῥᾴδιος **ῥαίδιος** *(α, ον)*	easy	**ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *easily*
ῥᾳδίως **ῥαιδίως**	easily	**ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ** *easily*
καθορᾶν	to inspect [mentally]	**ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ** *thoroughly looking*
ἐχόμενος *(η, ον)*	holding on to	**ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *holding*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning together*

102b. Lighting and Thunder – Sequential Generation

προτερεῖ δὲ Ἀστραπὴ βροντῆς ἐν τοιᾷδέ τινι περιστάσει νεφῶν – καὶ διὰ τὸ, ἅμα τῷ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐμπίπτειν, ἐξωθεῖσθαι τὸν ἀστραπῆς ἀποτελεστικὸν Σχηματισμὸν ¬ ὕστερον δὲ, τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἀνειλούμενον, τὸν βόμβον ἀποτελεῖν τοῦτον

Lightning precedes thunder in certain a circumstance of clouds such as this – either because of the fact that, simultaneously with the wind falling in, the Configuration productive of lightning is ejected ¬ while afterwards, the wind, being rolled back, fully produces this blasting out

[Bailey] Lightning precedes thunder in such a conformation of the clouds, either because at the moment when the wind dashes in, the formation of atoms which gives rise to lightning is driven out, but afterwards the wind whirls about and produces the reverberation;

πρότερος *(α, ον)*	former	**ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *before [contrast]*
προτερεῖν	to precede	**ΠΡΟΤΕΡΕΙΝ** *before [contrast]*
ἡ ἀστραπή **αἱ ἀστραπαί**	lightning	**ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ** *star viewing*
ἡ βροντή **αἱ βρονταί**	thunder	**ΒΡΟΝΤΗ** *roaring*
τοιόσδὶ = **τοιόσδε** *(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)*	like this here (such a kind as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ** **ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ** *of this sort here*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	**ἉΜΑ** *at once*
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	**ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling in*

ἐξωθεῖν	to eject	ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ *pushing out*
ἐξωθεῖσθαι	to be ejected	ΕΞΩΘΕΙΣΘΑΙ *pushing out*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing out*
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of forming*
ὕστερον	afterwards	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
ἡ ἀνείλησις αἱ ἀνειλήσεις	a rolling back	ΑΝΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of rolling back up*
ἀνειλούμενος	being rolled back	ΑΝΕΙΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *rolling back up*
ὁ βόμβος οἱ βόμβοι	blasting out	ΒΟΜΒΟΣ *booming*

102c-3a. Lighting and Thunder – Simultaneous Generation

καὶ κατ' ἔμπτωσιν δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα: τῷ τάχει συντονωτέρῳ κεχρῆσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν Ἀστραπήν ¬ ὑστερεῖν δὲ τὴν Βροντήν

or [*lightning and thunder occur*] by a collision of both simultaneously: [*it will be easy to inspect*] lightning making use of the more intense speed toward us ¬ but thunder comes after

(καθάπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων, ἐξ ἀποστήματος θεωρουμένων, καὶ πληγάς τινας ποιουμένων)

(just as in the case of some things, when observed from a distance, also making certain strikes)

[Bailey] or because they both dash out at the same moment, but lightning moves at a higher speed towards us, and thunder comes after, as in the case of some things seen at a distance and producing blows

ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling into*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ *what is on both sides*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ *swift*
συντείνειν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *stretching together*
σύντονος *(ον)*	intense	ΣΥΝΤΟΝΟΣ *stretching together*
συντονώτερος *(α, ον)*	more intense	ΣΥΝΤΟΝΩΤΕΡΟΣ *more stretching together*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
κεχρῆσθαι	to have been using	ΚΕΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *was necessary*
ὕστερος *(α, ον)*	after	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΣ *next*

ὑστερεῖν	to come after	ὙΣΤΕΡΕΙΝ *next*
ἡ βροντή αἱ βρονταί	thunder	ΒΡΟΝΤΗ *roaring*
	Part 2	
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as* *thoroughly*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	ἝΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἝΝ *one*
οἱ ἔνιοι	some people	ΕΝΙΟΙ *one*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ *one*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	
ἡ πληγή αἱ πληγαί	strike	ΠΛΗΓΗ *to hit*
ποιούμενος *(η, ον)*	making	ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *gathering*

103b. Thunderbolt – Ignition of Wind

Κεραυνὸς ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πλείονας πνευμάτων συλλογὰς:

a Thunderbolt is possibly produced also by greater gatherings of winds:

καὶ κατείλησιν ἰσχυράν – τε ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ κατάρρηξιν μέρους

by their thoroughly strong rolling up – and by their ignition and complete rupture of a part

καὶ ἔκπτωσιν ἰσχυροτέραν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς κάτω τόπους – τῆς ῥήξεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἑξῆς τόπους πυκνοτέρους εἶναι διὰ πίλησιν νεφῶν

and by a stronger emission of it toward the lower locations – with a rupture being produced because the succeeding locations are denser through the condensation of clouds

[Bailey] Thunderbolts may occur because there are frequent gatherings of wind, which whirls about and is fanned into a fierce flame, and then a portion of it breaks off and rushes violently on the places beneath, the breaking taking place because the regions approached are successively denser owing to the condensation of clouds.

ἡ βροντή αἱ βρονταί	thunder	ΒΡΟΝΤΗ *roaring*
ἡ ἀστραπή αἱ ἀστραπαί	lightning	ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ *star viewing*
ὁ κεραυνός οἱ κεραυνοί	thunderbolt	ΚΕΡΑΥΝΟΣ *thunderbolt*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ συλλογή αἱ συλλογαί	a gathering	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΗ *collecting together*
	Part 2	
εἰλεῖν [or] εἵλειν	to roll up	ΕΙΛΕΙΝ *rolling up*
ἡ ἀνείλησις αἱ ἀνειλήσεις	a rolling back	ΑΝΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of* *rolling back up*
ἡ κατείλησις αἱ κατειλήσεις	a thorough rolling up	ΚΑΤΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of* *thoroughly* *rolling up*
ἰσχυρός *(ά, όν)*	strong	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ *strength*
ἡ ἐκπύρωσις αἱ ἐκπυρώσεις	ignition	ΕΚΠΥΡΩΣΙΣ *process of fire out*
ἡ κατάρρηξις αἱ καταρρήξεις	complete rupture	ΚΑΤΑΡΡΗΞΙΣ *thoroughly* *wreaking*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἔκπτωσις αἱ ἐκπτώσεις	emission	ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling out*
ἰσχυρότερος *(α, ον)*	stronger	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more strength*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἡ ῥῆξις αἱ ῥήξεις	a rupture	ῬΗΞΙΣ *wreaking*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ *possessing*
πυκνός *(ή, όν)*	dense	ΠΥΚΝΟΣ *compacting*
πυκνότερος *(α, ον)*	denser	ΠΥΚΝΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more compacting*
ἡ πίλησις αἱ πιλήσεις	condensation	ΠΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of felting*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*

103c. Thunderbolt – Emission of Fire

καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἔκπτωσιν ἀνειλουμένου – καθὰ καὶ Βροντὴν ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι:

and [*a Thunderbolt is possibly produced*] even by the very emission of the fire being rolled back – just as thunder too can be produced:

[Bailey] or as the result of the actual outburst of the whirling fire, in the same way that thunder may be produced,

πλείονος γενομένου καὶ πνευματωθέντος ἰσχυρότερον ¬ καὶ ῥήξαντος τὸ νέφος διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑποχωρεῖν εἰς τὰ ἑξῆς – τῷ πίλησιν γίνεσθαι (τὸ μὲν Πολὺ πρὸς ὄρος τι ὑψηλόν, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα Κεραυνοὶ πίπτουσιν) ἀεὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα

with more [*fire*] being produced and being filled with air more strongly ¬ and with it rupturing the cloud because [the fire is] not able to recede into the free [parts of the cloud] – since condensation takes place always on each [*cloud*] (while the greater part [*of the condensation occurs*] toward some lofty limit, in which Thunderbolts especially fall)

[Bailey] when the fire becomes too great and is too violently fanned by wind and so breaks through the cloud, {removed by Bailey and Usener} because it cannot retreat to the next regions owing to the constant condensation of clouds one on the other.

τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*
ἡ ἔκπτωσις **αἱ ἐκπτώσεις**	emission	**ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling out*
ἀνειλούμενος	being rolled back	**ΑΝΕΙΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *rolling back up*
καθὰ	just as	
ἡ βροντή **αἱ βρονταί**	thunder	**ΒΡΟΝΤΗ** *roaring*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
	Part 2	
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into being*
πνευματοῦν	to fill with air	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΥΝ** *result of breathing*
πνευματωθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	filled with air [already]	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΘΕΙΣ** *result of breathing*
ἰσχυρότερος *(α, ον)*	stronger	**ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *more strength*
ἡ ῥῆξις **αἱ ῥήξεις**	a rupture	**ῬΗΞΙΣ** *wreaking*
ῥήγνυναι	to rupture	**ῬΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ** *wreaking*
ῥήξας	ruptured [already]	**ῬΗΞΑΣ** *wreaking*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
ἡ χώρα **αἱ χῶραι**	space	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*
ὑποχωρεῖν	to recede	**ῪΠΟΧΩΡΕΙΝ** *location under*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἙΞΗΣ** *possessing*
ἡ πίλησις **αἱ πιλήσεις**	condensation	**ΠΙΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of felting*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ὁ ὅρος **οἱ ὅροι**	limit	**ὉΡΟΣ** *outline, definition*
ὑψηλός *(ή, όν)*	high, lofty	**ῪΨΗΛΟΣ** *height*
μάλιστα	especially	**ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ** *very*
ὁ κεραυνός **οἱ κεραυνοί**	thunderbolt	**ΚΕΡΑΥΝΟΣ** *thunderbolt*
πίπτειν	to fall	**ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another [here, "each"]	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*

καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται Κεραυνὸς ἀποτελεῖσθαι

and also in several other ways a Thunderbolt can be fully produced

[Bailey] And thunderbolts may be produced in other ways too.

μόνον ὁ Μῦθος ἀπέστω ¬ ἀπέσται δέ, ἐάν Τις, καλῶς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθῶν, περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν σημειῶται

only the Myth must be absent ¬ but it will be absent, if someone, correctly following what is apparent, infers from signs concerning the invisible

[Bailey] Only superstition must be excluded, as it will, if one successfully follows the lead of seen phenomena to gain indications about the invisible.

ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "several"]	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
δέχεσθαι	to recieve	**ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting*
ὁ κεραυνός **οἱ κεραυνοί**	thunderbolt	**ΚΕΡΑΥΝΟΣ** *thunderbolt*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
	Part 2	
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	**ΜΟΝΟΣ** *single*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
εἶναι	to be	**ΕΙΝΑΙ** *being*
ἀπεῖναι	to be absent	**ΑΠΕΙΝΑΙ** *being away*
ἀπέστω	3rd person singular present imperative active "it must be absent"	
ἀπέσται	3rd person singular future indicative middle "it will be absent"	
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
τὸ ἄφανες **τὰ ἄφανη**	invisible thing	**ΑΦΑΝΕΣ** *not appearing*
ἀφανής *(ές)*	invisible	**ΑΦΑΝΗΣ** *not appearing*
τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
σημειοῦν	to infer from signs	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΝ** *state of indication*
σημειοῦσθαι	to infer [for oneself] from signs	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΣΘΑΙ** *state of indication*
σημειῶται	3rd person singular present subjunctive middle [if] he infers [for himself] from signs	

Πρηστῆρας Ἐνδέχεται γινεσθαι καὶ κατὰ κάθεσιν νέφους εἰς τοὺς κάτω τόπους στυλοειδῶς (ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἀθρόου ὠσθέντος) – καὶ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος πολλοῦ φερομένου, ἅμα καὶ τὸ νέφος εἰς τὸ πλάγιον ὠθοῦντος τοῦ ἐκτὸς πνεύματος

It is possible for Twisters to arise even by the setting of a cloud into the lower regions in a column-like way (having been pushed by a compact wind) – and through a great volume of wind being carried, while also at the same time the wind from outside is pushing the cloud sideways

[Bailey] Cyclones may be produced either by the driving down of a cloud into the regions below in the form of a pillar, because it is pushed by the wind gathered inside it and is driven on by the violence of the wind, while at the same time the wind outside impels it sideways;

ὁ πρηστήρ οἱ πρηστῆρες	twister	ΠΡΗΣΤΗΡ *instrument of blowing/burning*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ καθέσις αἱ καθέσεις	settling	ΚΑΘΕΣΙΣ *process of down*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
ὁμοειδής *(ές)*	appearing the same	ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*
στυλοειδής *(ές)*	column-like	ΣΤΥΛΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing standing / column*
στυλοειδῶς	in a column-like way	
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ *in groups*
ὠθεῖν	to push	ΩΘΕΙΝ *striking*
ὠσθέντος	aorist passive participle genitive singular neuter of [a cloud] having been pushed	
ὠθοῦντος	present active participle genitive singular neuter while the [wind] is pushing	
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long [here, "a great volume of"]	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
πλάγιος *(ον)*	sideways	ΠΛΑΓΙΟΣ *oblique*
ἐκτός	from outside	ΕΚΤΟΣ *out*

104c. Twisters – through Condensation of Surrounding Air

καὶ κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ πνεύματος εἰς κύκλον: ἀέρος τινὸς ἐπισυνωθουμένου ἄνωθεν – καὶ ῥύσεως πολλῆς πνευμάτων γινομένης (καὶ οὐ δυναμένης εἰς τὰ πλάγια διαρρυῆναι διὰ τὴν πέριξ τοῦ ἀέρος πίλησιν)

and also [*it is possible for twisters to arise*] from the encirclement of wind into a sphere: with some air being compressed upon from above – and with much outflow of winds being produced (and not having the force to flow through into the sideways [*winds*] because of the condensation of the air all-around)

[Bailey] or by wind forming into circular motion, while mist is simultaneously thrust down from above; or when a great rush of wind takes place and cannot pass through sideways owing to the surrounding condensation of the atmosphere.

ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance [here, "encirclement"]	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
ὁ κύκλος **οἱ κύκλοι**	sphere	**ΚΥΚΛΟΣ** *circular*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ συνώσις **αἱ συνώσεις**	compression	**ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ** *pushing together*
συνωθεῖν	to compress	**ΣΥΝΩΘΕΙΝ** *pushing together*
ἐπισυνωθεῖν	to compress upon	**ΕΠΙΣΥΝΩΘΕΙΝ** *pushing together upon*
ἐπισυνωθούμενος *(η, ον)*	being compressed upon	**ΕΠΙΣΥΝΩΘΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *pushing together upon*
ἄνωθεν	from above	**ΑΝΩΘΕΝ** *from above*
τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**ῬΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*
ἡ ῥεῦσις **αἱ ῥεῦσεις**	flowing	**ῬΕΥΣΙΣ** *action of flowing*
ἡ ῥύσις **αἱ ῥύσεις**	outflow	
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long [here, "much"]	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force [here, "being able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
πλάγιος *(ον)*	sideways	**ΠΛΑΓΙΟΣ** *oblique*
ῥεῖν	to flow	**ῬΕΙΝ** *flowing*
ἀπορρεῖν	to flow out	**ΑΠΟΡΡΕΙΝ** *flow away*
διαρρεῖν	to flow through	**ΔΙΑΡΡΕΙΝ** *flow through*
πέριξ	all around	**ΠΕΡΙΞ** *around*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ πίλησις **αἱ πιλήσεις**	condensation	**ΠΙΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of felting*

105a. Tornados vs. Waterspouts

καὶ ἕως μὲν γῆς τοῦ πρηστῆρος καθιεμένου, Στρόβιλοι γίνονται – ὡς ἂν καὶ ἡ Ἀπογέννησις κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ πνεύματος γίνηται ¬ ἕως δὲ θαλάττης, Δῖνοι ἀποτελοῦνται

and as long as the twister is set down on the earth, Tornados are produced – so that its Generation likewise comes to be according to the movement of the wind ¬ but as long as [*the twister is set down*] on the sea, Waterspouts are fully produced

[Bailey] And when the spout is let down on to the land, whirlwinds are produced in all the various ways in which their creation may occur owing to the movement of the wind, but if it reaches the sea it produces waterspouts.

ἕως	as long as	ἝΩΣ *until*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ὁ πρηστήρ οἱ πρηστῆρες	twister	ΠΡΗΣΤΗΡ *instrument of blowing/burning*
ἱέναι	to put into motion	ἹΕΝΑΙ *sending*
καθιέναι	to set down	ΚΑΘΙΕΝΑΙ *sending down*
καθιέμενος *(η, ον)*	being set down	ΚΑΘΙΕΜΕΝΟΣ *sending down*
ὁ στρόβιλος οἱ στρόβιλοι	tornado	ΣΤΡΟΒΙΛΟΣ *twisting*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	[process of] creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ *action of being born*
ἡ συγγέννησις αἱ συγγενήσεις	kinship	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΝΗΣΙΣ *action of being born together*
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	[process of] creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ *action of being born*
ἡ ἀπογέννησις αἱ ἀπογεννήσεις	generation	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΣΙΣ *action of being born away*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ἡ θάλαττα αἱ θάλατται	sea	ΘΑΛΑΤΤΑ *salt / sea*
ἡ δῖνα αἱ δῖναι	whirlwind	ΔΙΝΑ *vortex*
ἡ δίνησις αἱ δινήσεις	a whirling	ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ *process of vortex*
τὸ δινεῦμα τὰ δινεύματα	whirling [motion]	ΔΙΝΕΥΜΑ *vortex*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl [here, "waterspout"]	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing out*

105b. Earthquakes – from the Intake of Air

Σεισμοὺς Ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ πνεύματος ἐν τῇ γῇ ἀπόληψιν – καὶ παρὰ μικροὺς ὄγκους αὐτῆς παράθεσιν καὶ συνεχῆ κίνησιν (Ὃ τὴν κράδανσιν τῇ γῇ παρασκευάζει)

It is possible for Earthquakes to be produced by an intake of wind into the earth – and by a [*dislocating*] juxtaposition of its small particles and by this continuous movement (which provides the quaking to the earth)

[Bailey] Earthquakes may be brought about both because wind is caught up in the earth, so that the earth is dislocated in small masses and is continually shaken, and that causes it to sway.

[Young] Earthquakes may arise from the wind penetrating into the interior of the earth, or from the earth itself receiving incessantly the addition of exterior particles, and being in incessant motion as to its constituent atoms, being in consequence disposed to a general vibration.

καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦτο ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐμπεριλαμβάνει – ‹ἢ› ἐκ τοῦ πίπτειν [εἰς] ἐδάφη εἰς ἀντροειδεῖς τόπους τῆς γῆς, ἐκπνευματοῦντα τὸν πεπιλημένον ἀέρα

and either [*the earth*] completely takes this wind within from an external source – or from [*parts of the earth*] falling into the ground in earth's cavernous locations, while it vents out the condensed air

[Bailey] This wind it either takes into itself from outside, or else because masses of ground fall in into cavernous places in the earth and fan into wind the air that is imprisoned in them.

ἀσείστως	unshakably	**ΑΣΕΙΣΤΩΣ** *not shaking*
ὁ σεισμός **οἱ σεισμοί**	earthquake	**ΣΕΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of shaking*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τὸ πνεῦμα **τὰ πνεύματα**	[cool] wind	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑ** *breath result*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•Λ] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
ἡ περίληψις **αἱ περιλήψεις**	complete comprehension	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold around*
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to fully acquire	**ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping away from*
ἡ ἀπόληψις **αἱ ἀπολήψεις**	intake	**ἈΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold away from*
LSJ and Hicks render this word here (105b) as "imprisonment," Bailey as "caught up," and Young as "penetrating"		
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
παρατιθέναι	to juxtapose	**ΠΑΡΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing alongside*
ἡ παράθεσις **αἱ παραθέσεις**	juxtaposition	**ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing alongside*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	**ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ** *holding together*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
ὁ παλμός **οἱ παλμοί**	vibration	**ΠΑΛΜΟΣ** *pulse*
ἡ κράδανσις **αἱ κραδάνσεις**	quaking	**ΚΡΑΔΑΝΣΙΣ** *shaking*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
	Part 2	

ἔξωθεν	from an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	⁂ to completely comprehend within [here, "to completely take within"]	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around in*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
τὸ ἔδαφος τὰ ἐδάφη	ground	ΕΔΑΦΟΣ *bottom / surface*
στυλοειδής *(ές)*	column-like	ΣΤΥΛΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing standing / column*
ἀντροειδής *(ές)*	cavernous	ΑΝΤΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ *cave appearing*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
πνευματοῦν	to fill with air	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΥΝ *result of breathing*
ἐκπνευματοῦν	to vent out [air]	ΕΚΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΥΝ *result of breathing out*
ἐκπνευματοῦν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	venting out [air]	
ἡ πίλησις αἱ πιλήσεις	condensation	ΠΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of felting*
πιλεῖν	to condense	ΠΙΛΕΙΝ *felting*
πεπιλημένος	condensed	ΠΕΠΙΛΗΜΕΝΟΣ *felted*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*

105c. Earthquakes – from Falling Ground

‹καὶ› κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διάδοσιν τῆς κινήσεως, ἐκ τῶν πτώσεων ἐδαφῶν πολλῶν, καὶ πάλιν ἀνταπόδοσιν (ὅταν πυκνώμασι σφοδροτέροις τῆς γῆς Ἀπαντήσῃ) Ἐνδέχεται Σεισμοὺς ἀποτελεῖσθαι

> and it is possible for earthquakes to be fully produced by the exchange of the movement itself, from the falling of much ground, and in turn from its countershock – (whenever [*that falling ground*] encounters the earth's more intense concentrations)

> [Bailey] And again, earthquakes may be brought about by the actual spreading of the movement which results from the fall of many such masses of ground and the return shock, when the first motion comes into collision with more densely packed bodies of earth.

ἡ διάδοσις αἱ διάδοσεις	exchange	ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΣ *given through*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
ἡ ἔκπτωσις αἱ ἐκπτώσεις	emission	ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling out*
ἡ πτῶσις αἱ πτώσεις	falling	ΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling*
τὸ ἔδαφος τὰ ἐδάφη	ground	ΕΔΑΦΟΣ *bottom / surface*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long [here, "much"]	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
ἡ ἀπόδοσις αἱ ἀποδόσεις	explanation	ΑΠΟΔΟΣΙΣ *given away*

ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις αἱ ἀνταποδόσεις	countershock	ΑΝΤΑΠΟΔΟΣΙΣ *given away in return*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
σφοδρός *(ά, όν)*	attentive [here, "intense"]	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ *intense*
σφοδρότερος *(α, ον)*	more intense	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more intense*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ *meeting away*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
ὁ σεισμός οἱ σεισμοί	earthquake	ΣΕΙΣΜΟΣ *result of shaking*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *completing out*

106a. Earthquakes – from the Gathering of Air or Water Underground

καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ πλείους τρόπους τὰς Κινήσεις ταύτας τῆς γῆς γίνεσθαι:

and by multiple other ways [*it is possible for*] these movements of earth to be produced:

[Bailey] There are also many other ways in which these motions of the earth may be caused.

τὰ δὲ Πνεύματα συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι κατὰ χρόνον ἀλλοφυλίας τινὸς ἀεὶ καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν παρεισδυομένης – καὶ καθ᾽ ὕδατος ἀφθόνου συλλογήν

Winds continue to be produced over time by some foreign matter infiltrating always and little by little – and by a gathering of abundant water

[Bailey] The winds may be produced when from time to time some alien matter is continually and gradually forcing its way in, or owing to the gathering of a vast quantity of water.

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν, Πνεύματα γίνεται καὶ ὀλίγων πεσόντων εἰς τὰ πολλὰ κοιλώματα – διαδόσεως τούτων γινομένης

for the rest, Winds also are fully produced when a few [*currents of air*] have fallen into the many cavities – with an exchange of these [*currents*] taking place

[Bailey] The other winds arise when a few (currents of air) fall into many hollow spaces, and cause a spreading of wind.

ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *completing out*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "multiple"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*

Part 2		
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ *to have walked together*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to continue"]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁμόφυλος *(η, ον)*	of the same kind	ὉΜΟΦΥΛΟΣ *same race / tribe*
ἀλλόφυλος *(η, ον)*	of a different kind	ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΟΣ *other race / tribe*
ἡ ἀλλοφυλία αἱ ἀλλοφυλίαι	foreign matter	ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΙΑ *other race / tribe*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
κατὰ μικρὸν	little by little	
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking*
δύειν	to sink	ΔΥΕΙΝ *sinking*
ἡ παρείσδυσις αἱ παρεισδύσεις	infiltration	ΠΑΡΕΙΣΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking beside into*
παρεισδύειν	to infiltrate	ΠΑΡΕΙΣΔΥΕΙΝ *sinking beside into*
παρεισδυόμενος *(η, ον)*	infiltrating [itself]	ΠΑΡΕΙΣΔΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *sinking beside into*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ὙΔΩΡ *rain / water*
ἄφθονος *(ον)*	abundant	ΑΦΘΟΝΟΣ *not envy*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ συλλογή αἱ συλλογαί	a gathering	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΗ *collecting together*
Part 3		
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [here, "the rest"]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ *little*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
πεσών *(οῦσα, όν)*	having fallen upon	ΠΕΣΩΝ *fell*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
τὸ κοίλωμα τὰ κοιλώματα	cavity	ΚΟΙΛΩΜΑΤΑ *concave*
ἡ διάδοσις αἱ διάδοσεις	exchange	ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΣ *given through*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced [here, "taking place"]	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*

106b. Hail – General Production

Χάλαζα συντελεῖται καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν ἰσχυροτέραν: πάντοθεν δὲ πνευματωδῶν περίστασίν τινων – καὶ καταμέρισιν

Hail is produced by a stronger coagulation: by an encirclement of certain wind-like [*forces*] everywhere – and by a partitioning

[Bailey] Hail is produced both by a powerful congelation, when certain windy bodies form together from all sides and split up:

[Hicks] Hail is caused by the firmer congelation and complete transformation, and subsequent distribution into drops, of certain particles resembling wind:

καὶ τῆξιν μετριωτέραν ὑδατοειδῶν τινων – ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν ἅμα τήν τε σύνωσιν αὐτῶν ποιουμένην καὶ τὴν διάρρηξιν ¬ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρη συνίστασθαι πηγνύμενα καὶ κατὰ ἀθρότητα

and [*hail can be produced*] by a more moderate melting of certain watery [*aggregates*] – together simultaneously by their rupture that produces both a compression and a tearing apart ¬ toward being formed as they coagulate part by part and by their aggregatedness

[Bailey] also by a more moderate congelation of watery bodies and their simultaneous division, which causes at one and the same time their coagulation and separation, so that they cling together as they freeze in their separate parts as well as in their whole masses.

ἡ χάλαζα **αἱ χαλάζαι**	hail	**ΧΑΛΑΖΑ** *sleet*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill [here, "to produce"]	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing together*
ἡ πῆξις **αἱ πήξεις**	coagulation	**ΠΗΞΙΣ** *affixing together*
ἰσχυρότερος *(α, ον)*	stronger	**ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *more strength*
αὐτόθεν	from that place	**ΑΥΤΟΘΕΝ** *from self*
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location *(thence)*	**ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ** *from over there*
ἄνωθεν	from above	**ΑΝΩΘΕΝ** *from above*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	**ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ** *from all places*
πάντοθεν	from everywhere	**ΠΑΝΤΟΘΕΝ** *from all*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	**ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ** *quality of result of breathing*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance [here, "encirclement"]	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
ἡ καταμέρισις **αἱ καταμερίσεις**	a partitioning	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΡΙΣΙΣ** *process of thoroughly parting*
	Part 2	
ἡ τῆξις **αἱ τήξεις**	melting	**ΤΗΞΙΣ** *thawing*
μετρεῖν	to measure	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring*
μέτριος *(η, ον)*	moderate	**ΜΕΤΡΙΟΣ** *measuring*
μετριώτερος	more moderate	**ΜΕΤΡΙΩΤΕΡΟΣ** *more measuring*
τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ΎΔΩΡ** *rain / water*
ἀντροειδής *(ές)*	cavernous	**ΑΝΤΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ** *cave appearing*

ὑδατοειδής	watery	῾ΥΔΑΤΟΕΙΔΗΣ *water appearing*
ὁμοῦ	together	῾ΟΜΟΥ
ἡ ῥῆξις αἱ ῥήξεις	a rupture	῾ΡΗΞΙΣ *wreaking*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	῾ΑΜΑ *at once*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*
ποιούμενος *(η, ον)*	making [here, "produces"]	ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *gathering*
ἡ κατάρρηξις αἱ καταρρήξεις	complete rupture	ΚΑΤΑΡΡΗΞΙΣ *thoroughly wreaking*
ἡ διάρρηξις αἱ διαρρήξεις	a tearing apart	ΔΙΑΡΡΗΞΙΣ *wreaking through*
κατὰ μέρη	part by part	
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
συνίστασθαι	to be composed [here, "to be formed"]	
πήγνυναι	to coagulate	ΠΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ *affixing together*
πηγνύμενος *(η, ον)*	being coagulated	ΠΗΓΝΥΜΕΝΟΣ *affixing together*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
ὁ ἀθροισμός οἱ ἀθροισμοί	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of [being] gathered*
ἡ ἀθρότης αἱ ἀθρότητες	aggregatedness	ΑΘΡΟΤΗΣ *condition from being gathered*
	take note (from above)	
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
ἡ τῆξις αἱ τήξεις	melting	ΤΗΞΙΣ *thawing*

107a. Hail – Production of Shape

ἡ δὲ Περιφέρεια οὐκ ἀδυνάτως μὲν ἔχει γίνεσθαι πάντοθεν τῶν ἄκρων ἀποτηκομένων

the rounded Surface [of hail] is not impossibly produced by the highest parts melting away from every side

καὶ ἐν τῇ συστάσει πάντοθεν (ὡς Λέγεται) κατὰ μέρη – ὁμαλῶς περιισταμένων εἴτε ὑδατοειδῶν τινων, εἴτε πνευματοδῶν

and [*the rounded surface of hail can be produced*] at their composition from every side (as they say) part by part – by the melting around evenly either of certain watery [*aggregates*], or of those like [*cool*] wind

[Bailey] Their circular shape may possibly arise because the corners melt off all round or because at their conformation bodies, whether watery or windy, come together evenly from all directions part by part, as is alleged.

ἡ περιφέρεια αἱ περιφέρειαι	circumference [here, "rounded surface"]	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ *bringing around*
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ *not powerful*

ἀδυνάτως	impossibly	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΩΣ *not powerful*
ἔχειν	to have [here, "it is {Adv.} to"]	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ *from all places*
πάντοθεν	from everywhere [here, "from every side"]	ΠΑΝΤΟΘΕΝ *from all*
ἄκρος *(α, ον)*	highest	ΑΚΡΟΣ *highest*
τήκεσθαι	to melt	ΤΗΚΕΣΘΑΙ *melt down / pine away*
ἀποτήκειν	to melt away	ΑΠΟΤΗΚΕΙΝ *melt down away*
ἀποτηκόμενος	melting away	ΑΠΟΤΗΚΟΜΕΝΟΣ *melt down away*
	Part 2	
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	even	ὉΜΑΛΟΣ *same* *floor / ground*
ὁμαλῶς	evenly	
περιϊστάναι	to transfer around	ΠΕΡΙΪΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing around*
περιιστάμενος	transferring around [here, "melting around"]	ΠΕΡΙΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ *standing around*
ὑδατοειδής	watery	ὙΔΑΤΟΕΙΔΗΣ *water appearing*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
πνευματικός *(ή, όν)*	windy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of result of breathing*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ *quality of result of breathing*

107b. Snow – from Cloud Symmetry or Wind Encirclement

Χιόνα δὲ Ἐνδέχεται συντελεῖσθαι καὶ ὕδατος λεπτοῦ ἐκχεομένου ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν διὰ πόρων συμμετρίας

It is possible for Snow to be produced by subtle water pouring out from the clouds through the symmetry of the passageways

[Bailey] Snow may be produced when fine particles of rain are poured out of the clouds owing to the existence of pores of suitable shape

καὶ θλίψεως ἐπιτηδείων νεφῶν ἀεὶ ὑπὸ πνεύματος σφοδρᾶς – εἶτα τούτου πῆξιν ἐν τῇ φορᾷ λαμβάνοντος (διά τινα ἰσχυρὰν ἐν τοῖς κατώτερον τόποις τῶν νεφῶν ψυχρασίας περίστασιν)

and by a crushing of suitable clouds always under an intense [*cool*] wind – and then by this [*water*] acquiring a coagulation in its transmission (because of a certain strong encirclement of coldness in the lower locations of the clouds)

[Bailey] and the strong and constant compression by winds of clouds of the right kind; and then the water is congealed in its descent owing to some conformation of excessive coldness in the clouds in the lower regions.

ἡ χιών αἱ χιόνες	snow	ΧΙΩΝ *snowy*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill [here, "to produce"]	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	῾ΥΔΩΡ *rain / water*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ *fine/thin part*
λεπτός *(ή, όν)*	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΣ *fine/thin*
ἡ χύσις αἱ χύσεις	flow	ΧΥΣΙΣ *pouring*
ἐκχεῖν	to pour out	ΕΚΧΕΙΝ *pouring out*
ἐκχεόμενος	pouring out	ΕΚΧΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ *pouring out*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
ἡ συμμετρία αἱ συμμετρίαι	symmetry [of physical proportion]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ *measure together*
θλίβειν	to crush	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ *squeezing*
ἡ ἔκθλιψις αἱ ἔκθλιψεις	a squeezing out	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ *process of squeezing out*
	Part 2	
ἡ θλῖψις αἱ θλίψεις	a crushing	ΘΛΙΨΙΣ *process of squeezing*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
σφοδρός *(ά, όν)*	attentive [here, "intense"]	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ *intense*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	῾ΟΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	acquiring	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ *grasping*
ἰσχυρός *(ά, όν)*	strong	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ *strength*
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
κατώτερος *(α, ον)*	lower	ΚΑΤΩΤΕΡΟΣ *below*
κατώτερον	lower (adv)	
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἡ θερμασία αἱ θερμασίαι	heat	ΘΕΡΜΑΣΙΑ *state of warm*
ἡ ψυχρασία αἱ ψυχρασίαι	coldness	ΨΥΧΡΑΣΙΑ *state of cold*

ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance [here, "encirclement"]	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*

107c. Snow – from Even Thinness of Clouds and their Tight Packing

καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν δ' ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν ὁμαλῆ ἀραιότητα ἔχουσαν – τοιαύτη Πρόεσις ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν γίνοιτο ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα θλιβομένων ὑδατοειδῶν τινων συμπαρακειμένων (Ἃ, οἱονεί, σύνωσιν ποιούμενα, χάλαζαν ἀποτελεῖ – ὃ μάλιστα γίνεται ἐν τῷ ἔαρι)

and [*it is possible for snow to be produced*] also by coagulation in the clouds having an even thinness – such an issuing forth [*as snow*] from the clouds might be produced with certain watery [*aggregates*] being crushed toward each other while being placed close together (which, as it were, making a compression, fully produce hail – this is produced especially in spring)

[Bailey] Or else owing to congelation in clouds of uniform thinness an exudation of this kind might arise from watery clouds lying side by side and rubbing against one another: for they produce hail by causing coagulation, a process most frequent in the atmosphere.

[Hicks] Or again, by congelation in clouds which have uniform density a fall of snow might occur through the clouds which contain moisture being densely packed in close proximity to each other (and these clouds produce a sort of compression and cause hail, and this happens mostly in spring)

ἡ πῆξις **αἱ πήξεις**	coagulation	**ΠΗΞΙΣ** *affixing together*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	even	**ὉΜΑΛΟΣ** *same* *floor / ground*
ἀραιός *(ά, όν)*	rarefied	**ΑΡΑΙΟΣ** *spread out thin*
ἡ ἀραιότης **αἱ ἀραιότητες**	thinness	**ΑΡΑΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from being spread out thin*
ἔχων *(ουσα, ον)*	has	**ΕΧΩΝ** *holding*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it *(such as this/it)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
προϊέναι **προιέναι**	to go forward	**ΠΡΟΙΕΝΑΙ** *going forward*
ἡ πρόεσις **αἱ προέσεις**	issuing forth	**ΠΡΟΕΣΙΣ** *going forward*
ἡ ἀπόστασις **αἱ ἀποστάσεις**	emanation	**ΑΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed away*
ἡ διέκδυσις **αἱ διεκδύσεις**	emergence	**ΔΙΕΚΔΥΣΙΣ** *action of escaping through*
ἡ κατεργασία **αἱ κατεργασίαι**	outflow	**ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work thoroughly*
ἡ ἀπόρροια **αἱ ἀπόρροιαι**	effluence	**ΑΠΟΡΡΟΙΑΙ** *flow off*
ἡ ἔκπτωσις **αἱ ἐκπτώσεις**	emission	**ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling out*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another [here, "each"]	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
θλίβειν	to crush	**ΘΛΙΒΩΝ** *squeezing*
θλιβόμενος *(η, ον)*	being crushed	**ΘΛΙΒΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *squeezing*
ὑδατοειδής	watery	**ὙΔΑΤΟΕΙΔΗΣ** *water appearing*

κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting*
κείμενος *(η, ον)*	situated / lying [or, "established"]	ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated*
συμπαρακείμενος *(η, ον)*	being placed close together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated beside together*
οἱονεὶ	as it were	ὉΙΟΝΕΙ *such as if*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*
ποιούμενος *(η, ον)*	making [here, "produces"]	ΠΟΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *gathering*
ἡ χάλαζα αἱ χαλάζαι	hail	ΧΑΛΑΖΑ *sleet*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing out*
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τὸ ἔαρ τὰ ἔαρα	spring	ΕΑΡ *juice*

108a. Snow – from Rubbing of Coagulated Clouds

καὶ κατὰ τρῖψιν δὲ νεφῶν πῆξιν εἰληφότων: ἀπόπαλσιν ἂν λαμβάνοι τὸ τῆς χιόνος τοῦτο Ἄθροισμα

and [*it is possible for snow to be produced*] by the rubbing of clouds that have acquired coagulation: this Aggregate of snow would receive a shaking away [*from the clouds, and then fall*]

[Bailey] Or else, owing to the friction of congealed clouds, these nuclei of snow may find occasion to break off.

καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους ἐνδέχεται Χιόνα συντελεῖσθαι

and Snow can be produced also in other ways

[Bailey] And there are many other ways in which snow may be produced.

ἐνδιετρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	ΕΝΔΙΕΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ *rubbing through in*
ἡ παρατρίψις αἱ παρατρίψεις	friction	ΠΑΡΑΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing beside*
ἡ τρίψις αἱ τρίψεις	rubbing	ΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
εἰληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ *grasped*
ἡ φλεβοπαλία αἱ φλεβοπαλίαι	arterial pulsation "phlebopalía"	ΦΛΕΒΟΠΑΛΙΑ *vein shaking*
ἡ ἀπόπαλσις αἱ ἀποπάλσεις	shaking away	ΑΠΟΠΑΛΣΙΣ *shaking away*
ἡ χιών αἱ χιόνες	snow	ΧΙΩΝ *snowy*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*

τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
	Part 2	
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill [here, "to produce"]	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing together*

108b. Dew

Δρόσος συντελεῖται καὶ κατὰ σύνοδον πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος τῶν τοιούτων (Ἃ τῆς τοιαύτης ὑγρασίας ἀποτελεστικὰ γίνεται)

Dew is produced by a gathering toward one another from the air of such [*particles*] (which become productive of such moisture)

[Bailey] Dew may be produced both when such particles as are productive of this kind of moisture issue from the atmosphere and meet one another,

καὶ κατὰ φορὰν δὲ ἢ ἀπὸ νοτερῶν τόπων ἢ ὕδατα κεκτημένων (ἐν οἷς τόποις μάλιστα Δρόσος συντελεῖται) – εἶτα, σύνοδον τούτων εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ λαβόντων καὶ ἀποτέλεσιν ὑγρασίας, καὶ πάλιν φορὰν ἐπὶ τοὺς κάτω τόπους

and also by a transmission either from damp locations or from locations possessing water (in which locations Dew is especially produced) – next, with these [*particles*] both having acquired a gathering into the same place and [*having acquired*] a production of moisture, and in turn a transmission to the locations below

[Bailey] and also when particles rise from moist regions or regions containing water, in which dew is most naturally produced, and then meet together and cause moisture to be produced, and afterwards fall back on the ground below,

καθάπερ ὁμοίως καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπὶ πλειόνων τοιαῦτά Τινα συντελεῖται

just as similarly also among us such things are produced in multiple cases

[Bailey] as (is) frequently (seen) to be the case in phenomena on earth as well.

ἡ δρόσος **αἱ δρόσοι**	dew	**ΔΡΟΣΟΣ** *dew*
ἡ ἄφοδος **αἱ ἀφόδοι**	departure	**ΑΦΟΔΟΣ** *path away*
ἡ πάροδος **αἱ πάροδοι**	passage	**ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ** *course beside*
ἡ σύνοδος **αἱ σύνοδοι**	gathering	**ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ** *path together*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it *(such as this/it)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ἡ ὑγρασία **αἱ ὑγρασίαι**	moisture	**ὙΓΡΑΣΙΑ** *state of moist*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of completing out*
	Part 2	
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*

νοτερός (ά, όν)	damp	ΝΟΤΕΡΟΣ *damp*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water [here, in plural]	ὝΔΩΡ *rain / water*
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
ἡ δρόσος αἱ δρόσοι	dew	ΔΡΟΣΟΣ *dew*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
εἶτα	next	ΕΙΤΑ *hereafter*
ἡ σύνοδος αἱ σύνοδοι	gathering	ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ *path together*
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
λαβών (οῦσα, όν)	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΛΑΒΩΝ *grasped*
συντελεwῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἡ ἀποτέλεσις αἱ ἀποτελέσεις	production	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΙΣ *completing away*
ἡ ὑγρασία αἱ ὑγρασίαι	moisture	ὙΓΡΑΣΙΑ *state of moist*
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
	Part 3	
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
πλείων (ον)	more / greater [here, "multiple"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*

109a. Frost

‹Πάχνη δὲ συντελεῖται› τῶν δρόσων τούτων πῆξίν τινα ποιὰν λαβόντων διὰ περίστασίν τινα ἀέρος ψυχροῦ

‹Frost is produced› with these dews having acquired a certain kind of coagulation through a certain encirclement of cold air

[Bailey] [And frost is produced by a change] in the dew-particles, when such particles as we have described undergo a definite kind of congelation owing to the neighborhood of a cold atmosphere.

παχύς (εῖα, ύ)	thick	ΠΑΧΥΣ *packed / dense*
ἡ πάχνη αἱ πάχναι	frost	ΠΑΧΝΗ *packed / dense*

συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἡ δρόσος αἱ δρόσοι	dew	ΔΡΟΣΟΣ *dew*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ΟΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
ποῖος *(α, ον)*	what kind of [here, "kind of"]	ΠΟΙΟΣ *gathering*
λαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[generally] acquired	ΛΑΒΩΝ *grasped*
ἡ περίστασις αἱ περιστάσεις	circumstance [here, "encirclement"]	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing around*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
ἡ ψυχρασία αἱ ψυχρασίαι	coldness	ΨΥΧΡΑΣΙΑ *state of cold*
ψυχρός *(ά, όν)*	cold	ΨΥΧΡΟΣ *cold*

109b. Ice

Κρύσταλλος συντελεῖται καὶ κατ' ἔκθλιψιν μὲν τοῦ περιφεροῦς σχηματισμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος – σύνωσιν δὲ τῶν σκαληνῶν καὶ ὀξυγωνίων τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕδατι ὑπαρχόντων

Ice is produced by a squeezing-out of a rounded configuration from the water – and by a compression of the scalene and acute-angled [*configurations*] existing in the water

[Bailey] Ice is caused both by the squeezing out from the water of particles of round formation and the driving together of the triangular and acute-angled particles which exist already in the water,

καὶ κατὰ ἔξωθεν δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πρόσκρισιν – Ἅ, συνελασθέντα, πῆξιν τῷ ὕδατι παρεσκεύασε (ποσὰ τῶν περιφερῶν ἐκθλίψαντα)

and by an accretion of such things from an external source – which, having been driven together, provided coagulation to the water (having squeezed out some of the rounded parts)

[Bailey] and again by the addition from without of particles of this kind, which when driven together produce a congelation in the water, by squeezing out a certain number of the round particles.

κρυσταλλοειδής *(ές)*	ice-like	ΚΡΥΣΤΑΛΛΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing crystal / ice*
ὁ κρύσταλλος οἱ κρύσταλλοι	ice	ΚΡΥΣΤΑΛΛΟΣ *crystal / ice*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἡ ἔκθλιψις αἱ ἔκθλιψεις	a squeezing out	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ *process of squeezing out*
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ *toward bringing in*
περιφερής *(ές)*	rounded	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΗΣ *bringing around*
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of forming*

τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ὝΔΩΡ *rain / water*
συνωθεῖν	to compress	ΣΥΝΩΘΕΙΝ *pushing together*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*
σκαληνός *(ή, όν)*	scalene [of triangles with unequal sides, opposite of isosceles]	ΣΚΑΛΗΝΟΣ *having the quality of limping*
ἡ ὀξυδερκία αἱ ὀξυδερκίαι	sharp perception	ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ *sharp seeing*
τὸ τρίγωνον τὰ τρίγωνα	triangle	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ *three corner*
ὀξυγώνιος *(ον)*	acute-angled	ΟΞΥΓΩΝΙΟΣ *sharp corner*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under*
	Part 2	
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἡ πρόσκρισις αἱ προσκρίσεις	accretion [i.e., growth by assimilation]	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing in addition*
συνελαύνειν	to drive together	ΣΥΝΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ *driving together*
συνελασθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	driven together	ΣΥΝΕΛΑΣΘΕΙΣ *driving together*
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πήξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ *affixing together*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
πόσος *(η, ον)*	how much / how far [here, "some"]	ΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain*
θλίβειν	to crush	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ *squeezing*
ἡ ἔκθλιψις αἱ ἔκθλιψεις	a squeezing out	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ *process of squeezing out*
ἐκθλίψας *(ασα, αν)*	squeezed out [already]	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΑΣ *squeezing out*

109c. Rainbows – Cause

Ἶρις γίνεται κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν [ὑπὸ] τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς ἀέρα ὑδατοειδῆ ¬

the Rainbow is produced by an illumination from the sun upon watery air

[Bailey] The rainbow is caused by light shining from the sun on to watery atmosphere;

ἢ κατὰ πρόσφυσιν ἰδίαν τοῦ τε φωτὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος –Ἣ τὰ τῶν χρωμάτων τούτων ἰδιώματα ποιήσει (εἴτε πάντα εἴτε μονοειδῶς)

or by a particular clinging of both the light and the air – which will make the particularities of these colors (either all together or separately)

or else by a peculiar union of light and air, which can produce the special qualities of these colours whether all together or separately;

ἀφ' οὗ, πάλιν ἀπολάμποντος, τὰ Ὁμοροῦντα τοῦ ἀέρος χρῶσιν ταύτην λήψεται (οἵαν Θεωροῦμεν) κατὰ πρόσλαμψιν πρὸς τὰ μέρη

and from this [colored light], in turn while shining forth, what borders on the air will acquire this tinge (such as we observe) by illumination upon the parts

[Bailey] from it as it reflects back again the neighbouring regions of the air can take the tint which we see, by means of the shining of the light on to its various parts.

ἡ ἶρις αἱ ἶριδες	rainbow	ἾΡΙΣ *rainbow* *(Goddess Iris)*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
λαμπρός *(ά, όν)*	radiant	ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ *shining*
ἡ πρόσλαμψις αἱ προσλάμψεις	illumination	ΠΡΟΣΛΑΜΨΙΣ *shining toward*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ἭΛΙΟΣ *sunshine*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
ὑδατοειδής	watery	ὙΔΑΤΟΕΙΔΗΣ *water appearing*
	Part 2	
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἡ πρόσφυσις αἱ προσφύσεις	clinging	ΠΡΟΣΦΥΣΙΣ *producing toward*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
τὸ φῶς τὰ φῶτα	light	ΦΩΣ *shine*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ *skin color*
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ἰδιώματα	idiom [here, "particularity"]	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ *particular*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
πάντα	all together	ΠΑΝΤΑ *all*
μονοειδῶς	separately	ΜΟΝΟΕΙΔΩΣ *appearing single*
	Part 3	
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
ἀπολάμπειν	to shine forth	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΠΕΙΝ *shining away*
ἀπολάμπων	shining forth	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΠΩΝ *shining away*
ὁμορεῖν	to border on	ὉΜΟΡΕΙΝ *same* *outline / definition*
ὁμορῶν	bordering on	
τὸ ὁμοροῦν τὰ ὁμοροῦντα	what borders on	
ἡ χρῶσις αἱ χρώσεις	tinge	ΧΡΩΣΙΣ *skin color*
λαμβάνειν	[generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἡ πρόσλαμψις αἱ προσλάμψεις	illumination	ΠΡΟΣΛΑΜΨΙΣ *shining toward*

τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*

110a. Rainbow – Shape

τὸ δὲ τῆς περιφερείας τοῦτου Φάντασμα γίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ διάστημα πάντοθεν ἴσον ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως θεωρεῖσθαι,

the Impression of this rounded surface [*of the rainbow*] comes about because of the observation by vision of the separation as equal from every side

[Bailey] The appearance of its round shape is caused because it is perceived by our sight at equal distance from all its points,

[Hicks] The circular shape which it assumes is due to the fact that the distance of every point is perceived by our sight to be equal;

ἢ σύνωσιν τοιαύτην λαμβανουσῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἀτόμων ¬ ἢ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀέρος) ἀποφερομένων ἀτόμων περιφέρειάν τινα καθίεσθαι τὴν σύγκρισιν ταύτην

or [*impression of the rounded surface of the rainbow comes about*] with the atoms in the air acquiring such a compression ¬ or with the atoms being carried away in the clouds from the same air for this compound [*i.e., the rainbow*] to set down a certain circumference

[Bailey] or else because the atoms in the air or those in the clouds which are derived from the same air, are pressed together in this manner, and so the combination spreads out in a round shape.

[Hicks] or it may be because, the atoms in the air or in the clouds and deriving from the sun having been thus united, the aggregate of them presents a sort of roundness

ἡ περιφέρεια **αἱ περιφέρειαι**	circumference [here, "rounded surface"]	**ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ** *bringing around*
οὗτος (*αὕτη, τοῦτο*)	this	**ΟΥΤΟΣ** *this*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
τὸ φάντασμα **τὰ φαντάσματα**	[mental] impression	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ** *result of appearing*
τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
πάντοθεν	from everywhere [here, "from every side"]	**ΠΑΝΤΟΘΕΝ** *from all*
ἴσος (*η, ον*)	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἡ ὄψις **αἱ ὄψεις**	vision	**ΟΨΙΣ** *eye*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
	Part 2	
ἡ συνώσις **αἱ συνώσεις**	compression	**ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ** *pushing together*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
λαμβάνων (*ουσα, ον*)	acquiring	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
ὁ ἀήρ (*τοῦ ἀέρος*)	air	**ΑΗΡ** *air*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom (*"what is indivisible"*)	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*

ἀποφέρειν	to carry away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing away*
ἀποφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing away*
καθιέναι	to set down	ΚΑΘΙΕΝΑΙ *sending down*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*

110b. Halos – Air Moving To or Air Moving From the Moon

Ἅλως περὶ τὴν σελήνην γίνεται καὶ πάντοθεν ἀέρος προσφερομένου πρὸς τὴν σελήνην

a Halo around the moon is produced with the air being carried forward from every side toward the moon

[Bailey] A halo round the moon is caused either when air is carried towards the moon from all sides,

ἢ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ῥεύματα ἀποφερόμενα ὁμαλῶς ἀναστέλλοντος – ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον κύκλῳ περιστῆσαι τὸ νεφοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ μὴ τὸ παράπαν διακρῖναι,

or [*a halo is produced*] with [*the air*] holding back the flows being carried away from the [*moon*] evenly – to such an extent as to set around in a circle and not at all separate this cloud-like [*formation*]

[Bailey] or when the air checks the effluences carried from the moon so equably that it forms them into this cloudy ring all round without any gaps or differences,

ἡ ἅλως αἱ ἅλωες	halo [of sun or moon]	ἍΛΩΣ
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελῆναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ *shining light*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πάντοθεν	from everywhere [here, "from every side"]	ΠΑΝΤΟΘΕΝ *from all*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
προσφέρειν	to bring forward	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing as well*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing as well*
προσφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried forward	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing as well*
	Part 2	
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ *result of flowing*
ἀποφέρειν	to carry away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing away*
ἀποφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing away*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	even	ὉΜΑΛΟΣ *same* *floor / ground*
ὁμαλῶς	evenly	
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready away*
ἀναστέλλειν	to hold back	ΑΝΑΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready up/back*
ἀναστέλλων	holding back	
τοσοῦτος *(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)*	so long *(so great)*	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ *this so much*

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον	to such an extent	
ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	ὍΣΟΣ *however great*
ἐφ’ ὅσον	in so far as [here, only "as"]	
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ’ ὅσον	to such an extent as	
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
περιστάναι	to place/set around	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
περιστῆσαι	to place/set around [already]	
νεφοειδής	cloud-like	ΝΕΦΟΕΙΔΗΣ *cloud appearing*
τὸ παράπαν	at all	ΠΑΡΑΠΑΝ *beside all*
μὴ τὸ παράπαν	not at all	ΠΑΡΑΠΑΝ
διακρίνειν	to thoroughly separate	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *dividing through*
διακρῖναι	to thoroughly separate [already]	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΑΙ

111a. Halos – Still Air Around the Moon

ἢ καὶ τὸν πέριξ αὐτῆς ἀέρα ἀναστέλλοντος συμμέτρως πάντοθεν – εἰς τὸ περιφερὲς τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ παχυμερὲς περιστῆσαι

or [*a halo is produced*] also with [*the air*] holding back the air all around the [*moon*] symmetrically from every side – so as to set around what is rounded around the [moon] and thick-in-parts

[Bailey] or else when it checks the air round the moon uniformly on all sides so as to make that which encircles it round and thick in texture.

(Ὅ γίνεται κατὰ μέρη τινὰ – ἤτοι ἔξωθεν βιασαμένου τινὸς ῥεύματος – ἢ τῆς θερμασίας ἐπιτηδείων πόρων ἐπιλαμβανομένης: εἰς τὸ τοῦτο ἀπεργάσασθαι)

(which is produced in certain parts – either with some flow from an external source having forced [*the air*] – or with the heat seizing upon suitable passageways so as to accomplish this)

[Bailey] This comes to pass in different parts either because some current outside forces the air or because heat blocks the passages in such a way as to produce this effect.

πέριξ	all around	ΠΕΡΙΞ *around*
ὁ ἀήρ (τοῦ ἀέρος)	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
ἀναστέλλειν	to hold back	ΑΝΑΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready up/back*
ἀναστέλλων	holding back	
σύνμετρος = σύμμετρος (ον)	symmetric [in proportion]	ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ *measure together*
συμμέτρως	symmetrically	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΩΣ
πάντοθεν	from everywhere [here, "from every side"]	ΠΑΝΤΟΘΕΝ *from all*
περιφερής (ές)	rounded	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΗΣ *bringing around*

παχύς (εῖα, ύ)	thick	ΠΑΧΥΣ packed / dense
λεπτομερής (ές)	of a subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ fine/thin part
παχυμερής (ές)	thick in parts	ΠΑΧΥΜΕΡΗΣ packed / dense part
περιστάναι	to place/set around	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ standing together
περιστῆσαι	to place/set around [already]	
	Part 2	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ part
ἤτοι	either	ΗΤΟΙ or you
τὸ ἔξωθεν τὰ ἔξωθεν	an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ from outside
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ from outside
βιάζειν	to force	ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ violence
βιασάμενος (η, ον)	having forced	ΒΙΑΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ violence
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ result of flowing
ἡ θερμασία αἱ θερμασίαι	heat	ΘΕΡΜΑΣΙΑ state of warm
ἐπιτήδειος (α, ον)	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ towards this here
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ piercing
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping
ἐπιλαμβάνειν	to seize upon	ΕΠΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping upon
ἐπιλαμβανόμενος	seizing upon	ΕΠΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ grasping upon
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ work
ἐργαστικός (ή, όν)	productive	ΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of work
ἀπεργάζειν	to accomplish	ΑΠΕΡΓΑΖΕΙΝ work off (to completion)

111b. Comets – from Fire and Movement

Κομῆται-ἀστέρες γίνονται ἤτοι πυρὸς ἐν τόποις τισὶ διὰ χρόνων τινῶν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις (συντρεφομένου περιστάσεως) γινομένης

Comets-stars are produced either with fire arising in certain locations over a certain time in the meteorological region (with the circumstance being nurtured together)

[Bailey] Comets occur either when fire is collected together in certain regions at certain intervals of time in the upper air because some gathering of matter takes place,

ἢ ἰδίαν τινὰ κίνησιν διὰ χρόνων τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἴσχοντος ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς – ὥστε τὰ τοιαῦτα Ἄστρα ἀναφανῆναι

or with the sky over us retaining a particular movement through time – so that such celestial bodies are displayed

[Bailey] or when at certain intervals the heaven above us has some peculiar movement, so that stars of this nature are revealed, or

ὁ κομήτης οἱ κομῆται	comet	ΚΟΜΗΤΗΣ *agent of hair*
ὁ ἀστήρ οἱ ἀστέρες	star	ΑΣΤΗΡ *star*
ὁ κομήτης ἀστήρ οἱ κομῆται ἀστέρες	comet-star	
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἤτοι	either	ΗΤΟΙ *or you*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
μετέωρος *(ον)*	meteorological	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΣ *rising beyond*
συντρέφειν	to nurture together	ΣΥΝΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *raising together*
συντρεφόμενος *(η, ον)*	being nurtured together	ΣΥΝΤΡΕΦΟΜΕΝΟΣ *raising together*
ἡ περίστασις αἱ περιστάσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing around*
	Part 2	
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
ὁ οὐρανός οἱ οὐρανοί	sky	ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ *heaven*
ἴσχειν	to retain	ΙΣΧΕΙΝ *keeping back*
ἴσχων	retaining	ΙΣΧΩΝ *keeping back*
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
ἀναφαίνειν	to display	ΑΝΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining out*

111c. Comets – Appearance & Disappearance

ἢ Αὐτὰ ἐν χρόνοις τισὶν ὁρμῆσαι διά τινα περίστασιν – καὶ εἰς τοὺς καθ’ ἡμᾶς τόπους ἐλθεῖν: καὶ ἐκφανῆ γενέσθαι

or that those [*comets*] themselves at certain times rush forth due to some circumstance – and come into our regions: and become manifest

[Bailey] when they themselves at certain seasons start to move on account of some gathering of matter and come into the regions within our ken and appear visible.

τήν τε ἀφάνισιν τούτων γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας ταύταις αἰτίας

and [*one must understand that*] the disappearance of these occurs contrary to the causes opposed to these

[Bailey] And their disappearance occurs owing to the opposite causes to these.

ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁρμᾶν	to rush	‘ΟΡΜΑΝ *setting in motion*

ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἐλθεῖν	to come / go [once, completed]	ΕΛΘΕΙΝ *moved*
ἀφανής *(ές)*	invisible	ΑΦΑΝΗΣ *not appearing*
ἐμφανής *(ές)*	revealed	ΕΜΦΑΝΗΣ *shining in*
ἐκφανής	manifest	ΕΚΦΑΝΗΣ *appearing out*
	Part 2	
ἀφανής *(ές)*	invisible	ΑΦΑΝΗΣ *not appearing*
ἡ ἀφάνισις αἱ ἀφανίσεις	disappearance	ΑΦΑΝΙΣΙΣ *process of not appearing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced [here, "occurs"]	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated against*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*

112a. Circumpolar Stars – from Stationary Sky or Rotation of Air

Epicurus alludes to Homer's formulaic description (which is present in both the Iliad and the Odyssey) of the Great Bear constellation "turning in its place."

In the Iliad, the passage is describing the artwork that Hephaistos forged on the shield of Achilles:

Il. 18.483 **ἐν μὲν γαῖαν Ἔτευξ', ἐν δ' οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν,**
and He fashioned the earth upon it, and upon it the sky, and upon it the sea

ἠέλιόν τ' ἀκάμαντα – σελήνην τε πλήθουσαν,
and the tireless sun – and the moon at full,

ἐν δὲ τὰ τείρεα πάντα (τά τ' Οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται)
and upon it all the constellations (with which the Sky is crowned)

Πληϊάδας θ' Ὑάδας τε τό τε σθένος Ὠρίωνος
And the Pleiades, and the Hyades, and the strength of Orion,

Ἄρκτόν θ' (ἣν καὶ 'Ἄμαξαν' ἐπίκλησιν Καλέουσιν –
and the Bear (which they also call by the name 'the Wagon'–

ἥ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καί τ' Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει,
which turns in its place and watches Orion,

οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο)
and alone is without a share of the baths of Ocean)

In the Odyssey, the passage is describing Odysseus setting sail – after Zeus, through Hermes, commanded Calypso to release him:

Od. 5.269 γηθόσυνος δ' οὔρῳ – πέτασ' ἱστία δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.
Glad at the fair wind – godlike Odysseus spread the sails.

αὐτὰρ, ὁ πηδαλίῳ ἰθύνετο – τεχνηέντως
and then, he steered with the rudder – skillfully

ἥμενος, οὐδέ οἱ Ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔπιπτεν
Sitting there, nor for him did Sleep fall upon the eyelids,

Πληιάδας τ' ἐσορῶντι – καὶ ὀψὲ δύοντα Βοώτην
as he watched the Pleiades – and late setting Boötes

Ἄρκτόν θ' (ἣν καὶ 'Ἅμαξαν' ἐπίκλησιν Καλέουσιν –
and the Bear (which they also call by the name 'the Wagon'–

ἥ τ' αὐτοῦ στρέφεται καί τ' Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει,
which turns in its place and watches Orion,

οἴη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο)
and alone is without a share of the baths of Ocean)

τινὰ Ἄστρα "στρέφεται αὐτοῦ" – Ὃ συμβαίνει οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου ἑστάναι, περὶ ὃ τὸ λοιπὸν στρέφεται (καθάπερ Τινές φασιν) ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ δίνην ἀέρος ἔγκυκλον αὐτοῖς περιεστάναι – Ἣ κωλυτικὴ γίνεται τοῦ περιπολεῖν (ὡς καὶ τὰ Ἄλλα)

Some celestial bodies "turn in their place" – which continues not only because this part of the cosmos standing, around which the rest turns (just as some assert) ¬ but also because a circular rotation of air has stood around them – which becomes preventive of [*their*] wandering around (like the other [*stars*])

[Bailey] Some stars 'revolve in their place' (as Homer says), which comes to pass not only because this part of the world is stationary and round it the rest revolves, as some say, but also because a whirl of air is formed in a ring round it, which prevents their moving about as do the other stars:

τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *thoroughly turning*
ἡ συστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	assemblage	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ *turning together*
ἡ στροφή αἱ στροφαί	twisting	ΣΤΡΟΦΗ *turning*
στρέφειν	to turn [of celestial bodies, "to revolve"]	ΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *turning*
αὐτοῦ	in its place / in their place	
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to continue"]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
μόνος (η, ον)	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
ἱστάναι	to stand	ἹΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing*
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [here, "the other"]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*

φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
ὁ δῖνος οἱ δῖνοι	whirl	ΔΙΝΟΣ *vortex*
ἡ δίνησις αἱ δινήσεις	a whirling	ΔΙΝΗΣΙΣ *process of vortex*
ἡ δίνη αἱ δίναι	rotation	ΔΙΝΗ *vortex*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
ἡ κύκησις αἱ κυκήσεις	agitation [*of confusion*]	ΚΥΚΗΣΙΣ *process of circular*
τὸ ἐγκύκλιον τὰ ἐγκύκλια	general [affairs]	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΝ *pertaining to in circular*
ἐγκύκλιος *(α, ον)*	general	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΣ *pertaining to in circular*
ἔγκυκλος *(ον)*	circular	ΕΓΚΥΚΛΟΣ *in circular*
περιιστάναι	to transfer around [here, "to stand around"]	ΠΕΡΙΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing around*
κωλύειν	to prevent	ΚΩΛΥΕΙΝ *preventing*
κωλυτικός *(ή, όν)*	preventive	ΚΩΛΥΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of preventing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πολεῖν	to wander	ΠΟΛΕΙΝ *go about / haunt*
περιπολεῖν	to wander around	ΠΕΡΙΠΟΛΕΙΝ *go about / haunt around*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*

112b. Circumpolar Stars – from the Location of Fuel

ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἑξῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ὕλην ἐπιτηδείαν μὴ εἶναι ¬ ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ, ἐν ᾧ κείμενα θεωρεῖται

or also in the succeeding [*location*] suitable material does not exist for those [*circumpolar stars*] ¬ but [*suitable material does exist*] in this location, in which they are observed to be situated

[Bailey] or else it is because there is not a succession of appropriate fuel for them, but only in this place in which they are seen fixed.

καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ πλείονας τρόπους Τοῦτο δυνατὸν συντελεῖσθαι – ἐάν Τις δύνηται τὸ σύμφωνον τοῖς φαινομένοις συλλογίζεσθαι

and by multiple other ways this is able to be altogether fulfilled – if someone is able to infer what is in harmony with the things that are apparent

[Bailey] And there are many other ways in which this may be brought about, if one is able to infer what is in agreement with phenomena.

ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ *possessing*
τὸ ἑξῆς τὰ ἑξῆς	what is in succession [here, "the succeeding location"]	

ἡ ὕλη αἱ ὕλαι	material	ὙΛΗ *forest, wood ›* *raw material ›* *matter*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *towards this here*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
κείμενος *(η, ον)*	situated / lying	ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
	Part 2	
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "multiple"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
συντελεῖσθαι	to be altogether fulfilled	
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
σύμφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking together*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *reasoning action together*

112c-3a. Circumpolar vs. Non-Circumpolar Rotations

Τινὰ τῶν ἄστρων πλανᾶσθαι (εἰ οὕτω, ταῖς κινήσεσι χρώμενα, συμβαίνει), Τινὰ δὲ μὴ [κινεῖσθαι] Ἐνδέχεται:

that some of the celestial bodies wander (if they continue in this way, using these movements), but some do not wander, is possible:

[Bailey] That some of the stars should wander in their course, if indeed it is the case that their movements are such,while others do not move in this manner,

μὲν καὶ παρὰ τὸ κύκλῳ κινούμενα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω κατηναγκάσθαι – ὥστε Τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δίνην φέρεσθαι, ὁμαλὴν οὖσαν ¬ Τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἅμα τισὶν ἀνομαλίαις χρωμένην

and even apart from the [*fact of their*] moving in a circle, [*it is possible for celestial bodies*] to have been forced in such a way from the beginning – so that some are carried by the same rotation that exists as even ¬ while others [*are carried*] by a [*rotation*] working together with certain unevennesses

[Bailey] may be due to the reason that from the first as they moved in their circles they were so constrained by necessity that some of them move along the same regular orbit, and others along one which is associated with certain irregularities:

τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ *roaming*
πλανᾶν	to wander	ΠΛΑΝΑΝ *roaming*

ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *necessary*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to continue"]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
κινεῖσθαι	to be moved	ΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
	Part 2	
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
κινούμενος *(η, ον)*	being moved	ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *moving*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ *necessary*
καταναγκάζειν	to force back	ΚΑΤΑΝΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ *necessary against*
ἡ δίνη αἱ δίναι	rotation	ΔΙΝΗ *vortex*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	regular	ὉΜΑΛΟΣ *same* *floor / ground*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
ἡ ἀνωμαλία αἱ ἀνωμαλίαι	unevenness	ΑΝΩΜΑΛΙΑ *not same* *floor / ground*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using [here, "working"]	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *necessary*

113b. Even and Uneven Tracks of Air

Ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ, καθ' οὓς τόπους φέρεται οὗ μὲν Παρεκτάσεις ἀέρος εἶναι ὁμαλεῖς (ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνωθούσας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ὁμαλῶς τε ἐκκαούσας) ¬ οὗ δὲ ἀνωμαλεῖς οὕτως – ὥστε τὰς θεωρουμένας Παραλλαγὰς συντελεῖσθαι

It is possible also, in the locations through which [*a celestial body*] is carried, Tracks of air exist as even (with them compressing to the same point by burning out in succession evenly) ¬ but in other [*locations, the tracks are*] uneven in this way – so that the observed Varieties are produced

[Bailey] or it may be that among the regions to which they are carried in some places there are regular tracts of air which urge them on successively in the same direction and provide flame for them regularly, while in other places the tracts are irregular, so that the aberrations which we observe result.

ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
τείνειν	to extend	ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ *extending*
ἡ παρεκτασις αἱ παρεκτάσεις	track	ΠΑΡΕΚΤΑΣΙΣ *process of* *extending out* *beside*

ἡ ὑπερείσις αἱ ὑπερείσεις	projection	ὙΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ *going beyond*
ἡ διάστασις αἱ διαστάσεις	expansion	ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing across*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *air*
ὁμαλός *(ή, όν)*	even	ὉΜΑΛΟΣ *same* *floor / ground*
ἡ συνώσις αἱ συνώσεις	compression	ΣΥΝΩΣΙΣ *pushing together*
συνωθεῖν	to compress	ΣΥΝΩΘΕΙΝ *pushing together*
συνωθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	compressing	ΣΥΝΩΘΩΝ *pushing together*
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἝΞΗΣ *possessing*
ὁμαλῶς	evenly	ὉΜΑΛΩΣ *same* *floor / ground*
ἐκκαίειν	to burn out	ΕΚΚΑΙΕΙΝ *burning out*
ἐκκαύσας *(ασα, αν)*	burn out [already]	ΕΚΚΑΥΣΑΣ
ἡ ἀνωμαλία αἱ ἀνωμαλίαι	unevenness	ΑΝΩΜΑΛΙΑ *not same* *floor / ground*
ἀνώμαλος *(η, ον)*	uneven	ΑΝΩΜΑΛΟΣ *not same* *floor / ground*
οὕτως = οὕτω	thus / in this way	ὉΥΤΩΣ ὉΥΤΩ *in this way*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ *changing across*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill [here, "to produce"]	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing* *together*
συντελεῖσθαι	to be produced	

113c. Monocausal Madness & Pointless Astrology

τὸ δὲ μίαν αἰτίαν τούτων Ἀποδιδόναι, πλεοναχῶς τῶν φαινομένων ἐκκαλουμένων, μανικὸν – καὶ οὐ καθηκόντως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ματαίαν ἀστρολογίαν ἐζηλωκότων καὶ εἰς τὸ κενὸν αἰτίας τινῶν ἀποδιδόντων – ὅταν τὴν θείαν φύσιν μηθαμῇ λειτουργιῶν Ἀπολύωσι

but to demonstrate one cause of these things, with the phenomena being called out in several ways, is insane – and inappropriately being done by those who have admired pointless astrology and who demonstrate the causes of certain things into the void [*i.e., in vain*] – whenever they do not in any way release away the divine nature from administrating

[Bailey] But to assign a single cause for these occurrences, when phenomena demand several explanations, is madness, and is quite wrongly practiced by persons who are partisans of the foolish notions of astrology, by which they give futile explanations of the causes of certain occurrences, and all the time do not by any means free the divine nature from the burden of responsibilities.

εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ΈΙΣ ΜΙΑ ΈΝ** *one*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**ΌΥΤΟΣ** *this*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	**ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ** *more multiplicity*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἐκκαλεῖν	to call out	**ΕΚΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning out*
ἐκκαλούμενος *(η, ον)*	calling out	**ΕΚΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *summoning out*
ὁ μάντις **οἱ μάντεις**	prophet	**ΜΑΝΤΙΣ** *oracle*
μαντικός *(ή, όν)*	prophetic	**ΜΑΝΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of an oracle*
μανικός *(ή, όν)*	insane	**ΜΑΝΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of madness*
καθήκειν	to be appropriate	**ΚΑΘΗΚΕΙΝ** *having come according to*
καθηκόντως	appropriately	**ΚΑΘΗΚΟΝΤΩΣ** *having come according to*
οὐ καθηκόντως	inappropriately	
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
πραττόμενος *(η, ον)*	being accomplished [here, "being done"]	**ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *doing / affair*
ματαίως	pointlessly	**ΜΑΤΑΙΩΣ** *folly*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	**ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ** *folly*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ ἀστρολόγος **οἱ ἀστρολόγοι**	astrologer	**ΑΣΤΡΟΛΟΓΟΣ** *star reasoning*
ἡ ἀστρολογία **αἱ ἀστρολογίαι**	astrology	**ΑΣΤΡΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *star reasoning*
ζηλοῦν	to admire	**ΖΗΛΟΥΝ** *envying*
ἐζηλωκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having admired	**ΕΖΗΛΩΚΩΣ** *envying*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
εἰς τὸ κενὸν	in vain	
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
ἀποδιδούς *(οῦσα, όν)* **ἀποδιδόντες**	demonstrating	
θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	**ΘΕΙΟΣ** *[divine entity]*

ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
μηδαμῇ μηθαμῇ	not in any way	ΜΗΔΑΜΗ ΜΗΘΑΜΗ *but not one*
λειτουργεῖν	to administrate [to serve the state]	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΕΙΝ *council-room worker*
ἀλειτούργητος *(ον)*	free from administration	ΑΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΗΤΟΣ *not council-room worker*
ἡ λειτουργία αἱ λειτουργίαι	administrating	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΑ *council-room worker*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening away*

114a. Orbital Mechanics – Speed, Direction, & Distance

τινὰ ἄστρα ὑπολειπόμενά τινων θεωρεῖσθαι Συμβαίνει – καὶ παρὰ τὸ βραδύτερον συμπεριφέρεσθαι (τὸν αὐτὸν κύκλον περιιόντα)

It continues to be observed that certain celestial bodies remain behind others – either because of being carried around together more slowly (although around the same sphere)

[Bailey] That some stars should be seen to be left behind by others is caused because though they move round in the same orbit they are carried along more slowly,

[Hicks] That certain stars are seen to be left behind by others may be because they travel more slowly, though they go the same round as the others;

καὶ παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἐναντίαν κινεῖσθαι (ἀντισπώμενα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δίνης)

or [*some stars remain behind others*] because of being moved in the opposing motion (while being pulled against by the same rotation)

[Bailey] and also because they really move in the opposite direction though they are dragged back by the same revolution;

[Hicks] or it may be that they are drawn back by the same whirling motion and move in the opposite direction;

καὶ παρὰ τὸ περιφέρεσθαι – Τὰ μὲν διὰ πλείονος τόπου, τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἐλάττονος (τὴν αὐτὴν δῖναν περικυκλοῦντα)

or [*some stars remain behind others*] because of being carred around – with some [*stars being carried*] through larger locations but other [*stars being carried*] through smaller [*locations*] (while they [*all*] encircle the same rotation)

[Bailey] also because some are carried round through a greater space and some through a lesser, though all perform the same revolution.

[Hicks] or again it may be that some travel over a larger and others over a smaller space in making the same revolution.

τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	celestial body	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ *star*
ὑπολειπόμενος *(η, ον)*	remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ *leave under*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be observed	
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to continue"]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*

βραδύς (εῖα, ύ)	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ *slow*
βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
βραδύτερον	more slowly	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ *slower*
συμπεριφέρειν	to carry around together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together upon*
συμπεριφέρεσθαι	to be carried around together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing together upon*
περιάγειν	to revolve	ΠΕΡΙΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going around*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
προϊέναι προιέναι	to go forward	ΠΡΟΙΕΝΑΙ *going forward*
προϊών προιών (οῦσα, όν)	going forward	ΠΡΟΙΩΝ *going forward*
περιϊέναι περιιέναι	to go around	ΠΕΡΙΙΕΝΑΙ *going around*
περιϊών περιιών	going around	ΠΕΡΙΙΩΝ *going around*
	Part 2	
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *in against*
κινεῖσθαι	to be moved	ΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ὁ διασπασμός οἱ διασπασμοί	dispersal	ΔΙΑΣΠΑΣΜΟΣ *pulling through*
ἀντισπᾶν	to pull against	ΑΝΤΙΣΠΑΝ *pulling against*
ἀντισπώμενος (η, ον)	being pulled against	
ἡ δίνη αἱ δίναι	rotation	ΔΙΝΗ *vortex*
	Part 3	
περιφέρειν	to carry around	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together*
πλείων (ον)	more / greater [here, "larger"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἐλάττων (ων, ον)	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
περικυκλοῦν	to encircle	ΠΕΡΙΚΥΚΛΟΥΝ *circular around*
περικυκλῶν	encircling	ΠΕΡΙΚΥΚΛΩΝ

114b. The Charlatan's Shortcut

τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς Ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τούτων καθῆκόν ἐστι – τοῖς τερατεύεσθαί τι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς βουλομένοις

but the giving of an explanation in only one way regarding these things is appropriate – for those wanting to speak marvelously about something to the many

[Bailey] But to give a single explanation of these occurrences is only suitable to those who wish to make a show to the many.

ἁπλῶς	absolutely [here, "in only one way"]	ἉΠΛΩΣ *one fold*
ἀναφαίνειν	to display	ἈΝΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining out*
ἀποφαινόμενος (ομένη, όμενον)	representing	ἈΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining away*
ἀποφαίνειν	to represent	ἈΠΟΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining away*
ἀποφαίνεσθαι	[middle] to give an explanation	ἈΠΟΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *shining away*
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
καθήκειν	to be appropriate	ΚΑΘΗΚΕΙΝ *having come according to*
καθήκων (ουσα, ον)	appropriate	ΚΑΘΗΚΩΝ *having come according to*
τερατεύεσθαι	to speak marvelously about	ΤΕΡΑΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ *portent / marvel*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
βουλόμενος (η, ον)	wanting	ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ *council*

114c. Falling Stars – from Friction with Other Stars

οἱ λεγόμενοι "Ἀστέρες ἐκπίπτειν" καὶ παρὰ μέρος κατὰ παράτριψιν ἑαυτῶν δύνανται συντελεῖσθαι – καὶ παρὰ ἔκπτωσιν οὗ ἂν ᾗ Ἐκπνευμάτωσις γένηται (καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀστραπῶν Ἐλέγομεν)

what are called "falling stars" can be produced in part by their own friction – and by an emission wherever the exhalation is produced (just as we were saying in the case of lightning)

[Bailey] What are called falling stars may be produced in part by the rubbing of star against star, and by the falling out of the fragments wherever an outburst of wind occurs, as we explained in the case of lightning-flashes:

[Hicks] Falling stars, as they are called, may in some cases be due to the mutual friction of the stars themselves, in other cases to the expulsion of certain parts when that mixture of fire and air takes place which was mentioned when we were discussing lightning

[Young] Falling stars may be particles detached from the stars, or fragments resulting from their collision; they may also be produced by the fall of substances which are set on fire by the action of the wind;

λεγόμενος (η, ον)	being said	ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ *speaking*
ὁ ἀστήρ οἱ ἀστέρες	star	ἈΣΤΗΡ *star*
ἐκπίπτειν	to fall out	ἘΚΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling out*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἡ τρίψις αἱ τρίψεις	rubbing	ΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing*
ἡ παρατρίψις αἱ παρατρίψεις	friction	ΠΑΡΑΤΡΙΨΙΣ *rubbing beside*
τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη	cloud	ΝΕΦΟΣ *fog*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*

συντελεῖσθαι	to be altogether fulfilled [here, "to be produced"]	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *completing together*
ἡ ἔκπτωσις αἱ ἐκπτώσεις	emission	ΕΚΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling out*
οὗ	where	ὉΥ *where*
οὗ ἂν	wherever	ὉΥ ΑΝ *where ever*
πνευματικός *(ή, όν)*	windy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of result of breathing*
πνευματώδης *(ες)*	wind-like	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ *quality of result of breathing*
ἐκπνευματοῦν	to vent out [air]	ΕΚΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΥΝ *result of breathing out*
ἡ ἐκπνευμάτωσις αἱ ἐκπνευματώσεις	exhalation	ΕΚΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΣΙΣ *process of result of breathing out*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
ἡ ἀστραπή αἱ ἀστραπαί	lightning	ΑΣΤΡΑΠΗ *star viewing*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*

115a. Falling Stars – Gathering of Fire

καὶ κατὰ σύνοδον δὲ ἀτόμων πυρὸς ἀποτελεστικῶν – συμφυλίας γενομένης εἰς τὸ ταῦτα τελέσαι ¬ καὶ κατὰ κίνησιν οὗ ἂν ἡ Ὁρμὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον γένηται

and [*"falling stars" can be produced*] by a gathering of atoms productive of fire – with the similarity [*of their fiery material*] produced in fulfilling this [*phenomenon*] ¬ and by the movement [*of this material*], wherever the onset is produced from the beginning according to the gathering [*of atoms productive of fire*]

[Bailey] or else by the meeting of atoms productive of fire, when a gathering of kindred material occurs to cause this, and a movement in the direction of the impulse which results from the original meeting;

ἡ σύνοδος αἱ σύνοδοι	gathering	ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ *path together*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
ἡ συμφυλία αἱ συμφυλίαι	similarity	ΣΥΜΦΥΛΙΑ *race / tribe together*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *come into being*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
οὗ	where	ὉΥ *where*

οὗ ἄν	wherever	ὉΥ ΑΝ *where ever*
ὁρμᾶν	to rush	ὉΡΜΑΝ *setting in motion*
ἡ ὁρμή αἱ ὁρμαί	onset	ὉΡΜΗ *setting in motion*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*

115b. Falling Stars – Gathering and Ignition of Wind

καὶ κατὰ πνευμάτων δὲ συλλογὴν ἐν πυκνώμασίν τισιν ὁμιχλοειδέσι – καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν τούτων διὰ τὴν κατείλησιν:

and [*"falling stars" can be produced*] by a gathering of winds in certain fog-like concentrations – and by an ignition of these from their thorough rolling up:

εἶτ' ἐπέκρηξιν ‹ἐκ› τῶν περιεχόντων – καὶ ἐφ' ὃν ἂν τόπον ἡ Ὁρμὴ γένηται τῆς φορᾶς, εἰς τοῦτον φερομένων

then by an outburst from its surroundings – and to whatever location the Onset of the transmission is produced, with [*the winds*] being carried into this location

[Bailey] or else by a gathering of wind in certain dense and misty formations, and its ignition as it whirls round, and then its bursting out of what encloses it and its rush towards the spot to which the impulse of its flight tends.

καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ Τρόποι εἰς τοῦτο τελέσαι ἀμύθητοί εἰσιν

and there are other Ways to fulfill this that are non-mythological

[alternative] and the other Ways to fulfill this are beyond telling [*i.e., countless*]

[Bailey] And there are other ways in which this result may be brought about, quite free from superstition.

[Hicks] And there are other ways in which this can be brought about without recourse to myths

[Young] In short, this phenomenon also may admit a great number of explanations.

τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ συλλογή αἱ συλλογαί	a gathering	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΗ *collecting together*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
ὁμοειδής *(ές)*	appearing the same	ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ *appearing same*
ὁμιχλοειδής *(ές)*	fog-like	ΟΜΙΧΛΟΕΙΔΗΣ *fog-appearing*
ἡ ἐκπύρωσις αἱ ἐκπυρώσεις	ignition	ΕΚΠΥΡΩΣΙΣ *process of fire out*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ κατείλησις αἱ κατειλήσεις	a thorough rolling up	ΚΑΤΕΙΛΗΣΙΣ *process of thoroughly rolling up*
	Part 2	

ἡ ἐπέκρηξις αἱ ἐπεκρήξεις	outburst	ΕΠΕΚΡΗΞΙΣ *process of* *breaking out upon*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
περιέχειν	to surround	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΕΙΝ *holding around*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ *holding around*
τὸ περιέχων τὰ περιέχοντες	what surrounds [here, "the surrounding"]	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ *holding around*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἡ ὁρμή αἱ ὁρμαί	onset	ὉΡΜΗ *setting in motion*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
	Part 3	
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
ὁ μῦθος οἱ μῦθοι	myth	ΜΥΘΟΣ *speech / word*
ἀμύθητος *(ον)*	beyond telling / [or] non-mythological	ΑΜΥΘΗΤΟΣ *not speech / word*
An uncommon word, Demosthenes uses it with the meaning "unspeakably many" but it seems Epicurus is using it here with the sense of "non-mythological"		

115c-6a. Predictive Animal Behavior & Divine Providence

αἱ δ' Ἐπισημασίαι αἱ γινόμεναι ἐπί τισι ζῴοις κατὰ συγκύρημα γίνονται τοῦ καιροῦ – οὐ γὰρ τὰ Ζῷα ἀνάγκην τινὰ προσφέρεται τοῦ ἀποτελεσθῆναι χειμῶνα

the Indications [*of the change in weather*] that are produced by certain living beings are produced according to a coincidence of occurrence – for living beings do not bring forward any necessity for winter to be fully produced

[Bailey] The signs of the weather which are given by certain animals result from mere coincidence of occasion. For the animals do not exert any compulsion for winter to come to an end

οὐδὲ κάθηταί τις θεία Φύσις παρατηροῦσα τὰς τῶν ζῴων τούτων ἐξόδους – κἄπειτα τὰς ἐπισημασίας ταύτας ἐπιτελεῖ

nor is some divine nature situated while watching closely the departures of these living beings – and then bringing these indications [*of the change in weather*] to completion

[Bailey] nor is there some divine nature which sits and watches the outgoings of these animals and then fulfills the signs they give

οὐδὲ γὰρ ‹ἄν› εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ζῷον (κἂν ‹εἰ› "μικρὸν χαριέστερον εἴη") τοιαύτη Μωρία ἐμπέσοι ¬ μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον

for not into [*whatever*] animal happens to exist (even if "it is a little bit more graceful") would such Folly fall ¬ let alone into an [*animal*] having possessed absolutely complete wellbeing

[Bailey] *For not even the lowest animal, although 'a small thing gives the greater pleasure,' would be seized by such foolishness, much less one who was possessed of perfect happiness.*

[Hicks] For such folly as this would not possess the most ordinary being if ever so little enlightened, much less one who enjoys perfect felicity.

[Young] Nor can such folly as this occur to any being who is even moderately comfortable, much less to one which is possessed of perfect happiness.

[Bailey] Obviously an allusion to a proverb, *"the smaller the trifle, the greater the joy."*

Consider Menander's line from his **Γνῶμαι Μονόστιχοι** *(Single-line Maxims) DCLP 61311, line 1: "***Ὡς μέγα τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν, ἐν καιρῷ δοθέν***." How great a small thing is, when given at the right moment."*

σημαίνειν	to indicate	**ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *making indication*
τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
ἡ ἐπισημασία **αἱ ἐπισημασίαι**	indication	**ΕΠΙΣΗΜΑΣΙΑ** *indication upon*
this word is used in the plural with the meaning of "indications [of the change in weather]"		
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
κυρεῖν	to happen upon	**ΚΥΡΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἡ συγκύρησις **αἱ συγκυρήσεις**	concurrence	**ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *process of happening together*
τὸ συγκύρημα **τὰ συγκυρήματα**	coincidence	**ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΜΑ** *result of being happening together*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ καιρός **οἱ καιροί**	opportunity [here, "occurrence"]	**ΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *time*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing as well*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *completing out*
χειμάζειν	to distress	**ΧΕΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *winter storm*
ὁ χειμών **οἱ χειμῶνες**	winter	**ΧΕΙΜΩΝ** *winter storm*
	Part 2	
κάθησθαι	to be situated / seated	**ΚΑΘΗΣΘΑΙ** *thoroughly sat*
θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	**ΘΕΙΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	**ΤΗΡΕΙΝ** *protecting / watching*

παρατηρεῖν	to watch closely	ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting / watching beside*
παρατηρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	watching closely	ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΩΝ *protecting / watching beside*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ἡ σύνοδος αἱ σύνοδοι	gathering	ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ *path together*
ἡ ἔξοδος αἱ ἔξοδοι	departure	ΕΞΟΔΟΣ *path out*
κἄπειτα	then	ΚΑΠΕΙΤΑ *and after that*
τελεῖν	to fulfill [process-focused]	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
τελειοῦν	to complete [result-focused]	ΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΝ *completing*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing out*
ἐπιτελεῖν	to bring to completion	ΕΠΙΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing*
	Part 3	
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
τὸ τυχόν τὰ τυχόντα	what happens to come about	ΤΥΧΟΝ *happening*
τυχών	happening to be/exist	ΤΥΧΩΝ *happening*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
μεικρόν μικρόν	a little bit	
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
χαρίεις *(χαρίεσσα, χαρίεν)*	graceful	ΧΑΡΙΕΙΣ *being cheerful*
χαριέστερος *(α, ον)*	more graceful	ΧΑΡΙΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ *more being cheerful*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἡ μωρία αἱ μωρίαι	folly, foolishness	ΜΩΡΙΑ *dull / foolish*
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling in*
μὴ ὅτι	*[idiom meaning]* "let alone"	
παντελής *(ές)*	absolutely complete	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΗΣ *all completing*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτημένος *(η, ον)*	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*

116b. Step Out of Myth

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα, Πυθόκλεις, μνημόνευσον: κατὰ πολύ, τε γὰρ τοῦ μύθου ἐκβήσῃ – καὶ τὰ ὁμογενῆ τούτοις συνορᾶν δυνήσῃ

remember all these things, Pythocles: for, to a great extent, you will step out of myth – and you will be able to fully [*mentally*] see the things of the same kind as these

[Bailey] All these things, Pythocles, you must bear in mind; for thus you will escape in most things from superstition and will be enabled to understand what is akin to them.

Πυθοκλῆς	Pythocles	**ΠΥΘΟΚΛΗΣ** *Pythian glory* *i.e., Apollo's fame*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
ἀναβαίνειν	to ascend	**ΑΝΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking* *up against*
ἐκβαίνειν	to step out of	**ΕΚΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking out*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	**ὉΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ** *same born*
τὸ ὁμογενές **τὰ ὁμογενῆ**	what is of the same kind	
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*

116c. Infinity, Criteria, & Multiscale Analysis

μάλιστα δὲ σεαυτὸν ἀπόδος εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις θεωρίαν – ἔτι τε, κριτηρίων καὶ παθῶν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ταῦτα Ἐκλογιζόμεθα

especially give yourself over to the observation of beginnings and of infinity, and of the things akin to these – and further, of criteria and of experiences, and [of *the reasons*] for the sake of which we reason out these things

[Bailey] And most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them, and also of the criteria of truth and of the feelings, and of the purpose for which we reason out these things.

Ταῦτα, γὰρ, μάλιστα συνθεωρούμενα, ῥᾳδίως τὰς περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰτίας συνορᾶν ποιήσει

for, these things, especially when they are being mutually observed, will easily make [*you*] fully [*mentally*] see the causes about things for [*the details of*] each part

[Bailey] For these points when they are thoroughly studied will most easily enable you to understand the causes of the details.

μάλιστα	especially	**ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ** *very*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate [here, "to give over"]	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*

ἀπόδος	2nd person singular gnomic aorist active imperative "demonstrate"	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
ἡ ἀπειρία αἱ ἀπειρίαι	infinity	
συγγενής *(ές)*	akin	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ *born with*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of envisioning*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
ἕνεκα ἕνεκεν	for the sake of	ἙΝΕΚΑ ἙΝΕΚΕΝ
οὗ ἕνεκεν	*[idiom meaning]* [*a reason*] for the sake of which = "why"	
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *action of collecting*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐκλογίζεσθαι	to reason out	ΕΚΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning action out*
	Part 2	
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning together*
συνθεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	being mutually observed	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *envisioning together*
ῥᾳδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ *easily*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to gather"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*

116d. Motivation for Observation

Οἱ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ καταγαπήσαντες – ᾗ μάλιστα οὔτε ‹ἂν› αὐτὰ ταῦτα καλῶς συνθεωρήσαιεν ¬ οὔτε οὗ ἕνεκεν Δεῖ θεωρεῖν ταῦτα περιεποιήσαντο

but those [*people*] have not fully welcomed these things – especially insofar as they neither correctly have mutually observed these very things ¬ nor have they gathered around for themselves [*any reason*] for the sake of which it is necessary to observe these things

[Bailey] But those who have not thoroughly taken these things to heart could not rightly study them in themselves, nor have they made their own the reason for observing them.

καταγαπᾶν	to fully welcome	**ΚΑΤΑΓΑΠΑΝ** *thoroughly beloved / dear*
καταγαπήσας *(σασα, αν)*	having fully welcomed	**ΚΑΤΑΓΑΠΗΣΑΣ** *thoroughly beloved / dear*
ᾗ	insofar as	**ἉΙ** *in/for which*
μάλιστα	especially	**ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ** *very*
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning together*
ἕνεκα **ἕνεκεν**	for the sake of	**ἙΝΕΚΑ** **ἙΝΕΚΕΝ**
οὗ ἕνεκεν	[*idiom meaning*] [*a reason*] for the sake of which = "why"	
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made / to make for themselves	**ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *gathering*
περιποιεῖν	to gather around	**ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering around*
περιποιεῖσθαι	to gather around for themselves	**ΠΕΡΙΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *gathering around*

TO MENOECEUS

121c. Hello Menoeceus

Ἐπίκουρος Μενοικεῖ, Χαίρειν!

Epicurus to Menoeceus, Hello!

Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	**ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ** *running toward [to assist]*
μένειν	to remain	**ΜΕΝΕΙΝ** *staying*
οἰκεῖν	to inhabit	**ΟΙΚΕΙΝ** *the home*
Μενοικεύς	Menoeceus	**ΜΕΝΟΙΚΕΥΣ** *staying [steadfast at] home*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*

122a. Universal Exhortation to Philosophy

μήτε νέος Τις ὢν, μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν ¬ μήτε, γέρων ὑπάρχων, κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν

One should not, while young, delay to philosophize ¬ nor, when he is as an old man, grow weary while philosophizing

Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study.

οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος Οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον

for no one is too early nor too late for what is healthy concerning the soul

For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul.

ὁ νέος οἱ νέοι	young man	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
νέος *(α, ον)*	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ *loving knowledge*
φιλοσοφῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	philosophizing	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ *loving knowledge*
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ *old*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under*
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *beating against*
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *not beating against*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*
κοπιᾶν	to grow weary	ΚΟΠΙΑΝ *beating / toiling*
	Part 2	
ἡ ὥρα αἱ ὧραι	period of time	ὩΡΑ *the time / season*
ἄωρος *(ον)*	too early	ΑΩΡΟΣ *not the time / season*
πάρωρος *(ον)*	too late	ΠΑΡΩΡΟΣ *beyond the time / season*
οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ὑγιαίνειν	to be healthy	ὙΓΙΑΙΝΕΙΝ *making good life*
τὸ ὑγιαῖνον τὰ ὑγιαίνοντα	what is healthy	ὙΓΙΑΙΝΟΝ *making good life*

122b. Now is the Time for Philosophy and Wellbeing

Ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν Ὥραν ¬ ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν Ὥραν – ὅμοιός ἐστιν τῷ λέγοντι, πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν Ὥραν, ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι

but he who says either that the hour does not yet exist for philosophizing ¬ or that the hour has passed by – is similar to the one saying, in regards to wellbeing, that the hour is either not present, or no longer exists

And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away.

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
λέγων *(ουσα, ον)*	saying	ΛΕΓΩΝ *speaking*
μήπω	not yet	ΜΗΠΩ *not yet*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἡ ὥρα αἱ ὧραι	"hour" [used for any period of time]	ὪΡΑ *the time / season*
παρέρχεσθαι	to pass by	ΠΑΡΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving beyond*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
παρεῖναι	to be present	ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ *being beside*
μηκέτι	no longer	ΜΗΚΕΤΙ *not still*

122c. Philosophy for All Stages of Life

ὥστε, Φιλοσοφητέον – καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι:

therefore, it is necessary to philosophize – both for [*him while*] young and for [*him while*] while old:

τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων Νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων

for him while growing old so that he may at the same time be young in the good things through the grace of what has been produced

τῷ δὲ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων

and for him while young so that he may simultaneously also be ancient through the fearlessness of what is about to be

Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come.

φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ *loving knowledge*
φιλοσοφητέον	it is necessary to philosophize	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΤΕΟΝ *loving knowledge*
νέος *(α, ον)*	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ *old*
	Part 2	
ὅπως	so that	ὉΠΩΣ *in what way*
τῷ μὲν ὅπως… τῷ δὲ ὅπως…	so that for him… and that for him…	
γηράσκειν	to grow old	ΓΗΡΑΣΚΕΙΝ *growing old*
γηράσκων *(ουσα, ον)*	growing old	

ὁπωσδήποτε	in any way	ὉΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ *indefinite* *in what way*
	Part 3	
νέος (α, ον)	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
νεάζειν	to be young	
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
γεγονώς (υῖα, ός)	has been produced	ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ *came into being*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
παλαιός (ά, όν)	old / ancient	ΠΑΛΑΙΟΣ *long ago*
εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ *being*
ᾖ	3rd singular present subjunctive "it may be"	
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
φοβεῖν	to frighten	ΦΟΒΕΙΝ *fleeing*
ἡ ἀφοβία αἱ ἀφοβίαι	fearlessness	ΑΦΟΒΙΑ *not fleeing*
μέλλειν	to be about to do	ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ *going to*
μέλλων (οῦσα, ον)	being about to do	

122d. Wellbeing

μελετᾶν, οὖν, Χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν – εἴπερ, παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς, πάντα Ἔχομεν ¬ ἀπούσης, δὲ πάντα Πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν

It is necessary, then, to study the things that produce wellbeing – since indeed, with [*wellbeing*] present, we have everything ¬ but, with [*wellbeing*] absent, we accomplish everything in order to have it

We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it.

μελετᾶν	to study	ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ *caring*
χρή	it is necessary	ΧΡΗ *necessary*
ποιῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	making [here, "that produce"]	ΠΟΙΩΝ *gathering*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as* *thoroughly*
εἴπερ	since indeed	ΕΙΠΕΡ *just as if*
παρών (παρουσα, παρόν)	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ *to be beside*
ἀπών (ἄπουσα, ἄπον)	absent	ΑΠΩΝ
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*

ἃ δέ σοι συνεχῶς Παρήγγελλον – ταῦτα καὶ Πρᾶττε καὶ Μελέτα, στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταῦτ' εἶναι διαλαμβάνων

the things that I recommended continuously to you – Do these things and Study, while distinguishing them to be the components of living correctly

The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life.

συνεχῶς	continuously	**ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ** *holding together*
τὸ ἀγγεῖον **τὰ ἀγγεῖα**	vessel	**ΑΓΓΕΙΟΝ** *instrument of going / carrying*
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	**ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *sending a message across*
μελετᾶν	to study	**ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ** *caring*
τὸ στοιχείωμα **τὰ στοιχειώματα**	component [principle]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ** *result of a row (in a series)*
τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row (in a series)*
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping separation*
διαλαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	distinguishing	**ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping separation*

123b. Indestructibility & Blessedness of the Gods

πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν θεὸν ζῷον, ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων (ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ Νόησις ὑπεγράφη) μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ Πρόσαπτε

first, thinking of a god as a living being, indestructible and blessed (as the general Concept of god has been outlined) You should attribute to him nothing foreign to indestructibility nor incompatible with blessedness

πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν Δόξαζε

and You should judge everything of his as having the force to guard the blessedness around him that is accompanied by his indestructibility

First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men's minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality.

πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
θεῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	**ΘΕΙΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*

τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ἄφθαρτος *(ον)*	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ *not decaying*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ *greatness*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
νομίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	thinking	ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ *custom*
κοινός *(ή, όν)*	general	ΚΟΙΝΟΣ *common*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ἡ νόησις αἱ νοήσεις	concept	ΝΟΗΣΙΣ *seeing*
γράφειν	to compose	ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ *writing*
ἡ ὑπογραφή αἱ ὑπογραφαί	example	ὙΠΟΓΡΑΦΗ *writing under* *(i.e, to copy)*
ὑπογράφειν	to outline	ὙΠΟΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ *writing under*
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ *not destroyed*
ἡ ἀλλοφυλία αἱ ἀλλοφυλίαι	foreign matter	ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΙΑ *other race / tribe*
ἀλλότριος *(ία, ιον)*	foreign	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ *different other*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *greatness*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *appropriate*
οἰκείως	compatibly	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ *appropriate*
ἡ οἰκειότης αἱ οἰκειότητες	compatibility	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΣ *appropriate*
ἡ οἰκειότετα αἱ οἰκειότεται	greater compatibility	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΕΡΑΤΑ *more appropriate*
ἀνοίκειος	incompatible	ΑΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *not appropriate*
ἡ ἀφή αἱ ἀφαί	touch	ἉΦΗ *fastening*
ἅπτειν	to touch	ἉΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening*
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening together*
προσάπτειν	to attribute	ΠΡΟΣΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening toward*
	Part 2	
ἡ φυλακή αἱ φυλακαί	guarding	ΦΥΛΑΚΗ *watching*
φυλάττειν	to guard	ΦΥΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ *watching*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ *power*
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ *not destroyed*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *greatness*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*

Θεοὶ, μὲν γὰρ, εἰσίν: ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ Γνῶσις·

Gods, indeed, exist: for our Knowledge of them is detectible

οἵους δ' αὐτοὺς ‹οἱ› Πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ Εἰσίν – οὐ γὰρ Φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νοοῦσιν

but such as the many think them [*to be*], they are not – for [*people*] do not keep [*their idea of*] the [*gods*] such as they conceive [*them*]

For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be.

ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
τὸ ἐνάργημα **τὰ ἐναργήματα**	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ** *within clear*
ἡ γνῶσις **αἱ γνώσεις**	knowledge	**ΓΝΩΣΙΣ** *distinguishing*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	**ΟἿΟΣ** *of this sort*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
φυλάττειν	to guard [here, "to keep"]	**ΦΥΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *watching*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
νοοῦσιν	3rd person plural present indicative active "they conceive"	

123d. Impiety

ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ¬ ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων

impious is not he who confutes the gods of the many ¬ but he who attributes the judgments of the many to the gods

and the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many.

ὁ σεβασμός **οἱ σεβασμοί**	veneration	**ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΣ** *result of revering*
ἀσεβής *(ές)*	impious	**ΑΣΕΒΗΣ** *not revering*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	**ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping back*
ἀναιρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	confuting	**ΑΝΑΙΡΩΝ** *grasping back*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
προσάπτειν	to attribute	**ΠΡΟΣΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening toward*

προσάπτων	attributing	ΠΡΟΣΑΠΤΩΝ *fastening toward*

124a. Anticipations and Benefits of the Gods

οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ’ ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν Ἀποφάσεις

for the Assertions of the many about the gods are not anticipations but false suppositions

ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται Βλάβαι [τοῖς κακοῖς] ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ Ὠφέλειαι [τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς]

according to which [*denials*] the greatest Harms [*to the bad*] and Benefits [*to the good*] are brought in from the gods

For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods.

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold under*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ *deceiving*
ἡ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀποφάσεις	assertion	ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ *affirming out*
	Part 2	
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*
ἔνθεν	according to which	ΕΝΘΕΝ *from in*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
ἡ βλάβη αἱ βλάβαι	harm	ΒΛΑΒΗ *hindering*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ *going on/over*
ἡ ὠφέλεια αἱ ὠφέλειαι	benefit	ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ *helping*

124b. Kinship of Virtue

ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται – πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες

for, by making themselves accustomed always to their particular virtues, they accept the similar – while thinking everything not such as this as foreign

for men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ *appropriate together*

οικειοῦν	to be accustomed	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ *appropriate*
οἰκειούμενος	making themselves accustomed	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *appropriate*
διὰ παντὸς	always	
ἡ ἀρετή αἱ ἀρεταί	virtue	ΑΡΕΤΗ *excellence*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
ἀποδέχεσθαι	to accept	ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting from away*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ἀλλότριος *(ία, ιον)*	foreign	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ *different other*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
νομίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	thinking	ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ *custom*

124c. Death is Nothing

Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον

You should grow accustomed in the thinking that death is nothing to us

ἐπεὶ πᾶν Ἀγαθὸν καὶ Κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει ¬ στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ Θάνατος

since every good and bad is in sensation ¬ but the deprivation of sensation is Death

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation.

τὸ ἔθος τὰ ἔθη	custom	ΕΘΟΣ *accustomed*
ἐθίζειν	to accustom	ΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action*
συνεθίζειν	to grow accustomed	ΣΥΝΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action together*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
μηθείς = μηδείς *(μηδεμία, μηδέν)*	no one [modal]	ΜΗΔΕΙΣ *not one*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
στερούμενος *(η, ον)*	deprived	ΣΤΕΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *deprived*
ἡ στέρησις αἱ στερήσεις	deprivation	ΣΤΕΡΗΣΙΣ *deprived*

ὅθεν, Γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν:

therefore, the right knowledge of death being nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable:

οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον ¬ ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον

not by adding infinite time ¬ but by removing the longing for immortality

And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality.

ἔνθεν	according to which	ΕΝΘΕΝ *from in*
ὅθεν	therefore	ὍΘΕΝ *from which*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ *distinguishing*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	ΟΡΘΟΣ *straight upright*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ἀπολαύειν	to enjoy +gen	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΕΙΝ *profiting from*
ἡ ἀπόλαυσις αἱ ἀπολαύσεις	enjoyment	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ *process of* *profiting from*
ἀπολαυστός *(ή, όν)*	enjoyable	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΤΟΣ *profiting from*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to gather"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ἡ ζωή αἱ ζωαί	living	ΖΩΗ *animal*
θνητός *(ή, όν)*	mortal	ΘΝΗΤΟΣ *died*
	Part 2	
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
προστιθέναι	to add	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing toward*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ἡ ἀθανασία αἱ ἀθανασίαι	immortality	ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑ *state of* *not dying*
ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping away*
ἀφελόμενος *(η, ον)*	removing	ΑΦΕΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ ὄρεξις αἱ ὀρέξεις	impulse	ΟΡΕΞΙΣ *impulse*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ὁ πόθος οἱ πόθοι	longing	ΠΟΘΟΣ *yearning*

125a. Nothing is Terrible

Οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατειληφότι γνησίως τὸ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν

Nothing is terrible in living for the one who has genuinely comprehended that nothing exists as terrible in not living

For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living.

οὐθείς = **οὐδείς** (*οὐδεμία, οὐδέν*)	no one [factual]	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
οὐδέν	in no way	**ΟΥΔΕΝ** *not even one*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
δεινός (*ή, όν*)	terrible	**ΔΕΙΝΟΣ** *terrifying*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *thoroughly grasping*
γνήσιος (*α, ον*)	genuine	**ΓΝΗΣΙΟΣ** *belonging to one's race* *(i.e. legitimate)*
γνησίως	genuinely	
μηθείς = **μηδείς** (*μηδεμία, μηδέν*)	no one [modal]	**ΜΗΔΕΙΣ** *not one*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ΎΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*

125b. Anticipatory Anxiety's Pointlessness

ὥστε, μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον – οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών ¬ ἀλλ' ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων

therefore, he is pointless who says that he is terrified of death – not because it will distress while present ¬ but because it distresses while impending

Ὃ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ – προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ

for what is not disturbing when present – distresses in vain while being expected

So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it comes is but an empty pain in anticipation.

μάταιος (*α, ον*)	pointless	**ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ** *folly*
λέγων (*ουσα, ον*)	saying	**ΛΕΓΩΝ** *speaking*
δεδιέναι	to be terrified	**ΔΕΔΙΕΝΑΙ** *terror*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
λυπεῖν	to distress	**ΛΥΠΕΙΝ** *vexation*
παρών (*παρουσα, παρόν*)	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
μέλλειν	to be about to do [here, "to be impending"]	**ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *going to*
	Part 2	

ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ *in a crowd of people*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ *seeming toward*
προσδοκώμενος *(η, ον)*	being expected	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΩΜΕΝΟΣ *seeming toward*
κενῶς	in vain	ΚΕΝΩΣ *emptiness*

125c. The Mutual-Exclusion Principle

τὸ φρικωδέστατον, οὖν, τῶν κακῶν – ὁ Θάνατος – οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς:

thus, what is most horrifying of the bad things – Death – is nothing to us:

ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν Ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ Θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν ¬ ὅταν δὲ ὁ Θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ' Ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν

precisely because whenever we exist, death is not present ¬ but whenever death is present, then we do not exist

οὔτε, οὖν, πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντάς, ἐστιν ¬ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας: ἐπειδήπερ, περὶ οὓς μὲν, οὐκ ἔστιν – οἳ δ' οὐκέτι εἰσίν

neither, therefore, with respect to the living, does [*death*] exist ¬ nor with respect to the dead: precisely because, as to the former, it does not exist – and the latter no longer exist

So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.

φρικώδης *(φρικῶδες)*	horrifying	ΦΡΙΚΩΔΗΣ *full of shudder / horror*
φρικωδέστερος *(α, ον)*	more horrifying	ΦΡΙΚΩΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ *more full of shudder / horror*
φρικωδέστατος *(η, ον)*	most horrifying	ΦΡΙΚΩΔΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ *most full of shudder / horror*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
	Part 2	
ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ *since indeed certainly*
ὅταν	whenever	ὉΤΑΝ *whenever*
παρεῖναι	to be present	ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ *being beside*
παρῇ	3rd person singular present subjunctive active	
τόθ' = τότε	at that time	ΤΟΤΕ *the then*
	Part 3	

ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ζῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	living	ΖΩΝ *animal*
ὁ ζῶν οἱ ζῶντες	he who is living	
τελευτᾶν	to die	ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΝ *terminating*
ὁ τελευτήσας οἱ τελευτήσαντες	he who died	ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΑΣ *terminating*
ὁ τετελευτηκώς οἱ τετελευτηκότες	he who has died	ΤΕΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΚΩΣ *having terminated*
ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ *since indeed* *certainly*
οὐκέτι	no longer	ΟΥΚΕΤΙ *not still*

125d. Popular Ambivalence toward Death

ἀλλ' οἱ Πολλοὶ τὸν θάνατον ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν φεύγουσιν ¬ ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς ἀνάπαυσιν τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν ‹κακῶν αἱροῦνται›

but the Many sometimes avoid death as the greatest of what is bad ¬ but sometimes they choose [it] as a respite from what is bad in living

But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the (evils) in life.

πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
ὁτὲ	sometimes	῾ΟΤΕ
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
τὸ κακόν τὰ κακά	what is bad	ΚΑΚΟΝ *harmful*
φεύγειν	to avoid	ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ *fleeing*
ἡ ἀνάπαυσις αἱ ἀναπάυσεις	respite	ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΣ *ceasing up again*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	῾ΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*

126a. The Twin Victory of the Wise

‹ὁ δὲ Σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν› – οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ-ζῆν:

but the wise man neither excuses himself from living – nor fears not-living:

οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται τὸ Ζῆν ¬ οὔτε δοξάζεται κακόν εἶναί τι τὸ Μὴ-ζῆν

for living neither offends him ¬ nor is not-living judged to be something bad

(But the wise man neither seeks to escape life) nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil.

ὁ σοφός	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*

παραιτεῖσθαι	to excuse oneself [from]	**ΠΑΡΑΙΤΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *responsibility beside*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
ἡ ἀφοβία **αἱ ἀφοβίαι**	fearlessness	**ΑΦΟΒΙΑ** *not fleeing*
φοβεῖν	to frighten	**ΦΟΒΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
φοβεῖσθαι	to fear	**ΦΟΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *fleeing*
	Part 2	
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
ἀποκαθιστάναι	to reinstate	**ΑΠΟΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing back*
προσιστάσθαι	to offend	**ΠΡΟΣΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing toward*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*

126b. Harvesting Quality over Quantity

ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σιτίον οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον πάντως, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον, αἱρεῖται – οὕτω καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον, καρπίζεται

just as [*the wise man*] chooses for himself food not that is absolutely the most, but the most pleasant – thus also the time that he harvests for himself is not the longest, but the most pleasant

And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	**ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ** *since indeed certainly*
ὥσπερ	just as	**ὩΣΠΕΡ** *certainly as*
τὸ σιτίον **τὰ σιτία**	food	**ΣΙΤΙΟΝ** *grain / provisions*
πλεῖστος (η, ον)	the greatest [the most]	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most*
πάντως	absolutely / in every way	**ΠΑΝΤΩΣ** *all*
ἥδιον	more pleasantly	**ἩΔΙΟΝ** *more sweet*
ἥδιστα	most pleasantly	**ἩΔΙΣΤΑ** *most sweet*
ἥδιστος (η, ον)	most pleasant	**ἩΔΙΣΤΟΣ** *most sweet*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
αἱρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	**ἉΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *taking*
οὕτως = **οὕτω**	thus / in this way	**ὉΥΤΩΣ** **ὉΥΤΩ** *in this way*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** [seizing]
τό μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *length*

μήκιστος (η, ον)	the longest, of greatest length	ΜΗΚΙΣΤΟΣ *most length*
ὁ καρπός οἱ καρποί	fruit	ΚΑΡΠΟΣ *harvest*
καρπίζειν	to harvest	ΚΑΡΠΙΖΕΙΝ
καρπίζεσθαι	to harvest for oneself	ΚΑΡΠΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ

126c. Mimnermus' Foolish Division

ὁ δὲ Παραγγέλλων τὸν μὲν Νέον καλῶς ζῆν, τὸν δὲ Γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν, εὐήθης ἐστὶν:

but the one recommending the young to live correctly, and the old man to come to an end correctly, is naïve:

οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι μελέτην τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν

not only because living is welcome ¬ but also because living correctly and passing away correctly is the same study

Editors suggest the poet Mimnermus (Μίμνερμος, fl. c. 630 BCE)

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well.

τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὰ ἀγγεῖα	vessel	ΑΓΓΕΙΟΝ *instrument of going / carrying*
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΛΕΙΝ *sending a message across*
παραγγέλλων (ουσα, ουν)	recommending	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΛΩΝ *sending a message across*
νέος (α, ον)	young	ΝΕΟΣ *new*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *lovely*
ὁ γέρων οἱ γέροντες	old man	ΓΕΡΩΝ *old*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn [here, "to come to an end"]	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ *thoroughly turning*
εὐήθης	naïve	ΕΥΗΘΗΣ *good custom*
	Part 2	
μόνος (η, ον)	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ *single*
ἡ ζωή αἱ ζωαί	living	ΖΩΗ *animal*
ἀσπαστός (ή, όν)	welcome [i.e., wanted to be received]	ΑΣΠΑΣΤΟΣ *pulling*
ἡ μελέτη αἱ μελέται	study [i.e., practice / training]	ΜΕΛΕΤΗ *caring*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
ἀποθνήσκειν	to pass away	ΑΠΟΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ ΑΠΟΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ *died away*

126d. Theognis' Cynical Anti-Natalism

πολὺ δὲ χείρων καὶ ὁ Λέγων: καλὸν μὴ Φῦναι, "φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο Περῆσαι"

and much worse also is the one saying: it is proper not to be produced, "but having been produced, to have passed through the gates of Hades as quickly as possible"

Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but 'once born make haste to pass the gates of Death'.

Theognis of Megara, Elegies, lines 425-428:

Πάντων μὲν μὴ Φῦναι ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἄριστον
Of all things, for mortals upon the earth, to not be born is the best

μηδ' Ἐσιδεῖν αὐγὰς ὀξέος ἠελίου:
nor even to behold the rays of the sharp sun:

φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο Περῆσαι
but, having been produced, to have passed through the gates of Hades as quick as possible

καὶ Κεῖσθαι, πολλὴν γῆν ἐπαμησάμενον
and to lie there, the great earth heaped up over oneself

πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
χείρων *(ων, ον)*	worse	ΧΕΙΡΩΝ *[work done by]* *hand*
λέγων *(ουσα, ον)*	saying	ΛΕΓΩΝ *speaking*
καλός *(ή, όν)*	correct / beautiful [here, "proper"]	ΚΑΛΟΣ *lovely*
φῦναι	to produce [already]	ΦΥΝΑΙ *produced*
φυείς *(φυεῖσα, έν)*	produced [already]	ΦΥΕΙΣ
ὅπως	so that	ὉΠΩΣ *in what way*
ὠκύτατος *(ὠκυτάτη, ὠκύτατον)*	quickest	ΩΚΙΣΤΑ *quick*
ἡ πύλη αἱ πύλαι	gate	ΠΥΛΗ *door*
ὁ Ἅιδης *(τοῦ Ἀΐδαο)*	Hades	ἈΙΔΗΣ *not seen*
περῆσαι	to have passed through	ΠΕΡΗΣΑΙ *finished*

127a. Theognis' Bluff

εἰ, μὲν γὰρ, πεποιθὼς, τοῦτό Φησιν – πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν;

if, indeed, after having been persuaded, he asserts this – why does he not depart from living?

ἐν ἑτοίμῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ Τοῦτ' ἐστίν – εἴπερ ἦν βεβουλευμένον αὐτῷ βεβαίως

for this is at the ready for him – if indeed it had been decided by him affirmatively

εἰ δὲ μωκώμενος: μάταιος ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις

but if [*he is*] mocking: [*he is*] pointless among those not accepting [*his words*]

For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

πείθειν	to persuade	**ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ** *convincing*
πεποιθώς (*πεποιθυῖα, πεποιθός*)	having been persuaded	**ΠΕΠΟΙΘΩΣ** *convinced*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
ἀπέρχεσθαι	to depart	**ΑΠΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving away*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
	Part 2	
ἑτοιμάζειν	to make ready	**ἙΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing*
ἑτοῖμος (*ίμη, ῖμον*)	made ready	**ἙΤΟΙΜΟΣ** *preparing*
ἐν ἑτοίμῳ	at the ready	
εἴπερ	since indeed [here, "if indeed"]	**ΕΙΠΕΡ** *just as if*
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	**ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ** *wishing*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *wishing*
ἡ βουλή αἱ βουλαί	decision	**ΒΟΥΛΗ** *deliberating*
βουλεύειν	to decide	**ΒΟΥΛΕΥΕΙΝ** *deliberating*
βεβουλευμένος (*η, ον*)	had been decided	**ΒΕΒΟΥΛΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *deliberating*
βεβαιούμενος (*η, ον*)	being affirmed	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *firm standing*
βεβαίως	affirmatively	**ΒΕΒΑΙΩΣ** *firm standing*
	Part 3	
μωκᾶσθαι	to mock	**ΜΩΚΑΣΘΑΙ** *ridiculing*
μωκώμενος (*η, ον*)	mocking	**ΜΩΚΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *ridiculing*
μάταιος (*α, ον*)	pointless	**ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ** *folly*
ἀναδεχόμενος (*η, ον*)	taking upon [*itself*]	**ΑΝΑΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting back/again*
ἐνδεχόμενος (*η, ον*)	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
ἐπιδεχόμενος	accepting	**ΕΠΙΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting upon*

127b. Future Contingency

Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε πάντως ἡμέτερον – οὔτε πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον: ἵνα μήτε πάντως Προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον ¬ μήτε Ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον

One must remember that the future is neither absolutely ours – nor absolutely not ours: so that we neither absolutely keep waiting as if it is about to be ¬ nor do we despair as if it is absolutely not about to be

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ *"addition to"* *thinking*
μνημονευτέον	one must remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΕΟΝ *"addition to"* *thinking*
μέλλειν	to be about to do	ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ *going to*
μέλλων *(οὖσα, ον)*	being about to do	
τὸ μέλλον τὰ μέλλοντα	the future [lit., "what is about to be"]	
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
ἡμέτερος	our	῾ΗΜΕΤΕΡΟΣ *belong to us*
πάντως	absolutely / in every way	ΠΑΝΤΩΣ *all*
μένειν	to remain	ΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying*
προσμένειν	to keep waiting	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying toward*
ἐσόμενος *(η, ον)*	[about] to be	ΕΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ *will be*
ἡ ἐλπίς αἱ ἐλπίδες	hope	ΕΛΠΙΣ *expecting*
ἀπελπίζειν	to despair	ΑΠΕΛΠΙΖΕΙΝ *expecting away*

127c. Classification of Desires

Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς, τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: Αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, Αἱ δὲ κεναί – καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν: Αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, Αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον

One must analogize that, of the desires: some are natural, but others empty – and of the natural [*desires*]: some are necessary, but others only natural

τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων: αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι ¬
αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν

and of the necessary [*desires*]: some are necessary for wellbeing ¬
but others for the body's non-irritation, and others for life itself

We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life.

ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *reasoning action* *again*
ἀναλογιστέον	one must analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΝ *reasoning action* *again*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*

φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	**ΜΟΝΟΣ** *single*
	Part 2	
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἀόχλητος *(ον)*	not irritating	**ΑΟΧΛΗΤΟΣ** *without a crowd of people*
ἡ ἀοχλησία **αἱ ἀοχλησίαι**	non-irritation	**ΑΟΧΛΗΣΙΑ** *without a crowd of people*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*

128a. The Guide: Unwavering Observation of Desires

τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς Θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν – ἐπεὶ Τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος

for an unwavering observation of these [*desires*] knows how to lead every choice and avoidance back to the body's health and the soul's undisturbedness – since this is the fulfillment of living blessedly

The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and (the soul's) freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.

οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**ΟΥΤΟΣ** *this*
ἡ πλάνη **αἱ πλάναι**	error	**ΠΛΑΝΗ** *roaming*
πλανᾶν	to wander	**ΠΛΑΝΑΝ** *roaming*
ἀπλανής *(ές)*	unwavering	**ΑΠΛΑΝΗΣ** *not roaming*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
ἡ αἵρεσις **αἱ αἱρέσεις**	choice	**ΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *taking*
ἡ φυγή **αἱ φυγαί**	avoidance	**ΦΥΓΗ** *fleeing*
ἐπανάγειν	to lead back	**ΕΠΑΝΑΓΕΙΝ** *going toward again*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *seen*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
οἶδεν	3rd person singular perfect indicative active *"has mentally seen" ∴* *"knows"*	
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*

σημαίνειν	to indicate	ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ *making indication*
τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ *state of indication*
ὑγιαίνειν	to be healthy	ὙΓΙΑΙΝΕΙΝ *making good life*
τὸ ὑγιαῖνον τὰ ὑγιαίνοντα	what is healthy	ὙΓΙΑΙΝΟΝ *making good life*
ἡ ὑγίεια αἱ ὑγίειαι	health	ὙΓΙΕΙΑ *state of good life*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	blessedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from greatness*
μακαρίως	blessedly	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΩΣ *greatness*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*

128b. The Goal: Avoidance of Pain and Fear

τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα Πράττομεν: ὅπως μήτε Ἀλγῶμεν ¬ μήτε Ταρβῶμεν

for the sake of this we do everything: so that we do not feel pain ¬ and we are not afraid

For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear.

ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	grace	ΧΑΡΙΣ *being cheerful*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
πράττειν	to accomplish [here, "to do"]	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ὅπως	so that	ὉΠΩΣ *in what way*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	ΑΛΓΕΙΝ *pain*
δεινός *(ή, όν)*	terrible	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ *terrifying*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
φοβεῖν	to frighten	ΦΟΒΕΙΝ *fleeing*
ταρβεῖν	to be afraid	ΤΑΡΒΕΙΝ *fearing*

128c. Painlessness and Fearlessness

ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται: λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς Χειμών ¬ οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι – καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται

whenever this once comes to be for us: the whole winter storm of the soul is dissolved ¬ with the living being not having to proceed as though toward something lacking – and [*with it not having*] to seek something else by which the good of the soul and body will be fulfilled

And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfill the good of the soul and the good of the body.

ὅταν	whenever	**ὍΤΑΝ** *whenever*
ἅπαξ	once	**ἍΠΑΞ** *one all one*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced [here, "to come to be"]	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	**ἈΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening away*
λύειν	to dissolve	**ΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening*
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
χειμάζειν	to distress	**ΧΕΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *winter storm*
ὁ χειμών **οἱ χειμῶνες**	winter [here, "winter storm"]	**ΧΕΙΜΩΝ** *winter storm*
ἔχειν	to have	**ἘΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
βαδίζειν	proceed	**ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *walking*
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ἘΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*
ἐνδεής *(ής, ές)*	lacking	**ἘΝΔΕΗΣ** *deficiency*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [here "else"]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ἈΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
συμπληροῦν	to fulfill	**ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ** *filling together*

128d. The Beginning and the End of Living Blessedly: Pleasure

τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν Ἔχομεν: ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν Ἡδονὴν Ἀλγῶμεν ¬ ‹ὅταν δὲ μὴ Ἀλγῶμεν› οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς Δεόμεθα

for at that time we have use for pleasure: whenever we feel pain from pleasure not being present ¬ but whenever we do not feel pain, we no longer have need for pleasure

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν Ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος Λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν

and because of this we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end [*i.e., the fulfilment*] of living blessedly

For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure. And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us,

τόθ' = τότε	at that time	**ΤΟΤΕ** *the then*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	**ΧΡΕΙΑ** *necessary*
παρεῖναι	to be present	**ΠΑΡΕΙΝΑΙ** *being beside*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	**ΑΛΓΕΙΝ** *pain*
ὅταν	whenever	**ὉΤΑΝ** *whenever*
οὐκέτι	no longer	**ΟΥΚΕΤΙ** *not still*
δεῖσθαι	to need	**ΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *needing*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
μακαρίως	blessedly	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΩΣ** *greatness*
ζῆν	to live 0[to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*

129a. The Standard: Our Experiences & Feelings

ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν, πρῶτον, καὶ συγγενικὸν Ἔγνωμεν

for we have come to know this [*pleasure*] as good, primary, and congenital

καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης Καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς: καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν – ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες

and from this [*pleasure*] we make a beginning of every choice and avoidance: and to this [*pleasure*] we arrive – while we distinguish every good by feeling [*i.e., by our experience*] as a standard

and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.

ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
συγγενής *(ές)*	akin	**ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ** *born with*
συγγενικῶς	congenitally	**ΣΥΓΓΕΝΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of born with*

συγγενικός (ή, όν)	congenital	**ΣΥΓΓΕΝΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of born with*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
ἔγνωμεν	1st person plural aorist indicative active "we have come to know"	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
	Part 2	
κατάρχεσθαι	make a beginning	**ΚΑΤΑΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *thoroughly beginning*
ἡ αἵρεσις **αἱ αἱρέσεις**	choice	**ἉΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *taking*
ἡ φυγή **αἱ φυγαί**	avoidance	**ΦΥΓΗ** *fleeing*
καταντᾶν	come down to [*i.e., arrive*]	**ΚΑΤΑΝΤΑΝ** *thoroughly opposite* [*i.e., face-to-face*]
ὁ κανών **οἱ κανόνες**	standard	**ΚΑΝΩΝ** *measuring stick (ruler)*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
κρίνειν	to distinguish	**ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *separating*

129b. Hedonic Calculus

καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν Τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα ¬ ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν – ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ Δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται

and since this [*pleasure is the*] primary good and [*is*] innate: because of this we do not choose every pleasure ¬ instead, there are [*times*] when we step over many pleasures – whenever what is more difficult for us follows from those [*pleasures*]

καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους Νομίζομεν: ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν Ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ – πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας

and we consider many pains more advantageous than pleasures: whenever a larger pleasure follows along for us – after having endured the pains for a long time

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time.

ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	**ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ** *since indeed certainly*
ἐπεὶ	since	**ΕΠΕΙ**
πρῶτος (η, ον)	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*

τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτά	plant	ΦΥΤΟΝ *growing*
σύμφυτος *(ος, ον)*	innate	ΣΥΜΦΥΤΟΣ *growing together*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	῾ΗΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	῾ΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
μεταβαίνειν	to move [to another place]	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking change*
ὑπερβαίνειν	to step over	῾ΥΠΕΡΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking beyond*
ὅταν	whenever	῾ΟΤΑΝ *whenever*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater [here, "larger"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
δυσχερής *(ές)*	difficult	ΔΥΣΧΕΡΗΣ *hard hand*
τὸ δυσχερές τὰ δυσχερῆ	what is difficult	ΔΥΣΧΕΡΕΣ *hard hand*
ἕπεσθαι	to follow	῾ΕΠΕΣΘΑΙ *supporting*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *the state pain*
κρατεῖν	to prevail	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ *power*
κρείττων *(ων, ον)*	more advantageous	ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ *powerful*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
ἐπειδὰν = ἐπειδὴ ἄν	whenever	ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ *since if*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following beside*
παρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along	
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὑπομένειν	to endure	῾ΥΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying under*

129c. Avoiding Pleasures & Choosing Pains

πᾶσα οὖν Ἡδονὴ, διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν, ἀγαθόν – οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἱρετή

so every Pleasure, because it has a nature compatible [*with us*], is good – nevertheless not every [*pleasure*] is worth choosing

καθάπερ καὶ Ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν ¬ οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ, πεφυκυῖα

just as every Pain is bad ¬ but not every [*pain*] always is to-be-avoided, having naturally come to exist

Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
μέντοι	never-the-less	**ΜΕΝΤΟΙ** *indeed surely*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
αἱρετός *(ή, όν)*	worth choosing	**ἉΙΡΕΤΟΣ** *taking*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as* *thoroughly*
ἡ ἀλγηδών **αἱ ἀλγηδόνες**	pain	**ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ** *the state pain*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
φεύγειν	to avoid	**ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
φευκτός *(ή, όν)*	to-be-avoided	**ΦΕΥΚΤΟΣ**
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	**ΦΥΕΙΝ** *producing*
πεφυκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having naturally come to exist	**ΠΕΦΥΚΩΣ** *produced*

130a. Commensuration and Observation

τῇ, μέντοι, συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν Καθήκει

nevertheless, it is appropriate to distinguish all these [*pleasures and pains*] by commensuration and by looking at what is mutually benefiting and disadvantageous

Χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ ¬ τῷ δὲ κακῷ, τοὔμπαλιν, ὡς ἀγαθῷ

for we use the good at certain times as [*if it were*] bad ¬ but [*we use*] the bad, conversely, as [*if it were*] good

Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.

μέντοι	never-the-less	**ΜΕΝΤΟΙ** *indeed surely*
μετρεῖν	to measure	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring*

ἡ συμμετρήσις αἱ συμμετρήσεις	commensuration [i.e., measuring by comparison]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΗΣΙΣ *measuring together process*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing together*
συμφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	mutually benefiting	
σύμφορος *(ον)*	advantageous	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΟΣ *carrying together*
ἀσύμφορος *(ον)*	disadvantageous	ΑΣΥΜΦΟΡΟΣ *not carrying together*
ἡ ἐπιβλέψις αἱ ἐπιβλέψεις	observation	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ *looking upon*
ἡ περίβλεψις αἱ περιβλέψεις	admiration	ΠΕΡΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ *looking around*
ἡ βλεψις αἱ βλέψεις	[the act of] looking	ΒΛΕΨΙΣ *looking*
κρίνειν	to distinguish	ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *separating*
καθήκων *(ουσα, ον)*	appropriate	ΚΑΘΗΚΩΝ *having come according to*
καθήκειν	to be appropriate	ΚΑΘΗΚΕΙΝ *having come according to*
	Part 2	
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
πάλιν	again [here, "in turn"]	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
τοὔμπαλιν	conversely	ΤΟΥΜΠΑΛΙΝ = τὸ + ἔμπαλιν *the [thing] back in*

130b. Self-Sufficiency & Contentment

καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα Νομίζομεν: οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις Χρώμεθα ¬ ἀλλ' ὅπως, ἐὰν μὴ Ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις Ἀρκώμεθα (πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν – οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι)

and we think that self-sufficiency is a great good: not that we always use few things ¬ but so that, if we do not have many things, we are content with few things (being genuinely convinced that they enjoy extravagance most pleasantly – those least in need of it)

And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it.

ἡ αὐτάρκεια αἱ αὐτάρκειαι	self-sufficiency	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ *state of self-sufficing*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	ΜΕΓΑΣ *large*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*

πάντως	absolutely / in every way [here, "always"]	ΠΑΝΤΩΣ *all*
ὀλίγος (η, ον)	few, short [of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ *little*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
ὅπως	so that	ὉΠΩΣ *in what way*
τὸ ἀρκοῦν τὰ ἀρκοῦντα	what is sufficient	
ἀρκεῖν	to be sufficient	ΑΡΚΕΙΝ *sufficing*
ἀρκεῖσθαι	to be content	ΑΡΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *sufficing*
πείθειν	to persuade	ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ *convincing*
πεπεισμένος (η, ον)	[being] convinced	ΠΕΠΕΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *convinced*
γνήσιος (α, ον)	genuine	ΓΝΗΣΙΟΣ *belonging to one's race (i.e. legitimate)*
γνησίως	genuinely	
ἥδιον	more pleasantly	ἩΔΙΟΝ *more sweet*
ἥδιστα	most pleasantly	ἩΔΙΣΤΑ *most sweet*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ *much completing*
ἡ πολυτέλεια αἱ πολυτέλειαι	extravagance	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ *much completing*
ἡ ἀπόλαυσις αἱ ἀπολαύσεις	enjoyment	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ *process of profiting from*
ἀπολαύειν	to enjoy +gen	ΑΠΟΛΑΥΕΙΝ *profiting from*
ἥττων (ον)	worse	ἩΤΤΟΝ *inferior*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	ἩΤΤΟΝ *inferior*
ἥκιστος (η, ον)	least	ἩΚΙΣΤΟΣ *most inferior*
ἥκιστα	least	
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
δεῖσθαι	to need	ΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ *needing*
δεόμενος (η, ον)	in need of	ΔΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ *needing*

130c. Pleasure Without Luxury

καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι ¬ τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον

and that everything natural is well-acquirable ¬ but the empty is hard to obtain

οἵ τε λιτοὶ Χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν – ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ Ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ

and plain flavors bring pleasure equal to an extravagant way of living – whenever all the pain from lack has been removed

and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed;

φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
εὐπόριστος (ον)	well acquirable	**ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *easily piercing*
κενός (ή, όν)	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
δύσποριστος (ον)	hard to obtain	**ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ** *hard to pierce*
	Part 2	
λιτός (ή, όν)	plain	**ΛΙΤΟΣ** *simple*
ὁ χυλός **οἱ χυλοί**	flavor	**ΧΥΛΟΣ** *juice*
ἴσος (η, ον)	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἡ πολυτέλεια **αἱ πολυτέλειαι**	extravagance	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *much completing*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *much completing*
πολυτελής (ές)	extravagant	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ** *much completing*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἡ δίαιτα **αἱ δίαιται**	way of living	**ΔΙΑΙΤΑ** *through the responsibility*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	**ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing upon*
ὅταν	whenever	**ὉΤΑΝ** *whenever*
ἅπας (ασα, αν)	all [together]	**ἉΠΑΣ** *all together*
ἀλγῶν (οῦσα, οῦν)	feeling pain	**ΑΛΓΩΝ** *pain*
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ΕΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*

131a. Water & Barley Cake

καὶ Μᾶζα καὶ Ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν – ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων Τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται

both barley-cake and water give out the highest pleasure – whenever someone lacking brings them forward for oneself

and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips.

ἡ μᾶζα **αἱ μᾶζαι**	barley-cake	**ΜΑΖΑ** *kneading*
τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ὙΔΩΡ** *rain / water*

τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	the highest point	ΑΚΡΟΝ *highest*
ἀκρότατος *(η, ον)*	the highest	ΑΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ *most highest*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate [here, "to give out"]	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	῾ΗΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἐπειδὰν = ἐπειδὴ ἄν	whenever	ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ *since if*
ἡ ἔνδεια αἱ ἔνδειαι	lack	ΕΝΔΕΙΑ *deficiency*
ἐνδεής *(ής, ές)*	lacking	ΕΝΔΕΗΣ *deficiency*
προσφέρειν	to bring forward	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing as well*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing as well*

131b. Hedonic Calibration

τὸ Συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἁπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελέσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν – καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον

therefore to grow accustomed to simple and not to extravagant ways of living is completive of health – and makes the person unhesitating for the necessary tasks of life

καὶ τοῖς πολυτελέσιν, ἐκ διαλειμμάτων, προσερχομένοις κρεῖττον ἡμᾶς Διατίθησι – καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους Παρασκευάζει

and this [*habituation*] positions us more advantageously in approaching, at intervals, extravagant things – and also makes [*us*] fearless toward chance

To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune.

τὸ ἔθος τὰ ἔθη	custom	ΕΘΟΣ *accustomed*
ἐθίζειν	to accustom	ΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action*
συνεθίζειν	to grow accustomed	ΣΥΝΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action together*
ἁπλῶς	absolutely	῾ΑΠΛΩΣ *one fold*
ἁπλοῦς *(ῆ, οῦν)*	simple	῾ΑΠΛΟΥΣ *one fold*
ἡ πολυτέλεια αἱ πολυτέλειαι	extravagance	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ *much completing*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ *much completing*
πολυτελής *(ές)*	extravagant	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ *much completing*
ἡ δίαιτα αἱ δίαιται	way of living	ΔΙΑΙΤΑ *through the responsibility*
τὸ ὑγιαῖνον τὰ ὑγιαίνοντα	what is healthy	῾ΥΓΙΑΙΝΟΝ *making good life*
ἡ ὑγίεια αἱ ὑγίειαι	health	῾ΥΓΙΕΙΑ *state of good life*
τὸ πλήρωμα τὰ πληρώματα	fullness	ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ *result of filling*

συμπληροῦν	to fulfill	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ *filling together*
συμπληρωτικός *(ή, όν)*	completive	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of filling together*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ *necessity*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἡ χρῆσις αἱ χρήσεις	usage [here, "task"]	ΧΡΗΣΙΣ *the process of necessary*
ὁ ὄκνος οἱ ὄκνοι	hesitation	ΟΚΝΟΣ *sluggish*
ὀκνηρός *(ά, όν)*	hesitant	ΟΚΝΗΡΟΣ *having the quality of sluggish*
ἄοκνος *(ον)*	unhesitating	ΑΟΚΝΟΣ *not sluggish*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
	Part 2	
πολυτελής *(ές)*	extravagant	ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ *much completing*
λείπειν	to leave	ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *leaving*
τὸ διάλειμμα τὰ διαλείμματα	interval	ΔΙΑΛΕΙΜΜΑ *leaving through*
ἀνέρχεσθαι	ascends	ΑΝΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving toward*
ἐπεισερχόμενος *(η, ον)*	coming in afterward	ΕΠΕΙΣΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *moving upon into*
προσέρχεσθαι	to approach	ΠΡΟΣΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving toward*
προσερχόμενος *(η, ον)*	approaching	ΠΡΟΣΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ
κρατεῖν	to prevail	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ *power*
κρείττων *(ων, ον)*	more advantageous	ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ *powerful*
κρεῖττον	more advantageously	
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
διατιθέναι	to position	ΔΙΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing through*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἄφοβος *(ος, ον)*	not dreadful [here, "fearless"]	ΑΦΟΒΟΣ *not fleeing [in fear]*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide [here, "to also make"]	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*

131c. Calm Fulfillment

ὅταν οὖν Λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν – οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας Λέγομεν (ὥς, Τινες, ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι, νομίζουσιν)

therefore whenever we say that pleasure exists as the fulfillment – we are not speaking of the pleasures of the degenerates nor of those lying in enjoyment (as some, not knowing and not agreeing or receiving it poorly, think)

ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα – μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν

but [*we are speaking about*] not feeling pain with respect to the body – and not being disturbed with respect to the soul

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

ὅταν	whenever	**ὍΤΑΝ** *whenever*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
ὁ ἄσωτος **οἱ ἄσωτοι**	a degenerate	**ΑΣΩΤΟΣ** *not saving*
ἡ ἀπόλαυσις **αἱ ἀπολαύσεις**	enjoyment	**ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ** *process of* *profiting from*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	**ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting*
κείμενος *(η, ον)*	situated / lying down	**ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated*
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	**ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ** *not distinguishing*
ἀγνοῶν *(ἀγνοοῦσα, ἀγνοοῦν)*	not knowing	
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ὁμολογῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	agreeing	
κακός *(ή, όν)*	bad	**ΚΑΚΟΣ** *harmful*
κακῶς	badly [here, "poorly"]	**ΚΑΚΩΣ** *harmful*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
ἐκδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	**ΕΚΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting out*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ἀλγεῖν	to feel pain	**ΑΛΓΕΙΝ** *pain*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ταραχώδης *(ης, ες)*	disturbing	**ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ** *agitating*
ταράττεσθαι	to be disturbed	**ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΣΘΑΙ** *agitating*

132a. Sober Reasoning

οὐ γὰρ Πότοι καὶ Κῶμοι συνείροντες ¬ οὐδ' Ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν – – οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς Τράπεζα) τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον

for it is not drinking-bouts and parties strung together ¬ nor the enjoyment of slaves and women – nor of fish and of the other things (as many as an extravagant table brings) that generate the pleasant life

ἀλλὰ νήφων Λογισμὸς – καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς – καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων (ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει Θόρυβος)

but [*it is*] sober reasoning [*that generates the pleasant life*] – and searching out the causes of every choice and avoidance – and expelling the judgments (from which the greatest uproar thoroughly grasps souls)

For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.

ὁ πότος **οἱ πότοι**	a drinking-bout	**ΠΟΤΟΣ** *drinking*
ὁ κῶμος **οἱ κῶμοι**	a party	**ΚΩΜΟΣ** *festival / carousal*
συνείρειν	to be strung together	**ΣΥΝΕΙΡΕΙΝ** *connecting together*
συνείρων *(ουσα, ον)*	strung together	
ἀπολαύειν	to enjoy [+gen]	**ΑΠΟΛΑΥΕΙΝ** *profiting from*
ἡ ἀπόλαυσις **αἱ ἀπολαύσεις**	enjoyment	**ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΙΣ** *process of profiting from*
ὁ παῖς **οἱ παῖδες**	child / slave	**ΠΑΙΣ** *son*
ἡ γυνή **αἱ γυναῖκες**	woman	**ΓΥΝΗ** *wife*
ὁ ἰχθύς **οἱ ἰχθύες**	fish	**ΙΧΘΥΣ** *fish*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *much completing*
πολυτελής *(ές)*	extravagant	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ** *much completing*
ἡ τράπεζα **αἱ τράπεζαι**	table	**ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ** *three feet* *"tri-pod"*
ἡδύς *(ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)*	pleasant	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
γεννᾶν	to generate	**ΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
	Part 2	
νήφειν	to be sober	**ΝΗΦΕΙΝ** *not drunk*
νήφων *(ουσα, ον)*	sober	
ὁ λογισμός **οἱ λογισμοί**	[process of] reasoning	**ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *action of collecting*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

ἡ ἔρευνα αἱ ἔρευναι	search	ΕΡΕΥΝΑ *searching*
διερευνᾶν	to investigate	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΑΝ *searching through*
ἡ διερεύνησις αἱ διερευνήσεις	investigation	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΗΣΙΣ *searching through*
ἐξερευνᾶν	to search out	ΕΞΕΡΕΥΝΑΝ *searching out*
ἐξερευνῶν	searching out	ΕΞΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ *searching out*
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	ἉΙΡΕΣΙΣ *taking*
ἡ φυγή αἱ φυγαί	avoidance	ΦΥΓΗ *fleeing*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἐξελαύνειν	to expel	ΕΞΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ *driving out of*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest *[the most]*	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend [here, "to thoroughly grasp"]	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *thoroughly grasping*
ὁ θόρυβος οἱ θόρυβοι	uproar	ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ *noise*

132b. The Good: Prudence

τούτων δὲ πάντων, Ἀρχὴ – καὶ τὸ μέγιστον Ἀγαθὸν – Φρόνησις

but of all these, the Beginning – and the greatest Good – is Prudence

Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence.

διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει Φρόνησις

therefore Prudence exists as more valued than philosophy

Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy;

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες	he who considers well	ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ *good mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind*
ἡ φρόνησις αἱ φρονήσεις	prudence	ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ *process of mind*
	Part 2	
διὸ	therefore	ΔΙΟ *because of*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ *loving knowledge*
ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	honor	ΤΙΜΗ *value*
τιμιώτερος *(α, ον)*	more valued [i.e., held in honor]	ΤΙΜΙΩΤΕΡΟΣ *value*

ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἡ φρόνησις αἱ φρονήσεις	prudence	ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ *process of mind*

132c. Instrumental Virtues

ἐξ ἧς, αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν Ἀρεταί: διδάσκουσα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως Ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ¬ ‹οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως› ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως

from this [*prudence*], all the remaining Virtues have naturally come to exist: because it teaches that it is not possible to live pleasantly without [*living*] prudently and correctly and justly ¬ nor [*is it possible to live*] prudently and correctly and justly without [*living*] pleasantly

for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly

συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ Ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως – καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον

for the Virtues have naturally come to exist together with living pleasantly – and living pleasantly is inseparable from them

for the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them

λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	ΦΥΕΙΝ *producing*
ἡ ἀρετή αἱ ἀρεταί	virtue	ΑΡΕΤΗ *excellence*
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ *teaching*
διδάσκων (ουσα, ον)	teaching	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΩΝ *teaching*
ἡδύς (ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)	pleasant	ἩΔΥΣ *sweet*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	ἩΔΕΩΣ *sweet*
ζῆν	to live 0[to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
φρονεῖν	to consider	ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ *mind*
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
ἡ φρόνησις αἱ φρονήσεις	prudence	ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ *process of mind*
φρονίμως	prudently	ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ *mind*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *lovely*
δικαίως	justly	ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ *custom / right*
	Part 2	
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	ΦΥΕΙΝ *producing*
συμφύειν	to naturally come to exist together	ΣΥΜΦΥΕΙΝ *producing together*

ἡ ἀρετή αἱ ἀρεταί	virtue	ΑΡΕΤΗ *excellence*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
ἡδέως	pleasantly	ἩΔΕΩΣ *sweet*
ἀχώριστος *(ον)*	inseparable	ΑΧΩΡΙΣΤΟΣ *no location*

133a. The Wise Perspective

ἐπεὶ Τίνα Νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος – καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος ¬ καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος;

since whom do you think to be superior to the one judging pious [*things*] about the gods – and holding [*himself*] always fearlessly about death ¬ and having inductively considered the fulfillment of nature?

for indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature?

καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν Πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος ¬ τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς;

and also [*whom do you think to be superior to the one*] distinguishing that the Limit of good things as being well-fillable and also well-acquirable ¬ but also [*distinguishing that*] the [*limit*] of bad things as having either [*brief*] times or brief sufferings?

He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain;

τὴν δὲ ὑπό τινων δεσπότιν εἰσαγομένην πάντων, ἐγγελῶντος εἱμαρμένην;

but [*whom do you think to be superior to the one*] laughing at destiny, which is introduced by some as mistress of all things?

he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things.

ἐπεὶ	since	ΕΠΕΙ
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
κρατεῖν	to prevail	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ *power*
κρείττων *(ων, ον)*	more advantageous [here, "superior"]	ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ *powerful*
ὁ θεός οἱ θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ *[divine entity]*
ἱερός *(ά, όν)*	sacred	ἹΕΡΟΣ *holy*
ὅσιος *(α, ον)*	pious	ὉΣΙΟΣ *devout*
δοξάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	judging	ΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ *seeming*
ὁ θάνατος οἱ θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *dying*
διὰ παντὸς	always	
ἄφοβος *(ος, ον)*	not dreadful [or, "fearless"]	ΑΦΟΒΟΣ *not fleeing [in fear]*
ἀφόβως	fearlessly	ΑΦΟΒΩΣ *not fleeing [in fear]*

ἔχων (ουσα, ον)	has [here, "holding"]	ΕΧΩΝ *holding*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπιλελογισμένος (η, ον)	having inductively considered	ΕΠΙΛΕΛΟΓΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *process of having reasoned action upon*
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ *goal*
	Part 2	
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*
συμπληροῦν	to fulfill	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΟΥΝ *filling together*
συμπληρωτικός (ή, όν)	completive	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of filling together*
εὐσυμπλήρωτος (ον)	well fillable	ΕΥΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΤΟΣ *filling well together*
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
εὐπόριστος (ον)	well acquirable	ΕΥΠΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ *easily piercing*
διαλαμβάνων (ουσα, ον)	distinguishing	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ *grasping separation*
κακός (ή, όν)	bad	ΚΑΚΟΣ *harmful*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ὁ πόνος οἱ πόνοι	suffering	ΠΟΝΟΣ *toil*
βραχύς (εῖα, ύ)	short [here, "brief"]	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ *brief*
	Part 3	
ἡ ἐρωμένη αἱ ἐρωμέναι	mistress [i.e., female lover]	ΕΡΩΜΕΝΗ *having been loving*
ἡ δεσπότις αἱ δεσπότιδες	mistress [i.e., female master]	ΔΕΣΠΟΤΙΣ *[female] house master*
εἰσάγειν	to lead into	ΕΙΣΑΓΕΙΝ *going into*
εἰσαγόμενος (η, ον)	being lead into [here, mid., "introduced"]	ΕΙΣΑΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ *going into*
γελᾶν	to laugh	ΓΕΛΑΝ *deriding*
γελοῖος	laughable	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΣ *deriding*
ἐγγελᾶν	to laugh at	ΕΓΓΕΛΑΝ *deriding at*
ἐγγελῶν (ῶσα, ῶν)	laughing at	ΕΓΓΕΛΩΝ *deriding at*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἡ εἱμαρμένη αἱ εἱμαρμέναι	destiny	ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗ *having been parted*

133b. Necessity, Chance, & Personal Responsibility

‹ὧν, Ἃ μὲν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν›Ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης,Ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς:

of things, some exist by necessity, some from chance, and some from us:

(He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control;

διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι – τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν ¬ τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον – ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν

because necessity is not accountable – and he sees chance as unsteady ¬ whereas what is from us is without a master [*i.e., under our control*] – [*it is*] to this that it naturally comes about that both the blameworthy and the opposing [*i.e., praise*] follow along

for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against* *constraint*
ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
	Part 2	
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἡ εὔθυνα **αἱ εὔθυναι**	a setting straight	**ΕΥΘΥΝΑ** *well straight*
In Athens: **αἱ εὔθυναι** *= audits, the legal procedure at the end of a magistrate's term, when he had to give an account of his conduct and finances.*		
ἀνυπεύθυνος *(ον)*	not accountable	**ΑΝΥΠΕΥΘΥΝΟΣ** *not under* *well straight*
ἐνποδίζειν = **ἐμποδίζειν**	to hinder	**ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** **ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *in foot*
ἱστάναι	to stand	**῾ΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing*
ἄστατος *(ον)*	unsteady	**ΑΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *not standing*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**῾ΟΡΑΝ** *looking*
ἡ δεσπότις **αἱ δεσπότιδες**	mistress [i.e., female master]	**ΔΕΣΠΟΤΙΣ** *[female]* *house master*
ἀδέσποτος *(ον)*	without a master	**ΑΔΕΣΠΟΤΟΣ** *not house master*
μεμπτός *(ή, όν)*	blameworthy	**ΜΕΜΠΤΟΣ** *blaming*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	**ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following beside*
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	**ΦΥΕΙΝ** *producing*

134a. Hopelessness of Determinism

ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ Κατακολουθεῖν – ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ Δουλεύειν

since it is more advantageous to follow along with myth about the gods – than to be a slave to the destiny of natural things

For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers;

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς ¬ Ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην

for the one [*i.e., myth*] outlines a hope of excusal through the honoring of the gods ¬ but the other [*i.e., destiny*] holds necessity as unexcusing

for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation.

ἐπεὶ	since	**ΕΠΕΙ**
κρείττων (ων, ον)	more advantageous	**ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ** *powerful*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
κατακολουθεῖν	to follow along	**ΚΑΤΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *thoroughly following*
φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ἡ εἱμαρμένη **αἱ εἱμαρμέναι**	destiny	**ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗ** *having been parted*
δουλεύειν	to be a slave	**ΔΟΥΛΕΥΕΙΝ** *slave*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἐλπίς **αἱ ἐλπίδες**	hope	**ΕΛΠΙΣ** *expecting*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
αἰτεῖν	to beg	**ΑΙΤΕΙΝ** *responsibility*
ἡ παραίτησις **αἱ παραιτήσεις**	excusal	**ΠΑΡΑΙΤΗΣΙΣ** *process of aside responsibility*
ἡ ὑπογραφή **αἱ ὑπογραφαί**	example	**ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗ** *writing under (i.e, to copy)*
ὑπογράφειν	to outline	**ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing under*
ἡ τιμή **αἱ τιμαί**	honor [here, "the honoring"]	**ΤΙΜΗ** *value*
ἀπαραίτητος (ον)	unexcusing	**ΑΠΑΡΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ** *not aside responsibility*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*

134b. Extent of Chance

τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε θεόν (ὡς οἱ Πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν) ὑπολαμβάνων ¬ Οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται

but [*he*] supposes chance is not a god (as the many think) ¬ for nothing is done disorderly by god

As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god's acts there is no disorder),

οὔτε ‹πάντων› ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν – ‹οὐκ› οἴεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι

nor [*does he suppose chance to be*] an uncertain cause of everything – for he does not believe that either good or evil is given from [*chance*] to men for living blessedly

nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life,

ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι

nevertheless [*he does suppose that*] the beginnings of great goods or [*great*] evils are supplied by [*chance*]

but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it.

ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping under*
ὑπολαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	supposing	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping under*
οὐθείς = **οὐδείς** *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
ἡ τάξις **αἱ τάξεις**	arrangement	**ΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordered*
ἀτάκτως	disorderly	**ΑΤΑΚΤΩΣ** *not ordered*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
	Part 2	
βέβαιος *(α, ον)*	affirmed	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ** *certain*
ἀβέβαιος	uncertain	**ΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΣ** *not certain*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΣ** *great*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ΖΗΝ** *breathing / hot*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*

δίδοσθαι	to be given	**ΔΙΔΟΣΘΑΙ** *giving*
	Part 3	
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time] [here, "beginning"]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
μέντοι	never-the-less	**ΜΕΝΤΟΙ** *indeed surely*
μέγας *(μεγάλη, μέγα)*	great	**ΜΕΓΑΣ** *large*
χορηγεῖν	to supply [lit. "to lead a chorus"]	**ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΝ** *chorus leading*
χορηγεῖσθαι	to be supplied	**ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *chorus leading*

135a. Reason over Chance

κρεῖττον εἶναι Νομίζει εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν – ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν

He thinks it is more advantageous to be unfortunate with [*the use of*] good reason – than to be prosperous without [*the use of*] reason

He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason.

βέλτιον γὰρ, ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὸ καλῶς κριθὲν ‹μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι ¬ ἢ τὸ μὴ καλῶς κριθὲν› ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην

for [*he thinks*] it is better, in [*one's*] activities, that what has been correctly distinguished not be set right ¬ rather than that what has not been correctly distinguished be set right because of [*chance*]

For it is better in a man's actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance.

κρείττων *(ων, ον)*	more advantageous	**ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ** *powerful*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἀνεπιλογίστως	in a way without inductive consideration	**ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ** *not reasoning* *action upon*
ὁ λογισμός **οἱ λογισμοί**	[process of] reasoning	**ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *action of collecting*
εὐλογίστως	with [*the use of*] good reason	**ΕΥΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ** *well reasoning* *action*
ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
ἀτυχεῖν	to be unfortunate	**ΑΤΥΧΕΙΝ** *not happening*
ἀλογίστως	without [*the use of*] reason	**ΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ** *not happening* *action*
εὐτυχεῖν	to be prosperous	**ΕΥΤΥΧΕΙΝ** *happening well*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
καλῶς	correctly	**ΚΑΛΩΣ** *lovely*

κρίνειν	to distinguish	ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ *separating*
κριθείς (εῖσα,έν)	distinguished	ΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ *separating*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	ΟΡΘΩΣ *straight upright*
ὀρθοῦν	to set right	ΟΡΘΟΥΝ *straight upright*
ὀρθωθῆναι	to be set right [already]	ΟΡΘΩΘΗΝΑΙ *straight upright*
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*

135b. Godlike Fearlessness

ταῦτα, οὖν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ Μελέτα (πρὸς σεαυτὸν, ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτός, ‹καὶ› πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ) καὶ οὐδέποτε, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ, Διαταραχθήσῃ ¬ Ζήσῃ δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις

therefore, study these things and the things akin to them (by yourself, day and night, and with one similar to yourself) and you will never, neither in wakefulness nor in a dream, be thoroughly disturbed ¬ but you will live as a god among humans

Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself; and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men.

οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶνἌνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς

for in no way like a mortal living being is a person living in immortal goods

for a person living in immortal goods in no way is like a mortal living being

For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like a mortal being.

συγγενής (ές)	akin	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ *born with*
μελετᾶν	to study	ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ *caring*
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ *day*
ἡ νύξ αἱ νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ *night*
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
τὸ ὅμοιον τὰ ὅμοια	what is similar	
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ *not even at some point*
ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ὙΠΝΟΣ *sleep*
τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὰ ἐνύπνια	dream	ΕΝΥΠΝΙΟΝ *in sleep*
ὕπαρ	in wakefulness	ὙΠΑΡ *sleep*
ὄναρ	in a dream	ΟΝΑΡ *dream*
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating*
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating together*
διαταράττειν	to thoroughly disturb	ΔΙΑΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating through*

ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	ΖΗΝ *breathing / hot*
ὁ θεός οἱ θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ *[divine entity]*
	Part 2	
οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
οὐθὲν	in no way	ΟΥΘΕΝ *not even one*
ἔοικα	1st person singular perfect indicative active "it is like"	ΕΟΙΚΑ *yielding*
θνητός *(ή, όν)*	mortal	ΘΝΗΤΟΣ *died*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
ζῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	living	ΖΩΝ *animal*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἀθάνατος	immortal	ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ *not dying*

KNOWN WORKS

Fragments from Unknown Works

1.	**Περὶ Αἱρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν**	On Choices and Avoidances	
*	**Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας**	On Ambiguity	
2.	**Ἀναξιμένης**	Anaximénēs	*"Kingly Power"*
3.	**Ἀναφωνήσεις**	Declarations	
4.	**Ἀντίδωρος, Α Β**	Antidorus, in 2 Books	*"Given in return"*
5.	**Ἀριστόβουλος**	Aristobuolos	*"Best Counsel"*
6.	**Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ**	On the Atoms and the Void	
7.	**Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας**	On the Angle in the Atom	
8.	**Περὶ Ἀφῆς**	On Touch	
9.	**Περὶ Βασιλείας**	On Kingship	
10.	**Περὶ Βίων, Δ**	On Lifestyles, in 4 Books	
11.	**Πρὸς Δημόκριτον**	Against Democritus	*"Chosen by the People"*
12.	**Διαπορίαι**	Uncertainties	
13.	**Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας**	On Fair Dealing	
14.	**Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν**	On Justice and the Other Virtues	
15.	**Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος**	On Gifts and Gratitude	
16.	**Περὶ Εἰδώλων**	On Films	
17.	**Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης**	On Destiny	
18.	**Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή**	The Big Summary	
19.	**Μικρὰ Ἐπιτομή**	The Small Summary	
20.	**Περὶ Ἔρωτος**	On Love	
21.	**Εὐρύλοχος πρὸς Μητρόδωρον**	Eurylochus, for Metrodorus	
22.	**Περὶ Εὐσεβείας**	On Piety	
23.	**Ἡγησιάναξ**	Hegesianax	*"Leader of Kings"*
24.	**Περὶ Ἡδονῆς**	On Pleasure	
25.	**Θεμίστα**	Themista	*"Order-keeper"*

26.	**Πρὸς Θεόφραστον**	Against Theophrastus	*"Godly Phrased"*
27.	**Περὶ Θεῶν**	On the Gods	
28.	**Καλλιστόλας**	Kallistólas	*"Beautiful Armament"*
29.	**Περὶ Κριτηρίου ἢ Κανών**	On the Criterion or The Canon	
30.	**Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς**	Against the Megarians	
31.	**Μητρόδωρος**, **Ε**	Metrodorus, in 5 Books	*"Mother's Gift"*
32.	**Περὶ Μουσικῆς**	On Music	
33.	**Νεοκλῆς πρὸς Θεμίσταν**	Neocles, for Themista	*"New Glory"*
34.	**Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην**	Judgments about Diseases, for Mithres	
35.	**Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν**	On Vision	
36.	**Περὶ Ὁσιότητος**	On Holiness	
37.	**Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην**	On Theories about Feelings, against Timocrates	
38.	**Περὶ Πλούτου**	On Wealth	
39.	**Πολυμήδης**	Polymḗdēs	*"Abundant in Thought"*
40.	**Προγνωστικόν**	Prognostication	
41.	**Προτρεπτικός**	Exhortation	
42.	**Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς**	On Rhetoric	
43.	**Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα**	Twelve Elementary Principles	
44.	**Συμπόσιον**	Symposium	
45.	**Περὶ Τέλους**	On Fulfillment	
46.	**Τιμοκράτης**, **Γ**	Timocrates, in 3 Books	*"Honorable Authority"*
47.	**Περὶ Φαντασίας**	On Appearance	
48.	**Περὶ Φύσεως**, **ΛΖ**	On Nature, in 37 Books	
49.	**Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς**	Summary of Objections to the Physicists	
50.	**Χαιρέδημος**	Chairedemus	*"Joy of the People"*

1. Epicurus' 300 Scrolls

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), Lives, 10.26

Diogenes Laertius was the compiler of the "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" and a poet.

γέγονε δὲ πολυγραφώτατος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος – πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων: Κύλινδροι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους εἰσί

Epicurus became the most prolific writer – surpassing all in the number of books: for his Scrolls indeed exist to three hundred [*in number*]

γέγραπται δὲ Μαρτύριον ἔξωθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδέν ¬ ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν Ἐπικούρου Φωναί…

And there is no external Testimony written in them ¬ but they are the very Words of Epicurus…

καὶ τὰ Συγγράμματα μὲν Ἐπικούρῳ τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα – ὧν τὰ βέλτιστά ἐστι Τάδε:

And the writings of Epicurus are so many and so great – of which These are the best:

- **Περὶ Φύσεως, ΛΖ** — On Nature, in thirty-seven books
- **Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ** — On the Atoms and the Void
- **Περὶ Ἔρωτος** — On Love
- **Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς** — Summary of Objections to the Physicists
- **Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς** — Against the Megarians
- **Διαπορίαι** — Uncertainties
- **Κύριαι Δόξαι** — Principal Doctrines
- **Περὶ Αἱρέσεων Καὶ Φυγῶν** — On Choices and Avoidances
- **Περὶ Τέλους** — On Fulfillment
- **Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών** — On the Criterion, or The Canon
- **Χαιρέδημος** — Chairedemus
- **Περὶ Θεῶν** — On the Gods
- **Περὶ Ὁσιότητος** — On Holiness
- **Ἡγησιάναξ** — Hegesianax
- **Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα** — On Lifestyles, in four books
- **Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας** — On Fair Dealing
- **Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν** — Neocles, Dedicated to Themista
- **Συμπόσιον** — Symposium
- **Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον** — Eurylochus, Dedicated to Metrodorus
- **Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν** — On Vision
- **Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀτόμῳ Γωνίας** — On the Angle in the Atom
- **Περὶ Ἁφῆς** — On Touch
- **Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης** — On Destiny
- **Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην** — On Theories about Feelings
- **Προγνωστικόν** — Prognostication
- **Προτρεπτικός** — Exhortation to Study Philosophy
- **Περὶ Εἰδώλων** — On Films
- **Περὶ Φαντασίας** — On Appearance
- **Ἀριστόβουλος** — Aristobuolos

• **Περὶ Μουσικῆς**	On Music
• **Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν**	On Justice and Other Virtues
• **Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος**	On Gifts and Gratitude
• **Πολυμήδης**	Polymḗdēs
• **Τιμοκράτης γʹ**	Timocrates, in three books
• **Μητρόδωρος εʹ**	Metrodorus, in five books
• **Ἀντίδωρος βʹ**	Antidorus, in two books
• **Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην**	Judgments about Diseases, Dedicated to Mithres
• **Καλλιστόλας**	Kallistólas
• **Περὶ Βασιλείας**	On Kingship
• **Ἀναξιμένης**	Anaximénēs
• **Ἐπιστολαί**	Letters

2. Epicurus Wrote Many Books

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 1.16 (Prologue)

πολλὰ δὲ Ζήνων – πλείω Ξενοφάνης – πλείω Δημόκριτος – πλείω Ἀριστοτέλης – πλείω Ἐπίκουρος – πλείω Χρύσιππος

> Zeno [*wrote*] many [*books*] – Xenophanes even more – Democritus even more – Aristotle even more ¬ Epicurus even more – and Chrysippus even more

3. Chrysippus' Rivalry

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 7.181 (Chrysippus)

καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος δ᾽ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῇ "Συναγωγῇ τῶν δογμάτων," βουλόμενος παριστάνειν ὅτι τὰ Ἐπικούρου (οἰκείᾳ δυνάμει γεγραμμένα καὶ ἀπαράθετα ὄντα) μυρίῳ πλείω ἐστὶ τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων, φησὶν οὕτως αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει:

> Apollodorus of Athens, in his "Collection of Doctrines" wanting to show that the works of Epicurus (written by his own efforts and not copied) were innumerably more numerous than the books of Chrysippus, said in these very words:

"εἰ γάρ Τις ἀφέλοι τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων ὅσ᾽ ἀλλότρια παρατέθειται – κενὸς αὐτῷ ὁ Χάρτης καταλελείψεται!"

> "indeed if Someone were to remove from Chrysippus' books all that was cited from elsewhere – his papyrus would be left empty!"

Souda (epsilon 2404)

The Souda is a large encyclopedia, probably written in the 900's CE

Συγγράμματα δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πλεῖστα

> His writings are the most numerous

4. Lighting A Lamp to Write

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 1.20.19

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE) is known for his historical works, particularly those on Alexander the Great. He was also a devoted student of the Epictetus.

τί δὲ καὶ λύχνον Ἅπτεις [Ἐπίκουρε] – καὶ Πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν – καὶ τηλικαῦτα βιβλία Γράφεις;

> why [*Epicurus*] do You even light a lamp – and Labor for us – and Write so many books?

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.9

Ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Φροντίζεις; τί δι᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀ Ἀγρυπνεῖς;

> Man, why do You bother yourself about us? why do you keep up a vigil on our account?

τί λύχνον Ἅπτεις; τί Ἐπανίστασαι; τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία Συγγράφεις;

> why do You light a lamp? why do You rise up? why do You write so many books?

μὴ Τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων – ἢ μή Τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονήν;

lest Anyone among us be deceived regarding the gods that they take care of human beings – nor lest Anyone suppose another essence of the good [exists] other than pleasure?

εἰ γὰρ οὕτω Ταῦτα ἔχε – βαλὼν – Κάθευδε!

If this is indeed so – after you have throw [it] away – Go to sleep!

5. Epicurus Wrote Large Books

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 46.1

Lucius Seneca the Younger was a Roman statesman, Stoic philosopher, playwright, and advisor to Emperor Nero. He quotes Epicurus frequently in his "Moral Letters to Lucilius."

librum tuum quem mihi prōmīserās Accēpī… …Quī quam dissertus fuerit – ex hōc Intellegās licet: leuis mihi vīsus est – cum esset nec meī nec tuī corporis sed Quī, prīmō aspectū, aut Titi Līuī aut Epicūrī posset uidērī. tantā autem dulcēdine mē Tenuīt et Trāxit: ut illum sine ullā dīlātiōne Perlegerim

I received your book that you had promised me… …how eloquent It was – You can understand from this: it seemed light to me – since it belonged neither to my body [*of work*] nor yours, but It could, at first glance, seem to belong to either Titus Livius or Epicurus. nevertheless, it held and drew me with such sweetness: that I read through it without any delay

6. Books in Praise of Friends

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 3.1129A

Lucius Plutarchus was a Greek historian, Platonist philosopher, and biographer known for his work "Parallel Lives." He lived in Chaeronea (Boeotia), where he was also involved in local political and priestly duties.

τί δ᾽ αἱ τοσαῦται Μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον – ἐπ᾽ Ἀριστόβουλον – ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον – γραφόμεναι καὶ συντασσόμεναι φιλοπόνως; ἵνα μηδ᾽ ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν;

what are the many Myriads of lines about Metrodorus – about Aristobuolos – about Chairedemus – being written and composed industriously for? So that even having died they may not escape notice?

7. Reading Epicurus Makes Epicureans

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.3,8

Platōnem reliquōsque Sōcraticōs (et deincēps eōs quī ab hīs profectī sunt) legunt Omnēs – etiam quī Illa aut nōn adprobant aut nōn studiōsissimē cōnsectantur: Epicūrum autem et Metrodōrum nōn ferē praeter suōs Quisquam in manūs sūmit

Everyone reads Plato and the rest of the Socratic school (and those who successively have originated from them) – even Those who do not accept or are not enthusiastically following: while scarcely Anyone beyond their own [*adherents*] takes in hand Epicurus and Metrodorus

On the Language & Style of Epicurus

1. Clarity Only

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων – ἣν, ὅτι ἰδιωτάτη Ἐστίν – Ἀριστοφάνης, ὁ γραμματικὸς, αἰτιᾶται

He makes use of the principle terminology in accordance with the situations – which, because It is very particular – Aristophanes, the grammarian, criticizes [*him for it*]

σαφὴς δ᾽ Ἦν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς*, Ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν

and He was so clear that even in his *On Rhetoric*, He expects nothing else other than requiring clarity

ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle [here, "standard"]	**ΚΥΡΙΟΣ** *critical / valid*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	**ΚΥΡΙΟΣ** *critical / valid*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular [here, "idiosyncratic"]	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἀξιοῦν	to expect	**ΑΞΙΟΥΝ** *counterbalancing*

2. No Rhetorical "Enhancements"

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.5.14

"sed existimo te sicut nostrum Triarium minus ab eo [Epicuro] delectari, quod ista Platonis Aristoteli Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud quidem adduci uix possum, ut ea quae senserit ille tibi non uera uideantur"

(Torquatus to Cicero) "I think that you, like our friend Triarius, are displeased with Epicurus because he neglected the rhetorical embellishments of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. I find it hard indeed to figure out why you think his opinions untrue."

"Vide quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit: nam et complectitur uerbis quod uolt et dicit plane quod intellegam – et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner; si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aeque satis facit, et quidem locis pluribus"

(Cicero to Torquatus) "You will see, Torquatus" said I, "how mistaken you are. I am not annoyed by this philosopher's style. He is straightforward, expressing simple and plain concepts in a way that is easy to understand; though I do not despise eloquence in a philosopher either – but if he doesn't have it, I do not insist on it. It's in the contents where he does not satisfy me, and in many places."

3. Unconventional Use of Some Terminology

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 2.9.1

Aulus Gellius (fl. 165 CE) was a Roman politician and the compiler of the "Attic Nights" which has many quotes from lost works.

Quod idem Plūtarchus ēvidentī calumniā verbum ab Epicūrō dictum insectātus sit: In eōdem librō idem Plūtarchus eundem Epicūrum reprehendit, quod verbō ūsus sit parum propriō et aliēnae significātiōnis.

How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epicurus: In the same book [of Homer], Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epicurus for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning.

Ita enim scripsit Epicurus "Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις."

Now Epicurus wrote as follows "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains."

Nōn inquit 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος' sed 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ' dīcere oportuit – dētractiō enim significandī est dolōris, nōn, inquit, dolentis.

[Plutarch] declares that [Epicurus] ought not to have said "of everything that pains (**ἀλγοῦντος**)" but "of everything that is painful (**ἀλγεινοῦ**)" – for it is the removal of pain (***doloris***), he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain (***dolentis***).

nimis minute ac prope etiam subfrigide Plutarchus in Epicuro accusando λεξιθηρεῖ – has enim curas vocum verborumque elegantias non modo non sectatur Epicurus, sed etiam insectatur.

Plutarch, in his accusation against Epicurus, is overly meticulous and rather cold, practicing text-hunting (**λεξιθηρεῖ**) – for these concerns of eloquence in words and phrases Epicurus not only does not seek out (**sectatur**) but actually attacks (**insectatur**).

ἡ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις	**detractio dolentis**	*centers on the individual who is experiencing pain*
ἡ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὑπεξαίρεσις	**detractio doloris**	*centers on the experience of pain itself (Plutarch prefers this)*

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.4.12

Itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a uobis non intellegere nos quam dicat Epicurus uoluptatem…

You Epicureans frequently say to us that we do not correctly understand what pleasure might be which Epicurus refers to…

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2 (5) 15

Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus?

Do I seem to grasp the force of the words well enough, or must I still be taught to speak either Greek or Latin?

et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur.

And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language.

quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui σκοτεινάς perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis.

Obscurity may be excused for two reasons: it might be intentional, like with Heraclitus "The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore" or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style – an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus.

Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non volt, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici – sed de illustri et facili et iam in uolgus peruagata loquitur.

but Epicurus, as far as I can tell, neither refuses to speak in a simple and explicit manner whenever he can, nor does he speak here about an obscure subject, such as physics, or an artificial and technical subject, like mathematics – but he speaks of something evident, easy, and already widespread among the the crowd.

4. Unconventional Writing Style

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1 (31) 85

in hāc ita expositā sententiā, sunt Quī existiment quod Ille inscitiā plānē loquendī fēcerat – fēcisse cōnsultō: dē homine minimē vafrō, male Existimant

(Cotta speaking about Epicurus' first Principal Doctrine*)*

in this statement presented in this way, there are Those who believe that what He composed from ignorance in clearly speaking – he had done deliberately: They incorrectly judge regarding the man that is not at all clever

5. Epicurus condemned Dialogues

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.6.18

dum dialecticam contemnit Epicurus – quae ūna continet omnem et perspiciendī, quid in quāque rē sit, scientiam et iūdicandī, quale sit quidque, et ratiōne ac viā disputandī – ruit in dicendō, ut mihi quidem vidētur, nec ea quae docēre vult ullā arte distinguit.

while Epicurus scorns dialectic – which alone contains all knowledge both of seeing what each thing is and of judging what sort of thing something is, and of reasoning and the method of discussion – he, as it seems to me, collapses in speaking, and he distinguishes none of the things he wishes to teach by any method.

6. Blunt & Unpolished

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.9.27

Contemnit enim disserendī ēlegantiam, cōnfūsē loquitur

For he despises the elegance of discourse, he speaks in disorder

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Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 2.50.18

Epicūrum, quem hebetem et rudem dīcere solent Stoicī

Epicurus, whom the Stoics usually describe as blunt and uncultivated

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Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Brutus, 1.44.123

[T. Albucius] fuit Athēnīs adūlēscēns, perfectus Epicūreus ēvāsērat: minimē aptum ad dicendum genus

Titus Albucius grew up in Athens and left there a perfect Epicurean: typically lacking the capacity for eloquence

*Titus Albucius (fl. around 100 BCE) was a Roman orator and Praetor who was educated in Athens. He faced multiple legal challenges in Rome, ultimately being convicted of extortion (*Repetundae Pecuniae*). Following his conviction, he went into exile and settled in Athens.*

Aelius Theon (fl.c. 75 CE), Preliminary Exercises, 2.168

Aelius Theon wrote "Preliminary Exercises" (Progymnasmata), a training manual for orators.

Ἐπιμελητέον δὲ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων πάντα διδάσκοντα ἐξ ὧν Διαφεύξονται τὸ κακῶς συντιθέναι – καὶ μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν – ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Ἡγησίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, καὶ τῶν Ἀσιανῶν καλουμένων ῥητόρων, καί τινα τῶν Ἐπικούρου:

It is also necessary to take care of teaching everything in the composition of words from which [*students*] will escape composing poorly – and especially the metrical and rhythmical style – as many [*works*] of Hegesias the rhetor, and [*the works*] of the so-called Asiatic rhetors, and certain [*works*] of Epicurus

οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα Γράφει "Ὦ, πάντα τἀμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου" καὶ τῶν περιφερομένων δ' ὡς ἐκείνου (Ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν αὐτὰ Εὑρίσκομεν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν αὐτοῦ) "Λέγε δή μοι, Πολύαινε – Συναπέριμεν – μεγάλη Χαρὰ γένηται. ὡς Χαρῶ! ὡς Τέρψωμαι!"

such as He apparently writes to Idomeneus "O, [*you who*] perceived all my movements enjoyable from youth" and of those circulating as his (We have not yet even now found these in his writings) "Tell me, Polyaenus – when We journey together – that great Joy arises. how I rejoice! how I delight!"

τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἐπίμεμπτα – καὶ πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν κακίαν τῆς συνθέσεως: συγγνώμης δ' ἄξιον ὅταν εἰς ἐκεῖνά Τις ἐμπέσῃ ποτὲ τὰ μέτρα – Ἅπερ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ πεζόν (οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἰαμβικόν)

such things therefore are completely blameworthy – and evidently possess the badness of composition: but worthy of pardon when Someone occasionally falls into those meters – Which have a similarity to prose (such as the iambic)

Writers preferring the older Attic style (which they viewed as more concise and pure) often labeled other writers using a later style as being too ornate, elaborate, effeminate and Eastern (the East was generally associated with wealth and easy living). Note that Theon admits he does not have a citation for what he quotes.

ἐμός (ή, όν)	my	**ΕΜΟΣ** *mine*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
τὸ κίνημα **τὰ κινήματα**	[specific] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΜΑ** *result of moving*
τερπνός (ή, όν)	delightful	**ΤΕΡΠΝΟΣ** *satisfying*
τέρπειν	to delight	**ΤΕΡΠΕΙΝ** *satisfying*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*
ἡ χαρά **αἱ χαραί**	joy	**ΧΑΡΑ** *being cheerful*

8. Order of Topics in Epicurus' "Symposium"

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), The Learned Banqueters, 5.187C

Athenaeus of Naucratis (fl.c. 200 CE), wrote Deipnosophistaí "The Dinner Experts" or "The Learned Banqueters" a long comedic dialogue filled with many literary references.

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἶθ' ἑξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσαν τῇ λέξει ἀρρυθμίαν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

Epicurus poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention the rhythmlessness that permeates his style?

9. Discoverer of Truth – Speaking of Emotions

Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy, 2.1

Cleomedes (fl. perhaps around 200 CE) was a Stoic philosopher and astronomer who wrote Kyklikē Theōria Meteōrōn "The Cyclical Theory of Meteors,' which is also known as "Lectures on Astronomy" or "The Heavens."

Οὕτω καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὡς δή τις ὢν ἀλαζονεύεται, ἑαυτόν γε ἐν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καταριθμεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν – καὶ οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι διαβεβαιούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ γε καὶ τοῦ Θερσίτου θρασύτερον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνων.

So Epicurus boasts as if he were someone significant, trying to count himself among the philosophers – and not only that, but he insists on taking the lead, showing himself to be even bolder than Thersites.

Ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ μόνον ὡς ἀριστεὺς καὶ ἴσος τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀλαζονεύεται, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα ἀπονέμει ἑαυτῷ, οὗτος δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῆς τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης μόνος ἀνευρηκέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν διαβεβαιοῦται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι ἀξιοῖ.

For the latter boasted only of being the best and equal to kings, not claiming the foremost place for himself, but this man, under the pretense of great wisdom and knowledge, asserts that he alone has discovered the truth and therefore deserves the leading position.

Ὥστε πολὺ ἄν τις δικαιότερόν μοι ἐδόκει πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν "Θερσῖτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής, Ἴσχεο!" (Homer, Iliad 2.246-247) **Οὐδὲ γὰρ "λιγὺν" ἔγωγε τοῦτον ἂν *τὸν Θερσίτην (Epicurum)* καθάπερ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐκεῖνον, εἴποιμι.**

That is why I would believe it to be quite wrong for someone to say to *him*: "Babbling Thersites, clear orator though you are, be silent!" For I would not also call *this Thersites (Epicurus)* "clear" as Odysseus does the Homeric one,

ἐπεί γε πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν αὐτῷ διεφθορότα ἐστί, σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα λέγοντι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτης πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα, καὶ λίπασμα ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ δάκρυον ὀνομάζοντι καὶ ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα καὶ γαργαλισμοὺς σώματος καὶ ληκήματα καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κακὰς ἄτας.

when on top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. He speaks of "tranquil conditions of flesh" and "the confident expectations regarding it" and describes a tear as a "glistening of the eyes" and speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors.

ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐκ χαμαιτυπείων ἄν τις εἶναι φήσειε, τὰ δὲ ὅμοια τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐν τοῖς Δημητρίοις ὑπὸ τῶν θεσμοφοριαζουσῶν γυναικῶν, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέσης τῆς προσευχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς προσαιτούντων Ἰουδαϊκά τινα καὶ παρακεχαραγμένα καὶ κατὰ πολὺ τῶν ἑρπετῶν ταπεινότερα.

Some of these expressions might be said to be from the brothels, others similar to the things being said at the Demetria by the Thesmophoria-observing women, still others, from the middle of the prayers and from those begging in them, are both distinctly something Jewish and much lower than the reptiles.

All the criticized phrases include a "-ματα" superlative (and a "-ματος") whose usage rose in later Greek. This feature that is present in the quotes might be, in part, what Cleomedes critiques.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.1-5

Sextus Empiricus, was a Pyrrhonist philosopher, who accordingly wrote about many other philosophers with skepticism.

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντίρρησιν κοινότερον μὲν διατεθεῖσθαι δοκοῦσιν Οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρωνος ¬ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δέ διαθέσεως

both those around Epicurus and those around Pyrrho seem more commonly inclined to the opposition toward those from the professions ¬ but not from the same standpoint

ἀλλ' Οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδέν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν – ἤ (ὥς Τινες εἰκάζουσι) τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπαιδευσίας εἶναι Νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθὴς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται ¬ οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων)

Those around Epicurus [*oppose the professions, on the grounds*] that the professions contribute nothing to the perfection of wisdom – or (as some conjecture) thinking this is a cover for their own lack of education (for in many areas Epicurus is refuted as stupid ¬ not even speaking correctly in common conversations)

τὸ μάθημα **τὰ μαθήματα**	profession	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑ** *the result of learning*
ἡ ὁμιλία **αἱ ὁμιλίαι**	association [here, "conversation"]	**ὉΜΙΛΙΑ** *company*

11. Use of Sacred Language

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 2.17.46

Hic quam volet Epicūrus iocētur – Homō nōn aptissimus ad iocandum – minimēque resipiēns patriam

(Balbus) Let Epicurus joke as much as he wishes – a Man not very well-suited to joking – and hardly having the flavor of his fatherland

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.44.123

at etiam liber est Epicūrī De Sanctitāte? Lūdīmur ab homine nōn tam facētō quam ad scrībendī licentiam līberō.

(Cotta) There is even a book by Epicurus On Holiness? We are played by a man not so much witty as free with the license to write.

quae enim potest esse Sanctitās – sī Diī humana nōn cūrant?

what can Holiness exist – if the Gods do not care for humans?

quae autem animāns Nātūra nihil cūrāns?

what is a living Nature that cares about nothing?

12. Chorus of Epicureans
Standing on Fixed Criteria

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. 20 BCE), On the Composition of Words, 24.188

*Dionysius of Halicarnassus was a historian, classicist, and teacher of rhetoric – as well as one of the rumor-spreading madmen (**Οἱ Μεμηνότες**) mentioned by Diogenes Laertius*

Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορόν, οἷς Οὐδὲν μέλει τούτων, Παραιτούμεθα. τὸ γὰρ "οὐκ ἐπιπόνου τοῦ γράφειν ὄντως" ὡς αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος λέγει "τοῖς μὴ στοχαζομένοις τοῦ πυκνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου!" πολλῆς ἀργίας ἦν καὶ σκαιότητος ἀλεξιφάρμακον

We reject the chorus of Epicureans, for whom none of these things matter. The [*idea*] that "the tediousness of composing does not exist" as Epicurus himself says "for those not aiming at frequently shifting criterion!" was a counter-remedy for much idleness and awkwardness

Any attempt to build perfect understanding will collide with the shifting and relative nature of reality.

ἐπίπονος (ος, ον)	tedious	**ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ** *upon toil*
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
στοχαζόμενος (η, ον)	aiming at	**ΣΤΟΧΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *target*
πυκνός (ή, όν)	dense	**ΠΥΚΝΟΣ** *compacting*
πυκνὰ	frequently	
μεταπίπτειν	to shift	**ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling differently*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*

1. On Choices & Avoidances

Περὶ Αἱρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν

[U1]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

…Κύριαι Δόξαι. Περὶ Αἱρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν. Περὶ Τέλους…

…Principal Doctrines. On Choices and Avoidances. On Fulfillment…

1. Untroubledness & Painlessness – Established Pleasures

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.136

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει ¬ Ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος (ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Αἱρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς* καὶ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ Βίων* καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ)

[*Epicurus*] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure: [*the Cyrenaics*] do not include that [*pleasure*] which is established, but only that which consists in motion ¬ He [*admits*] both: [*pleasure*] of mind and of body (as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End* and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene)

[U2]

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος, ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει, λέγουσιν οὕτω "…νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς"

and similarly both Diogenes [*of Tarsus*] in the seventeenth book of his *Epilecta* and Metrodorus, in his *Timocrates*, speak in this way "...while pleasure is considered both according to motion and as established"

Diogenes of Tarsus (**Διογένης ὁ Ταρσεύς**) *was an Epicurean philosopher (2nd century* BCE*). We know he wrote "Selections ('***Ἐπιλέκτα***)," which was at least 20 books long – as well as an "Epitome of Epicurus' Ethical Doctrines."*

Timocrates of Lampsacus (**Τιμοκράτης**) *was Metrodorus's older brother. He left the school due to Epicurus' understanding that pleasure was the telos – and wrote a book "Delights (***Εὐφράντα***)" slandering the school.*

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Αἱρέσεων* οὕτω λέγει "ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ἀταραξία καὶ Ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί ¬ ἡ δὲ Χαρὰ καὶ ἡ Εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται"

Epicurus in *On Choice* speaks in this way "Undisturbedness and Non-suffering exist as established pleasures ¬ but Joy and Merriment are seen from movement through activity"

ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
τὸ σύστημα **τὰ συστήματα**	structure	**ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing together*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
καταστηματικός (ή, όν)	established	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly standing*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
κινεῖν	to move	**ΚΙΝΕΙΝ** *moving*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ἡ ἀπονία **αἱ ἀπονίαι**	non-suffering	**ΑΠΟΝΙΑ** *no toil*
ἡ χαρά **αἱ χαραί**	joy	**ΧΑΡΑ** *being cheerful*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
ἡ φροντίς **αἱ φροντίδες**	consideration	**ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ** *mind*
φρονεῖν	to consider	**ΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ** *mind*
ἡ εὐφροσύνη **αἱ εὐφροσύναι**	merriment	**ΕΥΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of good mind*
τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of working within*
ἡ ἐνέργεια **αἱ ἐνέργειαι**	activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ** *working within*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*

2. Pleasure from Movement

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE*), De Finibus, 2.16*

sin autem voluptātem putat adiungendam eam quae sit "in mōtū" – sic enim appellat hanc dulcem "in mōtū" – illam nihil dolentis "in stabilitāte," quid Tendit?

but if He thinks that pleasure ought to be joined with that which is "in motion" – for in this way He calls this sweet one "in motion" – that of no pain, [*he calls*] "in stability," what is He aiming at?

3. Pleasure is our Guide from Birth

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.31

Quam multa vitiosa! summum enim bonum et malum vagiēns puer utrā voluptāte diiūdicābit? 'stante' an 'movente'? (quoniam, sī dis placet, ab Epicūrō loquī discimus.)

What a mass of fallacies! Indeed, how will a crying newborn judge the highest good and evil? 'static' or 'in movement'? (Inasmuch as, heaven help us, we learn our language from Epicurus.)

4. Stable Pleasure is based in Active Pleasure

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.75

tum enim eam ipsam vīs, quam modo ego dīxī, et nōmen impōnis "in mōtū" ut sit et faciat aliquam varietātem – tum aliam quandam summam voluptātem, quō addī nihil possit, eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit: eam 'stabilem' appellās

for at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle "in motion" as it produces a definite change of feeling – but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, to which nothing can be added, when all pain is gone: this you call 'stable' pleasure

5. Aristotle: All Pleasure is Kinetic

Aristotle, Eudḗmeian Ethics, 8.1249a

Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ᾽ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τά τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα.

We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant.

οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει – διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἥδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν

Pleasure does not occur except in action – on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people think this.

ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστί τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή – καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον, οὐκέτι: οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς

But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the body healthy or not – and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have a certain standard both of character and of choice and avoidance

2. Anaximénēs
Ἀναξιμένης

…Περὶ βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί…

…On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters…

Usener: Perhaps the title was 'Anaximénēs On Kingship.' You might believe that the book was thus titled Anaximénēs' 'Changes of Kings.' Plentiful and favorable subject matter was provided for debating the miserable life of kings.

Excess and Insolence of Kings

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), The Learned Banqueters, 12.531D

Ἀναξιμένης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Βασιλέων Μεταλλαγαὶ περὶ τοῦ Στράτωνος τὰ αὐτὰ ἱστορήσας διημιλλῆσθαί φησιν αὐτὸν Νικοκλεῖ τῷ τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Σαλαμῖνος βασιλεύσαντι ἐσπουδακότι περὶ τρυφὴν καὶ ἀσέλγειαν – ἀποθανεῖν τ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους βιαίως

Anaximénēs, in his book entitled the Reverses of Kings, giving the same account of Strátonos, says that he was always endeavouring to rival Nicocles, who was the king of Salamis in Cyprus, and who was exceedingly devoted to excess and insolence – and that they both came to a violent end

Both Strátonos and Nicocles probably died during the revolt of satraps around 361 BCE, twenty years before Epicurus was born. The author of this book Reverses of Kings would be Anaximénēs of Lampsacus (fl. 340 BCE, about 40 years before Epicurus). Anaximénēs studied under Diogenes the Cynic, joined Alexander's Persian campaigns, and wrote about Homer, history, and rhetoric.

Alexander Threatens Lampsacus

Pausanias, Description of Greece, 6.18.3,4

Pausanias (fl. 150 CE) was a Greek geographer archaeologist. He wrote that Anaximénēs stopped Alexander from attacking Lampsacus.

Λαμψακηνῶν τὰ βασιλέως τοῦ Περσῶν φρονησάντων ἢ καὶ αἰτίαν φρονῆσαι λαβόντων, ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἅτε ὑπερζέων ἐς αὐτοὺς τῇ ὀργῇ κακῶν ἠπείλει τὰ μέγιστα ἐργάσασθαι: οἱ δὲ ἅτε θέοντες περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων καὶ αὐτῆς πατρίδος ἀποστέλλουσιν Ἀναξιμένην ἱκετεύειν, Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τε αὐτῷ καὶ ἔτι Φιλίππῳ πρότερον γεγονότα ἐν γνώσει.

The people of Lampsacus favored the cause of the Persian king, or were suspected of doing so, and Alexander, boiling over with rage against them, threatened to treat them with utmost rigor. As their wives, their children, and their country itself were in great danger, they sent Anaximénēs to intercede for them, because he was known to Alexander himself and had been known to Philip before him.

[Pausanias] **Προσῄει τε ὁ Ἀναξιμένης, καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, πεπυσμένον καθ᾽ ἥντινα αἰτίαν ἥκοι, κατομόσασθαί φασιν ἐπονομάζοντα θεοὺς τοὺς Ἑλλήνων ἦ μὴν αὐτοῦ ταῖς δεήσεσιν ὁπόσα ἐστὶν ἐναντία ἐργάσασθαι. ἔνθα δὴ εἶπεν Ἀναξιμένης 'χαρίσασθαι μοι τήνδε ὦ βασιλεῦ τὴν χάριν, ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα Λαμψακηνῶν, καταβαλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐς ἔδαφος τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν, τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν σφισιν ἐμπρῆσαι'. ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ σόφισμα ἀντιμηχανήσασθαί τι εὑρίσκων καὶ ἐνεχόμενος τῇ ἀνάγκῃ τοῦ ὅρκου συγγνώμην ἔνεμεν οὐκ ἐθέλων Λαμψακηνοῖς.**

Anaximénēs approached, and when Alexander learned for what cause he had come, they say that he swore by the gods of Greece, whom he named, that he would verily do the opposite of what Anaximénēs asked. Thereupon Anaximénēs said, "Grant me, O king, this favour. Enslave the women and children of the people of Lampsacus, raze the whole city even to the ground, and burn the sanctuaries of their gods." Such were his words; and Alexander, finding no way to counter the trick, and bound by the compulsion of his oath, unwillingly pardoned the people of Lampsacus.

Darius III was defeated by Alexander the same year Metrodorus of Lampsacus was born (when Epicurus was 15). So this event would have occurred a little earlier – before the birth of Metrodorus, when Polyaenus of Lampsacus was a child.

Perhaps instead Epicurus' work was a polemic against Anaximénēs of Miletus and his monism. Anaximénēs of Miletus (flourished 545 BCE, about 250 years before Epicurus) believed that air (ἀήρ) can change into water, earth, and fire – and into everything else – by getting thicker or thinner.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 2.3

Ἀναξιμένης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιμάνδρου. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ Παρμενίδου φασὶν ἀκοῦσαι αὐτόν. οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄστρα οὐχ ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀλλὰ περὶ γῆν. κέχρηταί τε λέξει Ἰάδι ἁπλῇ καὶ ἀπερίττῳ. Καὶ γεγένηται μέν, καθά φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος, περὶ τὴν Σάρδεων ἅλωσιν, ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τῇ ἑξηκοστῇ τρίτῃ Ὀλυμπιάδι. Γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι δύο Λαμψακηνοί, ῥήτωρ καὶ ἱστορικός, ὃς ἀδελφῆς υἱὸς ἦν τοῦ ῥήτορος τοῦ τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις γεγραφότος.

Anaximénēs, the son of Eurystratus, a native of Miletus, was a pupil of Anaximander. According to some, he was also a pupil of Parmenides. He took for his first principle, air or that which is unlimited. He held that the stars move round the earth but do not go under it. He writes simply and unaffectedly in the Ionic dialect. According to Apollodorus he was contemporary with the taking of Sardis and died in the 63rd Olympiad. There have been two other men named Anaximénēs, both of Lampsacus, the one a rhetorician who wrote on the achievements of Alexander, the other, the nephew of the rhetorician, who was a historian.

[U3]

* On Ambiguity

Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας

Errors come from Self-Deception

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 5 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 6 sup.)

καταγέλαστογ γὰρ [δή] τι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὅταμ… …ψε[ῦδος]… …μ[ὴ ἕ]τερο[ν]… …μεταφορὰς ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω[στα] ὑ[πὸ τῶγ γν]ωστῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὐ[τ]ῶμ πλάνας ἃς λέγ[ο]μεν ἐν το[ῖ]ς Περὶ Ἀμ[φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμ|μένοις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί τούτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διώρισται μέχρι πόσου φροντιστέον αὐτῶν ἃς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας, καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐμ ποίωι λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον. αἰ[εὶ] δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους π[οιη]τέον, ἐπειδὴ[π]ερ… …τὸμ β[ί]ον…

καταγέλαστον γὰρ δή τι καὶ Τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὅταμ… …Ψεῦδος… …μὴ ἕτερον… …μεταφορὰς ποιεῖν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνωστα ὑπὸ τῶν γνωστῶν ¬ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὑτῶν πλάνας ἃς λέγομεν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας* ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμμένοις.

for This too is indeed something thoroughly ridiculous, whenever… …Falsity… …not different… …[*not because other people are*] making transfers of statements onto unknown [*objects of thought*] from known [*objects*] ¬ but because of their own mistakes, which we discuss in the [*books*] that have been written by us [*entitled*] *On Ambiguity*…

[Sedley] For another absurdity is when… [not because] others transfer words from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our work *On Ambiguity*.

3. Declarations

Αἱ Ἀναφωνήσεις

ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ *speaking up*

Clarification of Terms – The Brief Anger of the Wise Man

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Anger, P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45

Philodemus of Gádara was a student of Zeno of Sidon.

῞Ο τε ἐπιθυμῶν τῆς κολάσεως οὕτω[ι] παρίσταθ' ὡς πρὸς αἱρετὸν δι' αὑτὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν – εἴ γε καὶ συνκαταδύνειν προαιρεῖται, σοφὸν δὲ μανία καὶ διανοεῖσθαι παριστάμενον ὡς πρὸς τοιοῦτο τὴν κόλασιν... ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς Καθηγεμόσιν οὐ τὸ κατ[ὰ] τὴν πρόληψιν [τ]αύτην θυμωθήσεσθαι τὸν σο[φ]όν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοι[ν]οτέραν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἐπίκου[ρ]ος ἐν ταῖς Ἀναφωνήσεσιν [δ]ιασαφεῖ [τό] τε θυμωθήσεσθαι καὶ [τὸ] μετρίως· καὶ ὁ Μητρόδω[ρ]ος, εἰ κυρ[ί]ως λέγει, τὸ [τοῦ] σοφοῦ θυμός συνεμφα[ίνε]ι τὸ λίαν βραχέως.

῞Ο τε ἐπιθυμῶν τῆς κολάσεως οὕτωι παρίσταθ' ὡς πρὸς αἱρετὸν δι' αὑτὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν – εἴ γε καὶ συνκαταδύνειν προαιρεῖται, Σοφὸν δὲ μανία καὶ διανοεῖσθαι παριστάμενον ὡς πρὸς τοιοῦτο τὴν κόλασιν... Ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς Καθηγεμόσιν οὐ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρόληψιν ταύτην θυμωθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινοτέραν.

He who is desirous of punishment is inclined towards vengeance chosen for its own sake – if indeed he also chooses to completely sink down together [along with the object of his vengeance], but it is madness to even consider a wise man being inclined towards such a punishment... and It is acceptable to our Founders not that the wise man gets angry according to this anticipation [*of "rage"*], but (that he gets angry) according to the more general [*anticipation of "anger"*].

[McOsker] And the person who desires punishment is thus inclined toward vengeance, as if toward a thing choice-worthy in itself, even if he is choosing to drown himself together with (his victim), but it is insanity even to imagine a sage being inclined to punishment as if it were such a thing... But also the Founders accept the idea that the wise man will be enraged not according to that preconception, but according to the more general one.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν Ταῖς Ἀναφωνήσεσιν διασαφεῖ "τό τε θυμωθήσεσθαι" καὶ "τὸ μετρίως·" καὶ ὁ Μητρόδωρος, εἰ κυρίως λέγει, "τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ θυμός" συνεμφαίνει "τὸ λίαν βραχέως."

For Epicurus, in the *Declarations* clarifies both "getting angry" and "moderation." And Metrodorus, if he speaks with authority, also shows "the anger of the wise man" to be "very brief."

[McOsker] In fact, Epicurus makes clear in his *First Appellations* both that the sage "will experience rage" and (will experience it) "in moderation" and Metrodorus, if he says "the rage of the wise man" in its proper sense, shows also that he feels it "very briefly."

[McOsker] *"Philodemus means that the Founders understood thymos not in the sense in which Philodemus' opponents use it, 'rage,' but in a more general one, as a synonym for 'anger' generally.*

The Anaphōnḗseis is mentioned only here, and this is its only fragment. Sedley argued that these Anaphōnḗseis should be identified with the 'natural' and primal meanings of words."

Immediate Understanding

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 4)

...φύσις ἐνταύθα κατὰ γε [τὴν] δόξ[αν τ]ὴν [αὐτοῦ] τοῦ πρῷ[τον οἰομ]ένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ πο[τὲ καὶ] ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕ[τως ο]ῦ̓ν καὶ τ[ο]ῦτο [ν]οεῖται [ἐν ἐκ]ίναις τα[ῖ]ς λέξ[εσιν] ἃς ἐν [τῶι] περὶ [τῶμ] πρῶ[τογ] γιγνω[σκ]όντω[ν αὐ]τοὺς γεγράφα[μεν· εἶ]τα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὖ[θις τ]ὸ [β]ιβλίον ἠκριβ[ώσαμεν]... ...καὶ μακρο[τέρ]ως...

...Φύσις, ἐνταῦθα, κατά γε τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρῶτον οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν, καὶ Τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναις ταῖς λέξεσιν ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρῶτον γιγνωσκόντων αὐτοὺς Γεγράφαμεν· εἶτα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὖθις τὸ βιβλίον –Ἠκριβώσαμεν... ...καὶ μακροτέρως...

…the Nature [*of the void exists*], in this respect, according to the judgment of the one who was originally suspecting at once, at some time and in this respect that the void [*exists*]. thus, This [*nature of the void*] too is conceived in those terms which We have composed in the work concerning those first [*men*] knowing those [*words*]. but then, [*when we*] took up [*our*] book again – We have made precise… …and more extensively…

Natural Generation of Words

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), On Textual Criticism, P.Herc. 1012, col. 67, lines 7 – 9

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE) was an Epicurean who wrote about geometry, poetry, music, meteorology, and the nature of the gods.

φύσει τὰς πρῶτας τῶν ὀνομάτων Ἀναφωνήσεις γεγονέναι Λέγομεν

We say that the first Declarations of words came into being by nature

[U4]

4. Antidorus

in two books

Ἀντίδωρος β᾽

This may be referring to Antidorus of Cyme.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…***Μητρόδωρος ε᾽. Ἀντίδωρος β᾽. Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην***…

…*Metrodorus, in five books. Antidorus, in two books. Judgments about Diseases, Dedicated to Mithres*…

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 32, p. 1126A

Εἰ γὰρ Πρὸς Ἀντίδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σοφιστὴν γράφων (Colotes) ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἄν τις εἶπεν αὐτῷ "*μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείτωσαν*."[Euripides, Orestes, 258] **εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν**.

If, (Colotes) had directed a book against Antidorus or the sophist Bíon, regarding laws and government and ordinances, no one would have retorted, "*Oh poor wretch, lie still in your blankets, and cover your miserable flesh; accuse me of these things only after having real-life experience managing a household and political service*." But such are exactly whom Colotes has insulted.

Antidorus of Cumae was an Ancient Greek grammarian who lived during the time of Epicurus.

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8

…καὶ Ἀντίδωρον "Σαννίδωρον"

…[*Epicurus used to call*] Antidorus "wood-giver"

σαννυρίζειν	to mock	ΣΑΝΝΥΡΙΖΕΙΝ *to poke repeatedly*

5. Aristobuolos

Ἀριστόβουλος

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Περὶ Φαντασίας***. ***Ἀριστόβουλος***. ***Περὶ Μουσικῆς***...

...On Appearance. Aristobuolos. On Music...

Friends as Sources of "Security" & "Gaiety"

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 22.1103A

Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Μητρόδωρος καὶ Πολύαινος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος "ἐκθάρσημα" καὶ "γῆθος" ἦσαν – ὧν τοὺς πλείστους θεραπεύων νοσοῦντας, ἢ καταθρηνῶν ἀποθνήσκοντας, Διετέλεσε

to Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Aristobuolos were "sources of security" and "gaiety" – He persisted tending for most of them as they were sick, and he mourned as they were dying

These are both uncommon words and are both closely associated with Epicurus.		
τὸ ἐκθάρσημα **τὰ ἐκθάρσηματα**	source of confidence	**ΕΚΘΑΡΣΗΜΑ** *result of holding firmly out*
τὸ γῆθος **τὰ γήθη**	source of gaiety	**ΓΗΘΟΣ** *joy*
It seems to be a shortened version of the more common:		
ἡ γηθοσύνη **αἱ γηθοσύναι**	gladness	**ΓΗΘΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of joy*

Four Brothers Practicing Philosophy Together

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.3

συνεφιλοσόφουν δ᾽ αὐτῷ προτρεψαμένῳ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τρεῖς ὄντες, Νεοκλῆς Χαιρέδημος Ἀριστόβουλος – καθά φησι Φιλόδημος ὁ, Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς τῶν *Φιλοσόφων* συντάξεως

at his instigation Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobuolos, who were his three brothers, practiced philosophy together – according to Philodemus the Epicurean, in the tenth book of [*Philodemus'*] comprehensive work *On Philosophers*

Epicurus titles many of his book with the name of an individual. He dedicated books to his brothers, Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobuolos – and he wrote other books that contained the praise of his friends, such as Eurylochus, Hegesianax, Themista, and Metrodorus.

In contrast, he also wrote books that contained criticism of others, such as Antidorus and Timocrates.

*[Usener] It seems to be along these lines that the Epicurean Karneîskos, wrote a book about Philísta (***Φιλίστα***), of which some tattered remains were preserved in the Herculaneum papyrus. Along with the title* ***Καρνείσκου Φιλίστα***, *this work reveals that a certain Philísta was presented as a model for wisely regulating life, giving instructions on how to live, discussing questions, and refuting the opinions of others.*

If you follow these traces of imitation, you will understand how it could happen that praises of Metrodorus or Themista by Epicurus could grow into both numerous and large volumes.

Always Mindful of the Natural Goal & the Best Life

Karneîskos, Philísta, P.Herc. 1027, fr. 192, col. 11, 12

Karneîskos (fl. around 285 BCE) was an Epicurean philosopher and disciple of Epicurus.

...Ἀλλὰ γόη[τες πάν]τε[ς ε]ὑρίσκοντα[ι] κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό[πον] ἀποθεω[ρο]ύ[μ]ενοι, μακρὰν ἀ[πέ]χοντες τοῦ τῶν δεόντων λέγειν περὶ φιλίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὅσα συντεί[ν]ει πρὸς τὸ βιῶσαι μακαρίως. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Φιλίσταν καλῶς ἐκ μειρακίου κατακοσμηθένθ' ὑπὸ τοιούτου [ε]ἶ[δον λό]γ[ο]υ μέχρι τε[λευτῆς, ὥσπερ] καὶ δ[εό]ν[τως τὸν οὐ]δεμίαν πω [κακίαν λ]αβόντα... καὶ ἀεὶ μεμνημένον, καθ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τέλους καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλλιπόντα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου παρὰ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖ[ν] τῶ[ν] παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖ[ς] περιβλέπτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος οὐθὲν ἔχοντα δυσχερὲς οὐδ' ε[ἰ]ς τὸν λοιπὸν αἰῶνα σχ[ή]σοντα...

...ἀλλὰ Γόητες Πάντες εὑρίσκονται – κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον ἀποθεωρούμενοι – μακρὰν ἀπέχοντες τοῦ τῶν δεόντων λέγειν περὶ φιλίας (ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν Ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς τὸ βιῶσαι μακαρίως)

...but All are found to be Charlatans – while being looked upon according to the outlined method – while keeping far away from saying the necessary things about friendship (or from the other things That contribute to living happily)

ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Φιλίσταν καλῶς ἐκ μειρακίου κατακοσμηθένθ' ὑπὸ τοιούτου Εἶδον λόγου μέχρι τελευτῆς – ὥσπερ καὶ δεόντως τὸν οὐδεμίαν πω κακίαν λαβόντα...

from which indeed I also saw Philísta properly adorned from youth by such a reasoning [*i.e., by Epicurus' philosophy*] until death – and just as is proper for one who had not yet taken on any vices...

καὶ ἀεὶ μεμνημένον, καθ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τέλους: καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλλιπόντα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου ¬ παρὰ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περιβλέπτων – ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος, οὐθὲν ἔχοντα δυσχερὲς, οὐδ' εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν αἰῶνα σχήσοντα...

and always mindful, throughout the time in which she lived, of the natural goal: and falling short in no way of the best life ¬ except for not obtaining the things conspicuous among the many – and in the present, [*she*] has nothing unpleasant , nor will have for the remaining perpetuity

It seems that Philísta was raised in the Epicurean tradition. Karneîskos address a certain "Zōpyrus" and writes about how good a person Philísta was. He also goes on to discuss the topic of depression after the death of a friend.

αἰώνιος *(αἰωνιᾱ, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	**ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ** *characterized by being forever*

[6. On the Atoms & the Void]

Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

*...**Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΖ**. **Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ**. **Περὶ Ἔρωτος**...*

...On Nature in thirty-seven books. On the Atoms and the Void. On Love...

[7. On the Angle in the Atom]

Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

*...**Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν**. **Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας**. **Περὶ Ἁφῆς**...*

...On Vision. On the Angle in the Atom. On Touch...

8. On Touch

Περὶ Ἁφῆς

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

*...**Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας**. **Περὶ Ἁφῆς**. **Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης**...*

...On the Angle in the Atom. On Touch. On Destiny...

"Touch is Untrustworthy" – Plato

Plato (fl.c. 388 BCE), Republic, 7.523E

τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ Ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ – καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει, ἐν μέσῳ Τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτῳ;

Well then, what? does Sight sufficiently see the largeness and smallness [*of one's fingers*] – and does it in no way make a difference for [*sight*], whether a certain one of them lies in the middle or at the edge [*of the hand*]?

καὶ ὡσαύτως, πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα, ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα, ἡ Ἁφή;

and likewise, does Touch [*perceive*] thickness and subtlety ¬ or softness and hardness?

καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι Αἰσθήσεις ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν;

and do not the other Senses also adequately reveal such things?

ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ Ἑκάστη αὐτῶν: πρῶτον μὲν, ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη Αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι – καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταὐτὸν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη;

or does Each of them act in this way: first, the Sense assigned to hardness – is necessarily also assigned to softness – and it reports to the soul that it is perceiving the same thing as both hard and soft?

[James Adam] It should be remembered that touch does not always report that an object is both hard and soft, but only when it feels the object is hard in relation to one thing and soft in relation to another, and similarly in other cases. This limitation is expressed by **αἰσθανομένη**, *and explains its emphatic position.*

Plato quickly follows this with praise for mathematics and geometry.

"Touch is Bestial" – Aristotle

Aristotle (fl. 344 BCE), Nikomácheian Ethics, 1118b.1

κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ᾽ ἣν ἡ Ἀκολασία: καὶ Δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι – ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρωποί Ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ζῷα – τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες

Indeed, [*Touch is*] the most common of the sensations through which Intemperance [*exists*]: and It would rightly seem to be shameful – because it does not exist [*for us*] in so far as We we are humans, but [*to the extent that we are*] animals – therefore to enjoy and love these things most of all is bestial

καὶ γὰρ, αἱ Ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται – οἷον Αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι.

indeed, the most Noble of the pleasures through touch have been set apart – such as Those arising in the gymnasia through rubbing and warming.

οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου Ἁφή ¬ ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη

for the Touch of the unrestrained is not about the entire body ¬ but [*only*] around certain parts

9. On Kingship
Περὶ Βασιλείας

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης...

...*Kallistólas*. *On Kingship*. *Anaximénēs*...

[U5]

Do Not Study Entertainment

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1095C

Ἐπίκουρος... προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατηγικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαινομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

Epicurus... does not allow room for musical problems or critical philological inquiries [even] with a drink, but actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U6]*

Vanity of Political Awareness

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 33.1127A

Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν ἐστι, ὅτι τοσούτων ὄντων φιλοσόφων μόνοι σχεδὸν ἀσύμβολοι τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τραγῳδιῶν ποιηταὶ καὶ κωμῳδιῶν ἀεί τι πειρῶνται χρήσιμον παρέχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας: οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα – καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν – καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι

And it is not the greatest indignity, that, of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them any thing of their own; but far worse is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defense of the laws and policy, these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal – of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence – and of royalty, that we may shun living with kings.

What is grave is not so much that among so many philosophers these alone (one might say) enjoy the advantages of civilized life without paying their share; it is that poets, both tragic and comic, are always trying to convey some useful lesson and take the side of law and government; whereas these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Epameinṓndas (fl. 375 BCE) was an elite Theban, statesman, and general whose victories notably weakened Spartan dominance and led to the brief period of Theban hegemony. Despite his significant impact, the effects of his reforms were short-lived and helped set the stage for the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander the Great.

Τοὺς δὲ πολιτικοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ γέλωτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν "ἐσχηκέναι τι" λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ "μικκόν" – οὑτωσὶ τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες! αὐτὸν δὲ "Σιδηροῦν Σπλάγχνον" ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τί παθὼν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἴκοι καθῆτο δηλαδὴ περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ὅλος καθεστώς. ἃ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας ἐξορχούμενος πολιτείαν γέγραφεν οὐκ ᾤμην δεῖν παρεῖναι λέγει δέ, ὅτι "τῶν σοφῶν τινες ὑπὸ δαψιλείας τύφου οὕτω καλῶς συνεῖδον τοὔργον αὐτῆς, ὥστ᾽ οἴχονται φερόμενοι πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς Λυκούργῳ καὶ Σόλωνι ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ βίων λόγους καὶ ἀρετῆς."

Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epameinṓndas had "something of good" but "very little" – for that is the very word they use! They moreover call him "iron-hearted," and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a night-cap on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his belly. But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Metrodorus writes in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus "Some, through an abundance of vanity and arrogance, have so deep an insight into the business of it, that in treating about the precepts of good life and virtue, they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon."

They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epameinṓndas, who they say had but "one good thing about him," and even that "small" (for this is their expression), and dubbing the man himself "iron-guts" and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head, wholly concerned (we must suppose) with the care and feeding of his belly. And Metrodorus" frivolous dismissal of the state in his work On Philosophy should not, I believe, be allowed to pass unnoticed. "Certain sages," he says, "in their prodigality of conceit, have been so well able to detect the function of the state that in their discourse about ways of life and about virtue they go flying off after the same desires as Lycurgus and Solon."

σιδηροῦς *–οῦν*	made of iron	**ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ** *iron*
τὸ σπλάγχνον	guts	**ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΝ** *entrails of a sacrifice*
σιδηροῦς σπλάγχνος	iron guts	**ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΣ**

10. On Lifestyles

in four Books

Περὶ Βίων Δ

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

…Ἡγησιάναξ. Περὶ Βίων, τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας…

…Hegesianax. On Lifestyles, in four books. On Fair Dealing…

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν (ἔχει) τὰ περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*.

His ethical doctrine deals with choice and avoidance, which may be found in the books On Lifestyles, in the letters, and in the book *On Fulfillment*.

[U7]

1.1 Pleasures of Body & Mind

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.136

Ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος (ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Αἱρέσεως* καὶ Φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ Βίων* καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ)

[*Epicurus admits*] both: [*pleasure*] of mind and of body (as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End* and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene)

[U8]

1.2 Avoid Politics

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

Οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεται [ὁ σοφός], ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Βίων. οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν.

Nor will [the wise man] take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant.

[The Sage] will not get involved in politics, as he relates in his first book On Lifestyles, nor will he make himself a tyrant.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Letters to Atticus, 14.20,5

Epicuri mentionem facis et audes dicere "μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι."

You mention Epicurus and dare to say "stay out of politics."

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Letters to Friends, 7.12 (February, 53 BCE)

Mirabar quid esset, quod tu mihi litteras mittere intermisisses: indicavit mihi Pansa meus Epicureum te esse factum. O castra praeclara! quid tu fecisses, si te Tarentum et non Samarobrivam misissem? iam tum mihi non placebas, cum idem tuebare quod Zeius, familiaris meus. sed quonam modo ius civile defendes, cum omnia tua causa facias, non civium? Ubi porro illa erit formula fiduciae 'UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET?

I was wondering what had made you [Caius Trebatius Testa] cease writing to me. My friend Pansa [Caius Vibius Pansa] has informed me that you have become an Epicurean! What a wonderful camp yours must be! What would you have done if I had sent you to Tarentum instead of Samobriva? I was already a little doubtful about you, when I found you supporting the same doctrine as my friend Selius! But on what ground will you support the principles of civil law, if you act always in your own interest and not in that of your fellow citizens? What, too, is to become of the legal formula in cases of trust, "as should be done among honest men"?

Quis enim est, qui facit nihil nisi sua causa? quod ius statues 'COMMVNI DIVIDVNDO,' quom commune nihil possit esse apud eos, qui omnia voluptate sua metiuntur? quo modo autem tibi placebit 'IOVEM LAPIDEM IVRARE,' cum scias Iovem iratum esse nemini posse? quid fiet porro populo Ulubrano, si tu statueris πολιτεύεσθαι non oportere? qua re si plane a nobis deficis, moleste fero, sin

Pansae adsentari commodumst, ignosco; modo scribe aliquando ad nos quid agas et a nobis quid fieri aut curari velis.

For who can be called honest who does nothing except on his own behalf? What principle will you lay down "in dividing a common property" when nothing can be "common" among men who measure all things by their own pleasure? How, again, can you ever think it right to swear by Jupiter lapis, when you know that Jupiter cannot be angry with anyone? What is to become of the people of Ulubrae, if you have decided that it is not right to take part in civic business? Wherefore, if you are really and truly a pervert from our faith, I am much annoyed; but if you merely find it convenient to humor Pansa, I forgive you. Only do write and tell us how you are, and what you want me to do or to look after for you.

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On the Laws, 1.13.39

Sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deseruientes, atque omnia quae sequantur in uita quaeque fugiant uoluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes, etiam si uera dicant –nihil enim opus est hoc loco litibus – in hortulis suis iubeamus dicere, atque etiam ab omni societate rei publicae (cuius partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse uoluerunt) paulisper facessant rogemus.

To those, however, indulgent and subservient to the body, and weighing all things that follow in life and that they seek or avoid according to pleasures and pains, even if they speak truths – for there is no need for disputes here – in their small gardens let us allow them to speak, and even from all association with the state (of which part they neither know any nor ever wished to know) let us ask that they withdraw for a while.

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1127D

Εἴπερ οὖν οἱ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας ἀναιροῦντες τὸν βίον ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ Μητρόδωρος τοῦτο ποιοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν συνήθεις ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν – τοῖς δὲ πράττουσιν ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες τῶν δὲ νόμων παρακελευόμενοι περιφρονεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ προσῇ φόβος πληγῆς καὶ κολάσεως: οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσται τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης – ἡλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων κατηγόρηκεν.

If then those who abolish the laws, governments, and policies of men subvert and destroy human life, and if Metrodorus and Epicurus do this, dissuading their friends from doing common things – being hostile to those who are actively engaged, and speaking ill of the foremost and wisest lawmakers, urging to despise the laws, unless there is present a fear of strike and chastisement: I do not see that Colotes has falsely attributed against the other philosophers – as much as he has alleged true ones against the writings and doctrines of Epicurus.

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1127A

Οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 31.1125C

Οὐδεὶς οὖν ἔπαινος ἄξιος ἂν γένοιτο τῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τὰ θηριώδη νόμους θεμένων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν. ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα συγχέοντες καὶ καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ πολιτείας ἀφιστάντες αὑτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας; οὐχ οἱ "τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις" λέγοντες;

> No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from the government? Are they not those who say that "the crown of untroubledness is incompatible with great positions of leadership"?

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Advice about Keeping Well, 135B

Οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲ πολιτικὸν οὐδ' ἀνθρωπικὸν ἀλλ' ὀστρέου τινὸς ζωῇ προσεοικὸς ἢ στελέχους τὸ ἀμετάστατον τοῦτο καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἐν τροφαῖς καὶ ἀποχαῖς καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ ἡσυχίαις εἰς ἐπίσκιόν τινα βίον καὶ σχολαστὴν καὶ μονότροπόν τινα καὶ ἄφιλον καὶ ἄδοξον ἀπωτάτω πολιτείας καθίσασιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ συστείλασιν· οὐ "κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν" ἔφη, "γνώμην."

> For it is not safe, nor easy, nor befitting a citizen or a man, but like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree–this immutability and forced compliance in the matter of food and abstinence, movement and rest; it is fitting only for men who have reduced and restricted themselves to a retired, idle, solitary, friendless, and inglorious life, far removed from the duties of citizenship. 'No,' said he 'it fits not with my opinion.'
>
> For it is a life neither safe, easy, politic, nor like a man, but more like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree, to live so without any variety, and in restraint as to our meat, abstinence, motion, and rest; casting ourselves into a gloomy, idle, solitary, unsociable, and inglorious way of living, far remote from the administration of the state, at least (I may say) in my opinion.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀργίας ὤνιον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀπραξίας, ἅ γε δὴ μέγιστα κακῶν ταῖς νόσοις πρόσεστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ τὰ ὄμματα τῷ μὴ διαβλέπειν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τῷ μὴ φθέγγεσθαι φυλάττοντος ὁ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀχρηστίᾳ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ σῴζειν οἰόμενος·

> For health is not to be purchased by idleness and inactivity, which are the greatest evils attendant on sickness, and the man who thinks to conserve his health by uselessness and ease does not differ from him who guards his eyes by not seeing, and his voice by not speaking.
>
> For health is not to be purchased by sloth and idleness, for those are chief inconveniences of sickness; and there is no difference between him who thinks to enjoy his health by idleness and quiet, and him who thinks to preserve his eyes by not using them, and his voice by not speaking.

1.3 Avoid Public Service

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Advice about Keeping Well, 135C

Πρὸς οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑαυτῷ χρήσαιτ' ἄν τις ὑγιαίνοντι κρεῖττον ἢ πρὸς πολλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους πράξεις. ἥκιστα δὴ τὴν ἀργίαν ὑγιεινὸν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ τὸ τῆς ὑγιείας τέλος ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ οὐδ' ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ μᾶλλον ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας·

> For a man in good health could not devote himself to any better object than to numerous humane activities. Least of all is it to be assumed that laziness is healthful, if it destroys what health aims at; and it is not true either that inactive people are more healthy.

For such a man's health will not be any advantage to him in the performance of many things he is obliged to do as a man. Idleness can never be said to conduce to health, for it destroys the very end of it. Nor is it true that they are the most healthful that do least.

Οὔτε γὰρ Ξενοκράτης μᾶλλον διυγίαινε Φωκίωνος οὔτε Δημητρίου Θεόφραστος, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ὤνησε πρὸς τὴν ὑμνουμένην "σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν" ἡ πάσης φιλοτιμίαν ἐχούσης πράξεως ἀπόδρασις. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέραις ἐπιμελείαις διασωστέον ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἕξιν, ὡς παντὸς βίου καὶ νόσον δεχομένου καὶ ὑγίειαν.

For Xenocrátēs did not keep in better health than Phōkíōnos, nor Theophrastus than Demetrius, and the running away from every activity that smacked of ambition did not help Epicurus and his followers at all to attain their much-talked-of condition of "perfect bodily health." But we ought, by attention to other details, to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies, recognizing that every life has room for both disease and health.

For Xenocrátēs was not more healthful than Phōkíōnos, or Theophrastus than Demetrius. It signified nothing to Epicurus or his followers, as to that so much talked of "good habit of body" that they declined all business, though it were never so honorable. We ought to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies by other means, knowing every part of our life is capable of sickness and health.

x

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 90.35

Non de ea philosophia loquor, quae ciuem extra patriam posuit, extra mundum deos, quae uirtutem donauit uoluptati.

The philosophy I speak of is not the one which takes the citizen out of public life and the gods out of [our] world, and hands virtue over to pleasure.

x

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 2.380

Epicurus cum dicat propter uoluptatem omnia esse facienda, exclaudit ab officiis actuque ciuili sapientem et sibi tantum oportere uiuere adfirmat.

Epicurus, saying that everything is done for the sake of pleasure, dissuades the Sage from duty and political activity, and asserts that he need only live for himself.

[U9]

x

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Leisure (to Serenus), 3.2

Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit, Epicurus ait "non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens nisi si quid interuenerit·" Zenon ait "accedet ad rem publicam nisi si quid inpedierit." alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa.

The two most prominent sects, the Epicureans and the Stoics, disagree especially in this matter, but each sends [its followers] to leisure by a different path, Epicurus says "The Sage will not engage in public affairs except in an emergency." Zeno says "He will engage in public affairs unless something prevents him." One seeks leisure purposefully, the other as a consequence.

[U10]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 27 (32)

Κα[τ'] οὐδ[έτερο]ν γὰρ τ[ρό]πον τῶν ἐ[κ]κειμένων τέχνην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικήν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχε[ι] τὴν μεθοδικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ τὴν τὸ ἑστηκὸς προσφερομένην, ὁμολογοῦσιν – ὅτι [δ'] οὐδὲ τὴν παρατήρησιν (τὴ[ν τοῦ] ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κα̣[ὶ] κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον στοχαζομένην) – Ἐπίκουρ̣[ος] ἐν τῶι πρώτω̣ι Π̣[ερὶ] Β̣ίων κ̣αὶ ἐν τῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορ[ι]κ̣[ῆς] π̣οιεῖ φα[νερὸν] καὶ Μ̣[η]τρόδωρ[ο̣ς ἐν] τ̣ῶι Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυσ[ιολογί]ας Λέγο̣[ν]τ̣[α]ς Ἀγα[θοὺς εἶ]να̣[ι] Ῥήτορας

Κατ' οὐδέτερον γὰρ τρόπον τῶν ἐκκειμένων τέχνην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικήν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὴν μεθοδικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ τὴν τὸ ἑστηκὸς προσφερομένην, ὁμολογοῦσιν – ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ τὴν παρατήρησιν (τὴν τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον στοχαζομένην) – Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῶι πρώτωι Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ποιεῖ φανερὸν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῶι Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυσιολογίας Λέγοντας Ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι Ῥήτορας

[Chandler] For in neither one of the two senses which have been set out is it possible to say that political rhetoric is an art: for they are in agreement that it does not possess methodical transmission which contributes to stable knowledge – but that it doesn't [even possess] observation (which aims to achieve its goal most of the time with a reasonable chance of success) – Epicurus makes clear in the first book of *On Ways of Living* and in his *On Rhetoric*, as does Metrodorus in his *Against Those Who Say That From The Study Of Nature Come Good Orators*.

[U11]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολ[λ]ῶν α[ὐτοὺς] Ἀνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ὶ] ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῶ[ι] Συμποσίω[ι Λ]έγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Πε[ρὶ Βί]ων ¬ οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμὲν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[η]ικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρί]σιν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν γ' ἔχει λ[όγου τ]υχεῖν

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν αὐτοὺς Ἀναπαύσωμεν ἐρεύνης καὶ ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῶι Συμποσίωι λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων – οὐδὲ κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐν πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμὲν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

⁂ however, We relieve them from much questioning and from many inquires: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in [*the works*] *On Lives* ¬ nor do We order him to seek a pebble in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic* Rhetoric is shown to exist as an art – [general quotes] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless still require having a reasoning {i.e., giving an explanation}

[Chandler] However, in order to relieve them from having to ask a lot of questions from a lot of people, we say that it is not in the Symposium nor in the On Ways of Life, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack. But we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed – even if the (citations) are shown to strengthen our own judgement, yet they require an argument for all the members of our philosophical school.

Below [U49] Philodemus shows that Sophistic Rhetoric is the practice of composing arguments together and conducting lectures.

[U12]

2.1 Observe Customs

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.31.877-898

...Φύ[σιν τὴν κατὰ] τὸ κρ[ιτήριον ποι]ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶς ἐπί]νοιαν ὠ[φελείας νομί]ζεσθαι. [ἵνα δὲ μὴ] ἐκτείνω [τὸν λόγον,] πάλιν· "ἡμ[εῖς θεοῖς] θύωμέν" φησιν "[ὀσί]ως καὶ καλῶς οὗ [καθ]ήκει κα[ὶ κ]αλῶ‹ς› πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους, μ[η]θὲ[ν] ταῖς δόξαις α[ὑ]τοὺς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων κ[αὶ] σεμοντάτων διαταράττοντε[ς. ἔτι] δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θύω]μεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλε[γον δό]ξης. οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φύσ[ιν θνη]τὴν ὀμοίω[ς τῶι Διὶ] νὴ Δία [διά]γειν, [ὡς φαί]νεται." κάν [τοῖς Πε]ρὶ Βίων δὲ π[ερὶ τῆς] προσκυνή[σεως...]

...Φύσιν τὴν κατὰ τὸ κριτήριον ποιουμένην ὀρθῶς ἐπίνοιαν ὠφελείας νομίζεσθαι. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ἐκτείνω τὸν λόγον, πάλιν· "ἡμεῖς θεοῖς θύωμέν" φησιν "ὁσίως καὶ καλῶς οὗ καθήκει καὶ καλῶς πάντα πράττωμεν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, μηθὲν ταῖς δόξαις αὑτοὺς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ σεμοντάτων διαταράττοντες. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι θύωμεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλεγον δόξης. οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φύσιν θνητὴν ὁμοίως τῶι Διὶ νὴ Δία διάγειν, ὡς φαίνεται." κἀν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων δὲ περὶ τῆς προσκυνήσεως...

> [Obbink] ...To conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard. And, lest I extend my discussion, again "Let us sacrifice to the [gods]" [Epicurus] says "devoutly, and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live [like Zeus], as it seems." And concerning obeisance in *On Lifestyles*...

[U13]*

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.26.730-751

[Ὁ δ΄] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[σεται] καὶ τετηρηκὼς [ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖς φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγ[γηυηκ]ώς, ού μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺς νόμους – ἀλλὰ διὰ φυσικὰς [αἰτίας.] προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ [Βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι [ἡμεῖ]ν φησιν, ούχ ὡς [δυσ]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή[σομεν], ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβαλλουσῶν [δυνά]μει καὶ σπου[δαιότ]ητι φύσεων [ἵνα τά]ς τε τελ[λ]ε[ιότητας] γιγνώσκω[μεν καὶ] τοῖς νόμοις [συμπερι]φοράς.

Ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος φανήσεται καὶ τετηρηκὼς ἅπαντα καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τηρεῖν παρεγγηυηκώς, οὐ μόνον διὰ τοὺς νόμους – ἀλλὰ διὰ φυσικὰς αἰτίας. προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ Βίων οἰκεῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν φησιν, οὐχ ὡς δυσμενῶν τῶν θεῶν εἰ μὴ ποιήσομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβαλλουσῶν δυνάμει καὶ σπουδαιότητι φύσεων ἵνα τάς τε τελειότητας γιγνώσκωμεν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις συμπεριφοράς.

> [Obbink] Furthermore, it will appear that Epicurus loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined his friends to observe them, not only because of the laws – but for physical [causes] as well. For in *On Lifestyles* he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfillments and social conformity with the laws.

[U14]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

Οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ βίων*, οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν.

> [The Sage] does not behave like a Cynic, [As Epicurus says] in the second book *On Lifestyles*, nor becomes a beggar.

[U15]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθέντα τὰς ὄψεις μὴ ἐξάξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φησι.

Even if one's eyes are blinded, he should not remove himself from life, as stated in the same [source].

※ But also, one who has lost their sight should not take themselves out of life, as he says in the same place.

11. Against Democritus
Πρὸς Δημόκριτον

This may not have been stand-alone work, but only a section of On Nature*.*

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100A

καὶ μὴν, ἀπὸ δόξης γίγνεσθαι τινας ἡδονὰς Ἐπίκουρος ὡμολόγει: τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἔμελλεν Αὐτὸς – οὕτω σπαργῶν περιμανῶς, καὶ σφαδάζων πρὸς δόξαν;

and indeed, Epicurus admitted that certain pleasures arise from reputation: and what would he himself not have been likely to do – being so frenziedly puffed up, and twitching for the sake of fame?

ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς, μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ (τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ) ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν ¬ σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν?

so that he not only rejected the founders [*of philosophy*], nor only contended with Democritus (the one from whom was taken the doctrines word-for-word) over syllables and diacritical marks ¬ but also [*Epicurus used*] to say that no one had become wise except himself and his students?

[U16]

Shared Errors – Shared Forgiveness

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 20 (col. 123)

…Φωναῖ[ς μετρίαις θεραπ]εύων, διὰ δὲ τὴ[ν προθυμία]ν αὐτῶν καὶ τήν, [εἵ γ' ἐ]δυνήθησαν, ὠφελίαν ἡμῶν, ἔτι δὲ τὴ[ν] μεριζομένην συνγ[ν]ώ[μ]ην ἐν οἷς διέπεσον, ὡς ἔν τ[ε] τοῖς πρὸς Δημόκρ[ι]τον ἵσταται διὰ τέλους ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κ[αὶ πρὸς] Ἡρακ[λ]είδην…

…φωναῖς μετρίαις θεραπεύων, διὰ δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τήν (εἵ γ' Ἐδυνήθησαν) ὠφελίαν ἡμῶν – ἔτι δὲ, τὴν μεριζομένην συνγνώμην ἐν οἷς Διέπεσον, ὡς ἔν τε τοῖς πρὸς Δημόκριτον ἵσταται διὰ τέλους ὁ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην…

…attending to them with moderate statements, because of their eagerness and (if indeed they were able) their benefit to us – and further, the shared pardon regarding the things in which they erred: just as Epicurus maintains to the end [*i.e., consistently*] in both his writings *Against Democritus* and *Against Heracleides*…

Heracleides of Pontus (fl. 350 BCE) was a pupil of Plato, playwright, and astronomer.

[U17]*

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 1.82

Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus: num igitur aliquis dolor aut omnino post mortem sensus in corpore est? nemo id quidem dicit, etsi Democritum insimulat Epicurus, Democritii negant.

For let the soul perish as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all in the body after death? No one, indeed, asserts that; though Epicurus charges Democritus with saying so; but the disciples of Democritus deny it.

Ne in animo quidem igitur sensus remanet; ipse enim nusquam est – ubi igitur malum est, quoniam nihil tertium est? an quod ipse animi discessus a corpore non fit sine dolore? ut credam ita esse, quam est id exiguum! sed falsum esse arbitror, et fit plerumque sine sensu, non numquam etiam cum voluptate, totumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est; fit enim ad punctum temporis.

No sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere – where, then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected without pain? but even should that be granted, how small a pain must that be! Yet I think that it is false; and that it is very often unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with pleasure: but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is instantaneous.

12. Uncertainties
Διαπορίαι

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27:

...*Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς*. *Διαπορίαι*. *Κύριαι Δόξαι*...

...*Against the Megarians*. *Uncertainties*. *Principal Doctrines*...

[U18]

Following the Laws

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 34.1127D

Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ νομοθέταις ἀλλὰ νόμοις ἐπολέμουν, ἔξεστιν ἀκούειν Ἐπικούρου: ἐρωτᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις

But that they made war not against the lawgivers but against the laws themselves, one may hear and understand from Epicurus. For in his *Uncertainties*, he asks himself:

"εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφός, ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει"

"whether a wise man, will do any thing that the laws forbid, being assured that it will not be known."

καὶ ἀποκρίνεται "οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστι κατηγόρημα" τουτέστι 'πράξω μὲν οὐ βούλομαι δ᾽ ὁμολογεῖν.'

and he answers "that is not so easy to determine simply" that is, ‘I will not act, but I do not wish to admit it either.’

* "The simple (minded) set-up is not easy (to navigate)"

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.9.28

Ex eo quod eam uoluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, uidetur amplexari saepe uehementius, in magnis interdum uersatur angustiis – ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit quod uoluptatis causa non uideatur esse facturus.

Because he seems often more vehement in embracing the pleasure which all people call by that name, he sometimes finds himself in great difficulties – so that, with human conscience set aside, there seems to be nothing so disgraceful that he would not appear to do it for the sake of pleasure.

He often seems unduly eager to approve of pleasure in the common definition of term, and this occasionally lands him in a very awkward position – it conveys the impression that that no action is so base that he wouldn't do it for the sake of pleasure, as long as a guarantee of secrecy was provided.

[U19]

Marriage

[=U94] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

καὶ μη{δὲ} καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν Σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς *Διαπορίαις* – καὶ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως*, κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν καὶ διατραπήσεσθαί Τινας

and the wise Man is not even going to marry and sire children, as Epicurus says in his '*Uncertainties*' – and [*he says*] in '*On Nature*,' that [*some wise men*] will marry at some point according to circumstance in life and Some will refuse [*to marry*]

γαμεῖν	to marry	**ΓΑΜΕΙΝ** *marriage*
γαμήσειν	going to marry	
τεκνοποιεῖν	to sire children	**ΤΕΚΝΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *child gathering*
τεκνοποιήσειν	going to sire children	
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ἡ διαπορία **αἱ διαπορίαι**	uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ** *doubting across*
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
διατρέπειν	to refuse	**ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning thoroughly*

Children

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον 1 - 10

Ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ ὅτι "οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδέχεσθαι" καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ.

Even Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk [in the body] he is no longer able to say anything else. For again, he strongly says that "it is necessary to not marvel at nor accept anything apart from the property of the good" and he is right in maintaining this.

Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that "we ought not to admire or accept anything separated from the nature of good" and he is in the right to maintain it.

Πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσική ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; διὰ γὰρ τὸν μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν μυίδιον μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ αὐτοῦ;

How then are we concerned [for them], if we have no natural affection to our children? Why then do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a tiny little mouse inside [the house] cries out to him?

But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our offspring? Then why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there?

Ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα: οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον: ἐπείτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυίαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει;

But [Epicurus] knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you?

But Epicurus knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it?

Ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι "μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα." ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δ᾽ ἀπολείπει; τί θέλεις; μωροὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὡς τὰ πρόβατα; οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὡς τοὺς λύκους; οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολ είπουσιν.

But Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that "we should not bring up children." But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young.

And does he, who knows all this, dare to say "we should not raise children"? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have, that we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them.

Ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πείθεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πεπτωκός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι μέλλεις ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐκ ἄν σε ἔρριψαν.

Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle that you would say what you have said, they still would not have cast you away.

Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and mother, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.

x

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Marriage Fragment 45 [Haase] by way of St. Jerome (fl.c. 385 CE), Against Jovinianus, 1.48

Epicurus uoluptatis assertor, quamquam Metrodorus discipulus eius Leontion habuerit uxorem, raro dicit sapienti ineunda coniugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis.

Epicurus, champion of pleasure, though his disciple Metrodorus had Leontion as his wife, he said the wise rarely enter into marriage, seeing that marriage entails many nuisances.

Et quomodo diuitiae et honores et corporum sanitates et cetera quae indifferentia nominamus, nec bona nec mala sunt sed uelut in meditullio posita usu et euentu uel bona uel mala fiunt – ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio.

And just as riches, honors, bodily health, and other things which we call indifferent, are neither good nor bad, but stand "midway" so to speak, and become good and bad according to the use and issue – in this way, wives stand on the borderline of good and bad.

Graue autem esse uiro sapienti uenire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

It is, moreover, a serious matter for a Sage to ponder whether he is going to marry a good or a bad woman.

[U20]

Poetry

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1095C

Καίτοι τἆλλα μὲν ἡμῖν ὡς ἐπῆλθεν εἴρηται μουσικὴν δ᾽ ὅσας ἡδονὰς καὶ χάριτας οἵας φέρουσαν ἀποστρέφονται καὶ φεύγουσι, βουλόμενος οὐκ ἄν τις ἐκλάθοιτο, δι᾽ ἀτοπίαν ὧν Ἐπίκουρος λέγει.

So far I have mentioned their views just as they happened to occur to me, but no one could forget, even if he wished, their rejection and avoidance of music with the great pleasures and exquisite delight it brings; the absurd discrepancy of Epicurus' statements sees to that.

Φιλοθέωρον μὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ταῖς *Διαπορίαις* καὶ χαίροντα παρ᾽ ὁντινοῦν ἕτερον ἀκροάμασι καὶ θεάμασι Διονυσιακοῖς, προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν.

On the one hand, he declares in his *Uncertainties* that the Sage is a lover of spectacles and yields to none in the enjoyment of theatrical recitals and shows; but on the other, he does not allow room for musical problems or critical philological inquiries [even] with a drink.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατιωτικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαινομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

But he actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U21]*

Aging

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse 1094E

Ὅτι τοίνυν αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἐτησίαι μαραίνονται μετὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ ἀπολήγουσιν, οὐ λέληθε τὸν Ἐπίκουρον:

Now it has not escaped Epicurus that bodily pleasures, like the Etesian winds, after reaching their full force, slacken and fail.

Διαπορεῖ γοῦν, εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἁφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεσιν. οὐ ταὐτὰ μὲν τῷ Σοφοκλεῖ διανοούμενος, ἀσμένως ἐκφυγόντι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην, ὥσπερ ἄγριον καὶ λυττῶντα δεσπότην.

Thus he raises the problem, if the old wise man, not being able to have intercourse, still enjoys the touches and caresses of the beautiful. In this he is not of the same mind as Sophocles, who was as glad to have got beyond reach of this pleasure as of a savage and furious master.

[13. On Fair Dealing]
Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν...

...On Lifestyles, in four books. On Fair Dealing. Neocles, Dedicated to Themista...

[14. On Justice & the Other Virtues]
Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος...

...On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude...

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), de finibus 2.16, 51

Istorum uerborum, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro: sapientiae fortitudinis iustitiae temperantiae.

Those words, which are very rarely used by Epicurus: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance.

15. On Gifts and Gratitude
Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης...

...On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymḗdēs...

[U22]

Learn the Rules of Grammar

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.49

Πλὴν διττῆς οὔσης γραμματικῆς [1] τῆς μὲν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς τούτων συμπλοκὰς διδάξειν ἐπαγγελλομένης καὶ καθόλου τέχνης τινὸς οὔσης τοῦ γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν [2] τῆς δὲ βαθυτέρας παρὰ ταύτην δυνάμεως: οὐκ ἐν ψιλῇ γραμμάτων γνώσει κειμένης, ἀλλὰ κἀν τῷ ἐξετάζειν τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα λόγου μέρη καὶ εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας θεωρεῖται, πρόκειται – νῦν ἀντιλέγειν οὐ τῇ προτέρᾳ. συμφώνως γὰρ κατὰ πάντας ἐστὶ χρειώδης.

However, with the study of grammar being twofold [1] the one promising to teach the elements and their combinations and being in general an art of writing and reading, and [2] the other being, in comparison, a deeper ability: not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind – it is not our purpose now to invalidate the first; for that it is useful is agreed by all men.

Ἐν οἷς θετέον καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεχθραίνειν· ἐν γοῦν τῷ *περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος* ἱκανῶς πειρᾶται διδάσκειν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῖς σοφοῖς μανθάνειν γράμματα. καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπαιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς, οὐ σοφοῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.

and amongst them we must place Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors; in his book *On Gifts and Gratitude* he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn grammar. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all men.

[16. On Films]

Περὶ Εἰδώλων

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…*Προτρεπτικός*. *Περὶ Εἰδώλων*. *Περὶ Φαντασίας*…

…Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films. On Appearance…

17. On Destiny

Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…*Περὶ Ἁφῆς*. *Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης*. *Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην*…

…On Touch. On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timocrates…

[U23]

[Divine Assistance]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.37.1061

…Κἀν τ[ῶι γε Π]ερὶ τῆς Εἱμ[αρμέ]νης ὑπὲρ τ[ῆς] ἐκ[εί]νων συνεργία[ς] ἀποφαίνεται.

…Κἀν τῶι γε *Περὶ τῆς Εἱμαρμένης* ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων συνεργίας ἀποφαίνεται

And in his book *On Destiny* there is an exposition concerning the assistance provided by them

18. The Big Summary

Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή

[U24]

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ* Φησι κατ᾽ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ά *Περὶ Φύσεως*} τὸ Πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν: σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ᾽ ἣν, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ Ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον

but indeed {He also says this in the *Big Summary* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature*} the Universe exists as bodies and as void: that bodies exist, Sensation itself in all [cases] testifies – using this [sensation], the Unseen must be inferred by reasoning

τεκμαίρεσθαι	to judge [from indications]	**ΤΕΚΜΑΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *definitive sign* *[of boundary]*

[U25]

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ᾽ καὶ ιε᾽ καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Big Summary*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

[U26]

Time – No Proof Needed

[=U79] *Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.73*

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ᾽ ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Hicks] "No further proof is required we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts – and likewise to feelings [of pleasure and pain] and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word 'time.'"

[Bailey] "For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it – and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time."

[U27]

19. The Small Summary

Μικρὰ Ἐπιτομή

The Small Summary is usually considered to be the letter to Herodotus – however the quote below is not preserved in the letter to Herodotus.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.135

μαντικὴν δ᾽ ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις Ἀναιρεῖ – ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μικρᾷ Ἐπιτομῇ*, καί φησι:

in other [*writings, Epicurus*] rejects all prophecy – as in the *Small Summary*, he also says:

"Μαντικὴ οὖσα ἀνύπαρκτος – εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτή: οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡγητέα τὰ γινόμενα"

"Prophecy is non-existent – but even if existent: what comes [*from it*] ought to supposed as nothing to us"

τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν – καὶ ἐπὶ πλείω διείλεκται ἀλλαχόθι

[*he says*] this much about things pertaining to lifestyle – and he has conversed to a larger [*extent*] elsewhere

ὁ μάντις οἱ μάντεις	prophet	ΜΑΝΤΙΣ *oracle*
μαντικός *(ή, όν)*	prophetic	ΜΑΝΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of an oracle*
ἡ μαντική αἱ μαντικαί	prophecy	ΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ *characteristic of an oracle*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	ἍΠΑΣ *all together*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	ΑΛΛΟΣ *another*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
ἡ ἐπιτομή αἱ ἐπιτομαί	summary	ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗ *to cut upon*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
	Part 2	
ἡ μαντική αἱ μαντικαί	prophecy	ΜΑΝΤΙΚΗ *characteristic of an oracle*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἀνύπαρκτος (ον)	non-existent	ΑΝΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ *not beginning before*
ὑπαρκτός (ή, όν)	existent	ΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ *beginning before*
οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
δήπουθεν	presumably	ΔΗΠΟΥΘΕΝ *from somewhere indeed*
ἡγεῖσθαι	to suppose	ἩΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ *leading*
ἡγητέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be supposed	ἩΓΗΤΕΟΣ *leading*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
	Part 3	
τοσοῦτος *(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)*	so long [here, "so much"]	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ *this so much*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
βιωτικός *(ή, όν)*	pertaining to lifestyle	ΒΙΩΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of life*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
ἐπὶ πλείω	to a larger [extent]	
λέγεσθαι	to be said	ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ *speaking*
διαλέγεσθαι	to converse	ΔΙΑΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ *speaking across*
ἡ ἀλλαγή αἱ ἀλλαγαί	change	ΑΛΛΑΓΗ *other*
ἀλλαχόθι	elsewhere	ΑΛΛΑΧΟΘΙ *at a place other*

Prophecy does not exist. However, even if the predictions of diviners were real and sufficiently unambiguous to be actionable – those predictions still could not add anything to our life: because they cannot add to our already existing state of total pleasure (which we already easily achieve by fulfilling our natural and necessary needs).

Consider Torquatus (De Finibus 1.72) "Should [Epicurus], like Plato, have wasted his days studying music, geometry, arithmetic and astronomy? Those subjects start from false premises and so cannot be true. And even if they were true, they have no bearing on whether we live more pleasantly."

[20. On Love]
Περὶ Ἔρωτος

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...***Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ***. ***Περὶ Ἔρωτος***. ***Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς***...

...On the Atoms and the Void. On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists...

[21. Eurylochus, Dedicated to Metrodorus]
Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Συμπόσιον***. ***Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον***. ***Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν***...

...Symposium. Eurylochus, Dedicated to Metrodorus. On Vision...

22. On Piety
Περὶ Εὐσεβείας

Use of Religious Terminology

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.14.115

(Cotta) **At etiam *De Sanctitate*, *De Pietate* aduersus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas, non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem – nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus – deorum inmortalium templa et aras euerterit.**

(Cotta) It is true that Epicurus wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Piety* towards the gods. But what does he actually say? You would imagine that you were listening to the high priests such as Coruncianus or Scaevola and not to the man who destroyed the whole foundation of religious faith – not by by force, as Xerxes did, but by deliberation – and overturned the altars and the temples of the gods.

Quid est enim cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant – sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant?

How can you say that mankind should revere the gods, if the gods not only have no care for man – but they care for nothing whatsoever, doing nothing?

Maintaining Holiness

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.14.123

[Cotta] **At etiam liber est Epicuri *De Sanctitate*. ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero! quae enim potest esse sanctitas – si di humana non curant?**

[Cotta] But there even is a book by Epicurus *On Sanctity*. In this book the reader is fooled by a man who wrote not so much with irony as with wild abandon! For how is holiness able to exist – if the gods do not care for humans?

23. Hegesianax
Ἡγησιάναξ

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...Περὶ Ὁσιότητος. Ἡγησιάναξ. Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα...

...On Holiness. Hegesianax. On Lifestyles, in four books...

Experiencing Emotions

[=U120] Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1101A

τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, Μάχονται καὶ Λέγουσι

to those who remove distress and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, They oppose and say that

"τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν – ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, Πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι: καὶ Λυπεῖσθαι καὶ – νὴ Δία! – Λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ Τήκεσθαι"

"impassivity established in apathy exists from another greater evil – of cruelty or of unrestrained vanity and of rage – therefore, to Experience something is better: and to be Distressed and – by Zeus! – to Anoint the eyes and to Melt"

καὶ – ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες – ὑγροί Τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι!

indeed – while experiencing and writing such things – They seem to be moist [*i.e., tipsy*] and friendly!

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε – καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν, τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολὰς Διῆλθον αὐτοῦ...

for Epicurus has said these things in many other contexts – and also while writing about the death of Hegesianax to Dositheus, the father, and to Phyrson [*of Colophon*], the brother of the deceased: for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ ἀπάθεια **αἱ ἀπάθειαι**	absence of experience	**ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ** *not experiencing*
ἀπαθής *(ές)*	apathetic	**ΑΠΑΘΗΣ** *not experiencing*
τὸ ἀπαθὲς **τὰ ἀπαθῆ**	apathy *"the apathetic state"*	**ΑΠΑΘΕΣ** *not experiencing*
καταστηματικός *(ή, όν)*	established	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly standing*

καθιστάναι	to establish	ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *thoroughly standing*
λυπηρός *(ά, όν)*	distressing	ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ *vexation*
ἡ λύπη αἱ λῦπαι	distress	ΛΥΠΗ *vexation*
ἡ ἀλυπία αἱ ἀλυπίαι	impassivity	ΑΛΥΠΙΑ *no vexation*
λυπεῖσθαι	to be distressed	ΛΥΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ *vexation*
ἡ ἀπονία αἱ ἀπονίαι	non-suffering	ΑΠΟΝΙΑ *no toil*
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ *without agitating*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ῩΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ἡ ὠμότης αἱ ὠμότητες	cruelty	ΩΜΟΤΗΣ *condition from being* *savage / raw*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἡ δοξοκοπία αἱ δοξοκοπίαι	vanity	ΔΟΞΟΚΟΠΙΑ *striving toward* *seeming*
κρατεῖν	to prevail	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ *power*
ἄκρατος *(ον)*	unrestrained	ΑΚΡΑΤΟΣ *no power*
ἡ λύσσα αἱ λύσσαι	rage	ΛΥΣΣΑ *fury / frenzy*
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ *enduring*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*
λιπαίνειν	to anoint	ΛΙΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ *fat / oil*
ὁ ὀφθαλμός οἱ ὀφθαλμοί	eye	ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΣ *eye chamber*
κατ' ὀφθαλμούς	directly observable	
τήκεσθαι	to melt	ΤΗΚΕΣΘΑΙ *melt down / pine away*

24. On Pleasure
Περὶ Ἡδονῆς

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 2.27.59

Nos autem ita leues atque inconsiderati sumus, ut si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus?... nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian, nuper apud me, mures corroserunt de re publica debui pertimescere? aut si Epicuri *De Voluptate* liber rosus esset – putarem annonam in macello cariorem fore?

But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life?... Hence, if one follows this type of reasoning, the fact that, recently at my house, mice gnawed my Plato's Republic, should I have been terrified about the [Roman] state? Or what if my book by Epicurus *On Pleasure* had been eaten – should I have thought that the yearly produce in the market will be more expensive?

25. Themista
Θεμίστα

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.21.67

In uestris disputationibus historia muta est, **numquam audiui in Epicuri schola Lycurgum Solonem Miltiadem Themistoclem Epaminondam nominari**, **qui in ore sunt ceterorum omnium philosophorum**... **nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis uoluminibus de Themista loqui**?

In your discourses, history is mute. In the school of Epicurus, I never heard one mention of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, who are always on the lips of the other philosophers... Would it not be better to talk of these than to devote those bulky volumes to Themista?

[U28]*

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 26.62

Inrisa est abs te paulo ante M. Pisonis cupiditas triumphandi... **ea contemnis quae "illi idiotae" ut tu appellas**, **praeclara duxerunt**... **tu tantis nationibus subactis**, **tantis rebus gestis minime fructum laborum tuorum**, **praemia periculorum**, **uirtutis insignia contemnere debuisti**. **neque uero contempsisti**, **sis licet Themista sapientior**...

A short while ago Marcus Piso's desire for a triumph was absurd to you... and you despise the things which "those idiots" as you are pleased to call them, deemed glorious... You, who have conquered nations so mighty, and done deeds so spirited, ought to have been the last to despise the fruit of your labors, the rewards of your risks, and the decoration due to your heroism. Nor indeed did you despise them, even if [you are] wiser than Themista...

After his praetorship, Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus was assigned the province of Spain as proconsul, and when he returned to Rome in 69 BCE, he was given a triumph. Lucretius was around 30 years old at the time.

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.60

Vertes te ad alteram scholam; **disseres de triumpho "quid tandem habet iste currus**, **quid vincti ante currum duces**, **quid simulacra oppidorum**, **quid aurum**, **quid argentum**, **quid legati in equis et tribuni**, **quid clamor militum**, **quid tota illa pompa**? **inania sunt ista**, **mihi crede**, **delectamenta paene puerorum**, **captare plausus**, **vehi per urbem**, **conspici velle**. **quibus ex rebus nihil est quod solidum tenere**, **nihil quod referre ad voluptatem corporis possis**."

Turn to another school, and then speak thus of a triumph "What is the meaning of that chariot? What is the use of those generals bound in front of the chariot? and of the images of towns? and of the gold? and of the silver? and of the lieutenants on horseback? and of the tribunes? What avail all the shouts of the soldiery? and all that procession? To hunt for applause, to be carried through the city, to wish to he gazed upon? Those are mere trifles, believe me, things to please children. There is nothing in all those things which you can grasp as solid, nothing which you can refer to [as causing] pleasure to the body."

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.65

Fac huius odi tanti ac tam universi periculum, si audes. instant post hominum memoriam apparatissimi magnificentissimique ludi, quales non modo numquam fuerunt, sed ne quo modo fieri quidem posthac possint possum ullo pacto suspicari. da te populo, committe ludis. sibilum metuis? ubi sunt vestrae scholae?

Make an experiment of this excessive and universal hatred if you dare. The most carefully prepared and magnificent games within the memory of man are just at hand, games such as not only never have been exhibited, but such that we cannot form a conception how it will be possible for any like them ever to be exhibited for the future. Trust yourself to the people, join in the games. Are you afraid of hisses? Where are all the precepts of your schools?

Ne acclametur times? ne id quidem est curare philosophi. manus tibi ne adferantur? "dolor enim est malum" ut tu disputas; existimatio, dedecus, infamia, turpitudo verba atque ineptiae! sed de hoc non dubito: non audebit accedere ad ludos. convivium publicum non dignitatis causa inibit, nisi forte ut cum P. Clodio, hoc est cum amoribus suis, cenet, sed plane animi sui causa – ludos nobis 'idiotis' relinquet.

Are you afraid that there will be no acclamations raised in your honor? Surely it does not become a philosopher to regard even such a thing as that. You are afraid that violent hands may be laid on you? "Indeed, pain is evil" as you assert. The opinion which men entertain of you, disgrace, infamy, baseness – these are all empty words, mere trifles! But about this I have no question: he will never dare to come near the games. He will attend the public banquet not out of regard for his dignity (unless, perchance, for the purpose of supping with Publius Clodius, that is to say, with those men who love him) but merely for the sake of gratifying his appetite – the games he will leave to us 'idiots.'

{26. Against Theophrastus}

in at least two books

Πρὸς Θεόφραστον

Did both Leontion and Epicurus write "Against Theophrastus" – or just Leontion?

Leontion's "Against Theophrastus"

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.93 (Cotta speaking)

…quandō quidem haec esse in deō propter pulchritūdinem Vultis. Istīsne fidentēs somniīs – nōn modo Epicūrus et Mētrōdōros et Hermarchos contrā Pythagoram, Plātōnem, Empedoclēmque dīxērunt – sed meretrīcula etiam Leontion contrā Theophrastum scrībere ausa est? Scītō, illa quidem sermōne et Atticō – sed tamen, tantum Epicūrī hortus habuit licentiae! (et soletis querī – Zēnō quidem etiam lītīgābat) quid dīcam Albucium?

…since indeed you want these [*parts of the body*] to exist in god because of beauty. Believing in these dreams [*of anthropomorphic gods*] – not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus spoke against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles – but even that little harlot Leontion dared to write against Theophrastus? Mind you, she indeed [*wrote*] even in the Attic diction – but nevertheless, only the garden of Epicurus had these liberties! (you all are also accustomed to complain – indeed, Zeno even used to litigate) why need I mention Albucius?

[Rackham] …Since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leontion to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! such was the license that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius.

Titus Albucius (praetor c. 105 BCE) was a Roman Epicurean who studied in Athens and was well known in Rome for his interest in Greek literature generally – and Epicurus specifically. Cicero remarked that he was "nearly a Greek."

He unsuccessfully accused Mucius Scaevola, the augur, of maladministration in his province. In turn, he was accused of the same offense by Gaius Julius Caesar (the elder) in 103 BCE and was condemned.

Although he faced satire from Lucilius and criticism from Cicero, Albucius' commitment to the Greek language and philosophy was present throughout his life. He continued his philosophical endeavors during his exile in Athens.

Our Zeno of Sidon took the Diotimus the Stoic (fl. c. 100 BCE) to court – Diotimus was accusing Epicurus of vice by forging and spreading fifty obscene letters.

nām Phaedrō nihil ēlegantius, nihil hūmānius, sed stomachābātur Senex sī quid asperius dīxeram ¬ cum Epicūrus Aristotelem uexārit contumēliōsissimē – Phaedōnī Socraticō turpissimē male dīxerit.

nothing could be more elegant, nothing more humane than Phaedrus, but the old man was offended if I said something rather harsh ¬ although Epicurus treated Aristotle with the most contempt – Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates, he foully slandered.

Mētrōdorī sōdālis suī frātrem, Timocratem, quia nescīo quid in philosophiā dissentīret, tōtīs volūminibus concīderit: in Dēmocritum ipsum, quem secūtus est, fuerit ingrātus – Nausiphānem, magistrum suum (ā quō nōn nihil didicerat) tam male accēperit

[Epicurus] also pelted Timocrates, the brother of his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes because he disagreed for some reason in philosophy: he was ungrateful even to Democritus himself, whom he followed – Nausiphanes, his teacher (from whom he had learned something) he treated very badly

x

Pliny, Inquiry on Nature, Preface 28 - 30

Ego, plane meis adici posse multa confiteor, nec his solis, sed et omnibus quos edidi, ut obiter caveam 'istos Homeromastigas' (ita enim verius dixerim) quoniam audio et Stoicos et dialecticos, Epicureos quoque (nam de grammaticis semper expectavi) parturire adversus libellos quos de grammatica edidi, et subinde abortus facere iam decem annis – cum celerius etiam elephanti pariant!

I plainly confess that many things can be added to my works, not only to these alone, but also to all that I have published, so that in passing I may insure myself against 'those scourges of Homer' (that would be the more correct term) as I am informed that both the Stoics and the dialecticians, and even Epicureans (for I have always expected [this] regarding the grammarians) they are laboring against the booklets I published on grammar, and for ten years now they've had miscarriages – while even elephants give birth more quickly!

Ceu vero nesciam adversus Theophrastum (hominem in eloquentia tantum ut nomen 'divinum' inde invenerit) scripsisse etiam feminam et proverbium inde natum "suspendio arborem eligendi."

As if indeed I did not know that against Theophrastus (a man so distinguished in eloquence he derived the name 'divine' from it) a woman even did the writing and from there a proverb was born "choosing a tree for hanging."

This proverb can probably be interpreted that Theophrastus is the tree, and Leontion, by choosing to write against (from Pliny's perspective) such an eloquent man as Theophrastus, was "choosing a tree to hang herself on." That is, she was "destroying her reputation" specifically, and the garden generally, by writing her book.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 5/6

...τῶν βαθυτέρων ὡς ἐν [δέ]χεται φανότατα πέφρασ[θαι] καὶ νοεῖ ταὐτὸ παν[ταχῆ]ι. ὧδε ποῦ δυνησό[μεθ' ἐκ βυβλί]ων σοφώ[τατ' ἐ]ξενεγκεῖν; ἐ[π]ιδεί[κνυ]ται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν [ὅλων ἐν το]ῖς βυβλίοις, τα[ράττων καὶ] θρυλῶν ὅτι Λε[ό]ντιον καὶ ἑτέρα ‹ἑταίρα› τις ἐν τῆι πραγματείᾳ μνημονεύεται – καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαμμά[ρι]ον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημη[τρ]ία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθο[κλ]έους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ[αινος]...

...τῶν βαθυτέρων, ὡς Ἐνδέχεται φανότατα πέφρασθαι – καὶ Νοεῖ ταὐτὸ πανταχῇ: ὧδε, ποῦ Δυνησόμεθ' ἐκ βυβλίων σοφώτατ' ἐξενεγκεῖν; Ἐπιδείκνυται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν ὅλων ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις, ταράττων καὶ θρυλῶν ὅτι Λεόντιον καὶ ἑτέρα Ἑταίρα τις ἐν τῇ πραγματείαι μνημονεύεται, καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαμμάριον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημητρία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθοκλέους παιδαγωγὸς Πολύαινος...

...regarding deeper matters, how They are able to have been expressed most clearly – He also perceives this everywhere: so, where will We be able to extract the wisest [insights] from books? while He displays [his mental] retention of everything within the books, he [also] stirs up and chatters that Leontion and some other Courtesan are mentioned in the work, and that the lover of Idomeneus was Nikídion, and of Leonteus was Mammárion, and of Hermarchus was Dēmētría – and such a kind also was Pythoclês' tutor Polyaenus ...

The "other companion" is probably Themista. Nikídion was the lover of Idomeneus, Mammárion was the lover of Leonteus, Demetria was the lover of Hermarchus , and Polyaenus was the tutor of Pythocles.

x

Pliny, Inquiry on Nature, 35.144

Theorus *Se Inungentem*, idem *Ab Oreste Matrem et Aegisthum Interfici*, *Bellum*que *Iliacum* pluribus tabulis, quod est Romae in Philippi Porticibus, et *Cassandram*, quae est in Concordiae Delubro, *Leontium* (Epicuri) *Cogitantem*, Demetrium Regem...

[The painter] Theorus [painted] a "*Man Anointing Himself*," and also "*Mother and Aegisthus killed by Orestes*," and the "*Trojan War*" in a series of pictures which is now in Philippus' Portico at Rome and a "*Cassandra*," which is in the Shrine of Concordia, a "*Leontion* (of Epicurus) *Contemplating*," "Demetrius the King" [*more paintings are listed*]...

The Temple of Concord (Concordiae Delubrum) was a Roman temple at the western end of the Forum, near the Capitoline Hill, dedicated to Concordia, the goddess of harmony. It symbolized reconciliation between the patricians and plebeians.

The Demetrius mentioned as "Demetrium regem" (King Demetrius) in this passage is most likely Demetrius I Poliorcetes, Epicurus' contemporary.

[U29]

Book 2

x

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.15,9

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος τὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ σώματα χρόαν οὐκ ἔχειν.

* Epicurus and Arístarchos [say] that objects in the dark do not have color.

Arístarchos was born in Samos in 310 BCE (when Epicurus was 40 years old) and became a student of the Lyceum.

[U30]

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1110B - D

Ὅτι δὲ τούτοις πρὸς πᾶν ἔστι χρῆσθαι τὸ καλούμενον καὶ νομιζόμενον πικρόν, γλυκύ, καθαρτικόν, ὑπνωτικόν, φωτεινόν: ὡς οὐδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτοτελῆ ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν, οὐδὲ δρῶντος μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχοντος, ὅταν ἐγγένηται τοῖς σώμασιν, ἄλλην δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις διαφορὰν καὶ κρᾶσιν λαμβάνοντος – οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν.

Because it is possible to use these [arguments in support of relative impressions of the senses] for everything that is called and considered bitter, sweet, cathartic, soporific, and illuminating: as none of these have any self-sufficient quality and power or are active rather than passive when they enter into [our] bodies, but takes on other forms and mixtures in different [bodies] – this is not obscure.

Αὐτὸς γὰρ οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν *Πρὸς Θεόφραστον* "οὐκ εἶναι" λέγων "τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν – ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιάς τινας τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν" οὐ μᾶλλόν φησι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀχρωμάτιστον σῶμα εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα ἔχον.

Epicurus himself in the second book of his *Reply to Theophrastus* says that "colors are not intrinsic to bodies – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative to the eye" is asserting by this reasoning that body is no more colorless than colored.

* "colors are not inherent in objects – but are generated according to some specific orders and positions in relation to sight."

Ἀνωτέρω δὲ κατὰ λέξιν ταῦτα γέγραφεν "ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τούτου τοῦ μέρους, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ σκότει ταῦτ᾽ ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα ἔχειν – καίτοι πολλάκις ἀέρος ὁμοίως σκοτώδους περικεχυμένου: οἱ μὲν αἰσθάνονται χρωμάτων διαφορᾶς, οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθάνονται δι᾽ ἀμβλύτητα τῆς ὄψεως! ἔτι δ᾽ εἰσελθόντες εἰς σκοτεινὸν οἶκον, οὐδεμίαν ὄψιν χρώματος ὁρῶμεν – ἀναμείναντες δὲ μικρὸν, ὁρῶμεν."

* Previously, however, he has written these things verbatim "But even without this part, I do not know how it is necessary to say that those things which are in the dark have colors – and yet, often, with similarly dark air surrounding: some people have perception of differences of colors, while others do not have a perception due to the dimness of vision! Moreover, having entered into a dark room, we see no sight of color – but having waited a little, we see."

Οὐ, μᾶλλον οὖν, ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ τὸ χρῶμα πρός τι, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἔσται πρὸς τι καὶ τὸ κυανοῦν – εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν: ὥστε, κατὰ πάσης ποιότητος, ἀληθῶς τὸ "μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι" κατηγορεῖσθαι – τοῖς γὰρ οὕτω πάσχουσιν ἔσται τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ τοῖς μὴ πάσχουσι.

Therefore, it will not be said that each of the objects has or does not have color. But if color exists with respect to something, then both white and blue will exist with respect to something – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: therefore, according to every quality, it is truly said that "it is no more to be than not to be" – for it will be like this for those affected in this way, but it will not be for those not affected.

Therefore no body will any more be said to have colour than not. If colour is relative, white and blue will be relative – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: so that of every characteristic we can truly say "It is no more this than it is not this" for to those affected in a certain way the thing will be this, but not to those not so affected.

27. On the Gods
Περὶ Θεῶν

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.271

...*Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν. Περὶ Ὁσιότητος*...

...*Chairedemus. On the Gods. On Holiness*...

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1102 B - D

...Μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως ἀτερπὲς αὐτῷ καὶ λυπηρόν: ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις (οὐδὲν δεόμενος) διὰ τὸν φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ: καὶ θύων – μὲν ὡς μαγείρῳ – παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι. θύσας δ', ἄπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον "ἔθυον οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδέν μοι θεοῖς."

Rather, [a festival] is entirely unpleasant and painful to [Epicurus]: (although needing nothing) he feigns prayers and acts of worship because of the fear of the many, and he speaks words contrary to what he philosophizes: and while sacrificing – as if by a cook – he stands by the slaughtering priest. And, having sacrificed, he goes away while quoting the Menandrian line "I sacrifice to gods who pay no attention to me at all."

Οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἷς χαίρουσιν ἕτεροι πράττοντες, αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας. "πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον Πρᾶγμ' ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ" κατὰ τὸν Εὔηνον – ᾗ καὶ τοὺς Δεισιδαίμονας, οὐ χαίροντας ἀλλὰ φοβουμένους, οἴονται θυσίαις καὶ τελεταῖς ὁμιλεῖν.

For in this way Epicurus thinks that it is necessary to conform oneself and not to envy nor to be hostile to the many things which others rejoice when practicing, while they find it troublesome themselves. "every necessary Thing is difficult" according to Eúēnos [Páros] – whereby they also think that the Superstitious, not while rejoicing but while fearing, engage with sacrifices and rituals.

μηδὲν ἐκείνων Αὐτοὶ διαφέροντες, εἴ γε δὴ διὰ φόβον ταὐτὰ δρῶσιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες ¬ ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδιότες καὶ ταραττόμενοι μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται, τοὺς πολλοὺς παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντες – ἐφ᾽ οὓς καὶ τὰ *Περὶ Θεῶν* καὶ *Ὁσιότητος* αὐτοῖς Βιβλία συντέτακται "ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ" ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας.

> Themselves [the Epicureans] differing in no way from the others, if indeed they do the same things because of fear, while not sharing as much good hope as those [the rest of the public] ¬ but only fearing and being troubled lest they become exposed, while deceiving and cheating the many – for whom also the Books *On the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them, "twisting and nothing sound, but everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the opinions they hold.

[Euripides, Andromeda, 448] **"ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες."**

> ※ "Twisted and unsound [thoughts] – but thinking everything around."

[U31]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On the Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 152 fr. 5

...Διαστέλλεται δὲ καὶ [πε]ρὶ τούτων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῶι *Περὶ Θεῶν* – διό περ καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ σάρκινον φθορᾶς εἶναι δεκτικὸν λέγει...

> ...Epicurus makes a distinction for these [the gods] in the book *On the Gods* – In which he also affirms that what is made of flesh is susceptible to decay...

[U32]

Philodemus defends our school against charges of impiety by citing a passage from Epicurus' On the Gods about how, although all flesh is susceptible to decay, the gods can exist as material compounds.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.7.190

[Επι]κούρωι δ' έν [τῶι Περὶ Θ]εῶν "τὸ μὴ [τῆι φύσ]ει τὴν α[ἰ]σ[θανομέν]ην σύγκρισιν ἔχον, σύμφω[νον τῷ θείῳ] – καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆς [φύσεως ὂν] μετεχού[σης τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό[νων, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκης μα[λακίας πολ]λὰς ποῆσαι. [ἡ θεία φύ]σις οὖσα, [φαίνεται] καί τις [δαιμόνιος]

Ἐπικούρωι δ' ἐν τῶι *Περὶ Θεῶν* "τὸ μὴ τῆι φύσει τὴν αἰσθανομένην σύγκρισιν ἔχον, σύμφωνον τῷ θείῳ – καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆς φύσεως ὂν μετεχούσης τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μαλακίας πολλὰς ποῆσαι. ἡ θεία φύσις οὖσα, φαίνεται καί τις δαιμόνιος"

> and according to Epicurus in *On the Gods* "that which does not have in its nature a sensitive constitution is consistent with divinity – and [divine nature appears to be] that which is not of the nature that partakes of pains, so that it necessarily creates many weaknesses – and to be a kind of divinity."

Oratio obliqua with the neuter article and participle is common in Epicurus and Philodemus.

[U33]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.44.1255

...Καὶ τὸ [ἀλλότρι]ον δ[ια]λῦ[σαί, τε] καὶ [κο]σμῆ[σαι τὸ] κ[ατι]σχῦον [πᾶν – οὐ]δ[ὲ κ]ωλυόμε[νον] ταῦτα πράτ[τειν ἐν] τῶι Περὶ Θεῶν [φησιν.]

...Καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον διαλῦσαί, τε καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὸ κατισχῦον πᾶν – οὐδὲ κωλυόμενον ταῦτα πράττειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Θεῶν* φησιν

※ ...And [the gods] dissolve the unfamiliar, and organize all that prevails – not being hindered in doing these things, [he mentions] in *On the Gods*.

[Obbink] ...And to dispel what is foreign to its nature, and to marshal all [its] overpowering strength – nor in *On the Gods* [does he say] anything conflicting with one's doing these things.

[U34]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.14.381

...[Ἐν] τῶι Περὶ Θε[ῶν ἀν]αμφιλέκτως [τίθε]ται τὸ τὴν...

...Ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Θεῶν* ἀναμφιλέκτως τίθεται τὸ τὴν...

[Obbink] ...In his book *On the Gods* it is indisputably set forth that the...

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.36.1040 –37.1060

ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ] Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐσ]τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ανθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογρά]φει διὰ πλεό[νων]. Ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ισκαι]δεκάτωι, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἣ[ν πρός] τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος.] ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ] τριακ[οσ]τῶ[ι, φησι], σὺν τῶι τι [ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διό[ι νομι]ζον...

ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Περὶ Θεῶν ποία τίς ἐστιν Αἰτία νεμέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειπτέον, Ὑπογράφει διὰ πλειόνων – ἔν τε τῷ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ, περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἣν πρός τινας ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος. ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ, Φησι, σὺν τῷ τι ταύτης τῆς ὠφελίας, διασαφεῖν, καὶ διότι Νομίζον...

and in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of Cause for vengeance and security exists through a god that must be thoroughly left behind for men, [*Epicurus*] writes with many [*details*]. and in the thirteenth [*book On Nature, Epicurus writes*] regarding the familiarity that a God has with certain [*people*] and regarding his alienation. and in the five-and-thirtieth [*i.e., Book 35 On Nature, Epicurus*] says that he clarifies, along with a little bit of this benefit, also why It is believed that...

[28. Kallistólas]
Καλλιστόλας

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην. Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας...

...Judgements about Diseases, Dedicated to Mithres. Kallistólas. On Kingship...

29. On Criterion, or Canon
Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἤ Κανών

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Τέλους. Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἤ Κανών. Χαιρέδημος...

...On Fulfillment. On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairedemus...

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 3.102B (Damoxenes, The Cook)

Α. Ἐπικούρου δέ με ὁρᾷς μαθητὴν ὄντα τοῦ σοφοῦν – παρ᾽ ᾧ ἐν δύ᾽ ἔτεσιν καὶ μησὶν οὐχ ὅλοις δέκα τάλαντ᾽ ἐγὼ σοι κατεπύκνωσα τέτταρα.

A. You see me here as a pupil of the wise Epicurus – from whom in two years and ten months or less, I condensed for you four talents.

Β. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστιν; εἰπέ μοι.

B. What is this? tell me.

Α. καθήγισα. μάγειρος ἦν κἀκεῖνος – οὐκ ᾔδει, θεοί, ποῖος μάγειρος: "ἡ φύσις πάσης τέχνης ἀρχέγονὸν ἐστ᾽, ἀρχέγονον, ὦλιτήριε! οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἓν νοεῖν σοφώτερον! πᾶν τ᾽ εὐχερὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦ λόγου τριβὴν ἔχοντι τούτου – πολλὰ γὰρ συμβάλλεται!"

I have initiated. And that one was a cook – he did not know, oh gods, what kind of a cook: "Nature is the origin of every art, the origin, wretched man! There is not even one thing wiser to think of! Every act is easy for the one having experience of this reasoning – then many things come together!"

Α. διόπερ μάγειρον ὅταν ἴδῃς ἀγράμματον μὴ Δημόκριτόν τε πάντα διανεγνωκότα (μᾶλλον δὲ κατέχοντα!) καταγέλα ὡς κενοῦ – καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου Κανόνα? μινθώσας, ἄφες! ὡς ἐκ διατριβῆς τοῦτο δεῖ γάρ εἰδέναι: τίν᾽ ἔχει διαφορὰν πρῶτον (ὦ βέλτιστε σύ) γλαυκίσκος ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ θέρει πάλιν ποῖος περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος συνειδέναι ἰχθὺς ὑπὸ τροπὰς τ᾽ ἐστὶ χρησιμώτατος!

And therefore, when you see a cook who is illiterate, not understanding everything by Democritus (he must remember him as well!) laugh at him as empty – and [he does not understand] the Canon of Epicurus? Having scrutinized [the cook], discharge [him]! For it is necessary to know this from practice: first, how great the difference (my friend) the glaukískos has in winter and again in summer – what kind of fish is most useful to recognize around the setting of the Pleiades and under the solstices!

ὁ γλαυκίσκος	"little gleaming fish" *(possibly)* anchovy	**ΓΛΑΥΚΙΣΚΟΣ** *gleaming little*

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

Ἀρκτέον δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλίγα προειπόντα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς κατ᾽ αὐτὸν φιλοσοφίας. Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν εἰς τρία: τό τε Κανονικὸν, καὶ Φυσικὸν, καὶ Ἠθικόν – τὸ μὲν οὖν Κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ *Κανών*.

We ought to begin at first with a few things said beforehand concerning the division philosophy according to him. It is divided into three: the Canon, Physics, and Ethics – the Canon forms the introduction, and is contained in the one book titled *Canon*.

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.14

Ἀρίστων δέ φησιν ἐν τῷ Ἐπικούρου Βίῳ *τὸν Κανόνα* γράψαι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ναυσιφάνους Τρίποδος – οὗ καὶ ἀκοῦσαί φησιν αὐτόν – ἀλλὰ καὶ Παμφίλου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ.

Aríston says in his Life of Epicurus that [Epicurus] wrote *The Canon* from the Tripod of Nausiphanes – to whom [Aríston] says [Epicurus] even listened – but also to Pamphílos the Platonist in Samos.

Peripatetic Ariston of Khîos (fl. c. 225 BCE) or Stoic Ariston of Khîos (fl. c. 260 BCE) or Aristo of Alexandria?

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.19.63

(Torquatus) **Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa – quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium – regula ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur: numquam ullius oratione victi, sententia desistemus.**

(Torquatus) Indeed if we will hold a stable knowledge of things, with that being preserved – which has fallen as though from heaven for the knowledge of all – the rule to which all judgments of things will be directed: then never, having been convinced by anyone's speech, will we abandon our knowledge

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.16.43

(Velleius) **Ea qui consideret (quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur) venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero (de quibus haec quaestio est) habere debeat!**

(Velleius) Whoever considers these things (how rashly and recklessly they are said) ought to revere Epicurus and hold him in the number of those themselves (about whom this question exists)!

Solus enim vidit, primum, esse deos quod in omnium animis eorum notionem inpressisset ipsa natura. Quae est, enim, gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam deorum?

For he alone saw, first, that gods exist because into the minds of all [men] nature herself had impressed a notion of them. In fact, what nation or race of men exists that does not have, without teaching, some anticipation of the gods?

ea nōtiō **nōtiōnēs**	notion	**NOTIO** *the result of* *becoming familiar*
ea anticipātiō **anticipātiōnēs**	anticipation	**ANTICIPATIO** *the result of* *taking before*

Quam appellat "πρόληψιν" Epicurus – id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem – sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quoius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri *de Regula et Iudicio* volumine accepimus.

Such [a notion] Epicurus calls "prólēpsis" – that is, some information in the mind obtained before [thinking] – without which nothing is able to be understood, questioned or disputed. We have received the strength and benefit of this reasoning from that celestial volume of Epicurus *on the Rule and Judgment.*

ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•^] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
anteceptus *(a, um)*	obtained before *[thinking]*	**ANTECEPTUS** *taken before*
ea īnfōrmātiō **īnfōrmātiōnēs**	information	**INFORMATIO** *making into shape*

antecepta īnfōrmātiō	information obtained before *[thinking]*

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1118A

Οὐ γὰρ Κωλώτῃ μὲν ὁ ἄρτος ἄρτος ἐφαίνετο καὶ χόρτος ὁ χόρτος ὅτι τοὺς 'διοπετεῖς' ἀνεγνώκει *Κανόνας* (ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ὑπὸ ἀλαζονείας ἄρτου μὲν ὡς χόρτου, χόρτου δὲ ὡς ἄρτου φαντασίαν ἐλάμβανε). δόγμασι γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ λόγοις οὗτοι χρῶνται βελτίοσιν οἱ σοφοί – ὁ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα κοινόν ἐστι πάθος ἀλόγοις περαινόμενον αἰτίαις.

> Bread did not appear to Colotes as bread and grass as grass because he had studied the 'heaven-sent' *Canons* (Socrates by false pretense perceived an appearance of bread as grass and grass as bread). For these wise men use teachings and arguments superior to ours – but perceiving and being affected by appearances is a common experience that is determined by irrational causes.

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123F

Εἰ γὰρ οὐ κραιπαλῶντες οὐδὲ φαρμακῶντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ παρακόπτοντες – ἀλλὰ νήφοντες καὶ ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ *Κανόνων* καὶ Κριτηρίων ἐν τοῖς ἐναργεστάτοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἢ 'τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀληθὲς' ἢ 'ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον' ἡγοῦνται 'τὸ ἀληθές' – οὐκ εἰ περὶ πάντων ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τισιν ὅλως ἀνθρώποι συγκατατίθενται, θαυμάζειν ἄξιον!

> For if men are neither intoxicated nor on drugs and raving – but rather are sober and healthy and writing about truth and Standards and Measurements in the clearest experiences and movements of sensations, if [such sober men] consider either 'the non-existent is true' or 'the false and non-existent is the truth' – then not if they are at peace about everything, but if the men agree in entirely anything, is worthy of wonder!

x

Alciphron (fl. fortasse 160 CE), Letters, Book 4, Letter 17 (2.2) – section 2

(Leontion scribentem ad Lamiam facit) **Μέχρι τίνος ὑπομενεῖ τις τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦτον; ἐχέτω τὰ "*Περὶ Φύσεως*" καὶ τὰς *Κυρίας Δόξας* καὶ τοὺς διεστραμμένους *Κανόνας* – ἐμὲ δὲ ἀφέτω τὴν φυσικῶς κυρίαν ἐμαυτῆς, ἀστομάχητον καὶ ἀνύβριστον.**

> (Leontion depicted as writing to Lamia) How long can one suffer this philosopher? Let him keep that "*On Nature*," the *Principal Judgements*, those twisted *Canons* – let me retain my natural mastery over myself, unchallenged and uninsulted.

Alciphron (fl. fortasse 160 CE), Letters, Book 4, Letter 17 (2.2) – section 7

...Κολακεύειν αὐτὸν καὶ καθυμνεῖν τὰς ὑπηνέμους αὐτοῦ *Δόξας*...

> ...To flatter him and to sing the praises of the sheltered *Judgements* of his...

x

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.21

εἶτα τηλικαύτη Δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ Σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἄν τις αὐτῆς

then, being so great a Power and set over all the rest, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say to us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh – not even if the Flesh itself declared that it itself is the most excellent, would anyone be tolerant of this

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ *Τέλους* συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰς *Φυσικάς*; τὸ περὶ *Κανόνος*; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός;

but now which is it, Epicurus, which declares these things? Which one wrote about *The End*, which one wrote on *Nature*? Which one wrote about the *Canon*? Which one let grow the beard?

Τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἡ Σὰρξ ἢ ἡ Προαίρεσις;

Which one wrote, when it was dying, that it "was spending the last and at the same time also a blessed day?" was it the Flesh or the Will?

εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν Ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ Μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς Εἶ;

then You agree to having something [*i.e., the will*] superior to this [*i.e., the flesh*]! are You not insane? Are you so blind and deaf to the truths?

[U35]

x

Diogenes Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.31 sup.

Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν, ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς Φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους. ἐν, τοίνυν, τῷ *Κανόνι*, λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς [1]αἰσθήσεις καὶ [2]προλήψεις καὶ τὰ [3]πάθη, οἱ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ [4]τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας

* [Epicureans] reject dialectic as misleading, [saying that] it is sufficient for the Physicists to proceed according to the [common] words for things. Therefore, In *The Canon*, Epicurus affirms the standards of truth are the [1]sensations and the [2]preconceptions and the [3]feelings, and the Epicureans [also affirm] the [4] impression-based focus of the mind

[U36]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.31 fin.

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς *Ἡρόδοτον Ἐπιτομῇ* καὶ ἐν ταῖς *Κυρίαις Δόξαις*, "πᾶσα γάρ" φησίν "αἴσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική – οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς οὔτε ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα, δύναταί τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν."

As he also says in the *Letter to Herodotus* and in the *Primary Judgements*, he says "Every sensation is devoid of reason and capable of no memory – for neither when moved by itself nor by another, is [a sensation] able to add anything or take [anything] away."

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.32

οὐδὲ ἔστι Τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια Αἴσθησις τὴν ὁμογενῆ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν – οὐθ᾽ ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν – οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικαί

nor is there Anything able refute them: for neither does the like Sensation [refute] the like [sensation] through equal force – nor the unlike [sense refute] the unlike – for they are not critical of the same things

οὔτε, μὴν, Λόγος – πᾶς γὰρ Λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται! οὔθ᾽ ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις γὰρ προσέχομεν – καὶ Τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ᾽ ὑφεστάναι, πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν

* indeed, neither [can] Reason [refute the senses] – for all Reason has been held up by the sensations! Nor [does] one [sense refute] another, for we cling to all – and the Fact that the impressions are established, confirms the truth of the senses

ὑφιστάναι	to be established	**ὙΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing under*

ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε Ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ Ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ Σημειοῦσθαι: καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἐπίνοιαι πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασι – κατά τε [1]περίπτωσιν καὶ [2]ἀναλογίαν καὶ [3]ὁμοιότητα καὶ [4]σύνθεσιν – συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ

* Seeing and Hearing have been established for us, just like feeling pain, where Taking signs from what is visible is also necessary for unseen things: for indeed, all Thoughts have arisen from the sensations – according to [1]incident, [2]analogy, [3]similarity, and [4]synthesis – with reasoning also throwing in something

ἡ περίπτωσις **αἱ περιπτώσεις**	incident	**ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling around*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
ἡ ὁμοιότης **αἱ ὁμοιότητες**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being similar*
ἡ σύνθεσις **αἱ συνθέσεις**	synthesis	**ΣΥΝΘΕΣΙΣ** *to put together*

τά τε τῶν μαινομένων Φαντάσματα καὶ τὰ κατ᾽ ὄναρ ἀληθῆ – κινεῖ γάρ – Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, οὐ κινεῖ

the mental impressions of maniacs and [the Mental impressions] in dreams are real – because they move [the mind] – and What does not exist, does not move

[30. Against the Megarians]
Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι...

...Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians. Uncertainties...

After the death of his teacher Socrates, Eukleídēs of Mégara founded a school in Mégara (a city 25 miles west of Athens and 30 miles east of Corinth), where many students of Socrates took refuge with him.

The school formed into a group of thinkers known for studying logical puzzles and paradoxes (such as 'the Horns,' 'the Sorites,' and 'the Covered Father'). Eukleídēs was interested in the dilemmas of logic and criticized the use of analogy.

According to Diogenes Laértios, Eukleídēs declared that "the good is one – though it is called by many names: sometimes wisdom, sometimes god, sometimes mind, and so forth." Eventually the Stoics would take much inspiration from this school.

31. Metrodorus

in five books

Μητρόδωρος εʹ

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…***Τιμοκράτης γʹ. Μητρόδωρος εʹ. Ἀντίδωρος βʹ***…

…*Timocrates, in three books. Metrodorus, in five books. Antidorus, in two books…*

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129A

τί δʹ αἱ τοσαῦται Μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον – ἐπʹ Ἀριστόβουλον – ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον – γραφόμεναι καὶ συντασσόμεναι φιλοπόνως; ἵνα μηδʹ ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν;

what are the many Myriads of lines about Metrodorus – about Aristobuolos – about Chairedemus – being written and composed industriously for? So that even having died they may not escape notice?…

Book 1

[U37]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.23

ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος πρός τε τὰς ὀχλήσεις καὶ τὸν θάνατον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Μητροδώρῳ φησί

[Metrodorus] also was not struck down by troubles and death, as Epicurus says in the first book of his Metrodorus memoirs

[32. On Music]

Περὶ Μουσικῆς

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…***Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν***…

…*Aristobuolos. On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues…*

[33. Neocles]

Dedicated to Themista

Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

…***Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς, Πρὸς Θεμίσταν. Συμπόσιον***…

…*On Fair Dealing. Neocles, Dedicated to Themista. Symposium…*

[34. Judgements about Diseases]

Dedicated to Mithres

Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι, πρὸς Μίθρην

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Ἀντίδωρος β΄***. ***Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην***. ***Καλλιστόλας***...

> ...*Antidorus, in two books. Judgements about Diseases, Dedicated to Mithres. Kallistólas*...

[35. On Vision]
Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾷν

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον***. ***Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾷν***. ***Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἀτόμῳ Γωνίας***...

> ...*Eurylochus, Dedicated to Metrodorus. On Vision. On the Angle in the Atom*...

36. On Holiness
Περὶ Ὁσιότητος

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...***Περὶ Θεῶν***. ***Περὶ Ὁσιότητος***. ***Ἡγησιάναξ***...

> ...*On the Gods. On Holiness. Hegesianax*...

x

[=U30] *Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1102C*

...τὰ *Περὶ Θεῶν* καὶ *Ὁσιότητος* αὐτοῖς Βιβλία συντέτακται "ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ Πᾶν πέριξ" ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας

> ...the Books *About the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them "twisting and in no way sound, but Everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the judgements they hold

x

[=U27] *Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.41.115*

(Cotta) **at etiam *De Sanctitate*, *De Pietate* aduersus deos libros scripsit Epicurus – at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire Dicas...**

> (Cotta) indeed Epicurus wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Reverence* towards the gods – but in what manner does he actually speak in them? so that You might say that you were listening to the high priests Coruncianus or Scaevola...

[U38]

Life of Perfection

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.44.1258

Κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τὸν τ[ελειό]τητος [βίον "ἥ]διστον καὶ μ[ακαρι]ώτατον" ἐν [τῶι] Περὶ Ὁσιότητ[ος – καὶ Κ]αταξιοῖ πᾶ[ν τὸ μι]αρὸν φυλάτ[τεσθαι νοήσ]εως συ[νορω]μένης τὰ[ς καλὰς] διαθέσεις – [τοῦ πάν]τα γ΄ οἰκε[ιοῦν τὰ] γιν[ό]μεν[α ἡμῖν] πρ[ὸς] μακ[αριότητ]α καὶ ἀπηρτισμένα [γ΄ ἔ]χε[ιν]

Καλεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν τελειότητος βίον "ἥδιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον" ἐν τῶι *Περὶ Ὁσιότητος* – καὶ Καταξιοῖ πᾶν τὸ μιαρὸν φυλάττεσθαι νοήσεως συνορωμένης τὰς καλὰς διαθέσεις – τοῦ πάντα γ' οἰκειοῦν τὰ γινόμενα ἡμῖν πρὸς μακαριότητα καὶ ἀπηρτισμένα γ' ἔχειν

He also calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most happy" in the work *On Holiness* – and He considers it necessary that all that is base is guarded by our mind paying attention to good attitudes – for making familiar all that happens to us for having happiness and particularly for having [it be] adequate

[Obbink] And in *On Holiness* he calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most blessed" – and instructs us to guard against all defilement, with our intellect comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions – for the sake of fitting all that happens to us to blessedness and especially having it in good order.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.39.1127

[Ἐγὼ] δὲ τούναντίον – [ούχ] ἡγοῦμαι [τόνδε τὸν] τρόπον [διὰ τὰ τοι]αῦτ᾽ ἀνο[σίως ἐ]ξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὁσιότητα σὺν τῶι τ[ὰ κοι]νὰ φυλάττειν ὧ[ς] δ᾽ Οἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει]σιδαίμονες εἰ[ς ἀνυ]πέρβλητον ἀ[σέβει]αν ἐκβάλλειν

Ἐγὼ δὲ τούναντίον – οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἀνοσίως ἐξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὁσιότητα σὺν τῶι τὰ κοινὰ φυλάττειν (ὧς δ᾽ Οἱ λεγόμενοι δεισιδαίμονες) εἰς ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀσέβειαν ἐκβάλλειν

[I think] the opposite – I do not consider this manner [of thinking] regarding these things unlawfully eliminates all holiness along with the protection of the state and (as Those called superstitious think) extends [us] into unparalleled impiety

[Obbink] But I by contrast – do not think that this manner on account of these things impiously does away with the whole [notion of] holiness together with the preservation of common beliefs and that (as those who are said to be religious think) it hurls us into unsurpassable impiety.

Piety: Preserving Immortality and Blessedness

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.40.1138

[ὅσιος] γὰρ Ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θ[ε]οῦ σῴ[ζων σὺ]ν ἅπασι[ν] τ[οῖς συ]ναπτομ[έ]νο[ις ἡμῖν – α]σεβὴς δὲ περ[ὶ θεό]ν Ὅς ἑκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ίζει

ὅσιος γὰρ Ὁ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ τὴν ἄκραν μακαριότητα τοῦ θεοῦ σῴζων (σὺν ἅπασιν τοῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – ασεβὴς δὲ περὶ θεόν Ὅς ἑκάτερον ἐξορίζει

pious is the He who preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness of god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards god [is he] Who banishes either one

[Obbink] For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God (together with all the things included by us) – but impious is the person who banishes either [blessedness or immortality] where God is concerned.

Ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆ[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκε[υὰς] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κακ]ῶν ἀπο[φαί]νετ' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀνθρω[πείω]ν μηδ[ε]νὸ[ς προς]δεῖσθαι...

Ὁ δ' ἐπινοῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκευὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀποφαίνετ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι...

He who deliberates without anger and without weakening of favor on the procurement from [*god*] for both benefits and harms shows [*god*] to be in need of nothing from humans...

[Obbink] And the person who sees also that the good and ill [sent us by God] come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence – declares that God has no need of human things...

[U39]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.8.205

Γράψας [δὲ] καὶ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος ἄλλο βυβλίον, κἀν τούτωι διασαφεῖ τὸ (μὴ μόνον ἀφθάρτως, ἀλλὰ κ[αὶ κα]τὰ συντέλε[ιαν] ἓ[ν] καὶ ταύ[τὸν συν]εχῶ[ς ὑπάρχον καθ' "ὁ]μιλ[ίαν ἐνότητας]" προσαγορεύε[σθαι] – τὰς μὲν ἐκ [τῶν ὄντων] τῶν αὐτῶ[ν ἀποτε]λεῖσθαι, τὰ[ς δ' ἐκ τῶν] ὁμοίων

Γράψας δὲ καὶ *Περὶ Ὁσιότητος* ἄλλο βυβλίον, κἀν τούτωι διασαφεῖ τὸ (μὴ μόνον ἀφθάρτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ συντέλειαν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν συνεχῶς ὑπάρχον) καθ' "ὁμιλίαν ἐνότητας" προσαγορεύεσθαι – τὰς μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τὰς δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων

[Epicurus] also wrote another book *On Holiness*, an in it he makes clear that it [the nature of the gods] (which exists continuously as one and the same, not merely in an imperishable manner, but also according to an influx of provisions) is called "an association [of unity]" – both those [unities] composed from the same things, and those from the similar things

[Obbink] And having written another book *On Holiness*, in it too he makes clear that not only that thing which exists indestructibly, but also (that which) continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ** *one*
ἡ ἑνότης **αἱ ἑνότητες**	unity	**ΕΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition of oneness*
ἡ ὁμοιότης **αἱ ὁμοιότητες**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being similar*

[U40]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.13.347

στοιχ[είω]σις ὁ[μοίων οὖσα], φαίνο[ιτ'] ἂ[ν Ἑν]ότης, δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν – ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ ἧττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων Ἑνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται, καθάπερ ἐν τῶι Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, αὐτότατα)

στοιχείωσις ὁμοίων οὖσα, φαίνοιτ' ἂν Ἑνότης, δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν – ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ ἧττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων Ἑνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται, καθάπερ ἐν τῶι *Περὶ Ὁσιότητος*, αὐτότατα)

with the composition of similar [elements] that exist, a Unity emerges, for it is able to possess out of similarities eternal perfect wellbeing – since no less from the same or similar elements can Unities be composed (and are left undisputed by Epicurus as the same things, just as [he says] in *On Holiness*)

[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are recognized by Epicurus as [being] exactly the same things, for example in his book *On Holiness*.)

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.13.364

τ[ὸ δ]ὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπε[ναν]τιολογίαν εἶναι παρα[ιτη]τέον Ὑποδεικνύειν: Εἴωθε, τοίνυν, [πά]νθ' ὀμῶς Ταῦτα φύ[σι]ν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν – τὰ Πολλὰ [μὲ]ν ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων [καὶ ἄλ]λων [ἐπι]συνκρί[σεως ἀ]τόμ[ων γέ]νηται...

τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπεναντιολογίαν εἶναι παραιτητέον Ὑποδεικνύειν: Εἴωθε, τοίνυν, πάνθ' ὀμῶς Ταῦτα φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν – τὰ Πολλὰ μὲν ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων καὶ ἄλλων ἐπισυνκρίσεως ἀτόμων γένηται...

Proving that there is no logical contradiction must be declined: accordingly, [Epicurus] used to say that all These things are equally brought to completion by nature – indeed many Things come into existence from the aggregation of similar and different atoms...

[Obbink] The demonstration that this involves no contradiction may be passed over: Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles...

[U41]

x

[=U88] Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111

...[Καὶ ἄλ]ληι κἀν [τῶι Περὶ Ὀ]σιότητ[ος, κἀν τῶι] δωδεκά[τωι καὶ] τρεισκα[ιδεκάτωι] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κἀν τῶι] πρώτω[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους.

...Καὶ ἄλληι κἀν τῶι *Περὶ Ὀσιότητος*, κἀν τῶι δωδεκάτωι καὶ τρεισκαιδεκάτωι *Περὶ Φύσεως*, κἀν τῶι πρώτωι τῶν *Περὶ Τιμοκράτους*.

...In other places, such as in *On Holiness*, and *in the 12th and 13th [books] On Nature*, and in the first of [his books] *On Timocrates*.

[37. On Theories about Feelings]
against Timocrates
Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι, πρὸς Τιμοκράτην

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Εἱμαρμένης. Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν...

...On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timocrates. Prognostication...

38. On Wealth
Περὶ Πλούτου

[U42]*

Acquiring & Guarding Wealth

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Vices and the Opposite Virtues, Book 9, On Property Management, P.Herc. 1424, col. 12, line 5 -17

Διαλεξόμεθα, τοίνυν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκωι καλῶ[ς] ἔστιν βιοῦν – ἀλλ' ὡς ἵστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς: περὶ [ἃ], τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι Συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀν[ό]μασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρ[ο]ύμενους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφωι δεούσης κτήσεως, [οὐ] τῆς ὀτωι[δή]ποτε

Διαλεξόμεθα, τοίνυν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκωι καλῶς ἔστιν βιοῦν – ἀλλ' ὡς ἵστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς: περὶ ἃ, τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι Συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρούμενους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφωι δεούσης κτήσεως, οὐ τῆς ὀτωιδήποτε

We will explore, therefore, not how to live well at home – but how it is necessary to be positioned in regards to the acquisition and guarding of wealth: regarding which, It has come to be that economic [management] and economical [principles] are perceived distinctly – making no distinction towards those who choose to submit different things to these names, and concerning the possession required by philosophy, not just of any sort [of possession]

[Tsouna] We shall discuss, then, not how one can live well at home – but what attitude one must take up both with regard to the acquisition and the preservation of wealth, concerning which property management and the property-management expert are in fact conceived specifically, (and we shall do so) without contending at all with those who prefer to make other meaning underlie the terms and, moreover, discussing the acquisition (of property) that is appropriate for the philosopher, [not] for just anyone.

Wealth is Sometimes Good

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 19 (50)

...κα[ὶ τ]ὸ πάντως κα[τ'] ἐναντιό[τ]ητα τῶι πλού[τ]ωι τ[ὴ]ν πενίαν Τίθεσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὴν [ἐνί]οτε ἀγαθὸν Λέγεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ μ[έ]γα – σὺν ταῖς καὶ πρὸς π[ε]ν[ί]αν... Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος ἀδρὰν...

...καὶ τὸ πάντως κατ' ἐναντιότητα τῶι πλούτωι τὴν πενίαν Τίθεσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὴν ἐνίοτε ἀγαθὸν Λέγεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ μέγα – σὺν ταῖς καὶ πρὸς πενίαν... Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος ἀδρὰν...

...and always Placing poverty in opposition to wealth: and Saying that wealth [is] sometimes good and significant – particularly in the [context] of poverty... Epicurus asserts strongly...

Wealth Produces Pleasure

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.17.55

(Cicero ad Torquatum) **tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem – unde (si secutus esset eorum sententiam Qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent) nummum nullum attigisset!**

(Cicero to Torquatus) [*Publius*] Sextilius [*Rufus*] held a very large inheritance – from which (if he had followed the opinion of those Who place honorable and upright things above all benefits and advantages) he would not have come in contact with a single coin!

num igitur Eum postea Censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? nihil minus. contraque, illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus

Do You think, then, that he was later with an anxious or worried mind? Not at all. On the contrary, he was wealthy from that inheritance and happy because of it

magni enim Aestimabat pecuniam: non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam – quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis – est enim Effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum

for He valued the money highly: [*which was*] not only not acquired contrary to the laws, but indeed by the laws – which according to you all ought to be sought indeed even with danger – for it is the Producer of many and great pleasures

[U43]*

Consolation for Poverty

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 16 (47)

...[Επ]ίκου[ρος τὴ]ν φι[λοσ]ο[φ]ία[ν ἐ]ν τῆι τῶν [ἀγαθῶ]ν [ἀ]να[πλ]ώσει – τὴν γὰρ πε[νί]αν [τ]ο[ῦ] Καθηγ[ε]μόνος ἀγαθὸν [ε]ἶναι νομίζοντ[ος] ἐ[ν τῶι] δευτέρ[ωι]... ...[τὴν πενί]αν ὀνομάζοντες οὐκ ἐκωλύοντο λέγειν κακὸν ἔχε[ιν], ἀ[λ]λ' ου [π]αραμυθεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ ταύτηι λυπουμένου[ς] ἐδύνατο Μητρόδωρος, οὐ δὴ[ι] τοὺς ἐπὶ κακῶι μό[ν]ον λυπουμένους, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ τοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ κα[κ]ῶι [λυπουμένους]...

...Ἐπίκουρος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐν τῆι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναπλώσει – τὴν γὰρ πενίαν τοῦ Καθηγεμόνος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζοντος ἐν τῶι δευτέρωι...

> ...Epicurus [*considers*] philosophy in [*the context of*] the fulfillment of goods – with [*our*] Leader considering poverty to be good in a secondary [*role*]...

..."τὴν πενίαν" ὀνομάζοντες, οὐκ Ἐκωλύοντο λέγειν κακὸν ἔχειν: ἀλλ' <u>ου</u> παραμυθεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ ταύτῃ λυπουμένους ἐδύνατο Μητρόδωρος: οὐ δή τοὺς ἐπὶ κακῷ μόνον λυπουμένους ¬ ἀλλά τε καὶ τοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ κακῷ λυπουμένους...

> ...using the word "poverty," They were not prevented from saying it contains what is bad: but Metrodorus was able to console those distressed because of it – not only those grieving because of what is bad ¬ but also those grieving as if because of what is bad...

[U44]*

Suitably Treating The Pain Of Poverty

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 9 (40)

...καὶ θαρ[ρ]ούντως Εἶ[π]ε, δὴ καὶ καθάπερ ἔφησε Πολύαινος "σ[υμμ]έτρως ἐθεράπευεν [τὸ ἄλ]γος" – καὶ το[ῦ]το ποεῖ, κ[αθ]άπερ εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, [ὅτα]ν παρῆι ποτὲ πεσώ[ν... ὁ Σο]φὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον [τρέ]πεται... ...[τοῖς ἐπι]λογ[ισμοῖς] πλοῦτον ἀγα[θὸν]... ...λέγοντες...

...καὶ θαρρούντως Εἶπε, δὴ καὶ καθάπερ ἔφησε Πολύαινος "συμμέτρως ἐθεράπευεν τὸ ἄλγος" – καὶ τοῦτο ποεῖ, καθάπερ εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν παρη ποτὲ πεσὼν... ὁ Σοφὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον τρέπεται...

> ...and indeed He confidently said, and just as Polyaenus declared "he was suitably treating the pain" – and this occurs, just as Epicurus said, whenever the Wiseman sometimes happens to fall into poverty, he only is turned...

...τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς πλοῦτον ἀγαθὸν... ...Λέγοντες...

> ...Saying... ...through the arguments, that wealth is a good...

[U45]*

Poverty is Bad

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 14 (45), lines 31 - 40

...διὰ [ταῦτ]α [τῶν] Ἐπι[κ]ουρείων λέγοντα[ί τι]νες ὑ[πὲρ το]ῦ κακὸν εἶνα[ι τὴ]ν πε[νί]αν ἐπιλογισ[μ]ο[ῖ]ς χρῆσθαι τοιούτοι[ς]. ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἔν τε ἄλλοις πο[λλο]ῖς φησι τὴν πενία[ν κ]ακὸν εἶναι – καὶ ἐν [τύχαις] δ' ἑτέραις [σ]υναφθεῖσα[ν], μὴ φέρε[σθαι]...

...διὰ ταῦτα τῶν Ἐπικουρείων λέγονταί Τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τὴν πενίαν ἐπιλογισμοῖς χρῆσθαι τοιούτοις

> ...Because of these things, Some of the Epicureans are said to use such types of reasoning in support of poverty being bad

ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἔν τε ἄλλοις πολλοῖς φησι τὴν πενίαν κακὸν εἶναι – καὶ, ἐν τύχαις δ' ἑτέραις συναφθεῖσαν, μὴ φέρεσθαι...

> Epicurus says in many other [*books*] that poverty is bad – and, when combined with different chance [*circumstances*], not to be endured...

<u>[39. Polymḗdēs]</u>
Πολυμήδης

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης. Τιμοκράτης γʹ***...

...On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymḗdēs. Timocrates, in three books...

[40. Prognostication]
Προγνωστικόν

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός...

...On Theories about Feelings, against Timocrates. Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy...

[41. Exhortation to Study Philosophy]
Προτρεπτικός

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28:

...Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός. Περὶ Εἰδώλων...

...Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films...

42. On Rhetoric
Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1127A

Οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write [about such matters at all], write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (fl. 75 CE) was a Roman orator and politician, who wrote "Institutio Oratoria" or "The Institutes of Oratory," a detailed twelve-volume treatise on rhetoric crafted around 95 CE. The work extensively discusses rhetorical methods and the training of orators. His notable pupils included Pliny the Younger, and Emperor Vespasian honored him with a consulship.

x

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 2.15 - 17

Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror! hi complura dicunt sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breviter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat.

Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he is going to indict rhetoric. As to [the statements of] Epicurus, who flees all training, they cause me no surprise! These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity.

Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est: omnes enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est verum; rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.

Their first contention is based on the subject-matter: for they assert that all arts have their own subject-matter (which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has none, which I shall show in what follows to be false.

[U46]*

Art has a definite set of external principles which can be imparted from teacher to student. Ability, in contrast, is the result of personal practice and experience.

Keeping in mind that rhetors called their own instruction books "technai" "technical [manuals]" – questioning to what extent rhetoric is an "art / techne" cuts to the base of the whole profession because it asks: to what extent do these "technical manuals" actually have any repeatable and teachable technique ("art / techne") at all?

Philodemus informs us that some Epicureans in Rhodes argued that Epicurus thought that no form of rhetoric was an art. However, most of the students in Athens, following Zeno of Sidon, disagreed and argued that Epicurus thought that the study of the principles of composition is in fact an art (but they all agreed that Epicurus thought that forensic and deliberative oratory, as well as political science, are not arts).

Below, Philodemus argues that when the verb "estí" is combined with the genitive in order to indicate the method by which something is achieved, it doesn't necessarily suggest exclusivity of the method. Additional clarification would be required from the author to unambiguously state that it is the sole method used. Philodemus notes that since Epicurus does not include an adjective such as "only," it should not be implicitly assumed by the reader. Philodemus references normal usage of Greek as a guide to understand Epicurus' intent.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 18

οὕτως τοίνυν, εἰπόντος Ἐπικούρου διότι "πολλῆς ἐσ[τι]ν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας" οὐχ ὑπ[α]κουστέο[ν] τὸ "μόνης" – ἀλλὰ μό[νον τ]ὸ "[δεῖ]ται πολλῆς τριβῆς κα[ὶ συν]ηθείας." τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν οὕτως ὁμειλῶμεν – ἡ συνηθ[ε]ία τό γε μετριώτατ[ο]ν ὑπὸ [τ]ῶν λέξεων σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐχ[ὶ] θάτερον μόνον ἀεὶ [συ]νόλω[ς σ]ημαίνεσθ[αι] ῥητέον... ...ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ τριβῆς (και) οὐδ' ὅλως ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας...

οὕτως τοίνυν, εἰπόντος Ἐπικούρου διότι "πολλῆς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας" οὐχ ὑπακουστέον τὸ "μόνης" – ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ "δεῖται πολλῆς τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας." τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν οὕτως ὁμειλῶμεν – ἡ συνηθεία τό γε μετριώτατον ὑπὸ τῶν λέξεων σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐχὶ θάτερον μόνον ἀεὶ συνόλως σημαίνεσθαι ῥητέον... ...ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ τριβῆς (και) οὐδ' ὅλως ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας...

[Chandler] So in this way, when Epicurus said that "rhetoric is (the result) of much practice and familiarity" one should not understand the word "*alone*," but only the meaning "*requires much practice and familiarity*." For he writes the word "is" in place of "*requires*," just as we do when we speak in ordinary conversation, where by the standards of common parlance the most normal (meaning) is meant by the words; and one should not insist that the other meaning only is all the time meant in general... ⁂ *...for the sake of the expression which this man has used, I say that it is unclear whether Epicurus means [that (1)rhetoric comes about] from familiarity and practice alone [or (2)rhetoric comes about] not entirely from practice and familiarity [but also art]*

Therefore, given that Epicurus said "rhetoric is of much practice and habit" this should not be considered to mean "[*rhetoric*] only [*requires much practice and habit*]" – but only that "[*rhetoric*] does require much practice and habit." For "is" means "requires," when we speak in this way – habit indicates the most regular [usage] by these words, and it must not be said that it signifies only the other [*meaning of exclusivity*] altogether... ⁂ *...Epicurus, whether through skill and effort, or not at all from habitual practice...*

Philodemus advocates for an interpretation of "estí" which he asserts is the most common in this specific context. While Philodemus acknowledges the potential for the sentence to be understood in the manner preferred by "the Rhodian," he contends that in cases of ambiguity like these, ordinary language stands as the only reliable criterion.

Another question to consider is whether requiring "practice" (tribḗ) and "habit" (synḗatheia) inherently exclude sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures) from being considered an art. Philodemus says that they do not, as the founders recognized that some arts demand significant practice.

[U47]*

x

Metrodorus, On Poems Book 1, quoted by Philodemus, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 22

Πότερον οὖν (1) τὴν [ῥη]τορικὴν δύναμιν λέγει[ν] τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνωσιν τοῦ ὃ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλλοντι εὐδαίμον[ε]ι εἶναί τε καὶ ἔσεσθαι – καὶ ἃ [ου πρ]ακτέον, καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀ[π]ὸ φ[υσι]ολογίας παραγείνεσθαι, [ἢ κ]αὶ (2) τὴν πολειτικὴν ἐμπειρ[ί]αν καθ᾽ ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων συνορῴη ἄν τις οὐ κακῶς τὰ πλήθει συμφέροντα;

Πότερον οὖν (1) τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύναμιν λέγειν τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνωσιν τοῦ ὃ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλλοντι εὐδαίμονει εἶναί τε καὶ ἔσεσθαι – καὶ ἃ ου πρακτέον, καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας παραγείνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ (2) τὴν πολειτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν καθ᾽ ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων συνορῴη ἄν τις οὐ κακῶς τὰ πλήθει συμφέροντα;

> Is one then to speak of (1) rhetorical power by being aware of the discernment of what ought to be done for the one intending to be and to continue being fortunate – and what should not be done, and say that this comes from natural philosophy, or [is one to speak of] the (2) political experience through which a man, from the practice and history of city affairs, could not badly [*i.e., well*] observe what is beneficial for the masses?
>
> [Chandler] So does one speak of (1) rhetorical capability by looking to the distinction of what must be done and must [not] be done by the man who intends to be, and to continue to be, successful, and say that this (capability) derives from the science of nature, or does one speak of (2) political experience in accordance with which one is likely to observe from practice and research in the affairs of a city that which is advantageous to the people?

Philodemus cites Metrodorus' statements from the first book of "De Poematis," where he says that Metrodorus states clearly that civic rhetoric is not a science but rather grounded in experience and observation. It seems Metrodorus is addressing a certain vagueness about what is meant by "rhetorical advances."

Philodemus appears mainly focused on how Metrodorus highlights the empirical and practical elements crucial for success in politics. The term "political experience (politikḕ empeiría)" and its definition as deriving "from the experience and history of the city's affairs" strongly imply that Metrodorus does not view political activity as an art, but as practical knowledge gained through active political engagement.

[U48]*

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 12

Οὐδὲ πολειτι[κὸν] καὶ δικανικὸν ἐρε[ῖν] ἑαυτὸν λαμβάνειν μέρος. ὧ[δε] γὰρ ῥητῶς "τὴν ῥητορικὴν" λέγει κα[ὶ] πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλόμεν[ο]ν σοφιστὴν πάντ᾽ ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. διόπερ οὐκ ἀπὸχωρήσαντος, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπίκουρός ἐστ[ι] τῆι μεταβάσει κεχρημένος

Οὐδὲ πολειτικὸν καὶ δικανικὸν ἐρεῖν ἑαυτὸν λαμβάνειν μέρος. ὧδε γὰρ ῥητῶς "τὴν ῥητορικὴν" λέγει καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλόμενον σοφιστὴν πάντ᾽ ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. διόπερ οὐκ ἀπὸχωρήσαντος, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπίκουρός ἐστι τῆι μεταβάσει κεχρημένος

[Chandler] For one will say that [Epicurus] does not accept a political and judicial branch. For he explicitly says "rhetoric" when replying to the sophist who claims he possess all the branches. Therefore since he does not retract, Epicurus has made use of the analogy in a humorous fashion.

Neither in politics nor in law does he claim a role for himself. He declares unequivocally "rhetoric" when directed at the sophist who avowed that he encompasses all elements. Therefore, not having retreated, Epicurus employs the shift humorously.

Philodemus reminds us that the speaker in Epicurus' Symposium used the term "rhetoric" and meant by that all the categories which the youth claimed to possess. The claim is erroneous, so Epicurus has used a metabasis (shift from one point to another) with ironic intent.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 16, line 10

Φ[ήσ]ει δὲ πρὸς τὸ συστῆσαι, διότ[ι δὴ], τέχνη κατ᾽Ἐπίκουρόν [ἐ]στιν ἡ ῥητορική – τοῦθ ἡμεῖς παρετίθεμεν, λέγ[ο]ντες· εἰ μὲν [δὴ] τε()[ι]βὴν αὐτὴν ἐνόμι[ζεν] εἶναι καὶ συν[ήθ]ε[ια]ν [οὐκ] ἂν τὸ "δοκεῖ" προσέ[θηκεν. οἱ] δὲ ἔφησαν οὐ δηλοῦ[σθαι] τὸ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, [ἤ][τοι] μὴ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθ[αι] μ[όν]ον. εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ συν[ίεμ]εν ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ ο()ια[λεγ]ομένων· εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτεχ()ο[ν, δι]ὰ τίν αἰτίφι() αὐτοὶ χρῶν[ται ἀ]μφιβόλοις λέξεσιν [ἐν τοῖς πρὸς] ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχου[σιν;]

Φήσει δὲ πρὸς τὸ συστῆσαι, διότι δὴ, τέχνη κατ᾽Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική – τοῦθ ἡμεῖς παρετίθεμεν, λέγοντες· εἰ μὲν δὴ τε()ιβὴν αὐτὴν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι καὶ συνήθειαν οὐκ ἂν τὸ "δοκεῖ" προσέθηκεν. οἱ δὲ ἔφησαν οὐ δηλοῦσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἤτοι μὴ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθαι μόνον. εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ συνίεμεν ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ ο()ιαλεγομένων· εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτεχ()ον, διὰ τίν αἰτίφι() αὐτοὶ χρῶνται ἀμφιβόλοις λέξεσιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχουσιν;

[Chandler] He [will speak] for the purpose of organizing (an argument), because [if] rhetoric is [not] an art according to Epicurus – then we have shown it is by saying if he considered it to be a practice and familiarity he would [not have added] the word "seems." But they said that our argument was not made clear by us, or at least this point alone is not made clear. If the former is the case, then we do not understand people who speak Greek; if the latter, then why do they themselves use ambiguous terms in their refutations [in response to] us?

[U49]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 23, line 34 – col. 24, line 7

τῶν τε περὶ τὸ[ν Ἐ]πίκουρ[ον] ἀποφ[αι]νομένων τέχνην [εἶν]αι τὴν σοφιστικὴν τ[οῦ λ]όγους [σ]υγγράφειν καὶ ἐ[πιδε]ίξεις π[οι]εῖσθαι, [τοῦ δὲ] δίκας λέγειν καὶ δ[ημη]γορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέ[χνη]ν

τῶν τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἀποφαινομένων "τέχνην" εἶναι "τὴν σοφιστικὴν" τοῦ λόγους συγγράφειν καὶ ἐπιδείξεις ποιεῖσθαι, τοῦ δὲ δίκας λέγειν καὶ δημηγορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην

[Chandler] Since Epicurus and his followers reveal that sophistic is an art of writing speeches and composing display pieces, and is not an art of pleading cases and addressing the people.

...while those around Epicurus show that "sophistic" is composing together arguments and conducting lectures, whereas pleading in courts and demagoguery is not an art.

ἡ τέχνη **αἱ τέχναι**	art	**ΤΕΧΝΗ** *technique*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
συγγράφειν	to compose together	**ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing together*
ἡ ἐπίδειξις αἱ ἐπιδείξεις	lecture	**ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΙΣ** *upon pointing out*

Above, Philodemus has quoted Epicurus as saying "rhetoric is of much practice and habit."

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric, P.Herc. 1427, col. 7, line 9

Τοῖς δ' ἡμετέροις μεμπτέον ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττότερον τοῖς γέ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅσοι καὶ τὴν σοφισ[τ]ικὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην διειλήφασι καὶ τούτου συστατικοὺς λόγους πεποιήκασι. εἰ γὰρ Ἐπ[ί]κουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἔτι δ' Ἕρμαρχος ἀποφαίνονται τέχνην ὑπάρχειν τὴν τ[οι]αύτη[ν] (ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ὑπομνήσομεν) οἱ τούτοις ἀντιγράφοντες οὐ πάνυ τι μακρὰν τῆς τῶν πατραλοίων καταδίκης ἀφεστήκασιν.

For our own people, it would indeed be necessary to censure even more those of such a kind as have decided that sophistic rhetoric is not an art – and have made arguments supporting this. If indeed Epicurus, Metrodorus, and also Hermarchus declare that such is indeed an art (as we will remind in what follows) those who write against them are not far removed from condemnation as patricides.

[Chandler] Our people might have to be censured and particularly all those sort of people who assume that sophistic rhetoric too is not an art – and have composed confirmatory arguments of this view. For if Epicurus and Metrodorus and moreover Hermarchus declare such a practice to be an art (as we shall record in what comes next) then those who write against them are not very from being condemned as parricides.

[Hubbell] Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epicurus, Metrodorus and Hermarchus , as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 4

κἂν ἔχη[ι] τις καθ' ὑπόθεσι[ν] διὰ παντὸς πείθο[υ]σαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμ[ιν] – οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κα[κῶν] μεγάλων αἰτίαν ε[ἶναι] ταύτην. καὶ τού[των ἕ]καστον [κα]τασ[κευάσας] (ὡς νομίζει) ποικί[λως], οἴεται κατ' ἄκρας ἀποδεδειχέναι τὸ: παρ' Ἐπίκουρον [ἵ]στασ[θαι] το[ὺς] [ἢ] πᾶσαν τὴν ῥη[το]ρικ[ὴν] [ἢ] μέρος αὐτῆς ἔν τ[ε][χν]ον ἀ[πο]φαινο[μένους].

κἂν ἔχηι τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν διὰ παντὸς πείθουσαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμιν – οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κακῶν μεγάλων αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτην. καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον κατασκευάσας (ὡς νομίζει) ποικίλως, οἴεται κατ' ἄκρας ἀποδεδειχέναι τὸ: παρ' Ἐπίκουρον ἵστασθαι τοὺς ἢ πᾶσαν τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἢ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔν τεχνον ἀποφαινομένους.

[Chandler] ...And that even if someone, for the sake of argument, has always an ability to persuade the majority – this is a cause not of good things but great evils. And having constructed each one of these [arguments] in an artful way (so he thinks), he supposes he has shown thoroughly that: those who demonstrate that either the whole of rhetoric or a branch of it is technical are adopting a position contrary to Epicurus.

Under a certain assumption, if someone has a power at all times persuasive over many – this [is] the cause not of goods things of great harms, and having fully crafted in various ways each of these [arguments] (as he believes), he presumes to have shown extensively that: those who are revealing either all rhetoric or a part of it to be art stand [contrary] to Epicurus.

x

Philodemus (*fl.c.* 70 BCE), *On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18*

[Ἔγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ὶ τ]ῶ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγ[α]μ[αι] τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνῃσιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὧ[ν Ὁ] μὲ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῷ[ι Συμ]πο[σίωι Πε][ρὶ τῆς] Ῥητορικῆ[ς ἔφη] [συγ]γεγράφθαι – π[ιστεύ]ε[ιν] [ε]ἰ Χρὴ τοῖς λέγουσιν, ο[ὐ]δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περ[ὶ] [φι]λοσόφων πιστεύε[ιν] ¬ [Ὁ δ]' οὐκ ἔ[φη] γινώσκειν [ὅ]που λέγουσιν ο[ἱ περὶ] τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

Ἐγὼ δ' ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγαμαι τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνῃσιν ἀνδρός· ὧν Ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷι Συμποσίωι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη συγγεγράφθαι – πιστεύειν εἰ Χρὴ τοῖς λέγουσιν, οὐδ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περὶ φιλοσόφων πιστεύειν ¬ Ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

☘ Yet I certainly wonder at what is heard from the man who [currently] has leisure in Athens. One of them says [it] was written in [Epicurus'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if It is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe the philosophers about philosophers ¬ yet He denies knowing where those [originally] around Epicurus said [this]

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epicurus wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epicurus and his followers say (this).

x

Philodemus (*fl.c.* 70 BCE), *On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 15, line 3*

Ὁ δ᾽ ἐπαγγελλ[ό]μενος ῥητὰς παρατε[θ]ή[σε]σθαι διαλέκτους οὐ λιπαρεῖν ὀφείλει τοῦτ᾽ ἐγδέχ[ε]σθαι τοὺς ἀκο[ύ]οντας ὃ βούλεται – καὶ ἄλλων δηλουμένων. καὶ δὴ γὰρ [[δη]] οὔ φησι τῇ[ι] "ὑπο[σ]τελ[λ]όμενον τὸν" 'Ε[πί]κουρον λ[έγ]ει[ν] δ̣[ιαλέκ]τωι συνκατατίθ[εσ]θαι τέ[χνην] εἶν[αι] τὴ[ν] ῥητορικήν: α[ὑ]τοῦ [τοῦ]τό τε δὴ καὶ σαφῶς λ[έγοντος κ]αὶ ἐν ἄλλοις – τέχνην ε[ἶναι κατὰ] τὴν ἀλήθεια[ν]. ὃ σ̣τιε()ασμὸν τοῦ ῥήτορος καμ()εῖν [οὐ] μανικόν;

Ὁ δ᾽ ἐπαγγελλόμενος ῥητὰς παρατεθήσεσθαι διαλέκτους οὐ λιπαρεῖν ὀφείλει τοῦτ᾽ ἐγδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὃ βούλεται – καὶ ἄλλων δηλουμένων. καὶ δὴ γὰρ δη οὔ φησι τῇι "ὑποστελλόμενον τὸν" 'Επίκουρον λέγειν διαλέκτωι συνκατατίθεσθαι τέχνην εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν: αὑτοῦ τοῦτό τε δὴ καὶ σαφῶς λέγοντος καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις – τέχνην εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὃ στιε()ασμὸν τοῦ ῥήτορος καμ()εῖν οὐ μανικόν;

[Chandler] The man who claims he is going to quote arguments word for word must not insist that his audience accept (the meaning) that he wants – if other (interpretations) are revealed too. For in fact, he says that with the term "hesitating" Epicurus does not mean by the term that he agrees with those who say that rhetoric is without method, especially since in other places it is clearly revealed to be an art in reality. Is it not madness to call this an allusion to the rhetor?

The Rhodesian must have made the argument that Epicurus' use of the term "hesitating" in his Symposium supported the conclusion that no part of rhetoric is an art, even sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures).

[U50]

x

Philodemus (*fl.c.* 70 BCE), *On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 43, line 25*

νῦν ἐπ'[έ]κεῖν[ο] βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τ̣ὴν σοφιστικήν – οἱ δὲ τὴν αἵ[ρ]εσιν Κτίσαντες ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν: καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστορίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατήρησιν συνησκημένην οὐχ ἡμεῖς. ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παραθήσομ[εν]α[ι] ὅπου καὶ δι' ὧν ἐφα[ίνο]ν [[το]] [Ζ]ήνων ταῦτα διασαφεῖσθαι.

νῦν ἐπ'ἐκεῖνο βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τ̣ὴν σοφιστικήν – οἱ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν Κτίσαντες ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν: καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστορίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατήρησιν συνησκημένην οὐχ ἡμεῖς. ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνο παραθήσομεναι ὅπου καὶ δι' ὧν ἐφαίνον το Ζήνων ταῦτα διασαφεῖσθαι.

[Chandler] [But] Now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and (they who said) that political rhetoric is a certain research and practiced observation, not we. But I shall also set out where and how Zeno said these things were made clear.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 44

Ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν [τ]ῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ὅτι μὲν διατελε[ῖ] λέγων "τὰ διδα[σ]καλεῖα τῶν ῥητορικῶν" καὶ "το[ὺς] ἐκ τῶν διδα[σ]καλείων" [κ]αὶ "τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ[ς] ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλ[εί]ων" – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "τ[ὰς] ἐκ τῶν δ[ι]δασκαλείων [εὐ]μορφίας", καὶ διότι κ[αὶ] "πρα[γ]ματείαν αὐτῶν" καὶ "τὰς παρ[α]δόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περί τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθ[υ]μημάτων [κα]ὶ τῶν ἄλλων," καὶ τἀν[ά]λ[ογα] πάντα το[ύ]τοις τί ἂν λέγοι [τι]ς; [ἀ]λλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἕρμα[ρ]χος ἐπὶ Μενεκλέου[ς] [ἔ]ν τινι πρὸς Θεοφείδην ἐπιστολῆ[ι] τὴν αὐτὴ[ν] ἔχε[ι] γνώμην.

Ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ὅτι μὲν διατελεῖ λέγων "τὰ διδασκαλεῖα τῶν ῥητορικῶν" καὶ "τοὺς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων" καὶ "τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων" – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "τὰς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων εὐμορφίας", καὶ διότι καὶ "πραγματείαν αὐτῶν" καὶ "τὰς παραδόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περί τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων," καὶ τἀνάλογα πάντα τούτοις τί ἂν λέγοι τις; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἕρμαρχος ἐπὶ Μενεκλέους ἔν τινι πρὸς Θεοφείδην ἐπιστολῆι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει γνώμην.

[Chandler] Well then, what could one say of the fact that Epicurus in his *On Rhetoric* continually mentions "those who come from the schools," and "the capabilities that come from the schools" – and in addition "the symmetries that come from the schools," and "the teachings of the rhetoricians," and "their business," and "the teaching and instruction concerning both speech and enthymemes and the rest," and everything analogous to these things? Furthermore Hermarchus too, in a letter addressed to Theopheídēs in the archonship of Menekleús, has the same opinion.

[U51]*

x

Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, 30.4, 3

Ammianós Markellínos (fl. 370 CE) was a Greek, an officer in the army of Emperor Julian, and author of Res Gestae, a history of Rome from 100 CE to 378 CE.

Hanc professionem oratorum forensium "πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον" id est civilitatis particulae umbram vel adulationis partem quartam esse definit amplitudo Platonis – Epicurus autem "κακοτεχνίαν" nominans inter artes numerat malas.

This forensic oratory profession the rich genius of Plato defines as "*politikês moríou eídōlon* (an image of a part of politics)" that is, the shadow of a small part of the science of government or as the fourth part of flattery – but Epicurus counts it among evil arts, calling it "*kakotechnía* (a vile technique)."

ἡ κακοτεχνία **αἱ κακοτεχνίαι**	harmful art	**ΚΑΚΟΤΕΧΝΙΑ** *bad technique*

[U52]*

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 28

{[Πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔστι τε τεκμήρια τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν στοχάζεσθαι το]ῦ} ...ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ [πολὺ] καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον, καὶ δῆτα καὶ φέρεται πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. λέγω δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀόριστον καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν πειθόμενον ὅτε δὲ προσκόπτον.

...ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὔλογον, καὶ δῆτα καὶ φέρεται πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. λέγω δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀόριστον καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν πειθόμενον ὅτε δὲ προσκόπτον.

> [Chandler] { *too fragmentary* } ...for the most part and with a reasonable chance of success and it is certainly taken from Epicurus and his followers. I mean the uncertainty of many (in that) it is sometimes believed by, and sometimes gives offence to, the same people...

[U53]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 16 - line 32

[Ἀλλὰ μ]ὴν οὐχ ἕνε[κα] τοῦ κοινοποιῆσαι μόνον τὸ τεκμήριον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο νομιστέον πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις – καὶ πλανῶνται πάντες οἱ σοφισταῖς ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκοντες. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσωσι[ν αὐ]τῶν ἐν ταῖς δείξεσ[ι] καὶ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι, [φησ]ὶν [ὁ] Ἐπίκουρος, κα[ὶ ψυ]χαγωγηθῶσι διὰ τ[ὸ μ]ὴ [ε]ἶναι περὶ συ[μ]βολ[αί]ου τινὸς τὸν λόγο[ν μηδὲ τῶ]ν συμφερόν[των – ὃ ἐ]ν τ[αῖς] ἐκκλ[ησί]αις [κ]αὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις [γ]ίνεται.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοποιῆσαι μόνον τὸ τεκμήριον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο νομιστέον πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις – καὶ πλανῶνται πάντες οἱ σοφισταῖς ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκοντες. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσωσιν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς δείξεσι καὶ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι, φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ψυχαγωγηθῶσι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι περὶ συμβολαίου τινὸς τὸν λόγον μηδὲ τῶν συμφερόντων – ὃ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις γίνεται.

> But one should not consider that this was said merely to make the argument common knowledge to us, but rather for the sake of truths – all those who spend money on sophists are in error. For whenever they listen to [sophistic orators] at displays and festivals, Epicurus says, they are entertained because the speech is not about a treaty or agreements – as happens in the assemblies and law courts...

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 33 – col. 51, line 21

Ἐν μὲν γὰ[ρ τούταις] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνκειμέ[νου] διαλεγόμενοι κινδ[υ]νεύοντες ὅταν ἐ̣κ̣κ̣λησιά̣ζ̣ω̣σιν, ὅταν δὲ δι[κάζωσιν,] τὸν ὅρκον φοβο[ύ]μενοι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ δείξεσι τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ὑπὲρ [ὅρ]κου φ[ρο]ντίζον[τες - οὐ γὰρ ὀ]μωμόκασιν ὀ[ρθῶς] κ[ριν]εῖν. οὔθ' ὑπὲρ τῶ[ν λεγομ]ένων, εἰ συμφέρει [τῆι πόλει] ἢ μή - οὐ γάρ ἐστι[ν] ὑπ[ὲρ πο]λέμου καὶ [εἰρ]ήνης ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀτταδήποτε ψηφίσασθαι· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ῇ γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλη[σίαι]ς [β]ουλεύονται, οὐ περὶ κατεπε[ίγο]ντός τινος [ἢ] οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν τῶι παρόντι ὁ λόγος.

Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τούταις ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνκειμένου διαλεγόμενοι κινδυνεύοντες ὅταν ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ὅταν δὲ δικάζωσιν, τὸν ὅρκον φοβούμενοι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις – ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ δείξεσι τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ὅρκου φροντίζοντες, οὐ γὰρ ὀμωμόκασιν ὀρθῶς κρινεῖν. οὔθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν λεγομένων, εἰ συμφέρει τῆι πόλει ἢ μή, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀτταδήποτε ψηφίσασθαι· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ῇ γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βουλεύονται, οὐ περὶ κατεπείγοντός τινος ἢ οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν τῶι παρόντι ὁ λόγος.

> ...For in [law courts], as the saying goes, they risk their neck whenever they serve as assemblymen, and whenever they judge cases, they pay attention to what's being said because they fear their oath – but in the assemblies and displays of the sophists, they do not care at all, either about an oath (because they have not sworn to judge correctly) nor about whether what's being said is beneficial to the city or not (because the speech is not about war and peace, about which we must sometimes vote, or if it does happen to be about war and peace or some other thing that they deliberate in their assemblies, the speech at that moment is not about anything pressing at all).

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 51, line 25 – col. 52, line 7

Ὥστε σφ[ό]δρα ἔξωι ὄντες τοῦ ἀγω[νιᾶν ἀκούουσιν ἐν [τα]ῖς πανηγύρεσιν – ὅταν δ' οὔ[τ]ως ἀκού[ω]σι, τοῖς μὲν λεγομένοι[ς οὐ πρ]οσέχ[ο]υ[ς]ιν, [πότ]ερα συμ[φ]έροντα ἢ [ο]ὐ συμ[φ]έροντα καὶ τὸ σύνολον [ἀ]ληθῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἤχου καὶ τῶν περιόδων καὶ τῶν παρίσων καὶ ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτων ψυχαγωγούμενοι ἤδη προσεδόκησαν, εἰ οὕτωι λά[λοι] ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις ε[ὖ ἀπ]αλλάττειν οὐ συνορῶ[ν]τες, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἠ[ν]έ[σχο]ντ[ο], εἰ ἐν ἐκκλησίαι κ[αὶ] δικαστηρίωι [οὕ]τωι λαλοῦντος ἤκουον· ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναλίσκειν μισθὸν τοῖς σοφισταῖς. [Ε]ἶτ' εὐθὺς γινώσκουσ[ιν] ὅτι ἀπολωλέκασι τὸ ἀργύριον.

Ὥστε σφόδρα ἔξωι ὄντες τοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν ἀκούουσιν ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν – ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἀκούωσι, τοῖς μὲν λεγομένοις οὐ προσέχουσιν, πότερα συμφέροντα ἢ οὐ συμφέροντα καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἀληθῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἤχου καὶ τῶν περιόδων καὶ τῶν παρίσων καὶ ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτων ψυχαγωγούμενοι ἤδη προσεδόκησαν, εἰ οὕτωι λάλοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις εὖ ἀπαλλάττειν οὐ συνορῶντες, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἠνέσχοντο, εἰ ἐν ἐκκλησίαι καὶ δικαστηρίωι οὕτωι λαλοῦντος ἤκουον· ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναλίσκειν μισθὸν τοῖς σοφισταῖς. Εἶτ' εὐθὺς γινώσκουσιν ὅτι ἀπολωλέκασι τὸ ἀργύριον.

> Therefore, they are entirely outside of competition while they listen at the festivals – but whenever they listen in this way [sc. to a display oration at a panegyris (national assembly or festival), they do not pay attention to whether what is being said is beneficial or not, and, on the whole, true or not, but, entertained by the sound itself, the periods, balanced clauses, antitheses, and rhymes, they already expect to acquit themselves well, if they should speak like that, both in assemblies and in courtrooms, because they do not understand that they would not tolerate it if they heard someone speaking like that in an assembly or courtroom, on which grounds they came to hire sophists. Then they immediately recognize that they have wasted their money.

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 52, line 8

Οὐθὲν γάρ, οἶμα[ι], αὐτοῖς συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἢ δια[β]ολὴ καὶ ἀγωνία· δια[βο]λὴ μὲν ὡς [γ]εγυμ[ν]ασμένοις ῥητορεύειν, [καὶ κ]ατὰ τρόπον μὲν ἀ[παλ]λάττοντας κατὰ τὴ[ν ἐ]ν τῶι λέγειν ἰδέαν δοκεῖν παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς, μὴ κατὰ τρόπον δὲ ἀποχωροῦντας διὰ κενῆς ἀργύριον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι σοφιστι ἀνηλωκέναι· ἀγωνία δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνθυμουμένοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τῶι λόγωι δόξει ἀπαλλάττειν ἤπερ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δόξῃ παρακρού[ε]σθαι τοὺς δικαστάς. Ταῦτά τε δὴ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἅμα συ[νδ]έσμοις ἔπε[σθ]αι προσεχῶς καὶ [πτ]ώσεσιν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις μήτε τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναγγελλομένοις παρακο[λ]ουθεῖν μήτε τοῖς [ὑ]φ' ἑ[τέ]ρων.

Οὐθὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοῖς συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἢ διαβολὴ καὶ ἀγωνία· διαβολὴ μὲν ὡς γεγυμνασμένοις ῥητορεύειν, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον μὲν ἀπαλλάττοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῶι λέγειν ἰδέαν δοκεῖν παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς, μὴ κατὰ τρόπον δὲ ἀποχωροῦντας διὰ κενῆς ἀργύριον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι σοφιστι ἀνηλωκέναι· ἀγωνία δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνθυμουμένοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τῶι λόγωι δόξει ἀπαλλάττειν ἤπερ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δόξῃ παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς. Ταῦτά τε δὴ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἅμα συνδέσμοις ἕπεσθαι προσεχῶς καὶ πτώσεσιν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις μήτε τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναγγελλομένοις παρακολουθεῖν μήτε τοῖς ὑφ' ἑτέρων.

> ⁂ { Indeed, I believe, nothing is achieved by them in the matter but only defamation and anxiety; defamation insofar as trained to speak rhetorically, and in a manner, they seem to alienate the judges through their way of speaking, not properly withdrawing, thinking they have wasted money on sophistry; [they have] anxiety, however, concerning these considerations, and more so about how they might seem convincing in their speech rather than appearing not to convince the judges. These very issues are beset upon them by the situation, and they must meticulously follow the connections and downfalls in the statements, neither adhering to reports by themselves nor by others. }

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 10, line 24

Φησὶν ἐν τῶι Περὶ [τῆς] Ῥητορικῆς Ἐπίκουρ[ος], ὅτι τοῖς διατριβικοῖς οἱ π[ροσ]ιόντες ἀπατῶντα[ι] κ[αὶ] οὐκ ἀπεικότως διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν – ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούωσιν ἐν ταῖς δε[ί]ξεσιν καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τῶν [μ]ήτε π[ερ]ὶ συμβου[λῆς μήτε] περί τινος τῶν τ[ῆι π]όλει συμ[φ]ερόντω[ν]...

Φησὶν ἐν τῶι *Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς* Ἐπίκουρος, ὅτι τοῖς διατριβικοῖς οἱ προσιόντες ἀπατῶνται καὶ οὐκ ἀπεικότως διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν – ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούωσιν ἐν ταῖς δείξεσιν καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τῶν μήτε περὶ συμβουλῆς μήτε περί τινος τῶν τῆι πόλει συμφερόντων…

> [Chandler] Epicurus in his *On Rhetoric* says that those who attend the professors of the schools are deceived, and not unreasonably for the following reason – for whenever they listen to speeches at displays and panegyrics, because [the speech] is neither concerned with deliberation [or] anything which is of advantage to the state…
>
> ⁂ Epicurus states in *On Rhetoric* that those engaging in academic exercises, the participants deceive [themselves] and not without justification for such a reason – whenever they hear [speeches] at demonstrations and festivals that are neither about advice nor about anything of benefit to the city…

[U54]

Clarity Only

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων – ἣν, ὅτι ἰδιωτάτη Ἐστίν – Ἀριστοφάνης, ὁ γραμματικός, αἰτιᾶται

> He makes use of standard terminology in his efforts – which, because It is very idiosyncratic – Aristophanes, the grammarian, criticizes [*him for it*]

σαφὴς δ᾿ Ἦν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς*, Ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν

> and He was so clear that even in his *On Rhetoric*, He expects nothing else other than requiring clarity

[U55]

x

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col 21, line 22

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ [῞Ε]ρμαρχος, δι' ὧν παρεθέμε[θ]α, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πάσης [ἐ]ξεργασίας Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ṭῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητọρικῆς ṭελείοθ()ς ἀνεπιμείκτους [δ]ιδάσκων τὰς δυ[ν]άμεις κ[αὶ] συνεργούσας μὲν οὐθὲ[ν] εἵς γε τὴν ἕξιν τὴν πολ[ι]τικὴν τὰς διατρịβάς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταβαλλοụ́{σ}σατ(), ἃ προφέρεσθαι νῦν ἐμ μέσωι κείμενα πᾶσιν μά[τα]ρ()ον ησα()[νετ]αι καὶ [περ]ιττόν.

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ῞Ερμαρχος, δι' ὧν παρεθέμεθα, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πάσης ἐξεργασίας Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῶι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητọρικῆς τελείοθ()ς ἀνεπιμείκτους διδάσκων τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συνεργούσας μὲν οὐθὲν εἵς γε τὴν ἕξιν τὴν πολιτικὴν τὰς διατριβάς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταβαλλού{σ}σατ(), ἃ προφέρεσθαι νῦν ἐμ μέσωι κείμενα πᾶσιν μάταρ()ον ησα()νεται καὶ περιττόν. ⁂

> [Chandler] Hermarchus too, by what we have cited, shows this, as does Epicurus with his entire treatment in *On Rhetoric* by teaching that the capabilities are completely independent of one another and that the schools contain nothing for the political faculty, but often even change it, things which it seems pointless and superfluous to offer now when they lie exposed for everyone.

x

Maximus Planoúdēs, Commentary for Hermogenes On Stasis:

Máximos Planoúdēs (fl. 1300) was a Byzantine monk and translator.

Ὁ δέ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς* αὐθαδέστερον οἶμαι λέγων φησὶν αὐτὸς μόνος εὑρηκέναι τέχνην πολιτικῶν λόγων. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀποσκορακίζων ῥήτορας ἑαυτῷ πως μαχόμενα λέγει. φύσις γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατορθοῦσα λόγους, τέχνη δὲ οὐδεμία.

Epicurus, in his treatise *On Rhetoric* is seen to speak quite arrogantly, stating that he alone has discovered the art of political speeches. He ridicules the other orators, claiming that they are only contesting against him. According to him, it is nature that succeeds in creating speeches, not any craft.

Philodemus frequently mentions Plato's Gorgias, where rhetoric is portrayed mainly as a tool for persuasion, disconnected from genuine truth. Epicureans who agree with Philodemus' interpretation of Epicurus might see Plato's critical stance on rhetoric in this work as suggestive that that Epicurus held a more nuanced view – and was less adversarial toward certain educational facets falling under the realm of "rhetoric" – specifically the study of the principles of composition.

43. Twelve Elementary Principles
Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα

[U56]

Color Shifts with Atom Position

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.44b

Φησὶ δ,᾽ ἐνδοτέρω, μηδὲ ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βάρους – τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι, *ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσί* Φησι

He says, moreover, that there is no quality at all for the atoms except shape, size, and weight – that Color varies with the position of the atoms, He states in the *Twelve Elementary Principles*

τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
τὸ βάρος **τὰ βάρη**	weight	**ΒΑΡΟΣ** *heavy*

44. Symposium
Συμπόσιον

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...***Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν. Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον***...

...Neocles, Dedicated to Themista. Symposium. Eurylochus, Dedicated to Metrodorus...

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 1.0.1

Τὸ δ᾽ ὅλως ἀμνημονεῖν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ μὴ μόνον τῷ φιλοποιῷ λεγομένῳ μάχεσθαι τῆς τραπέζης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους ἀντιμαρτυροῦντας ἔχειν (Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Σπεύσιππον, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Πρύτανιν καὶ Ἱερώνυμον καὶ Δίωνα τὸν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ὡς ἄξιόν τινος σπουδῆς πεποιημένους ἔργον ἀναγράψασθαι λόγους παρὰ πότον γενομένους).

But to deliver over to oblivion all sort of discourse that merry meetings do usually produce is not only repugnant to that endearing quality that most allow to an entertainment, but against the known practice of the greatest philosophers (for Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis, Hieronymus, Dion the Academic, have thought it a worthy and noble employment to deliver down to us those discourses they had over drinks).

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 186E

Ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν περὶ τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν συμποσίων λέξομεν. ἀφορίζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ ποιητὴς χρόνους, πρόσωπα, αἰτίας. τοῦτο δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμάξατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ Πλάτων, οἳ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῶν ξυγγραμμάτων ἐκτίθενται τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ τίνες οἱ παρόντες. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ οὐ τόπον, οὐ χρόνον ἀφορίζει, οὐ προλέγει οὐδέν. δεῖ οὖν μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ποτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἐξαπίνης ἔχων κύλικα προβάλλει ζητήματα καθάπερ ἐν διατριβῇ λέγων.

We will now talk about the Homeric symposia. In these, namely, the poet distinguishes times, persons, and occasions. This feature Xenophon and Plato rightly copied, for at the beginning of their treatises they explain the occasion of the symposium, and who are present. But Epicurus specifies no place, no time; he has no introduction whatsoever. One has to guess, therefore, how it comes about that a man with cup in hand suddenly propounds questions as though he were lecturing before a class.

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 187B

Ἔτι δὲ ὁ μὲν Ὅμηρος ἡλικίαις εἰσάγει διαφέροντας καὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσι τοὺς κεκλημένους – Νέστορα καὶ Αἴαντα καὶ Ὀδυσσέα – τὸ μὲν καθόλου σύμπαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντεχομένους, εἴδει δὲ διαφόροις ὁδοῖς ὡρμηκότας ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἅπαντας εἰσήγαγε προφήτας ἀτόμων, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχων παραδείγματα τήν τε τοῦ Ποιητοῦ τῶν συμποσίων ποικιλίαν καὶ τὴν Πλάτωνός τε καὶ Ξενοφῶντος χάριν.

Homer introduces guests who differ in their ages and views of life – Nestor, Ajax, Odysseus – all of whom, speaking generally, strive after excellence, but have set out in specifically diverse paths to find it. Epicurus on the other hand, introduced none but prophets of atoms, although he had before him these as his models, such as the variety of symposia of the Poet, and the charm of Plato and Xenophon as well.

ὁ προφήτης οἱ προφῆται	prophet	**ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ** *to say before*
οἱ προφῆται ἀτόμων	prophets of atoms	

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 177B

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνων πεποίηται.

Epicurus, however, portrayed a symposium of only philosophers.

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 179D

Καὶ πρὸ τοῦ θοινᾶσθαι δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς διδάσκει πάλιν Ὅμηρος, ἀπαρχὰς τῶν βρωμάτων νέμειν τοῖς θεοῖς… ἅπερ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ συμπόσιον… παρὰ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρῳ οὐ σπονδή, οὐκ ἀπαρχὴ θεοῖς – ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Σημωνίδης ἔφη περὶ τῆς ἀκόσμου γυναικός: "ἄθυστα δ᾽ ἱρὰ πολλάκις κατεσθίει."

> Again, Homer tells us what we are to do before we begin to eat, namely, we are to offer as first portions of the food to the gods… all of which Plato also retains in his symposium… But with Epicurus there is no libation, no preliminary offering to the gods – on the contrary, it is like what Simonides says of the lawless woman: "Oftentimes she eats up the offerings before they are consecrated."

*Simonides of Ceos (fl.c. 515 BCE) was a lyric poet. He is credited for introducing **Ω, Η, Ξ,** and **Ψ** as new letters for the revised Greek alphabet.*

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 182A

Ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἐπικούρου Συμποσίῳ κολάκων ἐστὶν ἄγυρις ἀλλήλους ἐπαινούντων – τὸ δὲ Πλάτωνος πλῆρές ἐστι μυκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθαζόντων… παρὰ δ᾽ Ὁμήρῳ κεκρότηται τὰ σώφρονα συμπόσια.

> In the Symposium of Epicurus there is an assemblage of flatterers praising one another – while the symposium of Plato is full of men who turn their noses up in jeers at one another… In Homer, on the other hand, only sober symposia are organized.

[U57]

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 187C

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἶθ' ἑξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσαν τῇ λέξει ἀρρυθμίαν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

> Epicurus poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention the rhythmlessness that permeates his style?

[U58]

Effects of Wine

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1109E

Ὅρα δ᾽ ἅ, περὶ τοῦ οἴνου τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ, Πολύαινον αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον Ἐπίκουρος πεποίηκε, λέγοντος γὰρ "οὐ φῂς εἶναι, ὦ Ἐπίκουρε, τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας;" (ὑπέλαβέ τις) "οὐ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι." (καὶ μετὰ σμικρόν) "φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ εἶναι 'θερμαντικὸς ὁ οἶνος' – τοῦδε δέ τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθείη."

> Observe what, regarding the heat of the wine in the Symposium, Epicurus has [portrayed] Polyaenus conversing with him, as he says "Do you deny, Epicurus, the absolute heating effect caused by wine?" (Someone interrupts) "it is not a universal fact that wine seems fully warming." (And a little later) "For the universal fact does not seem to be that 'wine is warming' – but that a certain quantity for a certain person may be said to be warming."

Consider the discussion that Epicurus holds in his Symposium with Polyaenus about the heat in wine, when Polyaenus says "Do you, Epicurus, deny the existence of the warmth produced by wine?" (Some one interrupted) "It does not appear that wine is unconditionally productive of heat."(And a little later) "It seems that wine is not unconditionally productive of heat, but wine of a certain quantity might be said to produce heat for a given person."

[Alternative] (ὑπέλαβε) "τί δεῖ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι;"

[Alternative] (he replies) "what need is there to generalize that wine is warming?"

[U59]

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1109F – 1110A

Καὶ πάλιν, αἰτίαν ὑπειπὼν – θλίψεις τε καὶ διασπορὰς ἀτόμων, ἑτέρων δὲ συμμίξεις καὶ παραζεύξεις αἰτιασάμενος – ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καταμίξει τοῦ οἴνου, ἐπιλέγει "διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὸν οἶνον εἶναι θερμαντικόν – τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως καὶ τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης: θερμαντικὸν τὸν τοσοῦτον – ἢ (τῇσδε) τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι ψυκτικόν!"

* And again, having hinted at a cause – he attributes [1] compressions and dispersals of [some] atoms and of others their [2] mixings and joinings – in the blending of the wine with the body, he states "therefore it should generally not be said that wine is warming – but of such a nature and of an arrangement in such a way that: this much is warming – but (in another case) this much is cooling!"

Again, after assigning as one cause [1] the crowding and dispersal of atoms, and as another, the [2] mixture and alignment of these with others, when the wine is mingled with the body, he adds in conclusion "Thus, one should not generalize that wine is productive of heat – but only say that a particular amount produces heat for a particular body in a particular condition, or that such an amount results in chilling for another!"

"Ἔνεισι γὰρ καὶ τοιαῦται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀθροίσματι φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ψυχρὸν συσταίη – εἰς δέον τε ἑτέραις παραζυγεῖσαι: ψυχρασίας φύσιν ἀποτελέσειαν – ὅθεν ἐξαπατώμενοι οἱ μὲν ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου φασὶν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον, οἱ δὲ θερμαντικόν"

* "For there are such natures in such a conglomerate [as wine], from which coldness might be composed – and if in proper measure yoked with other [elements]: they would achieve a nature of cooling – therefore, while some are deceived and say that the universal fact is that wine is generally cooling, others [say it is] warming."

"For in an aggregate such as wine there are also certain natural substances of such a sort that coolness might be formed of them, or such that, when aligned with others, they would produce a real coolness. Hence, deceived by this, some generalize that wine is cooling, others, that it is heating."

[U60]

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1110A

Ὁ δὴ λέγων ἐξηπατῆσθαι τοὺς πολλούς, τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαντικὸν ἢ τὸ ψῦχον ψυκτικὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, εἰ μὴ νομίζοι "τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον" ἕκαστον ἀκολουθεῖν οἷς εἴρηκεν, αὐτὸς ἐξηπάτηται.

If then the man who asserts that the majority are deceived in supposing that what heats is heating or what cools is cooling should refuse to recognize "Everything is no more this than that" as a conclusion from his premises, he is himself deceived.

Προστίθησι δ᾽ ὅτι "πολλάκις οὐδ᾽ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα θερμαντικὴν ἐπιφέρων ἢ ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν ὁ οἶνος – ἀλλὰ κινηθέντος τοῦ ὄγκου καὶ γενομένης τῶν σωμάτων μεταστάσεως: αἱ ποιοῦσαι τὸ θερμὸν ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνῆλθον εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ παρέσχον ὑπὸ πλήθους θερμότητα καὶ πύρωσιν τῷ σώματι – νῦν δ᾽ ἐκπεσοῦσαι κατέψυξαν."

* He adds that "Often the wine did not come into the body bringing either a heating or cooling power – but with the mass having been moved and a displacement of the objects having occurred: the atoms that produce heat now indeed came together and by the multitude provided heat and inflammation to the body – but now having fallen out, they cooled."

He proceeds to add "And often the wine does not even possess the property of heating or cooling as it enters the body – rather, the bodily mass is so set in motion that the corpuscles shift their position: the heat-producing atoms are at one time concentrated, becoming numerous enough to impart warmth and heat to the body, but at another time are driven out, producing a chill."

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 3.5, 652A

Διείλεκται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Συμποσίῳ* πολλοὺς λόγους, ὧν τὸ Κεφαλαιόν ἐστιν, ὡς Ἐγῷμαι, τοιόνδε: Φησὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν Οἶνον: ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὐτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς – ἑτέρας δ᾽ αὖ ψυχρότητος

Epicurus also discussed in the *Symposium* many arguments, the main point of them, as I understand it, as follows: for He says that Wine is not hot in itself: but has certain atoms in itself productive of heat – and others again of coldness

ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀποβάλλειν ὅταν εἰς τὸ σῶμα παραγένηται – τὰς δὲ προσλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἂν ἔχωσι κράσεως ἡμῖν ἢ φύσεως ὁμιλῆσαι: ὡς Τοὺς μὲν ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι, Τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον πάσχειν μεθυσκομένους

[Epicurus says that] some of these [atoms of wine] are shed whenever [wine] is in the body – but other [atoms] are taken along from the body in addition [to the wine], depending on how they may be suited to interact with our constitution or nature: so that Some [people] are warmed – but Others experience the opposite while they are intoxicated

[U61]

Appropriate Time for Intercourse

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 653B

περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας: Νεανίσκοι τινὲς, οὐ πάλαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λόγοις προσπεφοιτηκότες – ἐσπάραττον τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ὡς οὐ καλὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἐμβεβληκότα λόγον περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας εἰς τὸ *Συμπόσιον*

about the proper time for intercourse: some Youngsters, not long acquainted with the ancient discussions, were tearing apart Epicurus, as though he had introduced a discussion that was neither good nor necessary about proper time for intercourse in the *Symposium*

ἡ οὐσία **αἱ οὐσίαι**	existence	**ΟΥΣΙΑ** *being*
ἡ συνουσία **αἱ συνουσίαι**	intercourse	**ΣΥΝΟΥΣΙΑ** *being together*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning [here, "discussion"]	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*

μιμνήσκεσθαι γὰρ Ἀφροδισίων Ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ἐν δείπνῳ μειρακίων παρόντων – καὶ διαπορεῖν πότερον μετὰ δεῖπνον ἢ πρὸ δείπνου Χρηστέον, ἐσχάτης ἀκολασίας εἶναι

for an older man to make mention of Aphrodisian activities at a dinner-party with youths present – and to be in doubt whether It is necessary before dinner or after dinner is [they said] the extreme of licentiousness

πρὸς ταῦθ᾽ οἱ μὲν τὸν Ξενοφῶντα παρέλαβον ὡς ἀπάγοντα τοὺς συμπότας μετὰ δεῖπνον οὐχὶ πεζοὺς ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἵππων ἐπὶ συνουσίας πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας. Ζώπυρος δ᾽ ὁ Ἰατρός, εὖ μάλα τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις ἐνωμιληκώς, οὐκ ἔφη προσέχοντας αὐτοὺς ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ Ἐπικούρου *Συμπόσιον*

at this, some among our company brought up Xenophon, who, so to speak, took his guests home after dinner, not on foot, but on horseback, for intercourse with their wives. And Zopyrus the Physician, who was very well acquainted with the works of Epicurus, did not say that that they were attentively reading the *Symposium* of Epicurus

οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος καὶ καταστάσεως τοῦτο πρόβλημα ποιησάμενον εἶτα λόγους ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ περαίνειν ¬ ἀλλὰ τοὺς νέους ἀνιστάντα μετὰ δεῖπνον εἰς περίπατον ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἀνακρούειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν – ὡς ἀεὶ μὲν ἐπισφαλοῦς εἰς βλάβην τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος (κάκιστα δὲ τοὺς παρὰ πότον καὶ ἐδωδὴν χρωμένους) αὐτῷ διατιθέντος

for it is not as if, from some principle and foundation, [Epicurus] made this problem and then completed arguments upon it ¬ but rather he made the young men rise after dinner for a walk to converse regarding moderation, and to push back away from desires – with [the discussion] being arranged by him that it is always risky regarding the harm of the circumstance (but especially for those engaging during drinking and eating)

"εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ προηγουμένως" εἶπεν "ἐζητεῖτο περὶ τούτου – πότερον οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ἐσκέφθαι καλῶς εἶχε τὸν φιλόσοφον περὶ συνουσίας καιροῦ καὶ ὥρας; ἢ βέλτιον μὲν ἐν καιρῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν; τὸν δὲ καιρὸν ἄλλως μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον – ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ καὶ περὶ τράπεζαν αἰσχρόν;"

"indeed, even if previously" he said "the inquiry had been about this – would it not be entirely proper that the philosopher considered the proportion and time for intercourse? is it not better to do such things at the right time and with reason? or is it not inappropriate to examine the right occasion [for intercourse] at another [event] – but shameful to do so during a symposium or around the table?"

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 653F

πρὸς τοῦτο πληγέντες, οἱ Νεανίσκοι σιωπῇ κατέκειντο: τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων τὸν Ζώπυρον ἀξιούντων τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους Ἐπικούρου διελθεῖν, ἔφη τῶν μὲν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἀκριβῶς μνημονεύειν, οἴεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τὰς ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας πληγὰς δεδιέναι – διὰ τὸν τῶν σωμάτων παλμὸν εἰς ταραχὴν καὶ σάλον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ βαδιζόντων

struck by this, the young men sat down in silence. with the rest of the company asking Zopyrus to go through the reasonings of Epicurus about this, and he replied that he did not remember accurately in detail, but thought that [Epicurus] feared the afflictions resulting from intercourse – due to the pulsation of the bodies moving in the disturbance and agitation in such a state of movement

καθόλου μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἕδρας τὰ σώματα μεθιστάναι – πλήκτην ὄντα καὶ κινητικὸν ταραχῆς τὸν ἄκρατον: ἂν δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοντα τὸν ὄγκον ἡμῶν γαλήνη μὴ παραλάβῃ καὶ ὕπνος, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτεραι διὰ τῶν Ἀφροδισίων κινήσεις ¬ ἐκθλιβομένων καὶ μοχλευομένων τῶν μάλιστα συνδεῖν καὶ κολλᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεφυκότων: Κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἀνέδραστον γίγνεσθαι τὸν ὄγκον, ὥσπερ ἐκ θεμελίων γιγνόμενον

for generally [wine] moves our body from its position – because it is impactful and the extreme of kinetic disturbances: and if calmness and sleep do not take possession of our body when it is in this condition [*of being full of wine or food*], but instead different movements in line with Aphrodisian activities ¬ then those things which are especially natural for connecting and joining together the body are pressed out and dislodged: there is a Danger that the mass will be become unsupported, as though becoming [shifted] from its foundation

οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖ ῥεῖν, τηνικαῦτα, τὴν γονήν, σφηνώσεως διὰ τὴν πλησμονὴν οὔσης, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ καὶ συμπεφυρμένην ἀποσπᾶσθαι: διὸ, χρῆναί φησιν ὁ Ἀνήρ ὅταν Ἡσυχία γένηται περὶ τὸ σῶμα (καὶ λωφήσωσιν αἱ τῆς τροφῆς Ἀναδόσεις καὶ τὰ Ῥεύματα διεξιούσης καὶ φευγούσης) τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν – πρὶν ἑτέρας αὖ πάλιν τροφῆς ἐνδεὲς γενέσθαι τὸ Σῶμα)

for, at that time [of being full of wine or food], our seed does not flow well, due to the [internal] constriction from the fullness, but rather it is pulled out with difficulty while being mixed together: consequently, [Epicurus] says it is necessary to perform such actions [only] when tranquillity comes about for the body (and the Assimilation of nourishment and the Flows of processing and removal have ceased) – before the Body again becomes in need of [more] nourishment

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 654B

Σκοπῶμεν οὖν εἰ δοκεῖ πότερον ἐμμελῶς καὶ προσηκόντως ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ παρὰ πᾶν δίκαιον ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην τῆς νυκτός

Let us then examine if it seems appropriate whether Epicurus fittingly and property, or contrary to all justice, removes Aphrodite from the night

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Quaestiones Convivales, 655A

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ Σῶμα βλάπτοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς συνουσίας μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται, μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον – ἄν γε μὴ (μεθύων Τις ἢ ῥηγνύμενος ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς) ἅπτηται καὶ βεβαρημένος: ἀμέλει γὰρ, οὕτως, ἐπισφαλὲς τὸ Πρᾶγμα καὶ βλαβερόν

surely the Body would not suffer greater harm by intercourse, as Epicurus thinks, after dinner – provided that Someone is not (while drunk or bursting from overindulgence) engaged and weighed down: for certainly, in that case, the Circumstance is precarious and harmful

αὐτοῦ μαλακοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς παρεστώσης διὰ χρόνου ποιῆται τὴν ἔντευξιν: οὔτε ταραχὴν ἀπεργάζεται μεγάλην διὰ τὸν ὄγκον, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τι ὧν ἐπήγαγεν – ἢ Ψῦξις ἢ Μετάθεσις ἐξ ἕδρας ἀτόμων – φησιν Ἐπίκουρος.

[as long as] he arranges the encounter after some time while the [body] has become relaxed and the soul remains present: he neither causes a great disturbance because of the mass, nor [does he cause] anything else that would have come about – neither a Chilling nor a Change from the position of the atoms – as Epicurus claims

[U62]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.118 fin

[Usener]

Συνουσίη ὤνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δ' εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψε

Intercourse never is advantageous – but it is welcome if it has not harmed

[Henderson]

Συνουσίαν δέ Φασιν ὀνῆσαι μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε

They say that although Intercourse never is advantageous – but it is desirable if it has not also harmed

ἀγαπητός (ή, όν)	desirable	**ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ** *love worthy*

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Instructor, 2.10

Titus Flavius Clemens "Klḗmēs of Alexandria" was a Christian theologian who wrote the Paedagogus. Although a Christian work, it also includes elements of ancient philosophy and references to Homer.

εὖ γοῦν Τις εἰρηκέναι φέρεται "Συνουσία ὤνησε μὲν οὐδένα – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν"

at least Someone is reported to have well said that "Intercourse has benefited no one – but it is welcome if it has not harmed"

x

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.52

Porphyry was a native speaker of Aramaic, student of Plotinus, and one of the founders of Neoplatonism. He is known of his anti-Christian polemics and books on logic.

Οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν τοὺς πολλοὺς οἴεσθαι εἰς ὑγίειαν συντελεῖν τὴν κρεοφαγίαν – τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις οἴεσθαι ὑγείας εἶναι τηρητικὰς καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίσια, ὀνῆσαι μὲν οὐδένα τινά – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.

It is not surprising that the public thinks meat-eating contributes to health – for they are just people who think that enjoyment and Aphrodisian activities preserve health, whereas these things have never profited anyone ¬ but one must be content if it has not harmed

x

Galen (fl. 170 CE), Art of Medicine 24.1

Claudius Galenus of Pergamon was a Greek physician, surgeon. He was the doctor of Marcus Aurelius, Commodus, & Septimius Severus.

…Ἀφροδισίων δὲ, κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον: οὐδεμία Χρῆσις ὑγιεινή

…but regarding Aphrodisian activities, according to Epicurus: no Use is healthy

x

Galen (fl. 170 CE), comment on The Epidemics of Hippocrates 3.1.4, Art of Medicine 17

Τίς γὰρ ἦν ἀνάγκη γράφειν… εἰρηκέναι…Ἐπίκουρον, μηδέποτε μὲν ὠφελεῖν Ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν, ἀγαπητὸν δ᾽ εἰ μὴ βλάψειεν;

※ Why then was there a need to write… what Epicurus has said, that the use of Aphrodisian activities has never been beneficial – but one must be content if it did not harm?

[U63]

x

[Usener] **οὐδὲ μὴν τ̲ηρήσειν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν Σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Συμποσίῳ***

in fact, Epicurus says in the *Symposium* that [the wise man] will not stay guarded in drunkenness

[Henderson, Dorandi] **οὐδὲ μὴν λ̲ηρήσειν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν Σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ *Συμποσίῳ***

in fact, Epicurus says in the *Symposium* that [the wise man] will not be foolish in drunkenness

τηρεῖν	to preserve *(here, "to stay guarded")*	**ΤΗΡΕΙΝ** *protecting / watching*
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	**ΛΗΡΕΙΝ** *trash / trifle*
ἡ μέθη **αἱ μέθαι**	drunkenness	**ΜΕΘΗ** *mead*
τό μέθυ **τά μέθυα**	wine	

[U64]

The Telos

⁂ Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric, VH² VII 184

...καὶ ζῶιον ἔμψυ[χον διὰ] ζωγραφίας άπο[τελεῖν ἐσ]ται. Ταῦτα μὲν ο[ῦν τοῦ]τον ὠικονομήθ[η τὸν] τρόπον ¬ παρ᾽Ἐπικούρ[ωι] δὲ τῶν λόγων ὁ Τύπ[ος] ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ διαλόγο[υ] συνθεῖναι τοιοῦτος: "[πρῶ]τον, Διομολογησώ[με]θα τί ἐστιν οὗ χάριν [ἅπαν]τα Πράττο[μεν]..."

‹...καὶ ζῶιον ἔμψυχον διὰ ζωγραφίας ἀποτελεῖν ἔσται.› Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον ὠικονομήθη τὸν τρόπον ¬ παρ᾽Ἐπικούρωι δὲ τῶν λόγων ὁ Τύπος ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ διαλόγου συνθεῖναι τοιοῦτος: "πρῶτον, Διομολογησώμεθα τί ἐστιν οὗ χάριν ἅπαντα Πράττομεν..."

‹...and to create a living being through realistic writing will be possible.› These things, therefore, were arranged in that way ¬ while for Epicurus the Impression from his discourse is constructed like this by means of a dialogue: "first, let Us agree on what it is for the sake of which We do everything..."

ἡ ζωγραφία **αἱ ζωγραφαί**	⁂ realistic writing	**ΖΩΓΡΑΦΙΑ** *life writing*
this is an uncommon term, and is typically associated with painting		
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*

[U65]

x

[=U49] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18

[Ἐγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ὶ τ]ῶ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγ[α]μ[αι] τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὧ[ν Ὁ] μὲ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῷ[ι Συμ]πο[σίωι Πε][ρὶ τῆς] Ῥητορικῆ[ς ἔφη] [συγ]γεγράφθαι – π[ιστεύ]ε[ιν] [ε]ἰ Χρὴ τοῖς λέγουσιν, ο[ὐ]δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περ[ὶ] [φι]λοσόφων πιστεύε[ιν] ¬ [Ὁ δ]' οὐκ ἔ[φη] γινώσκειν [ὅ]που λέγουσιν ο[ἱ περὶ] τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

Ἐγὼ δ' ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγαμαι τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀνδρός· ὧν Ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷι Συμποσίωι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη συγγεγράφθαι – πιστεύειν εἰ Χρὴ τοῖς λέγουσιν, οὐδ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περὶ φιλοσόφων πιστεύειν ¬ Ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

⁂ Yet I certainly wonder at what is heard from the man who [currently] has leisure in Athens. One of them says [it] was written in [Epicurus'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if It is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe the philosophers about philosophers ¬ yet He denies knowing where those [originally] around Epicurus said [this]

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epicurus wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epicurus and his followers say (this).

x

[= U11] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57

ού μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολ[λ]ῶν α[ὐτοὺς] Ἀνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ὶ] ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῶ[ι] Συμποσίω[ι Λ]έγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Πε[ρὶ Βί]ων ¬ οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμὲν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[η]ικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρί]σιν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν γ' ἔχει λ[όγου τ]υχεῖν

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν αὐτοὺς Ἀναπαύσωμεν ἐρεύνης καὶ ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῶι *Συμποσίωι* Λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Βίων* ¬ οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμὲν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν *Σοφιστηικὴν* Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

⁂ however, We relieve them from much questioning and from many inquires: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in [*the works*] *On Lives* ¬ nor do We order him to seek a pebble in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic* Rhetoric is shown to exist as an art – [*with the quotations given above*] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless still require having a reasoning {i.e., giving an explanation}

Above [U49] Philodemus shows that Sophistic Rhetoric is the practice of composing arguments together and conducting lectures.

45. On Fulfillment
Περὶ Τέλους

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*Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27...**Περὶ Αἱρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν**. **Περὶ Τέλους**. **Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών**...*

...On Choices and Avoidances. On Fulfillment. On the Criterion, or The Canon...

[=U6] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

τὸ δὲ Ἠθικὸν [ἔχει] τὰ περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς – ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Βίων* βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*

but the ethical Part [concerns] things relating to choice and avoidance – and it is in the books *On Lifestyles*, in the letters, and in the book *On Fulfillment*

τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.18.41

in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam… totusque liber, qui est *De Summo Bono*, refertus et uerbis et sententiis talibus.

> indeed in that book which contains all your teaching… and the entire book, which is about *On the Highest Good*, is filled with such words and sentiments

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.19.44

haec Epicuro confitenda sunt, aut ea quae modo expressa ad verbum dixi, tollenda de libro – vel totus liber potius abiciundus – est enim confertus voluptatibus

> these things must be admitted by Epicurus, or what I just expressed verbatim must be removed from the book – or rather the whole book should be thrown out – for it is packed with pleasures

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.7 [20]

duae sunt enim Res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes: unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. Vos, ex his tam dissimilibus rebus, non modo nomen unum – nam id facilius paterer – sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo potest! hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti: sicut facit re, neque tamen dividit verbis

> for there are indeed two Things, lest you think there are only [two] words: One is to be without pain, the other is to be with pleasure. You all, from such dissimilar things as these, try not only to make one name – for that I might more easily tolerate – but also to make one thing out of two, which in no way can be done! He, who approves of both [circumstances], ought to use each [description]: as he does in fact, and yet he does not divide them with words

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio *De Summo Bono*

> indeed, when in many places He praises that very pleasure, which We all call by the same name: he dares to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good separate from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Aristippos – and he says this there, where all of his Discourse is about the *Highest Good*

x

[=U34] Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.21

εἶτα τηλικαύτη Δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ Σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἄν Τις αὐτῆς

> then, being so great a Power and set over all the rest, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say to us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh – not even if the Flesh itself declared that it itself is the most excellent, would Anyone be tolerant of this

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ *Τέλους* συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰς *Φυσικάς*; τὸ περὶ *Κανόνος*; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός;

> but now which is it, Epicurus, which declares these things? Which one wrote about *The End*, which one wrote *On Nature*? Which one wrote about the *Canon*? Which one let grow the beard?

Τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἡ Σὰρξ ἢ ἡ Προαίρεσις;

Which one wrote, when it was dying, that it "was spending the last and at the same time also a blessed day?" was it your Flesh or your Choice?

εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν Ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ Μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς Εἶ;

then you agree to having something [*i.e., choice*] superior to this [*i.e., the flesh*]! are you not insane? Are you so blind and deaf to the truths?

προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping before*
προαιρεῖσθαι	to choose [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *grasping before*
ἡ προαίρεσις **αἱ προαιρέσεις**	choice	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *grasping before*

[U66]

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.137 fin

ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν: τῷ τὰ ζῷα, ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι, τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν, φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν Φεύγομεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα: ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς – καταβιβρωσκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος – βοᾷ, δάκνων, ἰύζων:

ἀμφὶ δ,᾿ ἔστενον Πέτραι: Λοκρῶν τ᾿
ὄρειοι Πρῶνες, Εὐβοίας τ᾿Ἄκραι

and he uses as proof that pleasure is the complete fulfilment: through the fact that that living beings, starting right when they are born, either [act] by being satisfied or by recoiling from pain, naturally and without reasoning: therefore, We flee from pain instinctively: so even Heracles – being dissolved by his robe – cries out, while gnawing and wailing:

and around, the Rocks lamented: both the Locrian
mountainous Headlands, and the Euboean Heights
Sophocles, Trachiniae (The Women of Trachis), 786-87

In myth, Heracles was burned to death by putting on a tunic ("the shirt of Nessus") which his confused second wife Deianeira coated with the blood of the centaur Nessus. Nessus, in turn, had been poisoned by Heracles with an arrow coated with the poisonous blood of the Lernaean Hydra.

[U67]

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 12.67, 546E

οὐ μόνος δ᾿ Ἀρίστιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάζοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτου – καὶ ἵνα μὴ "τοὺς καταιγισμοὺς" λέγω καὶ "τὰ ἐπεντρώματα" (ἅπερ πολλάκις προφέρεται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος) καὶ "τοὺς γαργαλισμοὺς" καὶ "τὰ νύγματα" – ἃ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* εἴρηκεν, τούτων μνησθήσομαι

not only Aristippos and those around him embraced pleasure from motion, but also Epicurus and those around him – and lest I mention "the excitements" and "the delicacies" (the very things which Epicurus often brings up) and "the titillations" and "the pinches" – which he has spoken about in *On the Goal*, I will make mention of these

ἡ αἰγίς αἱ αἰγίδες	hurricane, the Aegis (of Athena)	ΑΙΓΙΣ *shaking / goat*
ὁ καταιγισμός	excitement *(gust of passion)*	ΚΑΤΑΙΓΙΣΜΟΣ *full shaking action*
τὸ ἐπέντρωμα τὰ ἐπεντρώματα	delicacy *(dessert)*	ΕΠΕΝΤΡΩΜΑ *over nibble in*
ὁ γαργαλισμός	titillation *(tickling)*	ΓΑΡΓΑΛΙΣΜΟΣ *tickle action*
τὸ νύγμα τὰ νύγματα	pinch *(nibble)*	ΝΥΓΜΑ *a sting*

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 7.11, 280A

κάν, τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* δέ Φησιν οὕτω πως "οὐ γὰρ Ἔγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι τἀγαθόν – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ Ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ ἀκροαμάτων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατ᾽ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις"

> again, in the work *On Fulfillment*, He speaks in such a way "for I myself am not able to conceive the good – removing the pleasures from flavor, or removing those from Aphrodisian activities, or removing those from auditory experiences, or removing those pleasurable movements from form in accordance with appearance"

x

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 7.8, 278F

καὶ γὰρ, οὐκ ἐγκαλυπτόμενος, ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, ἀλλὰ μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ "οὐ γὰρ Ἔγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι τἀγαθόν – ἀφελὼν μὲν τὴν διὰ χυλῶν, ἀφελὼν δὲ τὴν δι᾽ Ἀφροδισίων ἡδονήν." οἴεται γὰρ οὕτως ὁ Σοφὸς καὶ τὸν ἀσώτων βίον ἀνεπίληπτον εἶναι – εἴπερ αὐτῷ Προσγένοιτο τὸ ἀδεὲς καὶ ἵλεων! διὸ καὶ οἱ τῆς κωμῳδίας Ποιηταὶ, κατατρέχοντές που τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀκρασίας, Ἐπικούρους καὶ βοηθοὺς βοῶσιν

> and indeed Epicurus, while not hiding himself, says loudly "I myself am not able to conceive the good – if I removed the pleasure from flavor, and removed the pleasure from Aphrodisian activities." For this wise man believes that even the life of profligates can be irreproachable – if It should be safe and favorable for one of them! Therefore, the Poets of comedy, who are perhaps disdainful of pleasure and intemperance, call out the Epicureans and [their] followers

The version quoted by Diogenes Laertius (below) is slightly contracted.

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.6

Ἔν τε τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* γράφειν οὕτως: "οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε Ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθόν – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι᾽ Ἀφροδισίων, καὶ τὰς δι᾽ ἀκροαμάτων, καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς"

> [Epicurus] writes in this way in *On Fulfillment*: "for I myself do not possess what I would consider to be the good – if I remove the pleasures from flavor, and remove those from Aphrodisian activities, and those from auditory experiences, and those from form"

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.41

quid Tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem – quam Tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necne? in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam (Fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne Quis me putet fingere)

> why do We hesitate, Epicurus, and not admit that we are talking about that pleasure – which You yourself, when you have wiped your mouth,* are accustomed to talk about? Are these your words or not? Indeed, in that book which contains all your teachings (I will now perform the duty of an interpreter, lest Anyone may think I am inventing)

In Roman rhetoric, **perfricare os or **perfricare frontem** (to wipe one's mouth or forehead) symbolized wiping away a blush – and wiping away any embarrassment or restraint – allowing one to speak boldly or shamelessly.*

Dicis haec "nec equidem Habeo quod intellegam bonum illud – detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur Veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suavis motiones – sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu..."

> You say this "nor indeed do I have that which I might understand as good – removing those pleasures that are perceived by taste, removing those that are perceived in Venereal activities, removing those from listening to songs, and even removing those that are perceived from forms by the eyes as sweet movements – or whatever other pleasures are generated in the entire person by any sense..."

"...nec vero ita dici potest mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis – laetantem enim mentem ita Novi: spe eorum omnium quae supra dixi – fore ut natura Is potiens dolore careat" atque Haec quidem his verbis, Quivis ut intellegat quam voluptatem norit Epicurus

> "...nor, in truth, can it be said that joy of the mind alone exists among the good things – for I know the mind rejoices in this way: by the hope of [enjoying] all those things that I mentioned above – so that it will happen that He is naturally able to be free from pain" and indeed these things [he-said] in these words, so that Anyone may understand what pleasure Epicurus knows

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.46

non enim verbo solum Posuit voluptatem, sed explanavit quid diceret: "saporem" inquit "et corporum complexum et ludos atque cantus et formas eas quibus oculi iucunde moveantur"

> for He did not define pleasure merely in a word, but explained what he meant: "taste" he said "and the embrace of bodies, games and music, and those forms by which the eyes are pleasantly moved"

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.7

(Torquatus) **"istam voluptatem" inquit "Epicurus ignorat?"**

(Cicero) **"Non semper" inquam "nam interdum nimis etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur – an Haec ab eo non dicuntur?"**

> (Torquatus) "this pleasure" he asked "Epicurus does not know?"

(Cicero) "Not always" I said "for sometimes he knows all too well, since he testifies that he cannot even understand where or what any good is, except that which is found in food, drink, in pleasure of the ears, and in obscene pleasure – or is This not said by him?"

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.20

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio *De Summo Bono*

indeed, when in many places He praises that very pleasure, which We all call by the same name: he dares to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good separate from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Aristippos – and he says this there, where all of his Discourse is about the *Highest Good*

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.23

Nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere – mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis – vitantes cruditatem "quibus Vinum defusum e pleno sit chrysizon" ut ait Lucilius "cui Nihil dum sit, Vis et Sacculus abstulerit" – adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum

None of us thinks that debauched people of that kind live pleasantly – [but instead] clean, elegant people, with the best cooks, bakers, fish, fowl, hunting-games, with all these exquisite things – avoiding rawness, "for whom Wine poured from a full vessel is golden" as Lucilius says "for whom there is Nothing, if Strength and Money are taken away" – employing games and those things which follow, those things, when removed, Epicurus shouts that he does not know what the good is

Cicero seems to be paraphrasing Lucilius here and adapts the poet's language to support his own argument and setting.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.29

hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse: voluptatem illam – qua sublata neget Se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum *(eam autem ita persequitur: Quae palato percipiatur, Quae auribus; cetera Addit, quae si Appelles, Honos praefandus sit)* – hoc igitur, quod "solum bonum," severus et gravis Philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non Desideremus, cum dolore Careamus

he truly does not see the greatest argument is: that this [kinetic] pleasure – which, when removed, He denies that he understands at all what the good is *(but he nevertheless pursues it in this way: That which is perceived by the palate, That [which is perceived] by the ears; He adds other things, which, if You mention, Honor must [also] be proclaimed)* – this [kinetic pleasure], therefore, which the severe and serious Philosopher knows to be "the sole good," he likewise does not see that it should not even be sought, because, according to this same author, We do not long for that pleasure when We are free from pain

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.30

hanc in motu voluptatem – sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates Appellat… interdum ita laudat ut quid praeterea sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem

this pleasure in motion – for in this way indeed He calls these pleasant and almost sweet pleasures… sometimes he praises in such a way that he denies he can even understand what else might be good

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.64

cetera illa adhibebat – quibus demptis negat Se Epicurus intellegere quid sit Bonum

[Thorius] added those other things – without which Epicurus denies that He understands what the Good is

Lucius Thorius Balbus was a moneyer who was from from Lanuvium (20 miles southeast of Rome), where there was a cult of Juno Sospita.

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.111

nullam enim Novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. non Arbitror te velle similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum – quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum – quibus Ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus: quas, quidem, non erubescens, persequitur omnis nominatim!

(Cotta) for You know no pleasure of the soul except what originates from the body and returns to the body. I do not think you wish to be like the rest of the Epicureans – who may be shamed by certain words of Epicurus – in which He declares that he does not even understand any good that is separated from [both] refined and obscene pleasures: which, indeed, without feeling shame, he pursues them all with precise identification!

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 28.69

Epicurum diserte dicere existimare: Dicit autem, Opinor, se nullum bonum intellegere posse demptis corporis voluptatibus. quid multa?

[Piso] thinks that Epicurus speaks eloquently: indeed, He says, I believe, that he cannot understand any good if bodily pleasures are removed – why [say] more?

[U68]

x

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1089D

ὅθεν Αὐτοί μοι δοκοῦσι τούτων αἰσθόμενοι τῶν ἀτοπιῶν, εἰς "τὴν ἀπονίαν" καὶ "τὴν εὐστάθειαν" ὑποφεύγειν "τῆς σαρκός" – ὡς ἐν τῷ ταύτην ἐπινοεῖν περί τινας [1] ἐσομένην καὶ [2] γεγενημένην τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ὄντος: "τὸ" γὰρ "εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς Κατάστημα" καὶ "τὸ" περὶ ταύτης "πιστὸνἜλπισμα" τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις

because They seem to me to be aware of these absurdities, they retreat to "non-suffering" and "health of the body" – as in conceiving this [state] about certain things in relation to living pleasantly both [1] existing in the future and [2] having already been: because the "stable Condition of the body" and "the sure Expectation" regarding [this stable condition] holds the greatest and most certain joy for those capable of considering

Ὅρα δὴ, πρῶτον, μὲν, οἷα Ποιοῦσι: "τὴν" εἴθ᾽ "ἡδονὴν" ταύτην εἴτ᾽ "ἀπονίαν" ἢ "εὐστάθειαν" ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετερῶντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχήν – εἶτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἐκεῖνο!

See then, first of all, what They are doing: transferring either this "non-suffering" or "painlessness" or "stability" back and forth from the body to the soul – then back again from the [soul] into the [body]!

x

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 9.5.2

Epicurus uoluptatem summum bonum esse ponit – eam tamen ita definit "σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς Κατάστημα"

Epicurus places pleasure as the highest good – yet he defines it in this way: "the stable Condition of the body"

ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*
		ΕΥΣΤΑΘΕΣ
καταστηματικός *(ή, όν)*	established	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of thoroughly standing*
		ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑ

[U69]

x

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.42

atque haec quidem his verbis, Quivis ut intellegat quam voluptatem norit Epicurus, deinde paulo infra: "saepe Quaesivi" inquit "ex is Qui appellabantur sapientes, quid haberent quod in bonis relinquerent – si illa detraxissent ¬ nisi si vellent voces inanis fundere"

and this indeed [is] in [his] words, just a little below, so that Anyone may understand what kind of pleasure Epicurus recognizes: "I often asked" he says "from those Who were called wise men, what would they have that they could leave remaining among the good things – if they had taken those [physical pleasures] away ¬ unless they just wanted to pour out empty words"

"nihil ab is potui cognoscere – Qui, si virtutes ēbullīre volent et sapientias, nihil aliud dicent nisi eam viam qua efficiantur eae Voluptates quas supra dixi." Quae secuntur in eadem sententia sunt, totusque Liber, qui est de summo bono, refertus est et verbis et sententiis talibus

"I could learn nothing from them – Who, if they want to babble on about virtues and wisdoms, will say nothing other than that way by which those Pleasures I mentioned above are achieved." What follows is in the same opinion, and the whole Book, which is about the highest good, is full of such words and ideas

x

hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit: quam aut qualem esse velint Qui honestate summum bonum metiantur – si enim ad honestatem omnia referant neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, Ait "eos voce inani sonāre" – his enim ipsis verbis utitur – neque intellegere nec videre sub hanc vocem "honestatis" quae sit subicienda sententia

Your Epicurus says that he completely does not understand this: what thing or what quality it is that Those who measure the highest good by honor want – for if they refer everything to honor and do not say that pleasure is contained within it, He says that "they are making a sound with an empty word" – for he uses those exact words – and [Epicurus says that he] neither understands nor sees what concept should be placed under this word "honor"

ut enim consuetudo Loquitur: Id solum dicitur honestum Quod est populari fama gloriosum – "Quod" inquit "quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem"

indeed It is said, according to common usage: only That is called honorable which is glorious according to popular opinion – "which" [Epicurus] says "although it is often more pleasant than certain pleasures, is nevertheless sought for the sake of pleasure"

[U70]

"Goodby

Athenaeus (*fl.c.* 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 546F

κἀν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* δὲ πάλιν Φησὶν "Τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιουτότροπα ¬ ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ ¬ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, 'χαίρειν' Ἐατέον" – σαφῶς ὑπουργὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ θεραπαίνης τάξιν ἐπέχουσαν

and in the work *On Fulfillment* he again says "It is necessary to honor what is correct and the virtues and such things ¬ if they provide pleasure ¬ but if they do not, It is necessary to tell them 'goodbye'" – clearly making virtue a servant to pleasure in these matters and holding the rank of an attendant

[U71]

46. Timocrates

in three books

Τιμοκράτης, Γ

x

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.93

cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime – Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit – Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem, Timocraten (quia nescioquid in philosophia dissentiret) totis voluminibus conciderit

(Cotta) while Epicurus insulted Aristotle in the most shameful manner – he was slanderous toward Socrates' pupil Phaedo in the most disgraceful way – the brother of his own companion Metrodorus, Timocrates (because he disagreed with him about something in philosophy) he attacked in entire volumes

Epicurus writes to the Royal Court in Asia

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1126C

Ἐπίκουρος, μὲν γὰρ, εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λοιδορησομένους, καὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξελῶντας αὐλῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι Μητροδώρῳ προσέκρουσεν, ἀδελφὸς ὢν – καὶ Ταῦτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται τοῖς ἐκείνων!

Epicurus, in fact, sent men into Asia to rail at Timocrates, and to expel the man from the royal court – because he had clashed with Metrodorus, despite being his brother – and This is written in those books of theirs!

If the event with Timocrates occurred before the year 301 BCE, the "royal court in Asia" was probably the court of Antigonus I Monophthalmus.

Lysimachus, Séleucus I, and Ptolemy I Soter allied against and defeated Antigonus I (in the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE – when Epicurus was 40 years old). Lysimachus married Arsinoe II as his second wife – the daughter of Ptolemy I Soter.

Therefore, if the event with Timocrates occurred after the year 301 BCE, the "royal court in Asia" was probably the court of court of Lysimachus. Laertius records that Epicurus had positive correspondence with Lysimachus' minister. Lysimachus ended up killing his own son Agathocles in 284 BCE (from his first marriage to Nicaea – the daughter of Antipater).

In response, Séleucus I killed his former ally Lysimachus (in the battle of Corupedium in 281 BCE – when Epicurus was 60 years old). Therefore, by then, the "royal court in Asia" was the court of Séleucus I.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus, married his sister Arsinoe II after Lysimachus' death. Later on, around 268 BCE (after Epicurus had passed away) Colotes would dedicate to the treatise "On the Point that Conformity to the Views of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes It Impossible to Live" to Ptolemy II.

[U72]

Book 1

Uncertain Author, VH² 10.201, fr. 44

...[κὰν τῶ]ι πρώτω[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκρ[άτους]...

...κὰν τῶι πρώτωι τῶν *Περὶ Τιμοκράτους*...

...and in the first of those books *On Timocrates*...

[U73]

Book 3

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.23

Γέγονε δὲ ἀγαθὸς πάντα – καθὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ *Τιμοκράτους*

and [Metrodorus] became good in all respects – just as Epicurus also testifies in his previous writings and in the third [book] *On Timocrates*

47. On Appearance
Περὶ Φαντασίας

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Εἰδώλων. Περὶ Φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος...

...On Films. On Appearance. Aristobuolos...

ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*

48. On Nature
in 37 Books
Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΖ

Introduction

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

...*Περὶ Φύσεως, ΛΖ*, *Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ*...

...On Nature, in thirty-seven books, On the Atoms and the Void...

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

...διαιρεῖται, τοίνυν, εἰς τρία: τό τε Κανονικὸν, καὶ Φυσικὸν, καὶ Ἠθικόν... τὸ δὲ Φυσικὸν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βίβλοις ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχεῖον

...[Epicurus' Philosophy], therefore, is divided into three: the Canonical, the Physical, and the Ethical.... The Physical [part is] the entire theory about nature, and exists in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in the letters according to [their] basic components *[i.e., in an abridged form]*

x

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.7

...ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* τὰ πλεῖστα ταὐτὰ λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν, ἐν αὐταῖς, ἄλλοις τε – καὶ Ναυσιφάνει τὰ πλεῖστα

[Timocrates also says that Epicurus] in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* says mostly the same things and that he writes, in them, against others – and for the most part against Nausiphanes

Nausiphanes supported "science-based political rhetoric" as well as reductionist skepticism.

In support of science-based political rhetoric, Philodemus quotes him as saying, "honor depends on winning a reputation for cleverness in politics... the wise man is he who can persuade his hearers – and this power of persuasion belongs to the man of science."

In support of reductionist skepticism, Philodemus quotes Nausiphanes as saying, "of those things which appear to exist, nothing exists more than it does not exist."

x

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.35

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἐξακριβοῦν ¬ μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν...

for those who are not able, Herodotus, to examine each of the things written by us about nature ¬ nor inspect the larger books of what has been organized...

x

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 10.84

Ἐδέου τε σεαυτῷ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων σύντομον καὶ εὐπερίγραφον διαλογισμὸν ἀποστεῖλαι – ἵνα ῥᾳδίως μνημονεύῃς: τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν γεγραμμένα δυσμνημόνευτα εἶναι, καί τοι, ὡς ἔφης, συνεχῶς αὐτὰ βαστάζεις

You needed a brief and easily described discourse about celestial phenomena sent to you – so that you might easily remember: for the things that have been written by us in other works are difficult to remember, and indeed, just as you said, you continuously carry them

x

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 91

καὶ πᾶν δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος Ἔνστημα ῥᾳδίως διαλυθήσεται – ἐάν τις τοῖς ἐναργήμασι προσέχῃ – ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βιβλίοις Δείκνυμεν

and every Objection to this part easily will be resolved – if one attends to what is evident – which We demonstrate in the books *On Nature*

x

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On Hippocrates' Nature of Man 1.1, note 15

Τινὲς δ᾽ οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πλείονα βιβλία τῆς θεωρίας ἐποιήσαντο ταύτῆς [τῆς περὶ φύσεως], Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ πάνυ πολλά – καθά περ Ἐπίκουρος: ἄρχεται γὰρ καὶ Αὐτός, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἄλλοι πάντες, ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητῆσαι πότερον ἕν τι καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, οὗ τὴν φύσιν εὑρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν – ἢ σύνθετον ἔκ τινων ἑαυτοῦ προτέρων ἁπλῶν, ἅ περ Οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς παλαιοὺς εἰθίσθησαν ὀνομάζειν "στοιχεῖα"

Some people have written not [just] one, but several books on this theory [concerning nature], and Some even [wrote] very many [books] – just like Epicurus: for even He himself begins, just as all the others, from the question whether [it is] a single and simple thing, whose nature we attempt to discover – or composed from certain prior simple [parts] of itself, which indeed Those after the ancient philosophers were accustomed to call "components"

τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row* *(in a series)*

[U74]

Book 1

1.1 Atoms & Void

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1114A

ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας Ὑπειπὼν "τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν σώματα εἶναι καὶ κενὸν" – ὡς, μιᾶς οὔσης εἰς δύο Πεποίηται τὴν διαίρεσιν: ὧν Θάτερον ὄντως μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν ¬ ὀνομάζεται δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν "ἀναφὲς" καὶ "κενὸν" καὶ "ἀσώματον"

while He proposes in the beginning of [his] treatise that "the nature of existence is bodies and void" – so that, while it is [actually] one He has made the division it into two [parts]: One of them is actually nothing ¬ but termed by your company "intangible" and "void" and "incorporeal"

[U75]*

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 1.333

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ φύσιν "ὅλον" τε καὶ "πᾶν" προσαγορεύειν εἴωθεν – ὁτὲ μὲν γάρ φησιν ὅτι "ἡ τῶν ὅλων Φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ κενόν"

But Epicurus is accustomed to indifferently call [the nature] of bodies and the nature of the void "whole" and "all" – for sometimes he says that "the Nature of the whole is bodies and void"

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 2.82

(Cotta) **Sunt, autem, Qui omnia naturae nomine appellent – ut Epicurus, qui ita diuidit "omnium quae sint naturam esse corpora et inane, quaeque his accident"**

(Cotta) There are, however, Those who call everything by the name of nature – like Epicurus, who divides it like this "the nature of all things that exist is bodies and void, and whatever happens to these"

[U76]

"Nature"

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1112E

Ἐπικούρου δὲ λέγοντος "ἡ τῶν ὄντων Φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ τόπος" – πότερον οὕτως ἀκούομεν, ὡς ἄλλο τι "τὴν φύσιν" παρὰ "τὰ ὄντα" βουλομένου λέγειν ¬ ἢ "τὰ ὄντα" δηλοῦντος ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν; ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ "κενοῦ φύσιν" αὐτὸ "τὸ κενόν" καὶ νὴ Δία "τὸ πᾶν" "παντὸς φύσιν" ὀνομάζειν εἴωθε;

When Epicurus says "the Nature of things is bodies and location" – do we understand this as him meaning something other than "nature" apart from "existing things" ¬ or [is he] explaining "existing things" and nothing different? Just as he customarily names "the nature of the void" as "the void" itself and indeed, by Zeus, "the all" as "the nature of all"?

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.39

τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ* Φησι κατ᾽ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ά *Περὶ Φύσεως* "τὸ Πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν"

He also says this in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature* "the Universe exists as bodies and as void"

[U77]

1.2 Composites

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ᾽ καὶ ιε᾽ καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

[U78]

1.3 Symmetric Impacts

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 23 (16)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 23 (16)

…ἀ[να]γκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸ[ς] ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῆι πρώτηι γραφῆι εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἧττον παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ις] σ[υμ]μετρ[ία] αὐτ[αῖ]ς γίγνε[σθαι]…

…Ἀναγκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται: οὐθὲν ἧττον παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἡμῶν τις Συμμετρία αὐταῖς γίγνεσθαι…

...It is necessary for [*sensations*] to exist according to the mutual impacts [*of the films and of ourselves*] – as has been said in the first writing: a certain Symmetry is produced not to a lesser extent for [*the sensations*] than in relation to the [*impacts*] from us...

[U79]

Book 2

2.1 On Time

[=U26] *Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.73*

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ᾽ ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.137

Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων, φησί [χρόνον εἶναί] "σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων – παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι, καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς."

Epicurus, according to Demetrius the Lacedaemonian, claims [that time is] "a symptoms of symptoms [i.e., a separable characteristic of a separable characteristic] – accompanying days and nights and hours and experiences, as well as non-experiences and movements and stillness."

2.2 On Films

Plato, Timaeus *"The first of the organs fabricated were light-bearing eyes which [the gods] fixed in place for the following reason: they contrived to create a body from fire which does not burn but provides a gentle light kindred to the light of each day. So they caused the pure fire within us which is brother of this light of day, to flow through the eyes, and they compressed the whole eye, but especially the center, to be smooth and dense, so as to retain all the coarser fire, and filter through only this kind of pure fire by itself. Then if ever there is daylight surrounding this stream of vision, like meets with like, joins together and establishes a single kindred body along a straight line from the eyes to wherever the stream from within is obstructed by the outside objects on which it impinges."* [45B-C]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 14

...ούκ ἔστιν εἴδωλα, καθάπερ λέγω· ού Γὰρ μοναχαὶ έν τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι, λέγω δὲ τῶι προειρημένω[ι, ἀ]ποστ[άσεις] [έν] τοῖς ϛ[ώμασιν, ὡς] εἴρητ[αι]...

...οὐκ ἔστιν Εἴδωλα, καθάπερ λέγω ¬ οὐ γὰρ μοναχαὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. Λέγω δὲ τῷ προειρημένῳ: Ἀποστάσεις ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὡς εἴρηται...

...[*they say*] the Films do not exist, as I say [*they do*] ¬ nor [*are these emanations*] singular in this manner [*of their formation*]. but I speak concerning what was previously mentioned: that [*there are*] Emanations in bodies, as has been said...

μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	**ΜΟΝΟΣ** *single*

μοναχός *(ή, όν)*	singular	**ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ** *single* *multiplicity*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἡ ἀπόστασις **αἱ ἀποστάσεις**	emanation	**ΑΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed away*

2.3 Flow of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 37

...ἀφ' ὅλης ῥε[ύσ]ηι πρὸ[ς στε]ρέμνιά ṭ[ινα] σώ[ματα] [τὰ] εἴδωλ[α]...

...ἀφ' ὅλης ῥεύσῃ πρὸς στερέμνιά τινα Σώματα τὰ εἴδωλα...

...certain Bodies would flow from the whole towards hard objects as films...

τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**ῬΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*
ῥεῖν	to flow	**ῬΕΙΝ** *flowing*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 38

...ḳαὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὁμοιομορφίαν τοῦ σ[ώμα]τος [δ]ιασώζουσ[ιν] ἕως [ἂν] ἀπαντῆσά[ν τι] [σ]τρέψηι τινὰς ἃ[ς] ọ διασπασμ[ὸς κ]αταστήσηι εἰς ἄ[λλο φ]ορᾶς εἶδος...

...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὁμοιομορφίαν τοῦ σώματος διασώζουσιν – ἕως ἂν ἀπαντήσῃ Τι στρέψῃ τινὰς ἃς ὁ Διασπασμὸς καταστήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο φορᾶς εἶδος...

...and [the films] thoroughly preserve a similar shape of [their source] body on its surface – until Something encounters and turns aside some [of its emanations] which the Dispersal might establish into another form of transmission...

[Maso] ...and on the surface they preserve the identity of the body's shape until something they encounter changes the direction of some [atoms], and the separation thereof induces a different kind of movement...

[Maso] Since the mechanical error in the transmission of the images is caused by the interference of a foreign body or movement, the first step is to ensure the 'continuity' of the transmission. Indeed, truth is directly connected to that which has specific natural consistency and constitutive definition that allow it to prevent or attenuate interferences.

τὸ πρόσωπον **τὰ πρόσωπα**	surface	**ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΝ** *towards the eye*
ὁμοιόμορφος *(ον)*	similarly formed	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ** *similar form*
ἡ ὁμοιομορφία **αἱ ὁμοιομορφίαι**	similar shape	
διασῴζειν	to thoroughly preserve	**ΔΙΑΣΩΖΕΙΝ** *saving through*
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	**ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ** *meeting away*
ὁ διασπασμός **οἱ διασπασμοί**	dispersal	**ΔΙΑΣΠΑΣΜΟΣ** *pulling through*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*

τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 4

…[τ]ὴν τοια[ύ]την φύ[σι]ν εἶναι, ἀπείρων [ὄ]ντω[ν οὐθέ]ν πω τῶν σ[χημάτων]… τῆι σ[υμμετρίαι πρὸς τὰ φαινό]με[να ἡ δὲ]
ἀπειρία – ὥστ[ε μα]κρὰν ἀπ[όστα]σι[ν ἀ]πέχειν τῆι [ἀλληλο]υχία[ι] τῆς…

…τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν εἶναι, ἀπείρων ὄντων Οὐθέν πω τῶν σχημάτων… τῇ συμμετρίᾳ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα: ἡ δὲ Ἀπειρία – ὥστε μακρὰν ἀπόστασιν ἀπέχειν τῇ ἀλληλουχίᾳ τῆς…

…such a nature exists, yet Nothing of the infinite existing shapes… in symmetry [*of proportion*] to what is apparent: but the Infiniteness [of the emanations] – in as much as a great emanation is restricted due to the interconnectedness of the…

τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure together*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ὁ σχηματισμός **οἱ σχηματισμοί**	configuration	**ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of action of forming*
ἡ ἀπόστασις **αἱ ἀποστάσεις**	emanation	**ΑΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed away*
ἀπέχειν	to restrict	**ΑΠΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding away*
ἡ ἀλληλουχία **αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι**	interconnectedness	**ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ** *holding each other*

2.4 Formation of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 80

…χύ[σ]εως συ[στῆι, ὥσ] τε καὶ στε[ρ]έμνιό[ν] τι συστῆναι τὸ ἄ[λλο] δήποτε ὅπ[ου] δήποτε [τό]που· ποῦ [γὰρ] το[σ]ούτου
πλήθους ὅμοιον οἷς γ' ἄλ[λ]ως [συστ]α[ί]η τ[ὸ] πλ[ῆθ]ος…

…χύσεως συστῇ, ὥστε καὶ Στερέμνιόν Τι συστῆναι τὸ ἄλλο δήποτε, ὅπου δήποτε τόπου – ποῦ γὰρ τοσούτου πλήθους ὅμοιον οἷς γ' ἄλλως συσταίη τὸ Πλῆθος…

…[in that case anything] may compose itself by the flow [of atoms], so that even some hard Object could form as any thing whatsoever, in any place whatsoever – for, where [is there] something similar in such a large number [of atoms] with which the large Number [of films] could otherwise be composed…?

ἡ χύσις **αἱ χύσεις**	flow	**ΧΥΣΙΣ** *pouring*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
τὸ πλῆθος **τὰ πλήθη**	[large] number	**ΠΛΗΘΟΣ** *fullness*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 92sup

...[ἐ]ν παρόδωι προ[σθεω]ρήσαιμεν· καὶ [ἔστι] [κ]αὶ κατὰ τὸ[ν] ἐκτο[πι]στικὸν τρό[πον] τῆ[ς γε]νέσεως [αὐ]τῶν εὖ [δη]λόνως – ἡ [δ]ὲ ἀπειρ[ία] ἡ [π]ροειρη[μ]ένη π[ο]νᾶ[ται] ἅμα νοήμ[α]τ[ι] – θεωρεῖν ὅτι σ[υνίστα]ιτ' ἂν εἴδ[ωλα,] καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀ[πειρίαν αὐτῶ]ν οὐκ ἀδύ[νατόν ἐστι]ν...

...ἐν παρόδῳ Προσθεωρήσαιμεν· καὶ Ἔστι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκτοπιστικὸν τρόπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν εὖ δῆλόνως – ἡ δὲ Ἀπειρία ἡ προειρημένη <u>πονᾶται</u> ἅμα νοήματι. Θεωρεῖν ὅτι συνίσταίτ' ἂν Εἴδωλα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν...

> ...We may also observe in [their] passage. and It is also clearly evident according to the expelling way of their creation – indeed, the previously mentioned Infinity may be worked through [i.e., <u>understood</u>] along with [our] conception [of it]. [Mentally] observing that the Films would be composed even according to their infinity is not impossible...

ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
ἡ ἄφοδος **αἱ ἀφόδοι**	departure	**ΑΦΟΔΟΣ** *path away*
ἡ πάροδος **αἱ πάροδοι**	passage	**ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ** *course beside*
προσθεωρεῖν	to also observe	**ΠΡΟΣΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envision further*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
ἐξωστικός *(ή, όν)*	ejecting	**ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of pushing out*
ἐκτοπιστικός *(ή, όν)*	expelling	**ΕΚΤΟΠΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of out of place*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ἡ ἀπειρία **αἱ ἀπειρίαι**	infinity	
τὸ νόημα **τὰ νόηματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *not powerful*

2.5 Speed of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 1 (column 93sup)

...περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτῆτ[ος] νῦν λέγειν ἐπιχ[ειρ]ήσομεν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ λεπτότης, μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέ[χο]υσα, ταχυτῆτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τ[ὴ]ν [φ]ο[ρ]ὰν ἀνυπέρβλ[η]τον [ἐ]νδε[ί]κνυται...

...περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτῆτος νῦν λέγειν Ἐπιχειρήσομεν: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ Λεπτότης – μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέχουσα – ταχυτῆτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἐνδείκνυται...

> ...but We will venture to speak now about the speed that exists in the transmission [*of the films*]: first, their Subtlety – because it is far different than the subtlety [*derived*] from the senses – is indicated in the unsurpassable speed of the films in regards to their transmission...

ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* ὑπάρχοντες *(ουσαι, οντα)*	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ *in hand*
ἐπιχειρεῖν	to venture	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ *upon hand*
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtlety	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ *condition of being* *fine/thin*
ἀπέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	distant / different	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ *holding away*
ἀνυπέρβλητος *(ον)*	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ *not thrown over*
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing away*
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ *showing in*

2.6 Dispersal of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 2 (column 94sup)

...πολλὰ καὶ ἄ[πειρα] ἦν φορούμεν[α πάν]τως κοῦφα· εἰ δ' [ὑ]περ βαλλόντως [κοῦ]φα, δηλόνως καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντως ταχεῖα κατὰ τὴν φοράν· ε̣ἶτ[α] εἰ τὸ μὲν ὅ[λο]ν ἰσοταχεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἄτομοι, λέγει̣ν̣ ἔδει ῥο[ῦ]ν ἕτερον [ἑ]τέρο̣υ̣ τῶι ἐφ' ἕνα τ̣ό̣πον φ[έρεσθαι] περαι̣ο̣ῦν συνεχέσ̣τερο[ν], καὶ μὴ π̣υ̣κνὸν εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους [τό] π[ο]υ̣[ς] ἀ̣ν̣αφερό[μενον...

...πολλὰ, καὶ ἄπειρα ἦν φορούμενα, πάντως κοῦφα – εἰ δ' ὑπερβαλλόντως κοῦφα – δηλόνως καὶ ὑπερβαλλόντως ταχεῖα κατὰ τὴν φοράν: εἶτα, εἰ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἰσοταχεῖς εἰσιν αἱ Ἄτομοι, λέγειν Ἔδει Ῥοῦν ἕτερον ἑτέρου, τῷ ἐφ' ἕνα τόπον φέρεσθαι, περαιοῦν συνεχέστερον, καὶ μὴ πυκνὸν εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους, τοὺς ἀναφερόμενον...

...many, even infinite [Films] are carried, [being] absolutely lightweight – but if [being] exceedingly lightweight – clearly also [they are] exceedingly swift in their transmission: then, if the Atoms as a whole are equally fast, It would have been necessary to say that, in being carried to one place, a different Stream comes over more continuously than another, and not frequently into those opposing, which... what is carried back...

κοῦφος *(η, ον)*	lightweight	κοῦφος *nimble*
ἰσοταχής *(ής, ές)*	equally fast	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ *equally swift*
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ *result of flowing*
ὁ ῥόος οἱ ῥόοι	stream	ῬΟΟΣ *current*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ *boundary*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of* *compacting*
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ *compacting*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *in against*

The atoms that compose the films move at the same rate, but some are obstructed in their path.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 94inf

...δέ τις σύνκρι[σις] τοῦτο πράττο[υσα,] τ[ὰ]ς καλουμένας κλάσει[ς] τῶν μερῶν...

...δέ τις Σύγκρισις, τοῦτο πράττουσα, τὰς καλουμένας κλάσεις τῶν μερῶν...

...yet a certain Compound, performing this [action, arranges] the classes of parts being called...

ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*
καλούμενος *(η, ον)*	being called	**ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *summoning*
ἡ κλάσις **αἱ κλάσεις**	class	**ΚΛΑΣΙΣ** *dividing*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 101sup

...ὥστε μὴ [δια]βα[ί]νειν ταχέως [καὶ] τὰ μόρια τού[του αὐ]τὰς παρασκευ[άζειν] τινὰς του[τ]...

...ὥστε μὴ διαβαίνειν ταχέως, καὶ τὰ Μόρια τούτου αὐτὰς παρασκευάζειν τινὰς τούτ[ων]...

...so that [they do] not pass through quickly, and the Portions of this [instead] prepare certain ones of them...

συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
διαβαίνειν	pass through	**ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking through*
τὸ μόριον **τὰ μόρια**	a portion [as part of a whole]	**ΜΟΡΙΟΝ** *receiving one's portion*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 1 (column 102in)

...ὥστ[ε τῆι φύσει τὴν] ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ ἐξωτάτου χιτῶνος εἶναι τοιαύτην, τῶν ἐν τ[ῶ]ι ἐναπειλημμένωι ἔνδοθεν...

...ὥστε τῇ φύσει, τὴν Ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ ἐξωτάτου χιτῶνος εἶναι τοιαύτην, τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐναπειλημμένῳ ἔνδοθεν...

...so that by nature, the Interconnectedness of the outermost covering is such that, with [atoms] in the enveloped [layers] from inside...

ἡ ἀλληλουχία **αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι**	interconnectedness	**ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ** *holding each other*
ἐξώτατος *(η, ον)*	outermost	**ΕΞΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *the most out of*
ὁ χιτών **οἱ χιτῶνες**	covering	**ΧΙΤΩΝ** *tunic*
ἐναπειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	enveloped	**ΕΝΑΠΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasped away in*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 103sup

...[οὐθέν πω ἀπ]είρων, ὥστε μὴ ν[ομ]ίζειν κατὰ τὴν σ[ύστ]ασιν τοῦ ε̣ἰ̣δ[ώ]λου ἐκ [σ]υνκλάσ̣[εως τινὸς α]ὐτὰ τ[οὺς σκεδασμοὺς] λαμβ̣[άνειν] ἀλ[λ' ὅτ]αν καὶ πρ[ὸ]ς στερέμνιόν [τι προ]σκ[ρ]οῦ[σα]ν τὴν σ̣[κέδ]α̣σιν λ[αμβάν]ειν...

...οὐθέν πω ἀπείρων – ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν, κατὰ τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ εἰδώλου, ἐκ συνκλάσεως τινὸς αὐτὰ τοὺς σκεδασμοὺς λαμβάνειν ¬ ἀλλ', ὅταν καὶ πρὸς στερέμνιόν τι προσκρούσαν, τὴν σκέδασιν λαμβάνειν...

...in no way yet of the infinite [shapes] – so as not to think that, according to the composition of the film, [the films] themselves receive dispersions from some fragmentation ¬ but rather, whenever [the films] also strike against some firm object, they receive the dispersement...

Films do not fragment because of their composition but only disperse when they collide with firm objects. This dispersion is caused by external impacts, not internal flaws.

ἄπειρος *(ος, ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΩΝ** *not limited*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
ἡ σύγκλασις αἱ συγκλάσεις	fragmentation	**ΣΥΓΚΛΑΣΙΣ** *breaking together*
ὁ σκεδασμός οἱ σκεδασμοί	dispersion	**ΣΚΕΔΑΣΜΟΣ** *an act of scattering*
ἡ σκέδασις αἱ σκέδασεις	dispersement	**ΣΚΕΔΑΣΙΣ** *general process of scattering*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	firmness	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ** *condition from making stiff*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
προσκρούσας *(α, αν)*	striking against	**ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΣΑΣ** *hitting upon*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 2 (column 103inf)

...[ἀ]λλὰ μᾶλλον ὥ[σ]τε μὴ ἀντικόπτε̣[ιν] ἢ̣{ι} ἀρτίως ἀντικ[ό]πτοντα είς τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους ἢ οὓς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφέρετο τὴν ἀναχώ[ρη]σιν πο̣ιεῖν...

...ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴ ἀντικόπτειν, ἢ ἀρτίως ἀντικόπτοντα, εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους ἢ οὓς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφέρετο, τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ποιεῖν...

...but rather, given that [the flows] do not collide against, or are only just colliding against, the opposing locations or [those locations] which [the Film] was heading from the beginning, making a withdrawal [*i.e., naturally shifting toward a path with less resistance*]...

ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating against*
ἀντικόπτων *(οῦσα, ον)*	colliding [against]	

ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *in against*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ ἀναχώρησις αἱ ἀναχωρήσεις	withdrawal	ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ *place / location back*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 3 (column 104inf)

...νυνὶ μηκέτι [τῶι τ]οῦτο μὴ ἔχειν ἄ[λ]λα σύνεγγυς ἐληλυθέναι, μὴ οἷον καταλιποῦσαι τὴν παρ' ἀλ[λ]ή[λω]ν...

...νυνὶ μηκέτι τῷ Τοῦτο μὴ ἔχειν Ἄλλα σύνεγγυς ἐληλυθέναι ¬ μὴ οἷον καταλιποῦσαι τὴν παρ' ἀλλήλων...

...now, no longer in regard to that, this [Film] does not have other [Atoms] that have come nearby ¬ not as if [the Fragmentations] leave behind a [connection] for one another...

σύνεγγυς	nearby	ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ *near together*
καταλιπών *(οῦσα, όν)*	leaving behind	ΚΑΤΑΛΙΠΩΝ *thoroughly leaving*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 3 (column 105sup)

...[θ]έσιν καὶ τάξιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ταύταις προσχωρήσασαι ὧν [πρ]ότερον διαστήματα εἶ[χον], καὶ οἱονεὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατεναντίον αὐταῖς ἔχειν τὸ σῶ[μα ἐ]ν τῆι φύσει τι σχετ[ικὸ]ν καὶ οὔπω προσκρούσας... ...τῶι στερεμνίωι [λ]αβεῖν τ[ι]να συνίζ[ησι]ν· καὶ ὅ[τ]αν οὖν [δή,] φημί, πρὸς στερέμ[νι]όν τ[ι] προ[σ]κροῦσα[ν]...

...θέσιν καὶ τάξιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ταύταις προσχωρήσασαι ὧν πρότερον διαστήματα Εἶχον – καὶ οἱονεὶ, ἐκ τοῦ κατεναντίον αὐταῖς, ἔχειν τὸ Σῶμα ἐν τῇ φύσει τι σχετικὸν καὶ οὔπω προσκρούσας... ...τῷ στερεμνίῳ λαβεῖν τινὰ συνίζησιν: καὶ ὅταν, οὖν δή, Φημί, πρὸς στερέμνιόν τι προσκροῦσαν...

...position and arrangement, but [*because the Compounds of the films*] have already advanced only towards those [*positions and arrangements*] whose separation They previously held – and as if, from what is opposing them, the Body has something stable in nature and [*the Stream*] is not yet striking against... ...acquiring a certain settlement for the hard object: and whenever, therefore, I say, [a Film] strikes against a certain hard object...

ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ *ordered*
ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις	position and arrangement	
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
χωρεῖν	to advance	ΧΩΡΕΙΝ *place / location*
προσχωρεῖν	to advance toward	ΠΡΟΣΧΩΡΕΙΝ
προσχωρήσας *(ήσασα, ῆσαν)*	advanced toward [already]	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ *standing together*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*

τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
τὸ κατεναντίον **τὰ κατεναντία**	what is opposing	**κατεναντίον** *against down in*
κατεναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
σχετικός *(ή, όν)*	stable	**ΣΧΕΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being retentive*
ὁ ῥόος ***οἱ ῥόοι***	*stream*	***ῬΟΟΣ*** *current*
προσκρούσας *(α, αν)*	striking against	**ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΣΑΣ** *hitting upon*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
λαβεῖν	[generally] to acquire [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*
ἡ συνίζησις **αἱ συνιζήσεις**	settlement	**ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ** *sitting together*
τὸ εἴδωλον ***τὰ εἴδωλα***	*film*	***ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ*** *object from appearing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 4 (column 105inf)

...ἡ σύν[κρ]ισις ἐγ[έ]νετο τοῦ π[εραι]νοῦν ταχέως εἰς [μα]κρ[ο]ὺς τόπους· ὥστ[ε,] φημί, καὶ περὶ τὰ εἴδ[ωλ]α ἀναγκαῖον τ[ο]ιαύτην...

...ἡ Σύγκρισις ἐγένετο τοῦ περανοῦν ταχέως εἰς μακροὺς τόπους: ὥστε, Φημί καὶ περὶ τὰ εἴδωλα Ἀναγκαῖον τοιαύτην...

...the Compound is made with it quickly accomplishing [its course] into distant locations: therefore, I also say regarding the films that It is necessary for such a [*compound*]...

ἡ σύνκρισις = **ἡ σύγκρισις** **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ** **ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
περαίνειν	to accomplish	**ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *finished*
μακρὰν	by a long way	**ΜΑΚΡΑΝ** *long-reaching*
μακρός *(ά, όν)*	distant	**ΜΑΚΡΟΣ** *long-reaching*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*

2.8 Generation of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 5 (column 106inf)

...ὤσ[τε μ]ὴ [εἶναι τὰ στε]ρ[έ]μν[ια] οἷς ἂν [μ]εγίστη ἐπιπ[ολῆ]ς ἀλληλουχία ὑπάρχη[ι σ]ύμμετρ[α] εἰς ὃ λέγω εἶδος, τάπε()ντῶντα πολλὰ κ[αὶ] παντοῖα οὐκ ὀλίγα [ἦι]σαν δι' αὐτὸ...

...ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰ Στερέμνια οἷς ἂν μεγίστη ἐπιπολῆς Ἀλληλουχία ὑπάρχῃ σύμμετρα εἰς ὃ Λέγω εἶδος: Τἀπελθόντα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα – οὐκ ὀλίγα ἦσαν δι' αὐτὸ...

...therefore the hard Objects in which the greatest Interconnectedness superficially exists do not exist as symmetric [*in proportion*] to the form I speak of: the many and varied kinds of [films] that went away – there were not [just] a few [films] because of the...

στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
ἡ στερεότης **αἱ στερεότητες**	firmness	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ** *condition from making stiff*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
πέλεσθαι	to take place	**ΠΕΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *taking place*
ἡ ἐπιπολή **αἱ ἐπιπολαί**	surface	**ΕΠΙΠΟΛΗ** *taken place upon*
ἐπιπολῆς	superficially	
ἡ ἀλληλουχία **αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι**	interconnectedness	**ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ** *holding each other*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
ἀπιέναι	to go way	**ΑΠΙΕΝΑΙ** *going away*
τὸ ἀπελθόν = τἀπελθόν **τὰ ἀπελθόντα** = τἀπελθόντα	what went away	**ΑΠΕΛΘΟΝ** *went away*
τὸ εἴδωλον ***τὰ εἴδωλα***	*film*	***ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ*** *object from appearing*
τοῖος *(τοίᾱ, τοῖον)*	like this *(of such a kind)*	**ΤΟΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
παντοῖος *(α, ον)*	all kinds	**ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ** *all of this sort*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 6 (column 107inf)

...[μᾶλλο]ν [τῆι αὐτ]ῆι θέσ[ει] κ[α]ὶ τάξ[ε]ι ἤπερ τὰ στερέμνια διὰ τὴν ἀφθονίαν· πολλάκις γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπαντᾶι σώματα ἃ τὴν...

...μᾶλλον τῇ αὐτῇ θέσει καὶ τάξει ἤπερ τὰ Στερέμνια διὰ τὴν ἀφθονίαν – πολλάκις γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπαντᾷ Σώματα ἃ τὴν...

...[*regarding transmission over a distance, the films maintain*] with the same position and arrangement more so than hard Objects, due to their lack of scarcity [*i.e., due to the abundance of the films*] – for often such Bodies encounter those things which the...

ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
ἡ τάξις **αἱ τάξεις**	arrangement	**ΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordered*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ἡ ἀφθονία **αἱ ἀφθονίαι**	lack of scarcity [i.e., abundance]	**ΑΦΘΟΝΙΑ** *not scarcity*
πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	**ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ** *meeting away*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 7 (column 108inf)

...μηχανᾶ]σθαι, ἔ[τι τε τὴν συν]κρίσει ἀναλ[ογίαν] ἔχοντος οἷαν [ε]ἴρηκα· τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μηχανηθείη μορφῆς εἶδος ὃ τὴν...

...μηχανᾶσθαι, ἔτι τε, τὴν συγκρίσει ἀναλογίαν, ἔχοντος οἷαν Εἴρηκα – τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μηχανηθείη μορφῆς Εἶδος, ὃ τὴν...

※...moreover, to construct an analogy for the compound, of [a compound] having the kind [ ] which I have mentioned – for what Form of shape could not be constructed, which [...] the...

μηχανᾶσθαι	to construct	**ΜΗΧΑΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *device*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 8 (column 109inf)

...προειρημένη[ν τα]χυτῆτα ἔχουσα[ν] συσσ[ώζεσ]θαι· αἱ γὰρ ἔν[δο]θεν θέσ[εις] καὶ τάξεις, καθ' ἃς [ἔμ]ψυχον τόδε τι...

...προειρημένην, ταχυτῆτα ἔχουσαν συσσώζεσθαι. γὰρ ἔνδοθεν Θέσεις καὶ Τάξεις, καθ' ἃς ἔμψυχον Τόδε τι...

...the previously mentioned [interconnectedness], having high speeds [that are] preserved together. indeed, the inner Positions and Arrangements, according to which this particular animate Thing...

λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	**ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *spoke*
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	
προειρημένος *(η, ον)*	previously mentioned	**ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *spoke before*
τὸ τάχος **τὰ τάχη**	speed	**ΤΑΧΟΣ** *swift*

ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ *condition from quickly*
σώζειν	to preserve	ΣΩΖΕΙΝ *saving*
συσσώζειν	to preserve together	ΣΥΣΣΩΖΕΙΝ *saving together*
συσσώζεσθαι	to be preserved together	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ *ordered*
ἔμψυχος *(ος, ον)*	animate	ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ *in soul*

2.9 Mechanics of the Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 9 (column 110inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 4 (column 111sup)

...[ούδ]ὲ κωλυόμε[να] [δ]ηλ[ό]νως ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς [βά]θος παραλλαγῆς· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ εἴδωλα οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκειν [ο]ὐθὲν | ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ [το]ῖς φαινομένοις· [κατ]αφα νὲς ο]ὖν πάλιν γί[νετ]αι ὅτι τὰ εἴδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον κέκτηται κατὰ τὴν [φο]ράν· καὶ ἐν τοιού τωι δέ τινι τρόπωι ἔσται περὶ τῆς ταχυτῆτος τῶν εἰδώλω[ν] [ἀπ]όδειξιν ποιήσασ[θαι·] ἐπειδὴ γὰ[ρ]... [τα]χὺν οὐ μόν[ον καὶ] κουφότητα...

...οὐδὲ κωλυόμενα δηλόνως ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς βάθος παραλλαγῆς – Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ εἴδωλα, οὕτως, ἔχειν φάσκειν οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις: καταφανὲς, οὖν, πάλιν Γίνεται ὅτι τὰ Εἴδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον κέκτηται κατὰ τὴν φοράν – καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ δέ τινι τρόπῳ, Ἔσται περὶ τῆς ταχυτῆτος τῶν εἰδώλων ἀπόδειξιν ποιήσασθαι – ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ταχὺν οὐ μόνον, καὶ κουφότητα...

...nor are they clearly prevented by the variety in depth – therefore, This [explanation] regarding the films has nothing to allege that contests what is apparent: thus, It again becomes fully evident that the Films possess a certain unsurpassable high speed in their transmission – and in such a specific way, that It will be possible to provide a demonstration concerning the swiftness of the films – since not only the high speed [of the films], but also [their] lightness...

κωλύειν	to prevent	ΚΩΛΥΕΙΝ *preventing*
κωλυόμενος *(ομένη, όμενον)*	being prevented	
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
τὸ βάθος τὰ βάθη	depth	ΒΑΘΟΣ *deep*
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ *changing across*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ *affirming*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
φανερὸς *(ά, όν)*	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ *appearing*
τὸ καταφανές τὰ καταφανῆ	what is fully evident	ΚΑΤΑΦΑΝΕΣ *thoroughly appearing*

καταφανής *(ές)*	fully evident	
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ ταχύτης **αἱ ταχύτητες**	high speed	**ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ** *condition from quickly*
ἀνυπέρβλητος *(ον)*	unsurpassable	**ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ** *not thrown over*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure [here, "to possess"]	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἡ ἀπόδειξις **αἱ ἀποδείξεις**	demonstration	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ** *from pointing out*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to provide"]	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ταχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	swift	**ΤΑΧΥΣ** *swift*
τὸ κοῦφον **τὰ κούφα**	light things	**ΚΟΥΦΟΝ** *nimble*
ἡ κουφότης **αἱ κουφότητες**	lightness	**ΚΟΥΦΟΤΗΣ** *condition from nimble*

2.10 Films Generated from Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 17

…[φ]α[ν]ερ[ὸν] ὡς κα[ὶ] το[ῖς εἰδώλοις] ὑπά[ρχει καὶ] αὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς ἐξώσεις πο[ιεῖν,] [τὸ δ'] εἴδω[λ]ον μ[ή,] ἦν ἂν κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μ[ό]νον ταχέω[ς] [δ]ύνασθα[ι] φέρεσθαι, [τ]ὰ δ' εἴδωλα μή, κα[τά] γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κόν, κατὰ μέ[ν[τ]οι τὸ ἐπιλαμ[βα]νόμε[νον] εὐθὺς ἐ[τοίμου] κε[νο]ῦ διὰ τὰς συνι[ζ]ήσεις τὰς ε[ἰς σ]τε[ν]ότητα καὶ [λ]επτότητα καὶ μικρότ[η]τα.

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 10 (column 111inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 5 (column 112sup)

…[άέ]ρα ἐξω[θεῖ]ν [δυνα]τὸν περαιοῖ, φα[ν]ερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ [α]ὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς | ἐξώσεις π[οιεῖσ]θαι, τὸ δ' εἴδωλο[ν μή], ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ[ξ]ωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσ[θ]αι, [τ]ὰ δὲ εἴδωλα μή, κατά γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κό[ν], κα[τ]ὰ μέντοι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον εὐθὺ[ς ἐξ] ἑτ[ο]ίμου κενοῦ διὰ τ[ὰς] συνιζήσεις τὰς ε[ἰς στ]ενότητα καὶ λεπτ[ό]τητα καὶ μι[κρ]ότη[τ]α…

…ἀέρα ἐξωθεῖν Δυνατὸν, περαιοῖ – Φανερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ αὕτη ἡ Δύναμις: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ Στερέμνιον μόνον ἠδύνατο τὰς ἐξώσεις ποιεῖσθαι ¬ τὸ δ' Εἴδωλον μή – ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ Στερέμνια μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσθαι ¬ τὰ δὲ εἴδωλα μή, κατὰ γε τὸν ἐξωστικόν: κατά, μέντοι, τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον εὐθὺς ἐξ ἑτοίμου κενοῦ διὰ τὰς συνιζήσεις τὰς εἰς στενότητα καὶ λεπτότητα καὶ μικρότητα…

…It has the force to eject air, [while] carrying [the air] over – and It is evident that this same Force also exists even in the films: for if only a hard Object had the force to produce ejections ¬ but a Film did not [have the force to produce ejections] – then only hard Objects would have the force to be quickly carried in the ejecting way ¬ but the films would not [have the force to be quickly carried], at least [not] in the ejecting [way]: however, in what is completely encompassed around immediately from the ready void, through the settlements into narrowness, subtlety, and minuteness…

ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*

ἐξωθεῖν	to eject	ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ *pushing out*
ἡ ἔξωσις αἱ ἐξώσεις	ejections	ΕΞΩΣΙΣ *pushing out*
τὸ ἐξωστικόν τὰ ἐξωστικά	what is ejected	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΝ *pushing out*
ἐξωστικός *(ή, όν)*	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of* *pushing out*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
περαιοῦν	to carry over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ *boundary*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
φανερὸς *(ά, όν)*	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ *shining*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	῾ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ *power*
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ *object from* *making hard*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ ἔξωσις αἱ ἐξώσεις	ejections	ΕΞΩΣΙΣ *pushing out*
ἐξωστικός *(ή, όν)*	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of* *pushing out*
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ *swift*
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ *quickly*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing*
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα	[generally] what is completely encompassed	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *grasping around*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
ἑτοιμάζειν	to make ready	῾ΕΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing*
ἑτοῖμος *(ίμη, ῖμον)*	made ready	
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ *emptiness*
ἡ συνίζησις αἱ συνιζήσεις	settlement	ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ *sitting together*
ἡ στενότης αἱ στενότητες	narrowness	ΣΤΕΝΟΤΗΣ *narrow*
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtlety	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ *condition of being* *fine/thin*

ἡ μικρότης **αἱ μικρότητες**	minuteness	**ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ** *little*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 11 (column 112inf)

…πῶς οὐχί; ἐπει δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτῆτος, Νομιστέον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ…

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 18 | column 19 sup.

…ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον δ̣υνατόν ἐστιν ἐ[ξ]ω̣θεῖν πολλὰ σώ̣ματα, [ἔτι] μ̣ᾶ̣λλον ἥ[περ κ]α[ὶ α]ὐ[τὰ τ]ὰ στερέμν[ια τ]οῦτο πράττ[ειν,] π̣ῶς οὐχί, ἐπειδὴ καὶ [τ]οῦτ̣ον ἔχ[ε]ι τ̣ὸν τ̣[ρό]π̣ον τῆ[ς] ταχυ̣τῆτος, νομ[ισ]τέο[ν] αὐτοῖς ὑ̣π̣[ά]ρχ[ειν] καὶ τοῦ[τον τὸν τρόπον;] εἰ κ̣αί τιν[α] κατ[ὰ] [τὰ σώμ]ατ[α ἔχει] [τὸν τ]ρόπον το[ῦτο]ν̣ [ὅτα]ν περα[ι]ῶ[ν]τα[ι], καὶ ἡ τῶν ε[ἰ]δώλων φύσ̣ις, [ὥσ]π̣[ερ] λ̣έγω, κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τῶν ἀπαντώντ̣ω̣[ν] σ̣ωμάτω̣[ν] [τ]ρόπ̣ον φέρεσθαι [δ]ύ[ναται·] ὁ τρόπ̣ος [δ' ἐστὶ] κ[αὶ τῶν ού]ρίων π[ο]υ· ἐπε[ιδὴ δὲ] περ̣ι[φο]ρούμενα̣…

…ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ Εἴδωλον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐξωθεῖν πολλὰ σώματα, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἤπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ Στερέμνια τοῦτο πράττειν – πῶς οὐχί; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτῆτος, Νομιστέον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰ καὶ τινα κατὰ τὰ σώματα ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅταν περαιῶνται – καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδώλων Φύσις, ὥσπερ Λέγω, κατὰ τὸν ἐξωστικόν τῶν ἀπαντώντων σωμάτων τρόπον φέρεσθαι δύναται – ὁ Τρόπος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν ὁρίων που· ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιφορούμενα…

…since Film also has the force to eject many bodies, even more so than hard Objects themselves can accomplish this – how [could it] not [be this way]? since [the films] indeed possesses this way of high speed, It must be considered that this way [of ejection] also exists for the [films]. indeed, if certain [examples] among bodies have this way [of movement] when they are being carried over [through the void] – then the Nature of the films, as I say, is also able to be carried according to the ejecting way of the encountering bodies – this Way [of ejection from encountering another body] is also, in a sense, of boundaries [i.e., concerning their surfaces]. And since [the films] are being transmitted around…

τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
ἐξωθεῖν	to eject	**ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ** *pushing out*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἡ ταχύτης **αἱ ταχύτητες**	high speed	**ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ** *condition from quickly*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
περαιοῦν	to come over	**ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ** *boundary*
ἡ ἔξωσις **αἱ ἐξώσεις**	ejections	**ΕΞΩΣΙΣ** *pushing out*
ἐξωστικός *(ή, όν)*	ejecting	**ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of pushing out*

ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	**ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ** *meeting away*
ἀπαντῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	encountering	
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	**ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing*
δύνασθαι	to be able	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *having power*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ὁρίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	setting a limit	
τὸ ὅριον **τὰ ὅρια**	boundary	**ὉΡΙΟΝ** *separating*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
φορεῖν	to transmit	**ΦΟΡΕΙΝ** *carrying*
φορούμενος	being transmitted	
περιφορούμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	being transmitted around	**ΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *carrying around*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 12 (column 113inf)

...κρ̣ίσεις ἢ ṭὰς σφό[δρα] μικκὰς ἐξω̣θεῖ[ν] δυνάμενα αύτ[αῖς] καὶ αὐτοῖς εύοδί[αν] παρασκευάζειν, π̣[ῶς] ούκ εὕοδον τὸ λ[έ]γε̣[ι]ν...

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 19 fin. | column 20 sup.

...προσκ̣ρο̣[ύ]σ[αντα] πρ[ὸς] τ̣ὰς ἐλαχίσ̣τας συγκρ[ί]σεις ἢ τὰ[ς] σφόδ̣[ρ]α μικρὰ̣[ς] ἐ̣ξωθεῖν [δ]υ̣[ν]ά̣μ̣[ενα αὐταῖ]ς καὶ ἐ̣α[υτο]ῖ[ς ε]ὐδίαν π̣αρα̣[σ]κ̣ε̣υά[ζε]ι̣ν̣, π[ῶ]ς ούκ εὔοδον̣ τὸ λέγειν ὡς καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν ἔν̣[ει]σί τινε[ς] συμμέτρως ἔχουσαι στερεμ[νίοις δυνάμε]ις;

...προσκρούσαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐλαχίστας συγκρίσεις ἢ τὰς σφόδρα μικράς, ἐξωθεῖν δυνάμενα, αὑταῖς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς εὐδίαν παρασκευάζειν. πῶς οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ Λέγειν ὡς καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν ἔνεισί τινες συμμέτρως ἔχουσαι στερεμνίοις Δυνάμεις;

...[because the films are] striking against the most minuscule compounds or [at least] the very small [ones, the films] have the force to eject [these compounds], to provide a good situation [for movement] for other [compounds] and for themselves. how is it not good progress [for this topic] to Say that certain Forces are also present in symmetrical [proportions] within [their] hard [source] objects for the nature of the films [to generate]?

κρούειν	to strike	**ΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ** *bumping*
προσκρούειν	to strike against	**ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ** *bumping towards*
προσκρούων *(ούουσα, οὖον)*	striking against	
τὸ ἐλάχιστον **τὰ ἐλάχιστα**	the minimum *(the smallest thing)*	**ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ** *small*
ἐλαχύς	minuscule	**ΕΛΑΧΥΣ** *small*
ἐλάχιστος *(ἐλαχίστη, ἐλάχιστον)*	most minuscule	
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
σφόδρα	very	**ΣΦΟΔΡΑ** *vehement*

μικκός *(ή, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΚΟΣ**
ἐξωθεῖν	to eject	**ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ** *pushing out*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
ἡ εὐδία **αἱ εὐδίαι**	good progress	**ΕΥΔΙΑ** *good day*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
ἡ εὐοδία **αἱ εὐοδίαι**	good progress	**ΕΥΟΔΙΑ** *good path*
εὔοδος *(ος, ον)*	progressing well	
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
τὸ λέγειν	[the] saying	
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
συμμέτρως	symmetrically	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΩΣ**
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	**ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ** *stiff*
τὸ στερεμνίον **τὰ στερεμνία**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *hard*
στερεμνῖος *(α, ον)*	hard	
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 13 (column 114inf)

...[μῆκος περιλαμβάνο]ụσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξῳ̣ώσεσιν καὶ οὐ δυν[ά]μεναι ἐν τρόπωι τινὶ πρὸς τὰς μ̣ικρὰς προσπίπτειν· καθ' ἅ...

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 6 (column 115sup)

...{[π]αντας οὖ[ν] τοὺς [τρό]πους οὓς θεωροῦ[με]ν τὰς ταχυτῆτας [ὑπ]αρχούσας σώμα[σί τισι]ν εὖ ἐπι[β]λέ[πομε]ν ὅτι καὶ τὰ̣ εἴ[δωλ]α δύν[αται] τα[χέω]ς εἰς μακροὺς [τόπ]ους περαιοῦν· [δεῖ δ' ἐ]πιβλέ[πε]ιν [ὅτι κατὰ] τὴν αὐ̣τὴν [ἔμ]πτω̣[σι]ν̣ ῥᾳιδίως [διὰ π]α[ν]τὸς π[όρου] τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔ[χ]ει}

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 20 fin., 21, 22 sup.

γῆ[ν δὲ προσα]σ̣πά[ζον]τ[αί] π̣ο̣[υ,] καὶ [τὴν] μ̣ετα[λλ]αγὴ̣ν ἐκ τῆς ἐξ [ἀρ]χῆς [ἀ]πορρυείσης μορ[φ]ῆς λαμβάνου̣σης(*) [ἐ]ξώ[σε]ις αὐτῶν ποιοῦντα[ι διαδ]ύν̣[τ]α μ[ὲν] π[ρὸς σ]υγκρί̣σεις, [εἰ] καὶ... [three lines missing] ...[σ]τερέμνι[α, μᾶλλ]ον ἤπερ [αὐτὰ τὰ] στερέμν̣ι[α] μέγα μῆκος περιλαμβάνουσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξώσεσιν κ̣αὶ ο[ὐ δ]υν[ά]μεναι ἐ[ν τρό]π̣ω[ι τινὶ πρ]ὸς [τὰς μ]ι̣κρὰ̣ς π̣ροσ[π]ίπτε̣ιν· καθ' ἅ{π[α]ν̣τας ο̣ὖ̣ν τοὺ̣[ς] τ[ρόπ]ο̣υ̣[ς ο]ὓ[ς θε]ωρο̣ῦ̣[μεν τ]ὰ̣ς [τα]χυ[τῆτας ὑπ]α̣ρχού[σα]ς̣ σώμα[σί τ]ισιν [εὖ ἐπι]β̣λέπ[ομεν] ὅ[τι καὶ τὰ] εἴ̣δωλ̣[α δύνα]τ̣[αι τ]α̣χ[έ]ω[ς εἰς μα]κ[ρο]ὺ[ς τ]ό[πους] π[ερ]α̣ιο̣ῦ̣ν· δεῖ δ̣' [ἐ]π[ι]βλέπε[ι]ν ὅτ[ι] κ[ατὰ] τὴν αὐ̣[τὴ]ν ἔ̣μπτωσ[ι]ν ῥ̣α̣ιδί̣[ως] διὰ παντὸς πόρου τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔ[χ]ει} [ἐν]ε̣[ῖ]να[ι]...

γῆν δὲ προσασπάζονταί που, καὶ τὴν μεταλλαγὴν ἐκ τῆς, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπορρυείσης, μορφῆς λαμβάνουσης ἐξώσεις αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται – διαδύνα μὲν πρὸς συγκρίσεις, εἰ καὶ...

[because certain forces] are somehow cleaving onto the earth, and they make an exchange out of the shape [of the film] that, flowing out from the beginning, encompasses the ejections of these [objects] – [*with the films*] thoroughly having the force for [moving other] compounds, if indeed…

…στερέμνια, μᾶλλον ἤπερ αὐτὰ τὰ στερέμνια μέγα μῆκος περιλαμβάνουσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξώσεσιν – καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι, ἐν τρόπωι τινὶ, πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς προσπίπτειν; καθ' ἅπαντας οὖν τοὺς τρόπους οὓς Θεωροῦμεν τὰς ταχύτητας ὑπαρχούσας σώμασί τισιν, εὖ Ἐπιβλέπομεν ὅτι καὶ τὰ Εἴδωλα δύναται ταχέως εἰς μακροὺς τόπους περαιοῦν· Δεῖ δ' ἐπιβλέπειν ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔμπτωσιν, ῥαιδίως διὰ παντὸς πόρου τοῖς εἰδώλοις Διέκδυσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως, ἔχει ἐνεῖναι…

…hard objects, even more than [the compounds of the films] encompass in their ejections the hard objects themselves at great length – and [yet] they do not have the force, in any way, to fall upon [other] small [compounds]? therefore, in all the ways that We observe high speeds existing for certain bodies, We fully and easily see that even the Films are able to quickly come over to distant locations. It is necessary fully see how, in accordance with the same collision, the Emergence through every passageway easily has, not unreasonably, to exist for the films within…

ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ἀσπάζεσθαι	to cleave	**ΑΣΠΑΖΟΜΑΙ** *[welcoming eagerly]*
προσασπάζεσθαι	to cleave onto	**ΠΡΟΣΑΣΠΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *[welcoming eagerly]* *further/toward*
ἀλλάσσω	to alter	**ΑΛΛΑΣΣΩ** *changing*
ἡ μεταλλαγή **αἱ μεταλλαγαί**	exchange	**ΜΕΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing change*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀπορρεῖν	to flow out	**ΑΠΟΡΡΕΙΝ** *flow away*
ἀπορρυείς *(υεῖσα, υέν)*	flowing out	
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
διαδύνασθαι	to thoroughly have the force	**ΔΙΑΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *fully power*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *length*
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely comprehend	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around*
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around*
ἡ ἔξωσις **αἱ ἐξώσεις**	ejections	**ΕΞΩΣΙΣ** *pushing out*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

μικρός (ά, όν)	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling toward*
ἅπας (ασα, αν)	all together	ἉΠΑΣ *all together*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ *condition from quickly*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking upon*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ *quickly*
μακρός (ά, όν)	distant	ΜΑΚΡΟΣ *long-reaching*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ *a place*
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ *boundary*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ *falling into*
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ *strike*
ῥαδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ *easily*
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
ἡ διέκδυσις αἱ διεκδύσεις	emergence	ΔΙΕΚΔΥΣΙΣ *action of escaping through*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἄλογος (ον)	(of things) unreasoning, (of men) unreasonable	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ *not reasoning*
ἀλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ *not reasoning*

2.11 Against Complete Permeability

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 7 (column 116sup)

…πρ[ὸς τοῖς στε]ρεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός, πλὴν οὐχὶ τῶι ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν ε[ἰς] βάθος πε[ποιῆσ]θα[ι, ἀλ]λὰ τῶι [τὴν] τοῦ [ἔνδ]οθεν [κενο]ῦ διά[στ]ασιν τὴν [α]ὐτὴν ἔχειν, λέγειν τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως πως ὡς δ̣ιὰ̣ τ̣ὴν λεπτότητ̣α ῥαδίως δι[ὰ π]αντ[ὸς] πόρου [περ]αι[οῦν ἔδει], οὐδ' ἐν[θ]υ[μούμενοι…

...πρὸς τοῖς στερεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφώς ¬ πλὴν οὐχὶ τῷ ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν εἰς βάθος πεποιῆσθαι – ἀλλὰ τῷ τὴν τοῦ ἔνδοθεν κενοῦ διάστασιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν. λέγειν Τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως, πως, ὡς διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα ῥαδίως διὰ παντὸς πόρου περαιοῦν ἔδει, οὐδ' ἐνθυμούμενοι...

> ...while [the film] even acquired the same expansions in depth in relation to the hard objects [that were its source] ¬ except with [the film] having been made deeply not by many bodies – but by having the same dimensions of the inner void. They unreasonably dare to say that, somehow, because of the subtlety [of the films], it would be necessary [for the films] to easily pass through every passageway, without [those who say this] reflecting that...

τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ διάστασις **αἱ διαστάσεις**	expansion	**ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing across*
τὸ βάθος **τὰ βάθη**	depth	**ΒΑΘΟΣ** *deep*
εἰληφέναι	to have comprehended	**ΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ** *grasped*
εἰληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	**ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ** *grasped*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
τὸ ἔνδοθεν **τὰ ἔνδοθεν**	the inner part "what is from within"	**ΕΝΔΟΘΕΝ**
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
τολμᾶν	to dare	**ΤΟΛΜΑΝ** *courage*
ἀλόγως	unreasonably	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
ἡ λεπτότης **αἱ λεπτότητες**	subtlety	**ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being fine/thin*
ῥᾴδιος **ῥαιδιος** *(α, ον)*	easy	**ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *easily*
ῥᾳδίως **ῥαιδίως**	easily	**ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ** *easily*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
περαιοῦν	to come over	**ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ** *boundary*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	**ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *spirit in*
ἐνθυμούμενος *(ουμένη, ούμενον)*	reflecting upon	

2.12 Permeability of Films

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 24

...{συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, πε̣ραιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο(*)σεων} [τῶ]ν ε(*)τερ[εμνί]ω̣ν̣· τ̣[οῦ]τ̣ο̣ [δ' αύ]ταὶ αἱ αἰσθήσει[ς ἐ]π[ι]μαρτυροῦσ[ιν· οὐθ]ὲν γὰρ ἂ[ν μᾶλλον] ἔ̣νδοθέν τ[ι] π̣ο̣λ[ύ]κενον, [ὅ]μ[οι]ον δ̣ὲ φ[ύσε]ι τῶιδε μ̣ὴ πολυκένωι δ̣ύ̣ν[αι]το, διὰ τῶ[ν] τ[οίχ]ω̣ν [περ]αιοῦ[ν,] τ[ὴν ἑξῆς θέσιν δι]ασώζε[ι]ν [πρὸς στ]ερ̣έ[μνι]ο[ν]·

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 8 (column 117sup)

......{συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο(*)σεων} τῶν στερεμνίων· τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἔνδοθέν τι πολύκενον, ὅμοιον [δὲ] φύσε[ι τῶιδε] μὴ πο[λυ]κένωι, δύναιτο, [διὰ τῶν τοί]χων [πε]ραιοῦν, τὴ[ν] ἑξῆς θέσιν διασώζει[ν] [πρ]ὸς στερέμνιον.

...συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρίσεων τῶν στερεμνίων – τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἱ Αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἔνδοθέν Τι πολύκενον, ὅμοιον δὲ φύσει τῷδε μὴ πολυκένῳ, δύναιτο, διὰ τῶν τοίχων περαιοῦν, τὴν ἑξῆς θέσιν διασώζειν πρὸς στερέμνιον

...[*films are not able to form*] a settlement that prevails [*i.e., maintain a stable form*], and carry over through the walls and through the remaining compounds of hard objects – this is attested by the Sensations themselves: for in no way would Something [that is] more internally porous, but similar in nature to [something] non-porous, have the force to come over through the walls, to thoroughly preserve its successive position against a hard object [*and be seen on the other side*]

ἡ συνίζησις **αἱ συνιζήσεις**	settlement	**ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ** *sitting together*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	**ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ**
ἰσχύων *(ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)*	prevailing	**ΙΣΧΥΩΝ** *strength*
ἰσχυρός *(ά, όν)*	prevails	
περαιοῦν	to carry over	**ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ** *boundary*
ὁ τοῖχος **οἱ τοῖχοι**	wall	**ΤΟΙΧΟΣ** *mound*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα**	[M] what is attested	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of testifying upon*
τὸ ἔνδοθεν **τὰ ἔνδοθεν**	the inner part "what is from within"	**ΕΝΔΟΘΕΝ**
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
πολύκενος *(η, ον)*	porous "containing much void"	**ΠΟΛΥΚΕΝΟΣ** *much emptiness*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
περαιοῦν	to come over	**ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ** *boundary*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἝΞΗΣ** *possessing*
ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
σώζειν	to preserve	**ΣΩΖΕΙΝ** *saving*
διασώζειν	to thoroughly preserve	**ΔΙΑΣΩΖΕΙΝ** *saving through*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 24 fin., 25

{ọύ[κ ἔστι] συμ[φυῆ] τα[ῦτα] δή, φημί, τού[του, ἀ]λλὰ [μόν]ον ṭ[ῶν [ἐ]πιṭηδ[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τ[ι]νὰ φύσẹ[ι], ἀλλὰ π[ολ]λοὺς καὶ [ἄλ]λọ[υ]ς ἄλλως,} λέγω δ' ọἷον πυρὸς, καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων· ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλωι τρόπωι τὴ[ν] λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντ[α] ἥπερ ἐν ὧι α[ἱ ἔξ]ωθεν μ[ὲ]ν ἀλληλοῦ[χο]ι [φύσεις, ἔνδοθ]ẹ[ν] [δὲ] π[ολύ]κε[νοι], δύνα[νται τὰς δ]ιεκδύσεις [διὰ τῶν] στερεμ[νίων φ]ύ[σ]εω[ν] λαμβ[άνε]ιν· οἷς δ[ὲ]

{added to the expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2

P.Herc. 1010 (columns 24fin, 25),

P.Herc. 993 col. 14 (column 117inf), P.Herc. 1149 col. 9 (column 118sup),

P.Herc. 1010 (columns 26, 27sup), P.Herc. 1149 col. 10 (column 119sup)

{ọύ[κ ἔστι] συμ[φυῆ] τα[ῦτα] δή, φημί, τού[του, ἀ]λλὰ [μόν]ον ṭῶν [ἐ]πιṭηδ[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τ[ι]νὰ φύσẹ[ι], ἀλλὰ π[ολ]λοὺς καὶ [ἄλ]λọ[υ]ς ἄλλως,} [λέ]γω δ' οἷọν [πυρὸς καὶ] πνεύμα[τος καὶ τ]ῶν τοιουτο[τρόπω]ν· ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλωι τρόπωι | τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχ[ο]ντα ἥπερ ἐν ὧι αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν [ἀ]λλη[λοῦ]χοι φύσεις, [ἔ]νδοθε[ν δὲ] πολύκενοι, δύ[να]νται τὰς [διεκδύσεις δ]ιὰ τῶν στερεμνί[ω]ν φύσε[ω]ν λαμβάνειν· οἷς δή, φημί, βλ[έ]ποντες [ἔ]τι τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ τοῦτ[ο ἐ]γχει[ρο]ῦσιν κατ[α]δοξά[ζε]ιν διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμ[ί]α[ν τὴν δὴ] τῆς λε[πτότητος] {τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσθẹωρ[ο]ῦντες [missing word] μ[ή]τε ạὐτὰ μᾶλλο[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς δ]ύναṣθαι ποιεῖσ[θα]ι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμ]ν[ίων φύσε]ω[ν] ṣυνβέβη[κ]εν ἤπ[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν [χειρῶ]ν συγκρίσεις, ἂν μή [τ]ις τὸν τρόπον [τ]ῆς δ[ια]δύσεω[ς,] [ὃν] ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν, δ[ει]κνύῃ δυ[νατὸ]ν αὐτọῖς [ὑπάρ]χ[ειν ὄντα]}. {δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρη[κ]α, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγονυ̣ῖ[α]ν οἰκονομίαν ἡμ[ῖ]ν ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι σύντομ[ον] πρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] καὶ τ[ὴ]ν [παραλλαγὴν]}

οὐκ ἔστι συμφυῆ Ταῦτα δή, Φημί, τούτου, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τινὰ φύσει – ἀλλὰ, πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλως, λέγω δ' οἷον πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων: Ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντα ἧπερ ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν ἀλληλοῦχοι Φύσεις, ἔνδοθεν δὲ πολύκενοι, Δύνανται τὰς διεκδύσεις διὰ τῶν στερεμνίων φύσεων λαμβάνειν· οἷς δή, Φημί: βλέποντες ἔτι τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐγχειροῦσιν καταδοξάζειν διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν – τὴν δὴ τῆς λεπτότητος τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ Προσθεωροῦντες

I say, These [abilities of traveling through hard objects] are not inherent to [film], but only [inherent] to suitable things not having a certain singular shaped configuration by nature – rather, [these abilities are inherent to things having] many other [shapes] also. I mean, for instance, [particles] of fire and of [cool] wind and such types of things: for These [hot and cold particles], because they have a subtle composition in a different manner than that in which [their] external interconnected Natures [exist], but [with their nature also being] porous within, have the force to acquire their emergence through the natures of hard objects. indeed, I say to these [people]: while they are still observing the films, they attempt to thoroughly judge this very thing [*i.e., transfer of temperature*] through the sameness of names – in fact, They are not also observing the difference in the subtlety of these things

μήτε Αὐτὰ μᾶλλον τὰς διαδύσεις δύνασθαι ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν στερεμνίων φύσεων συνβέβηκεν ἤπερ τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν χειρῶν συγκρίσεις. ἂν μή Τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως, ὃν Ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, δεικνύῃ δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντα. Δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ Εἴρηκα, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγονυῖαν οἰκονομίαν ἡμῖν ἐπιβλέπειν: ἔστι γάρ Τι σύντομον πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι καὶ τὴν παραλλαγὴν…

These [hot and cold particles] are not more able to make penetrations through the nature of hard objects than they [are able to] endure their rebounding through the compounds of [our] hands. unless Someone proves that this way of penetration, which We ourselves have described, is able to exist for [films]. then It is necessary, just as I have said, for us to also fully see the internal management [in ways of movement] that is produced in this form: for there is Something [illegible] for understanding even the variety…

συμφυής *(ές)*	inherent	**ΣΥΜΦΥΗΣ** *growing together*
τὸ ἐπιτήδειον **τὰ ἐπιτήδεια**	suitable things	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΝ** *suitable upon*
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
μορφοειδής *(ής, ές)*	shaped	**ΜΟΡΦΟΕΙΔΗΣ** *seen form*

ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of forming*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
τὸ πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ *breath result*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
τὸ τοιουτοτρόπος τὰ τοιουτοτρόπα	such a type of thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *such a kind of way*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ *fine/thin part*
ἡ λεπτομέρεια αἱ λεπτομέρειαι	subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ *fine/thin part*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἡ λεπτομέρεια αἱ λεπτομέρειαι	subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ *fine/thin part*
(ἡ, τὸ) ὁ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ *from outside*
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ *holding each other*
ἀλληλοῦχος *(ος, ον)*	interconnected	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΟΣ *holding each other*
πολύκενος *(ος, ον)*	porous "containing much void"	ΠΟΛΥΚΕΝΟΣ *many emptinessness*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
ἡ διέκδυσις αἱ διεκδύσεις	emergence	ΔΙΕΚΔΥΣΙΣ *action of escaping through*
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ *object from making hard*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	Film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
ἡ χείρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ *hand*
ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ *in hand*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
καταδοξάζειν	to thoroughly judge	ΚΑΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *thoroughly seeming*
ἡ ὁμωνυμία αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι	the same name	ὉΜΩΝΥΜΙΑ *same name*
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtlety	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ *condition of being fine/thin*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*

θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
προσθεωρεῖν	to also observe	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *observing further*
	Part 2	
συνβαίνειν = συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ *imprinting*
ἡ ἀντιτυπία αἱ ἀντιτυπίαι	rebounding	ΑΝΤΙΤΥΠΙΑ *to imprint against*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking*
ἡ διαδύσις αἱ διαδύσεις	penetration	ΔΙΑΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking through*
δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	̔ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γεγονώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having been produced	ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ *came into being*
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομίαι	household management [here, "internal management"]	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ *managing the home*
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking upon*
σύντομος *(ος, ον)*	concise	ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ *cut together*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
γνῶναι	to know [already]	
τὸ γνῶναι	understanding	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ *changing across*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 26, 27sup

...δή, φημί, β[λ]έ[π]οντες καὶ τῶν εἰδώλ[ω]ν ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐγχειροῦσιν [κ]ατ[α]δο[ξ]άζε[ιν] [διὰ τὴν ὀμ]ων[υ]μίαν τὴν δὴ τῆς λεπτότητος, {τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσθεωρ[ο]ῦντες [missing word] μ[ή]τε αὐτὰ μᾶλλο[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς δ]ύνασθαι ποιεῖσ[θα]ι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμ]ν[ίων φύσε]ω[ν] συνβέβη[κ]εν ἤπ[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν [χειρῶ]ν συγκρίσεις, ἂν μή [τ]ις τὸν τρόπον [τ]ῆς δ[ια]δύσεω[ς,] [ὃν] ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν, δ[ει]κνύη δυ[νατὸ]ν αὐτοῖς [ὑπάρ]χ[ειν ὄντα]·}

{added to expanded fragment above}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 15 (column 118inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 10 (column 119sup)

...[προσθε]ω[ροῦντες· ~~ἡ δὲ γὰρ] αἴ[σθησις~~ [missing word] μ]ήτε αὐ[τ]ὰ μ[ᾶλλον τ]ὰς δι[αδύσεις] δύ[ν]ασθαι [πο]ι[εῖ]σθαι διὰ τῶν [σ]τερεμνίων φύσεων συμβέβηκεν ἤπερ τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς | διὰ τῶν χειρῶν συνκρίσεις, ἐὰν μή τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως, ὃν ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, δεικνύηι δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντ[α·] {δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρη[κ]α, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγονυῖ[α]ν οἰκονομίαν ἡμ[ῖ]ν ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι σύντομ[ον] πρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] καὶ τ[ὴ]ν [παραλλαγὴν]}...

{also added to the same expanded fragment above}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 27fin

{δεῖ[ῖ] οῦ[ν], ὥσ[πε]ρ εἴρηκα, καὶ τὴν [εἰς] τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος [γ]εγονυῖα[ν] ο[ἰ]κονομ[ία]ν ἡμῖν [ἐ]πιβλ[έπει]ν· ἔστι [γά]ρ [τι σύντομ]ον [π]ρὸ[ς τὸ γνῶν]α[ι κ]αὶ [τὴν παραλ]λαγὴν}...

{expanded fragment above}

2.14 Summary

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 28

...{τ[ι] τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν [ἀπ]οτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὅ[τι τ]ὰ[ς φορὰς ἀνυ]π[ερ]βλήτους τοῖς τά[χε]σιν [κε]κτῆσθαι· τ[ὰ δ'] ἁρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτ[οι]ς ῥηθῆ[ν]αι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξ[ιμε]ν}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 16 (column 119inf) | 1149 col. 11 (column 120)

...τρόπ[. .] ὥστ[ε] π[α]ραθεωρ[ε]ῖν· ἀποδ[έ]δεικτα[ι] οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ὅτι ἔστι ‹τι[νὰ› ε]ἴδωλα καὶ ὅ{τι τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμανοήματι | συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι καὶ ἔτι τὰς φορὰς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσιν κεκτῆσθαι· τὰ δ' ἁρμόττοντα [ἐ]ξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξιμεν}

...τῷ τρόπῳ ὥστε παραθεωρεῖν· Ἀποδέδεικται, οὖν, ἡμῖν καὶ ὅτι (1) ἔστι τινὰ Εἴδωλα, καὶ ὅτι (2) τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι (3) τὰς φορὰς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσιν κεκτῆσθαι· τὰ δ' ἁρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα Διέξιμεν

...so as to investigate in this way. therefore, It has already been fully proved to us that (1) certain Films exist, and that (2) their creation is fully produced simultaneously enduring with conception, and also that (3) [the films] possess transmissions unsurpassable in speed. in those [books] after these, We will fully go through those [topics] fitting in succession to these [topics] that were spoken...

[Sedley] Thus we have proved (1) that images (**εἴδωλα**) exist, (2) that they have the property of being generated as quick as thought, and (3) that they have motions unsurpassed in speed. In what follows ['in the following books'] we will go through the topics which belong in sequence after these ones.

ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
παραθεωρεῖν	to investigate	**ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *observing alongside*
δείκνυναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing away*
ἀποδεδεῖχθαι	to have been fully proved [already]	**ΑΠΟΔΕΔΕΙΚΤΑΙ** *fully shown*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
τὸ νόημα **τὰ νόηματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*

ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of completing out*
ἀποτελεῖσθαι	to be fully produced	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *completing out*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἀνυπέρβλητος *(ον)*	unsurpassable	**ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ** *not thrown over*
τὸ τάχος **τὰ τάχη**	speed	**ΤΑΧΟΣ** *swift*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure [here, "to possess"]	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*
ἐναρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting into	**ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting into*
ἁρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting	**ἉΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ**
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἝΞΗΣ** *possessing*
διεξεῖναι	to fully go through	**ΔΙΕΞΕΙΝΑΙ** *to go across out of*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως Β*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 subscriptio

Ἐπιḳούρο[υ] *Περὶ Φ̣ύ̣σεως Β̣*

Epicurus, On Nature, *Book 2*

[Book 3 - Vision, Truth And Falsity]

[U80]

[Book 4 - Sensations & Thought]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Περὶ θανάτου, P.Herc. 807

...οὔτ' Ἐ[πίκο]υ[ρος λέ]γει γὲν [ἐν τῶι τ]ετάρωι Περὶ Φ[ύσεως]...

οὔτ' Ἐπίκουρος λέγει γὲν ἐν τῶι τετάρωι *Περὶ Φύσεως*

...nor does Epicurus say, in Book 4 of *On Nature*...

[Book 5 - Secondary Qualities]

Book 6

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.38.1077

...[ὁμοί]ως καὶ [ἐν τῶι] ἕκτω[ι π]ερὶ [τοῦ δι]κάζεσ[θαι]... ...[κ]αὶ εὐόρκους [καὶ δι]καίους ταῖς ἀ[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους...

...ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι... ...καὶ εὐόρκους καὶ δικαίους ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσεσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους...

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 concerning adjudication... ...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous exchanges both from their own selves and from those...

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 [*On Nature*] concerning forensic speaking... ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the best transmissions both from their own selves and from [the gods]...

δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
δικάζειν	to judge	**ΔΙΚΑΖΕΙΝ**
δικάζεσθαι	to legally plead one's cause	**ΔΙΚΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ**
περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι	concerning legally defending oneself	
ἡ διάδοσις αἱ διάδοσεις	exchange	**ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΣ** *given through*

[Book 7 - Direction and Speed]

Book 8

Benefit of Virtue

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.38.1082

[κ]αὶ εὐόρκους [καὶ δι]καίους ταῖς ἀ[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους. [κ]αὶ παρα[π]λησίως ἐν τῶι ὀγδόωι. καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν τ[ί]θενται [τὸν αὐ]τὸν τ[ρ]όπον, [ὅνπερ] Πολύ[αι]ος ἐ[ν τῶι] πρώ[τωι] Πρ[ὸς Τὸ Πε]ρὶ Φιλοσοφί[ας Ἀρισ]τοτ[έλ]ους [τὴν τού]των [τ]ῶν ἀ[γαθῶν] αἰτίαν ἡμε[ῖν ἀπε]φήν[α]τ' εἶνα[ι] τ[ὴν] θείαν φύσιν

...καὶ εὐόρκους καὶ δικαίους ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσεσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους. καὶ παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ. καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν τίθενται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅνπερ Πολύαιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Πρὸς Τὸ Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας Ἀριστοτέλους* τὴν τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν ἡμῖν ἀπεφήνατ' εἶναι τὴν θείαν Φύσιν

...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those. And similarly in book 8; and they define the notion of benefit in the same way as Polyaenus in the first book of his *Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* declared [his opinion] that divine Nature is the cause for us of these goods.

[Obbink] ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the most virtuous repercussions both from their own selves and from [the gods]. And similarly in book 8 [On Nature]; and [the kathēgemónes] define the notion of benefit [for humans] in the same way as Polyaenus in the first book of his *Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* declared [his opinion] that divine Nature is the cause for us of these goods.

[Book 9 - Mortality and Corporeality]

Book 10

10.1 Time Not Existing Is Inconceivable

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 2 & 3

...οὔ[τοι]οῦτον [εἶναι] οὐδ' οἷον ὅλως [τῶ]ν ὄντων τις ἔνια. [οὐ δεῖ], φημί, ζητεῖν [ταῦτα] διάνοιαν, ἀλ[λὰ μόν]ον τις, ἐπεὶ... ...[αὐ]τὸν οὐδ[ὲ δυνά]μενον νοεῖσθα[ι ὅτι] χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπιβλεπόμενον ὅτι τ[οῦ]τό τι νοεῖ ἐξ ἀν[άγ]κης...

...οὔΤοιοῦτον εἶναι – οὐδ' οἷον ὅλως τῶν ὄντων τις Ἔνια. οὐ Δεῖ, Φημί, ζητεῖν ταῦτα Διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τις, ἐπεὶ... ...αὐτὸν οὐδὲ δυνάμενον νοεῖσθαι ὅτι Χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπιβλεπόμενον ὅτι τοῦτό τι Νοεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης...

…Such a thing does not exist – nor [*is such an incorrect idea*] entirely like some of the things that do exist. I say, it is not necessary for [*mental*] Perception to seek these things, but only some… since… …[he] himself is not even able to conceive that Time would never exist, but [with him] directly fully seeing that He conceives this particular thing out of [natural] necessity…

τοῖος *(τοιᾶ, τοῖον)*	like this *(of such a kind)*	**ΤΟΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**ὉΥΤΟΣ** *this*
τό τοιοῦτον **τά τοιαῦτα**	such a thing	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *self of this sort*
οὗτοιοῦτον = οὗτοι οὗτον	not such a thing	**ΟΥΤΟΙ ὉΥΤΟΝ** *not of this sort self*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	**ὉΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
ὅλως	entirely	**ὉΛΩΣ** *whole*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	(of men) able (of objects) having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	**ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	**ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking upon*
ἐπιβλέπων *(ουσα, ον)*	fully seeing	
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*

10.2 Using Conventional Terms in Forming Judgments

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 5

…{μν}μνηι διὰ λέξε[ως ἐθισ]μούς, ὦ πρὸς θε[ῶν, ὅ]τι ταῦθ' ὁρᾶις θη..[μ..] κατὰ δόξας ἰών· [πα]ντοδαπῶς {πως} γινομένων πραγμάτ[ων τί]ς ταράττοι [ἂ]ν ἀεὶ γὰ[ρ] ὄν[τ]α κεν[ὰ]…

…μνήμῃ διὰ λέξεως ἐθισμούς – ὦ, πρὸς θεῶν! – ὅτι ταῦθ' Ὁρᾶις θῆμα… κατὰ δόξας ἰών παντοδαπῶς πως γινομένων πραγμάτων: Τίς ταράττοι ἂν – ἀεὶ γὰρ ὄντα κενὰ…

…[*to such an extent produces linguistic*] conventions by [*your*] memory through [*the use of*] a term – oh, by gods! – that You see these [*conventions*] as an established thing… [*with you*] proceeding according to [*your*] judgements as [*practical*] situations arise in various ways: Anyone could disturb [*those practical situations*] – for they are always empty…

ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*

λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
τὸ ἔθνος **τὰ ἔθνη**	ethnicity	**ΕΘΝΟΣ** *accustomed*
ὁ ἐθισμός **οἱ ἐθισμοί**	convention	**ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of being* *accustomed*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
τό θῆμα **τά θήματα**	the established thing	**ΘΗΜΑ** *putting*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
παντοδαπός *(ή, όν)*	varied	**ΠΑΝΤΟΔΑΠΟΣ** *all countries*
παντοδαπῶς	variously	
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
συνταράττειν	to confuse	**ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *agitating* *together*
ταράττειν	to disturb	**ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *agitating*

10.3 Correspondence

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 11

...οὐ γὰρ τοιού[τοις τισὶν] ἐγχειρήμασι π̣[ρὸς διά]νοιαν λόγοι γίνοντ[αι], ἀλλ' ὅταν τόδε τ[ὸ] προειλημμένον δεικνύηι τις κατὰ̣ τὸ ἴδι[ο̣ν̣] ὄνομα, εἶτα ἐξ ἀποστή[μ]ατος κ̣άτ[ω] προσυ[πο]μένοντο̣[ς]...

...οὐ γὰρ [1] τοιούτοις τισὶν ἐγχειρήμασι πρὸς διάνοιαν Λόγοι γίνονται ¬ ἀλλ' [2] ὅταν [•^] τόδε τὸ προειλημμένον δεικνύῃ Τις κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα – εἶτα, ἐξ ἀποστήματος κάτω προσυπομένοντος...

...for Reasonings do not come to exist [1] from such attempts directed toward thought ¬ but rather [2] whenever Someone demonstrates [•^] that anticipated thing according to a particular word – then, with it further enduring afterwards from a distance...

ἡ χείρ **αἱ χεῖρες**	hand	**ΧΕΙΡ** *hand*
ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	**ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ** *in hand*
τὸ ἐγχείρημα **τὰ ἐγχειρήματα**	attempt	**ΕΓΧΕΙΡΗΜΑ** *result of being* *in hand*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τὸ προειλημμένον **τὰ προειλημμένα**	[•^] what has already been anticipated	**ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ** *being having grasped* *before*
δεικνύναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*

ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ *below*
προσυπομένων (α, ον)	further enduring	ΠΡΟΣΥΠΟΜΕΝΩΝ *toward enduring*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 12

...[ού]δέ τίς [έσ]τι τόδε τι ἄλλο νομίζειν δίκαιος· καὶ μά[λ]α εὖ, ἔφη, μοὶ δο[κ]εῖς ἄπαντα τὰ προ[ειρη]μένα διειλέχθαι, [καὶ ού]κ ἀνυποπτευ...

...οὐδέ Τίς ἐστι τόδε τι ἄλλο νομίζειν δίκαιος – καὶ "μάλα εὖ" Ἔφη "μοὶ Δοκεῖς ἄπαντα τὰ προειρημένα διειλέχθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀνυπόπτευ[τος]..."

...nor is Anyone just in thinking of this [*i.e., "time"*] as something else – and, He said "You seem to me to have discussed all that has been previously mentioned very well, and [you are] not unsuspected [regarding]..."

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
δίκαιος (ᾱ, ον)	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ *spoke*
τὸ προειρημένον τὰ προειρημένα	what has been previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΝ *spoke before*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
διειλέχθαι	to discuss [already]	ΔΙΕΙΛΕΧΘΑΙ *had spoken through*
ἀνύποπτος (ος, ον)	without [a reason for] suspicion	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ *not looking [suspiciously] under*
ἀνυπόπτευτος (ος, ον)	unsuspected	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΕΥΤΟΣ *not looking [suspiciously] under*

10.4 Judging from Impressions

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 15

...[μ]ατος τεκμα[ιρόμε]νοι, τὰς δὲ γινομ[έ]νας φαντασίας ἡμῶν περὶ μεγέθους χρόνου μὴ συμφώνους τῶι πλήθει τοῦ [παν]τὸς ὡς ψευδε[ῖς, μηδὲ πρὸς] τὸ ἄλλο μέγε[θο]ς προστυ[πουμένας· τ]ουτ[ο]νὶ ἔφη...

...[σχήμ]ατος τεκμαιρόμενοι – τὰς δὲ γινομένας φαντασίας ἡμῶν περὶ μεγέθους χρόνου μὴ συμφώνους τῷ πλήθει τοῦ παντός ὡς ψευδεῖς ¬ μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο μέγεθος προστυπουμένας· τουτονὶ Ἔφη...

...because they are judging [from] the shape – but [they are judging] the appearance produced in us as false regarding the extension of time not in harmony with the [large] number of all [things] ¬ but [they are] not [judging the images that] are making a further impression in relation to the other extension [of time]. He said that that this [*masc. sg.*] here...

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*

τεκμαίρεσθαι	to judge [from indications]	**ΤΕΚΜΑΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *definitive sign* *[of boundary]*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τὸ γινόμενον **τὰ γινόμενα**	what is produced	
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of* *appearing*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ** *speaking* *together*
σύμφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	
τὸ πλῆθος **τὰ πλήθη**	[large] number	**ΠΛΗΘΟΣ** *fullness*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*
προστυπεῖν	to make a further impression	**ΠΡΟΣΤΥΠΕΙΝ** *toward/further* *imprinting*
οὑτοσί *(αὑτηί, τουτί)*	this here	**ὉΥΤΟΝΙ** *this here*

10.5 Practical Experience of Time

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 17

...[ἔ]χομέν [τινα φαν]τα[σ]ίαν τ[ῶ]ν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν, καθ' ἣμ μῆκός τι νο[ο]ῦμεν περὶ αὐτὰς [κατα]μετρητικὸν [πασ]ης κεινήσεως· ού [γὰρ] θέλομεν αὐτο[ὶ ταῖς] αὐταῖς μετ[ρεῖσθαι] τὸ[ν χρό]νον ὡς [ἡμερῶ]ν [καὶ] νυκ[τῶν]...

...Ἔχομέν τινα φαντασίαν τῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν, καθ' ἣν μῆκός τι Νοοῦμεν περὶ αὐτὰς καταμετρητικὸν πάσης κινήσεως – οὐ γὰρ Θέλομεν αὐτοὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς μετρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον ὡς ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν...

> ...[*their argument is that*] We possess a certain appearance of days and nights, according to which We conceive a certain length [of time] that fully measures all movement relating to those [days and nights] – for We ourselves do not want to measure time by those same [*standards*] as days and nights...

ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
ἡ νύξ **αἱ νύκτες**	night	**ΝΥΞ** *night*
τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *extent*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
τὸ καταμέτρημα **τὰ καταμετρήματα**	full measurement	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΜΑ** *thoroughly* *measuring*

καταμετρητικός *(ή, όν)*	fully measuring	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *pertaining to thoroughly measuring*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
θέλειν	to want	**ΘΕΛΕΙΝ** *wanting*
μετρεῖν	to measure	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring*
μετρεῖσθαι	to be measured	

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 19 & 20

...[τῶι] χρόνω(*) πω[ς] ἅμα [λαμβά]νεσθαι τ[ὰ] συ[να]μφότερα, ϝτὸν πο[λὺν χρόν]ον μετρεῖ[σθαι καὶ τὸ]ν δια...|κον καὶ το... εἰ ἄρα σοι [περὶ] τα[ῦτα] ἐκ τῆς ἐκκειμ[ένης] λέξεως ὁ λόγος ἦι, οὐδ' ἂν ὀκνήσα[ι]μι οὐ χρόνον εἶναι τὰς ἡμέρας φῆσαι καὶ τὰς νύ[κτας οὐ]δ' ἄμετρον...

...τῷ χρόνῳ πῶς ἅμα λαμβάνεσθαι τὰ συναμφότερα, τὸν πολὺν χρόνον μετρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν δια...|...εἰ, ἄρα, σοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς ἐκκειμένης λέξεως ὁ Λόγος ἦ – οὐδ' ἂν Ὀκνήσαιμι οὐ χρόνον εἶναι τὰς ἡμέρας φῆσαι καὶ τὰς νύκτας, οὐδ' ἄμετρον...

...[*it is necessary to understand*] how both together may be comprehended in time at once, [*and how*] a long time is measured and [*how*] a [*short time is measured*] through...|...if, indeed, your Reasoning about these things is from this term [*of "time" that has been*] set forth – I would not hesitate at all to declare that time *is* the days and the nights, nor [*is time*] immeasurable...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is on both sides*
τὰ συναμφότερα	both together	**ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ** *both of the two together*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
μετρεῖσθαι	to be measured	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *measuring*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
ἐκκείμενος *(η, ον)*	set forth	**ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated out*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	**ΟΚΝΕΙΝ** *hesitating*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
ἡ νύξ **αἱ νύκτες**	night	**ΝΥΞ** *night*
ἄμετρος *(ος, ον)*	immeasurable	**ΑΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *without measure*

10.6 Thought Experiment

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 22, 23

...τοῦτο μὲν [ὁμολογοῦ]μεν, τὸ δ' έναν[τί]ον κατασκευάζομεν ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι περὶ [ἕ]καστον ὑπάρχωσιν· ἀλλὰ προφά[σει]ς οἰόμεθ[α εἶναι] τῶ[ν] τάσ[δε τὰς] | [τὸ]ν ού νοọύμεν[ον χρό]νον δὴ ὁπόταν [ὑμ]ᾶς εἴπωμεν νοεῖν, τὸν χρόνον ὡσαν[εὶ συ]μβεβηκός τινι [φαντ]ασία[ι τ]ῆι τῶν...

...τοῦτο μὲν Ὁμολογοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον Κατασκευάζομεν ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν ἀμφότεροι οἱ Λόγοι περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχωσιν. ἀλλὰ προφάσεις Οἰόμεθα εἶναι τῶν: τάσδε τὰς τὸν οὐ νοούμενον χρόνον – δὴ, ὁπόταν Ὑμᾶς Εἴπωμεν νοεῖν τὸν χρόνον ὡσανεὶ συμβεβηκός τινι φαντασίᾳ τῇ τῶν...

...We agree on this, but We construct what is opposing [*i.e., a contrary argument*] so that indeed both Reasonings may exist for us concerning each [topic]. but we believe [these reasonings] exist as presumptions of those [people]: these particular [presumptions in which] time is not correctly conceived – indeed, whenever We say You all conceive time as if [it was] a property [inseparably linked] with a certain appearance of those...

ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
τὸ ἐναντίον **τὰ ἐναντία**	what is opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ**
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing* *alongside*
κατασκευάζειν	to construct	**ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *thoroughly* *preparing*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is* *on both sides*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
φάσκειν	to allege	**ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *affirming*
ἡ πρόφασις **αἱ προφάσεις**	presumption	**ΠΡΟΦΑΣΙΣ** *before affirming*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
νοούμενος *(η, ον)*	conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked* *together*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*

10.7 Planetary Movements

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 25

...κἀκẹίṿων [οὐχὶ ο]ὐθὲṿ τοδὶ πρ[οσμ]ετρεῖς ἐπειδάν τις λέγῃι, τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν παραθεωρῶṿ πλε[ί]ω ἢ ἐλάττω χρόνον γιγνομένην, κạταδοξάζειν [αὐ]τὸ καὶ τὸν χρό[νον] διὰ το[ὺ]ς...

...κἀκείνων, οὐχὶ οὐθὲν τοδὶ Προσμετρεῖς – ἐπειδάν Τις λέγῃ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν παραθεωρῶν πλεῖω ἢ ἐλάττω χρόνον γιγνομένην, καταδοξάζειν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν χρόνον διὰ τοὺς...

...and of those, You do not in any way further measure [time] – whenever Someone claims, while investigating the movement of the sun which occurs with greater or smaller [amounts of] time, to thoroughly judge that [motion of the sun] and time itself through those...

κἀκεῖνος = **καὶ ἐκεῖνος** *(η, ο)*	and that	**καὶ ἐκεῖνος** *and that*
μετρεῖν	to measure	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring*
προσμετρεῖν	to further measure	**ΠΡΟΣΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *further measuring*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
παραθεωρεῖν	to investigate	**ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *observing alongside*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *lesser*
γιγνόμενος *(η, ον)* **γιγνόμενοι** *(αι, α)*	happening	**ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *birthing*
καταδοξάζειν	to thoroughly judge	**ΚΑΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *thoroughly seeming*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 27

...ταύτοῦ πλέον[ος] αὐτῶν ὄντος, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸ πάλιν, ὅτι τὸ ̣π̣ε̣ρὶ [τ]ῶν οὐχ ὑ̣π̣ὸ νο̣ῦν ̣συμπ[ιπτ]όντων αὖ̣...

...ταὐτοῦ πλέονός αὐτῶν ὄντος ¬ ἕτερον δὲ, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸ πάλιν, ὅτι Τὸ περὶ τῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ νοῦν συμπιπτόντων...

...with the same thing existing in a greater amount [of time compared to] them ¬ but different [amount of time], and not the same [amount] again, because [it is] What concerns those [qualities that are] not symptomatic to the intellect [*"things that do temporarily occur under the scope of the mind"*]

πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ὁ νοῦς **οἱ νοῖ**	intellect	**ΝΟΥΣ** *sense*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling together*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 29

...καὶ τ[ῶ]ν λοιπῶν πραγμάτων ἀτάρ̣α̣κ̣τ̣α̣ [ἐ]πὶ τοῦ χρ[όνου ο]ὐχ ὅτι ἤ[ρ]ξαν[το]...

...καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πραγμάτων, ἀτάρακτα ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου, οὐχ ὅτι Ἤρξαντο...

...and of the rest of the situations, undisturbed in regard to time, not that They had begun [for themselves]...

λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*

ἀτάραχος = **ἀτάρακτος** (ος, ον)	undisturbed	**ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ** **ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ** *without agitating*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ἄρχειν	to begin	**ΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning*
ἄρξασθαι	to begin for oneself [already]	**ΑΡΞΑΣΘΑΙ** *beginning*

10.8 Against Time as a "Measurable Image"

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 31

...καὶ φαντασ[ία τ]ίς ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος [κι]ṿήσεως πάσης κα[τα]μετρητικὴ καὶ [οὐ τ]ῆ(*) κειṿ[ήσει συμ]μετρουμένη [μέ]γεθος...

...καὶ φαντασία τίς ἐστιν ὁ Χρόνος κινήσεως πάσης καταμετρητικὴ καὶ οὐ τῇ κεινήσει συμμετρουμένη μέγεθος...

...[*their argument is that*] Time also is a certain appearance that is fully measurable for every movement and not measured together with movement as an extension...

ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἡ κείνησις = **ἡ κίνησις**	movement	**ΚΕΙΝΗΣΙΣ** **ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving*
καταμετρητικός (ή, όν)	fully measurable	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly measuring*
συμμετρούμενος (η, ον)	measured together	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ**
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 32

...τοῦτο [θ]ẹ́λοẹ[σιν] κατη[γο]ροῦ[ντες] ταῖσδέ τισιν ἑρ[μηνε]ịαις· ḳ[αὶ] π[άλι]ν [πρὸ]ς ὅλον [τρ]έποντος...

...τοῦτο Θέλουσιν, κατηγοροῦντες ταῖσδέ τισιν ἑρμηνείαις – καὶ πάλιν, πρὸς ὅλον τρέποντος...

...They want [to maintain] this [account], because they are fully indicating [it] by means of these specific interpretations – and again, with [*this account*] directed toward the whole...

θέλειν	to want	**ΘΕΛΕΙΝ** *wanting*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speak*
κατηγορῶν	fully indicating	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΩΝ**
ἡ ἑρμηνεία **αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι**	interpretation	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ** *Hermes / interpreting*
διατρέπειν	to refuse	**ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning thoroughly*
τρέπων (ουσα, ον)	turning	**ΤΡΕΠΩΝ** *turning*

Epicurus, *On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 34*

…[ἐρ]μηνείαις χρῶ[νται·] ἀλλὰ γοῦν οὐ[δεπώ]ποτε οἱ ṭόδ' ἡμ[ῶν] γενεᾶς [ṭọ κ]ῦδọ[ς ἐ]πὶ τοῦτο τὸ παράλλαγμα φέροντες…

…ἑρμηνείαις Χρῶνται ¬ ἀλλὰ γοῦν, οὐδεπώποτε Οἱ τόδ' ἡμῶν γενεᾶς τὸ κῦδος ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ παράλλαγμα φέροντες…

…They use interpretations ¬ but at any rate, never yet have the Men bearing this glory of our generation into that variation…

ἡ ἑρμηνεία **αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι**	interpretation	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ** *Hermes / interpreting*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
ἡ γενεά **αἱ γενεαί**	generation (group of contemporaries)	**ΓΕΝΕΑ** *being born*
τὸ κῦδος **τὰ κύδεα**	glory	**ΚΥΔΟΣ** *paying attention*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
τὸ παράλλαγμα **τὰ παραλλάγματα**	variation	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ** *changing across*
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
φέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	carrying	**ΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing*

10.9 Man-Made Measurements

Epicurus, *On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 35 & 36*

..[τῶν νυκτ]ῶν ἅμα τ[ε καὶ τῶν ἡ]μερ[ῶν] βλέπων [παραλλαγὰς ἱκα]ναῖς λέξεσιν ὀκνεῖς χρῆσ[θ]αι· εἰ δὴ ἐμ φύσει μ[έτρον] μὴ ἔστι, κ[αθὰ ὑ]με[ῖ]ς ὑμν[εῖτε, οὐ δὲ] χρόνον ε[ἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν]…|…κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἔχοντες, κατ' αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τ[ήνδε] φαντασίαν, ἧι [ὡς μῆ]κός τι {ṿ} ἄλλο, [κα]ὶ ὁμοία[ν τῶι] πλή[θει], εἰ ὑφ' ἡμ[ῶν]…

…τῶν νυκτῶν ἅμα τε καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν βλέπων παραλλαγάς, ἱκαναῖς λέξεσιν Ὀκνεῖς χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὴ ἐμ φύσει Μέτρον μὴ ἔστι, καθὰ Ὑμεῖς ὑμνεῖτε, οὐ δὲ χρόνον εἶναι Δεῖ νομίζειν;… …Κατηγοροῦμεν καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἔχοντες κατ' αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τήνδε φαντασίαν – ᾗ, ὡς Μῆκός τι ἄλλο, καὶ ὁμοίαν τῷ πλήθει, εἰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν…

…seeing the varieties of the nights and the days as well You hesitate to use sufficient terms. If indeed a [standard of] Measurement does not exist by nature, just as You all [always] chant, [then] It is necessary to think that time does not exist…? …We even fully indicate [the length of] the day, while we have such an appearance as this contrary to those [people] – which [appearance], just as some certain Length, [is] also similar to a [large] number… if by us…

ἡ νύξ **αἱ νύκτες**	night	**ΝΥΞ** *night*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
βλέπων *(ουσα, ον)*	seeing	
τὸ παράλλαγμα **τὰ παραλλάγματα**	variation	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ** *changing across*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	**ἹΚΑΝΟΣ** *fitting / proper*

ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ *speaking*
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	ΟΚΝΕΙΝ *hesitating*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
μετρεῖν	to measure	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ *measuring*
τό μέτρον τά μέτρα	(standard of) measurement	
ὑμνεῖν	to chant	῾ΥΜΝΕΙΝ *singing*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly* *speaking publicly*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of* *appearing*
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ *extent*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	῾ΟΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ *fullness*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 37

...[εἰ δ]έ ποτ' ἐκ πρ[οτέρων] θεωρ[ιῶν τοῦ]τό μο[ι λεί]ψει ἐξ ἀνάγ[κ]ης, [ἀλλ'] ὅμω[ς λέγομε]ν ὅτι, ὅταν ὁ λό[γος περὶ τὸν] [χ]ρόνον πρὸς α[ὐτὰς ἀνέλθηι], ταύταις δέ [τ]οι δοκοῦσιν αἵ τε [ἑρμην]εῖαι καὶ αἱ φαν[τασ]ίαι ἐνδιαμέ[νειν ὡς ἀπ]ὸ τοῦ ὅλου κα[τὰ ταύτα]ς τὰς ἐνχη...

...εἰ δέ ποτ', ἐκ προτέρων θεωριῶν Τοῦτό μοι λείψει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ¬ ἀλλ' ὅμως Λέγομεν ὅτι ὅταν ὁ Λόγος περὶ τὸν χρόνον πρὸς αὐτὰς ἀνέλθῃ, ταύταις δέ τοι δοκοῦσιν αἵ τε Ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ αἱ Φαντασίαι ἐνδιαμένειν – ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ἐνχή[σεις]...

...If ever, due to [natural] necessity, this leaves me out of [my] former observation* ¬ yet still We say that whenever Reasoning about time ascends toward those [*words*], both the Interpretations and the appearance seem to you to persist within those [words] – as according to those impositions from the whole...

**i.e., "I do not think what I thought then" ?*

πρότερος *(α, ον)*	former	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *before [contrast]*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of* *envisioning*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
λείπειν	to leave	ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *leaving*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against* *constraint*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἀνέρχεσθαι	ascends	ΑΝΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving toward*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ *seeming*

δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ *seeming*
ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ *Hermes / interpreting*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying through*
ἐνδιαμένειν	to persist within	ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying in through*
ὅλως	entirely	ὉΛΩΣ *whole*
τὸ ὅλον τὰ ὅλα	the whole	ὉΛΟΝ *whole*
ἐγχεῖν	to pour in	ΕΓΧΕΙΝ *pouring in*
τὸ ἐνχῆμα τὰ ἐνχήματα	what is poured in [here, "imposition"]	ΕΝΧΗΜΑ *pouring in*
I can find no other possible good options for completing ένχη-		

10.10 The Nature of Time

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 38

...[ούχ ὁμοίως ἐν]διαμέ̣[νει] σ̣ώματι τὸ [κ]α̣θ' ἐ[αυ]τὸ μὲν καὶ τὸ [κα]τὰ [τὴ]ν ἰ̣δ̣ι̣ό̣τροπον [πρόλ]ηψιν νοούμε[νον καὶ] ούκ ἔχον δ[ί] αὐ[τὸ ούδὲ]ν τοῦτο ἄλλο{ν}, ὡς μία ἡμέ[ρ]α διαφορᾶι καλεῖ[ται, κ̣]α[ὶ ο]ύ μό[νον λέγομεν έν αύτῆι] ταύ[την διαφο]ρ̣ὰν έν[υπάρ]χειν· ὃ θεωρῶ[ν καὶ] τ̣ὸ ὑπὸ ταύ[της]...

...οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐνδιαμένει σώματι Τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ – μὲν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότροπον πρόληψιν νοούμενον. καὶ, οὐκ ἔχον δι' αὐτὸ οὐδὲν, Τοῦτο ἄλλον: ὡς μία Ἡμέρα διαφορᾷ καλεῖται. καὶ οὐ μόνον Λέγομεν ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτην διαφορὰν ἐνυπάρχειν: ὃ θεωρῶν καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ ταύτης...

> ...[time] does not persist in the same way [as] What exists per se with a body – but [time persists] as What is conceived according to a particular type of anticipation. and [time, because it] does not have anything in-and-of-itself, it [relies on] something else: as one [specific] Day is called [by a specific term] according to [its] difference. and We do not only say that difference exists within the [conception of that specific day]: observing [time] and what is subject to it...

ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
ἐνδιαμένειν	to persist within	ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying in through*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
ἰδιότροπος (ον)	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *particular way*
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•^] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
νοούμενος (η, ον)	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *seeing*
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ *day*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ *crying out*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*

ἐνυπάρχειν	to exist within	**ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before) in*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
θεωρῶν *(ῶσα, οῦν)*	observing	**ΘΕΩΡΩΝ**

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 39 & 40

…εἰ ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἕ[τερον] ε̣ἶν̣[αι κα]τ' ἐ̣[ν̣]α̣[ν]τίαν [θεωρίαν πεπλεγ]μ̣ένον̣ [λέγομεν, ὅμως] ζητεῖ[ται]… …φωνὰ̣ς̣ [περὶ] τοιαύ̣[την φ]ύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄν[τως εἶ]ναι τὸγ χρό[νον] παρὰ τὸ μηθὲν εἶ[ναι μ]ῆκος τοιοῦτο [μᾶλλον ἢ ἐ]κ̣εῖνο· οὕτως…

…εἰ, ἄρα, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι κατ' ἐναντίαν θεωρίαν πεπλεγμένον Λέγομεν, ὅμως ζητεῖται… …φωνὰς περὶ τοιαύτην φύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον παρὰ τὸ μηθὲν – εἶναι μῆκος τοιοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὕτως…

> …if, therefore, We also say that a different [conception of time] exists as entangled in an opposing observation, nevertheless, it is sought… …statements concerning such a nature from the reality that time exists rather than [being] nothing [at all – time] exists as a length such as this or that [thing which] in this way…

ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
πλεκτικός *(η, ον)*	entangling	**ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of weaving*
πεπλεγμένος *(η, ον)*	entangled	**ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΟΣ** *wove*
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *extent*

10.11 Conceiving Time

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 41 & 42

…τὰς λα[μβ]α[νο]μ̣έν[ας] ὑφ' ἐκα[τ]έρων [τῶν] ἑρμην̣[ειῶν] κ̣αν… …ἅμα κ̣αὶ κα[τὰ τ]ὴν ἑτέραν βρα[χύ] τι νο[ῆ]σαι τοῦ [ὅλ]ου [πρ]άγματος γεν[ομέ]νου· ὥστε [καὶ ἄλ]λο πως π̣α[ρ' ἑτέ]ραν ὀνο[μασίαν ἅ]μα τι ἴδιον…

…τὰς λαμβανόμενας ὑφ' ἑκατέρων τῶν ἑρμηνειῶν κἀν… …ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν βραχύ τι Νοῆσαι τοῦ ὅλου πράγματος γενομένου – ὥστε καὶ ἄλλο, πως, παρ' ἑτέραν ὀνομασίαν ἅμα Τι ἴδιον…

> …the [differences] comprehended by each of the interpretations and also… …to briefly Conceive something of the whole situation [once] it has been produced together and according to the other [explanation] – so that, in some way, even some other particular [situation exists] at the same time with another designation…

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
ἡ ἑρμηνεία **αἱ ἑρμηνείαι**	interpretation	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ** *Hermes / interpreting*
βραχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	short	**ΒΡΑΧΥΣ** *brief*

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
ἡ ὀνομασία αἱ ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ *state of name*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 43 & 44

...τὸ ἄλλο ὑφ' ἐκ[ατέρ]ων τῶν ἑρμ[ηνειῶν] φάσμα... ...ζητοῦσιν ἅ[μ]α πο[σά]κις μὲν [ἐ]πὶ τὸ αποτευσι.ν ἀνάγκη τὸ[ν ἐπι]νοούμενον [κ]α[ὶ] παρεπόμε[νον δια]λαμ[βάνειν χρ]όν[ον]...

...τὸ ἄλλο ὑφ' ἑκατέρων τῶν ἑρμηνειῶν φάσμα... ...Ζητοῦσιν ἅμα ποσάκις μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποτεύσιν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐπινοούμενον καὶ παρεπόμενον διαλαμβάνειν χρόνον...

⁂ ...the other appearance under each of the interpretations... ...They simultaneously seek how often [it is] necessary to distinguish the time that is objectively conceived and [the time] follows along upon the outcome...

ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ΈΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ *Hermes / interpreting*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *shining*
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ *shining*
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ *seeking*
ἡ ἀποτεύσις αἱ ἀποτεύσεις	outcome	ΑΠΟΤΕΥΣΙΣ *action of finishing away*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against constraint*
νοούμενος *(η, ον)*	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *seeing*
ἐπινοούμενος *(η, ον)*	objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *seeing upon*
παρεπόμενος *(η, ον)*	following along	ΠΑΡΕΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ *following beside*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping separation*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 47 & 48

...[τ]ὸν συνκείμε[νον] χρόνον [ἐξ ἀπ]άν[των μερῶν]... ...[χρ]όνο[ι]... ...νοού[μεν τε καὶ] προσεπινο[ούμεν] ἀφήσομεν [οὖν ἡ]με[ῖς] τὸ ἐπινοη[θὲ]ν ε[ἶναι] χρόνον, χρό[νον δὲ] κατὰ τι... | ...τοῦτο [γὰρ οὐ μόνον] νοοῦμεν θεω[ροῦντες] ἐπὶ τ[ῶνδε τῶν] κι[νη]τῶν, ἀλλὰ πᾶ[ς ὁ δι]ειλημμένος [ἡμῖν] χρόν[ος] ἄλλος...

...τὸν συνκείμενον χρόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων μερῶν... Χρόνοι... Νοοῦμεν τε καὶ προσεπινοούμεν. ἀφήσομεν οὖν Ἡμεῖς τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν εἶναι χρόνον – χρόνον δὲ κατὰ τι... τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον Νοοῦμεν θεωροῦντες ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν κινητῶν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ὁ διειλημμένος ἡμῖν Χρόνος ἄλλος...

...the time composed together from all parts... Times... We conceive and we also objectively conceive additionally. therefore, we Ourselves will let go of what is objectively conceived about existing as time – but as time according to a certain... for not only do We conceive this while we are observing these moving things, but all Time that has been distinguished by us is another...

ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
ἐκκείμενος *(η, ον)*	set forth	**ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated out*
συνκείμενος	composed together	**ΣΥΝΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated together*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
προσεπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive additionally	**ΠΡΟΣΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ**
ἐπινοηθείς *(α, έν)*	[objectively] conceived [already]	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ** *seeing upon*
τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν **τὰ ἐπινοηθέντα**	what is objectively conceived	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΝ** *seeing upon*
ἀφίεναι	to let go of	**ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ** *going away*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
θεωρῶν *(ῶσα, οῦν)*	observing	**ΘΕΩΡΩΝ** *envisioning*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
κινητός *(ή, όν)*	moving	**ΚΙΝΗΤΟΣ**
διειλημμένος	having been distinguished	**ΔΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasped through*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 49 & 51

...ταύτὸ σ̣ημ[ειουμένη] ο̣ὐ̣ τ̣ὸν μικ[ρὸν χρόνον] διαλ̣α̣β̣ο̣[ῦσα]... ...μόνον [λέγ]ομεν ὅ[τι μέ]μ̣νηται ο τῷ̣ν[δ' ἀλλὰ τ]οῦ λοιποῦ...

...ταὐτὸ σημειουμένη ¬ οὐ τὸν μικρὸν χρόνον διαλαβοῦσα... ...μόνον Λέγομεν ὅτι μέμνηται ὅ τῶνδ', ἀλλὰ τοῦ λοιποῦ...

> ...[*with the interpretation*] being indicated as this ¬ not having distinguished the small time... We only say that he was reminded of this, among these things [topics] ¬ but of the remaining...

σημειούμενος *(η, ον)*	being indicated	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *sign*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping separation*
διαλαβών	having distinguished	**ΔΙΑΛΑΒΩΝ** *grasped through*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
μιμνήσκειν	to recall	**ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ** *thinking "again"*
μιμνήσκεσθαι	to be reminded	**ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ** *thinking "again"*
μέμνηται	he was reminded	
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + gen]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 59 & 60

...[ἐπ]ελθὸν ἂν [οὐδὲν] ἀντιμαρ[τυρεῖ, οὐδέ τι ἄλ]λο τῶν [τοιουτοτρόπων] ἀναλ[όγως] τῆι χ[ρό]νου β[ραδυτῆτι ἢ ταχυτῆτι, ἂν μόνον] τά[δ]ε [διαμέ]νη[ι τὰ σ]υμπί[πτοντα ὡς ἐ]ν τῆ(*) ἄλ[ληι]... ...[δι]α[φ]ορὰ τοιαύ[τη τὸ γ]ιγνόμεν[ο]ν [πρᾶγμα] τάδε καὶ τὰ [ἄλλα] τινὰ...

...ἐπελθὸν ἂν Οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ, οὐδέ Τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων ἀναλόγως τῇ χρόνου βραδυτῆτι ἢ ταχυτῆτι. ἂν μόνον Τάδε διαμένῃ τὰ συμπίπτοντα ὡς ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ... ...Διαφορὰ τοιαύτη τὸ γιγνόμενον πρᾶγμα τάδε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τινὰ...

...Nothing that might have occurred contests [this conclusion], nor Anything else like it in a way that is analogous to a slow speed or high speed of time. if only These things that are a symptom [*i.e., a separable quality*] persist, as in the other... ...a Difference of this sort [is] the situation that arises [for] these things and certain other...

τὸ ἀπελθόν **τὰ ἀπελθόντα**	what went away	**ΑΠΕΛΘΟΝ** *went away*
ἐπελθών *(οῦσα, όν)*	having occurred	**ΕΠΕΛΘΩΝ** *went upon*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
τό τοιοῦτον **τά τοιαῦτα**	such a thing	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *self of this sort*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
τοιουτότροπος	of such a manner [here, "like that"]	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *self of this sort of way*
ἀναλόγως	analogously	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ** *reasoning again*
βραδύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	slow	**ΒΡΑΔΥΣ** *slow*
τό βράδος = **ἡ βραδύτης** **αἱ βραδύτητες**	slow speed	**ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ** *condition of being slow*
τὸ τάχος **τὰ τάχη**	speed	**ΤΑΧΟΣ** *swift*
ἡ ταχύτης **αἱ ταχύτητες**	high speed	**ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ** *condition from quickly*
διαμένειν	to persist	**ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ** *staying through*
συμπίπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	to fall into each other	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ** *falling together*
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling together*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 67 & 69

...τὸ πρᾶγμ[α πρὸς] τὸ τὴμ ψυχὴ[ν]... ...[δ]υνάμεσιν εἴτε [ἐν] οἷς δήποτε πα[λαι]οῖς εἴτε ἣ[ι] διὰ...

...τὸ Πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν... ...δυνάμεσιν, εἴτε ἐν οἷς δήποτε παλαιοῖς εἴτε ᾗ διὰ...

...the Situation regarding what... the soul... ...with forces, whether in whatever ancient [things] or in that... because of...

τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*
παλαιός *(ά, όν)*	old / ancient	**ΠΑΛΑΙΟΣ** *long ago*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 70

...[ἱ]κ̣α̣ναὶ ε[ἶε]ν ἅπαντα τρόπον τ[ῆ]ς [β]ρα[δυτῆ]τ[ος π]αρ[ὰ τ]ὴ̣[ν πε]π̣ο̣ι[ημέ]ν̣ην...

...ἱκαναὶ εἶεν ἅπαντα τρόπον τῆς βραδυτῆτος παρὰ τὴν πεποιημένην...

...sufficient [*forces*] would [...] in all respects in [their] way of slowness beyond what was made...

ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	**ἹΚΑΝΟΣ** *fitting / proper*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner /* *direction*
τό βράδος = **ἡ βραδύτης** **αἱ βραδύτητες**	slowness	**ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ** *condition of* *being slow*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
πεποιημένος	having been made	**ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *gathered*

Epicurus, On Nature, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 74 & 75

...[εἰ γὰρ ὁ] χρόνος, φήσα[ι τις, ἐστὶ] τọ̀ αὐτ̣ọ̀ εἶν[αι]... ...[ὦ] φίλτα[τε]... [ὡσ]περεὶ γὰ[ρ τῶι ὑπα]ρχθέντι... ...π̣ερὶ χρόν[ου]...

...εἰ γὰρ ὁ Χρόνος, φήσει Τις, ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι... ὦ, Φίλτατε... ὡσπερεὶ γὰρ τῷ ὑπαρχθέντι... περὶ χρόνου...

...for if Time, Someone will say, is the same thing that exists... oh, Dearest one... just as if with what has already been set forth... concerning time...

ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
ὑπαρχθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	has come to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΘΕΙΣ**

[U81]

Book 11

11.1 Size of the Sun

Scholion to Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 10.91

Τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια᾿ *Περὶ Φύσεως*, "εἰ γάρ" Φησί "τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει: πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χρόαν – ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον Διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι"

This is also in the 11th book of *On Nature*, He says "if [*the sun*] had lost its size due to the space in-between: then [*it would have lost*] its coloring [*i.e., brilliancy*] even more – for [some] other [*larger or smaller*] Space in-between is in no way more symmetric [*in proportion*] to this [*mutual diminishment in brightness and size*]"

βάλλειν	to throw	**ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing*
ἐκβάλλειν	to extend	**ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing out*
ἀποβάλλειν	to throw off [here, "to lose"]	**ΑΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing away*
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *skin color*
ἡ χρόα **αἱ χρόαι**	coloring	**ΧΡΟΑ** *skin color*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
συμμετρότερος *(α, ον)*	more symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *more measured together*

The apparent size and intensity of a light source both diminish as the distance from the source increases: a nearby fire appears larger and brighter than one farther away, just as stars seem smaller and dimmer compared to the Sun.

Consider the Pyrrhonian teaching that "things that are thought to be large appear small, square things round, flat things bumpy, straight things bent, and pale things colorful. The sun, at any rate, owing to its distance, appears small… moreover, the sun has a certain appearance at its rising, another at the zenith… since, therefore, one cannot observe these things apart from [specific] places and positions, their nature remains unknown." (Laertius 9.85)

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 10.91 *Scholion above

τὸ δὲ Μέγεθος ἡλίου, τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων, [1] **κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται…** * **…**[2] **κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ**: **ἤτοι** [2a] **μεῖζον τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἢ** [2b] **μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ** [2c] **τηλικοῦτον τυγχάνει. οὕτω, γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, Πυρὰ, ἐξ ἀποστήματος, θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρεῖται**

the Size of the sun, and of the remaining celestial bodies, is as big as it appears to be in magnitude [1] according to what relates to us… * …but [2] according to what it is in-and-of-itself: [the Size of the sun] happens to be either [2a] larger than what is seen, or [2b] slightly smaller, or [2c] of the magnitude [it appears]. Fires, when they are considered according to perception from a distance, are observed in the same way for us

τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*
πηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of some magnitude	**ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ** *extent*
ὁπηλίκος *(η, ον)*	of any magnitude	**ὉΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ** *which extent*
τηλικοῦτος *(η, ον)*	of [such a] magnitude	**ΤΗΛΙΚΟΥΤΟΣ** *extent*
ἡλίκος	as big as	**ἩΛΙΚΟΣ** *extent*
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*

τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
τὸ ἀπόστημα **τὰ ἀποστήματα**	distance	**ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing away*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	**ΜΕΙΖΩΝ** *greater*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**῾ΟΡΑΝ** *looking*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *lesser*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	

11.2 [Cosmology]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 18

...[βεβ]αιώσασθ[α]ι δ[υ]να[τ]όν· τὸ γὰρ κ[ατ'] αὐτὸ τοῦτοο πότερον ἐν[δέ]χεται ἢ [ο]ὐκ ἐνδέχ[ετ]αι πα[ντελ]ῶς γίνε[σθαι]...

...βεβαιώσασθαι Δυνατόν: τὸ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ Τοῦτο πότερον ἐνδέχεται – ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παντελῶς – γίνεσθαι...

...[It is] able to affirm [itself]: for whether This very thing itself can – or [whether] it absolutely cannot – be produced...

βεβαιούμενος *(η, ον)*	being affirmed	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *firm standing*
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ** *firm standing*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον **τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα**	possibility [of]	
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible [here, "can"]	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	**ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ** *all completing*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 19

...αὶ λαμ[βάνει]ν παραλ[λαγ]ὴν [δ]ι' ἀπειρία[ν], εἰ πρὸς [ἐ]κεῖνο περὶ μυρια...

...λαμβάνειν παραλλαγὴν δι' ἀπειρίαν, εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο περὶ μυρία...

...to comprehend a variety through the infinity, if concerning that regarding the innumerable...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*

ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ἡ ἀπειρία **αἱ ἀπειρίαι**	infinity	
μυρίος *(α, ον)*	innumerable	**ΜΥΡΙΟΣ** *ants*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 23

...τα παρ' ἡμῖν τά τι ὀχεῖσθ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀ[έρος] δυνάμενα καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι κα[ὶ]...

...Τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν – Τά τι ὀχεῖσθ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος – δυνάμενα καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι καὶ...

...the Things among us – those certain Things that are carried over the air – which have the force both to be suspended and [*to move*]...

ὁ ὄχος **οἱ ὄχοι**	carriage, cart, chariot	**ΟΧΟΣ** *riding*
ὀχεῖν	to carry	**ΟΧΕΙΝ** *riding*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
μετεωρίζειν	to suspend	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *suspended*
μετεωρίζεσθαι	to be suspended	

11.3 Walled Earths

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 27

...[δια]τηρητ[ι]κοὶ ε[ἶ]ν[α]ι [τοῦ] ὠμοιωμ[ένου τῶι τοῦ τυμ]πά[ν]ου [ἐκτ]μή[μα]τι. οἳ μ[ὲ]ν γὰρ οἱο[ν]ε[ὶ τοί]χους το[ὺς κύκλ]ω[ι ἐπε]νόησαν [ὑ]πάρχον[τας τῆ]ι γῆι [τοι]αύτης...

...διατηρητικοὶ εἶναι τοῦ ὠμοιωμένου τῷ τοῦ τυμπάνου ἐκτμήματι – Οἳ μὲν γὰρ οἱονεὶ τοίχους τοὺς κύκλῳ ἐπενόησαν ὑπάρχοντας τῇ γῇ τοιαύτης...

...existing as fully preserving what has been formed similar to a section of a drum – indeed, Some people objectively conceived that in a certain way walls existed in a sphere for an earth of such a kind...

τηρεῖν	to preserve	**ΤΗΡΕΙΝ** *protecting*
διατηρητικός	fully preserving	**ΔΙΑΤΗΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of completely protecting*
ἡ ὁμοιότης **αἱ ὁμοιότητες**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being similar*
ὁμοιοῦν	to make similar	
ὡμοιωμένος *(η, ον)*	having been formed similar	**ὩΜΟΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *similar*
τὸ τύμπανον **τὰ τύμπανα**	drum	**ΤΥΜΠΑΝΟΝ** *beating*
τὸ ἐκτμῆμα **τὰ ἐκτμήματα**	section	**ΕΚΤΜΗΜΑ** *cutting out of*
οἱονεὶ	as if [here "in a certain way"]	
ὁ τοῖχος **οἱ τοῖχοι**	wall	**ΤΟΙΧΟΣ** *mound*
ὁ κύκλος **οἱ κύκλοι**	sphere	**ΚΥΚΛΟΣ** *wheel*

ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* **ὑπάρχοντες** *(ουσαι, οντα)*	existing [already]	**ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 3 (column 20)

...δους ταύτης, τιμ[ὴν] ὁ[ρ]ατὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῆσδε δυν[άμεν]αι ἤ πρότερον [ἢ ὕστε]ρον ὥστε ού τὸ... ...ά[π]ειρίαι ἀκό[λ]ου[θ]ον τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὴ τὴν μὲν...

...τιμὴν ὁρατὴν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τῆσδε δυνάμεναι – ἢ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον, ὥστε οὐ τὸ... ...ἀπειρίαι ἀκόλουθον τοῦ παντός...

...to make honor visible, and [*the act of mental observation*] has the force of this – either before or afterwards, so that it is not... ...consistent with the infinity of the whole...

ἡ τιμή **αἱ τιμαί**	honor	**ΤΙΜΗ** *value*
ὁρατός *(ή, όν)*	visible	**ὉΡΑΤΟΣ** *seeing*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to produce"]	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
ὕστερον	afterwards	**ὝΣΤΕΡΟΝ** *next*
ἡ ἀπειρία **αἱ ἀπειρίαι**	infinity	**ΑΠΕΙΡΙΑ** *not limited*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 4 (column 21)

...ἀπαντᾶν ἢ μὴ λ[ή]ρους ἀπαντᾶν, ἀπείρου δὲ μὴ ἀπαν[τᾶν]... ...ἀπαντᾶν ὥσ[τε τὸ ἄ]πε[ιρο]ν τὰς ὀμο[ίας] φ[ύ]σει[ς] ἔχι καὶ μὴ...

...ἀπαντᾶν ἢ μὴ λήρους ἀπαντᾶν, ἀπείρου δὲ μὴ ἀπαντᾶν... ...ἀπαντᾶν ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον τὰς ὁμοίας φύσεις ἔχει, καὶ μὴ...

...encountering or not encountering trifles, but not encountering [explanations] of the infinite... ...encountering the infinite having similar natures, and not......

ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	**ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ** *meeting away*
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	
ὁ λῆρος **οἱ λῆροι**	trifle	**ΛΗΡΟΣ** *trash / trifle*
ἡ ἑρμηνεία **αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι**	interpretation	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ** *Hermes / interpreting*
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	**ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ** *not limited*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*

ἡ ὁμοία **αἱ ὁμοίαι**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΑ** *similar*

11.4 Weight of Earth

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 5 (column 22)

...ἐκεῖνο, τὸ δὲ ὅτ[ι μ]ὴ φοβητέọν τὸ βαρ[ὺ τῆ]ς γῆς πρὸς τὸν μ[ε]τε[ω]ρ̣ισμὸν ὅταν...

...Τὸ δὲ ὅτι μὴ φοβητέον τὸ βαρὺ τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὸν μετεωρισμὸν ὅταν...

...and [the fact] That the weight of the earth is not to be feared in relation to [its] suspension whenever...

φοβεῖσθαι	to fear	**ΦΟΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *fleeing*
ὁ βαρύστονος	the deep-voiced one	**ΒΑΡΥΣΤΟΝΟΣ** *heavy tone*
τὸ βάρος **τὰ βάρη**	weight	**ΒΑΡΟΣ** *heavy*
τὸ βαρὺ **τὰ βαρέα**	what is weighty [here, "the weight"]	
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*
ὁ μετεωρισμός **οἱ μετεωρισμοί**	suspension	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of rising beyond*

11.5 Thought Experiment

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 2 (column 28)

...καὶ διὰ τοῦτ[ο πα]νταχόθεν πρὸ ὀμμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὡς τοῦ α[ὐτ]οῦ πράγμ̣ατο[ς]...

...καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, πανταχόθεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος...

...and because of this, placing the circumferences before the eyes from all sides as though [they belong to] the same situation...

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	**ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ** *from all places*
τὸ ὄμμα **τὰ ὄμματα**	eye	**ΟΜΜΑ** *eye*
μετατιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	rearranged	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ** *placing change*
τιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	placing	**ΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ** *placing*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	**ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing*
ἡ περιφέρεια **αἱ περιφέρειαι**	circumference	**ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ** *bringing around*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 6 (column 30)

...νομί[ζοιμ]εν, ἐν ταῖς μεταβάσε[σ]ιν, ὅμ[ο]ιον εἰπεῖν, ταῖ[ς ἐ]πὶ τὸ ἄν[ω, καὶ] ὃ ὑπ[ὲ]ρ κεφαλῆς ἀρτίως εἶχε το[ῦτ' ἂ]ν ὑπὸ π[οσ]ὶν ἰσχάνοι[μ]εν κα[τὰ] τὴν μ[ε]τάβασιν φα[ί]νẹ[σθ]α̣[ι κάτ]ω...

...Νομίζοιμεν ἐν ταῖς μεταβάσεσιν ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ταῖς ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω – καὶ ὃ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀρτίως εἶχε, τοῦτ' ἂν ὑπὸ ποσὶν Ἰσχάνοιμεν, κατὰ τὴν μετάβασιν φαίνεσθαι κάτω...

...We might think to say [that it is] similar in [spatial] extensions for those towards the upper part – and what was just now [positioned] overhead, [we might think to say that] we would ourselves restrain this under our feet, to be apparent below according to [its spatial] extension...

νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
ἡ μετάβασις **αἱ μεταβάσεις**	[spatial] extension	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ** *stepping beyond*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
ἡ κεφαλή **αἱ κεφαλαί**	head	**ΚΕΦΑΛΗ** *head*
ὁ πούς **οἱ πόδες**	foot	**ΠΟΥΣ** *foot*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	**ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ** *strength*
ἰσχάνειν	to restrain	**ΙΣΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *restraining*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 1 (column 32)

...ποσὶν αὐτῶι φαινομένου κατωτέρωι τ[οῦ]το οὐ νοήσει, ὃ νῦν ἀναβὰς ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἔλαβεν, πρότερον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἔχ[ο]ν [ἔ]δυ... παρὰ τὸ οὖν, φημί, ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τ[οῖ]ς τόποις... ...στρ[ογ]γύλον ποιοῖ γε[γε]νῆσθ[αι] κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν [ἐ]ν μέσωι ὡς [ἂν]...

...ποσὶν, αὐτῷ φαινομένου κατωτέρῳ, τοῦτο οὐ Νοήσει: ὃ, νῦν ἀναβὰς, ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἔλαβεν – πρότερον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἔχον – ἔδυ... ...παρὰ τὸ, οὖν, Φημί, ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τοῖς τόποις... ...στρογγύλον Ποιοῖ γεγενῆσθαι κόσμον – καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐν μέσῳ, ὡς ἂν...

...to [his] feet, as it appears lower to him, He will not conceive this: what he, having now already gone up, took under [his] feet – while earlier he was holding [it] above [his] head – he sank... ...beside this, therefore, I say [*that his theory amounts to saying that*] the earth is in the middle of [all] locations... He would make the cosmos round – and the earth in the middle, as if...

ὁ πούς **οἱ πόδες**	foot	**ΠΟΥΣ** *foot*
ἀποφαινόμενος *(ομένη, όμενον)*	representing	**ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining away*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
κάτω	below	**ΚΑΤΩ** *below*
κατωτέρος *(α, ον)*	lower	**ΚΑΤΩΤΕΡΟΣ** *more down*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
ἀναβάς *(ᾶσα, άν)*	gone up [already]	**ΑΝΑΒΑΣ** *walked up*
ἡ κεφαλή **αἱ κεφαλαί**	head	**ΚΕΦΑΛΗ** *head*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
δύειν	to sink	**ΔΥΕΙΝ** *sinking*

μέσος *(η, ον)*	middle	**ΜΕΣΟΣ** *in between*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
στρογγύλος *(η, ον)*	round	**ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ** *droplet*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*

11.6 Atmospheric Boundary

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 2 (column 33)

...τοίχους ἐν [κύκλ]ωι ποιήσαντες ἵ[να φρά]ξωσιν ἡμᾶς πρ[ὸς τ]ὴν δῖναν, ὡς ἔξωθεν αὐτῆς περιφερομέ[ν]ης, πᾶ[σ]ιν [ὑ]π[ὲρ] [κε]φα[λ]ῆς τὰ ἄ[σ]τ[ρα] περιάγου[σι]ν...

...τοίχους ἐν κύκλῳ Ποιήσαντες, ἵνα Φράξωσιν ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν δῖναν – ὡς ἔξωθεν αὐτῆς περιφερομένης, πᾶσιν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τὰ Ἄστρα περιάγουσιν...

...[*because these men, in their theory, have*] made walls into a circle, so that [these Walls] would block us from the whirlwind *[i.e., shield us from the vortex]* – since [the whirlwind] is carried around from an external source [*of motion*], the celestial Bodies revolve for all [people] above [their] heads...

ὁ τοῖχος **οἱ τοῖχοι**	wall	**ΤΟΙΧΟΣ** *mound*
ὁ κύκλος **οἱ κύκλοι**	sphere	**ΚΥΚΛΟΣ** *circular*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
φράσσειν	to block	**ΦΡΑΣΣΕΙΝ** *fencing in*
ἡ δῖνα **αἱ δῖναι**	whirlwind	**ΔΙΝΑ** *vortex*
τὸ ἔξωθεν **τὰ ἔξωθεν**	an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	**ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing*
περιφερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried around	**ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *bringing around*
ἡ κεφαλή **αἱ κεφαλαί**	head	**ΚΕΦΑΛΗ** *head*
τὸ ἄστρον **τὰ ἄστρα**	celestial body	**ΑΣΤΡΟΝ** *star*
περιάγειν	to revolve	**ΠΕΡΙΑΓΕΙΝ** *going around*

11.7 Relative Observations of the Sun

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 5 (column 37)

...ἀνατέλλων, ἀνατείνοντες εἰς τὸ μέρος τῆς πάσης γῆς, οὗ μετέβημεν, ἐκ τούτου ἡμῖν δυόμενος φαίνεται, οὐδὲ πολλὴν ἐνίοτε πάνυ γῆν με[ταβ]εβηκόσιν· [ἀ]λ[λὰ τού]του οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ τ[ο]ὺς πλαγιασμοὺς α[ἰ]τιάσασθαι· τ[ί] γὰρ τὴν ἐν[θ]ένδε κ[α]ταστάθμη[σ]ιν {[ἢ] τὴ[ν] ἐνθένδε} {καταστάθμησιν} ἢ τὴν ἐνθένδε τινὰ... ...καταστά[θμησιν] τῶν ἀνα[τ]ολῶν [ἢ δ]ύσεων...

…ἀνατέλλων, ἀνατείνοντες εἰς τὸ μέρος τῆς πάσης γῆς: οὗ Μετέβημεν ἐκ τούτου ἡμῖν δυόμενος Φαίνεται, οὐδὲ πολλὴν ἐνίοτε πάνυ γῆν μετεβηκόσιν ¬ ἀλλὰ τούτου οὐκ῞Εστιν αὖ τοὺς πλαγιασμοὺς αἰτιάσασθαι: τί γὰρ τὴν ἐνθένδε καταστάθμησιν ἢ τὴν ἐνθένδε τινὰ… …καταστάθμησιν τῶν ἀνατολῶν ἢ δύσεων…

…[*the sun*] when rising up, and while we are extending up [our attention] to that part [out] of all the land: [the Sun] is apparent to us while setting from that [place] from where We had moved, and sometimes [this occurs] for those who truly have not traveled across much land ¬ but It is not possible again to blame the deviations [*i.e., the changing angles of the sun's course*] for this: for what [about] an accurate measurement from here or an [accurate measurement] from some other [location]… …an accurate measurement of the risings or settings…?

[Sedley] *[The sun, if we walk towards the place from which it appeared to us]* to rise, directing ourselves up into the mainland zone, appears to us to set where we previously passed by, sometimes even when we have moved in all only a short distance. And this time we cannot blame it on the latitudinal movements. Why after all should you declare the measurement from here, or the one from here, or the one from here, or this one a more reliable guide of the risings and settings [of the sun]?

ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ΗΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	**ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready away*
ἀνατέλλειν	to rise	**ΑΝΑΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready up*
τείνειν	to extend	**ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending*
ἀνατείνειν	to extend up	**ΑΝΑΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending up*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth [here, "land"]	**ΓΗ** *land*
διαβαίνειν	pass through	**ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking through*
μεταβαίνειν	to move [to another place]	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking change*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
δύειν	to sink	**ΔΥΕΙΝ** *sinking*
δυόμενος *(η, ον)*	setting	
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*
ὁ πλαγιασμός **οἱ πλαγιασμοί**	deviation	**ΠΛΑΓΙΑΣΜΟΣ** *an act of turning sideways*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	**ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ** *responsibility*
ἡ καταστάθμησις **αἱ καταστάθμησεις**	accurate measurement	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΘΜΗΣΙΣ** *thoroughly measuring*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*

Epicurus may be describing the experience of walking east at sunset, where, upon looking back at the sun, it appears to set at the spot you had recently passed.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 6 (column 38)

...[ὁ]μοίωμά τι λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαί τι περὶ τούτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περινοοῦντες, οἶμαι, λέγω δὲ τὰ [ὄρ]γανα, ἐν δ[ὲ] τοῖς κυ[λιν]δοῦντες αὐτούς, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς [παρεμ]ποδείας, τὰς ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] δίν[ευ]μάτων αὐτ[ο]ῖς παρα[γιγν]ομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τ[ο]ῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεω[ν] εἰκότω[ς δια]νοίᾳ [οὐ δύ]νανται, [δι]ὰ τῶν ὀργάνων ο[ὐ]θὲν ἀπαρτίζοντες; {[δ]ιανοίαι} ὁμοιω[μα] λαβεῖν...

...ὁμοίωμα τι λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαί τι περὶ τούτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ Περινοοῦντες, Οἶμαι – Λέγω δὲ τὰ ὄργανα – ἐν δὲ τοῖς κυλινδοῦντες αὐτούς. οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς παρεμποδείας τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν δινευμάτων αὐτοῖς παραγιγνομένας – ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων, εἰκότως διανοίᾳ οὐ Δύνανται. διὰ τῶν ὀργάνων οὐθὲν Ἀπαρτίζοντες? διανοίᾳ ὁμοιωμα λαβεῖν...

> ...because they comprehended something similar to infer something about these [*risings and settings*]. for, I believe, while they are cunningly conceiving these things – I mean the instruments – they are also rolling themselves [*into a confusion*] with them. not only due to the impediments that attend along with the whirling motions of those [instruments] – but also [due to] those [hinderances that occur] from the lack of definition in the appearances of the sun's risings and settings, They are not reasonably able by mental perception [*to produce an accurate measurement*]. Do they, in any way, produce an even result with the instruments? to [already] comprehend a similarity by mental perception...

ἡ ὁμοιότης **αἱ ὁμοιότητες**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being similar*
τό ὁμοίωμα **τὰ ὁμοιώματα**	what is similar	**ὉΜΟΙΩΜΑ** *result of [being] similar*
λαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	**ΛΑΒΩΝ** *grasped*
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action again*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action together*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
περινοῶν *(ῦσα, ῦν)*	to cunningly conceive	**ΠΕΡΙΝΟΩΝ** *seeing around*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
τὸ ὄργανον **τὰ ὄργανα**	instrument	**ΟΡΓΑΝΟΝ** *tool*
κυλινδεῖν	to roll	**ΚΥΛΙΝΔΕΙΝ** *turning over*
κυλινδῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	rolling	
τὸ ἐμποδοστατῆσον **τὰ ἐμποδοστατῆσαντα**	obstacle	**ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΗΣΟΝ** *standing in [the way of] foot*
ἐνποδίζειν = **ἐμποδίζειν**	to hinder	**ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** **ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *in foot*
ἡ παρεμπόδεια **αἱ παρεμπόδειαι**	impediment	**ΠΑΡΕΜΠΟΔΕΙΑ** *beside in [the way of] foot*
ἡ δῖνα **αἱ δῖναι**	whirlwind	**ΔΙΝΑ** *vortex*

τὸ δινεῦμα **τὰ δινεύματα**	whirling [motion]	**ΔΙΝΕΥΜΑ** *vortex*
παραγινόμενος *(η, ον)*	attending along with	**ΠΑΡΑΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into* *being alongside*
τὸ φάσμα **τὰ φάσματα**	appearance	**ΦΑΣΜΑ** *shining*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**῾ΗΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**῾ΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ἡ ἀοριστεία **αἱ ἀοριστεῖαι**	lack of definition	**ΑΟΡΙΣΤΕΙΑ** *no border*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	a rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ[** *power*
ἀπαρτίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	to produce an even result	**ΑΠΑΡΤΙΖΩΝ** *[alpha-intensive]* *part*
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*

11.9 Shallow Implications of Local Predictions

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 7 (column 39)

…[ὄρ]γα[να] προσποίημα καταλείπει καὶ παραβίασιν τοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου δείγματα τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν κατασκευάζειν το[ῖ]ς κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα φ[α]ινομένοις. διοριστέ[ο]ν γάρ, οἶμαι, πρῶτ[ο]ν [μ]ὲ[ν] τὸν εὐφρο[ν]οῦν[τ]α ὅ τι διαλέγεται, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ [κ]όσμ[ου] διαλέγηται καὶ τῶν ἐ[ν] τῶι κόσμωι φ[αι]νομένων, περὶ φάσμα[τό]ς τινος ἐκ… …τινῶν τῶν κατ' ὄψιν ἀναπεμπο[μέ]νων πρὸς ἐπίνο[ια]ν ἢ αὐτῆι τῆι ψ[χῆι ἐ]νσεσωσμ[ένην]…

…ὄργανα προσποίημα Καταλείπει καὶ παραβίασιν – τοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου δείγματα τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν κατασκευάζειν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα φαινομένοις. Διοριστέον γάρ, Οἶμαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν εὐφρονοῦντα – ὅ τι Διαλέγεται, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου Διαλέγηται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φαινομένων, περὶ φάσματος τινος ἐκ… …τινῶν τῶν κατ' ὄψιν ἀναπεμπομένων πρὸς ἐπίνοιαν – ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνσεσωσμένην…

…This leaves undisputed the instruments [*that are*] fabrications and a distortion – by constructing the examples on [the dial of] the instrument in the same analogy as what appears in relation to meteorological phenomena. It is necessary, I believe, first to differentiate he who considers well – [and to differentiate] what He examines, whenever He gives a discourse on the cosmos and the phenomena appearing within the cosmos, regarding some appearance from… …with certain things sent through vision up towards an objective concept – or [with a conception] preserved in the soul itself…

ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
τὸ προσποίημα **τὰ προσποιήματα**	fabrication	**ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΗΜΑ** *result of gathering* *in addition*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
ὁ βιασμός **οἱ βιασμοί**	forcing	**ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ** *process of violence*
ἡ παραβίασις **αἱ παραβιάσεις**	distortion	**ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ** *violence alongside*
τὸ ὄργανον **τὰ ὄργανα**	instrument	**ΟΡΓΑΝΟΝ** *tool*

δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing*
τὸ δεῖγμα τὰ δείγματα	example	ΔΕΙΓΜΑ *a showing*
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning back/again*
κατασκευάζειν	to construct	ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *thoroughly preparing*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ *between the border*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες	he who considers well	ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ *good mind*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
διαλέγειν	to give a discourse	ΔΙΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ *thoroughly speaking / choosing*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ *shining*
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ *eye*
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying out*
ἀναπεμπόμενος *(η, ον)*	being sent up	ΑΝΑΠΕΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ *conveying up*
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
σῴζων *(σῴζουσα, σῷζον)*	preserving	ΣΩΙΖΩΝ *saving*
ἐνσεσωσμένος *(η, ον)*	preserved in	ΕΝΣΕΣΩΣΜΕΝΟΣ *saved in*

The nature of the void and of atoms is the same everywhere. In contrast, the movement of the stars in our sky is specific to place (our earth) and time (during the existence of our earth).

Therefore, the ability to predict the local movements of these temporary bodies does not explain the fundamental mechanisms of nature. Those who think these temporary and local predictions show that all movement is fundamentally deterministic are in error.

11.10 Differentiating Sources

...[μη]δ' ὅταν, οἶμαι, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέπων τύχῃ κα[ὶ] μὴ διορῶν τό τε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον λ[ε]γόμεν[ο]ν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον [ὑπὸ] τοῦ ὑποκειμέ[νου, κἂν] πολλαὶ δὲ [ἀ]πὸ [το]ῦ ὑποκειμένου [φαντ]ασίαι γίγνωντα[ι τ]οῦ μικροτάτ[ου, μ]ὴ ὅτι τοῦ κόσμ[ου, εἰ]κότως ἀδημονεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀ[ρ]τίως ῥηθέντων ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων. ἄ[τοπ]ον μὲν γὰρ καὶ τά[χα ἐ]στὶν ἕκαστα...

...μηδ' ὅταν, Οἶμαι, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέπων Τύχῃ καὶ μὴ διορῶν [O] τό τε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον λεγόμενον καὶ [Θ] τὸ κατὰ τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου – κἂν πολλαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου Φαντασίαι γίγνωνται τοῦ μικροτάτου, μὴ ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου. εἰκότως Ἀδημονεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀρτίως ῥηθέντων ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων. ἄτοπον, μὲν, γὰρ καὶ τάχα ἕκαστα...

...nor even, I believe, when He happens to see the original source and does not differentiate [O] what is spoken about regarding that original source versus [Θ] that which relates to what is completely comprehended [directly] from the original source – [Θμ] even if many appearance are produced from an original source that is most minute, let alone [Θκ] [from an original source the size] of the cosmos. He fittingly feels distressed by these risings and settings of the sun [that have been] suitably discussed [here by us]: absurdly, for perhaps even each...

οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *situated under*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
βλέπων *(ουσα, ον)*	seeing	
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
διορίζειν	to differentiate	**ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *between the border*
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον **τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα**	[intellectually] what is completely comprehended	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *grasping around*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ μικρότης **αἱ μικρότητες**	minuteness	**ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ** *little*
μικρότατος	most minute	**ΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ** *most little*
ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*
ἡ εἰκών **αἱ εἰκόνες**	image	**ΕΙΚΩΝ** *portraying*
εἰκότως	fittingly	
ἀδημονεῖν	to be distressed	**ΑΔΗΜΟΝΕΙΝ** *without community*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἀρτίως	suitably	**ΑΡΤΙΩΣ** *fitting / timely*
ῥηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* **ῥηθέντες** *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	said [here, "discussed"]	**ῬΗΘΕΙΣ** *said*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	rising	**ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ** *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	**ΔΥΣΙΣ** *process of sinking*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
ἄτοπος *(ος, ον)*	absurd	**ΑΤΟΠΟΣ** *without a place*

τάχα	perhaps	ΤΑΧΑ *quickly*

11.11 Empiricism, Against Geocentrism

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 11 (column 41)

...τάξεις [τ]ούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου τοῦ μέρους οὕτω διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερεί[σ]εις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς φα[μ]εν τὴν [ἀρ]αιὰν φύσ[ιν ὑ]πὸ...

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 9 (column 41)
& P.Herc. 154 fr. 11

...ἡμῶν μὴ ἐναντίας ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως βουλόμεθά τι συνάψαι φάσμα τούτοις ἐνπερινενοημένο[ν], ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμ[έ]νου ληπτέον φοράν τινα τῆι διαν[οί]αι ἡλ[ί]ου καὶ σελή[ν]ης [εἰς] ἀνατολὴ[ν] κα[ὶ δύσιν,] καὶ τὴν [α]ὐτ[ήν, *φασί,] γιγνομένην [ἐ]να[ν]τίως φατέον ἔχειν. κατά γε δὴ τὸ ὑπο[κεί]μενον καθ' ἑα[υτὸ] καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἑτέρωθι μέντ[οι ἄλλ]ας κ[αὶ] ἄλ[λ]ας [εἶναι] {τάξεις [τ]ούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου ‹τοῦ› μέρους οὕτω διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερεί[ς]εις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς φα[μ]εν [τ]ὴν [ἀρ]αιὰν φύσ[ιν ὑ]πὸ}...

* *Emendavi φασί pro φημί*

...ἡμῶν μὴ ἐναντίας. ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως Βουλόμεθά τι συνάψαι φάσμα τούτοις ἐνπερινενοημένον. ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου Ληπτέον φοράν τινα – τῇ διανοίᾳ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης εἰς ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν. καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, *Φημί, γιγνομένην ἐναντίως Φατέον ἔχειν: κατά, γε δὴ, τὸ ὑποκείμενον καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἑτέρωθι μέντοι ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι τάξεις τούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου τοῦ μέρους, οὕτω Διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερείσεις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς Φαμεν τὴν ἀραιὰν φύσιν ὑπὸ...

...[*the forces*] of our [Earth that are] not opposing. We desire to connect to these [*original sources*] any certain appearance of the rising and setting [that is] completely conceived within [us]. It is necessary to comprehend some transmission from an original source – in [our mental] perception of the sun and moon in [their] rising and setting [*i.e., some direct observation is necessary*]. I even say* It is necessary to declare that the same [rising and setting] happen to occur in an opposing way: indeed, according to the original source per se and not [relative] to us – elsewhere indeed various and different arrangements of these things exist. and even concerning this particular part, It is necessary to distinguish in this way. but the projections beneath the earth, which We say are of a rarefied nature under...

ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *in against*
ἡ ἀνατολή **αἱ ἀνατολαί**	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ *lifting up*
ἡ δύσις **αἱ δύσεις**	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ *process of sinking*
ἡ βούλησις **αἱ βουλήσεις**	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ *wishing*
βούλεσθαι	to want	
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening together*
τὸ φάσμα **τὰ φάσματα**	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ *shining*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ἀπερινόητος (ον)	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not seeing around*
ἐνπερινενοημένος (η, ον)	completely conceived within	ΕΝΠΕΡΙΝΕΝΟΗΜΕΝΟΣ *having seen around in*
μεταληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be substituted	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ *change ought to be taken hold*
ληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be comprehended	ΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ *taking hold*

ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
γιγνόμενος *(η, ον)* **γιγνόμενοι** *(αι, α)*	happening	**ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *birthing*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἐναντίως	opposingly	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ** *in against*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *situated under*
ἑτέρωθι	elsewhere	**ἙΤΕΡΩΘΙ** *different* [location]
ἡ τάξις **αἱ τάξεις**	arrangement	**ΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordered*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
διαληπτός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] distinguishable	**ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *taking hold between*
διαληπτέος	out to be distinguished	
ἡ ὑπερείσις **αἱ ὑπερείσεις**	projection	**ὙΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ** *going beyond*
κάτωθεν	beneath	**ΚΑΤΩΘΕΝ** *below*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ἀραιός *(ά, όν)*	rarefied	**ΑΡΑΙΟΣ** *spread out thin*

*It is incorrect to think that the earth is the center of the universe – and it is therefore also incorrect to think that predictions of the rising and setting in our sky explain the entire working of the infinite universe (**τὸ ἄπειρον πᾶν**).*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 12 (column 42)

...τούτων δύναται γίνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν, τῶν δ[ὲ τὰς] ἰσότητας [α]ὐτὰς [αἰτί]ας εἶναι [τοῦ] μὴ κο[ιν]ωνε̣[ῖν]...

...τούτων, Δύναται γίνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν – τῶν δὲ τὰς ἰσότητας αὐτὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κοινωνεῖν...

...of these things, We mutually observe that It is able to be produced – while their equalities themselves exist as the causes of [their] not taking part...

δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning* *together*
ἴσος *(η, ον)*	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἡ ἰσότης **αἱ ἰσότητες**	equality	**ΙΣΟΤΗΣ** *equal*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *common*
κοινωνεῖν	to take part in	ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙΝ *common*

11.12 Planetary Balance

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 10 (column 42)

...[ὑ]πό τιν[ος] διαστήματος ὁριζομένης· οὕτωι γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερον ἡ διάνοια τὴν μονὴν τῆι γῆι λήψεται – κα[ὶ] συνφωνότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις φαινομένοις. πυκνότητα [δ]ὲ τὴν κάτω [π]αρὰ [συνέ]χειαν αὐτῆι νοητ[έ] ον τῆς ἄνωθ[ε]ν, ἵν[α], ἐσθλαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀ[ν]τ[έ]ρεισιν, τοῦ μὴ φ[έ]ρ[ε]σθαι τὴν γῆν τὴν π[ρέπ]ουσαν ἀναλ[ογί]αν [ὦσι]ν κεκτημ[έναι]. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡμ[ῖ]ν [ἡ τοῦ ἡ]λίου περιφορὰ [διὰ ταῦ]τα ἐνοχλή[σει ἂν τὸ] πο[σ]α[χῶς] {ἕκασ[τα] τούτων δύναται γίγνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν, τῶν δ[ὲ τὰς] ἰσότητας [α]ὐτὰς [αἰτί]ας εἶναι [τοῦ] μὴ κο[ιν]ωνε[ῖν τ]ὴν γ[ῆν] | δεήσεσθαι}.

...ὑπό τινος διαστήματος ὁριζομένης – οὕτῳ γὰρ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡ Διάνοια τὴν μονὴν τῇ γῇ λήψεται – καὶ συνφωνότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις φαινομένοις. πυκνότητα δὲ τὴν κάτω παρὰ συνέχειαν αὐτῇ Νοητέον τῆς ἄνωθεν: ἵνα, ἐσθλαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀντέρεισιν, τοῦ μὴ φέρεσθαι τὴν γῆν τὴν πρέπουσαν ἀναλογίαν Ὦσιν κεκτημέναι. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου Περιφορὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἐνοχλήσει – ἂν τὸ ποσαχῶς Ἕκαστα τούτων δύναται γίγνεσθαι Συνθεωρῶμεν: τῶν δὲ τὰς ἰσότητας αὐτὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κοινωνεῖν τὴν γῆν δεήσεσθαι

...being limited by a certain separation – for in this way, [our mental] Perception will more stably comprehend earth's remaining [*in a position*] – and more harmoniously with what appears according to [our] sensations. but It is necessary to conceive the concentration below [the Earth to be] in coherence with the [concentration] above [the earth]: so that, [Forces], being effective for resistance, may possess a suitable proportion for the earth not to be carried away. for the Orbit of the sun concerning these [issues] will not at all be disturbing to us – if We mutually observe that Each of these things is able to be produced in various ways: then the balances themselves need to be recognized to exist as the causes of the earth not taking a part [*in apparent motion*]

τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing* *between*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ *separating*
ὁριζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being limited	ὉΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ *separating*
ἀσφαλής *(ής, ές)*	stable	ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ *not stumbling*
ἀσφαλέστερον	more stably	
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
ἡ μονή αἱ μονα	[state of] remaining [in a position]	ΜΟΝΗ *staying*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
σύνφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	ΣΥΝΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking* *together*
συνφωνότερον	more harmoniously	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving* *process*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ *action of* *compacting*

τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
ἡ πυκνότης αἱ πυκνότητες	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from compacting*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ *holding together*
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ	continuity	
ἡ συνέχεια αἱ συνέχειαι	coherence	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΑ *state of holding*
ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ *above upon*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ *seeing*
ἄνωθεν	from above	ΑΝΩΘΕΝ *from above*
ἐσθλός *(ή, όν)*	effective	ΕΣΘΛΟΣ *good*
ἡ ἔρις αἱ ἔριδες	strife	ΕΡΙΣ *striving*
ἡ ἀντέρισις αἱ ἀντερίσει	resistance	ΑΝΤΕΡΙΣΙΣ *striving against*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ *bringing*
ἀπρεπής	unsuitable	ΑΠΡΕΠΗΣ *not appearing proper*
πρέπειν	to be suitable	ΠΡΕΠΕΙΝ *appearing proper*
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy [here, "proportion"]	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning back/again*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ *acquired*
κεκτημένος *(η, ον)*	possessing	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἡ περιφορά αἱ περιφοραί	orbit	ΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΑ
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ *crowd of people*
ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ *in a crowd of people*
ποσαχῶς	in various ways	ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ *how many ways*
δύνασθαι	to be able	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *having power*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning together*
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	balance	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ *equal*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*

κοινωνεῖν	to take part in	**ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙΝ** *common*

11.13 Against "A Cosmic Center"

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 11 (column 43)

...δεήσεσθαι. | πανταχόθεν γὰρ ἴσον [ἁ]πέχουσαν οὐθαμῆ βρίθειν δυνήσεσθαι· ὃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως αὐτῆι ὑπάρ[χ]ει, τὸ [δ]ὴ πανταχόθεν ὁμοί[ως] στελλομένην ἴσον [ἀ]πέχε[ι]ν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ πανταχόθεν, ὡσπερεὶ τοιαύτη[ν] λ[έ]γε[ι ἐ]ν μέσωι κεῖσθ[αι] τοῦ κό[σ]μου ὅπερ οὐκ [ἀ]δύνατον εἶναι καὶ τοι[α]ύ[τ]ην – τοῦτο ἄ[ρα] τὸ τῆς μονῆς αἴ[τιον κ]αὶ οὐ τὸ τούτου παπαρασκευαστικόν· τ[ὴ]ν γὰρ ἰσότητα ἡ το[ῦ] ἀέ[ρ]ος στολ[ὴ] πανταχό[θε]ν...

πανταχόθεν γὰρ ἴσον ἀπέχουσαν, οὐθαμῇ βρίθειν δυνήσεσθαι·Ὃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει: Τὸ, δὴ, πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως στελλομένην ἴσον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ τροχοῦ πανταχόθεν – ὡσπερεὶ τοιαύτην, Λέγει, ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου: ὅπερ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτην – τοῦτο, ἄρα, τὸ τῆς μονῆς αἴτιον καὶ οὐ τὸ τούτου παρασκευαστικόν· τὴν γὰρ ἰσότητα ἡ τοῦ ἀέρος Στολὴ πανταχόθεν...

[He says that, because the Earth] is equally distant on all sides, it will be able to be heavy in no place. This exists for [Earth] from the nature of air: That, of course, [because] it is positioned similarly on all sides, it restricts equally from the circumference from all sides – just as if, He says, such a thing is set up at the center of the cosmos: which [he says] is not impossible that even such a thing exists – therefore, [he says] this is the [actual] cause of [Earth's] remaining [in a position] and not [merely] instrumental [for it]. the Pressure of the air on all sides... an equality...

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	**ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ** *from all places*
ἴσος *(η, ον)*	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἀπέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	different /distant	**ΑΠΕΧΩΝ** *holding away*
οὐθαμῇ = **οὐθαμεῖ** = **οὐδαμοῦ**	nowhere	**ΟΥΘΑΜΗΙ** *not in any place*
βρίθειν	to be heavy	**ΒΡΙΘΕΙΝ** *weighed down*
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ** *not powerful*
δυνατεῖν	to be able	**ΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ** *powerful*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
στέλλειν	to send	**ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready*
στελλόμενος *(η, ον)*	being sent [here, "being positioned"]	
ἀπέχειν	to restrict	**ΑΠΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding away*
ὁ τροχός **οἱ τροχοί**	circumference	**ΤΡΟΧΟΣ** *wheel*
μέσος *(η, ον)*	middle	**ΜΕΣΟΣ** *in between*
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	**ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting together*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	**ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting*

ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*
ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *not powerful*
ἡ μονή **αἱ μοναί**	[state of] remaining [in a position]	**ΜΟΝΗ** *staying*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
τὸ αἴτιον **τὰ αἴτια**	what is the cause	**ΑΙΤΙΟΝ** *responsibility*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
παρασκευάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	providing	
παρασκευαστικός *(ή, όν)*	instrumental	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of preparing alongside*
ἡ ἰσότης **αἱ ἰσότητες**	equality	**ΙΣΟΤΗΣ** *equal*
στέλλειν	to send	**ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready*
ἡ στολή **αἱ στολαί**	pressure	**ΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 13 (column 43)

...ὁμοία οὖσα, παρεσκε[ύ]ακεν, ὡς [ἔφη] τις τ[ῶ]ν δίων: τὸ δὴ παρασκευάσας ἐν [μέ]σωι τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ παντα[χόθ]εν ὁμ[οί]ω[ς στ]ελλο[μέ]νην μέν[ειν ἐ]ν τῶι [κόσμωι κ]ατ[ὰ]...

...ὁμοία οὖσα, παρεσκεύακεν, ὡς ἔφη Τις τῶν δίων: Τὸ, δὴ, παρασκευάσας ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τροχοῦ, πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως στελλομένην μένειν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατὰ...

> ...[*because the Earth*] is similar, it has prepared, as Someone among "the divine ones" said: That [situation of] being placed in the middle of the circumference, while being made similarly ready on all sides to remain in the cosmos according to...

ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide [here, "to prepare"]	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
δῖος *(α, ον)*	divine	**ΔΙΟΣ** *heavenly*
μέσος *(η, ον)*	middle	**ΜΕΣΟΣ** *in between*
ὁ τροχός **οἱ τροχοί**	circumference	**ΤΡΟΧΟΣ** *wheel*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	**ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ** *from all places*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
στέλλειν	to send	**ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready*
στελλόμενος *(η, ον)*	being sent [here, "being placed"]	
διαμένειν	to persist	**ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ** *staying through*
μένειν	to remain	
ὁ κόσμος **οἱ κόσμοι**	cosmos	**ΚΟΣΜΟΣ** *arranging / adorning*

For 'Someone among the divine ones' consider: "**si Platō de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus, quod Ego concede…**" (Cicero de Orat. 1.49)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 14 (column 44)

…νομίζειν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἐν πολλοῖς [δὲ κ]αὶ μάλιστα τῶι ὅλωι τρόπωι πολλῶι βελτίους, τινὰς δ[ὲ] καὶ παντελῶς ἄπλατ[ο]ν…

…νομίζειν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ μάλιστα τῷ ὅλῳ τρόπῳ πολλῷ βελτίους – τινὰς δὲ καὶ παντελῶς ἄπλατον…

… to think of the men in many [ ], while especially [to think of the men] in many [ ] as much better in their whole way [of interpretation] – but also some [men are] absolutely unapproachable [*regarding their interpretations*]…

νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
ὁ ἀνήρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ *man*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ *all completing*
ἄπλατος *(ος, ον)*	unapproachable	ΑΠΛΑΤΟΣ *not drawing near*
LSJ states that Epicurus uses ***ἄπλατος*** *here as an equivalent to* ***ἄπλετος***		
ἄπλετος	immense	ΑΠΛΕΤΟΣ *not filling*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 12 (column 44)

…ἦν τοῦτο εἰπεῖν αἴτι[ο]ν εἶναι, τὴν δὴ ἰσότητ[α], ἥπερ αὐτὸ τό, ὅτ[ι] τ[ὸ] μένειν αὐτὴ[ν ἐν τ]ῶι μέσωι τοῦ κόσμ[ου] αἴτιόν ἐστ[ιν] τοῦ [μέ]νειν καὶ… …κα[ὶ] ὄντ[ω]ν ṭ[ού]τωι συ[μφ]ώνων [πο]τέ, τὰς τῶν ἀέρων ὑπερείσεις πεποιηκότας, διὰ τὰς τῶν [συν]ημμέ[νω]ν ἀλ[λοτρι]ότητας· [οἷ]ς ἂν [καὶ ἀ]πὸ τύ[χ]ης ὀρθῶς ἐπ[ενε]χθῶσιν, [ο]ὐ[θ]ὲν δεῖ βελτείους τούτων εἶναι…

…ἦν Τοῦτο εἰπεῖν αἴτιον εἶναι: τὴν δὴ ἰσότητα, ἥπερ αὐτὸ τό, ὅτι Τὸ μένειν Αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου αἴτιόν ἐστιν τοῦ μένειν, καὶ… …καὶ ὄντων τούτῳ συμφώνων ποτέ, τὰς τῶν ἀέρων ὑπερείσεις πεποιηκότας διὰ τὰς τῶν συνημμένων ἀλλοτριότητας· οἷς ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης ὀρθῶς Ἐπενεχθῶσιν, οὐθὲν δεῖ βελτείους τούτων εἶναι…

…This was to say that a cause exists: indeed, the equality, rather than the very thing itself – That the [Earth] remaining in the middle of the cosmos is the cause of [its] remaining [motionless to us]… …and while they are in harmony with this at some point […] the projections of the air that have been produced through the foreignness of the connected [parts]. to those Who, even by chance, might rightly be applied, It is not necessary to be better than these…

τὸ αἴτιον τὰ αἴτια	what is the cause	ΑΙΤΙΟΝ
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	equality	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ *equal*
μένειν	to remain	ΜΕΝΕΙΝ *staying*
μέσος *(η, ον)*	middle	ΜΕΣΟΣ *in between*
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ *arranging / adorning*
φωνῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	speaking	ΦΩΝΩΝ *speaking*

συμφωνῶν	agreeing [here, "in harmony"]	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩΝ** *speaking together*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ ὑπερείσις **αἱ ὑπερείσεις**	projection	**ΎΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ** *going beyond*
πεποιηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having made	**ΠΕΠΟΙΗΚΩΣ** *having gathered*
συνημμένος *(α, ον)*	connected	**ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *joined together*
ἀλλοτρίως	in a foreign way	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ** *different other*
ἡ ἀλλοτριότης **αἱ ἀλλοτριότητες**	foreignness	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from different other*
ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	**ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing upon*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*

11.14 Incompatible Forms

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 13 (column 45)

...πάντα γὰρ τιθέμενα παρ' ἀλλ[ό]τ[ρ]οπον αὐτῶν συνα[φ]ῆς εἶδο[ς] διέφθαρτα[ι]... ...μὲν ο[ὖν τα]ύτηι τῆι βίβλω[ι] τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰρήσθ[ω.] ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐχο[μέ]νοις ἔ[τ]ι περὶ τῶν [με]τεώρων τουτωνε[ί τι] προσεκκα[θ]αροῦμεν...

...Πάντα γὰρ τιθέμενα παρ' ἀλλότροπον αὐτῶν συναφῆς εἶδος διέφθαρται... ...μὲν οὖν, ταύτῃ τῇ βίβλῳ, Τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰρήσθω ¬ ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐχομένοις, ἔτι περὶ τῶν μετεώρων τούτων, εἴ τι Προσεκκαθαροῦμεν...

...for all Things that are set in a form [*that is*] foreign for their union have been thoroughly destroyed... ...therefore, in this book, let This much be said by us concerning the hypothesis from the beginning ¬ but in the subsequent [*parts*], still concerning these meteorological phenomena, if We further make fully clear some...

τιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	being set	**ΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ** *placing*
ἀλλοτρίως	in a foreign way	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ** *different other*
ἀλλότριος *(ία, ιον)*	foreign	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ** *different other*
ἀλλότροπος *(ος, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *other turn / way*
ἡ συναφή **αἱ συναφαί**	union	**ΣΥΝΑΦΗ** *joining together*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
φθείρειν	to destroy	**ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ** *damaging*
διαφθείρειν	to thoroughly destroy	**ΔΙΑΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ** *damaging through*
ἡ βίβλος **αἱ βίβλοι**	book	**ΒΙΒΛΟΣ** *papyrus*

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ ὑπόθεσις αἱ ὑποθέσεις	hypothesis	ΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ *placing under*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἐχόμενος *(η, ον)*	holding on to [here, "subsequent"]	ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *holding*
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	meteorological phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ *rising beyond*
καθαρός *(ά, όν)*	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ *cleaning*
προσεκκαθαίρειν	to further make fully clear	ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleaning further out*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΑ*

Epicurus' On Nature, *11*

[U82]

Book 12

12.1 Shapes of Worlds

Scholion with Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.74

ἐν τῇ ιβʹ *Περὶ Φύσεως* Αὐτός φησιν "οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ᾠοειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἀλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέρους – οὐ, μέντοι, πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν ¬ οὐδὲ ζῷα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου"

in the 12th book *On Nature*, He himself says "some [Cosmoi] are spherical, others egg-shaped, and others differently shaped – they do not, however, have every shape ¬ nor are [the Cosmoi] living beings that are distinguished from the infinite"

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.74

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης Δεῖ νομίζειν ἕνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς

It should not necessarily be thought that the Cosmoi have [just] one configuration ¬ they are also different

[U83]

12.2 Eclipses

Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 10.96

Ἔκλειψις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ σβέσιν – καθάπερ καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν Τοῦτο θεωρεῖται γιγνόμενον

an Eclipse of the sun and of the moon is able to be produced also by extinguishing – just as This is also observed being produced among us

καὶ ἤδη καὶ κατʼ ἐπιπροσθέτησιν ἄλλων τινῶν: ἢ γῆς ¬ ἢ ἀοράτου τινὸς ἑτέρου τοιούτου

and furthermore [*an eclipse can be produced*] also by the additional interposing of certain other things: either of the earth ¬ or of something else unseen like it

καὶ, ὧδε, τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους Συνθεωρητέον καὶ τὰς ἅμα συγκυρήσεις τινῶν – ὅτι οὐκ Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι

and, in this way, One must also mutually observe the ways compatible to each and the simultaneous concurrences of certain things – [*understanding*] that it is not impossible [*for those concurrences*] to be produced

ἡ ἔκλειψις **αἱ ἐκλείψεις**	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an "eclipse"]	**ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ** *leaving out*
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	**ἩΛΙΟΣ** *sunshine*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ σβένσις = **ἡ σβέσις**	extinguishing	**ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ** **ΣΒΕΣΙΣ** *cancelling*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as* *thoroughly*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	[being] produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
	Part 2	
ἤδη	actually	
ἡ πρόσθεσις **αἱ προσθέσεις**	addition	**ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing toward*
ἡ ἐπιπρόσθεσις **αἱ ἐπιπροσθέσεις**	interposition	**ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing toward upon*
ἄλλος *(η, ο)*	other	**ΑΛΛΟΣ** *another*
ἡ γῆ **αἱ γαῖ**	earth	**ΓΗ** *land*
ὁ οὐρανός **οἱ οὐρανοί**	sky	**ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ** *heaven*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [here "else"]	**ἙΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this/it *(such as this/it)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
	Part 3	
ὧδε	in this way	**ὩΔΕ** *this*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another [here, "each"]	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning together*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	**ἉΜΑ** *at once*
κυρεῖν	to happen upon	**ΚΥΡΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἡ συγκύρησις **αἱ συγκυρήσεις**	concurrence	**ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *process of happening together*

ἀδύνατος *(ον)*	impossible	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *not powerful*

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Laertius 10.96

ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβʹ Περὶ Φύσεως ταῦτα Λέγει – καὶ πρός "Ἥλιον ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἐπισκοτούσης, Σελήνην δὲ τοῦ τῆς γῆς σκιάσματος ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀναχώρησιν"

[*Epicurus*] also says these things in the 12th [*book*] On Nature – and additionally [*he says there that*] "the Sun is eclipsed by the occulting moon, and the Moon [*is eclipsed*] by the earth's shadow ¬ but also in accordance with its withdrawal"

ἡ ἔκλειψις **αἱ ἐκλείψεις**	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	**ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ** *leaving out*
ἐγλείπειν = **ἐκλείπειν**	to disappear [or, of the sun & moon] to be eclipsed	**ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** **ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving out*
ἡ σελήνη **αἱ σελῆναι**	moon	**ΣΕΛΗΝΗ** *shining light*
ἐπισκοτῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	occulting	**ΕΠΙΣΚΟΤΩΝ** *darkness upon*
τὸ σκίασμα **τὰ σκιάσματα**	shadow	**ΣΚΙΑΣΜΑ** *result of* *reflected image*
ἡ ἀναχώρησις **αἱ ἀναχωρήσεις**	withdrawal	**ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ** *process of* *place / location* *back*

[U84]

12.3 Conceptions of Gods

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.8.225

κάν τῶι δωδεκάτ[ω]ι Περὶ Φ[ύ]σ[ε]ω[ς το]ὺς πρώτους φη[σὶν ἀ]νθρώπους ἐπὶ ν[οή]ματα ‹τῶν ἔ›ξω βα‹ί›νειν ἀφθάρτων φύσεων

κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ Περὶ Φύσεως τοὺς πρώτους Φησὶν Ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ νοήματα τῶν ἔξω βαίνειν ἀφθάρτων φύσεων

and in the 12th book of *On Nature* He says that the first People [*in human history*] arrived at conceptions of indestructible external natures

τὸ νόημα **τὰ νόηματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
ἄφθαρτος *(ον)*	indestructible	**ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ** *not decaying*

[U85]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.106 [p. 124.1 Gomperz]

[Anderson] *The rendering of this fragment in Usener (as virtually the same as U88, but attributed to Book 12) has been abandoned by subsequent scholarship*

[=U88] Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111

…[καὶ ἄλ]ληι κάν [τῶι Περὶ Ὁ]σιότηιτ[ος, κάν τῶι] δωδεκά[τωι καὶ] τρεισκα[ιδεκάτωι] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κάν τῶι] πρώτω[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους…

…καὶ ἄλλῃ κἀν τῷ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ καὶ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ Φύσεως, κἀν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ Τιμοκράτους…

…in other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of the books *On Timocrates*…

[U86]

12.4 Physical Immortal Gods

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.3.60

εἴ γ´ εὐ[σκοποῦσίν] φησιν φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων δοξ[άζειν ἀξεῖναι] καὶ πολ[λοῖς ἀι]δίοις [θεοῖς κἀθα]νάτο[ις εἶναι]

εἴ γ' Εὐσκοποῦσίν, Φησιν, φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων Δοξάζειν ἀξεῖναι καὶ πολλοῖς αἰδίοις θεοῖς κἀθανάτοις εἶναι

> If, indeed, They examine carefully, [*Epicurus*] says, the nature of these situations and the many things [*that relate to*] this [*nature*], They will judge [*this nature*] to rise up and to exist for many eternal and immortal gods

τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	

[U87]

12.5 Madness of Atheists

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.18.514 – 1.19.541

[Π]αρασ[τήσας] ὡς τοῖς μὲν [ὑπὸ τ]ῶν [ἀν]δρῶν αὐ[τῶν γε]γραμμέν[οις ἡ]μ[ᾶς] προσέχε[ιν, αὐτ]τοῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μ[ανίαν Ἐ]πίκουρος ἐμ[έμψα]το τοῖς τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦσιν, ὡς κά[ν τῶι] δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]δίκωι καὶ Δια[γόραι] καὶ Κριτίαι κἄ[λλοις] μέμφ[εται] φὰς πα[ρα]κόπτ[ει]ν καὶ μ[αίνεσ]θαι, καὶ βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς [εἴ]κά[ζει, κε]λεύσ[ας μ]ὴ πρᾶγμα ἡμεῖν παρέχειν οὐδ' ἐνοχλεῖν

παραστήσας ὡς τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτῶν γεγραμμένοις ἡμᾶς προσέχειν, αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μανίαν Ἐπίκουρος ἐμέμψατο τοῖς τὸ θεῖον ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἀναιροῦσιν – ὡς κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ: Προδίκῳ καὶ Διαγόρᾳ καὶ Κριτίᾳ, κἄλλοις Μέμφεται – φὰς παρακόπτειν καὶ μαίνεσθαι. καὶ Βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς Εἰκάζει, κελεύσας μὴ πρᾶγμα ἡμεῖν, παρέχειν οὐδ' ἐνοχλεῖν

> …having proposed that we pay attention to the writings of [our] own men – Epicurus reproached all the madness of those who abolish the divine from existing things – just as, in the 12th [*book*]: He finds fault with Prodíkos, Diagóras, Kritías, and others – saying that they are deranged and insane. He even likens them [*to*] Those [*who*] go bacchating, commanding [*them*] to cause no trouble for us, and to not be irritating

κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραμμίζ[ουσι] τὰ τ[ῶ]ν θεῶν [ὀνόμα]τα, [κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τισ]θέ[νης] τὸ κοινό[τατον] ὑποτείνων ἀν[αφέρει] τὰ κατὰ μέρος [τῆι θέ]σει καὶ διά τι[νος ἀπά]της ἔτι πρότ[ερον].

καὶ γὰρ Παραγραμμίζουσι τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα – καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης, τὸ κοινότατον ὑποτείνων, ἀναφέρει τὰ κατὰ μέρος τῇ θέσει – καὶ διά τινος ἀπάτης ἔτι πρότερον

> for They erase* the names of the gods – just as Antisthénēs, insisting on the most general [conception of the gods], attributes the particular [conceptions and names] to an establishment [*by human convention*] – and even earlier [*by cynical people*] through some deception

τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written out	**ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ** *written again*
παραγραμμίζειν	to erase	**ΠΑΡΑΓΡΑΜΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *writing across*

*this is a rare verb that may mean either "to erase" or "to rewrite"

Prodíkos, Diagóras, and Kritías were well known atheists.

Antisthénēs (fl. 406 BCE) learned rhetoric under Gorgias, developed a group of his own followers. Then, he became a student of Socrates and encouraged his students to do the same. He later feuded with Plato and "began the Cynic way of life." He was known for saying "I would rather be insane than feel pleasure" (Laertius 6.3)

[U88]

Book 13

Divine Neutrality

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.36.1023 – 37.1060

τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεσθαι ὡ]φελίας ἐκ [θεῶν τοῖς] ἀγαθοῖς κα[ὶ βλάβας] τοῖς κακ[οῖς, κατα]λείπουσι[ν. καὶ τοῖς] μὲν φρον[ίμοις καὶ] δικαίοις τ[ὸ τελει]οῦσθαι νοη[τέον] καὶ τὰς ὠφ[ελίας καὶ] τὰς βλάβα[ς οὐ κατα]δεεστέρα[ς ἢ καὶ] μείζους ὧ[ν ἄνθρω]ποι συνάπ[τουσιν, ο]ὐ κατ' ἀσθέ[νειαν οὐ]δὲ καθάπερ [ἡμεῖν ἐκ] τοῦ θεοῦ τι[νος δέ]ον κἀν ἐπα[ναχω]ρήσει τῆς [ὀνήσευς] αὐτοῦ, καὶ τ[αῦτά φ]ασι σεμνό[τατα]

τὸ δὲ περαίνεσθαι ὠφελίας ἐκ θεῶν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ βλάβας τοῖς κακοῖς Καταλείπουσιν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν φρονίμοις καὶ δικαίοις τὸ τελειοῦσθαι Νοητέον καὶ τὰς ὠφελίας καὶ τὰς βλάβας οὐ καταδεεστέρας ἢ καὶ μείζους ὧν Ἄνθρωποι συνάπτουσιν ¬ οὐ κατ' ἀσθένειαν, οὐδὲ καθάπερ ἡμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τινος Δέον, κἀν ἐπαναχωρήσει τῆς ὀνήσεως αὐτοῦ – καὶ ταῦτά Φασι σεμνότατα

The [Kathēgemónes] thoroughly leave undisputed [the idea of] the achieving benefits out of the gods for good [people] and harms for bad [people] – as It is necessary for the wise and just to conceive the fulfillment of both benefits and harms [to be] neither inferior nor greater than those which Men [themselves] connect [to the gods] ¬ [*with wise people leaving alone the idea of fulfillment of benefits from a god*] not out of weakness, nor as though for us There is a need from some god, even in stepping back from that benefit – and these things They say most solemnly

καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
for this passage, Obbink translates καταλείπειν as "allow" and "accept"		
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
συνάπτειν	to connect	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening together*

ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ] Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐσ]τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ανθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογρά]φει διὰ πλεό[νων]. Ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ισκαι]δεκάτωι, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἥ[ν πρός] τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος.] ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ] τριακ[οσ]τῶ[ι, φησι], σὺν τῶι τι [ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διό[ι νομι]ζον...

ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Περὶ Θεῶν ποία τίς ἐστιν Αἰτία νεμέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειπτέον, Ὑπογράφει διὰ πλειόνων – ἔν τε τῷ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ, περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἣν πρός τινας ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος.

and in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of Cause for vengeance and security exists through a god that must be thoroughly left behind for men, [*Epicurus*] writes with many [*details*]. and in the thirteenth [*book On Nature, Epicurus writes*] regarding the familiarity that a God has with certain [*people*] and regarding his alienation.

ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ, Φησι, σὺν τῷ τι ταύτης τῆς ὠφελίας, διασαφεῖν, καὶ διότι Νομίζον...

and in the five-and-thirtieth [*i.e., Book 35 On Nature, Epicurus*] says that he clarifies, along with a little bit of this benefit, also why It is believed that...

The "familiarity and the alienation that a god has with certain people" may be explained by Epicurus largely along the lines of "It is necessary for the wise and just to conceive the fulfillment of both benefits and harms to be neither inferior nor greater than those which men themselves connect to the gods," (as just stated above).

[=U87] Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111

...[καὶ ἄλ]ληι κάν [τῶι Περὶ Ὁ]σιότητι[ος, κάν τῶι] δωδεκά[τωι καὶ] τρεισκα[ιδεκάτωι] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κάν τῶι] πρώτω[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους...

...καὶ ἄλλῃ κάν τῷ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, κάν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ καὶ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ Φύσεως, κάν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ Τιμοκράτους...

...in other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of the books *On Timocrates*...

Book 14

In Book 14, Epicurus critiques inconsistent explanations of natural phenomena.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3

...ḳαθὸ τὰς μ[ε]ṭαβά̣σ̣εις ἐ̣ν α̣ὐταῖς ἂν νο[ή]σωμεν διὰ λόγου...

...καθὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἐν αὐταῖς ἂν Νοήσωμεν διὰ λόγου...

...whereby We might conceive the [spatial] extensions in them through [our] reasoning...

Probably a reference to the atoms.
Compare: "It is not necessary to think that a [spatial] extension is produced within the finite [atoms] into infinity, not into something [ever] smaller (10.56b)

ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ *stepping beyond*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*

14.1 Unnecessary Burden of Endless Inquiry

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 24

...[ἀ]γαπητ[ὸν] καὶ τοῦτ[ο], τὸ δὴ πάντα τὸν συνẹ[χό]μενọν [ταῖς] τοιαύταις περιεργ[ε]ίαις ἔχειν οἱονὶ φάρμακον δι' οὗ κạτạστάσεις ἀ̣πλ[ᾶς ἔστι]ν ἐν τῆι περὶ φύσε[ως θεωρί]αι ἀπαλλαγήσε[σθαι τῆς σ]υμφύτου ἑαυτạ[ῖς ταραχ]ῆς ἢ καὶ ὕṣτερον...

...ἀγαπητὸν καὶ Τοῦτο: Τὸ δὴ πάντα τὸν συνεχόμενον ταῖς τοιαύταις περιεργείαις ἔχειν οἱονὶ φάρμακον – δι' οὗ Καταστάσεις ἁπλᾶς Ἔστιν ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως θεωρίᾳ ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι τῆς συμφύτου ἑαυταῖς ταραχῆς. Ἢ καὶ ὕστερον...

...This is also desirable: That one who is entirely afflicted by such over-questionings has a kind of remedy – through which It is possible that a simple Condition [*of life, focused*] in the [*mental*] observation of nature will set free their innate trouble. Which [*remedy*] afterward also...

ἀγαπητός *(ή, όν)*	desirable	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ *love worthy*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ *thoroughly holding*

συνέχειν	to keep united	**ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding together*
συνέχεσθαι	to be kept united [here, "to be afflicted"]	**ΣΥΝΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *being held together*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
ἡ περιεργεία = **ἡ περιεργία**	over-questioning	**ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΕΙΑ** *work around*
οἱονὶ	of what sort [here, "a kind of"]	**ΟΙΟΣ + ΝΙ** *such as*
τὸ φάρμακον **τὰ φάρμακα**	remedy	**ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΝ** *drug*
ἡ ἀποκατάστασις **αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις**	reestablishment	**ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed thoroughly back*
ἡ κατάστασις **αἱ καταστάσεις**	condition	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *thoroughly placed*
ἁπλοῦς *(ῆ, οῦν)*	simple	**ἉΠΛΟΥΣ** *one fold*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
ἀπαλλάττειν	to remove away	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing away*
ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι	to remove away [in the future]	
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
τὸ φυτόν **τὰ φυτά**	plant	**ΦΥΤΟΝ** *growing*
σύμφυτος *(ος, ον)*	innate	**ΣΥΜΦΥΤΟΣ** *growing together*
ἡ ταραχή **αἱ ταραχαί**	disturbance	**ΤΑΡΑΧΗ** *agitating*
ὕστερον	afterward	**ὝΣΤΕΡΟΝ** *later*

14.2 Anaximénēs

Anaximénēs of Miletus (flourished 545 BCE, about 250 years before Epicurus) believed that air (ἀήρ) can change into water, earth, and fire – and into everything else – by getting thicker or thinner.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 6 (column 27)

…π̣ρὸς τ̣[ο]ὺ̣ς ἐ[κ τ]ῶν νεφῶν [φ]άσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖ[ον εἶ]ναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσε[ως ἅ]παντα̣ γίνεται π̣υ̣[κνώ]σ̣ε̣ι̣ καὶ ἀ̣[ρ]αιώσ̣ε̣ι̣ παρ[εξαλλα]τ̣τούσ̣ης τὸ̣ν̣ [ἀέ]ρα…

…πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος Φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι – καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως Ἅπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα…

…to those alleging that, the Nature of water is fully produced out of the clouds concentrating – and thinking that this too is a sign that Everything is produced from one nature slightly modifying the air by concentrating and dispersing…

τὸ νέφος **τὰ νέφη**	cloud	**ΝΕΦΟΣ** *fog*
φάσκειν	to allege	**ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *affirming*

τὸ πύκνωμα **τὰ πυκνώματα**	a concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ** *the result of compacting*
ἡ πυκνότης **αἱ πυκνότητες**	concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from compacting*
πυκνούμενος *(η, ον)*	concentrating	**ΠΥΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ**
ἡ πύκνωσις **αἱ πυκνώσεις**	a concentrating	**ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ** *action of compacting*
τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ὝΔΩΡ** *rain / water*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
νομίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	thinking	**ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ** *custom*
σημειούμενος *(η, ον)*	being indicated	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *sign*
τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ ἀραίωσις **αἱ ἀραιώσεις**	dispersing	**ΑΡΑΙΩΣΙΣ** *action of thinning*
ἀπαλλάττειν	to remove away	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *away*
παρεξαλλάττων	to [slightly] modify	**ΠΑΡΕΞΑΛΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *changing out of beside*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 8 (column 29)

...[παρὰ] τὰς ὁμοίας [φα]ντασ[ί]ας [αὐ]τοὺς παραλο[γίζ]ονται...

...παρὰ τὰς ὁμοίας φαντασίας, αὑτοὺς Παραλογίζονται...

...beyond the similar appearances, They deceive themselves...

ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὍΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
παραλογίζομαι	to deceive	**ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΟΜΑΙ** *beside reason*

14.3 Democritus

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 9 (column 30)

...[βελτίο]νες ἄνδρες πράτ[τουσιν, ἀλ]λὰ καὶ τῶν προσα[γ]ορευομ[έ]νων φιλοσόφων, οὕς, ναὶ μὰ τό[ν], ἔλπ[ο]μαι, εἰ δεῖ, καὶ Δημόκριτο[ν] ὣς ὀνομάσαι· ἆρ' ἂν ἐ[νι]σταῖμεν πρ[ὸ]ς... ...ἐν το[ῖς] μετεώροις...

...βελτίονες Ἄνδρες πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν προσαγορευομένων "φιλοσόφων" – οὕς, ναὶ μὰ τόν, Ἔλπομαι, εἰ Δεῖ, καὶ Δημόκριτον ὣς ὀνομάσαι· ἆρ' ἂν Ἐνισταῖμεν πρὸς... ...ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις...?

...better Men accomplish [*this*], but even those being referred to as "philosophers" – [among] whom, yes by [god], I suppose, if It is necessary, to even bring up the name of Democritus in this way. would We resist against... ...in the meteorological phenomena...?

βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
πράττειν	to accomplish [here, "to act"]	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
προσαγορευόμενος *(η, ον)*	being referred to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *speaking publicly toward*
ὁ φιλόσοφος **οἱ φιλόσοφοι**	philosopher	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ** *loving knowledge*
ἔλπειν	to suppose	**ΕΛΠΕΙΝ** *hoping*
ὁ Δημόκριτος	Democritus	**ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ** *judging community*
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word [here, "to bring up the name"]	**ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *naming*
συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
ἐνιστάναι	to resist	**ΕΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing in[stead]*
τὸ μετέωρον **τὰ μετέωρα**	meteorological phenomenon	**ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ** *rising beyond*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 10 (column 31)

…[κατὰ μι]κρὸν πολλοὺς ὄγκ̣[ους δε]ξομένης, καὶ ἄλλ[ων συγ]κ̣ρίσεων…

…κατὰ μικρὸν πολλοὺς ὄγκους δεξομένης, καὶ ἄλλων συγκρίσεων…

…while receiving many particles little by little, and other compounds…

μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
κατὰ μικρὸν	little by little	
ὁ ὄγκος **οἱ ὄγκοι**	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
δεξόμενος *(η, ον)*	recieving	**ΔΕΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *separating together*

14.4 Monism

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 11 (column 33)

…[οὐ γὰρ] πα[ρὰ τούτου π]ύκνωσιν ἢ ἀρα̣[ί]ωσιν τὰ πράγματα γεν[ν]ᾶται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ [σ]χημάτ̣[ω]ν διαφορὰς τὸ ἰσχυ̣ρὸ[ν τῶ]ν̣ παραλλαγῶν [ἐκγί]ν̣εται…

…οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τούτου πύκνωσιν ἢ ἀραίωσιν τὰ Πράγματα γεννᾶται ¬ ἀλλὰ, παρὰ σχημάτων διαφορὰς Τὸ ἰσχυρὸν τῶν παραλλαγῶν ἐκγίνεται…

…for these Situations are not created from this [one single underlying substance] by [its] concentrating or by [its] dispersing ¬ but rather, What prevails is produced out of the differences in the variety of the shapes…

τὸ πύκνωμα **τὰ πυκνώματα**	concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ** *the result of compacting*
ἡ πύκνωσις **αἱ πυκνώσεις**	a concentrating	**ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ** *action of compacting*

ἡ ἀραίωσις **αἱ ἀραιώσεις**	dispersing	**ΑΡΑΙΩΣΙΣ** *action of thinning*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ γένεσις **αἱ γενέσεις**	[process of] creation	**ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ** *action of being born*
γεννᾶσθαι	to be created	**ΓΕΝΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *being born*
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἐκγίνεσθαι	to be produce out of	**ΕΚΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being out of*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	**ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ** *strength*
ἰσχύων *(ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)*	prevailing	**ΙΣΧΥΩΝ** *strength*
ἰσχυρός *(ά, όν)*	strong	**ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ** *strength*
τὸ ἰσχυρόν **τὰ ἰσχυρά**	what prevails	
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*

14.5 Platonic "Solids"

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 1 (column 34)

...[πρὸς τοὺς] ὁρίζοντας σχῆμα π̣[υρ]ὸς ἴδιο̣ν ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ̣ [ἀ]έρος, ὅτι γελοιότεροί εἰσι τῶν οὐχ ὁριζόντων μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς παραθέσεις ὁμολογησάν[τ]ων ἂν ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκου[σί]ως γίνεσθαί τινα σχημά[τ]ων ἴδια εἴδη καθ' ἑκάστην [οὐ]σιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγ[κρ]ισιν· ο̣ἱ μὲγ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν [στ]οιχείο[ι]ς ἁμαρτάνουσιν, [ἀ]κόλουθ̣ον δέ τι τούτοις [μ]ᾶλλον, οὕτω λέγοντες, [λέ]γοιεν ἄ̣ν, καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν [τα]ῖς μείξεσι[ν] παραλλαγήν· [οἱ] δὲ πρὸς τὴν...

...πρὸς τοὺς ὁρίζοντας σχῆμα πυρὸς ἴδιον ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος: ὅτι γελοιότεροί Εἰσι τῶν οὐχ ὁριζόντων μέν – κατὰ δὲ τὰς παραθέσεις, ὁμολογησάντων ἄν, ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, γίνεσθαί τινα σχημάτων ἴδια Εἴδη καθ' ἑκάστην οὐσιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγκρισιν.

...[such is the case] for those who define [one] particular shape for fire, or earth, or water, or air: since They are more ridiculous than those who do not define [any type of shape for each element] – given that, in [their comparative] juxtapositions, those [who define a specific shape for each element] should have agreed, either willingly or unwillingly, that certain [multiple] particular Forms of shapes are produced which can [affirmatively] be said to be substantial [*i.e., really existing*] in accordance with each compound.

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν στοιχείοις ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἀκόλουθον δέ Τι τούτοις μᾶλλον – οὕτω λέγοντες, Λέγοιεν ἂν καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν ταῖς μείξεσιν παραλλαγήν – Οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν...

but Some [people] make a mistake regarding these component [elements], and there is Something more consistent [to be said that pertains] to these [elements] – speaking in this way, Those [who define one particular shape for each element] could also entirely refer to the variety in the mixtures – but Those [people who...] for the...

ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*

ὁρίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	setting a limit [defining]	ὉΡΙΖΩΝ *separating*
τὰ ὁρίζοντα τὸ ὁρίζον	what sets a limit	
ὁ ὁρίζων οἱ ὁρίζοντες	he who defines	
ὁ οὐχ ὁρίζων οἱ οὐχ ὁρίζοντες	he who does not define	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ *fire*
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ἰδιώματα	idiom	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ *particular*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ὙΔΩΡ *rain / water*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	ΑΗΡ *morning mist*
γελοιότερος *(οτέρα, ότερον)*	more ridiculous	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more laughing*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
ἡ παράθεσις αἱ παραθέσεις	juxtaposition	ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing alongside*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *same reasoning*
ὁ ὁμολογήσας οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες	he who has agreed	ὉΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ *same reasoning*
ἑκών *(ἑκοῦσα, ἑκόν)*	willing	ἙΚΩΝ *voluntary*
ἑκουσίως	willingly	ἙΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ *voluntarily*
ἄκων *(ἄκουσα, ἄκον)*	unwilling	ΑΚΩΝ *not voluntary*
ἀκουσίως	unwillingly	ΑΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ *not voluntarily*
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
οὐσιώδης *(ώδης, ῶδες)*	substantial	ΟΥΣΙΩΔΗΣ *quality of being*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ *said*
ῥηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* ῥηθέντες *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	said	ῬΗΘΕΙΣ *said*
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [fact *or* thing]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ *instance of a row (in a series)*

ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	**ἉΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ** *missing the mark*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ἈΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	
ἡ μεῖξις **αἱ μείξεις**	a mixing	**ΜΕΙΞΙΣ**
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*

Epicurus appears to be criticizing the theory of elements in Plato's Timaeus, where Plato assigns the shape of tetrahedron (four triangular faces) to fire, hexahedron (six square faces) to earth, octahedron (eight triangular faces) to air, icosahedron (twenty triangular faces) to water – as well as the dodecahedron (twelve pentagonal faces) to the cosmos as a whole.

Epicurus disagrees with Plato that elements have one specific shape. For example, the element of water is not necessarily the specific shape of an icosahedron, the aggregates of atoms that are the element of water can only be said to be within a class of multiple similar shapes.

14.6 Shapes of the Elements

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 2 (column 35)

...πῶς ἄν τις ὕδωρ ἢ άέ[ρ]α διανοηθείηι ἢ πῦρ, επεὶ ούδ' ἂν γῆν στερεὰν καὶ άδιάλυτον διανοηθείηι τις, μὴ ὅτι ταῦτα άποφαινόμενοι τέμνουσιν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ στερεὸν ἕκαστον τούτων νοηθήσεται, πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας κατ[ὰ] τὰς τομὰς φαντασίας παρασκευᾶι σχημάτων, καὶ ο[ὐ] τ[ρ]ίγωνα [ο]ὐδὲ πυραμίδας οὐδὲ κύβους ούδ' άλλ' ούθὲν ὡ[ρ]ισμένον σχῆμα· ο[ὐ]θὲν γ[ὰ]ρ πιθανὸν ἔχοιεν [ἂ]ν λέγειν ὡς μᾶλλον τι τὰ ὀρώμενα ταῦτα [τὰ] τ[έτ]ταρα [εἴ]δη ἔ[σ]τι [νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τομὰς λαμβάνειν ἢ παντοδαπά]...

...πῶς ἄν Τις ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα διανοηθείη ἢ πῦρ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν γῆν στερεὰν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον διανοηθείη Τις;

...how could Someone [mentally] perceive water or air or fire [as solid and indissoluble], when One cannot even [mentally] perceive earth as solid and indissoluble?

μὴ ὅτι ταῦτα Ἀποφαινόμενοι τέμνουσιν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ στερεὸν Ἕκαστον τούτων νοηθήσεται, πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας κατὰ τὰς τομὰς φαντασίας Παρασκευᾷ σχημάτων – καὶ οὐ τρίγωνα οὐδὲ πυραμίδας οὐδὲ κύβους οὐδ' ἀλλ' οὐθὲν ὡρισμένον σχῆμα – Οὐθὲν γὰρ πιθανὸν Ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς μᾶλλον τι τὰ ὁρώμενα ταῦτα τὰ τέτταρα Εἴδη Ἔστι νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τομὰς λαμβάνειν ἢ παντοδαπά...

not [to mention the fact] that Those [people] representing these [ideas of indissoluble elements] do in reality] divide [them]: given that Each of these [elements] is not conceived as firm, [then] One could provide many and varied appearances of shapes according to the divisions [of elements] – and [there will] not be [just] triangles, or pyramids, or cubes, or any other finite shape [specific to each element] – for Those [people who define a particular shape for each element] would have Nothing persuasive to say [to convince us that] that It is more [fitting] to think that these four visible Forms are comprehended [by us] according to [their] divisions [of a specific shape for each element] rather [than the elements being] varied [in their specific class of shapes]...

τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ὝΔΩΡ** *rain / water*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*

ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ *land*
στερεός *(ά, όν)*	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ *stiff*
ἡ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution [i.e., explanation]	ΛΥΣΙΣ *the process of loosening*
ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ *fully loosening*
ἀδιάλυτος *(ον)*	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ *not fully loose*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ἀποφαινόμενος *(ομένη, όμενον)*	representing	ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining away*
ὁ ἀποφαινόμενος οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι	he who represents	
ἐπιτέμνειν	to cut short	ΕΠΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ *cutting upon*
τέμνειν	to divide	
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
παντοῖος *(α, ον)*	all kinds	ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ *all of this sort*
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ *cut*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
τὸ τρίγωνον τὰ τρίγωνα	triangle	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ *three corner*
ἡ πυραμίς αἱ πυραμίδες	pyramid	ΠΥΡΑΜΙΣ *fire-shaped*
ὁ κύβος οἱ κύβοι	cube	ΚΥΒΟΣ *dice*
ὡρισμένος *(η, ον)*	finite	ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *limit*
πιθανός *(ή, όν)*	persuasive	ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ *probable*
ὁρώμενος *(ὁρωμένη, ὁρώμενον)*	being seen	ὉΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *perceiving*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ *cut*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
παντοδαπός *(ή, όν)*	varied	ΠΑΝΤΟΔΑΠΟΣ *all countries*

Epicurus explains that Plato's theory of the elements being composed of distinct geometric shapes is flawed: because even earth – which is usually the most solid of "the four elements" – is not permanently solid or indissoluble.

*Given that this is the case, it is absurd to assign **solid** and **fixed** shapes to the even **less solid** elements of water, fire, or air.*

14.7 Shape of Fire

The word "pyramid" comes from the Greek word for "fire." The assumption was that fire had this basic fundamental shape due to its being "pointed" and causing pain when touched. Epicurus points out that this argument is insufficient to conclude that fire is always composed of pyramid shaped components.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3 (column 36)

...*[συγχωρῶμεν δὲ τό γε νῦν τῶι πυρὶ τὴν πυραμίδα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐκείνων τῶν σ]*χημάτω[ν] τοῖ[ς] λοιποῖς στοιχείοις κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν' αὐτῶν εἴδη ταυτεί· ἀλλ' οὐχ[ὶ] μόνον, εἰ ἄρα, ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἂν τοιαύτη τις φαντασία σχήματος οἵαν ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδωσίν ποτε δόξαι γίνεσθαι, οὐδ' αὔ[τ]η αἰεί, οὐ δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν φύσιν πυρός, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν αὐτῆς φλ[ο]γός, κα[ὶ] ταύτην ἐμ ποιᾶ[ι] τ[ι]νι τοῦ [π]εριέ[χοντο]ς καταστάσει· ἐπὶ [δ' ε]ἴδη ταυτ[ὶ] φερόμενος [ἐν]ίοτε ἔοικε[ν] ἀποδ[ι]δ[οὺς τ]ῶι πυρὶ σχ[ῆ]μα [διάφορον κ]αί...

...[*Συγχωρῶμεν, δὲ τό γε νῦν, τῷ πυρὶ τὴν Πυραμίδα ὑπάρχειν: καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐκείνων τῶν*] σχημάτων τοῖς λοιποῖς στοιχείοις κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν' αὐτῶν εἴδη ταυτεί – ἀλλ' οὐχὶ μόνον·

> ...[*let Us agree, for now, that a Pyramid-shape exists in fire: nevertheless, certain other*] shapes also [exist] among those in the remaining components [of fire] according to the very forms of [those components] that appear – not just one [shape].

εἰ ἄρα, ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἂν τοιαύτη τις Φαντασία σχήματος οἵαν Ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδωσίν ποτε δόξαι γίνεσθαι – οὐδ', Αὔτη αἰεί ¬ οὐ δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν φύσιν πυρός, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν αὐτῆς φλογός, καὶ ταύτην ἐν ποιᾷ τινι τοῦ περιέχοντος καταστάσει·

> if indeed, [there] might [be] in fire such a certain appearance of the shape as that which This person [*i.e., Plato*] sometimes demonstrates seems to be produced – nevertheless, [it is] not always This [image] ¬ nor [does this image of a specific shape] encompass the entire nature of fire, but rather [only] encompasses the [nature] of the flame itself, and this [is only produced] in a certain type of condition of the surrounding [environment].

ἐπὶ δ' εἴδη ταυτὶ φερόμενος, ἐνίοτε Ἔοικεν ἀποδιδοὺς τῷ πυρὶ σχῆμα διάφορον καί...

> but being carried along in these forms sometimes demonstrates for fire that It resembles a differing shape and...

ἡ χώρα **αἱ χῶραι**	space	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*
συγχωρεῖν	to agree	**ΣΥΓΧΩΡΕΙΝ** *place / location together*
τὸ πῦρ	fire	**ΠΥΡ** *fire*
ἡ πυραμίς **αἱ πυραμίδες**	pyramid	**ΠΥΡΑΜΙΣ** *fire-shaped*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ΎΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row (in a series)*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
ταυτεί = **ταυτὶ**	[here, "the very"]	
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ *seeming*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ φλόξ αἱ φλόγες	flame	ΦΛΟΞ *burning*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ *holding around*
ἡ κατάστασις αἱ καταστάσεις	condition	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ *thoroughly placed*
φερόμενος *(η, ον)*	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
ἔοικεν	it resembles	
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
ἀποδιδούς *(οῦσα, όν)*	demonstrating	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
διάφορος *(ον)*	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ *carrying apart*

14.8 Air Pressure & Fire, Errors from Analogy and Inference

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 4 (column 37)

...ἐξέφευ[γε] τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος στο[λ]ήν, λεπτομερὲς πα[ν]τελῶς αὐτὸ ὂν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν ἀθροισμῶι λαμβάνεσθαι συναγωγὴν ἐπιδεχομένωι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐμβρείθεια ποσὴ τις στολὴν ἐπιδέχεται οὔτ[ε] λεπτομέρεια, ἀλλὰ συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου συντελεστικὴ γί[ν]εται· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο γελοίως ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας ἀναλελόγισται καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταμένως τἀφανὲς διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογί[ζ]εσθαι· καὶ ἡ γῆ δὲ π[ά]λιν οὐ[κ] ἐ[κ τοῦ] αὐτ[οῦ τ]ρόπου δύν[αται]...

...Ἐξέφευγε τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος στολήν, λεπτομερὲς παντελῶς Αὐτὸ ὂν, καὶ οὐ δυνάμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν ἀθροισμῷ λαμβάνεσθαι συναγωγὴν ἐπιδεχομένῳ·

> ...[*flowing upwards, the Form of flames*] flows out from the pressure beneath the air, being absolutely of a subtle composition Itself, and not having the force beneath the air to be taken into an aggregation that permits a gathering.

οὔτε γὰρ Ἐμβρείθεια ποσὴ τις στολὴν ἐπιδέχεται – οὔτε Λεπτομέρεια: ἀλλὰ Συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου συντελεστικὴ γίνεται·

> for neither does any measurable Density [*on its own*] permit pressure [to form] – nor does its subtle composition [*on its own, permit pressure to form*]: but some measurable Symmetry [*of density and subtlety*] does become contributive to such a [*formation of pressure as seen in flames*].

ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ Τοῦτο [1] γελοίως ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας ἀναλελόγισται ¬ καὶ οὐκ [2] ἐπισταμένως τἀφανὲς διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογίζεσθαι· καὶ ἡ Γῆ δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου δύναται...

> but even This has been [1] ridiculously analogized from the appearance ¬ and not [2] by them inferring in an understandable way the invisible thing through what is apparent [*i.e., the shape of fire on a fundamental level through observing fire and flames*]. and again, the Earth is not capable from the same way...

τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
ἡ φλόξ αἱ φλόγες	flame	ΦΛΟΞ *burning*
ἐκφεύγειν	to flow out from	ΕΚΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ *fleeing out*
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ *equipping*
λεπτομερής *(ές)*	of a subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ *fine/thin part*
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ *all completing*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ *power*
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ *in groups*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
ὁ ἀθροισμός οἱ ἀθροισμοί	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ *result of action of [being] gathered*
λαμβάνειν	[generally] to acquire [here, "to be taken"]	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
ἡ συναγωγή αἱ συναγωγαί	gathering	ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ *going together*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible [here, "permitting"]	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *accepting in*
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ *the result of compacting*
ἡ πυκνότης αἱ πυκνότητες	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ *condition from compacting*
ἡ ἐμβρείθεια = ἡ ἐμβρίθεια	density	ΕΜΒΡΕΙΘΕΙΑ *heaviness within*
ποσός *(ή, όν)*	how many / measurable	ΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain*
ἡ λεπτομέρεια αἱ λεπτομέρειαι	subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ *fine/thin part*
ἡ συμμετρία αἱ συμμετρίαι	symmetry [of physical proportion]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ *measure together*
ἀποτελεστικός *(ή, όν)*	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing out*
συντελεστικός	contributive	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of completing together*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
γελοιότερος *(οτέρα, ότερον)*	more ridiculous	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ *more laughing*
γελοίως	ridiculously	ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ *laughing*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *reasoning action again*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*

ἐπισταμένως	in an understandable way	**ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΩΣ** *standing upon*
τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον **τὰ ἀφανιζόμενα**	what disappears	**ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of not appearing*
τἀφανὲς = **τὸ ἄφανες** **τὰ ἄφανη**	invisible thing	**ΑΦΑΝΗ** *not appearing*
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action together*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

14.9 Critique of Triangle Theory

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 5 (column 38)

...τα αὑτῶι τρίγωνα ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συμπλέκει σχήματα· εἰ μὲν ἄτομα ὑφείληπτο εἶναι, τί οὐχὶ ἐποιήσατό τινα ἀπόδειξιν ὡς ἔστιν ἄτομα [σ]ώματα; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄτομα, τ[ί] ἂν ἐκ τούτων νομίζοι τις συνίστασθαι τὰ λοιπὰ ἃ συμπηγνύει ἐξ ἄλλων ὡνδήποτε; ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὖθίς που ταῦτα μηκυνθήσεται· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἱ[κ]ανὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτ[ι] συνέβαι[ν]ε γελοίως τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦ[τον ἅμ]α μὲν ὅμοιον ε[ἶ]παί πως τἄ[λλ]α καταζημ[ιοῦν]... ...ἅμα δὲ κατα[λέγειν π]άθ[η] μηθὲν δυ[νη]σό[μενον λ]ογί[ζε]σθαι [κα]τὰ τὸ...

...τὰ αὐτῷ τρίγωνα ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ Συμπλέκει σχήματα· εἰ μὲν ἄτομα Ὑφείληπτο εἶναι, τί οὐχὶ Ἐποιήσατό τινα ἀπόδειξιν ὡς ἔστιν ἄτομα σώματα;

...the triangles of his from which He also entangles the remaining shapes. if He supposed that [indivisible] atoms exist, why did He not make any proof that bodies exist as indivisible [*i.e., atomic*]?

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄτομα, τί ἂν ἐκ τούτων νομίζοι Τις συνίστασθαι τὰ λοιπὰ – ἃ Συμπηγνύει ἐξ ἄλλων ὡνδήποτε;

but if [his shapes are] not indivisible [*and therefore can be divided further*], what would One think the remaining [*shapes that result from this further dividing*] are composed of – which He puts together out of anything whatsoever?

ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὖθίς που ταῦτα μηκυνθήσεται: νῦν δὲ Ἐκεῖνο ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Συνέβαινε γελοίως τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἅμα μὲν ὅμοιον εἶπαί, πως τἄλλα καταζημιοῦν... ...ἅμα δὲ καταλέγειν πάθη μηθὲν δυνησόμενον λογίζεσθαι κατὰ τὸ...

however, these [topics] will again, I suppose, be lengthened out: but for now, It is sufficient to say that It ridiculously occurred that this man [*i.e., Plato*] simultaneously called [his basic shapes] similar, [while] somehow fully depriving other [shapes]... ...simultaneously describing experiences, while being unable to reason at all in accordance with...

τὸ τρίγωνον **τὰ τρίγωνα**	triangle	**ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ** *three corner*
λοιπός (ή, όν)	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
πλεκτικός (η, ον)	entangling	**ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of weaving*

συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom ("what is indivisible")	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping under*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made	**ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *gathering*
ἡ ἀπόδειξις **αἱ ἀποδείξεις**	proof	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ** *from pointing out*
ἄτομος *(ον)*	indivisible	**ΑΤΟΜΑ** *not cut*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
συνίστασθαι	to be composed	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing together*
συμπηγνύναι	to put together	**ΣΥΜΠΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ** *securing together*
αὖθίς	again	
τὸ μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *extent*
μηκύνειν	to lengthen out	**ΜΗΚΥΝΕΙΝ** *extent*
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	**ἹΚΑΝΟΣ** *fitting / proper*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to occur"]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
γελοίως	ridiculously	**ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ** *laughing*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
καταζημιοῦν	to fully deprive	**ΚΑΤΑΖΗΜΙΟΥΝ** *thoroughly damaging*
καταλέγειν	to describe	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking thoroughly*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
δυνάμενος *(μένη, μενον)*	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *power*
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action again*
ἀναλογιστέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be analogized	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be reasoning action again*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	**ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *action of collecting*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 6 (column 39)

...[ὅμοι]ον τ[ο]ῖς πάθεσίν ἐστιν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τεττάρων τούτων στοιχείων γινομένοις ὃ ἀποδίδωσιν σχῆμα, μάλ[ι]στα μὲν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἑκάτερον, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε ἤδη τὴν ὁμοιομέρειαν τῶι φαινομένωι κεκτημένον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν αὑτοῦ κατεστρέφθω· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰομένους καταζηλοῦν, ὅταν οὐσίαν τις ὀνομάζηι, τοὺς ταύταις ταῖς φωναῖς χρωμένους, [καὶ π]άλιν, ὅ[τ]αν λέξεως ἀναγκαίαν τινὰ διάθεσιν ποιήσηται, τοὺς σοφιστεύοντας ἀπὸ τούτων τῶ[ν] μερῶν, μικρὰ βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι· φασὶ γ[ὰ]ρ δὴ τοὺς μ[ε]τα[δ]οξάζοντ[ας]...

...ὅμοιον τοῖς πάθεσίν Ἐστιν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τεττάρων τούτων στοιχείων γινομένοις –Ὃ ἀποδίδωσιν σχῆμα μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἑκάτερον ¬ εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε ἤδη τὴν ὁμοιομέρειαν τῷ φαινομένῳ κεκτημένον.

...[*He suggests that*] It is similar to [*our*] experiences [*that are*] produced by these four elements – [*and it is our experiences*] Which most of all demonstrates a shape and also [*suggests*] each [*of the four as*] primary [*elements*] ¬ but if not, at least as what already possesses homoeomeria in what appears.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν αὑτοῦ Κατεστρέφθω.

but Let these [*shapes*] of his be overturned.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰομένους καταζηλοῦν ὅταν "οὐσίαν" Τις ὀνομάζῃ – τοὺς ταύταις ταῖς φωναῖς χρωμένους, καὶ πάλιν, ὅταν λέξεως ἀναγκαίαν τινὰ διάθεσιν Ποιήσηται – τοὺς σοφιστεύοντας ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, μικρὰ Βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι· Φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς μεταδοξάζοντας...

as for those believing [themselves] to zealously emulate[※] [*Plato*] when Someone uses the word "existence" – and again, [as for those who] use these very statements, when They make a certain arrangement of a term necessary – I wish to converse [only] briefly with those engaging in sophistry derived from these very [particular] details [of grammar]. for They say that those who are changing their opinions...

[Alternative] ※ as for those thinking to create prejudice against Someone using the word "existence"

ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
τέτταρες *(ες, α)*	four	**ΤΕΤΤΑΡΕΣ** *four*
τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row (in a series)*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	**ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *become*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ὁμοιομερής *(ές)*	"similarly composed" homoiomeric	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *similar parts*
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια **αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαι**	homoeomeria	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ** *state of similar parts*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
κεκτημένος *(η, ον)*	having possessed	**ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *acquired*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *thoroughly turning*

οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
οἰόμενος *(η, ον)*	believing	**ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *perceiving*
καταζηλοῦν	* to zealously emulate	**ΚΑΤΑΖΗΛΟΥΝ** *thoroughly* *envying*
	addition of -κατα forms a hapax legomenon, which LSJ translates for this passage as "to create prejudice against," but Epicurus uses ζηλοῦν, with the sense of "to strive after"	
ἡ οὐσία **αἱ οὐσίαι**	existence	**ΟΥΣΙΑ** *being*
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	**ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *naming*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	**ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
ἡ διάθεσις **αἱ διαθέσεις**	arrangement	**ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of* *placing through*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
σοφιστεύων *(ουσα, ον)*	engaging in sophistry i.e., engaging in what is considered to be wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΩΝ** *considered to have knowledge*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part [here "detail"]	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *council*
διαλεχθῆναι	to converse [already]	**ΔΙΑΛΕΧΘΗΝΑΙ** *spoke across*
μεταδοξάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	changing one's opinion	**ΜΕΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ** *change seeming*

An obscure critique of certain forms of eclecticism in physics. The critique may have been sparked by Plato's combination of Empedoclean and Pythagorean principles in his theory of elements.

14.11 Empedocles

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 7 (column 40)

...[οἰκεῖον εἶ]ναι, τοῦ συνάψαντος τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶι καὶ ἀκόλουθον, ἐκείνου δὲ ἀλλότριον, τοῦ κυκήσαντος μετὰ τῶν ούκ οἰκείων δογμάτων τόδε τι ὀρθὸν δόγμα, κἂν πρότερος ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτῶι τύχηι· συμπεφορημένος γάρ ἐστ[ι]ν οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὸ δι[ε]σπαρμένον δόγμα μεθ' ἑτέρω[ν] ἀλλοτρίων ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων εἰς [τ]αὐτὸ συṇάγηι, ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν ἀ̣ν{ι}ομολ̣[ογ]ούμεν' ἀλ̣λ[ή]λοις τινά, [εἴ]τε παρ' α[ὐτοῦ] εἴτε π̣αρ' ἄ̣[λλ]ων σ̣υντιθ̣ῆι· κἄν [τις] τό̣[δε] μὲν Ἐμπεδο[κ]λέ̣ους λέ[γη]ι π̣ρ̣ὸς νοῦν, τό[δ]ε̣ δ' ἄν[ε]υ [νοῦ] τύχηι...

...οἰκεῖον εἶναι τοῦ συνάψαντος τὸ Σύμφωνον αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκόλουθον ¬ ἐκείνου δὲ ἀλλότριον, τοῦ κυκήσαντος, μετὰ τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων δογμάτων, τόδε τι ὀρθὸν δόγμα, κἂν πρότερος ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτῷ Τύχῃ: συμπεφορημένος γάρ, ἐστιν οὐχ῞Ος ἂν τὸ διεσπαρμένον δόγμα μεθ' ἑτέρων ἀλλοτρίων ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων εἰς ταὐτὸ συνάγῃ ¬ ἀλλ'῞Ος ἂν ἀνομολογούμεν' ἀλλήλοις τινά, εἴτε παρ' αὐτοῦ εἴτε παρ' ἄλλων συντίθῃ·

...the Agreement of someone who has connected with that [teaching] as a consistent [follower, is] compatible ¬ but [the Agreement] of another who has mixed up this or that right teaching with teachings that do not belong is foreign, even if He initially happens to have fallen upon that [teaching]: for, having joined [the teachings] together, He is not one who would gather the scattered teaching along with other teachings incompatible with his own into the same [compatible] thing ¬ but [he is] one Who would mutually agree to something disagreeing with itself, whether from himself or from others.

κἄν Τις τόδε μὲν Ἐμπεδοκλέους λέγῃ πρὸς νοῦν, τόδε δ' ἄνευ νοῦ, Τύχῃ...

and even if Someone says something from Empedocles [was said] with reason but something else [from him was said] without reason, It may happen that...

οἰκεῖος (α, ον)	compatible	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *appropriate*
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening together*
συνάψας (ασα, αν)	having connected	ΣΥΝΑΨΑΣ *fastening together*
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ *speaking together*
τό σύμφωνον τά σύμφωνα	agreement [with]	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ *speaking together*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
ἀκόλουθος (ος, ον)	consistent	
ἀλλοτρίως	in a foreign way	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ *different other*
ἡ ἀλλοτριότης αἱ ἀλλοτριότητες	foreignness	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from different other*
ἀλλότριος (ία, ιον)	foreign	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ *different other*
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ *circular*
κυκήσας (ασα, αν)	mixed up	ΚΥΚΗΣΑΣ *wheel*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	ΟΡΘΩΣ *straight upright*
ὀρθός (ή, όν)	right	ΟΡΘΟΣ *straight upright*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ *seeming*
πρότερος (α, ον)	former [here, "initially"]	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *before [contrast]*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
ἐπιπεσών (οῦσα, όν)	having fallen upon	ΕΠΙΠΕΣΩΝ *fell (upon)*
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
τύχῃ	it may happen	ΤΥΧΗΙ *happening*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
συμφορεῖν	to put together	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΕΙΝ *carrying together*
συμπεφορημένος (η, ον)	having been joined together	ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ *carried together*

παρεσπαρμένος *(η, ον)*	spread out	**ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ** *scatter beside*
διεσπαρμένος *(η, ον)*	spread through	**ΔΙΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ**
ἀλλότριος *(ία, ιον)*	foreign	**ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ** *different other*
συνάγειν	to gather	**ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ** *going together*
ἀνομολογούμενος *(η, ον)*	disagreeing	**ΑΝΟΜΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *not same reasoning*
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς	Empedocles	**ΕΜΠΕΔΟΚΛΗΣ** *steadfast glory*
ὁ νοῦς **οἱ νοῖ**	intellect	**ΝΟΥΣ** *sense*

14.12 Concession

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 8 (column 41)

...[συντί]θησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπαινεῖ ἐξαπίνης τονδεί τινα, [ε]ἶτα πάλιν τὸν ἀντιδοξάζοντα τούτωι, οὔτε τοδί τι ἐγκωμιάζει ὃ ὅδε τις λέγει, εἶτα πάλιν τὸ ἀντ[ι]κείμενον τούτωι ὃ ἄλλος τις λέγει, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐπαινῆι τὸ τοῦδέ τινος ἐπιφορᾶς ὀρθῆς εἶδος, εἶτα πάλιν τὸ τοῦδε, οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῶι τοῦδε ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν σύμφωνον ἦι, καὶ οὕτως [ἐ]π̣ὶ πάντων πράττει· ἀρχὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ἔλεγον, οὐ̣δ' ἐκείνων οἴετα[ι] δίκαιο̣ν νομίζειν [τι]νά, τούτων οὐθέν, ὥσ̣τε ο[ὐ]κ ἐπ̣άγε̣τ̣[αι ποιη]τὰς καὶ σοφ[ι]στὰ̣[ς καὶ ῥήτο]ρας, οἵ γ[ε] πᾶν [τὸ] τ̣ὴν ὀρθὴν ἔχον ἐπιφο[ρὰ]ν̣...

...συντίθησιν. οὔτε γὰρ Ἐπαινεῖ ἐξαπίνης τονδεί τινα, εἶτα πάλιν τὸν ἀντιδοξάζοντα τούτῳ ¬ οὔτε τοδί τι Ἐγκωμιάζει ὃ ὅδε Τις λέγει, εἶτα πάλιν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ, ὃ ἄλλος Τις λέγει: ἀλλ', ὅταν Ἐπαινῇ τὸ τοῦδέ τινος ἐπιφορᾶς "ὀρθῆς" εἶδος – εἶτα πάλιν τὸ τοῦδε – οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῷ τοῦδε Ἐπαινεῖ ¬ ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν σύμφωνον ᾖ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων Πράττει·

> ...to mutually agree. neither does [Empedocles] suddenly praise a certain person, and then next [praise] someone else who argues against him ¬ nor does He extol something that Someone says, and then next [extol] something contrary to it, that Someone else says: instead, when [Empedocles] praises the form of someone's "right" application – and then next, the [form] of another's [application] – He does not praise what is contrary to his [view] ¬ but what would be in harmony with it, and He acts this way in all things.

ἀρχὴν δέ, ὥσπερ Ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἐκείνων Οἴεται δίκαιον νομίζειν τινά τούτων οὐθέν. ὥστε οὐκ Ἐπάγεται ποιητὰς καὶ σοφιστὰς καὶ ῥήτορας, Οἵ γε πᾶν τὸ τὴν "ὀρθὴν" ἔχον ἐπιφορὰν...

> but, as I was saying in the beginning, he believes it is not just to consider any of these [views], nor any of those [views]. therefore, He does not bring in poets and sophists and rhetors – Who indeed promote everything holding a "right" application...

συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
ἐπαινεῖν	to praise	**ΕΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *praising upon*
ἐξαπίνης	suddenly	**ΕΞΑΠΙΝΗΣ** *unexpectedly out of*
εἶτα	next	**ΕΙΤΑ** *hereafter*
πάλιν	again	**ΠΑΛΙΝ** *back*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἀντιδοξάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	arguing against	**ΑΝΤΙΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ** *seeming against*

ἐγκωμιάζειν	to extoll	ΕΓΚΩΜΙΑΖΕΙΝ *[to speak]* *in celebration*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated against*
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ *carrying*
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ *carrying upon*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	ΟΡΘΟΣ *straight upright*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
ὑπεναντίος *(α, ον)*	contrary	ὙΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *over against*
σύμφωνος *(ος, ον)*	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ *speaking* *together*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀρχὴν	in the beginning	
οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*
δίκαιος *(ᾱ, ον)*	just	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ *custom / right*
νομίζειν	to think [here, "to consider"]	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ *custom*
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality *(characteristic)*	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *gathering*
ὁ ποιητής οἱ ποιηταί	poet	ΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ *gathering*
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ *considered to* *have knowledge*
ὁ ῥήτωρ οἱ ῥήτορες	rhetor	ῬΗΤΩΡ *speaking*

14.13 Enthymematic Uproars

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 9 (column 42)

...[τῶν τοῖς προσέ]χουσι θορύβους ἐνθυμηματικοὺς καὶ ἀποφθε[γ]γματικοὺς παρασκευα ζόντων· σολοικίζει[ν] τ' ἐν δόξαις τὸ μὲν ὅλ[ον ὁ] μηθὲν ἀκόλο[υ]θον συναρτῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] ὁ ἐπιβαλόμενος μὲν [κατὰ του]τον[ί] τινα βαδ[ίζει]ν, ἐξαπίν[η]ς δ' ἀ[ρ]χόμε[νος καθ'] ἕτερον, ἕνα καθ' ἕ[ν', ἀλλ'] οὐχ ὃς ἂν τῶι μὲν ὅλω[ι τρό]πωι | μὴ ἐπιβάλληται τῶ[ι λ]όγω[ι] τῶι τούτου χρῆ[σθ]αι, αὐτ[ὸν δ]ὲ μόνον τ[ι παρ]αποιῇ[ι ἐ]πι[τηδ]εύ[σας ἅμα] καὶ [π]ρὸς τὸ ο[ἰ]κεῖο[ν δόγμα] ἀποκαταστήση[ι] | [τινὸς τὰ] τυχόντ' ἀ[να]μά[ρτητα] μικρὸν τ' [ἀπέ]χον[τα τοῦ λόγο[υ τοῦ αὐτ]ο[ῦ]...

...τῶν τοῖς προσέχουσι θορύβους ἐνθυμηματικοὺς καὶ ἀποφθεγματικοὺς παρασκευαζόντων – σολοικίζειν τ' ἐν δόξαις – τὸ μὲν ὅλον Ὁ μηθὲν ἀκόλουθον συναρτῶν·

> ...while they also provide enthymematic and apophthegmatic uproars [i.e., implicit and proverbial arguments] for [those people who] pay attention – [while they are] committing solecisms also in [their] judgments – [particularly someone] Who joins together nothing consistent as a whole.

οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁ ἐπιβαλόμενος μὲν κατὰ τουτονί τινα βαδίζειν, ἐξαπίνης δ' ἀρχόμενος καθ' ἕτερον, ἕνα καθ' ἕν' ¬ ἀλλ' οὐχ Ὃς ἂν τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἐπιβάλληται, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτου χρῆσθαι.

not only this, but even [Someone] who focuses on proceeding according to this certain [teaching], and then suddenly begins according to a different [teaching], one by one, [*he can nevertheless be considered consistent*] – but not Someone who does not objectively focus in the entire way, [*and is not appropriately*] using this specific reasoning.

αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον τι Παραποιῇ – ἐπιτηδεύσας ἅμα – καὶ, πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον δόγμα, Ἀποκαταστήσῃ τινὸς τὰ τυχόντ' ἀναμάρτητα, μικρὸν τ' ἀπέχοντα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ αὐτοῦ...

but only by Him distorting it in some [way] – while simultaneously being [well] trained [in the teaching] – and He reinstated, for a compatible teaching, anything of someone's that happened to be mistake-free, that was slightly different from his reasoning...

προσέχειν	to pay attention	**ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold towards*
προσέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	paying attention	
ὁ θόρυβος **οἱ θόρυβοι**	uproar	**ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ** *noise*
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	**ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *spirit in*
ἐνθυμηματικός *(ή, όν)*	implicit *enthymematic*	**ΕΝΘΥΜΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characterized by being in spirit*
	"in the form of enthymemes" *An enthymeme is an argument developed from unstated assumptions that are based on experience and common sense probability.*	
ἀποφθεγματικός *(ή, όν)*	proverbial *apophthegmatic*	**ΑΠΟΦΘΕΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characterized by uttering away from*
	"dealing in apophthegms" *An apophthegm is short, clever saying that expresses a general truth or principle, often in a memorable way*	
παρασκευάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	to also provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΩΝ** *preparing alongside*
σολοικίζειν	to commit solecisms	**ΣΟΛΟΙΚΙΖΕΙΝ**
	"to act like a person from the city of Sóloi (on the southern coast of Anatolia)" with the meaning of "to make a large number of grammatical errors while speaking or writing"	
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	
συναρτῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	joining together	**ΣΥΝΑΡΤΩΝ** *attaching together*
βάλλειν	to throw	**ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing*
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	**ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing upon*
βαδίζειν	proceed	**ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *walking*
ἐξαπίνης	suddenly	**ΕΞΑΠΙΝΗΣ** *unexpectedly out of*
ἄρχειν	to begin	**ΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning*
ἀρχόμενος *(η, ον)*	beginning	**ΑΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ**
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
παραποιεῖν	to distort	**ΠΑΡΑΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering across*
τὸ ἐπιτήδειον **τὰ ἐπιτήδεια**	suitable things	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΝ** *suitable upon*
ἡ ἐπιτηδειότης **αἱ ἐπιτηδειότητες**	supply	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from being suitable towards*
ἐπιτηδεύειν	to be trained	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΕΙΝ** *pursuing towards*
ἐπιτηδεύσας *(ασα, αν)*	having been trained	
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἱστάναι	to stand	**ΊΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing*
ἀποκαθιστάναι	to reinstate	**ΑΠΟΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing back*
ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
τυχών	happening	**ΤΥΧΩΝ** *happening*
τὸ τυχόν **τὰ τυχόντα**	what happens [to come] to be	**ΤΥΧΟΝ** *coming to be*
ἀναμάρτητος *(ος, ον)*	mistake-free	**ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ** *not missing the mark*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ἀπέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	different	**ΑΠΕΧΩΝ** *holding away*

14.14 Let Them Have Silence

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 10 (column 43)

...αὐτοὺς γὰρ δίκαιον φάσκει[ι]ν σολ[ο]ικίζειν ἢ συμπεφορῆσθαι, λελυμασμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τ[ῆ]ς φύσ[ε]ως αὐτῶν ὀρθὸν ἐπ[ι]φορᾶς εἶδος· οἱ δὲ δὴ δι[ὰ] τινος ὀνόματος ἢ ὀνο[μασ]ίας ἀδιαφόρ[ο]υ κοινότητα, τῶι τε λελογισμέ[ν]ωι καὶ τῶι τυχόντι γ[ι]νομένην, τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκέτι ἐπαισθανόμενο[ι], παντελῶ[ς] ἡσυχίαν [ἐ]χέτωσαν.

...Αὐτοὺς γὰρ Δίκαιον φάσκειν σολοικίζειν ἢ συμπεφορῆσθαι – λελυμασμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν ὀρθὸν ἐπιφορᾶς εἶδος·

> ...for [it is] just to allege that They [either] commit solecisms, or they have been [eclectically] pressed together – [because] they have spoiled even the correct form of impact [arising] from the chance of their nature.

Οἱ δὲ δή, διὰ [1] τινος ὀνόματος ἢ ὀνομασίας ἀδιαφόρου κοινότητα τῷ τε λελογισμένῳ καὶ [2] τῷ τυχόντι γινομένην, τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκέτι ἐπαισθανόμενοι: παντελῶς ἡσυχίαν Ἐχέτωσαν

> but indeed, because They, [can] no longer sense the difference between [1] the general quality of some undifferentiated word or designation [that is] produced from what is reasoned and [2] [*the general quality of some word*] that is produced from what happens to come about: We should absolutely let them have silence

δίκαιος *(ᾰ, ον)*	just	**ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ** *custom / right*
φάσκειν	to allege	**ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *affirming*
σολοικίζειν	to commit solecisms	**ΣΟΛΟΙΚΙΖΕΙΝ** *[from] Sóloi*
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing together*
συμπεφορῆσθαι	*to have been [eclectically] pressed together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *having been brought together*
ἡ λύσις **αἱ λύσεις**	solution [i.e., explanation]	**ΛΥΣΙΣ** *the process of loosening*
λελυμασμένος *(η, ον)*	having spoiled	**ΛΕΛΥΜΑΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *having loosened*
ἡ τύχη **αἱ τύχαι**	chance	**ΤΥΧΗ** *happening*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	**ΟΡΘΟΣ** *straight upright*
ἡ ἐπιφορά **αἱ ἐπιφοραί**	application	**ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ** *carrying upon*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ἡ ὀνομασία **αἱ ὀνομασίαι**	designation	**ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ** *state of name*
διάφορος *(ον)*	differing	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *carrying apart*
ἀδιάφορος *(ος, ον)*	undifferentiated	**ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *not carrying apart*
ἡ κοινότης **αἱ κοινότητες**	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	**ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *action of collecting*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
τυχών	happening to be	**ΤΥΧΩΝ** *happening*
τὸ τυχόν **τὰ τυχόντα**	what happens to come about	**ΤΥΧΟΝ** *happening*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἐπαισθανόμενος *(η, ον)*	sensing	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *result of perceiving upon*
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	**ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ** *all completing*
ἡ ἡσυχία **αἱ ἡσυχίαι**	silence	**ἩΣΥΧΙΑ** *stillness*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἐχέτωσαν	let them have	

Epicurus' On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 (subscriptio)

Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΔ, ΧΧΧ𐅄ΗΗΗΗ ἐπὶ Κλ[εάρ]χο

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως* ΙΔ. ΧΧΧ𐅄ΗΗΗΗ. ἐπὶ Κλεάρχο

Epicurus' On Nature, [*book*] 14. 3,900 lines. during [*the archonship of*] Clearchus [301/300 BCE]

X = 1000
XXX = 3000
𐅅 = H (100) x Π (5) = 500
𐅅 = 500
H = 100
HHHH = 400
=
XXX𐅅HHHH = 3,900

Epicurus was 40 years old in 301/300 BCE. This was the year of the Battle of Ipsus and the death of Antigonus I Monophthalmus.

Book 15

[U89]

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Laertius 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ᾽ καὶ ιε᾽ καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [*book*] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [*are bodies*] out of which compounds are made

---

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 1A (superscriptio)

Ἐ[π]ικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΕ. ΧΧΧΗΗ. ἐπὶ [Η]γεμάχου

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως* ΙΕ. ΧΧΧΗΗ. ἐπὶ Ἡγεμάχου

Epicurus' *On Nature*, [*book*] 15. 3,200 lines. during [*the archonship*] of Hēgémachos [300/299 BCE]

Epicurus was 41 years old in 300/299 BCE. During this year Demetrius I Poliorcetes married Seleucus I Nicator's daughter, Stratonice.

15.1 Future Developments

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 5

...[εἰ] μὲν οὖν τις φιλοσοφῶ̣ν... ...[πρά]γματα ἑαυτῶι παρέχε[ι ἐστὶν ἐ]ξ ἧς εἴρηκα ἰδέας· πρ[οιόντ]ος δὲ χρόνου ἔ̣ιπερ τι ̣τῷ[ν] [ἐνδ]εόντ[ω]ν πράττοι...

...εἰ, μὲν οὖν, Τις φιλοσοφῶν... ...πράγματα ἑαυτῷ παρέχει, Ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς Εἴρηκα ἰδέας· προιόντος δὲ χρόνου εἴπερ τι τῶν ἐνδεόντων Πράττοι...

...if, therefore, Someone philosophizing... ...provides [*new*] situations for himself, It exists from the idea which I have mentioned. but as time goes forward, if He will accomplish something of what is lacking...

ὁ φιλόσοφος **οἱ φιλόσοφοι**	philosopher	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ** *loving* *knowledge*
φιλοσοφῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	philosophizing	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ**
τὸ πράγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*

παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
εἴρηκα	I have mentioned	
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing*
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
ἡ ἰδέα αἱ ἰδέαι	idea	ΙΔΕΑ *appearing*
προϊών προιών *(οῦσα, όν)*	going forward	ΠΡΟΙΩΝ *going forward*
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	ΧΡΟΝΟΣ *[seizing]*
ἐνδεῖν	to be lacking	ΕΝΔΕΙΝ
ἐνδεών *(οῦσα, όν)*	lacking	ΕΝΔΕΩΝ
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*

15.2 **Homoeomeria** by Majority

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 11

...καθὸ γὰρ [πρ]ọσαγορεύεταị ọ̈τị δῆ[λον εἶ]ναι κατ' ἐκε[ῖ]νο ἐκ τῶν [π]λείστων τῶν[δ]έ τ̣ινων [πε]ποιη[μ]ένη, ἐξ ọ̣μọιομε[ρειῶν]...

...καθὸ γὰρ Προσαγορεύεται ὅτι "δῆλον" εἶναι κατ' ἐκεῖνο, ἐκ τῶν πλείστων τῶνδέ τινων πεποιημένη – ἐξ ὁμοιομερειῶν...

...to the extent that [*an object's composition*] is said to be "clear" in this [respect], because it has been made from the greatest [*amount*] of certain [*uniform parts*] – from [*their*] homoeomeria...

[Sedley] For [it is claimed that] the respect in which it is spoken of – because it is evident – is the respect according to which it is made out of a majority of such and such things, namely the homoiomeries.

καθό	to the extent that	ΚΑΘΟ
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as [here, "to be said"]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *speaking publicly toward*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	most / greatest	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most filling*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
πεποιημένος	having been made	ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ *gathered*
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαι	homoeomeria	ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ *state of similar parts*

15.3 Impressions & Categories

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 12

...φαντασίαν τοια[υτη]νεὶ [ἢ] τοιαυτηνεί, πόθεν ῥηθή[σον]ται [ἔ]χειν αἱ συ[γκρί]σεις...

...φαντασίαν τοιαυτηνεὶ ἢ τοιαυτηνεί – πόθεν ῥηθήσονται ἔχειν αἱ Συγκρίσεις...

...an appearance like this very thing or like THIS very thing – where will the compounds be said to have...?

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
τοιοῦτοσεί *(τοιαύτηεί, τοιοῦτεί)*	like this very thing, *(such as this exact kind of thing here)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣΕΙ *this of this sort here*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ *said*
ῥηθήσεσθαι	will be said	ῬΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing together*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 17

...ἀλλ' ἐπιβλέπει πό[σα ο]ὕτω[ς] ἥδε ἡ κατηγορία περιλα[μ]βά[ν]ει τῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰσ[θ]ήσ[εσιν κ]αὶ...

...ἀλλ' Ἐπιβλέπει πόσα οὕτως ἥδε ἡ Κατηγορία περιλαμβάνει τῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν καὶ...

...but He fully sees how many things this full [categorical] Indication completely encompasses among what [is] in [the realm of our] sensations and...

ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking upon*
ποσός *(ή, όν)*	how many / measurable	ΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as [here, "to be said"]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *speaking publicly toward*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly speaking publicly*
ἡ κατηγορία αἱ κατηγορίαι	full [categorial] indication	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ *thoroughly speaking publicly*
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*

15.4 Atomic Size

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 19

...ἐπισπᾶται καὶ τὸ τὰ[ς] ἀτ[ό]μο[υς] μηδὲν ἧττον, μ[ηδ]ὲν ἐλάττου[ς] τὰς τοιάσδε ἢ τοιάσδ[ε λ]έγειν εἶναι...

...Ἐπισπᾶται καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀτόμους μηδὲν ἧττον μηδὲν ἐλάττους, τὰς τοιάσδε ἢ τοιάσδε, λέγειν εἶναι...

...He is even drawn to saying that the Atoms, [whether] of one kind or another, are not to a lesser extent nor smaller...

ἐπισπᾶν	to draw to	ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ *pulling upon*
ἐπισπᾶσθαι	to be drawn to	
ἄτομος *(ος, ον)*	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ *not cut*

ἧττον	to a lesser extent	ἭΤΤΟΝ *inferior*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ *lesser*

15.5 Atomic Expulsion

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 20

...ἀτόμων ἐκ̣βο[λὴ]ν̣ ποιε̣ῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ τοι[οῦτ]ον ἤδη ἔνδηλον ποι[εῖ] τ̣ι ὂ̣[ν] κἂν ὑπῆρχε̣ν̣ εἰ...

...ἀτόμων ἐκβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι – τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἤδη ἔνδηλον ποιεῖ Τι ὄν, κἂν ὑπῆρχεν...

...to produce an expulsion of atoms – for Something that exists already makes such a thing clear, even if it were to exist...

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[Β'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
ἡ ἐκβολή αἱ ἐκβολαί	expulsion	ΕΚΒΟΛΗ *throwing out*
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ *clear within*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*

15.6 Organization of Study

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 21

...οὕτω[ς] ὑφηγεῖσθαι· ὅπερ τε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] πρ[οε]ιλόμεθα, οἰκο̣νομεῖτ̣αι [ἡ]μῖν...

...οὕτως ὑφηγεῖσθαι – ὅπερ τε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Προειλόμεθα, Οἰκονομεῖται ἡμῖν...

...to guide in this manner – indeed, just as We preferred from the beginning, It is internally managed by us...

ὑφηγεῖσθαι	to guide	ὙΦΗΓΕΙΝ *guiding under*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀναιρεῖν	to rescind	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping before*
προῄρησθαι	to prefer	ΠΡΟΗΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ *grasped before*
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομίαι	household management	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ *managing the home*
οἰκονομεῖν	to manage the household [here, "to internally manage"]	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΕΙΝ *managing the home*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 22

...αὐτοῖς, ἃ ὀχή[σ]ει κ̣αὶ στεγά[σ]ει αὐτά, καὶ [α]ὐτ[ὰ ὑ]π' ἐκείνων δ̣ιασ̣ωθήσετ̣α̣[ι] καθ̣ά̣περ καί α̣ἱ π̣αρ' ἡμ̣ε̣[τέρ]...

...αὐτοῖς,Ἃ ὀχήσει καὶ στεγάσει αὐτά, καὶ Αὐτὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων διασωθήσεται – καθάπερ καὶ Αἱ παρ' ἡμετέρ...

...to them, Which [ ] will carry and cover them, and They [themselves] will be preserved by those [things] – just as also Those [ ] among us as well...

ὁ ὄχος **οἱ ὄχοι**	carriage, cart, chariot	**ΟΧΟΣ** *riding*
ὀχεῖν	to carry	
στεγάζειν	to cover	**ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ** *covering*
σῴζων *(σῴζουσα, σῷζον)*	preserving	**ΣΩΙΖΩΝ** *saving*
διασῴζων *(ουσα, ον)*	preserving	**ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΩΝ** *fully saving*
διασῴζειν	to preserve	

15.7 Qualities from Shape

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 23

...ἔ̣οικε̣ν̣, οὐ ταῖς κατ̣[ὰ] τὴν σ̣χηµ̣άτισιν ποιό[τ]ησ̣ι τ[ῶν] συγκ̣ρίσεων...

...Ἔοικεν, οὐ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν σχηµάτισιν ποιότησι τῶν συγκρίσεων...

...It seems compatible, not for the qualities of the compounds according to their shapes...

οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἐοικέναι	to seem compatible	**ΕΟΙΚΕΝΑΙ** *was appropriately*
τὸ σχῆµα **τὰ σχήµατα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*

15.8 Correct Judgements

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 24

...πεπραγµ̣α̣τ̣ε̣υµένους· ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας διορᾶν ἀ̣ρχῶν, π̣οῖαί ε̣ἰσ̣ι̣ν̣ ὀρθα̣ὶ ἢ ποῖαι οὐκ ὀ[ρ]θ̣αί...

...πεπραγµατευµένους: ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας διορᾶν ἀρχῶν – Ποῖαί εἰσιν ὀρθαὶ ἢ Ποῖαι οὐκ ὀρθαί...

...[topics] that have been dealt with [*in our writings*]: but also to distinguish judgments of the foundations [*i.e., teachings regarding the atoms*] – What kinds [of judgments] are right and What kinds are not right...

τὸ πρᾶγµα **τὰ πράγµατα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ πραγµατεία **αἱ πραγµατεῖαι**	effort	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ** *state of the result of doing / affair*
πραγµατεύεσθαι	to deal with	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ** *the result of doing*
πεπραγµατευµένος *(η, ον)*	having been delt with	**ΠΕΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *the result of having done*

τό δόγμα **τά δόγματα**	teaching	**ΔΟΓΜΑ** *seeming*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
διορᾶν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΟΡΑΝ** *seeing through*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ποιῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making	**ΠΟΙΩΝ** *gathering*
ποῖος *(α, ον)*	what kind of	**ΠΟΙΟΣ** *gathering*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	**ΟΡΘΟΣ** *straight upright*

15.9 Homoeomeria, Qualities

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 25

...[γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότ[η]τα[ς τὰς] μὴ κατὰ μορφ[ὴν] ὁμ[οιο]μέρεια...

...γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας τὰς μὴ κατὰ μορφὴν Ὁμοιομέρεια...

...for the Homoeomeria according to the qualities [that are] not [determined] by shape...

ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from [asking] what kind*
ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια **αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαι**	homoeomeria	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ** *state of similar parts*

15.10 Descent into Reasoning

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 26

...ἑκάστη ἐπιφορὰ ἐφ' ὅ τι δήποτε γίν[ε]ται, τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβα[νό]μ[εν]ον, καὶ ἐπ[ειδ]ὴ ταῖς μ[ὲν] ἐπιφοραῖς...

...ἑκάστη Ἐπιφορὰ ἐφ' ὅ τι δήποτε γίνεται – τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβανόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῖς μὲν ἐπιφοραῖς...

...each Application is produced in relation to whatever [it is applied to] – as what is completely comprehended together from a descent into [our] reasoning, and since for these applications...

ἡ ἐπιφορά **αἱ ἐπιφοραί**	application	**ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ** *carrying upon*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἡ καταφορά **αἱ καταφοραί**	descent	**ΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying thoroughly / down*

περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	**ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around*
συμπεριλαμβανόμενος *(η, ον)*	completely comprehended together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *grasping around together*
τὸ συμπεριλαμβανόμενον	what is completely comprehended together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ**
ἡ ἐπιφορά **αἱ ἐπιφοραί**	application	**ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ** *carrying upon*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 27

...τῆς καταφορᾶς ἐμπ̣[εριει]λημμένον ἐνδ[ε]ικνύ[σα]σθ̣α̣ι [τῶ]ν οὐκ οἰκ[ε]ίων [ἐν τῇ] π̣ρ̣ώ̣τ̣ηι ἐπιφορ[ᾶι]...

...τῆς καταφορᾶς ἐμπεριειλημμένον ἐνδεικνύσασθαι – τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἐπιφορᾷ...

...to have [already] been indicated in [what is] completely comprehended within the descent [into our reasoning] – of those not compatible in the primary application...

ἡ καταφορά **αἱ καταφοραί**	descent	**ΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying thoroughly / down*
ἐμπεριειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	⁂completely comprehended within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ** *being grasped around in*
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing away*
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ** *showing in*
ἐνδεικνύσασθαι	to be indicated in [already]	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΑΣΘΑΙ**
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ἡ ἐπιφορά **αἱ ἐπιφοραί**	application	**ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ** *carrying upon*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 28

...τῶν ἡμῖν τ̣ο̣ῖ̣ς δόγμασιν· [ἀ]ναγκαῖον [ο]ὐ τοῦτ' ἔστ[ι]ν πράττειν δι[ὰ π]ο̣λλὰ̣[ς] αἰτία[ς]...

...τῶν ἡμῖν τοῖς δόγμασιν – ἀναγκαῖον οὐ τοῦτ' ἔστιν Πράττειν, διὰ πολλάς αἰτίας...

...of those for our teachings – Accomplishing this is not necessary, for many reasons...

τό δόγμα **τά δόγματα**	teaching	**ΔΟΓΜΑ** *seeming*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *compulsion*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause [here, "reason"]	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

[U90]

[Book 16]

[Book 17]

[Book 18]

[Book 19]

[Book 20]

Book 21

21.1 Imageless Names are Meaningless

Epicurus, On Nature, [Possibly Book 21], P.Herc. 362 fr. 2 | 3 | subscriptio

...σιν μαρτύ[ρησιν] ἢ μὴ ἀντιμ[αρτύρη]σ[ις] τῶν λόγων κοπηρίων... ...συγχωροῦμ[εν]... ...οὐδὲ κα[τὰ] φα[ν]τασιαν, οὐδὲ [γ' ἂ]ν ἐπὶ λο[γ]ικ[ὴ]ν, κ[αθ]ὼς πολλάκις [ποι]οῦντα[ι]. οἱ δέ γ[ε]... | ...μὲν ἀπὸ τῶνδέ τινας ὡς [β]λαβησομένο[υς] ἢ ταραχθησομέν[ο]υς ε[ἴρ]ηται. καὶ καθὸ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα καὶ μὴ ὄντα φαμὲν δοξάζειν καὶ κ[α]θό[λου] οὐ[δ]ὲ λαμβάνειν [οὐ]θὲ[ν] φάσμα ἐπινοητικόν, ἀλλὰ ἢ [μόνα] ὀνόμα[τα]. | Ἐπι[κ]ού[ρ]ου Π[ε]ρὶ Φύσεως

...[M] μαρτύρησιν ἢ [¬W] μὴ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τῶν λόγων κοπηρίων... ...Συγχωροῦμεν... ...οὐδὲ κατὰ φαντασιαν, οὐδὲ γ' ἂν ἐπὶ λογικὴν, καθὼς πολλάκις Ποιοῦνται. Οἱ δέ γε...

> ...[M] attestation or [¬W] non-contestation of the clashing reasonings... ...We allow... ...[*they are*] not [*forming their thoughts*] even on the basis of presentation, nor even up to the rational, just as They are often made. but They at least...

...μὲν ἀπὸ τῶνδέ τινας ὡς βλαβησομένους ἢ ταραχθησομένους Εἴρηται. καὶ καθὸ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα καὶ μὴ ὄντα Φαμὲν δοξάζειν: καὶ (κ) καθόλου οὐδὲ λαμβάνειν οὐθὲν Φάσμα ἐπινοητικόν ¬ ἀλλὰ ἢ μόνα Ὀνόματα!
– Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως

> ...while It is said that some from these [*are*] about to be harmed or about to be disturbed. and to the extent We assert that certain false and nonexistent things are being judged: not in any way is an objectively conceivable Appearance also (κ) universally comprehended ¬ but only Words!
> – Epicurus' *On Nature*

ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	[M] attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις	[W] contestation	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying against*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating against*
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ** *beating against*
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	**ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ** *not beating against*
κοπήριος *(α, ον)*	clashing *possibly a hapax legomenon*	**ΚΟΠΗΡΙΟΣ** *relating to beating*
ἡ χώρα αἱ χῶραι	space	**ΧΩΡΑ** *location*

συγχωρεῖν	to agree	ΣΥΓΧΩΡΕΙΝ *place / location together*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
λογικός *(ή, όν)*	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of reasoning*
καθὼς = κατά + ὡς	just as	
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ *many times*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made	ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ *gathering*
	Part 2	
βλάπτειν	to harm	ΒΛΑΠΤΕΙΝ *hindering*
βλαβησόμενος *(η, ον)*	will be harmed	ΒΛΑΒΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ *will hinder*
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating*
ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ *agitating*
τεταραγμένως	with disturbance	ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ *having been agitated*
ταραχώδης *(ης, ες)*	troubling	ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ *agitating*
ταραχθησόμενος *(η, ον)*	will be disturbed	ΤΑΡΑΧΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ *will be agitated*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ *spoke*
καθὸ = κατά + ὅ	inasmuch as, according to the extent that	
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ *deceiving*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
καθόλου	(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ *completely*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *shining*
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ *shining*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing upon*
ἐπινοητικός *(ή, όν)*	objectively conceivable	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being seen upon*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*

End of *On Nature*

[Book 22]

[Book 23]

[Book 24]

Book 25

τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = *Movement*, *which results in* *Action*, *which results in* *[dispositional]* *Development*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	

25.1 Human Agency (Against Hard Determinism)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 3a (A 16.1)

...[ἀνθρ]ώπους, ἧι μὲν μᾶ[λλον αἴ]τιον τῶνδέ... [λ]έγομεν... ἧι δὲ κ[αὶ ἧττο]ν ἄλλων τινων [εἶναι.] ταυτὶ δ' ούθὲν...

...ἀνθρώπους ᾗ μὲν μᾶλλον αἴτιον τῶνδέ... Λέγομεν... ᾗ δὲ καὶ ἧττον ἄλλων τινων εἶναι. Ταυτὶ δ' οὐθὲν...

...insofar as humans [*are*] more the cause of these things... We say... but insofar as [*humans*] are also to a lesser extent [*the cause*] of certain other things. These very things, however, in no way...

ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ᾗ	insofar as	**ἩΙ** *in/for which*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
τὸ αἴτιον **τὰ αἴτια**	what is the cause	**ΑΙΤΙΟΝ**
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 2 (A 18)

...[τ]ὸ μέρος συμμε[ταλαμβάνει,] τοῖς δὲ λο[ιποῖς κα]θ' ἓν ἕκαστον μ[έρος αὐτ]οῦ συμμεταδ[ίδωσι]...

...τὸ μέρος συμμεταλαμβάνει – τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μέρος αὐτοῦ Συμμεταδίδωσι...

...[*one's soul*] jointly partakes in a part [*of the motion that surrounds it*] – but [*also, one's soul*] jointly distributes a part of [*the motion*] to the remaining [*parts of the body*] one by one...

τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
συμμεταλαμβάνειν	to partake [lit. "to take a share together"]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping change together*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*

ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
συμμεταδίδοναι	to jointly distribute	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving change together*

25.2 Against Rejection of the Soul

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 7 (A 19)

...τὴ[ν] ψυχὴν κ[αὶ τ]ὴν λοιπ{ι}ὴν φύσιν [ἀ]ποποιῆσαι τὸ ζῶ[ιον] καὶ τὸ νοουμένην [ἑ]νότητι μηθὲν – ἢ [τὸ] ἕτερον νοεῖν τὴν [ψυχι]κὴν καὶ τὴ[ν λοιπὴν] φύσιν ἐξ ἧς ε[ἶναι εἰρή]καμεν... ...μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλ[μ]...

...τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν ἀποποιῆσαι τὸ Ζῷον, καὶ τὸ νοουμένην ἑνότητι μηθὲν – ἢ τὸ ἕτερον νοεῖν τὴν ψυχικὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἧς εἶναι Εἰρήκαμεν... ...μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλμούς...

...for a living Being to reject its soul and its remaining nature, and [*to reject*] what is conceived in the unity [*of the two*] as nothing – or to conceive as different, its spiritual [nature] and its remaining nature, from which We have said [*both*] exist , the... not directly observable...

[alternative] *...to reject the soul and the remaining nature as [constituting] a living being and in no way [as] what is conceived in unity – or to conceive of as the other, the spiritual [nature] and the remaining nature, from which We have said exists... not directly observable...*

ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
ψυχικός *(ή, όν)*	spiritual	
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἀποποιεῖν	to reject	**ΑΠΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering / making away*
τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
νοούμενος *(η, ον)*	conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing*
τὸ νοούμενον **τὰ νοούμεν**	what is conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *seeing*
ἡ ἑνότης **αἱ ἑνότητες**	unity	**ΕΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition of oneness*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	**ΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ** *having said*
ὁ ὀφθαλμός **οἱ ὀφθαλμοί**	eye	**ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΣ** *eye chamber*
κατ' ὀφθαλμούς	directly observable	

25.3 Source of Feelings

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 1 (A 20)

...τῆς [οὕτως] ἀ̣πογεγεννημ[ένης] ἐνότητος ἐκ τ̣[ῶν κα]τὰ μέρος... ἐπεὶ [δὲ καθ]ὁ̣λου δήπουθ[εν ἐρρήθ]η̣ πάθη ἢ δι' ἓν μ̣[όριον ἢ κ]ατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον̣ [σῶμα]...

...τῆς οὕτως ἀπογεγεννημένης ἑνότητος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος... ἐπεὶ δὲ [κ] **καθόλου δήπουθεν Ἐρρήθη πάθη ἢ δι' ἓν μόριον ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα...**

...with the unity [*of movement of our soul and body*] being fully generated in this way from each part [*of our body*]... but, since It was presumably said [κ] universally that [*one's*] experiences [*arise*] either through a single portion [*of one's body*] or by means of the aggregated body [*and soul*]...

ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἀπογεγεννημένος (η, ον)	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
ἡ ἑνότης **αἱ ἑνότητες**	unity	**ΕΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from oneness*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
καθόλου	[κ] universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
δήπουθεν	presumably	**ΔΗΠΟΥΘΕΝ** *from somewhere indeed*
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	**ΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ** *having said*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	**ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *said*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
τὸ μόριον **τὰ μόρια**	a portion [as part of a whole]	**ΜΟΡΙΟΝ** *receiving one's portion*
ἀθρόος (α, ον)	aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΣ** *in groups*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*

25.4 Unity of Soul and Body

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 5 (A 22a)

...[συ]λλογίζεσθαι ὃν [δεῖ τρό]πον, οὔτε γὰρ ἕν [τί ἦν] ὧς τὸ συμβεβηκ[ὸς κ]αὶ ὧι συμβέβηκ[ε ῥη]τέον εἶναι – οὔτ[ε ἕτε]ρον ὡς τὸ ἀ[πό τινος δι]αστήματος [ἐπεισερχό]μενον...

...συλλογίζεσθαι ὃν Δεῖ τρόπον: οὔτε γὰρ [1] **ἕν τι ἦν ὧς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς – (καὶ ᾧ Συμβέβηκε ῥητέον εἶναι) ¬ οὔτε** [2] **ἕτερον ὡς τὸ ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος ἐπεισερχόμενον...**

...It is necessary to infer which way [*our soul exists*]: for it was neither [1] some singular [*portion of the body*, *existing*] as that which has [*inseparably*] endured [*without it*] – (and *into what* It has endured must be said to exist)* ¬ nor [was the soul] [2] a different [*portion distinct from of the body*], as something entering [*into the body*] afterward from a certain separation...

**or "It must be said into what [the parts that compose the soul] have endured existing" i.e., the atoms that compose the soul*

ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action together*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

συμβεβηκώς (υῖα, ός)	having endured	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ** *to have walked together*
τὸ συμβεβηκός **τὰ συμβεβηκότα**	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ** *to have walked together*
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
συμβεβηκέναι	to have endured [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΕΝΑΙ** *to have walked together*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	**ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *said*
ῥητέον	it must be said	**ῬΗΤΕΟΝ**
ἕτερος (*ἑτέρᾶ, ἕτερον*)	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
ἀνέρχεσθαι	ascends	**ΑΝΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving toward*
ἐπεισερχόμενος (*η, ον*)	coming in afterward	**ΕΠΕΙΣΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *moving upon into*

25.5 Thinking Causes Movement (Reductionist But Not Eliminativist)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 2 (fr. A 37)

...εἴρ[η]κ̣α καὶ ἐπὶ [τοῦ] παντὸς ἡ [ἐπι]λ̣[όγ]ι̣[σ]ις ἐ[γ]γενν̣ᾶται, τὰς [ἐκ τῶν] κ̣ειν̣ήσεω̣ν... ὧν προεῖπα ἐν το̣ῖς ἐπάνω αἰτ̣[ίας] κ̣εκ̣τημ̣[έ]νη...

...Εἴρηκα καὶ, ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς, ἡ Ἐπιλόγισις ἐγγεννᾶται τὰς ἐκ τῶν κεινήσεων... ὧν Προεῖπα ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω αἰτίας κεκτημένη...

...I have even said that, with regard to all things, the [*faculty of*] Consideration generates those [*causes*] out of movements... [*our faculty of Consideration*] possesses the causes [*of movement*]... which I have said before in the matters above...

τὸ πᾶν (*τοῦ παντός*)	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
τό διαλόγισμα **τὰ διαλογίσματα**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning through action*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις **αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις**	[faculty of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	**ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating in*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
προλέγειν	to say before	**ΠΡΟΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking before*

ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ *above upon*
τὸ ἐπάνω τὰ ἐπάνω	something above	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
κεκτημένος *(η, ον)*	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*

25.6 The Soul's Feeling

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 (fr. B 1)

...λ̣ύ̣ει τὸ πᾶν ἄθροι[σμα. τ]άσδε δὴ καὶ παρεσ[π]αρμένας ἔν τισιν μέρε̣[σι]ν̣ ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς [πά]θ̣ους καθ' ἃς καὶ τὸ κα[τὰ] [τὸ συ]μβεβηκὸς καὶ...

...Λῦει τὸ πᾶν ἄθροισμα, τάσδε δὴ καὶ παρεσπαρμένας ἔν τισιν μέρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθους – καθ' ἃς, καὶ Τὸ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ...

...It dissolves the whole aggregate, and indeed [it dissolves] these [*movements*] that are spread out across certain parts [*of the body*] from the experience of the soul – according to which [*movements*], even What [*exists*] according to an inseparable quality also...

λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ *loosening*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	ΠΑΝ *all*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ *result of action of [being] gathered*
παρεσπαρμένος *(η, ον)*	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ *scatter beside*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	*"that which has endured"* property *(inseparable quality)*	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ *to have walked together*

25.7 Desire & Expectations

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 fr. 2 (B 4)

...τὸ προορώμε[νον τοια]ῦ̣τα πάσχει... ἐπὶ [γὰρ τῆς] ἐπιθυμίας οὐ πᾶν [κατὰ τὴν] π̣ροόρασιν τὸ σύμ[βαῖνον]...

...τὸ Προορώμενον τοιαῦτα πάσχει... ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐ Πᾶν κατὰ τὴν πρoόρασιν τὸ Σύμβαῖνον...

...What is [mentally] seen beforehand undergoes such things... for in the case of desire, not everything That happens according to foresight...

συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*
συνορώμενος *(η, ον)*	fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *seen together*

προορώμενος *(η, ον)*	seen before [mentally]	**ΠΡΟΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *seen before*
τὸ προορώμενον **τὰ προορώμενα**	what is seen before [mentally]	
ἡ προόρασις **αἱ προοράσεις**	foresight	**ΠΡΟΟΡΑΣΙΣ** *seen before*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
πάσχειν	to experience [here, "to undergo"]	**ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ** *enduring*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole *[here, "everything"]*	**ΠΑΣ** *all*

25.8 Soul's Craving

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 1 (fr. B 7)

...γὰρ μὴ εὑρίσκη[ι, τις] τόδε τὸ σ̣ύ̣μ̣π[τωμα πῶς ἀπ]οτελεῖται, ὁμῶ̣[ς] π̣ειντεῖ ψυχεῖ... ...ἀ̣λ̣λ̣ὰ̣ μὲν γὰρ̣ ὁ̣ λογι̣κ̣[ὸς] τ̣ρ̣ό̣πος περαίνηται...

...γὰρ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ Τις τόδε τὸ σύμπτωμα πῶς ἀποτελεῖται – ὁμῶς, πειντεῖ Ψυχῇ...
...ἀλλὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ λογικὸς Τρόπος περαίνεται...

> ...for if Someone does not discover how this symptom [*i.e., separable quality*] is fully produced – nevertheless, the Soul may crave... but the rational Way is accomplished...

εὑρίσκειν	to discover	**ἙΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *finding*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
πεινᾶν	to crave	**ΠΕΙΝΑΝ** *hungering*
πειντεῖ ≈ **πείνῃ**	it may crave	
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
λογικός *(ή, όν)*	rational	**ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*
περαίνειν	to accomplish	**ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *finished*

25.9 Mechanics of Impressions

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 3 (fr. B 11)

...ἦττον, τοῖς δ' ὅλως ἐπὶ βρα[χύ] τι καὶ οὐκ̣ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύνκρισιν (ὁμοιοσχημόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια) παρεμπιπτόν των ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποι⟦η⟧ηθῆναι τά γε δὴ πολ λά ἐχούσης μὲν καὶ αὐ τῆ̣ς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰ τίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτ[ό]μων διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόν των πόρων... οὐ μὴν [ἀ]λ̣λ̣[ὰ] καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεγεν̣[νη μέ]ν̣[ο]υ ν̣ο̣ηθέντ̣ο̣[ς]...

...ἧττον τοῖς, δ' ὅλως ἐπὶ βραχὺ τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύνκρισιν – ὁμοιοσχημόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια – Παρεμπιπτόν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποιηθῆναι:

...to a lesser extent for [*compounds of such a shape*] but entirely with a certain short [*space*], and without [It] again imprinting certain things also in relation to a [*mentally*] perceptible compound – [*imprinting*] with those [*compounds*] that are shaped similarly in relation these very sense-organs – [*while this is incidentally*] occurring from what had been prepared beforehand out of that location:

τά, γε δὴ, Πολλά ἐχούσης μὲν καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτόμων διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόντων πόρων... ...οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου νοηθέντος...

⁂ certainly indeed, Many [*compounds among*] what possess [*such a shape*] and also among [*many compounds*] of the composition itself through [*the composition's elemental*] components [*possess*] the causes [*of movement*] through the difference of atoms and the preexisting passageways... ...not indeed, but also with what has been fully generated being conceived...

ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
βραχύς (εῖα, ύ)	short	**ΒΡΑΧΥΣ** *brief*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*
ἐντυπῶν (οῦσα, ῶν)	imprinting	**ΕΝΤΥΠΩΝ** *imprinting within*
τὸ ἔντυπον **τὰ ἔντυπα**	an imprinting	**ΕΝΤΥΠΟΝ** *imprinting within*
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *saw through*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
διανοητὸς (ή, ὸν)	[mentally] perceptible	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ** *saw through*
αἰσθητικός (ή, όν)	[directly] perceptible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *charateristic of perceiving*
διανοητικός (ή, όν)	[mentally] perceptible	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being seen through*
ἡ σύνκρισις = **ἡ σύγκρισις** **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ** **ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
ὁμοειδής (ές)	appearing the same	**ὉΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ** *appearing same*
ὁμοιομερής (ές)	"similarly composed" homoiomeric	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ** *similar parts*
ὁμοιόμορφος (ον)	similarly formed	**ὉΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ** *similar form*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ὁμοιοσχημών (οῦσα, όν)	similarly shaped	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ** *similar*
τὸ αἰσθητήριον **τὰ αἰσθητήρια**	sense-organ	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of perceiving*
πίπτειν	to fall	**ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling*
παρεμπιπτών (ουσα, όν)	[incidentally] occurring	**ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ** *falling into beside*
ἐκεῖθεν	from that location (thence)	**ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ** *from over there*
προοδοποιεῖν	to prepare beforehand	**ΠΡΟΟΔΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *making path before*

ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
τὸ στοιχεῖον **τὰ στοιχεῖα**	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	**ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ** *instance of a row* *(in a series)*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom *("what is indivisible")*	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	**ῩΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under*
προυπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	preexisting	**ΠΡΟΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *before* *beginning under*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα**	what has been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *generated out*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
ἐπινοηθείς *(α, έν)*	[objectively] conceived [already]	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ** *seeing upon*
νοηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* **νοηθέντες** *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	conceived	**ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ** *seeing*

25.10 [Perceptions and Standards]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 48

...[δ]ιᾳ[ν]ọητι[κ]ὴ̣[ν σύγκ]ρ̣ι̣σ̣ιν ἤ τι τῶν ἄ̣λλ[ων κρι]τ̣ηρίων̣...

...διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων...

......the [*mentally*] perceptible compound or any of the other criteria [*of truth*]...

διανοητικός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] perceptible	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being seen through*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*

25.11 Against Determinism, Fully Generated Memories

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 50 & 51

...{τ̣[α ἀ]πὸ τῆς προτέρας κι[νήσεως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν] κ̣[αῖ περικάτω τρέποντες] τ̣[ὸν λόγον – διὸ δὴ καὶ] | [κατ' εὐήθεια]ν̣ ε̣ἰς τ̣[οῦτ' ἐ]τελέ̣σ̣α̣[τε ἀφυείας – α]ὑ̣[τ]ῶ̣ν τῶν [ἀπογεγενν]η[μέ]ν̣ων ῥ̣[ητ]ἑ̣ον̣ [τὰ]ς μ̣ν̣ή[μας] γίγνε̣[σ]θαι ἢ [τὰ] ταῖ[ς] [μνή]μ̣α̣ι̣ς ἀνάλογ[α πάθη ἃ συνη]κολούθ̣[ησε]}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 4 (fr. B 12)

...ἅμα ποιοῦντες πάν{τ' ἀ[πὸ] τῆς προτέρας κινήσε[ω]ς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν καὶ περικάτω τρέποντες τὸν λόγον... (διὸ δὴ καὶ κατ' εὐ[ήθ]εια<ν> [[τ]] εἰς τοῦ τ' [ἐ]τελέσα[τ]ε ἀφυείας) αὐτῶν τῶν [ἀ]π[ο]γεγεννημένων [ῥη]τέο<ν> τὰς μνήμας γ[ίνε]σθαι ἢ τὰ ταῖς μνή[μαι]ς ἀνάλο γα πά[θη ἃ συν]ηκολούθη[σ]ε}...

...ἅμα Ποιοῦντες Πάντ' ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας κινήσεως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν καὶ περικάτω Τρέποντες τὸν λόγον. διὸ δὴ, καὶ κατ' εὐήθειαν εἰς τοῦ τ' Ἐτελέσατε ἀφυείας – αὐτῶν τῶν ἀπογεγεννημένων, Ῥητέον τὰς Μνήμας γίνεσθαι ἢ τὰ ταῖς μνήμαις ἀνάλογα Πάθη. Ἃ συνηκολούθησει...

...[*while you all*] simultaneously Make Everything have [its] cause [*of movement*] from its former movement and Turn reasoning upside down. therefore indeed, You all through [*naïve*] sincerity in [*your*] inability even fulfilled some [*memory*] – and, with [*those memories*] themselves being fully generated [*in the mind*], It must be said that Memories are produced or [*at least*] Experiences proportionate to memories [*are mentally produced*]. Which [experiences] will accompany...

πρότερος (α, ον)	former	**ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *before [contrast]*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
περικάτω	upside down	**ΠΕΡΙΚΑΤΩ** *around below*
τρέπων (ουσα, ον)	turning	**ΤΡΕΠΩΝ** *turning*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ εὐήθεια **αἱ εὐήθειαι**	sincerity (naivety)	**ΕΥΗΘΕΙΑ** *good character*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ἡ ἀφυεία **αἱ ἀφυεῖαι**	inability	**ΑΦΥΕΙΑ** *not producing*
ἀπογεγεννημένος (η, ον)	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	**ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *said*
ῥητέον	it must be said	**ῬΗΤΕΟΝ**
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
ἀνάλογος (ος, ον)	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning back/again*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience (feeling)	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
συνακολουθεῖν	to accompany	**ΣΥΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ**

25.12 Self-Production of Memories

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 5 (fr. B 13)

...δ' ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἰδί\αν/ ἑκατέρου. οὐ γὰρ αἱ ἄ\τομοι/... ...πράττουσιν τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον οὐθὲν, \ἀλλὰ/, καίπερ μιᾶς οὔσης ἐπ' ἐνίων κατὰ τὴν σ[υ]μπλοκὴν τῆς πρ[ά]ξεω[ς]... ...εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον συνάπτουσα πολλὰ, κα[ὶ] δὲ κα[ὶ] εἰς ἕτερον ἐπ' ἐνίων. ἦν δὲ τὸ τῆς μνή[μη]ς...

...δ' ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἰδίαν ἑκατέρου. οὐ γὰρ αἱ Ἄτομοι... ...πράττουσιν τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον οὐθὲν ¬ ἀλλὰ, καίπερ μιᾶς οὔσης (ἐπ' ἐνίων κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῆς πράξεως)... ...εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον συνάπτουσα πολλὰ, καὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἕτερον ἐπ' ἐνίων. ἦν δὲ Τὸ τῆς μνήμης...

....for which [*there is*] also a particular [*memory*] of each [*experience*]. indeed, the Atoms do not... ...bring about what [*memory*] has been fully generated in any way ¬ but, while there is even one [*atom*] (among certain [*atoms that compose the soul*] in relation to the entanglement of their activity [*that we can move with our thought*])... ...[*this chain of movement*] connects many [*atoms*] into the same task [*that we choose to enact*], and even into a different [*task we choose to enact*] among others. and This was the [*characteristic*] of memory...

Diogenes of Oenoanda (*New fr. 5.3:6-14*) *tells us that "after the impingements of the first images, passages are opened up in us in such a way that, even when the objects which we originally saw are no longer present, our mind takes in likenesses of the original objects."*

This suggests that the images of memory have easier access to the mind, and thus occur to it with greater clarity and consistency, than those of mere imagination; and perhaps also that the original visual image of an object imprints its pattern in the atoms of the mind in such a way that memory-images of the same object immediately ' lock in ' to it and are thus identified.

ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἡ ἄτομος **αἱ ἄτομοι**	atom	**ΑΤΟΜΟΣ** *not cut*
πράττειν	to accomplish [here, "to bring about"]	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ** *one*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*
ἡ περιπλοκή **αἱ περιπλοκαί**	intertangling	**ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ** *weave around*
ἡ συμπλοκή **αἱ συμπλοκα**	entangling	**ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ** *weave together*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
συνάπτειν	to connect	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening together*
συνάπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	connecting	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΩΝ** *fastening together*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*

25.13 Mental Movements

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 55

...[νήσεω]{ν ἀπὸ τῆς γεν[ο]μένης πληγῆς κατ[ὰ τὴν] διαν[ο]ητικὴν σύ[γκρισιν ο]ὐκ εὐθ[ὺς ἐγλει]πού[σῶν ἀλλὰ] κ[ατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμε]νο[ν]}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 1 (fr. B 14)

...ἄ̣θ̣ρ̣ο̣ι̣σ̣μ̣α̣ κ̣α̣ὶ δὴ καὶ τ̣[ῶν] κινή̣σεω̣{ν [ἀ]π̣ὸ τῆς γ[ενομέ]ν[η]ς π̣λ̣[η]γῆς κατ̣ὰ τ̣[ὴν] διανοητ[ι]κὴν σ̣ύγκ̣ρ̣ι̣[σιν οὐ]κ ε̣ὐ[θ]ὺ̣ς ἐ̣γλειπο̣υ̣[σῶ]ν ἀ̣[λλὰ] κατ̣ὰ τ̣ὸ̣ν [ἀπολ]υ̣ό̣μεν[ον} τὸ] π̣α̣θ̣η̣τ̣ὸν [τ]ρό[πο]ν̣, τὴ̣ν̣... ἀπὸ τῆς ἀ̣π̣ο̣μ̣ά̣ξ̣ε̣ω̣ς... τ̣ο̣ῦ εἰδ̣ώ̣λ̣ο̣υ̣ κ̣α̣τ̣ὰ...

...Ἄθροισμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν Κινήσεων – ἀπὸ τῆς γενομένης πληγῆς, κατὰ τὴν διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν – οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐγλειπουσῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμενον, τὸ παθητὸν τρόπον... ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπομάξεως... τοῦ εἰδώλου κατὰ...

...Aggregate. and then because the [*mental*] Movements – [*which occur*] from a strike that has already occurred from a mentally perceptible compound – are not simply disappearing, but according to what is released, the experiential way... from the wiping away... of the film, according to...

τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into being*
ἡ πληγή **αἱ πληγαί**	strike	**ΠΛΗΓΗ** *to hit*
διανοητικός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] perceptible	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being seen through*
ἡ σύγκρισις **αἱ συγκρίσεις**	compound	**ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing together*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἡ ἔκλειψις **αἱ ἐκλείψεις**	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	**ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ** *leaving out*
ἐγλείπειν = **ἐκλείπειν**	to disappear [or, of the sun & moon] to be eclipsed	**ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** **ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving out*
ἐγλειπών = **ἐκλειπών**	disappearing [or, of the sun & moon] being eclipsed	**ΕΓΛΕΙΠΩΝ** **ΕΚΛΕΙΠΩΝ** *leaving out*
ἀπολύειν	to release away	**ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ** *loosening away*
πάσχων *(ουσα, ον)*	affected [by]	**ΠΑΣΧΩΝ** *suffering*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
παθητός *(ή, όν)*	experiential	**ΠΑΘΗΤΟΣ** *enduring*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the experiential way	
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	
ἡ ἀπομάξις **αἱ ἀπομάξεις**	wiping away	**ΑΠΟΜΑΞΙΣ** *wiping away*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*

25.14 [Reminders]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 68

...τ̣ο̣ῦ [π]ρ̣[άγματ]ο̣ς ο̣ὗτος [μέλλ]ε̣ι μ̣ν̣ή̣μ̣ων [ἔσ]ε̣σθαι δοχ... ...[στε]ρ̣ε̣μνίου...

...τοῦ πράγματος Οὗτος μέλλει μνήμων ἔσεσθαι... ...στερεμνίου...

...of the situation, This will exist as reminding [us]... ...of the hard object...

τὸ πράγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
μέλλειν	to be about to do [here, "will be"]	**ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *going to*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*
μνήμων *(ων, ον)*	reminding	**ΜΝΗΜΩΝ** *thinking*
ἔσεσθαι	to exist [in the future]	**ΕΣΕΣΘΑΙ** *will be*
τὸ στερεμνίον **τὰ στερεμνία**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *hard*

25.15 General Understanding

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 1.3.3 (B 26)

...κοινοῦ̣ τ̣ινος ἐ[πιστ]ῆμαι ἐν̣ πλείοσι κα[ὶ δ]ιαφόροις ὑπάρχουσιν̣. τ̣ὰ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτα μν[ημ]ο̣νευόμενα καὶ τ̣[ὰς ἐ]π̣ιστήμας...

...κοινοῦ τινος Ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν πλείοσι καὶ διαφόροις ὑπάρχουσιν – τὰ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτα μνημονευόμενα καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας...

...Understandings of something general [*begin to*] exist in more and differing [*ways*] – for indeed the primary [*situation*] being remembered and [*our*] understandings...

κοινός *(ή, όν)*	general	**ΚΟΙΝΟΣ** *common*
τὸ σύστημα **τὰ συστήματα**	structure	**ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing together*
ἡ ἐπιστήμη **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι**	understanding	**ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ** *standing upon*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
διάφορος *(ον)*	differing	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *carrying apart*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist [here, "to begin to exist"]	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*

25.16 Practical Reductionism

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 6 (fr. B 28)

...ἧ̄ι ἄθροι̣σμα τόδε τ̣[ι ἂ]ν̣ προσαγορ̣εύσαιμ[ε]ν̣ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧ̣ ἀτόμους καὶ ἧ̣ ἄθροισμα καὶ μὴ{ι} μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ κα[τα]κινεῖσθαι λέγοντ̣αι...

...ἧ ἄθροισμα τόδε τι ἂν Προσαγορεύσαιμεν: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἧ "ἀτόμους" καὶ ἧ "ἄθροισμα." καὶ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ Κατακινεῖσθαι λέγονται...

...insofar as We would refer to this aggregate as something: but also insofar as [*we would refer to an aggregate as*] "atoms" and insofar as [*we would refer to an aggregate as*] "an aggregate" [*per se*]. and not only is [*the act of*] Being completely moved itself spoken of as...

ἧ	insofar as	**ἫΙ** *in/for which*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
ἄτομος *(ος, ον)*	indivisible	**ΑΤΟΜΑ** *not cut*
ἡ ἄτομος **αἱ ἄτομοι**	atom	**ΑΤΟΜΟΣ** *not cut*
κατακινεῖσθαι	to be completely moved	**ΚΑΤΑΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *thoroughly moving*
τὸ κατακινεῖσθαι	[the act of] being completely moved	

25.17 Imagination

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)

...τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν καταλειπόντ̣ω[ν σ]ὺν τ̣οῖς ὑποκειμένοις ὅθ̣ε̣ν ἕτερα προσδοξαζόντων τὰ μὲν κατ' είδώλων ἐμ[πτώ]σεις τ̣ι̣ν̣ας ὅσ' ἀπερι[λή]πτως [προσδο]ξάζουσι[ν ἢ] καὶ ἀν̣α̣λ[ό]γως ἀπερι̣λ̣[ή]πτοι[ς] π̣ρ̣ο̣[σδο]ξα[ζ]...

...τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν καταλειπόντων, σὺν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις – ὅθεν, ἕτερα προσδοξαζόντων. Τὰ μὲν κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις τινας, ὅσ' ἀπεριλήπτως Προσδοξάζουσιν – ἢ καὶ ἀναλόγως ἀπεριλήπτοις Προσδοξάζουσιν...

...many [*mental movements*] with the general [*collisions that are*] left undisputed, in accordance with the [*collisions from the films off of*] original sources – from these [*external collisions*], with those [*people*] adding [*their*] judgment to other [*mental movements*]. Some [*of these mental movements are*] certain collisions from films, to which They add judgment without complete comprehension – or They also analogously add judgment to [*what is*] not completely comprehensible...

κοινός *(ή, όν)*	general	**ΚΟΙΝΟΣ** *common*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of situated under*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον **τὰ προσδοξαζόμενα**	[Δ+] an addition of judgement [i.e., "a theory"]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of addition to seeming*
προσδοξάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	[Δ+] adding [one's] judgment to	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ** *addition to seeming*
προσδοξάζειν	to add [one's] judgement to	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ**
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*

ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	**ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ** *hitting*
ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	**ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ** *hitting together*
ἡ πληγή αἱ πληγαί	strike	**ΠΛΗΓΗ** *impacting*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	**ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling toward*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	**ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling into*
ἀπεριλήπτως	without complete comprehension	**ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ** *not taken hold around*
ἀπερίληπτος *(ος, ον)*	not completely comprehensible	**ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ** *not taken hold around*
ἀναλόγως	analogously	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ** *reasoning again*

25.18 Emergence of Awareness

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 9 (fr. B 31)

…ἐξ ὄγκων ⟦ων⟧ εἶναι σωματικῶν πεποιημένον, εἶτα τὸ κοινὸν ἑαυτῆς ἐπεθεώρ̣ησε⟦ν⟧ πάθος ὡς ούδὲ διανοηθῆναι ἄ̣λ̣λα δύναται παρὲ[κ] τού[τ]ω̣ν, ἄν τε σώματα… …ἄν τε κα[ὶ] τὸν τό̣[π]ο̣ν πρὸς ἀναλογία̣[ν]…

…ἐξ ὄγκων εἶναι σωματικῶν πεποιημένον. εἶτα, τὸ κοινὸν ἑαυτῆς Ἐπεθεώρησε πάθος – ὡς ούδὲ διανοηθῆναι ἄλλα δύναται παρὲκ τούτων, ἄν τε Σώματα… …ἄν τε καὶ τὸν τόπον πρὸς ἀναλογίαν…

> …[*because your reasoning*] exists composed out of corporeal particles. then, [*your Reasoning*] carefully observed its own general experience – as it is not even possible to mentally perceive other things apart from these [*corporeal particles*], whether Bodies… …or even location in relation to an analogy…

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	**ΟΓΚΟΣ** *bulk*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
σωματικός *(ή, όν)*	corporeal	**ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of body*
πεποιημένος	having been made [here, "composed"]	**ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *gathered*
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	**ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from common*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
ἐπιθεωρεῖν	to carefully observe	**ΕΠΙΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning upon*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
παρὲκ	apart from	**ΠΑΡΕΚ**
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *spot*

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning back/again*

25.19 Unified Consciousness

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 10 (fr. B 32)

...[ἑ]αυτῶι κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἑαυτὸν ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι οἷον ἑνός τινος ταύτηι τοῦ νοουμένο⟦ν⟧υ ὄντος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτ[ὸ]ν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν[τὸς] ἄλλων. καθότι δ' ἐν [πά]θει τινι ἑαυτὸν λέ[γεται διαν]οε[ῖσθ]αι...

...ἑαυτῷ, κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον, ἑαυτὸν Ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι [1] οἷον ἑνός τινος ταύτῃ τοῦ νοουμένου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ [2] ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν, ἑαυτοῦ, ἐντὸς ἄλλων – καθότι δ' ἐν πάθει τινι ἑαυτὸν Λέγεται διανοεῖσθαι...

...for itself, according to what is similar and undifferentiated, [*your reasoning*] will be said to mentally perceive itself [1] as if it were one particular thing in what is conceived to exist [*i.e., "this is my ability to reason"*], but also [2] in reference to itself, of itself, within [the context] of other things [*i.e., "my ability to reason is based in atomic movement"*] – and in as much as [*your reasoning*] is said to perceive itself in some experience [*of feeling*]...

ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	ὉΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
τὸ ὅμοιον τὰ ὅμοια	what is similar	
ἀδιάφορος *(ος, ον)*	undifferentiated	ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ *not carrying apart*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ *said*
ῥηθήσεσθαι	will be said	ῬΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as [here "as if"]	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ *one*
ἐντός *+ gen*	within	ΕΝΤΟΣ
καθότι	in as much as	ΚΑΘΟΤΙ *thoroughly because*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*

25.20 Internal Dialogue vs. Deterministic Monotony

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 11 (fr. B 33)

...[ῥη]θήσεται δ[ιανοε]ῖσθα[ι ἀ]λλ' ἧι ἐξεῖπο[ν τό]τε, κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶι ἑαυτὸ λέγεσθαι διανοεῖσθαι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναισθητοῦντα ἐτύγχανεν καὶ ⟦τα⟧ τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν... ἐπ[ίπ]ονον λαβεῖν, οὐχ ὥ[σ]περ [σ]ὺν ἐπαισθήσ[ε]σ[ι]ν. σημειο[ῦ]ν... [ἀ]λλὰ δὴ τ[οῦ]τον τὸν [τρόπο]ν φημ[ι καθ'] ὄν...

...Ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι – ἀλλ' ᾗ Ἐξεῖπον τότε – καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτὸ λέγεσθαι διανοεῖσθαι. Πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναισθητοῦντα ἐτύγχανεν: καὶ τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐπίπονον λαβεῖν ¬ οὐχ ὥσπερ σὺν ἐπαισθήσεσιν... ἀλλὰ δὴ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον Φημι καθ' ὃν...

...[*which one's Reasoning*] will be said to [*mentally*] perceive – but insofar as I spoke out at that time – and [*one's reasoning will be said*] to perceive to speak to oneself, as oneself. for [*unless it was*] in this way, indeed, All things would have lacked sensation of themselves in every way: and would have comprehended [*only*] a tedious [*process of*] inductive consideration of these ¬ not as with focused sensations... but truly, I assert that this way according to which...

ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	**ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *said*
ῥηθησθῆναι	*to be said* *[in the future]*	
ῥηθήσεται	it will be said	**ῬΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ** *said*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ᾗ	insofar as [here, "in the sense"]	**ἩΙ** *in/for which*
λέγειν	to say [here, "to speak"]	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
ἐκλέγειν	to speak out	**ΕΚΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking out*
ἐξεῖπον	I spoke out	
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἀναισθητεῖν	to lack sensation	**ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ** *not sensing*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἐτύγχανεν	it happened	**ΕΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΝ** *happening*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπίπονος *(ος, ον)*	tedious	**ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ** *upon toil*
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις **αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις**	focused sensation	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *upon perceiving*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
φημι	I assert	

25.21 Cause of Movement

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 12 (fr. B 34)

...δ' [ά]π[οτ]ελεῖται τὰ μὲν κατ' ἐπείσοδόν τι[[τ]]\ν/ων ἀπογεγεννώμενων [[α]] τὰ δὲ καθ' ὁμούρησιν (καί που καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰωρούμενον τῆς φύσεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐν [ἑ]αυτῶι τ[έ]λους [μ]νήμην καὶ [ἐπι]λογ[ισ]μὸν λαμβά[νον] κατὰ [π]λέ[ο]ν ἢ ἔλατ[τον],) ἔτι δε...

...δ' Ἀποτελεῖται [1] Τὰ μὲν κατ' ἐπείσοδόν τινων ἀπογεγεννώμενων, [2] Τὰ δὲ καθ' ὁμούρησιν – καί που καὶ [3] Τὸ μὴ αἰωρούμενον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῶι τέλους μνήμην καὶ ἐπιλογισμὸν λαμβάνον, κατὰ πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον. ἔτι δε...

...[1] Those [*movements*] that have been fully generated are fully produced according to the penetration of certain [*particles*], and [2] Those [*movements are produced*] according to the proximity [*of particles*], and also in some way [3] That [*movement*] which is not being raised up by nature, but [*produced by one's spirit*] comprehending the memory and inductive consideration of its fulfillment in itself, more or less. and further...

τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
ἡ ἐπείσοδος **αἱ ἐπεισόδοι**	penetration	**ΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ** *upon course into*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
ἡ ὁμούρησις **αἱ ὁμούρησεις**	proximity	**ἉΟΜΟΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *state of being together with*
αἰωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	being raised up	**ΑΙΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *hanging / lifting*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	comprehending	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
τὸ πλέον **τὰ πλέω**	the greater	**ΠΛΕΟΝ** *more*
τὸ ἐλάττον **τὰ ἐλάττω**	the lesser	**ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ** *less*

25.22 Careful Studying Student

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 2 (fr. A 38)

...{πρ̣ο̣σ̣ε̣δρ̣ε̣[ίαι ἐ]κμ̣ε̣τ̣ρ̣οῦν̣τ̣α̣ς [τ]ρ̣όπ[ους]} ἐ̣μέ̣μνητο [κ]αὶ λ̣αμβ̣[άν]ον τ̣ῆ μν̣ή[μ]η̣ ὃ π̣α̣[ρεῖ]χε τ̣ῷ[ι] φυ̣[σι]κ̣ῷ[ι]}...

{combined with overlapping text below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.3 (B 35)

......{π̣ρ̣ο̣σ̣ε̣δ̣ρ̣ε̣[ίαι ἐ]κμ̣ε̣τ̣ρ̣οῦν̣τ̣α̣ς [τ]ρ̣όπ[ους]} ἐμέμνητο καὶ λ̣αμ̣[βάνον τ]ῆι μνήμη̣ι [π]α̣[ρ]εῖχε τῶι φυσικῶι τ̣έλει τὸ χαρτὸν ἢ τὸ λυπ̣[ηρὸν, ὡς π]ά[ν]υ προκατ[έγρα]φον, ἐν δόξαις \ἢ/ ἄλλ[ως] ποσὸν [δ]ὲ δὴ...

...προσεδρείᾳ ἐκμετροῦντας τρόπους Ἐμέμνητο – καὶ λαμβάνον τῇ μνήμῃ παρεῖχε τῷ φυσικῷ τέλει τὸ χαρτὸν ἢ τὸ λυπηρὸν – ὡς πᾶνυ προκατέγραφον, ἐν δόξαις ἢ ἄλλως. Ποσὸν, δὲ δὴ...

...through assiduous study He had already been reminded of the ways [*of thinking*] that measure out [*sensations*] – and while he was comprehending [these ways] in memory, He yielded to [*our arguments regarding*] what is delightful or what is distressing in regards to their natural fulfillment – as is already wholly written [*by us*], in [*our*] judgments [*concerning doctrines*] or in other [*writings*]. but indeed, That which is measurable...

ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
ἡ προσεδρεία **αἱ προσεδρείαι**	assiduous study	*ad-sedeō* **ΠΡΟΣΕΔΡΕΙΑ** *toward seat*

καταμετρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)* **καταμετροῦντες** *(οῦσαι, οῦντα)*	fully measuring	**ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΩΝ** *thoroughly measure*
ἐκμετρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	measuring out	**ΕΚΜΕΤΡΩΝ** *measure out*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the experiential way	
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*
τὸ μνημονευόμενον **τὰ μνημονευόμενα**	what is remembered	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of "addition to" thinking*
μνημονεύων *(ουσα, ον)*	remembering	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΩΝ** *thinking*
μιμνῄσκεσθαι	to be reminded	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ** *thinking "again"*
μιμνῄσκειν	to recall	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *thinking "again"*
ἐμέμνητο	he had been reminded [already]	
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	comprehending	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
παρέχειν	to yield [here "to admit"]	**ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold beside*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ἡ χαρά **αἱ χαραί**	joy	**ΧΑΡΑ** *being cheerful*
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	favor [here, "grace"]	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *charming / gracious*
χαρτός *(ή, όν)*	delightful	**ΧΑΡΤΟΣ** *cheer*
ἐπίπονος *(ος, ον)*	tedious	**ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ** *upon toil*
λυπηρός *(ά, όν)*	distressing	**ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ** *vexation*
πάνυ	wholly	**ΠΑΝΥ**
συγγράφειν	to compose together	**ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing together*
προκαταγράφειν	to have already written	**ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing thoroughly before*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ποσός *(ή, όν)*	how many / measurable	**ΠΟΣΟΣ** *some / certain*

25.23 Silent Memorization

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.4 (B 36)

…ποτε ἀπεμν̣[ημόν]ευεν ἢ ἀνάλογον τε̣ῖ̣[ι ἀπομ]νημον[εύ]σει πάθος ἴσχα[νεν] καὶ ἐνδιέτριβε̣ν̣ ὅθε[ν ἡ]συχίει τε καὶ τῶν… καὶ μ̣εγίστους φόβους… αξ̣[ό]ν̣των ἐπισκεψε̣[ων]… φυσ̣[ικοῦ] πάθους φόβ[ους]… κατ̣[ὰ] τ̣[οὺς ἀνθ]ρώπους καὶ κα[τ]ὰ τὰ̣ ὑπ[ὲρ ἄ]ν̣θρωπον… κα̣[ὶ] τ̣ο̣ῦ ἀφανοῦ̣[ς]…

...ποτε, Ἀπεμνημόνευεν – ἢ ἀνάλογον τῇ ἀπομνημονεύσει πάθος Ἴσχανεν – καὶ Ἐνδιέτριβεν, ὅθεν Ἡσυχίει τε καὶ... καὶ μεγίστους φόβους... ἀξόντων ἐπισκεψεων... φυσικοῦ πάθους φόβους... κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ κατὰ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον... ...καὶ, τοῦ ἀφανοῦς...

...at some point, He was memorizing – or He was retaining an experience analogous to memorization – and He was occupying himself with [it], for which reason He was silent and... and the greatest fears... of the examinations of those [ ] leading... fears of natural experience... according to humans and according to what is beyond a human... ...also, of the invisible...

[Arr.] ...πότε ἀπεμ[νημόν]ευεν ἢ ἀνάλογον τ[ῆι μ]νημον[εύ]σει πάθος ἰσχά[νετο (...) καὶ [μά]λιστα τ[ὸν ἀπὸ] φυ[σικοῦ] πάθους φόβ[ον] κατὰ [τοὺς ἀνθ]ρώπους καὶ κα[τ]ὰ τὰ ὑπ[ὲρ ἄν]θρωπον [τὴν ἀλ]ήθ[ει αν κατὰ τὸ] ὡρισμένον ἐζ[ήτει καὶ τοῦ συνε]χοῦς καί πο[τε καὶ το]ῦ ἀφανοῦ...

[Maso] [*The mind*] sometimes remembered or took a feeling as if it where something similar to a memory [...] and particularly with reference to fear of physical suffering, either in relation to humans or to something beyond human, it searched for truth on the basis of what is defined, of what is continuous, or of what is not evident...

μιμνήσκειν	to recall	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *thinking "again"*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	**ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking*
ἀπομνημονεύειν	to memorize	**ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *"addition to" thinking fully*
ἀνάλογος *(ος, ον)*	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning back/again*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
ἡ ἀπομνημόνευσις **αἱ ἀπομνημονεύσεις**	memorization	**ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΣΙΣ** *process of "addition to" thinking fully*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἴσχειν	to retain	**ΙΣΧΕΙΝ** *keeping back*
ἐνδιετρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	**ΕΝΔΙΕΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ** *rubbing through in*
ἡ ἡσυχία **αἱ ἡσυχίαι**	silence	**ἩΣΥΧΙΑ** *stillness*
ἡσυχίειν	to be silent	**ἩΣΥΧΙΕΙΝ** *stillness*
μέγιστος *(η, ον)*	greatest	**ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ** *biggest*
ὁ φόβος **οἱ φόβοι**	fear	**ΦΟΒΟΣ** *fleeing*
ἄξων *(ουσα, ον)*	leading	**ΑΞΩΝ** *leading*
ἐπισκέπτεσθαι	to examine	**ΕΠΙΣΚΕΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ** *looking upon*
ἡ ἐπισκέψις **αἱ ἐπισκέψεις**	examination	**ΕΠΙΣΚΕΨΙΣ** *looking upon*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
τὸ ἄφανες **τὰ ἄφανη**	invisible thing	**ΑΦΑΝΕΣ** *not appearing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 86

...{[μ]νήμη ἢ τὸ τε̃ι [μνή]μηι πά}θος ἀνάλο[γον] ὢν ἔδει μᾶλλον [ἐνεγί]γνε[το, π]ρὸς τ[ὸ] ὡ[ρισμέ]νον καὶ τὰ πά[ν]τα...

{added to the expanded version below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 2 (fr. A 41)

...{[τούτου μν]ήμη{ι} ἢ ἀ[νάλογος μνή]μηι κεί[νησις τὰ μὲν] συνεγε[νέννητο, εὐθ]ύς, τὰ δ' εὔ[ξητο, τὴ]ν ἀρχὴν ἔχου[σα καὶ τὴ]ν αἰτ[ί]αν, ἧι μὲ[ν τῆι π]ρώ[τ]ηι συστάσ[ει... τῆ ἀτό]μων ἅ[μα καὶ τοῦ ἀπο]γεννη[θέ]ντος, [ἧι δὲ τῆι ἐπαυ]ξαμ[ένηι, ἧι πάντα] δρῶ[μεν, τῶν ἀτόμ]ων ἅμ[α καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ] ἀπο[γεγεννη]}

{better version below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37) et alia

...{[μ]νήμη ἢ τὸ τε̃ι [μνή]μηι πά}θος ἀνάλογον ὢν ἔδει μᾶλλον ἐνεγείνετο πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον καὶ τὰ πάντα {ἐξελέγχον τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα — αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ {τούτου μνήμη ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμηι κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνεγε}γέν[νη]το εὐθὺς, τὰ δ' ηὔξητο τὴν [ἀρχὴ]ν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν. εἶ [μ]ὲν τε̃ι πρώτει συστάσει τ[ῶ]ν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντ[ος, εἶ]] \ἧι/ δὲ τε̃ι ἐ[παυ]ξομένει, ˙ε[ι π]άντα δρῶ[με]ν, τ[ῶ]ν ἀτόμω[ν ἅμ]α καὶ αὐ[τοῦ τοῦ ἀ]πογε[γεν]νη}μένου ἐ[ξ] ἀ[νά]γκ[ης ἀ]ντίξουν ἐπ' ἐ[νίω]ν [τοῖς] ἀπ[ογ]εννήσασιν...

...Μνήμη ἢ τὸ τε̃ι μνήμη Πάθος ἀνάλογον ὢν. Ἔδει μᾶλλον Ἐνεγείνετο πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον – καὶ τὰ Πάντα ἐξελέγχον τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης ¬ καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα. αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ τούτου Μνήμη ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμη Κίνησις: Τὰ μὲν συνεγεγέννητο εὐθὺς – Τὰ δ' ηὔξητο, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν.

...Memory, or the Experience of those [*movements*] analogous to memory. It would have been more necessary that [*the memory*] was implanted in relation to what [*experience*] was being defined – even with Everything refuting out the reference [*to the definition*] as it was being produced ¬ and not in relation to the undefined things, that are also in need of distinction. but again, this Memory of [*an experience*] or a Movement analogous to memory: with Some [*aspect of memory*] having been generated together directly [*from experiences*] – while Other [*aspects of memory*] had increased, although they have a foundation and a cause [*from former experiences*].

εἶ μὲν, [1] τε̃ι πρώτει συστάσει τῶν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντος – [2] εἶ δὲ, τε̃ι ἐπαυξομένει. εἶ πάντα Δρῶμεν τῶν ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου ἐξ ἀνάγκης: ἀντίξουν ἐπ' ἐνίων τοῖς ἀπογεννήσασιν...

in one respect, [our *memories are formed*] [1] in the primary composition of the atoms together with what [*movement*] had been fully generated [*at the time*] – while [2] in another respect, in [*that which*] is being further increased [*by us over time*]. if We do all things with the atoms together with what [*motion*] itself has been fully generated out of necessity: with us, for some [*of our actions*], resisting against what [*atomic motion*] has fully generated [*out of necessity*]...

τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἀνάλογος *(ος, ον)*	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning back/again*
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
ἔδει	it would have been necessary	**ΕΔΕΙ** *was needing*
μᾶλλον	more	**ΜΑΛΛΟΝ** *very*
ἐνεῖναι	to implant	**ΕΝΕΙΝΑΙ** *being inside*
ἐνεγείνετο	it was implanted	
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ὡρισμένος *(η, ον)*	being limited / being defined	**ὩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *border*
ἡ ἀοριστεία **αἱ ἀοριστεῖαι**	lack of definition	**ΑΟΡΙΣΤΕΙΑ** *no border*

ἀόριστος *(ος, ον)*	undefined	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ *no border*
ἐξελέγχειν	to refute out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ *confuting out* *[with contrary proof]*
ἐξελέγχων *(ουσα, ον)*	refuting out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ *carrying upon*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
ἡ συμφόρησις αἱ συμφόρησεις	accumulation	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΗΣΙΣ *carrying together*
ἡ ἀναφορά αἱ ἀναφοραί	reference?	ΑΝΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying back*
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ *dividing*
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ *needing in addition to*
προσδεόμενος *(η, ον)*	also being in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating in*
συγγεννᾶν	to generate together	ΣΥΝΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating together*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ *increasing*
ηὔξητο	it had increased	ΗΥΞΗΤΟ *increasing*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
	Part 2	
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*
ἡ πρῶτη σύστασις τῶν ἀτόμων	the primary composition of the atoms	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37)*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating out*
ἀπογεννηθῆναι	to be fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΗΝΑΙ *generating out*
ἀπογεννηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	fully [been] generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΕΙΣ *generating out*
ἀπογεννήσας	having fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ *generating*

ἀπογεγεννημένος (η, ον)	having been fully generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	*what = Movement, which results in Action,*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	*which results in [dispositional] Development*
εἶ = ᾗ	insofar as	**ἩΙ** *in/for which*
εἶ μὲν… εἶ δὲ…	in one respect, while in another respect	
αὐξάνειν	to increase	**ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ** *increasing*
ἐπαυξόμενος (η, ον)	being further increased	**ΕΠΑΥΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *upon / further increasing*
δράν	to do	**ΔΡΑΝ** *taking action*
δρῶμεν	we do	**ΔΡΩΜΕΝ**
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
ἀντιέναι	to go against	
ἀντίξων (ουσα, ον)	resisting	**ΑΝΤΙΞΩΝ** *holding against*
ἔνιοι (αι, α)	some	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 87

…{ἐξελ̣έ̣γχο̣[ν] τ̣ῆς ἀ̣[ν]α̣φο̣ρᾶς γιγνομ̣[έ]ν̣η̣[ς κ]αὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀ̣όρι[σ]τα κα̣ὶ κ̣ρίσεως προσδεόμ̣ενα… α̣[ὕτ]η δ' α̣ὖ πάλ̣ι[ν] ἡ̣ τ̣[ούτου] μ̣ν̣ήμ̣η [ἢ ἀνάλογος μνή]μ̣ηι[κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνε]γε}…

{expanded version above}

25.25 Atomic Generation

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 42)

…[ἀ]ποβαινόντων κατὰ [τ]ὰ̣ς συνωσθ̣είσας ἀλ[λ]ὰ καὶ αἱ συνωσθεῖσαι δ̣ηλόνως ὁμ̣οίως. φύ[σ]ιν γὰρ εἶχον συνωσ[θ]εῖσαι τοιαῦτα ἀπο̣γ[εννᾶ]ν̣ καὶ τοιούτο̣[υ] ἔ[ργου ἄρ]χ̣εσθαι αἱ αὐ[ταὶ] κ̣α̣[τὰ] τὸν [ἀ]π̣[ὸ] τ̣οῦ α̣ὐτ̣ο̣[ῦ δ]ιαστή̣ματος τρ̣ό̣πον…

…ἀποβαινόντων κατὰ τὰς συνωσθείσας ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ Συνωσθεῖσαι δηλόνως ὁμοίως. φύσιν γὰρ εἶχον συνωσθεῖσαι τοιαῦτα ἀπογεννᾶν καὶ τοιούτου ἔργου ἄρχεσθαι, αἱ Αὐταὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διαστήματος τρόπον…

…of those [*movements*] that result according to the crowded-together [*atoms*], but even the Crowded-together [*atoms*] clearly [*move*] similarly. for they had a nature to fully generate such things and to begin such a task, the same [atoms] in accordance with a way [arising] from the same separation…

[Laursen] …coming about in accordance with the [atoms] thrust together, but also the [atoms] thrust together, evidently, in the same way. For they had the capacity, [if thrust together], to produce such thing and such… the same [atoms] in accordance with the manner "from the same distance"…

συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	**ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking together*
ἀποβαίνειν	to result	
ἀποβαίνων	resulting	**ΑΠΟΒΑΙΝΩΝ** *walking away*
συνωσεῖν	to crowd together	

συνωσθείς (εἶσα, ἐν)	crowded together [already]	ΣΥΝΩΣΘΕΙΣ *pushing together*
δῆλος (η, ον)	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
δηλόνως	clearly	ΔΗΛΟΝΩΣ
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating out*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*
ἄρχειν	to begin	ΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἄρχεσθαι	to begin [for themselves]	ΑΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *beginning*
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*

25.26 Responsibility

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 90 & 91

...{[θα]ι κατ<ὰ> [τὸν προειρημ]έ[νον τ]ρόπ[ον] κα[ὶ] τ[ῶν] α[ὑτ]ῶν [ἀπ]ερ[γα]στι[κ]ὰ εἶναι – π[ολλὰ δὲ κ]αὶ τ[ῶ]ν δ[ε] κ[αὶ τ]ῶ[ν]δε φύσιν ἔ- χ[ο]ντ[α ἀπεργ]αστ[ικὰ] γί[γν]εσ[θαι] δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ | γίγν[εται ἀπε]ρ[γ]αστ[ικ]ά, (οὐ διὰ [τὴν] α[ὐ]τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν τε ἀ[τόμ]ων κα[ὶ ἑα]υτῶν), οἷ[ς δ]ὴ κα[ὶ] μά[λ]ιστα μ[α]χό[με]θα κα[ὶ] ἐπιτιμῶ[μ]ε[ν]... [οῦν]τες κατ[ὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχ]ῆς [τα]ραχώδη φύσιν [ἔχοντα]}...

{better and expanded version, B 38, below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 (fr. A 43)

...{οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργ[η]κεν εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἡ τῶν [ἀτ]όμων φύσις... ἀλλ' αὐ[τ]ὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ί]στην κέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτί[α]ν των[δέ τι]νων, ἐκ δ' [ἐκε]ίνης [ἔ]νιαι τῶν [ἀ]τόμων [κε]ινή[σεις] ταραχώδε[ις] κέ[κτην]ται, οὐχὶ δ[ιὰ] τὰ[ς] ἀ[τό]μο[υς] πάν[τως]}

{overlaps with B 38 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 92

...κέκ[τηται αἰτί]αν τωνδέ τ[ινων, ἐκ] δ' [ἐ]κίνη[ς ἔνιαι τῶν ἀτό]μων [κι]νήσ[εις] τα[ραχώδει]ς κ[ινοῦν]ται οὐ[χὶ διὰ] τ[ὰς {ἀ]τόμου[ς] πά[ν]τω[ς]... [διὰ τῶν παρεμ]π[ιπτό]ν [των κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ] περι[έχοντος εἰς] τὴμ φυσικὴ[ν]}...

{added to B 38 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 16 (fr. B 38)

...[γί]νεσ{θαι κατὰ τὸν π[ρ]οειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν [α]ὑτῶν ἀπεργαστικὰ εἶναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν[δε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεργαστικὰ [γί]νεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίνεται ἀ[πε]ργαστικά, οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ ἑαυτῶν. οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μ[ι]σοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα} καθ[ά]περ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων ζώιων. {οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ίσ]τ[ην] κέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτίαν τῶνδέ [τι]νων, ἐκ δ' ἐκ[εί]νη[ς ἔν]ιαι τ[ῶν ἀτόμ]ων κιν[ή]σεις [τα]ραχώ[δεις κιν]οῦνται, ο[ὐ]χ[ὶ] διὰ τὰ[ς] ἀ[τό]μο[υς {ἀ]τόμου[ς] πά[ν]τω[ς]... [διὰ * τῶν παρεμ]π[ιπτό]ν [των κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ] περι[έχοντος εἰς] τὴμ φυσικὴ[ν]}...

* P.Herc. 1056 has δὲ here, in brackets – but P.Herc. 1191 does not.

...γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπεργαστικὰ εἶναι. Πολλὰ δὲ, καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδε φύσιν ἔχοντα, ἀπεργαστικὰ γίγνεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ Γίνεται ἀπεργαστικὰ – οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ ἑαυτῶν. οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα Μαχόμεθα καὶ Ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μισοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα – καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων ζώιων.

…[*one's own actions*] are generated in the previously mentioned way, existing as productive of the same things. yet, although they have a nature [*that could be productive*] of these and those [*achievements*], Many [*actions that people generate*], are made unproductive because of themselves ¬ not through the SAME cause [*of movement*] of both the atoms and of themselves. against these [*unproductive generated actions*] We especially contend and rebuke, while resenting [*those who*] have [*a temperament*] from their birth in accordance with a disturbing nature – just as [*we do*] in the case of all living beings [*that choose to act counterproductively*].

[Sedley 20 B.1-2] …‹ › …But many naturally capable of achieving these and those results fail to achieve them because of themselves, not because of one and the same responsibility of the atoms and of themselves. And with these we especially do battle, and rebuke them, hating them for a disposition which follows their disordered congenital nature as we do with the whole range of animals.

[Laursen] …come about in the aforementioned manner and be productive of the same things. Many [products] capable of producing both this and that do not produce them, because of themselves and not because of the same cause in the atoms and themselves. These [products] are therefore a main target of our attacks and criticism, because we… behave in accordance with the original disturbing nature, as is the case with animals as a whole.

οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν [1] εἰς ἔνια ἔργα τε καὶ [2] μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ [3] διαθέσεων ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων Φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσαν ἢ τὴν πλείστην κέκτηνται αἰτίαν τῶνδέ τινων – ἐκ δ' ἐκείνης, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀτόμων Κινήσεις ταραχώδεις κινοῦνται ¬ οὐχί διὰ τὰς ἀτόμους πάντως διὰ τῶν παρεμπιπτόντων κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς τὴμ φυσικὴν…

for them the Nature of the atoms has contributed nothing [1] to some [*of their*] tasks, and [2] to the sizes of [*their*] tasks, and [3] of the arrangements [*of their tasks*], but rather [*their movements*] that are fully generated have procured the whole or [*at least*] the greatest cause of these particular [*tasks*] – and [*it is*] from that [*responsibility of theirs*] that some disturbing Movements of the atoms are moved ¬ but not completely through the atoms through what happens to occur according to necessity from the surroundings into the natural…

[Sedley 20 B.3-4] For the nature of their atoms has contributed nothing to some of their behaviour, and degrees of behaviour and character, but it is their developments which themselves possess all or most of the responsibility for certain things. It is as a result of that nature that some of their atoms move with disordered motions – but it is not on the atoms that all ‹*the responsibility should be placed for their behaviour*›.

[Laursen] …For the nature of the atoms never did help them in any way to [perform] certain acts or to [develop] certain dimensions of acts and dispositions, but the products themselves were fully or for the most part responsible for these particulars. and out of that [i.e., the nature of the atoms or the cause] some of the atoms move disturbing movements, not as a whole because of the atoms, but because of what comes in from the environment into the natural… {*the original constitution of the atoms being the cause… aggregate… out of the product itself unless… all…*}

γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced [here, "to be generated"]	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
προειρημένος (η, ον)	previously mentioned	**ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *spoke before*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἡ κατεργασία **αἱ κατεργασίαι**	outflow	**ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work thoroughly*
ἀπεργαστικός (ή, όν)	productive	**ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of working away*
οὐ ἀπεργαστικός (ή, όν)	unproductive	**ΟΥ ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *not characteristic of working away*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ *combating*
ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	honor	ΤΙΜΗ *value*
ἐπιτιμᾶν	to rebuke	ΕΠΙΤΙΜΑΝ *value upon* *"laying a penalty on"*
μισῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	resenting	ΜΙΣΩΝ *hating*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning [here, "from their birth"]	
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating*
ἡ ταραχή αἱ ταραχαί	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ *agitating*
τεταραγμένως	with disturbance	ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ *having been agitated*
ταραχώδης *(ης, ες)*	troubling	ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ *agitating*
τὸ ζῷον τὰ ζῷα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ ΖΩΟΝ *animal*
συνεργεῖν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ *work together*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing through*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ *generated out*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	most / greatest	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most filling*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ *acquiring*
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ *acquired*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ *moving*
παρεμπιπτών *(ουσα, όν)*	[incidentally] occurring	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ *falling into beside*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against constraint*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ *holding around*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*

Epicurus responds to the arguments of determinists by asserting the existence and causal power of the self and its volitions, which transcend the basic patterns of atomic motion. Many people who could succeed in different tasks fail, not because of their atoms, but because of their own choices and actions. We often criticize these people, avoiding them for their harmful nature.

Psychological impulses are not fully determined by the movements of the atoms. Your psychological impulses can initiate your own thoughts and move your body. Even though your atomic make-up might cause chaotic motions in your mind, it does not mean that you cannot initiate motions that counteract them.

25.27 Fundamental Agency

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 94

...[ἀπο]γεν[νη]θῆ[ι] λα[μβάνο]ν τινα ἑτερότητι̣τ̣[α τῶ]ν ἀτόμων κ̣[ατ]ά τ[ινα τρό]πον [διαλ]ηπτικόν, [ο]ὐ [τ]ὸ̣ν ὡ[ς ἀφ' ἐ]τέρου διαστήμ[α]το[ς] ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ [ἑαυ]τοῦ αἰτίαν – εἶτα ἀνα[δί]δωσιν εὐθ[ὺ]ς μ[έ]χ[ρ]ι τῶμ πρώτωμ φύσ[εων κα]ὶ μίαμ πως ἅ[πασαν] | [αὐτ]ὴ[ν] ποιεῖ...

{B 39 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 (fr. A 44)

...{σεσαι μαχόμεν[οι πο]λλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀν[θρώ]πων καὶ νουθε[τοῦν]τες, ὃ τῆι τοῦ αὐτοῦ [τρ]όπου κατ' ἀνάγκην α[ἰ]τία[ι] ὑπεναντίον ἐστ[ιν.} οὕ]τως, ἐπειδὰν ἀπ[ο]γεννηθῆ [τ]ι λαμ[βάνον] τ[ι]νὰ [ἑ]τερότη[τα] [τῶν ἀ]τό[μ]ων κατά [τι]ν[α τρ]όπον [δι]αληπτ[ικόν], οὐ τὸν [ὡς] ἀ[φ' ἑτέ]ρο[υ] δ[ι]αστ[ήματος, ἰ]σχ[άνει]...

{added to B 39 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.3 (B 39)

...{σεσαι μαχόμεν[οι πο]λλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀν[θρώ]πων καὶ νουθε[τοῦν]τες, ὃ τῆι τοῦ αὐτοῦ [τρ]όπου κατ' ἀνάγκην α[ἰ]τία[ι] ὑπεναντίον ἐστ[ιν.} οὕτως ἐπειδὰν ἀπογεννηθῆ τι λανβάνον [τι]νὰ [ἑ]τερότη[τα τῶν] ἀτό[μ]ων κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἑτέρου δ[ι]αστήματος, ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν, εἶτα [ἀν]αδίδ[ωσι] εὐθὺς μέχρι τῶν [πρ]ώτω[ν] φύσεων καὶ [κ]αν[όνα π]ᾶσαν αὐτὴ[ν] ποιεῖ. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὑτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτιῶν ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τού[των ἐ]π' αὐτῶν τοῖς [μ]ὲν μᾶλλο[ν τοῖς δ' ἧ]ττον μαχ[όμε]θα καὶ ἐ[πιτιμ]ῶμεν {καὶ καθαίρο]}...

...Μαχόμενοι πολλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ Νουθετοῦντες, Ὃ τῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου κατ' ἀνάγκην αἰτίαι ὑπεναντίον ἐστιν: οὕτως, ἐπειδὰν ἀπογεννηθῇ Τι λαμβάνον τινὰ ἑτερότητα τῶν ἀτόμων κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν (οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἑτέρου διαστήματος), Ἰσχάνει τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίαν – εἶτα Ἀναδίδωσι εὐθὺς μέχρι τῶν πρώτων φύσεων. καὶ κανόνα πᾶσαν αὐτὴν Ποιεῖ

...[*We are*] contending with many people simultaneously and Instructing about [*this issue*], Which is contrary to the cause of the same way [*of thinking that all motion is*] in accordance with necessity: thus, whenever Something is fully generated [*i.e., one's consciousness*] that comprehends a certain difference in the atoms in a certain [*mentally*] distinguishing way, ([but] not as though from a different separation [*in space*]),* One gains control of the cause [*of mental movements*] out of his own [*conscious choice*] – then he simply Delivers [*those conscious mental movements*] up to the primary natures [*of the atoms*]. and He makes this [*mentally generated movement*] entirely a Standard [*that tests for truth – i.e., a canon*]

** i.e., even though the soul can be distinguished from the atoms that compose it as its own emergent object, the soul is not physically distinct from the atoms that compose it.*

[Sedley 20 B.5-6] ...‹ › ...Thus when a development occurs which takes on some distinctness from the atoms in a differential way – not in the way which is like viewing from a different distance – he acquires responsibility which proceeds from himself; then he straightaway transmits this to his primary substances and makes the whole of it into a yardstick

[Laursen] ...attacking and criticizing at the same time of the human being, something that is in contrast to the cause in this same "necessary" manner. Consequently, whenever something is produced that takes on some otherness within the atoms in a way that allows for a distinction, not the one as from another distance, he acquires the cause out of himself; then he gives it on immediately until it comes to the first natures and in some way makes all of it one.

ὅθεν, δὴ, καὶ Οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὑτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτιῶν ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τούτων, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ' ἧττον Μαχόμεθα, καὶ Ἐπιτιμῶμεν, καὶ Καθαίρωμεν...

from which, indeed, Those who are not able to distinguish such things in a way distress themselves about [*their*] assertion of [*their own generated*] causes. and among these [people], We contend against them, more with some and to a lesser extent with others, and We rebuke, and We clarify [them]...

[Sedley 20 B.7] That is why those who cannot correctly make such distinctions confuse themselves about the adjudication of responsibilities... ‹ ›...

[Laursen] Hence, clearly, those who cannot distinguish these things correctly put themselves in a winter storm as to the explanation of these causes, and in these same things we attack and criticize some more, some less.

μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ *combating*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ὁ νοῦς οἱ νοῖ	intellect	ΝΟΥΣ *sense*
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ *setting sense*
νουθετῶν	instructing about	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΩΝ *setting sense*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against* *constraint*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ὑπεναντίος (α, ον)	contrary	ὙΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *over against*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating out*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
ἡ ἀλλοτριότης αἱ ἀλλοτριότητες	foreignness	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *different other*
ἑτέρωθι	elsewhere	ἙΤΕΡΩΘΙ *different* [location]
ἡ ἑτερότης αἱ ἑτερότητες	difference	ἙΤΕΡΟΤΗΣ *condition from* *different*
ἕτερος (ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἙΤΕΡΟΣ *other*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom (*"what is indivisible"*)	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
διαληπτός (ή, όν)	[mentally] distinguishable	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ *taking hold between*

διαληπτικός (ή, όν)	[mentally] distinguishing	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of taking hold between*
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ *strength*
ἰσχύων (ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ *strength*
ἰσχάνειν	to gain control of	ΙΣΧΑΝΕΙΝ *holding*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
ἀναδιδόναι	to deliver	ΑΝΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving up*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς (εῖα, ύ)	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ *until*
πρῶτος (η, ον)	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
ὁ κανών οἱ κανόνες	standard	ΚΑΝΩΝ *measuring stick (ruler)*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
	Part 2	
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
τὸ τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	such a thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ *self of this sort*
ἀναιρεῖν	to rescind	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping before*
διορίζειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ *between the border*
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ *between the border*
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping through*
χειμάζειν	to distress	ΧΕΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ *winter storm*
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ *affirming*
ἡ πρόφασις αἱ προφάσεις	presumption	ΠΡΟΦΑΣΙΣ *before affirming*
ἡ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀποφάσεις	assertion	ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ *affirming out*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	῾ΗΤΤΟΝ *inferior*
ἐπιτιμᾶν	to rebuke	ΕΠΙΤΙΜΑΝ *value upon "laying a penalty on"*
ἀναιρεῖν	to rescind	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleansing*

We can make decisions that control our own mental movements. One's psychological actions can move the atoms in the mind, and this begins the process of moving the whole body.

As the motion of our hands can move material in our hands, the motion of our minds can move the material in our minds.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 95

...[ὅ]θεν δὴ κα[ὶ ο]ἰ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα δ[ι]αιρεῖν χι[μά]ζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς πε[ρὶ] τὴν τῶν αἰτ[ιῶν] ἀπ[ό]φα[σιν] καὶ το[ύτων ἐπ'] αὐ[τ]ῶν τοῖς μ[ὲν] μᾶ[λλον, τοῖς δ' ἧττον μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν {καὶ καθαίρο]}...

{added to B 39 above}

25.28 Praise and Blame

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 45)

...{οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτ[ῶν] αἰτίαν, ἀλλ[ὰ]} τὴν [τῶν] βελτίστων ἔργω[ν] καὶ διανοημάτ[ων]...

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 96

...{οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτ[ῶν] αἰτίαν, ἀλλ[ὰ]} [τὴν] τῶ[ν βελτίστων ἔρ]γων [καὶ δια]ν[ο]ημ[άτων]... τότε [α]ὐτοῖς [μα]χόμ[ε]θα μὲν [οὐδέ]ν. ἀλλ' ἑα[υ]τ[οῖς], μετὰ... ἀτόμ[ων]... ἐπενεγκαμένοις. καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν α[ἰ]τίαν καίπερ ἐκθα[ί]ροντες... ἢ οὐ ν[ου]θετ[οῦ]ντές γε ὅσα αμ...

...οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βελτίστων ἔργων καὶ διανοημάτων... τότε, αὐτοῖς Μαχόμεθα μὲν οὐδέν. ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς, μετὰ... ...ἀτόμων... ἐπενεγκαμένοις. καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν αἰτίαν καίπερ Ἐκθαίροντες... ἢ οὐ Νουθετοῦντές γε ὅσα ἅμα...

...[*we praise others*] not [*merely*] through a cause [*of movement that originates*] out of themselves but [*through*] that [*cause of movement that originates of themselves*] toward the best tasks and mental perceptions... at this time, We contend with them in no way. but for us, along with... of atoms... to those that have applied themselves. and even while [*we are*] fully clearing out the cause [*of movement that originates*] out of ourselves... or not Instructing about as many things as simultaneously...

ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
βέλτιστος *(η, ον)*	best	**ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΣ** *strong*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	
τὸ διανόημα **τὰ διανοήματα**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing through*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	**ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing upon*
ἐπενεγκεῖν	to apply to [already]	**ΕΠΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ** *brought upon*
ἐπενεγκάμενος *(η, ον)*	having applied themselves	
καθαίρειν	to clarify	**ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing*
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	**ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *clearing out*
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	
νουθετῶν	instructing about	**ΝΟΥΘΕΤΩΝ** *setting sense*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 98

...λεῖν ἐ[πιχειροῦμε]ν [καὶ παρ]οξ[ύ]νε[ιν ἐπὶ τὰ καιριώ]τατα ὡς [ἤδ]η π[έπηγεν ἀπὸ] τῆς φύ[σεως τῆς αὐτῆς κ]ακη[θ]ρο[ισμέ]ν[ης] οὐ[χ ἑ]τέρωι τιν[ι τὴ]ν [αἰτίαν] ἀναψούσ[ης τὴ]μ [πῆξ]ιν τὴν ὁμ[ο]ίαν...

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 46)

...[χειροῦμ]εν καὶ παρο[ξύνειν] ἐπὶ [τ]ὰ καιρι[ώτατα ὡ]ς ἤδη πέπη[γεν ἀπὸ τῆ]ς φ[ύ]σεως τ[ῆς αὐτῆς κακ]ηθροισμένης ο[ὐχ ἑ]τέρω τ[ινι] τὴν [αἰτία]ν ἀνα[ψ]ούσης [τὴν] πῆξιν [τὴν] ὁμοί[αν]...

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.4 (B 40)

...οὐ μαχόμεθα τοῖς... κα[ὶ] οὐ τὴν ἀτον[ί]αν ἔχουσ[ιν ἀλλ'] οὐ[δ]ὲ παρακαλεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐπὶ τὰ κ[αιριώτατα], ὡς ἤδη πέπηγεν ἀ[πὸ τῆς φ]ύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς κακηθρ[οισμέ]νης οὐχ ἑτέρως τινι τὴ[ν αἰτίαν] ἀναψού[σης], τὴν πῆξ[ιν] τ[ὴν ὁ]μοίαν τ[ῆ]ι... ...[τὴν] α[ἰτίαν π]ροσφέ[ροντες] οὐ[δ'] ὅσοι[ς προσφ]έρομε[ν]...

...οὐ Μαχόμεθα τοῖς... καὶ οὐ τὴν ἀτονίαν Ἔχουσιν ¬ ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖν Ἐπιχειροῦμεν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐπὶ τὰ καιριώτατα, ὡς ἤδη Πέπηγεν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς κακηθροισμένης, οὐχ ἑτέρως τινι τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναψούσης τὴν πῆξιν τὴν ὁμοίαν... ...τὴν αἰτίαν προσφέροντες, οὐδ' ὅσοις Προσφέρομεν...

...[*regarding those who sincerely struggle to move themselves toward the best tasks*] We do not contend with those [*people*]... and they are not holding onto laziness ¬ but neither do We venture to encourage or provoke them toward the most opportune things, as [*their temperaments*] have already coagulated from a nature which itself is poorly-assembled, [*and which*] is not fastening {and igniting} the cause [*of movement*] for something in a different way to the coagulation [*of their temperaments*] which is similar to... ...[*although weare*] bringing forward the cause [*i.e., the responsibility for our own movement*], We do bring [*it*] forward for as many as...

μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
ἡ ἀτονία **αἱ ἀτονίαι**	laziness	**ΑΤΟΝΙΑ** *not vigorous*
παρακαλεῖν	to encourage	**ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning beside*
ἐπιχειρεῖν	to venture	**ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ** *upon hand*
παροξύνειν	to provoke	**ΠΑΡΟΞΥΝΕΙΝ** *sharp beside*
καιριώτατος	most opportune	**ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *time*
πήγνυναι	to coagulate	**ΠΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ** *affixing together*
πέπηγεν	they had coagulated	**ΠΕΠΗΓΕΝ** *affixed together*
ἡ πῆξις **αἱ πήξεις**	coagulation	**ΠΗΞΙΣ** *affixing together*
τὸ ἀθρόον **τὰ ἀθρόα**	what is aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΝ** *gathered*
τὸ ἄθροισμα **τὰ ἀθροίσματα**	[inorganic] aggregate [organic] organism	**ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of [being] gathered*
κακηθροίζειν	to aggregate badly	**ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΖΕΙΝ** *badly gathered*
κακηθροισμένος *(η, ον)*	badly aggregated	**ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ**
συνάπτειν	to connect	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening together*

συνάπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	connecting	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΩΝ** *fastening together*
συνάψας *(ασα, αν)*	having connected	**ΣΥΝΑΨΑΣ** *fastening together*
ἀνάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	**ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ** *thoroughly fastening*
ἀναψών	fastening to	**ΑΝΑΨΩΝ**
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing as well*
προσφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	bringing forward	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing as well*
προσφέρειν	to bring forward	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing as well*

25.30 Against Empty Linguistic Distinctions (Bringing Words and Nature to the Same Point)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 47)

...γε [φύσιν αἰ]τιᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ το[ῦτ]ον ο̣ὐθὲν διαφέρ[ει, ἀλ]λ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρομ̣[εν] ἀμφο̣τ̣ε̣ρα τὰ ὀνό̣[μα]τ̣α κ[αὶ τὴ]ν̣ φύσιν κακίζον̣[τες] ὁμοίω[ς] τ̣οῦτον̣ κ̣[α]κίζ[ο]μεν ὅταν ...*υξω̣μεν̣ [τ]α̣ύτην τ̣[ὴν διάλ]εκ[τον]. ἔσ̣τ̣ι δ̣' [ὅτ]ε [κατὰ] τὴ̣ν πρώτ[η]ν̣ [σύστασι]ν κατὰ σάρ[κ]α...

...γε, φύσιν αἰτιᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ τοῦτον οὐθὲν Διαφέρει – ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ Φέρομεν ἀμφότερα τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὴν φύσιν, κακίζοντες ὁμοίως τοῦτον Κακίζομεν ὅταν ...Συζύξωμεν ταύτην τὴν διάλεκτον... ἔστι δ' ὅτε, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύστασιν, κατὰ σάρκα...

...indeed, It is in no way different to blame nature, ourselves or this [*word "necessity"*] – but We bring both the words and nature to the same [*point*], reproaching this similarly when We reproach... ...We would coalesce this way of speaking... there are also times when, according to [*one's*] original composition, [*actions*] based on flesh...

ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	**ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ** *responsibility*
διαφέρειν	to differ	**ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing through*
φέρειν	to carry [here, "to bring"]	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
ἀμφίβολος *(ος, ον)*	ambiguous	**ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΟΣ** *throwing both*
τὰ συναμφότερα	both together	**ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ** *both of the two together*
ἀμφότεροι *(αι, α)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ** *both of the two*
τά ἄμφω	the pair	**ΑΜΦΩ** *both*
τὰ ἀμφότερα	both things	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΑ** *both of the two*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
κακίζειν	to reproach	**ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ** *bad*
κακίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	reproaching	**ΚΑΚΙΖΩΝ** *bad*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*

*υξωμεν συζύξωμεν	we would coalesce	ΣΥΖΕΥΓΝΥΝΑΙ *yoking together*
ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ *speaking across*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*
ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ *flesh*

25.31 Emergent Causation

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 48)

...νεσθαι ἢ καὶ τοιαυτηνὶ διά[θ]εσιν καὶ κ[εί]νησιν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τ[ο]ιοῦδε ἀπογεννω[μέ]ν[ο]υ ἐκ τῶν τοιουτωνὶ μ[έ]χρι δὲ τοῦ τοιανδὶ [ψυ]χὴν ἢ τ[οι]ανδὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδ' ἀπ[ογ]εννω[μ]ένου [ἢ] οὐκ ἐπειδὰν προβῆ[ι γ]ε τῆ[ι] ἡλικ[ί]αι τοιοῦδ' ἀπογενν[ωμ]ένου κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκ[ην] ἀ[λλ']...

{B41 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 102, 103

...ἀπ[ογεγεννημένου, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέχρι των]δ[ί τινων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀ]πογ[ενν[ωμένου ἀλλὰ μέ]χρι τοῦ ψυχὴν [γενέσθαι ἢ καὶ τ]οια[υ]τηνὶ δ[ιά]θ[εσι]ν [καὶ κίνησιν] ἔ[χουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοι]ο[ῦ]δε ἀ[πο γεν]ν[ωμένου ἐκ τῶν] το[ιουτωνί μέχρι δὲ] τοῦ [τοιανδ]ὶ [ψυχ]ὴν [ἢ τοιανδὶ οὐκ ἐ]ξ ἀνάγ[κ]ης τ[οιοῦ|δ]ε ἀπογεννωμένου ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδὰμ προβ[ῆ]ι γε τεῖ ἡλικίαι τοιοῦδε ἀπογενν[ω]μένου κατ' ἀνάγ[κ]ην, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτ[ο]ῦ δυ[ναμέ]νου {καὶ τ[ῆς] ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ αἰτ]ίας καὶ ἄλλο}...

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 19 (fr. B 41)

...κατηγορουμένης φύσεως καὶ οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς προσαγοευ[ο]μένης... κἂν κατὰ διάνοιαν δέ [τ]ι ἐκβιάζηται ἡ πρώτη σύστασις τοῦ ἀπογε‹γε›ννημένου, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέχρι τωνδί τινων τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ψυχὴν γενέσθαι ἢ καὶ τοσαυτηνὶ διάθεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης [τοιοῦ]δε ἀπογεν[νω]μένου ἐκ [τῶν το]ιουτ[ωνί, μ]έχρι δὲ τ[ο]ῦ τοιαν[δὶ ψ]υχὴν [ἢ τοι]αν[δὶ ο]ὐκ ἐξ [ἀνάγκ]ης τοιοῦ[δ]ε ἀ[πογ]ε[ν]νωμ[ένου ἢ οὐ]κ ἐπειδ[ὰν] [πρ]οβῆι γε τ[ῆι ἡλικία]ι το[ιοῦδε] ἀ[πογεννωμένου κα]τ' [ἀνάγκην ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δυνα]μέ[νου] {καὶ τ[ῆς] ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ αἰτ]ίας καὶ ἄλλο}...

...κατηγορουμένης φύσεως ¬ καὶ οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς προσαγοευομένης...

...[*however one refers to his self-generated movement, it is clear it exists*] with a nature that is fully indicated [*by his experience of it*] ¬ even while it is not referred to as itself or according to itself...

...κατὰ διάνοιαν δὲ τι ἐκβιάζηται ἡ πρώτη Σύστασις τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου – μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης – μέχρι τωνδί τινων τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου: ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ψυχὴν γενέσθαι – ἢ καὶ τοσαυτηνὶ διάθεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἔχουσαν Ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου ἐκ τῶν τοιουτωνί

...according to [*our mental*] perception, [*our*] primary Composition would – NOT out of necessity – force out some of [*the movement*] that has been fully generated up to [*the point of*] certain kinds of such a thing [*as our own non-necessitated movements*] being fully generated: while [*our primary atomic composition would force out some movement*] up to the point of a Soul being produced – and even a Soul having an arrangement and movement as great as this, given that some [*movement*] of this kind is necessarily generated from [*a composition*] such as this*

** the soul's subtle physical nature makes it susceptible to both moving and being moved*

μέχρι δὲ τοῦ – τοιανδὶ ψυχὴν ἢ τοιανδὶ – οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου. ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν Προβῇ γε τῇ ἡλικίαι τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου κατ' ἀνάγκην ¬ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δυναμένου καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίας...

but [*one's atomic Composition would force out some movement*] up to [*the point of movement*] such as this – [*specifically, the movement of*] this or that kind of soul – being fully generated NOT out of necessity. or [*at least one's atomic Composition would force out some volitional movement*] whenever [*Someone*] advances to the stage of life of such [*volitional initiations*] being fully generated NOT according to necessity ¬ but by having the force [*of movement*] from himself and from his own cause…

κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*
προσαγορευόμενος *(η, ον)*	being referred to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *speaking publicly toward*
	Part 2	
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ὁ βιασμός οἱ βιασμοί	forcing	**ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ** *process of violence*
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	**ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ** *violence alongside*
ἐκβιάζειν	to force out	**ΕΚΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ** *violence out*
ἐκβιάζηται	it would force out	
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἡ πρῶτη σύστασις τῶν ἀτόμων	the primary composition of the atoms	*Epicurus* *On Nature, Book 25* *P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37)*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἀπογεννηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	fully [been] generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΕΙΣ** *generating out*
ἀπογεννήσας	having fully generated [already]	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ** *generating out*
ἀπογεννώμενος	being fully generated	
	Part 3	
μέχρι	up to	**ΜΕΧΡΙ** *until*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already] [here, taken as middle]	**ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *came into being*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**῾ΟΥΤΟΣ** *this*

τοσοῦτος (*τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο*)	so long (*so great*)	**ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ** *this so much*
οὑτοσί (*αὑτηί, τουτί*)	this here	**ὉΥΤΟΝΙ** *this here*
τοσοῦτοσί (*τοσαύτηί, τοστοῦτί*)	so great as this here	**ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣΝΙ** *this so much here*
τοῖος (*τοίᾶ, τοῖον*)	like (*such*)	**ΤΟΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
τὸ τοιοῦτον **τὰ τοιαῦτα**	what is like this (*such a thing*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *this of this sort*
τοιοῦτοσεί (*τοιαύτηεί, τοιοῦτεί*)	like this very thing, (*such as this exact kind of thing here*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣΕΙ** *this of this sort here*
τοιόσδὶ = **τοιόσδε** (*τοιάδε, τοιόνδε*)	like this here (such a kind as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ** **ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ** *of this sort here*
ἡ διάθεσις **αἱ διαθέσεις**	arrangement	**ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing through*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
διαβαίνειν	pass through	**ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking through*
προβαίνειν	to advance, to go forward	**ΠΡΟΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *walking forward*
ἡ ἡλικία **αἱ ἡλικίαι**	age (*stage of life*)	**ἩΛΙΚΙΑ** *comrade*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
δυναμένος (*η, ον*)	having the force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ**
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*

25.32 [Severed Cause], Respecting Existing Terminology

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 20 (fr. B 42)

...πράττε[ι], ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ [ἐξ]α[ι]ρούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τὸ ἀπ[ογεγ]εννημένον ἀλλ' ἔν τι ποιοῦν[τες] αὐ[τ]ὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν [ὁμοίως κα]θαίρομεν τὸ δ' οὐ νο[υθε]τοῦμέν {γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατά τινας ἐθισμ[ο]ὺ[ς] ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν... τὸ γ]ὰρ ἐξαιρού μεν[ο]ν τῆς αἰτ[ίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ[ην]}...

{added to 1191 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 49)

...{[ἐξ] τῆ[ι]} ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστατικαὶ τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον καὶ μὴ ἦι δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπογεγεννη[μέ]νον ποιῆσαι μη[δ· ἐπὶ] τοῦ παρόντο[ς] μη[δὲν ἕ]τε[ρο]ν... ...πρώτη σ[ύσ]τασι[ς ἀ]πηργάσατο [μηδ'] ἔν[ια] κ[α]τὰ βρα[χ]ύ τ[ι μηδὲ βιαζόμενον] κ[αὶ]...

{not added to 1191 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 104, 105

...τεῖ ἐξ [αρ]χῆ[ς συστατ.κα]ὶ τὸ ἀπογ[εγε]νν[ημένον] καὶ μὴ ἦι [δυνα]τ[ὸν] ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπ[ο]γε[γ]εννημένομ ποιῆσαι μ[ηδ'] ἐπ[ι] τοῦ παρόντος μ[ηδὲν] ἕτερον ἤδ' ἡ πρώτη [σ]ύ[σ]τασις ἀπηρ[γάσατο μηδ'] | ἔνια κατὰ βραχύ τι μηδὲ βιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτῖνον... τι πράττ[ε]ι, ἀλλὰ τὰ α[ὐτ]ὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ ἐξαι[ρ]ούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τ' ἀ[πογ]εγεννημένον – ἀλλ[ὰ ἕν τ]ι ποιοῦντες αὐτὸ κ[αὶ τὴ]ν [σ]ύστασιν ὁμ[ο]ίως κ[αθα]ίρομεν [τὸ δ' οὐ] νουθ[ετοῦμεν] {γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατά τινας ἐθισμ[ο]ὺ[ς] ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν... [τὸ γ]ὰρ ἐξαιρού μεν[ο]ν τῆς αἰτ[ίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ[ην]}...

...ἐξ ἀρχῆς, Συστατικαὶ τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον, καὶ μὴ Ἦ δυνατόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ποιῆσαι ¬ μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος μηδὲν ἕτερον ἤδ' ἡ πρώτη Σύστασις ἀπηργάσατο. μηδ' ἔνια κατὰ βραχύ τι, μηδὲ βιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτῖνον...

...[*if our atomic composition did not force out some volitional movement*] from the beginning, [*then these*] constitutive [*parts of our composition*

would have automatically set in motion] what [*movement*] has been fully generated, and It would not be possible [*to have volitional movement*]. but [*our*] primary Composition already has made what [*movement*] has been fully generated ¬ and not even at the present [*time*] has it produced anything different. even though [*the atomic Composition of the soul itself has*] not [*produced*] certain [*movements, even*] by some small [*degree*], nor [*has it produced volitional movements*] while being forced and being affected [*by external movement*]...

...τι Πράττει ¬ ἀλλὰ, τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα ἔχον: οὐκ Ἐξαιρούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας – τ' ἀπογεγεννημένον

...[*our atomic composition*] is accomplishing something ¬ but, [*although it*] has all the same things:* We do not remove ourselves from the cause [*of the generation of movement*] – and [*we do not remove ourselves from*] what [*movement*] has been fully generated

i.e., although our soul is only composed of, and affected by, matter

ἀλλὰ ἕν τι ποιοῦντες, αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν ὁμοίως Καθαίρομεν. τὸ δ' οὐ Νουθετοῦμεν – γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατά τινας ἐθισμοὺς ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως Μετακοσμοῦμεν... ...τὸ γὰρ Ἐξαιρούμενον τῆς αἰτίας κατ' ἀνάγκην...

but by [*even*] doing ONE certain thing, We similarly clarify [*the nature of*] ourselves and [*of our*] composition. We do not instruct about it – indeed, We do not even rearrange many [*words*] in accordance with certain [*linguistic*] conventions without [*taking any*] mind of the terminology... ...for What is removed from a cause [*of movement*] BY NECESSITY [*is ITSELF its own cause of movement*]...

ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
συστατικός *(ή, όν)*	constitutive	**ΣΥΣΤΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of standing together*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **ἐξ ἀνάγκης**	what has been fully generated out of necessity	*what = Movement, which results in Action, which results in [dispositional] Development*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης**	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος	up to the present	
ἀπεργάζεσθαι	to produce	**ΑΠΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *work out*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some [here, "certain"]	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*
βραχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	short	**ΒΡΑΧΥΣ** *brief*
κατὰ βραχύ	gradually	
βιάζειν	to force	**ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ** *violence*
βιάζεσθαι	to be forced	**ΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *violence*
βιαζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being forced	**ΒΙΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *violence*

τίνειν	to pay a price	**TINEIN** *paying*
ἀντιτίνειν	to be affected	**ANTITINEIN** *paying against*
ἀντιτίνων *(ουσα, ον)*	being affected	
	Part 2	
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	**ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping back*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking out*
ἐξαιρεῖσθαι	to be removed from	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *taking out*
	Part 3	
τὸ σύστημα **τὰ συστήματα**	structure	**ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing together*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	**ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing out*
καθαίρειν	to clarify	**ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing*
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	**ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ** *setting sense*
τὸ ἔθνος **τὰ ἔθνη**	ethnicity	**ΕΘΝΟΣ** *accustomed*
ὁ ἐθισμός **οἱ ἐθισμοί**	convention	**ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of being accustomed*
ὁ νοῦς **οἱ νοῖ**	intellect *[here, "mind"]*	**ΝΟΥΣ** *sense*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	**ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ** *beyond/ change order*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*

25.33 Controlling Natural Impulses

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 107

...σύστασιν είς ἕν τι συμ[πλέ]κοντες, ού μὴν [οὔ]τε τῷ[ι νου]θε[τ]ητ[ι]κῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐ[πα]νορθωτικῶι {οὔτε τῶι ἁπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποητικῶι χρώμεθα}...

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 50)

...αὐτὴν ἐκεί[νηι] πε[ρ]αῖνον. ἂν δὲ κ[αὶ] βα[δί]ζη διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ [ἤ]δη α[ἰ]τίαν είς τὸ ὅμοιον τῆι ἐ[ξ ἀ]ρχῆς συσ[τά]σει φαύλ[η]ι οὔσ[η]ι, ἔτι μᾶλλον [ἐνίοτε κ]ακίζομεν. ἐν νουθετητ[ικ]ῶι μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόπω[ι], καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζώιων [καθ]αίρομεν μὲν ὁμοίως [α]ὐ[τ]ὰ τὰ ἀπογεγε[νν]ημένα [κ]αὶ τὴ[ν] σύστασιν είς ἕν τι συμπ[λέ]κοντες, ού μὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῶι νουθε[τ]ητ[ι]κῶι τρόπωι καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῶι {οὔτε τῶι ἁπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποι[η]τικῶι χρώμεθα}...

...αὐτὴν ἐκείνῃ Περαῖνον. ἂν δὲ καὶ Βαδίζῃ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἤδη αἰτίαν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστάσει φαύλῃ οὔσῃ, ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἐνίοτε, Κακίζομεν. ἐν νουθετητικῷ μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόπῳ καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζῴων Καθαίρομεν: μὲν ὁμοίως [a] αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα καὶ [2+b] τὴν σύστασιν εἰς ἕν

τι συμπλέκοντες ¬ οὐ, μὴν, οὔτε τῷ νουθετητικῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῷ οὔτε τῷ ἁπλῶς ἀντιποιητικῷ Χρώμεθα...

...Accomplishing it in that very way. but if [*Someone*] also proceeds through a cause [*of movement that is*] already his own into what is similar to a composition that originally exists as base [*i.e., if one chooses to give-in to his basic original nature*], We reproach [*him*], at times, even more. however, We clarify in a more instructive way and not as with the wild among living beings: [*because, in the helpless case of the wild, we*] entangle as similar [a] what [*actions*] have been fully generated themselves and [b] [*their dispositional*] composition [a=b] into one [*same*] thing ¬ no, indeed, [*with the wild*] neither do We use the instructive and corrective way nor the absolutely contradictory [*way*]...

[Sedley 20 j] ...‹ › ...We sometimes vilify it [a self-determining animal] all the more, but more in an admonitory mode ¬ and not in the way in which we exonerate those animals which are while by conflating their developments and their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.

[Laursen] ...‹ › ...We occasionally criticize even more: that is, not in the primary blaming way – and not as wild animals do, we rinse, in that we plait together [1] the products themselves and [2] the composition...‹ › ...

τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ *finished*
περαίνων	accomplishing *[here, "bringing to the end"]*	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΩΝ *finished*
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ *walking*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	῾ΟΜΟΙΟΣ *similar*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing together*
φαῦλος *(η, ον)*	base	ΦΑΥΛΟΣ *common / easy*
ὤν *(οὖσα, ὄν)*	being	ΩΝ *being*
ἡ κακοτεχνία αἱ κακοτεχνίαι	harmful art	ΚΑΚΟΤΕΧΝΙΑ *bad technique*
κακηθροίζειν	to aggregate badly	ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΖΕΙΝ *badly gathered*
κακίζειν	to reproach	ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ *bad*
μέντοι	never-the-less	ΜΕΝΤΟΙ *indeed surely*
μᾶλλον	more	
μέντοι μᾶλλον	never-the-less more	
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ *setting sense*
νουθετητικός	instructive [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of setting mind*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἄγριος *(η, ον)*	wild	ΑΓΡΙΟΣ *field*
τό ἄγριον τά ἄγρια	the wild	ΑΓΡΙΟΝ *field*

τὸ ζῷον **τὰ ζῷα**	living being	**ΖΩΙΟΝ** **ΖΩΟΝ** *animal*
καθαίρειν	to clarify	**ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **ἐξ ἀνάγκης**	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = *Movement,* *which results in* *Action,* *which results in* *[dispositional]* *Development*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης**	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	
συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*
συμπλέκων	entangling	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΩΝ** *weaving together*
ὀρθός *(ή, όν)*	right	**ΟΡΘΟΣ** *straight upright*
ἐπανορθωτικός *(ή, όν)*	corrective	**ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of straight upright again upon*
ἁπλῶς	absolutely	**ἉΠΛΩΣ** *one fold*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἀντιποιητικός *(ή, όν)*	contradictory	**ΑΝΤΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of gathering against*

We help and correct only those who take responsibility for their actions.
We also recognize that some living beings are not able to take responsibility for their actions – therefore we do not vainly try to change or correct their behavior.

25.34 Self-Development

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 108

...{νημένον ἤδη γίγνεσθ[αι τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περ[ιέχον]τος [κατ'] ἀνάγκ[ην δι]ὰ τ[ῶ]ν πό[ρων] εἰσρέο[ν]τα [π]αρ' ἡ[μ]ᾶς [πο]τε [γί]γν[εσθαι κ]αὶ π[αρ]ὰ [τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐξ] ἡμῶν α[ὐτῶν δόξας. κ]αὶ εἰ [παρὰ τὴν φύσιν]}...

{same as text below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 51 fin.)

...{ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶ[ς ποθ'] ἁπ[λ]ῶς τὸ [ἀ]πο[γ]ε[γενν]η[μέν]ον ἤδη γείνεσ[θαι] το[ῖ]α [ἢ] τ[ο]ῖα κα[ὶ] τὰ ἐκ τ[οῦ π]εριέχ[ον]τος κ[α]τ' ἀν[άγκ]ην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσρ[έον]τα παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμε[τέρα]ς [ἐξ] ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶν] δόξ[ας. καὶ] εἰ παρὰ τὴν φ[ύ]σι[ν]}...

{same as text below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43)

...ἀπ[ὸ τῆς πρ]ώτης ἀρχῆς σπέρμ[ατα ἡμῖν ἀγ]ωγά, τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδ[ε] τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω [ταῦ]τά [ἐ]στιν ἀεὶ [κα]ὶ πρά[ξ]εων [καὶ] διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέ[σε]ων καὶ πλεί[ω] καὶ ἐλάττωι. {ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ρῶτον] ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεν{νημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι, [τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα, καὶ τ[ὰ ἐ]κ τοῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσρέο[ν]τα [παρ'] ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμε[τέρα]ς [ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶν] δόξ[ας. καὶ] εἰ παρὰ τὴν φ[υ]σι[ν]}}...

...ἔκ τε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς, Σπέρματα ἡμῖν ἀγωγά, Τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδε, Τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε, Τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω Ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀεὶ καὶ [1] πράξεων καὶ [2] διανοήσεων καὶ [3] διαθέσεων, καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω. ὥστε, παρ' ἡμᾶς πρῶτον ἁπλῶς τὸ Ἀπογεγεννημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι – τοῖα ἢ τοῖα: καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος κατ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πόρους Εἰσρέοντα παρ' ἡμᾶς, ποτε γείνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξας. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν...

…from [our] primary foundation, Seeds are always leading us, Some [seeds] into these, Some into those, and Other [seeds] into both [types] of [1] activities and [2] [mental] perceptions and [3] [dispositional] arrangements, [some] more, [some] less. therefore [it is necessary that] what [habitual action] has been fully generated – [characteristics] such as this or such as that – is already produced first ABSOLUTELY FROM US: and what [seeds] Flow into us from what surrounds [us] by necessity through [our] passageways at some point is also produced by us FROM OUR JUDGMENTS. and if contrary to nature…

[Sedley 20 C.1] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and depend upon beliefs of our own making. If against the nature…

πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
τὸ σπέρμα **τὰ σπέρματα**	seed	**ΣΠΕΡΜΑ** *seed*
ἡ συναγωγή **αἱ συναγωγαί**	gathering	**ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ** *going together*
ἡ ἀγωγή **αἱ ἀγωγαί**	guidance	**ΑΓΩΓΗ** *going*
ἀγωγός *(ός, όν)*	leading	**ΑΓΩΓΟΣ** *going*
τά ἄμφω	the pair	**ΑΜΦΩ** *both*
αἰώνιος *(αἰωνίᾱ, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	**ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ** *characterized by being forever*
ἀΐδιος *(ος, ον)*	eternal *(static, singular)*	**ΑΪΔΙΟΣ** *characterized by forever [heavenly]*
ἀεὶ	always	**ΑΕΙ** *forever*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἡ διάθεσις **αἱ διαθέσεις**	arrangement	**ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing through*
πλείων *(ον)*	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** *more filling*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller / lesser	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *lesser*
ἀπογεγεννημένος *(η, ον)*	having been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *generated out*
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον **τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα**	what has been fully generated	**ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΝ**
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
τοῖος *(τοίᾱ, τοῖον)*	like *(such)*	**ΤΟΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
τὸ ῥεῦμα **τὰ ῥεύματα**	flow	**῾ΡΕΥΜΑ** *result of flowing*

ῥεῖν	to flow	ῬΕΙΝ *flowing*
εἰσρέων *(ουσα, ον)*	flowing into	ΕΙΣΡΕΩΝ
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*

There are external physical influences upon the development of our character – nevertheless we do have the ability to control these influences and change our character.

*Epicurus argues that, because we begin with a wide range of seeds (**σπέρματα**) for potential character traits, our actual development is not predetermined but can be decided upon from our own judgments (**ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξας**).*

25.35 [Character, Passageways]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 109

...τὰ τὸμ φυσικὸν χα[ρακ]τῆρα ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τ[οιού τ]οις κ[ενο]ῖς πόροις... ...[τ]ῶν αὐ[τ]ῶν ἰδιοτή[των]... ...[ἐ]πὶ πάν[τ]ων...

...τὸν φυσικὸν χαρακτῆρα, ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις κενοῖς πόροις... ...τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδιοτήτων... ...ἐπὶ πάντων...

...the natural character, similarly even to these empty passageways... ... of the particularities... ...in all...

ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ *engraving*
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ *similar*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ *emptiness*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
ἡ ἰδιότης αἱ ἰδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ *particular*

25.36 Overcoming Natural Dispositions

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 52 sup.)

...{νου[θετ]εῖν τ' ἀλλήλους καὶ μ[άχεσ]θαι καὶ μετα[ρυ]θμίζειν [ὡς ἔχ]οντας καὶ ἐν ἑα[υ]τοῖς [τὴ]ν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῆι [ἐ]ξ ἀρ[χῆς] μόνον συστάσε[ι κ]αὶ ἐν [τῆι τ]οῦ περιέχοντ[ος] καὶ ἐπει[σιό]ντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον [ἀ]νάγκη... εἰ γάρ τις καὶ τῶι [νο]υθετεῖν καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖσ[θ]αι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τόματο]ν [ἀ]νάγκ[η]ν [π]ρο[σ]τιθ[είη καὶ τοῦ] [πο]θ' ἑαυτῶ[ι] ὑπά[ρχοντος]}... ...[συ]νιέναι...

{same as text below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44), et alia.

...εστήκει ὢν οὐ[δέ ἀ]πολείπει τὰ πάθη τοῦ γίνε[σθαι, τὸ] {νουθε[τ]εῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχε[σ]θαι καὶ μεταρυθμίζειν ὡς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῆι ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῆι τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκ[ηι]. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖν καὶ τῶι νουθετεῖσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τό]μα[τ]ον ἀνάγκην προστι[θείη] ἀεὶ τοῦ [τό]θ' ἑαυτῶ[ι] ὑπάρχον[τος]}, μὴ οὐ[χ]ί πο[τε] δύν[ηται ταύτ]η [συ]νιέναι...

...Ἐστήκει – ὢν, οὐδέ ἀπολείπει τὰ Πάθη τοῦ γίνεσθαι: τὸ [1] νουθετεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ [2] μάχεσθαι καὶ [3] μεταρυθμίζειν ὡς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν ¬ καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος – κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκῃ

...[*against the false conclusion that one's innate composition already*] has been set in place – from which [*innate composition*], the Experiences of what [*automatic mental motion*] is produced do not leave out: [*we can demonstrate that there is*] the [1] instructing of one another and [2] contending and [3] readjusting as though also having WITHIN OURSELVES the cause [*of volitional movement*] ¬ and NOT ONLY [*having the cause of movement*] in [*our*] composition from its foundation and in the [*composition*] of the surrounding [*environment*] and of what enters into [*us*] – according to automation by necessity

[Sedley 20 C.2] *‹and we can invoke, against the argument that our eventual choice between these alternatives must be physically caused either by our initial make-up or by those environmental influences›* by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we [1] rebuke, [2] oppose and [3] reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us.

εἰ γὰρ Τις καὶ – τῷ νουθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖσθαι – τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκην προστιθείη ἀεὶ τοῦ τόθ' ἑαυτῷ ὑπάρχοντος: μὴ οὐχὶ ποτε Δύναιται ταύτῃ συνιέναι...

for if Someone – to both [*the actions of*] instructing and being instructed – should always add the [*natural*] necessity of what exists for oneself at that time according to what is automatic: He would never in this way be able to put it together [*i.e., the determinist's theory will never be consistent with his actions*]...

[Sedley 20 C.3] For if someone were to attribute – to the very processes of rebuking and being rebuked – the accidental necessity of whatever happens to be present to oneself at the time, I'm afraid that he can never in this way understand *‹his own behavior in continuing the debate›*

ἵστασθαι	to be placed upright	**ΊΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing*
στῆναι	to stand [already]	**ΣΤΗΝΑΙ** *standing*
ἑστάναι	to have set in place [already]	**ἙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *setting up*
λείπειν	to leave	**ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving*
ἀπολείπειν	to leave out	**ΑΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving away/out*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	**ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ** *setting sense*
νουθετεῖσθαι	to be instructed [about]	**ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting mind*
ἡ ἀλληλουχία **αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι**	interconnectedness	**ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ** *holding each other*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
μεταρυθμίζειν	to readjust	**ΜΕΤΑΡΥΘΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *change ordering*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*

ἐπεισιών *(οῦσα, όν)*	entering into	**ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ** *going upon*
αὐτόματος *(η, ον)*	automatic	**ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ** *self thinking*
τὸ αὐτόματον **τὰ αὐτόματα**	what is automatic	**ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ** *self thinking*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against* *constraint*
κατὰ τὸ **αὐτόματον** **ἀνάγκη**	according to automation by necessity	*i.e.,* *"Determinism"*
	Part 2	
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	**ΎΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
συνιέναι	to put it together {i.e. understand}	**ΣΥΝΙΕΝΑΙ** *sending together*

Democritus' reductionist atomism led to both skepticism and mechanistic determinism: his belief that everything could be explained by the interactions of atoms led to the idea that events are predetermined by these interactions, leaving no room for free will – this mechanistic view also fostered skepticism, as it suggested the movements of the atoms alone were real and what we sense was too subjective and inconsistent to be true.

25.37 Inconsistency of Determinists

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 52 fin.)

...[συ]νιέναι [μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν], ἀλλ' [εἰ μὲ]ν το[ῦτο πράττοι, τ]ọ̀ μὲ[ν ἔργον ἂν εἴη καταλεί]πον ὃ [ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν τ]ῆ[ς αἰτίας πρόληψιν]

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110

...[μεμ]φọ́μενος ἢ ἐπαιṿῶν. ἀλλ' ẹ[ἰ] ṃὲν τοῦτο πράṭṭοι, τὸ [αὐτὸ] ẹ̆ργ[ο]ν ἂν εἴη̣ [κ]ατα[λεί]πων ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῶṿ αὐṭῶν [ποιεῖ / κατὰ] τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρό[λη]ψιν, ἐν ὧι οὗ μὲν ṭὸ {δọ́[γμα] / δ' ὄ[νο]μ̣[α]}... μετατεθε[ι]μένọ[ς]...

...μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοῦτο Πράττοι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον ἂν Εἴη – Καταλείπων ῍Ο ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν Ποιεῖ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψιν: ἐν ᾧ, οὗ μὲν τὸ δόγμα... μετατεθειμένος...

...[*He may even perceive his self-refutation while he is*] blaming or praising. but if He were to accomplish this, It would be the same task – [and] He would be leaving undisputed *What establishes the anticipation of the cause of our own [*movement*]: in which [*case*], having changed for himself at one point [*his use of* his] teaching [*that relates to natural necessity*]...

** i.e., our sense of our own volition affecting our movement and thoughts*

[Sedley 20 C.4] *‹He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to›* blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And in that he would at one point be altering his theory, at another...

[O'Keefe] *‹He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to›* blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And we would understand (**ἐννοοῦμεν** *for* **ἐν ὧι οὗ μὲν**) that the theory was altered

αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	**ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ** *responsibility*
κακίζειν	to reproach	**ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ** *bad*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
μέμφεσθαι	to blame	**ΜΕΜΦΕΣΘΑΙ** *finding fault with*
μεμφόμενος *(η, ον)*	blaming	**ΜΕΜΦΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *finding fault with*
ἐπαινεῖν	to praise	**ΕΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *praising upon*
ἐπαινῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	praising	
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
καταλείπων *(ουσα, ον)*	leaving undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΩΝ** *thoroughly leaving*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•^] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
τό δόγμα **τά δόγματα**	teaching	**ΔΟΓΜΑ** *seeming*
συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing change*
μετατεθειμένος *(η, ον)*	having changed {for oneself} [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΕΘΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *placed change*

25.38 Self-Refuting Determinism

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 12

...{ὁ ṭοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται καὶ ούδέποτε δύνατaι βεβαιῶσαι – ὡς ἔστιν τοια τα πάνṭα <τὰ κατ' ά>νάγκην καλ[ο]ύμενα, ἀλλὰ μάχεται τινι περ[ὶ αὐ]τοῦ τ[ού]τ[ο]υ ὡς δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀβελ[τερ]ευομένωι. κ[ἂ]ν είς ἄπε[ι]ρον φῆι [πάλι]ν [κατ' ἀνάγκην]}...

{A 53 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 23 (fr. B 45)

...{το[σ]α[ύ]της πλάνης... περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπετα[ι] καὶ ούδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστι τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περ[ὶ] αὐτ[ο]ῦ τούτου ὡς δ[ι'] ἑαυτὸν ἀβελτ[ε]ρευομένωι. κἂν είς ἄπειρον φῇ πάλιν κατ' ἀ[νά]γκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεί, οὐ[κ ἐ]πιλογίζεται ἐν τῶι είς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν [ἀνάπ]τειν}...

{A 54 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 112 | P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 53)

...{τοι[αύτ]ης πλάνης. περικάτ[ω] γὰρ {ὸ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται, καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστιν τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα. ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὡς δι' ἑαυτὸυ ἀβελτερευομένωι. κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον φῆι πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην} τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεὶ, οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῶι εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνά[π]τειν} τοῦ κα[τὰ τ]ρόπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἃ πο[ιεῖ] ἀπολήγοι [εἰ]ς ἑαυτὸ[ν], ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν [ἀ]νάγ[κην] τ[ι]θείη, [ο]ὐδ' ἂν...

...τοιαύτης πλάνης. περικάτω γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος Λόγος τρέπεται – καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὡς ἔστιν Τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ "κατ' ἀνάγκην" καλούμενα. ἀλλὰ Μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, ὡς δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀβελτερευομένῳ!

> ...of such an error. for Reasoning like this is turned upside down – and is never able to affirm that ALL such Things exist as those things which are called "according to necessity." instead, He contends with some [*opponent*] about this very [*issue*], as if [*that opponent*] through himself is being obstinate!
>
> [Sedley 20 C.5] ...such error. For this sort of account is self-refuting, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called 'necessitated' – but he debates this very question on the assumption that his opponent is himself responsible for talking nonsense.

κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον Φῇ πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεὶ, οὐκ Ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτειν τοῦ κατὰ τρόπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἃ ποιεῖ Ἀπολήγοι εἰς ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην Τιθείη, οὐδ' ἂν...

> and even if He infinitely asserts again from [*his logical*] reasoning that he always does this by necessity, He does not inductively consider [*the fact that he attributes*] in [*the act of*] fastening onto himself the cause of reasoning ACCORDING TO a [*proper*] way, but onto [*his*] mutual opponent [*the cause*] of [*reasoning*] NOT ACCORDING TO a [proper] way. and if He would not stop from [*attributing*] what he does to himself, but instead He would assign [*his actions*] to [*natural*] necessity, [*he*] would not even...
>
> [Sedley 20 C.6-7] And even if he goes on to infinity saying that this action of his is in turn necessitated, always appealing to arguments, he is not reasoning it empirically – so long as he goes on imputing to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly and to his opponent that for having reasoned incorrectly. But unless he were to stop attributing his action to himself and to pin it on necessity instead, he would not even ‹*be consistent*›...

ἡ πλάνη **αἱ πλάναι**	error	**ΠΛΑΝΗ** *roaming*
περικάτω	upside down	**ΠΕΡΙΚΑΤΩ** *around below*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
διατρέπειν	to refuse	**ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning thoroughly*
τρέπειν	to turn	**ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning*
οὐδείς (*οὐδεμία, οὐδέν*)	no one	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
οὐδέποτε	never	**ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ** *not even* *at some point*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	**ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ** *firm standing*
τὸ τοιοῦτον **τὰ τοιαῦτα**	what is like this (*such a thing*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *this of this sort*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*

καλούμενος *(η, ον)*	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *summoning*
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ *combating*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*
ἀβελτερεύειν	to be obstinate	ΑΒΕΛΤΕΡΕΥΕΙΝ *not seeking better*
ἀβελτερευόμενος *(η, ον)*	being obstinate	ΑΒΕΛΤΕΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *not seeking better*
	I cannot find this word anywhere else	
ἄπειρος *(ον)*	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ *not limited*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
πάλιν	again	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against constraint*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning* *action upon*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning* *action upon*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἀνάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *thoroughly fastening*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *action of collecting*
λελογίσθαι	to have reasoned	ΛΕΛΟΓΙΣΘΑΙ *reasoned action*
τά ἄμφω *(dual)*	the pair	ΑΜΦΩ *both*
ἡ σβένσις = ἡ σβέσις	extinguishing	ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ ΣΒΕΣΙΣ *cancelling*
ἀμφισβητεῖν	to mutually oppose	ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΝ *cancelling* *both [sides]*
ἀμφισβητῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	mutually opposing	
ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες	mutual opponent	ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΩΝ *cancelling* *both [sides]*
ἀπολήγειν	to stop from	ΑΠΟΛΗΓΕΙΝ *leaving off* *away from*

Determinists often defend their actions by claiming they are compelled to behave in a certain way. These determinists might view their attitudes as necessary, but this does not prevent their self-refutation.

25.39 Anticipated Imprints

...εἰ τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῶι τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσαγ[ο]ρεύων [ὄ]νομα μό[ν]ομ μετατίθετα[ι] μη δ' ἐπιδίξει ὅτι ṭοιοῦτό τι ῷ μοχθηρ[ί εἰσι τύ]ποι προειḷ[η]φότẹς τọ δι' ἡμῶ[ν αὐ]τῶν αἴτιọν καλ[οῦμεν], οὔτ' ἰδ[ι]...

...εἰ, τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς "ἀνάγκης" ὀνόματι προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον Μετατίθεται, μη δ' Ἐπιδείξει ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι: ῷ μοχθηρί εἰσι Τύποι προειληφότες – τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἴτιον Καλοῦμεν. οὔτ' ἰδι...

> ...[*but*] if he is referring, with the word "necessity," to what [*action*] is being invoked by us ourselves, [*then*] He is only changing the name, but He is NOT [*actually*] exhibiting that it is such a [*circumstance*]: in which [*our*] anticipated Impressions are in a wretched [*state*] – [*specifically the anticipated impressions*] which We call responsible [*for the actions we take*] by us ourselves. and [*his*] particular [*actions will*] not [*change*]...*

** i.e., our anticipation [i.e., our mental impression before active thought] of our own agency is accurate. Merely changing the word used to refer to this agency does not demonstrate that these anticipated imprints are incorrect – neither does it lead to any practical change in one's actions.*

> [Sedley 20 C.8] ‹*on the other hand*› if in using the word 'necessity' of that which we call our own agency he is merely changing a name, and won't prove that we have a preconception of a kind which has faulty delineations when we call our own agency responsible, neither his own ‹*behavior nor that of others will be affected*›...

καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*
καλούμενος *(η, ον)*	being called	**ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *summoning*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὄνομα	the name of necessity, the word 'necessity'	
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
προσαγορεύων	referring to [as]	
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing change*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
δεικνύναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἐπιδεικνύναι	to exibit	**ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing upon*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
μοχθηρός *(ή, όν)*	wretched	**ΜΟΧΘΗΡΟΣ** *hardship*
ὁ τύπος **οἱ τύποι**	impression	**ΤΥΠΟΣ** *imprinting*
προλαμβάνειν	to anticipate	**ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping before*
προειληφώς *(υῖα, ός)*	anticipated [i.e., prior to active thinking]	**ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ** *before having grasped*
[perfect active participle taken here as implicit passive]		
τύποι προειληφότες	anticipated impressions	
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
αἴτιος	responsible	**ΑΙΤΙΟΣ** *responsibility*

ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ particular

Epicurus argues that determinism is not a meaningful explanation of the world. We all sense of our own agency. When determinists apply the wording of 'necessity' to human actions: this does not provide any new understanding – it is merely a change IN THE INDICATION *(i.e., wording) and not a change in* WHAT IS BEING INDICATED.

25.40 False Equivocation of Determinists

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 24 (fr. B 46)

...{δι' ἀνάγκην καλε[ῖ]ν πρ[ὸς] ὧν φατε... ἂν δὲ μή τις [τ]οῦτ[ο ἀ]π[ο]δείξει μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὅρμημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν ἀ[λλ]ὰ π[ά]νθ' ὅσα νῦν δι' ἡμῶν α[ὐτῶν ὀνο]μάζοντες τὴν αἰτία[ν πως προ]θ[υ]μούμεθα πράττε[ιν κ]ατ[ὰ χ]ώραν ἀνάγκην [πρ]ο[σα]γορε[ύ]ω[ν ὄνο]μα μόνον ἀμ[ε]ί[ψει]}...

{1191 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 54)

...{ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει, ἔργον δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστιν, ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πρ]άττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὑρεῖν τὸ ποῖο[ν ο]ὖν τι δεῖ νομίζε]ιν τὸ ἐξ [ἡμ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν π]ως [πρ]αττόμενον τῇ προθυμ[ίαι τοῦ πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λ' οὐθὲν]} πρ[άττ]ει[ν] ἢ φάν[α]ι...

{1191 below is an expanded fragment}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116

...γενέσθαι, ἀλ[λὰ κε]νὸν [καὶ] τὸ {δι' ἀνάγκην καλ[εῖ]ν προ[ὸ]ς ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μ[ή] τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει, μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὅρμημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσ[α] νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐ[τῶ]ν ὀνομάζοντες τὴν αἰτίαν [εἶναι διαβ]ε[βα]ιούμεθα πράττε[ιν] κατὰ χώραν {ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει.} ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι π[ρ]άττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὑρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [ο]ὖν τι δεῖ νομί[ζ]ειν τὸ ἐξ ἡ[μ]ῶν αὐτῶ[ν π]ως [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμ[ουμένων πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λο τι οὐθὲν]} εἰ μὴ φά[ναι τὸ] ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐσ[τὶ]...

...γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ κενὸν καὶ τὸ δι' "ἀνάγκην" Καλεῖν πρὸς ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μή Τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει – μηδ' ἔχει [1] ἡμῶν τι συνεργὸν μηδ' [2] ὅρμημα ἀποτρέπειν ὧν, καλοῦντες δι' "ἡμῶν αὐτῶν," τὴν αἰτίαν Συντελοῦμεν ¬ ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δι' "ἡμῶν αὐτῶν" ὀνομάζοντες "τὴν αἰτίαν" εἶναι Διαβεβαιούμεθα πράττειν κατὰ χώραν. "ἀνάγκην" προσαγορεύων – ὄνομα μόνον Ἀμείψει

...are [*already*] produced. but, from what you assert, what [*you*] Call "by necessity" [*is*] also EMPTY.* and if One cannot fully prove this [*theory*] – he has neither [*the ability*] to dissuade [1] something of ours [*that is internally*] cooperative nor any [2] impulse of what, [*while we are*] calling "by us ourselves," We mutually fulfill as the cause [*of movement*] ¬ but [*with us*] using the word "cause" We thoroughly affirm that we accomplish BY US OURSELVES all that [*movement that*] now exists in [*our own*] realm. while he is naming [*this volitional movement as*] "necessity" – He will only be replacing a name

**i.e., The term "necessity", when used to mean "all-encompassing natural automation," is purely a logical construct with no physical basis. As a label, it attempts to denote something that does not actually exist.*

On the other hand, using the word "necessity" for our volitional movement is a misapplication of the word for what does exist.

[Sedley 20 C.9] ...but even to call necessitation empty as a result of your claim. If someone won't explain this, and has no auxiliary element or impulse in us which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name.

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν Μετακοσμήσει – ὥσπερ, ἐπ' ἐνίων, Ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστὶν, ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πράττειν.

…[*by changing what he refers to by using the word "necessity"*] He will rearrange no [*actual*] task of ours [*i.e., he will not change the reality of our volitional movements*] – just as, in case for some [*people*], One who fully sees what kinds [*of movements*] DO EXIST BY NECESSITY, has been accustomed to dissuade those eager to accomplish something AGAINST THE FORCE [*OF THIS NECESSITY*].

[Sedley 20 C.10] He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion.

ζητήσει δ' ἡ Διάνοια εὑρεῖν τὸ ποῖον οὖν τι Δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πως πραττόμενον, μὴ Προθυμουμένων πράττειν! οὐ γὰρ Ἔχει ἄλλο τι οὐθὲν εἰ μὴ φάναι τὸ ποῖον κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστί…

but [*our mental*] Perception will seek to discover what kind of thing, then, It is necessary to think of as being accomplished somehow from us ourselves, while [*we*] are not eager to act!* for He has nothing else except to assert what kind of [*movement*] exists by necessity…

**i.e., It is inconceivable that we can willingly act against our will*

[Sedley 20 C.11] And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to. For he has no alternative but to say what sort of action is necessitated, ‹*and what is not*›…

γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *came into being*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
κενός (ή, όν)	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*
τὸ καλεῖν	a calling	
καλούμενος (η, ον)	being called	**ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *summoning*
καλῶν (οῦσα, ῶν)	calling	**ΚΑΛΩΝ** *crying out*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
ἐπιδεικνύναι	to exibit	**ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing upon*
δεικνύναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	**ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing away*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
ὁ συνεργός **οἱ συνεργοί**	colleague	**ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΣ** *working together*
συνεργός (ός, όν)	cooperative	**ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΣ** *working together*
τρέπειν	to turn	**ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning*

ἀποτρέπειν	to dissuade	ΑΠΟΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ *turning away*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ *naming*
ὀνομάζων	using the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΩΝ *naming*
βεβαιούμενος *(η, ον)*	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *firm standing*
διαβεβαιοῦσθαι	to thoroughly affirm	ΔΙΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΣΘΑΙ *firm standing through*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ἡ χώρα αἱ χῶραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ *location*
κατὰ χώραν	in [one's own] realm	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ *thoroughly speaking publicly*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ *speaking publicly toward*
προσαγορευόμενος *(η, ον)*	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *speaking publicly toward*
προσαγορεύων	referring to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΩΝ *speaking publicly toward*
ἀμείβειν	to replace	ΑΜΕΙΒΕΙΝ *exchanging*
	Part 2	
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ *beyond/ change order*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ *one*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*
συνορῶν *(ῶσα)*	fully seeing [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ *seen together*
ποῖος *(α, ον)*	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ *gathering*
τὸ ποῖον τὰ ποῖα	what kind of thing	ΠΟΙΟΝ
ἀποτρέπειν	to dissuade	ΑΠΟΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ *turning away*
εἰωθέναι	to be accustomed	ΕΙΩΘΕΝΑΙ *to set as one's own*
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ *spirit in*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
προθυμεῖσθαι	to strive for	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ *spirit forward*
προθυμούμενος	being eager [through oneself]	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *spirit forward*
ὁ προθυμούμενος οἱ προθυμούμενοι	one who is eager	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
ὁ βιασμός οἱ βιασμοί	forcing	ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ *process of violence*
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ *violence alongside*

ἡ βία **αἱ βίαι**	force	**ΒΙΑ** *violence*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
πραττόμενος *(η, ον)*	being accomplished	**ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *doing / affair*
	Part 3	
ζητεῖν	to seek	**ΖΗΤΕΙΝ** *seeking*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
εὑρίσκειν	to discover	**ἙΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *finding*
ποῖος *(α, ον)*	what kind of	**ΠΟΙΟΣ** *gathering*
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*

Determinists claim humans fundamentally lack an internal source of self-control. Consequently, determinists cannot – in a way that is consistent with their doctrine – expect their arguments to prevent humans from taking any actions.

25.41 The Great, Greatly Fallen

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 118

…{μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζηται μηδ' αὖ ὃ ἐξελέγχει} γε ἢ ὃ εἰσφέρει πρᾶγμα ἐκτιθεῖ, φω[νὴ] μόνον ἀμίβεται, καθάπερ πάλαι θρυλῶ. οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρ[χῆ]ς [ἱ]κ[αν]ῶς κ[αὶ ο]ὐ μ[όνον τ]ῶμ πρ[ὸ]…

{added to fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 25 (fr. B 47.1)

…{μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζηται, μηδ' αὖ ὃ ἐξελέγχει} | γ[ε ἢ ὃ εἰσ]φ[έ]ρε[ι π]ρᾶγμα ἐκτιθε[ῖ], φωνεῖ μόνον ἀμείβεται, καθάπερ πάλαι θρυλῶ. οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἱκανῶς, καὶ οὐ μό[ν]ον [τ]ῶμ πρὸ | αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλ[α]σίως, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοῖς, καίπερ ἐν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες, ε[ἰ]ς τὸ τ[ὴ]ν ἀνάγκην καὶ ταὐτόματ[ο]ν πάντα α[ἰτι]ᾶσθαι

…μάλιστα ἀδιανοήτων. ἂν δέ Τις τοῦτο μὴ παραβιάζηται, μηδ' αὖ ὃ ἐξελέγχει, τε ἢ ὃ εἰσφέρει: πρᾶγμα ἐκτιθεῖ – φωνὴ μόνον Ἀμείβεται – καθάπερ πάλαι Θρυλῶ

…especially of what is [*mentally*] imperceptible [*i.e., willfully acting against our will*]. but if Someone does not distort this [*false equivocation of "necessity" with volitional movement*], nor again [*clearly*] refutes it out, or even [*clearly*] introduces it: while he is setting out the situation – He replaces only a statement – just as I have repeated long ago

[Sedley 20 C.12] …supremely unthinkable. But unless someone perversely maintains this, or makes it clear what fact he is rebutting or introducing, it is merely a word that is being changed, as I keep repeating.

Οἱ δ' αἰτιολογήσαντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἱκανῶς, καὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλασίως: Ἔλαθον ἑαυτοῖς – (καίπερ ἐν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες) – εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ταὐτόματον πάντα αἰτιᾶσθαι

but Those who, having reasoned into the [*essential*] causes sufficiently from the beginning, not only differed greatly from those before them ¬ but also [*they differed*] in many ways from those [*that came*] afterwards: [*yet*] THEY EVADED NOTICE TO THEMSELVES – (even though, in many things, they had lightened what is great [*i.e., they made difficult topics easier to understand*]) – IN ORDER TO BLAME everything [*on*] necessity and what is automatic

[Sedley 20 C.13] The first men to give a satisfactory account of causes: men, not only much greater than their predecessors, but also many times greater than their successors, turned a blind eye to themselves – although in many matters they had alleviated great ills – in order to hold necessity and accident responsible for everything

[Taylor] ‹...› Those who gave an adequate account of causes from the beginning, far surpassing not only their predecessors but their successor ways, though they alleviated many great evils, failed to see what they were doing in making necessity and chance the cause of everything

μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ *very*
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ *very*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
ἀδιανόητος	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ *not seeing through*
τὸ ἀδιανόητον τὰ ἀδιανόητα	what is imperceptible [mentally]	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΝ *not seeing through*
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ *violence alongside*
παραβιάζεσθαι	to distort	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ *violence alongside*
ἐξελέγχειν	to refute out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ *confuting out* *[with contrary proof]*
εἰσφέρειν	to carry in [here, "to introduce"]	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing into*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
προστιθέναι	to add	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing toward*
ἐκτιθέναι	to set out	ΕΚΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing out*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
ἀμείβειν	to replace	ΑΜΕΙΒΕΙΝ *exchanging*
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ *just as thoroughly*
πάλιν	again	ΠΑΛΙΝ *back*
πάλαι	long ago	ΠΑΛΑΙ *back*
θρυλεῖν	to repeat	ΘΡΥΛΕΙΝ *murmuring*
αἰτιολογεῖν	to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *collecting blame*
αἰτιολογήσας *(ασα, αν)*	having reasoned into the [essential] causes [already]	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ *collecting blame*
ὁ αἰτιολογήσας οἱ αἰτιολογήσαντες	one who has reasoned into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ *collecting blame*
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	

ἱκανός (ή, όν)	sufficient	ἹΚΑΝΟΣ *fitting / proper*
ἱκανῶς	sufficiently	ἹΚΑΝΩΣ *fitting / proper*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing through*
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing*
ἐνεγκεῖν	to carry [already]	ΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ *brought*
διενέγκας (ασα, αν)	differing [already]	ΔΙΕΝΕΓΚΑΣ *brought through*
ὕστερον	afterwards	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ *many times*
πολλαπλασίως	in many ways	ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΩΣ *many fold*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *to be hidden*
ἔλαθον	they evade notice	
καίπερ	even though	ΚΑΙΠΕΡ *and indeed*
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ *largeness*
τὸ μέγα τὰ μεγάλα	what is great	ΜΕΓΑ *large*
τὸ κοῦφον τὰ κούφα	light things	ΚΟΥΦΟΝ *nimble*
κουφίζειν	to lighten	ΚΟΥΦΙΖΕΙΝ *nimble*
κουφίσας	having lightened [already]	ΚΟΥΦΙΣΑΣ *nimble*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against* *constraint*
αὐτόματος (η, ον)	automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ *self thinking*
τὸ αὐτόματον τὰ αὐτόματα	what is automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ *self thinking*
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ *responsibility*

*Epicurus argues that if Democritus had applied his idea of universal necessity to his own actions, it would have led to severe negative outcomes. Consider the "Lazy Argument" (***Ἀργὸς Λόγος***) which shows the practical absurdity of the determinists' position: since everything is fated, no action is necessary.*

Epicurus was also well aware of his older contemporary Pyrrho's "agnosticism and suspension of judgement" which led him to lead "a life consistent with this doctrine – going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses." (D.L. 9.62)

25.42 Cognitive Dissonance

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 55)

…ᾶσθαι. ὁ δὴ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανε τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργο[ι]ς πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συγκρού[ο]ντα, καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα, ἧι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης, κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπείπτοντα, ἧ[ι δὲ] μὴ ἐκρά[τει, σ]τάσ[ε]ως ἐμ[πι]πλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν [ἔ]ρ[γ]ων καὶ τ[ῆς δόξη]ς. τού[τω]ν οὖ[ν] οὕ[τ]ως ἐ[χό]ντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ [οὗ λέγων ἐ]ξ [ἀρ]χῆς [εἰς τὸ ταῦτα] π[αρεκκαθαί]ρει[ν ἀφικόμη]ν ἀποδιδ[ό]…

{expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 25 (fr. B 47.2) | 1191 fr. 119/120

ὁ δὴ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρού[ο]ντα. καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα. ἧι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις π[ε]ριπείπτοντα. ἧ[ι δὲ] μὴ ἐκράτει στάσεως ἐμπιμπλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης. τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα παρεκκαθαίρειν ἀφικόμην ἀποδιδόναι, μ[ὴ] κακ[όν τι] τοιοῦτ[ο]

ὁ δὴ Λόγος αὐτὸς, ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων, κατεάγνυτο – καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρούοντα – καὶ εἰ μὴ Λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο: συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα

…the Reasoning itself, which teaches this [*i.e., total determinism*], shattered – and it evaded the man [*from noticing that*] in [*his daily*] tasks he was clashing with [*his own*] judgment – and unless a certain Forgetfulness of [*his*] judgment had not been inherent for [*his daily*] tasks: he would continuously be disturbing himself

[Sedley 20 C.14 sup.] Indeed, the actual account promoting this view came to grief when it left the great man blind to the fact that in his actions he was clashing with his doctrine, and that if it were not that a certain blindness to the doctrine took hold of him while acting he would be constantly perplexing himself

[Taylor] The very thesis which asserts this broke down and involved the man [*i.e., Democritus*] unawares in a conflict between his actions and his opinion, so that, had he not in his actions forgotten his opinion, he would have been in a continual state of self-induced confusion

ᾗ δ' ἐκράτει Τὸ τῆς δόξης: κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπείπτοντα ¬ ᾗ δὲ μὴ ἐκράτει: στάσεως ἐμπιμπλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης. τούτων, οὖν, οὕτως ἐχόντων: Δεῖ καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα παρεκκαθαίρειν Ἀφικόμην ἀποδιδόναι – μὴ κακόν Τι τοιοῦτο

…insofar as This [aspect of his] judgment was prevailing [*in his daily life*]: he would be falling into extreme [*circumstances*] ¬ but insofar as [*his philosophical judgment*] was not ruling [*among his practical actions*]: He was being filled full with conflict due to the contradiction of his tasks and his judgment. therefore, since these things are so: It is also necessary to demonstrate concerning what I was saying from the beginning, that I arrived at making these things fully clear as well – [*so that*] Something bad like this does not [*occur in our own thinking or behaviour*]…

[Sedley 20 C.14 fin. – 15] and that wherever the doctrine prevailed he would be falling into desperate calamities, while wherever it did not he would be filled with conflict because of the contradiction between his actions and his doctrine. It is because this is so that the need also arises to explain the matter which I was discussing when I first embarked on this digression, lest some similar evil ‹*befall us*›

[Taylor] …‹ ›…succumbing to the most extreme consequences when his opinion prevailed, and full of conflict when it did not, through the opposition of his actions and his opinion… ‹ ›…

ᾗ	insofar as	ἩΙ *in/for which*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ *teaching*
κατάγνυναι	to shatter	ΚΑΤΑΓΝΥΝΑΙ *thoroughly* *breaking*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *to be hidden*
ὁ ἀνήρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ *man*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*
ἡ κροῦσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ *hitting*
συνκρούειν	to clash with	ΣΥΝΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ *hitting together*
συνκρούων *(η, ον)*	clashing with	ΣΥΝΚΡΟΥΩΝ *hitting together*
ἡ λήθη αἱ λῆθαι	forgetfulness	ΛΗΘΗ *oblivion*
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ *work*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἐνγίγνεσθαι	to be inherent	ΕΝΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
συνεχῶς	continuously	ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ *holding together*
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *agitating*
ταράττων *(ουσα, ον)*	disturbing	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΩΝ *agitating*
	Part 2	
κρατεῖν	to prevail	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ *power*
ἔσχατος *(ἐσχάτη, ἔσχατον)*	extreme	ΕΣΧΑΤΟΣ *last*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling around*
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	[stationary] position, *or* conflict	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ *standing*
ἐμπιπλάναι	to fill full	ΕΜΠΙΠΛΑΝΑΙ *filling in*
ἡ ὑπεναντιότης αἱ ὑπεναντιότητες	contradiction	῾ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΤΗΣ *over against*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleansing*
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *clearing out*
παρεκκαθαίρειν	to make fully clear as well	ΠΑΡΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleansing out alongside*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *come towards*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*

25.43 Causation of Characteristics

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 26 (fr. B 48)

…πολ[λ]άκις δὲ κα[ὶ τ]ὴν α[ὑτὴ]ν ἀμφότερα κέκτητ[αι μ]ὲν αἰτίαν καὶ μὴ συνεπεσπασμένα τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων μηδὲ συνεπισπώμενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρά τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συνπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας. ὅθεν κ[αὶ τὸ] τ[οῦ τέλους] αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγ[ισ]μα εἶχε μ[ὲ]ν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, ε[ἴ]χο[με]ν δὲ καὶ [ἡμεῖς]…

{expanded fragment 1191 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 56)

…καὶ ἡμε[ῖ]ς. ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν: ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα, τίς ὁ κανὼν καὶ τὸ {ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶ[ν] δοξῶν περαινό[με]να, ἀλλ' ἀκολ[ο]υθήσομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν φοραῖ[ς], οἰχήσεται πάντα, καθ' ἃ διερε[υνώ]μεθά τι, καὶ ὑπεροχή… τ[ὸ] δ' αὐτὸ κ[αὶ] ἀΐδ[ι]ον ἐγε[ννή]θη καὶ σπέ[ρμ]α [ἦν] τι, ὥσ[πε]ρ λ[η]ρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕ[τ]ε[ρον] ἀγω[γό]ν, π[αρ]όντος δὲ τού[το]υ ν[οοῦμεν] ἢ [δο]ξ[άζ]ομεν}…

{added to fragment 1191 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 121/122

…[πολλάκι]ς δ[ὲ καὶ τὴ]ν [αὐ]τὴν [ἀ]μ[φ]ότε[ρα κ]έ[κτ]ηται [μὲν] αἰτί[α]ν καὶ μὴ συνε[πε]σπασμ[έν]α ἕτερ[α] ὑπὸ τ[ῶν ἑ]τέρων [μ]ηδὲ συνεπ[ι]σπ[ώμε]να [καὶ βιαζ]όμ[ενα παρ]ά [τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν] τοιούτων συμπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτ[ί]ας… ὅθεν καὶ τὸ τοῦ τ[έ]λους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγισμα εἶχε μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, εἴχομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς. ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ – εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ καν[ώ]ν καὶ τὸ {ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶ[ν] δοξῶν περαινό[με]να, ἀλλ' ἀκολ[ο]υθήσομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν φοραῖ[ς], οἰχήσεται πάντα, καθ' ἃ διερε[υνώ]μεθά τι, καὶ ὑπεροχή… τ[ὸ] δ' αὐτὸ κ[αὶ] ἀΐδ[ι]ον ἐγε[ννή]θη καὶ σπέ[ρμ]α [ἦν] τι, ὥσ[πε]ρ λ[η]ρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕ[τ]ε[ρον] ἀγω[γό]ν, π[αρ]όντος δὲ τού[το]υ ν[οοῦμεν] ἢ [δο]ξ[άζ]ομεν}…

…πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν Ἀμφότερα κέκτηται μὲν αἰτίαν – καὶ μὴ συνεπεσπασμένα Ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ¬ μηδὲ συνεπισπώμενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρά τε χρόνους: Πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συμπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας… …ὅθεν καὶ τὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγισμα. εἶχε μὲν καὶ [1] ἡ Ἀρχὴ – τὴν αἰτίαν – Εἴχομεν δὲ καὶ [2] Ἡμεῖς

…often, Both things possess the same cause [*of movement*] – and with Different [*movements*] not having been drawn on together by other [*movements*] ¬ nor being drawn on together and being forced overtime: [*it is necessary to demonstrate that*] Many of these types of [*actions*] are SYMPTOMATIC of [*people's*] ages and other causes [*i.e., not a NECESSARY PROPERTY of their ages or other causes*]… …from where also [*we have*] an inductive consideration regarding [*our*] fulfillment. [1] THE FOUNDATION [*from natural necessity*] had – and [2] WE OURSELVES also had – a cause [*of initiating movement*]

ἦν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν Ἐπαίσθησις: τοῦ εἰ μὴ Ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ Κανὼν καὶ τὸ Ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν δοξῶν περαινόμενα, ἀλλ' Ἀκολουθήσομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν φοραῖς – οἰχήσεται Πάντα καθ' ἃ διερευνώμεθά τι, καὶ Ὑπεροχή…

but this is our focused Sensation: for if We will not comprehend [*for ourselves*] what the Standard is and what Discriminates all things that are accomplished through [*our*] judgments, but We will unreasonably follow along with the transmissions of the public [*thought*] – [*then*] EVERYTHING by which we investigate ANYTHING will be gone. and Excellence…

…τὸ δ' Αὐτὸ καὶ ἀΐδιον ἐγεννήθη – καὶ σπέρμα ἦν τι. ὥσπερ Ληρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀγωγόν, παρόντος δὲ τούτου, Νοοῦμεν ἢ Δοξάζομεν…

…and the Same [?] was generated also as eternal – and it was a certain seed. as though I am being foolish, [*while*] leading from the beginning towards something different ¬ but with this [*situation actually*] being present, We conceive or judge…

πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
τὰ ἀμφότερα	both things	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΑ** *both of the two*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure [here, "to possess"]	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἐπισπᾶν	to draw to	**ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ** *pulling upon*

συνεπισπᾶν	to draw on together	**ΣΥΝΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ** *dragging upon together*
συνεπεσπασμένος *(η, ον)*	having been drawn on together	
συνεπισπώμενος *(η, ον)*	being drawn on together	
βιαζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being forced	**ΒΙΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *violence*
ὁ χρόνος **οἱ χρόνοι**	time	**ΧΡΟΝΟΣ** *[seizing]*
παρά χρόνους	overtime?	
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	**ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling together*
ἡ ἡλικία **αἱ ἡλικίαι**	age *(stage of life)*	**ἩΛΙΚΙΑ** *comrade*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ἐπιλογιστέος *(α, ον)*	out to be inductively considered	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be action upon reasoning*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα **τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα**	an inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
	Part 2	
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις **αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις**	focused sensation	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *upon perceiving*
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended [in the future]	**ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ** *taking hold*
ὁ κανών **οἱ κανόνες**	standard	**ΚΑΝΩΝ** *measuring stick (ruler)*
ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
ἐπικρίνειν	to discriminate	**ΕΠΙΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *dividing upon*
ἐπικρεῖνων *(ουσα, ον)*	discriminating	**ΕΠΙΚΡΕΙΝΩΝ** *dividing upon*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
περαίνειν	to accomplish	**ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *extremity*
περαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	being accomplished	**ΠΕΡΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *extremity*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow [along with]	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀλόγως	unreasonably	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*

οἴχεσθαι	to be gone	ΟΙΧΕΣΘΑΙ *having departed*
ἡ ἔρευνα αἱ ἔρευναι	search	ΕΡΕΥΝΑ *searching*
διερευνᾶν	to investigate	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΑΝ *searching through*
ἡ ὑπεροχή αἱ ὑπεροχαί	excellence	῾ΥΠΕΡΟΧΗ *holding above*
	Part 3	
αἰώνιος (*αἰωνιᾶ, αἰώνιον*)	perpetual (*moving, multiple*)	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ *characterized by being forever*
ἀΐδιος (*ος, ον*)	eternal (*static, singular*)	ΑΪΔΙΟΣ *characterized by forever [heavenly]*
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating in*
γεννᾶν	to generate	ΓΕΝΝΑΝ *generating*
ἐγεννήθη	it was generated [already]	ΕΓΕΝΝΗΘΗ *generated*
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ *seed*
ὁ λῆρος οἱ λῆροι	trifle	ΛΗΡΟΣ *trash / trifle*
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	ΛΗΡΕΙΝ *trash / trifle*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀγωγός (*ός, όν*)	leading	ΑΓΩΓΟΣ *going*
παρών (*παρουσα, παρόν*)	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ *to be beside*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*

25.44 Autonomy

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 123

...πολὺ δ[ὲ] αὐ[τ]ὸ ἐστιμ μὲν ὃ [σ]υνε[ρ]γούσης τῆς φύσεω[ς], ἔστι δ' [ὃ] οὐ συνε[ρ]γο[ύση]ς, [ἔ]στ[ι] δ' ὃ κατακ[οσ]μουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν. ἔστι δ[ὲ] καὶ αὐτῆς πρ[ο]ηγου[μέν]ης τι...

...πολὺ δὲ Αὐτὸ: [1] ἐστιν μὲν Ὃ συνεργούσης τῆς φύσεως, [2] ἔστι δ' Ὃ οὐ συνεργούσης, [3] ἔστι δ' Ὃ κατακοσμουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς προηγουμένης Τι...

...This [*i.e., multiple causes of motion*] is significant: [*there is*] indeed, [1] That which exists with nature contributing [*movement by necessity*]; but [*also*] [2] That which exists with [*nature*] not contributing [*movement by necessity*], and [3] That which exists with arrangement by us. [*the fact that*] Something exists with it also proceeding on its own...

συνεργεῖν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ *work together*
συνεργῶν (*οῦσα, οῦν*)	contributing	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΩΝ *work together*
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ *beyond/ change order*

κατακοσμεῖν	to arrange	**ΚΑΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ** *beyond/ change order*
κατακοσμούμενος *(η, ον)*	being arranged	
προηγεῖσθαι	to proceed	**ΠΡΟΗΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *leading before*

It is important to understand the distinction between the primary causes of movement, be it [1] from automated necessity or [2] from the swerve, and the emergent cause of movement, [3] from our own initiation.

25.45 Leadership towards Improvement

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124

…ἐπαυξόμενον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκ τ̣οῦ περιέ̣χοντος ἐπεισιόντα τὰς καθηγεμο̣ν̣ία̣[ς εἰ]ς τ̣ὸ βέλτ̣ι̣ο̣ν, [ο]ὐ μό̣νο̣ν τὰς συ̣[να]κ̣[ο]λουθήσεις λ[α]μβάνοντα. εἰ δὲ καὶ… ἡσ̣υ̣χίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπ̣ὶ θαυμα̣σ̣μὸ̣ν [ἰ]σχυρ̣…

…ἐπαυξόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπεισιόντα τὰς καθηγεμονίας εἰς τὸ βέλτιον ¬ οὐ μόνον τὰς συνακολουθήσεις λαμβάνοντα. εἰ δὲ καὶ…

…further increasing, but also leaderships toward the better, through what is entering in from the surrounding ¬ not merely comprehending consequences. and if also…

…Ἡσυχίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ θαυμασμὸν ἰσχυρόν…

…Silence from the beginning and strongly toward marveling…

αὐξάνειν	to increase	**ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ** *increasing*
ἐπαυξόμενος *(η, ον)*	being further increased	**ΕΠΑΥΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *upon / further increasing*
ἐπαυξάνειν	to further increase	**ΕΠΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ** *growing upon*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
ἐπεισιέναι	to enter in	**ΕΠΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ** *going upon into*
ἐπεισιών	entering in	**ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ** *going upon into*
ὁ ἡγεμών **οἱ ἡγεμόνες**	guide	**ἩΓΕΜΩΝ** *leading*
ἡ ἡγεμονία **αἱ ἡγεμονίαι**	guidance	**ἩΓΕΜΟΝΙΑ** *quality of leading*
ὁ καθηγεμών **οἱ καθηγεμόνες**	leader	**ΚΑΘΗΓΕΜΩΝ** *thoroughly leading*
ἡ καθηγεμονία **αἱ καθηγεμονίαι**	leadership	**ΚΑΘΗΓΕΜΟΝΙΑ** *quality of thoroughly leading*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
βέλτιον	in a better way	
συμπαρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along together	**ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following alongside together*
ἡ συνακολούθησις **αἱ συνακολουθήσεις**	consequences	**ΣΥΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΗΣΙΣ** *following together*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*

ἡ ἡσυχία αἱ ἡσυχίαι	silence	ἩΣΥΧΙΑ *stillness*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
θαυμάζειν	to marvel	ΘΑΥΜΑΖΕΙΝ
ὁ θαυμασμός οἱ θαυμασμοί	marveling	ΘΑΥΜΑΣΜΟΣ *wondering / marveling*
ἰσχυρός *(ά, όν)*	strong	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ *strength*
ἰσχυρόν	strongly	

25.46 The Canon, Increasing Agency

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 27 (fr. B 49)

…{κα[ὶ νο]ήσεων κα[ὶ ἐ]πινοημ[ά]των καὶ φαντασμάτων καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κ[ατ]ὰ ψυχὴν ὀχλή[σ]εως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ μ[ὴ] αἰωνίας τὴν α[ἰτ]ίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ[α]ὶ κανόνα καὶ κριτήριον ⟦καὶ⟧ κατ[ὰ] μικρόν. ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν κα[ὶ ἐκ το]ῦ κριτηρίου… …εἰς τὴ[ν κατὰ μικρὸν] ὧνπερ [ἔ]ν}προ[σθ]εν εἶπ[α δ]ιερεύν[ησι]ν. ἀλλήλοις γὰρ [τα]ῦτα [τὴ]ν [αἰτίαν κ]αὶ χρε[ί]αν παρ[είχ]ετο κα[ὶ] ἐ[ναλλὰ]ξ ἑκάτερο[ν παρε]νπῖ[π]τον ἐπ[εσπάσα]το εὐθὺς τὸ ἕ[τερον ἐπινόη]μα κατὰ μ[ι]κρὸν [πρῶ]τ[ον ἐγ]γει[νόμ]ε[νον] καὶ ταχέω[ς ἐκ]ρέον, εἶτ[α μᾶλλ]ο[ν] κ[α]ταν[ο]ο[ύ]μεν[ον] τ[ὰ μὲν] διὰ τὴν [φυ]σικὴ[ν] αἰ[τ]ί[αν τῆς ἐπαυξήσεω]ς κ[αὶ τῆς ἀπαλλά]…

{added to fragment A 57 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 125

…σατο εὐθὺς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μικρὸν πρῶτον ἐγγιγνόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἶτα [μᾶλ]λομ μᾶλ[λο]ν κατα[νοούμε]νον, τὰ μὲν διὰ [τὴν] φυσικὴν αἰτίαν τῆς [αὐξ]ήσεως καὶ ἀπαλλά[ξεως πλαδαρ]ότητος, τ[ὰ δὲ]…

{expanded fragment A 57 below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 57)

……{κα[ὶ νο]ήσεων κα[ὶ ἐ]πινοημ[ά]των καὶ φαντασμάτων καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κ[ατ]ὰ ψυχὴν ὀχλή[σ]εως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ μ[ὴ] αἰωνίας τὴν α[ἰτ]ίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ[α]ὶ κανόνα καὶ κριτήριον ⟦καὶ⟧ κατ[ὰ] μικρόν. ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν κα[ὶ ἐκ το]ῦ κριτηρίου… …εἰς τὴ[ν κατὰ μικρὸν] ὧνπερ [ἔ]ν}προσθεν εἶπα: διερεύνη[σι]ν. ἀ[λ]λήλοις γὰρ ταῦτα τὴν αἰ[τί]αν [κ]αὶ χρείαν παρείχετο καὶ ἐνα[λλ]ὰ[ξ ἐκ]άτερον παρεμπεῖπτον ἐπεσπ[άσατο] εὐθὺς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μεικρὸν πρῶτον ἐγγεινόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἶτα μᾶλλ[ο]νμᾶλλον κατανοούμενον, τὰ μ[ὲν] διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν αἰτ[ί]αν τῆς ἐπαυ[ξ]ή[σ]εως κα[ὶ ἀπαλ]λ[άξε]ως πλαδαρότητος, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν γεινομένη[ν] καὶ…

…καὶ νοήσεων, καὶ ἐπινοημάτων, καὶ φαντασμάτων, καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κατὰ ψυχὴν ὀχλήσεως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ μὴ αἰωνίας: τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ κανόνα, καὶ κριτήριον, κατὰ μικρόν. Ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν: καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κριτηρίου… …εἰς τὴν κατὰ μικρὸν, ὧνπερ ἔνπροσθεν Εἶπα, διερεύνησιν

…and of concepts, and of objective conceptions, and of mental impressions, and of the perpetual disturbance or wellbeing of the soul, or of the non-perpetual [*disturbance or wellbeing of the soul*: *through these mental movements we have*] the cause of catching the foundation, and the Standard [*i.e. the canon*], and the criterion, little by little. for These [*mental movements*] led into [*our process of*] inductive consideration of the criterion: and out of the standard [*we measure truth*]… …into the investigation, little by little, of which I previously spoke precisely

> [Sedley] *"step by step to seek the starting-point and yardstick and criterion, for these led men to make an empirical calculation of the criterion, and from the criterion methods of empirical calculation were themselves learnt."*

ἀλλήλοις γὰρ Ταῦτα [1] τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ [2] χρείαν παρείχετο. καὶ ἐναλλὰξ Ἑκάτερον, παρεμπεῖπτον, ἐπεσπάσατο εὐθὺς τὸ ἕτερον ἐπινόημα: κατὰ μεικρὸν πρῶτον ἐγγεινόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον – εἶτα μᾶλλον μᾶλλον κατανοούμενον, Τὰ μὲν διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπαυξήσεως καὶ ἀπαλλάξεως πλαδαρότητος, Τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν γεινομένην…

for These [*actions of thinking, conceiving, and focusing*] yielded to one another [1] the cause [*of our movement*] and [2] the use [*of our movement*]. and alternatively Each, intruding upon [*the other*], directly draws toward the other objective conception: being introduced at first little by little and quickly flowing out – then while they [*i.e., the cause and the use of our movement*] are more and more fully conceived, Some through the natural cause of further increasing [*the use of their agency*] and [*through*] the deliverance from sluggishness, and Others through what was being generated from us...

ἡ κατανόησις **αἱ κατανοήσεις**	full conception	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *thoroughly seeing*
ἡ προσκατανόησις **αἱ προσκατανοήσεις**	additional full conception	**ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *addition to thoroughly seeing*
ἡ νόησις **αἱ νοήσεις**	concept	**ΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *seeing*
τὸ ἐπίνόημα **τὰ ἐπινοήματα**	[objective] conception	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΜΑ** *result of seeing upon*
τὸ φάντασμα **τὰ φαντάσματα**	mental impression	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ** *result of appearing*
ἀΐδιος *(ος, ον)*	eternal *(static, singular)*	**ΑΪΔΙΟΣ** *characterized by forever [heavenly]*
αἰώνιος *(αἰωνίᾱ, αἰώνιον)*	perpetual *(moving, multiple)*	**ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ** *characterized by being forever*
ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
ὁ ὄχλος **οἱ ὄχλοι**	crowd	**ΟΧΛΟΣ** *crowd of people*
τό ὄχλημα **τά ὀχλήματα**	[cause of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of a crowd of people*
ἡ ὄχλησις **αἱ ὀχλήσεις**	[feeling of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of a crowd of people*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ὁ θηρευτής	hunter	
θηρεύειν	to catch	**ΘΗΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *hunting*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ὁ κανών **οἱ κανόνες**	standard	**ΚΑΝΩΝ** *measuring stick (ruler)*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	**ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
κατὰ μικρόν **κατὰ μειкρόν**	little by little	
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις **αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις**	[faculty of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ὥνπερ	of which precisely	
προσθεν	earlier / before	**ΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ** *before*

τοὔμπροσθεν τἄμπροσθεν	what is ahead	ΤΟΥΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ = ΤΟ ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ *in before*
ἔνπροσθεν	previously	ΕΝΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ *in before*
ἡ ἔρευνα αἱ ἔρευναι	search	ΕΡΕΥΝΑ *searching*
ἡ διερεύνησις αἱ διερευνήσεις	investigation	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΗΣΙΣ *searching through*
	Part 2	
[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ *each other*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ *necessary*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
ἐναλλὰξ	alternatively	ΕΝΑΛΛΑΞ *in other*
ἑκάτερος *(ἑκατέρα, ἑκάτερον)*	each one	ἙΚΑΤΕΡΟΣ
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
παρεμπίπτειν	to intrude [in/upon]	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *beside in falling*
ἐπισπᾶν	to draws toward	ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ *pulling upon*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ *seeing*
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ *result of seeing within*
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα	an inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ *result of reasoning action upon*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing upon*
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ *seeing upon*
τὸ ἐπίνόημα τὰ ἐπινοήματα	[objective] conception	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΜΑ *result of seeing upon*
μεικρός = μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΕΙΚΡΟΣ ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
μεικρόν μικρόν	a little bit	
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἐγγίνεσθαι	to be introduced	ΕΓΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being in*
ἐγγεινόμενος	being introduced	ΕΓΓΕΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *come into being in*
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ *quickly*
ἐκρέειν	to flow out	ΕΚΡΕΕΙΝ *flowing out*
ἐκρέων	flowing out	ΕΚΡΕΩΝ *flowing out*
εἶτα	next	ΕΙΤΑ *hereafter*

μᾶλλον	more	**ΜΑΛΛΟΝ** *very*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*
κατανοούμενος	fully conceived	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing thoroughly*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
αὐξάνειν	to increase	**ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ** *increasing*
ἐπαυξάνειν	to further increase	**ΕΠΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ** *growing upon*
ἡ ἐπαύξησις **αἱ ἐπαυξήσεις**	further increasing	**ΕΠΑΥΞΗΣΙΣ** *process of growing upon*
ἀπαλλάττειν	to remove away	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing away*
ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι	to remove away [in the future]	
ἡ ἀλλαγή **αἱ ἀλλαγαί**	change	**ΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *other*
ἡ ἀπαλλαγή **αἱ ἀπαλλαγαί**	deliverance	**ΑΠΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *other away*
ἡ πλαδαρότης **αἱ πλαδαρότητες**	sluggishness	**ΠΛΑΔΑΡΟΤΗΣ** *flabby*

The criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning. The establishment of the **τό κριτήριον** *as* (1) **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**, (2) **αἱ πάθαι**, (3) **αἱ προλήψεις** *is an empirical process. Only because we have empirically learned that the senses are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries.*

25.47 Experiential Certainty

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 126

…ων τῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ περιέχον, ὥστε ἀποδέδοται κ[αὶ ὁ] παθολ[ο]γικὸς τρόπος κ[αὶ ὁ] αἰτιολογικὸς, ὧν] ἐξ ἀρχῆς π[ρ]οεθέμε[θα. κα]τέχεται γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτὲ κατέχεται τῶν [κα]τὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας…

{slightly expanded fragment below}

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 28 (fr. B 50)

…[ἐ]κ [δὲ τ]ούτων [τ]ῶν αἰτιῶν… τάνουσαι καὶ κ[ι]νήσεων [τ]ῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς [κ]α[ὶ τῶν δ]ιὰ τὴν φύσ[ι]ν κα[ὶ] τ[ὸ] πε[ρι]έχον. [ὥσ]τε ἀποδέδοτα[ι κα]ὶ ὁ παθολ[ο]γικὸς τρόπος καὶ ὁ αἰτιολογικός, ὧν ἐξ ἀρχῆ[ς] προεθέμεθα. κατέχετα[ι γὰρ ἤ]δη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτε κατέχ[ε]τα[ι τῶ]ν κατὰ τ[ὰ]ς ἐπ[ισ]τ[ήμ]ας…

…ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν… …τάνουσαι καὶ κινήσεων τῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ περιέχον. ὥστε ἀποδέδοται καὶ [1] ὁ παθολογικὸς Τρόπος καὶ [2] ὁ αἰτιολογικός, ὧν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Προεθέμεθα. κατέχεται γὰρ ἤδη Ταῦτα – ὅσα ποτε κατέχεται τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας…

…and from these causes… extending out from these movements, both those [*movements*] from us and those [*movements*] from nature and the surrounding [*environment*]. therefore, both [1] the Way [*of thinking*] relating to the study of [*sensed*] experiences and [2] the [*way of thinking*] relating to the study of the causes [*of movement*] have been demonstrated, which We proposed from the beginning. for These things are already firmly held – as far as anything is ever firmly held regarding the ways of understanding…

ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*

τείνων *(τείνουσα, τεῖνον)*	extending	**ΤΕΙΝΩΝ** *stretching*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
λογικός *(ή, όν)*	rational	**ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning*
παθολογικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to the study of experiences	**ΠΑΘΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning about enduring / feeling*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
αἰτιολογικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to the study of causes	**ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of reasoning about blame / cause*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
προτιθέναι	to propose	**ΠΡΟΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing before*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	**ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *thoroughly holding*
ἡ ἐπιστήμη **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι**	understanding	**ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ** *standing upon*

Epicurus informs us in this summary that he has structured his explanation in two approaches:

*One focusing on sensation and feeling – i.e., the "the way [of thinking] relating to the study of experiences" (***παθολογικὸς τρόπος***) and the other approach focusing on natural causes – i.e., the "the way [of thinking] relating to the study of causes" (the* **αἰτιολογικὸς τρόπος***)*

25.48 Subscriptio

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 subscriptio (subscriptio A 59)

Ἐπικο[ύρου Περὶ] Φ̣ύ̣σεω[ς.. Κ̣Ε̣]

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως, ΚΕ*

Epicurus' *On Nature, Book 25*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 subscriptio (B)

Ἐ̣π̣ι̣κ̣ο̣ύ̣ρου Π̣ε̣ρ̣ὶ Φ̣[ύ]σ̣ε̣ω̣ς Κ̣[Ε]

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως ΚΕ*

Epicurus' *On Nature, Book 25*

[Book 26]

Book 28

28.1 Labeling Objects Seen by Comprehension

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 1 (col. 1)

...ἅ̣μα καὶ ὅτι πᾶν... ...[το]ῦτ[ο ε]ἰ μηδ' οὕτως [εἴη τις ἐ]ν̣νοῶν, ὡς ἔ̣[σ]τι τό τε [σ]ω̣ματικὸν καὶ τὸ κενὸν...

...ἅμα, καὶ ὅτι Πᾶν... ...τοῦτο, εἰ μηδ' οὕτως εἴη, Τις ἐννοῶν, ὡς ἔστι: [1] τό τε Σωματικὸν καὶ [2] τὸ Κενὸν...

...simultaneously, and that Everything... ...One internalizes this, even if not in this way, as both exist: [1] What is corporeal and [2] the Void...

ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	ἉΜΑ *at once*
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ENNOIA *seeing in*
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	ENNOEIN *seeing within*
ἐννοῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	internalizing	ENNOΩN
σωματικός *(ή, όν)*	corporeal	ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of body*
τὸ κενόν	void	KENON *emptiness*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. D (col. 1c)

...ὅτι ού π̣ερι̣λη[πτικὴ] ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων γνῶ[σίς ἐστι]...

...ὅτι οὐ περιληπτικὴ ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων Γνῶσίς ἐστι...

...[*they say*] that Knowledge of the atoms does not relate to what is completely comprehensible...

περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being taken hold around*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ *distinguishing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 3 (col. 5b)

...[β]ουλόμε[θά σ]οι... προϊο̣ύσης... ὁμοιότητά τι[να]... [ἕτ]ε̣ρά τινα ὡμιλη[μένα, ἔν τ]έ τισι φθόγγοις...

...Βουλόμεθά σοι... ...προϊούσης... ...ὁμοιότητά τινα... ...ἕτερά τινα ὡμιλημένα, ἔν τέ τισι φθόγγοις...

...We want for you... ...while going forward... ...some similarity... ...some other [*similarly*] conversed [*words*], in certain expressions...

βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ *wishing*
προϊέναι προιέναι	to go forward	ΠΡΟΙΕΝΑΙ *going forward*

προϊών **προιών** *(οῦσα, όν)*	going forward	**ΠΡΟΙΩΝ** *going forward*
ἡ ὁμοιότης **αἱ ὁμοιότητες**	similarity	**ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition of being similar*
ὁμιλεῖν	to converse	**ὉΜΙΛΕΙΝ** *keeping company*
ὡμιλημένος *(η, ον)*	conversed	**ὩΜΙΛΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *keeping company*
ὁ φθόγγος **οἱ φθόγγοι**	[verbal] expression	**ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ** *uttering*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 4 (col. 4)

...[πρ]οσηγορευμένον ⟦ο⟧ ὧι ἕτερόν το ὡμιλημένον ὄ‹νο›μα... ...[τὴ]ν ταραχὴν...

...προσηγορευμένον ᾧ ἕτερόν το ὡμιλημένον Ὄνομα... ...τὴν ταραχὴν...

...the different conversed Word referred to with that [*meaning*]... ...the disturbance...

προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
προσηγορευμένος *(η, ον)*	referred to [as]	**ΠΡΟΣΗΓΟΡΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *speaking publicly toward*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
ὡμιλημένος *(η, ον)*	conversed	**ὩΜΙΛΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *keeping company*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ἡ ταραχή **αἱ ταραχαί**	disturbance	**ΤΑΡΑΧΗ** *agitating*

28.2 Classifying Ways of Thinking

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. E (col. 1)

...ἰσχ[υρῶς ἢ] ọύκ ἰσχυρῶς δεδ̣[ίχαμεν] τὴμ παραλλαγ[ὴν καθ' ἣν] τοῖσ[δε ἐ]χρώ̣μεθα [τοῖς̣] σ̣ιν· ὅθεν δὲ τὸ καν̣[ονικὸμ] βελτίον ἢ χῖρον ἀν̣[ελελογί]σμ̣εθα, πολλαχοῦ [ε]ἴρηται̣...

...ἰσχυρῶς ἢ οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς, Δεδίχαμεν τὴν παραλλαγὴν καθ' ἣν τοῖσδε Ἐχρώμεθα... ...ὅθεν, δὲ τὸ κανονικὸν βελτίον ἢ χῖρον Ἀνελελογίσμεθα – πολλαχοῦ εἴρηται...

...[*depending on the issue*], We have, firmly or not firmly, divided the variety according to which [*classifications*] We used these [*specific "ways" of thinking*]... ...from which, then, We have analogized what relates to standards as better or worse [*for measuring truth*] – as has been stated in many places...

ἰσχύων *(ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)*	prevailing	**ΙΣΧΥΩΝ** *strength*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	**ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ**
ἰσχυρῶς	prevailingly [here, "firmly"]	**ΙΣΧΥΡΩΣ**
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
διδοῦναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΥΝΑΙ** *giving*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*

χρᾶσθαι	[with dative] to use, [with genitive] to desire	ΧΡΑΣΘΑΙ
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
ὁ κανών οἱ κανόνες	standard	ΚΑΝΩΝ *measuring stick (ruler)*
τό κανονικόν τά κανονικά	what relates to standards	ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΟΝ *characteristic of measuring rod*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*
ἡ χείρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ *hand*
χείρων *(ων, ον)*	worse	ΧΕΙΡΩΝ *[work done by] hand*
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *reasoning action again*
πολλαχοῦ	in many places	ΠΟΛΛΑΧΟΥ *many*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 4 (col. 4)

...ἄξιό[ν τι]νος... ταύṭην τὴν [αἰ]τίαν ἐπιλέγομεν. πάν[τε]ς [γ]ὰρ οἱ τρόπ̣οι τῶν αἰ-...

...ἄξιόν τινος... ...ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν Ἐπιλέγομεν – πάντες γὰρ οἱ Τρόποι τῶν...

...deserving of something... ...We say in addition that this cause [*of mental movement*] – for all the Ways [*of thinking*] of the...

ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ἐπιλέγειν	to say in addition	ΕΠΙΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking in addition*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 1a)

...ṭὰ προειλ[ημμένα]... ...ἐπιμαρτ[υ]ρήσει[ς]... τυγχάνε[ι]... ...[κατη]γọρọῦμεμ... ...[ἀν]τικειμένον...

...τὰ προειλημμένα... ...Ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις... ...Τυγχάνει... ...Κατηγοροῦμεμ... ...ἀντικειμένον...

...the [*things*] that have already been anticipated... ...You attest... ...It happens to be... ...We fully indicate... ...the contrary [*observation*]...

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
προειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	having already been anticipated	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ *being having grasped before*
τὸ προειλημμένον τὰ προειλημμένα	[•Λ] what has already been anticipated	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ *being having grasped before*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	[M] what is attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *result of testifying upon*

ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	**ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking publicly*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	**ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting*
ἀντικεῖσθαι	to oppose	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting against*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*

28.3 The Clear Natural Character of a Word vs. Semantic Indeterminacy from Convention

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 2a)

...ο[ὔ]τ' ἀδιάλυτον· εἰ δὲ μὴ [πάν]τες κατὰ τούτο ταύτ[ην] τὴν ἰδέαν ἔλαβον, ἀλλ[ά τι]νες καὶ κατὰ τούτου...

...οὔτ' ἀδιάλυτον· εἰ δὲ μὴ Πάντες κατὰ τούτο ταύτην τὴν ἰδέαν ἔλαβον ¬ ἀλλά Τινες καὶ κατὰ τούτου...

...nor indissoluble. but if All [*people*] do not comprehend this very idea in accordance with this [*meaning of the word*] ¬ but Some [*people*] also against that [*meaning*, *comprehend a different idea*]...

ἀδιάλυτος *(ον)*	indissoluble	**ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ** *not fully loose*
ἡ ἰδέα **αἱ ἰδέαι**	idea	**ΙΔΕΑ** *appearing*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 5 (col.1)

...φανταστικῶς ἐπεὶ... ...μεν οὐδ' ὑπάρχοντος... ...νοήσηι... ...[ἐ]π' ἐνίων... ...ἴ[σ]ως οὖν ἤδη... [δι]αφορὰν ἀπὸ [ταύτης τῆς ο]ὕτως οὐ φαν[ταστικῆς] δόξης οὐ φαν[ταστικῶ]ς ἂν κατὰ τούτω[ν]...

...φανταστικῶς, ἐπεὶ... ...μεν οὐδ' ὑπάρχοντος... ...νοήσῃ... ...ἐπ' ἐνίων... ...ἴσως οὖν ἤδη... ...διαφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς οὕτως, οὐ φανταστικῆς δόξης ¬ οὐ φανταστικῶς ἂν κατὰ τούτων...

...in an appearance-based way [*i.e., in an objective way of thinking*], since... ...even though not existing... ...to a concept... ...already upon some... ...a difference [*in meaning*] from this very judgment, [*which is*] NOT impression-based ¬ would not in an impression-based way against these...

φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
φανταστικῶς	in an appearance-based way	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of appearance*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	**ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἡ νόησις **αἱ νοήσεις**	concept	**ΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *seeing*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*

ἴσως	perhaps	ΙΣΩΣ *equal / likely*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.3a)

...χουσι τοῦτο ἐπι... ...ἀλλὰ λαμβά[νουσι]... ...θεώρημ[α]... ...[ἐμ περιλ]ηπτικῷ[ι] τ[ρόπωι τὴν φαν]τασίαν...

...τοῦτο ἐπι... ...ἀλλὰ Λαμβάνουσι... ...Θεώρημα... ...ἐμ περιληπτικῷ τρόπῳ, τὴν φαντασίαν...

> ...this upon... ...but They comprehend... ...a [*mental*] Observation... ...in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible, the appearance...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	*[the act of mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ *act of envisioning*
τὸ θεώρημα τὰ θεωρήματα	*[a mental]* observation	ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ *result of envisioning*
περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being taken hold around*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.2)

...δόξαν... ...ἀτό[μ]ω[ν]... ...φαν[ταστικ]οῖς ἐγγενό[σ]ι εἰ... ...οὐκ ἐ[λ]άμβανον... ...[ἀλ]λ' ἔ[σ]τιν τοιοῦτο... π[άν]των τῶν...

...[φ]υσικὸγ χαρακτῆρα... ...τῶν ἐμ περ[ι]λη[πτ.κῶι] τρό[π]ωι διανο[ήσ]εων...

...δόξαν... ...ἀτόμων... ...φανταστικοῖς ἐγγενόσι, εἰ... ...οὐκ Ἐλάμβανον... ...ἀλλ' ἔστιν τοιοῦτο... πάντων τῶν... ...φυσικὸγ χαρακτῆρα... ...τῶν ἐμ περιληπτικῷ τρόπῳ διανοήσεων...

> ...judgment... ...of atoms... ...in the inherent [*objects of thought that are*] appearance-based, if... ...They did not comprehend... ...but [ ] such as this exists... ...of all... ...the natural character [*lit., "the physical engraving"*]... ...of mental perceptions in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible...

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ἄτομος *(ον)*	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ *not cut*
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom *("what is indivisible")*	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ *not cut*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of appearing*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

ἐγγίγνεσθαι = ἐνγίγνεσθαι = ἐνγίγεσθαι =	to be inherent	ΕΝΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἐνγενής = ἐγγενής *(ής, ές)*	inherent	ΕΝΓΕΝΗΣ *coming to be in*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*
ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ *engraving*
περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being taken hold around*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 5 (col. 4)

…ὕστ[ερον]… …τοῖ[ς ἀν]τικειμέν[οις]… …τι τῆς α[ἰ]ϲθήσεω[ς]… …τάδε αὐ[τὰ μηδε] πώπο[τε π]οιηθῆν[αι]… τὴν αὐτὴμ [φ]ύσιν… …ὕστερον ἐξ [ἄλλ]η[ς τινὸς φύ]σεως ἐφήσαμ[εν]… …ἀμέλει ἐπὶ… …[ἀλ]λὰ [πάσ]ας τὰς… …φάσκειν εἶνα[ι]… …ὄνομ[α]… …δοθ[έ]ν οὐ φαντ[αστικὸν]… …εἶ[ναι] τῶν…

…ὕστερον… …τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις… …Τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως… …τάδε αὐτὰ μηδε πώποτε ποιηθῆναι… …τὴν αὐτὴμ φύσιν… …ὕστερον, ἐξ ἄλλης τινὸς φύσεως Ἐφήσαμεν… …ἀμέλει ἐπὶ… …ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς… …φάσκειν εἶναι… …Ὄνομα… …δοθέν, οὐ φανταστικὸν… …εἶναι τῶν…

…afterwards… …to the things that are contrary to… …Something of sensation… …that these very things have never been made… …the same nature… …afterward, We asserted from a certain other nature… …doubtless upon… …but all the… …to allege to be… …a Word… …given, the NON-impression-based… …to be of the…

ὕστερον	afterwards	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ *next*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ *situated against*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ποιηθῆναι	to be made [already]	ΠΟΙΗΘΗΝΑΙ *gathered*
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ *speaking up*
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ *firm standing*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ *affirming*
ἀμέλει	doubtless	ΑΜΕΛΕΙ *not caring*
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλίαι	association	ὉΜΙΛΙΑ *company*

ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ *speaking*
ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ *speaking across*
ἡ ὀνομασία αἱ ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ *state of name*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
δοθείς *(εἶσα, έν)*	given	ΔΟΘΕΙΣ *given*

28.4 Inaccurate Language Shift

A change in the use of a word that is based only in the addition of opinion – and not based on sensation – obviously would not stand up empirically. Applying a name to an object expresses an opinion, and this opinion can be correct or incorrect.

The fact that differences in environment are reflected in differences in language further supports the idea that human use of language has a natural connection to its environment.

Within the original development of any functional language, each word must have naturally been used, mostly by natural impulse, to denote objects or circumstances that were immediately present and visible – yet, over time, by logical manipulation and conventional usages, languages tend to add abstractions.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 6 (col. 1)

…πραγ[μ]άτωμ… …[οὔ]τως ἐμφαιν[ό]ν[τω]ν ἐπὶ τῆ[ς] ἐμῆς περὶ διαθέσεως λόγ[ου]ς γυμνα[σ]ίας· οὔ[τω γ]ὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο {υτο} ἐνδίκνυ[σ]θαι τὸ δὴ ὅτ[ι] βλέποντες [το]ὺς ὁμοφώνου[ς ἡμῖν] ὄ[ν]τα[ς] ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]ν[ω]ς αἷς ἡμε[ῖ]ς φωναῖς χρ[ώμ]ε[θα] ψευδέ[ς τι ἄλ]λο ὑπ[οτ]άττοντα[ς ἀνύπ]οπτό[ν τε] ἐ[π]' ἐκί[ναι]ς τα[ῖς] ἐ[ννο]ία[ι]ς, ἀλλὰ μένο[ν]τ[ες]… …πρὸ[ς α]ὐτοὺς… …[δεδο]ξάσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ… κατ[αφα]τικὸν… μᾶ[λ]λον ἐπετ…

*addidi [οὔ]

…πραγμάτων… …οὕτως ἐμφαινόντων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ διαθέσεως λόγους γυμνασίας: οὕτω γὰρ, ἀναγκαῖον Ἦν Τοῦτο ἐνδίκνυσθαι τὸ δὴ ὅτι, Βλέποντες τοὺς ὁμοφώνους ἡμῖν ¬ ὄντας ἀντικειμένως αἷς Ἡμεῖς φωναῖς χρώμεθα – ψευδές τι ἄλλο ὑποτάττοντας, ἀνύποπτόν τε ἐπ' ἐκίναις ταῖς ἐννοίαις. ἀλλὰ μένοντες… …πρὸς αὐτοὺς… …δεδοξάσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ… …καταφατικὸν… …μᾶλλον…

…of [*practical*] situations… …thus revealing in relation to my reasonings about the arrangement of schools: for in this way, It was necessary for This to indicate the [*fact*] that indeed, [*we are*] Seeing those people speaking the same [*language*] as us ¬ while they are in opposition to Our use of statements – [*because they are*] assigning something else [*that is*] false, and [*which is*] without suspicion of those very internal conceptions. but [*we are still*] pending… …towards those… …to have been judged or through the… …affirmative… …more…

[Sedley] …‹ ›…For it was so necessary to point out that we, by observing that those who speak the same language as us were, in contrast to our own use of words, assigning some unsuspected false connotation in addition to those meanings… ‹ ›…

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
ἐμφαίνειν	to reveal	ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining in*
ἐμφαινών	revealing	
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing through*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*

ἡ γυμνασία **αἱ γυμνασίαι**	school / gymnasia	**ΓΥΜΝΑΣΙΑ** *naked*
This has both a literal and a metaphorical meaning. Initially, it referred to physical exercises or a gymnastic school, but it later came to mean a school more broadly, including philosophical schools		
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
δείκνυναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἐνδίκνυσθαι = **ἐνδείκνυσθαι**	to be indicated in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ** *showing in*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
τό σύμφωνον **τά σύμφωνα**	agreement [with]	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ** *speaking together*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
ὁμόφωνος *(ος, ον)*	speaking the same	**ΟΜΟΦΩΝΟΣ** *speaking the same*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
ἀντικειμένως	in opposition	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΩΣ** *situated against*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
χρᾶσθαι	*[with dative]* to use, *[with genitive]* to desire	**ΧΡΑΣΘΑΙ**
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
διατάττειν	to arrange	**ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering across*
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	**ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering under*
ὑποτάττων *(ουσα, ον)*	assigning	
ἀνύποπτος *(ος, ον)*	without [reason for] suspicion	**ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ** *not looking [suspiciously] under*
ἐκίνος = **ἐκεῖνος** *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
ἡ ἔννοια **αἱ ἔννοιαι**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΙΑ** *seeing in*
προσμένων *(ουσα, ον)*	still pending	**ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ** *remaining further*
μένων *(ουσα, ον)*	pending	**ΜΕΝΩΝ** *remaining*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*
δεδοξάσθαι	to have been judged	**ΔΕΔΟΞΑΣΘΑΙ** *seemed*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*
καταφατικός *(ή, όν)*	affirmative	**ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly appearing*

28.5 Impression-Based Interpretations
vs. Non-Impression-Based Interpretations

*Mental impressions (**τὰ φαντάσματα**) come from films (**τὰ εἴδωλα**) of external objects, and our feelings and experiences (**τὰ πάθη**) result, in part, from their infiltration from the outside world. Hence the primitive languages of different people are largely an instinctive reaction to their particular environment.*

People utter sounds naturally in reaction to objects and feelings, and, noticing that they have one sound to correspond with each object or feeling, they find it useful to employ those sounds as labels.

After this process, the role of convention is twofold:

(1) people try to rationalize or simplify language that ambiguous or excessively long-winded

(2) people introduce new words for objects of thought which lie beyond the range of direct perception (and thus do not have naturally formed labels)

Therefore language is based on natural impulse and is then altered, for better or worse, by reason and convention.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 2)

...εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἒν οἷọν τῶν [τε] ενṭạῦθα μεṭ[άθε]σις κα[ὶ] ού δογμάτωμ φαṿταστικῶν, τῶμ μέντοι ού φανταστικῶν καὶ δογμάτων. ού μὴν ἀλλ' ἕṭẹρά γ' ἄν τινα δηλọνότị εἴηι ẹ̣κίνοι[ς] εί μὴ έγὼ προήνεν[κα καὶ] έπ' ἄλλ' ἅτ[τ]α ἃ φαντ[ασιά]ζοιεṿ τὰς ά[να]γωγὰς...

...καὶ μὴ ἓν οἷον τῶν τε ἐνταῦθα μετάθεσις ¬ καὶ οὐ δογμάτων φανταστικῶν, τῶν μέντοι οὐ φανταστικῶν καὶ δογμάτων. οὐ μὴν ¬ ἀλλ'˝Ετερα γ' ἄν τινα δηλονότι εἴη ἐκίνοις – εἰ μὴ Ἐγὼ προήνενκα καὶ, ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἄττα, ἃ Φαντασιάζοιεν τὰς ἀναγωγάς...

...[*we did not recommend the rearrangement of meaning of all types of words*], and NOT one such as the rearrangement [*of the meaning*] regarding those [*words used*] in this respect ¬ indeed NOT [*the rearrangement of meaning*] regarding the APPEARANCE-BASED interpretation, but rather [*the rearrangement of meaning*] regarding the NON-appearance-based interpretation. no indeed ¬ instead it is clear that certain Different [*false connotations*] would exist for them – if I had not also presented, in relation to certain other things, that which They might have imagined [*to be*] references [*to appearance-based interpretations*]...

[Sedley] ...‹ ›...Nevertheless, it is clear that they would have additional ones, had I not cited appeals which they made to other opinions which they* associated with images...

**Possibly referring to the Megarian circle of Diodorus 'Cronus,' a contemporary of Epikouros, who is indirectly referenced later in this book*

Epicurus is not saying that any word that corresponds in some way to a visual object does not bear correction, but only the aspect of the word that does correspond in a visual way is not the aspect of the word that is at faut.

ἐνταῦθα	in this [respect]	**ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ** *in this*
ἡ μετάθεσις **αἱ μεταθέσεις**	rearrangement	**ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *placing change*
τό δόγμα **τά δόγματα**	teaching [here, "interpretation"]	**ΔΟΓΜΑ** *seeming*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	**ΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear*
δῆλον	clearly	**ΔΗΛΟΝ** *clear*
δηλονότι	it is clear that	**ΔΗΛΟΝΟΤΙ** *clear that*

ἐκεῖνος (*ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο*)	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
προφέρειν	to present	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
ἄττα	some	**ΑΤΤΑ** *is an alternative form of* **ΤΙΝΑ**
τινά	certain	
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός **οἱ φαντασμοί**	what appears	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ** *process of appearing*
φαντασιάζεσθαι	to imagine [for oneself]	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *to make the state of appearance*
ἡ συναγωγή **αἱ συναγωγαί**	gathering	**ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ** *going together*
ἡ ἀγωγή **αἱ ἀγωγαί**	guidance	**ΑΓΩΓΗ** *going*
ἡ ἀναγωγή **αἱ ἀναγωγαί**	reference	**ΑΝΑΓΩΓΗ** *going again*

28.6 Void as an Object of Thought

Consider 10.37b: "First of all, Herodotus, it is necessary to understand what is assigned to expressions: in order that, we may have what is judged, investigated, or uncertain to test by referring to these [expressions] ¬ so that everything does not go untested by us – leading into infinity, or us having empty expressions [i.e., using meaningless words]. Seeing [for ourselves] the primary internal conception for each word, and in no way needing proof, is necessary – if we are to have [something] to which we will refer what is investigated, uncertain, or judged."

The "first meaning" or "primary internal conception (**τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα**)*" is equivalent to an anticipation* (**ἡ πρόληψις**) *– a basic mental impression that exists in the mind from exposure to sense-evidence, but before any active manipulative thinking. By accessing this primary internal sense, a perceived object can be mentally associated with a word in an immediate and perceptual way.*

Thus a word used in a secondary non-perceptual sense can have no anticipation (**ἡ πρόληψις**)*. However many such words can be traced back to the anticipations naturally associated with a class of objects that IS directly perceptible.*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 3)

...κενὸμ μηδὲν ἧττον εἶναί γέ τι φήσωμεν κενόν. τοῦτ[ο οὖ]ν δή φη[μι]... ...ἡμ[ῖ]ν λέ γ[ουσ]ιν... τοῦθ' εὑρέθη ο[ὐ] τ[οι]οῦτον ὂ[ν οἷ]ον ἐδοξάζομεν...

...κενὸμ, μηδὲν ἧττον εἶναί γέ τι Φήσωμεν Κενόν. τοῦτο οὖν δή Φημι... ...ἡμῖν Λέγουσιν... τοῦθ' εὑρέθη οὐ τοιοῦτον ὂν οἷον Ἐδοξάζομεν...

...void, We shall assert that Void IN NO WAY TO A LESSER EXTENT also exists as something. Therefore, indeed, I assert this... ...They say to us... ...[*that*] this was discovered not to be such as We had judged...

τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
εὑρίσκειν	to discover	**ἙΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *finding*

τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	**ὉΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*

28.7 Example of the Void

Take, for example, the use of **κενόν** *to denote "void" in physics. To grasp this derived sense you must form an anticipation (***ἡ πρόληψις***) by picturing how the word is used in its primary, perceptual sense. You may perhaps picture an empty (***κενόν***) box. What distinguishes it from a full box is that you can move your hand around inside it without hindrance.*

Thus when using the word "void" in physics you will know – without requiring any further proof – that it always presupposes the possibility of movement.

Language, when used in this way, can act as an analogy between the visible and the invisible.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 4)

...φύσις ἐνταύθα κατὰ γε [τὴν] δόξ[αν τ]ὴν [αὐτοῦ] ṭοῦ πρῷ[τον οἰομ]ένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ πο[τὲ καὶ] ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὔ[τως ο]ὖν καὶ τ[ο]ῦτο [ν]ọεῖται [ἐν ἐκ]ίναις τα̣[ῖ]ς λέξ[εσιν] ἃς ἐν [τῶι] περὶ [τῶμ] πρῶ[τογ] γιγνω[σκ]όντω[ν αὐ]τοὺς γεγράφα[μεν· εἶ]τα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὖ[θις τ]ὸ [β]ịβλίον ἠκριβ[ώσαμεν]... ...καὶ μακρο[τέρ]ως...

...Φύσις, ἐνταῦθα, κατά γε τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρῶτον οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν, καὶ Τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναις ταῖς λέξεσιν ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρῶτον γιγνωσκόντων αὐτοὺς Γεγράφαμεν· εἶτα δ᾽ ἀναλαβόντες αὖθις τὸ βιβλίον – Ἠκριβώσαμεν... ...καὶ μακροτέρως...

...the Nature [*of the void exists*], in this respect, according to the judgment of the one who was originally believing at once, at some time and in this respect that the void [*exists*]. thus, This [*nature of the void*] too is conceived in those terms which We have composed in the work concerning those first [*men*] coming to know those [*words*]. but then, [*when we*] took up [*our*] book again – We have made precise... ...and more extensively...

[Sedley] ...The nature [of the void is] here, according to the opinion of the first man to think of void in terms of immediacy and time and place. Consequently, void too is given this meaning in those expressions which we have written in our work* concerning the men who *first had knowledge of them. We subsequently resumed that book and made a study of...

possibly Epicurus' book "Declarations" (*Ἀναφωνήσεις***).*

* *A language, in its early development, is more focused on visible objects and the present time. This is observably true for the origin of a new language from a pidgin to a patois. As a language develops from its origin of simple immediacy, purposeful human convention adds abstractions.*

ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ἐνταῦθα	in this [respect]	**ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ** *in this*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
οἰόμενος *(η, ον)*	believing	**ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *perceiving*
ἅμα	[adv] simultaneously, [prep] together with	**ἉΜΑ** *at once*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*

ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
ἡ γνῶσις **αἱ γνώσεις**	knowledge	**ΓΝΩΣΙΣ** *distinguishing*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
γιγνώσκων *(ουσα, ον)*	coming to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΩΝ** *having distinguished*
συγγράφειν	to compose together	**ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing together*
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
λαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	**ΛΑΒΩΝ** *grasped*
ἀναλαβών *(οῦσα, όν)*	took up again	**ΑΝΑΛΑΒΩΝ** *grasped up / again*
αὖθις	again	**ΑΥΘΙΣ**
τὸ βιβλίον **τὰ βιβλία**	book	**ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ** *strip of papyrus*
ἡ ἀκρίβεια **αἱ ἀκρίβειαι**	precision	**ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ** *state of pointed*
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα **τὰ ἀκριβώματα**	precise detail	**ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ** *result of pointed*
ἀκριβοῦν	to make precise	**ΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ** *pointed*
μακρὰν	by a long way	**ΜΑΚΡΑΝ** *long-reaching*
μακρός *(ά, όν)*	distant	**ΜΑΚΡΟΣ** *long-reaching*
μακροτέρως	more extensively	**ΜΑΚΡΟΤΕΡΩΣ** *long-reaching*

28.8 Limits of Altering Names

*Originally, Epicurus and Metrodorus understood, through the process of inductive consideration, i.e. "empirical reasoning" (**ὁ ἐπιλογισμός**), that certain words were incorrectly or at least not precisely defined by convention in the non-appearance-based way of thinking – but could be naturally and more immediately understood by analogy to the visible. Therefore they wished to correct the errors and imprecision in conventional language and return to the immediacy of a youthful language.*

With this understanding, Metrodorus began redirecting what many words indicated back to their natural and immediate sense, in a way that gave little regard to conventional usages.

However they eventually came to realize that (although this process is conceptually sound) it is nevertheless not possible to change most words, even if conceptual reasoning suggests they are used imprecisely – due to the deeply ingrained conventional usage now associated with those words.

From this will follow the concession that, for the most part, we do employ ordinary conventional language in our philosophy. Over time Epicurus came to accept that large linguistic changes were not practical and accepted conventional usages for most words – now only insisting on correcting those that actually indicate an error in thought (which will inevitably result in an error in action).

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 5)

…[οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιῆσαι πολλῶν] κ̣αὶ παντο̣[ί]ω̣[ν] ὀνομάτω̣μ̣ μεταθ̣[έσ]ε[ις]· ὀλίγα γὰρ ἔξ[ε]στιν τῶ[ν σ]ὺ̣ν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι̣ν̣ ἃ πρότερον [ο]ὕτως δ̣[ι]ο̣[ρί]ζοντες κατὰ τὸ̣ν οὐ φα̣ν̣τ̣αστικ[ὸ]ν τρ[όπομ] μετεθ̣έ̣μεθα συνιδόντες οὐ [τοια]ῦτα ἔκ τινος ἐπιλ[ογ]ισμ̣[ο]ῦ· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστ̣α τῶ̣ν ἐ̣[μ πε]ρι[λ]ηπτικῶι τρόπωι [ἐ]λ[εγχο]μένων ἂν… …τινι ἢ κ[ατ]ακα[λ]ύψει ὀχλ̣[εῖ]ν̣ ἕτερον ἢ ὄ̣νομ[α]… …μετατ[ιθέ]με[νοι]… …οἱ πολλ̣οὶ…

…οὐκ Ἔξεστι ποιῆσαι πολλῶν καὶ παντοίων ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεις· Ὀλίγα γὰρ ἔξέστιν τῶν σὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν – ἃ, πρότερον οὕτως (διορίζοντες κατὰ τὸν οὐ φανταστικὸν τρόπον) Μετεθέμεθα – συνιδόντες οὐ τοιαῦτα ἔκ τινος ἐπιλογισμοῦ· τὰ δὲ Πλεῖστα τῶν ἐμπεριληπτικῷ τρόπῳ ἐλεγχομένων, ἂν… …τινι ἢ Κατακαλύψει ὀχλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ὄνομα… …μετατιθέμενοι… …οἱ Πολλοὶ…

…It is not possible to make rearrangements of many and all kinds of words. for [*only a*] Few [*rearrangements*] are allowed of those [*words*] relating to sensation – which [*words*], We formerly changed in this way (while we were differentiating in a NON-appearance-based way) – because we fully mentally saw from a certain [*process of*] inductive consideration [*that they were*] not like this. but the Greatest [*amount*] of those [*words*] being refuted [*that exist instead*] in the completely comprehensive way [*of thinking*] within, would [*not be able to be changed due to their deeply ingrained conventional usage*]… …to some [*thing*], or It would completely cover Another [*phrase*] or Word that is annoying [*due to its improper use*]… …[*they*] rearranged… …the Public…

[Sedley] It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner,* but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind.⁑ But as for the majority of names which might have been found false by a conceptual process… ‹ ›…

> ***** *Defining a word in a "non-image-making manner" is to associate a word with an object without referring that word to a mental impression of the object to check that the word is suited to it. Some words are tied to perception in ways that are not obvious – we will use these words correctly when we understand them by analogy to observation. The process of empirical reasoning (***ἐπιλογισμός***) can show that a word is not suited to an object by tracing that word back to its single original connotation.*
>
> ⁑ *Practically speaking, during one's lifetime, most words are fixed in their usage (for example, the unnatural but conventional use of "wealth" for objects that extend beyond the wealth of nature) – but some words tied to perception and feelings can be corrected (for example, the naturally correct but unconventional meaning of the word "pleasure" for the lack of pain).*

ἔξεστιν	it is possible	**ΕΞΕΣΤΙΝ** *it exists out of*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
παντοῖος *(α, ον)*	all kinds	**ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ** *all of this sort*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ἡ μετάθεσις **αἱ μεταθέσεις**	rearrangement	**ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *placing change*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
πρότερος *(α, ον)*	former	**ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *before [contrast]*
διορίζειν	to differentiate	**ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *between the border*
διορίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	differentiating	**ΔΙΟΡΙΖΩΝ** *between the border*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing change*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	**ΙΔΕΙΝ** *seen*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*
συνιδεῖν	to have fully seen [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΙΔΕΙΝ** *seen together*
συνιδών *(οῦσα, όν)*	having fully seen [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΙΔΩΝ** *seen together*
τὸ τοιοῦτον **τὰ τοιαῦτα**	what is like this *(such a thing)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ** *this of this sort*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest *[the most]*	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most*
ἐμπεριληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	⁂ completely comprehensible way within	**ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around in*
ἐξελέγχειν	to refute out	**ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *confuting out [with contrary proof]*
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	**ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *confuting [with contrary proof]*
ἐλεγχόμενος *(η, ον)*	being refuted	**ΕΛΕΓΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *confuting [with contrary proof]*
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	**ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ** *completely covering*
ὁ ὄχλος **οἱ ὄχλοι**	crowd	**ΟΧΛΟΣ** *crowd of people*
ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	**ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ** *in a crowd of people*
ὀχλεῖν	to disturb	**ΟΧΛΕΙΝ** *crowd of people*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρα, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἙΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
μετατιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	rearranged	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ** *placing change*

ἡ ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεις	rearrangement of words
τῶν ὀνομάτων μετατίθεσθαι σὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν	rearranging of words [in alignment] with the sensations
i.e., using empirical reasoning to match the primary connotation of the word with its corresponding object	

Epicurus considered some of his early writings to contain mistakes. These early writings were called **τὰ ἀρχαῖα** *and* **τὰ ἀρχαικά**.

*"[The Stoics] claim 'just as Epicurus is not considered worthy of reproach for the mistakes mentioned in early writings (***ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαϊκοῖς***), so Zeno should not be either.'"* (Philodemus, P.Herc. 339 col. 17, On the Stoics, 11.4-22)

[Sedley] *"Epicurus' conclusion that the philosopher may, for want of a better medium, use ordinary language, is necessarily qualified by the demand (which he was already making when he wrote the Letter to Herodotus), that the resulting linguistic inaccuracies and ambiguities should be evaded by always seeing beyond the present conventional meanings of words to the natural first meanings which underlie them – and also that error should so far as possible be identified by reference not to language but to the practical behavior in which someone's falsity manifests itself."*

28.9 [Reference Practical Outcomes]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. fr.10 (col. 1a)

…πραγμ[ατα]… [π]ραγματικῶν [θε]ωρημ[άτω]ν ἐνδίξει καὶ [τ]ὴμ περ[ίληψ]ιμ… …τῆς δόξη[ς τ]ῆς… τοῖς πραγ[μασιν]… περ[ὶ ταύτ]ης [τε] τὴς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμ[β]αλλούσης ὑπολήψεως. ὄντων δ' οὖν τοιούτων οἷον… τούτων κατὰ τὴν [αἵρ]εσιμ π[ρατ]τόντων… τῇ[ς] ἐπαγωγῇ[ς] γιγν[έσ]θω τῆς πραγματ[ικ]ῆς…

*addidi [ατα] atque [μασιν]

…πράγματα… …πραγματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἐνδίξει καὶ τὴμ περίληψιμ… …τῆς δόξης τῆς… …τοῖς πράγμασιν… …περὶ ταύτης τε τὴς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμβαλλούσης ὑπολήψεως ¬ ὄντων δ' οὖν τοιούτων οἷον… …τούτων, κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιμ πραττόντων… …τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς Γιγνέσθω τῆς πραγματικῆς…

…[*practical*] situations… …to even indicate [*our*] complete comprehension with practical [*mental*] observations… …of the judgment which… …to the [*practical*] situations… …about this and [*about*] the supposition [*being*] thrown into this [*definition*] ¬ but with [*words*] like this existing such as this… …with these [*observations of practical consequences*], according to the choice of those accomplishing… …Let [*this argument*] be produced with a reference [*to observation*] of the practical [*way of thinking*]…

τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
πραγματικός *(ή, όν)*	practical	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of result of doing / affair*
ἡ θεωρία **αἱ θεωρίαι**	*[the act of mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΙΑ** *act of envisioning*
τὸ θεώρημα **τὰ θεωρήματα**	*[a mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ** *result of envisioning*
ἐνδεικνύσασθαι	to be indicated in [already]	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΑΣΘΑΙ**
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ** *showing in*
ἐνδεικνύναι	to indicate in	
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended [in the future]	**ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ** *taking hold*
ἡ περίληψις **αἱ περιλήψεις**	complete comprehension	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold around*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
βάλλειν	to throw	**ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing*
ἐμβάλλειν	to throw in	**ΕΜΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing in*
ἐμβάλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	throwing in	**ΕΜΒΑΛΛΩΝ**
ἡ ὑπόληψις **αἱ ὑπολήψεις**	supposition	**ΎΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold under*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*

οἷος *(οἵα, οἷον)*	such as [here "as if"]	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	ὉΥΤΟΣ *this*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	ἉΙΡΕΣΙΣ
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
πράττων *(ουσα, ον)*	accomplishing	ΠΡΑΤΤΩΝ *doing / affair*
συνάγειν	to gather	ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ *going together*
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ *going on/over*
ἡ ἐπαγωγή αἱ ἐπαγωγαί	reference [to observation]	ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ *result of* *going toward*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πραγματικός *(ή, όν)*	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of* *result of doing /* *affair*

28.10 [Sensations as a Test for Conceptions]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. fr. 11 (col. 1)

...α[ίσ]θήσεων όξυδερκίας... ...έν άπ[ορ]ήμαṭι νẹν[όηκε ῆ] κατ[α]καλύψεσι· δọξα[στὸν γὰρ δὴ] έκ τ[ῶ]μ φαινομένων [ἅπα]σιν άν[θ]ρώποις τὸ δηλ[ωθησό]μενον άνạλογίσματ[ί] ẹ́[σ]τιṿ. ὅθεν κατạ̀ τὸν τοιọ[ῦ]τον τρόπον τὰ φαιν[όμενον]... ...έπὶ τῶν αύ[τῶν]...

...[A]αἰσθήσεων ὀξυδερκίας... ...[O] ἐν ἀπορήματι Νενόηκε ἢ κατακαλύψεσι. δοξαστὸν γὰρ δὴ [θ] ἐκ τῶμ φαινομένων ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις Τὸ δηλωθησόμενον [Δ○] ἀναλογίσματί ἐστιν – ὅθεν, κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον, Τὰ φαινόμενον... ...ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν...

...[*one should make use*] [A] of the sharp perception of the sensations... ...[*to test what*] He has conceived [O] in questions or in obscurities. for What will be made clear by [Δ○] an analogous thought is able to be judged indeed from [θ] what appears to all people – from where, according to the way [*of thinking*] like this, The appearing things... ...upon the same...

[Sedley] [*one should rely on*] sharpness of perception [*in order to check notions*] of the kind which one conceives with difficulty or obscurity. For it is from what is plain for all men to see that opinions can be formed about that which awaits an analogically-reasoned proof. Hence it is in such a way that the perceptible...

ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
δέρκεσθαι	to see [clearly]	ΔΕΡΚΕΣΘΑΙ *seeing*
ἡ ὀξυδερκία αἱ ὀξυδερκίαι	sharp perception	ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ *sharp seeing*
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ *doubting across*
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
τὸ ἀπόρημα τὰ ἀπορήματα	question	ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ *result of doubting*
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ *completely covering*

ἡ κατακάλυψις **αἱ κατακαλύψεις**	obscurity	**ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΙΣ** *completely covering*
δοξαστός *(ή, όν)*	able to be judged	**ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ** *seeming*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	**ἍΠΑΣ** *all together*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
δηλοῦν	to make clear	**ΔΗΛΟΥΝ** *clear*
τὸ δηλωθησόμενον **τὰ δηλωθησόμενα**	what will be made clear	**ΔΗΛΩΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *clear*
τό διαλόγισμα **τὰ διαλογίσματα**	a thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning through action*
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα **τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα**	an inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα **τὰ ἀναλογίσματα**	analogous thought *[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]*	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of reasoning back*
ὅθεν	from where	
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*

28.11 Review of Previous Language Theories

[-M] non-attestation and [W] contestation are evoked in order to test the current meaning of words based in convention vs. their actual fundamental etymological meaning based in natural impulse. The connection of a word to an object is not correct if that connection is not attested or is contested by sensation.

*[-α] The error in the use of a word comes from our misapplication of our external sense of an object to our internal anticipation (**πρόληψις**) associated with that object.*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr.11 (col. 2)

...ἰδιοτήιτος τῶι σοφῶι καὶ μὴ σοφῶι διε[φώ]νεις, οὐδὲμ παρε[μ]βάλλων [τοῦ π]ερὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων κα[ὶ] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων. ἐτίθεις δ[έ] τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθὺς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τὴν κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶμ πολ[λῶ]ν ἀπο[σ]ημαίνων, οὐ μόν[ον] τὴν ἔν[νοιαν]... τῆς ἐντ[ε]ύ[ξεως]...

...ἰδιοτήιτος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ, Διεφώνεις ¬ οὐδὲν παρεμβάλλων τοῦ περὶ τῶν [-M] οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων καὶ [W] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων – [Δ] Ἐτίθεις δέ τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθὺς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τὴν κατ' [A] αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις [-α] πλάνην τῶν πολλῶν ἀποσημαίνων – οὐ μόνον τὴν ἔννοιαν... ...τῆς ἐντεύξεως...

...of a particularized [*vocabulary*] for the wise man and for the unwise man, You [Metrodorus] made transparent ¬ [*you were*] adding in nothing about [-M] non-attestations and [W] contestations [*from sensations*] – yet [Δ] You were setting up some of [*your technical*] words directly through the same terminology, and clearly signifying [-α] the error of the public concerning [A] the sensations themselves – not only [*our*] internal conception... ...of the encounter...

[Sedley] [*In your search for verbal*] individuality you were in conflict [*as much*] with the wise man as with the unwise, by including nothing about lack of confirmatory evidence and the presence of counter-evidence. You fixed some of your vocabulary directly with the same language, also representing the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive...

*Despite his eventual provisional acceptance of ordinary language as a philosophical medium, Epicurus did not drop his view that it can represent false opinion. Note in "the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive (**τὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶν πολλῶν**)" that once again a connection is implied between inaccurate word-usage and failure to correctly identify perceived objects.*

ἡ ἰδιότης **αἱ ἰδιότητες**	particularity	**ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ** *particular*
ἰδιότροπος *(ον)*	particular type of	**ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *particular way*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἰδιότητος *(η, ον)*	particularized	**ΙΔΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ** *particular* *characteristic?*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
ἐμφαίνειν	to reveal	**ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining in*
διαφαίνειν	to make transparent	**ΔΙΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining through*
μεταβάλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	transforming	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ** *throwing in change*
ὑποβάλλων *(ουσα, ον)*	suggesting	**ὙΠΟΒΑΛΛΩΝ** *throwing under*
παρεμβάλλων	adding in	**ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΛΛΩΝ** *throwing in beside*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	{M} to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	[M] attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	[-M] non-attestation	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	{W} to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις**	[W] contestation	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying against*
τιθέναι	to put [here, "to set up"]	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term [here, "terminology"]	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ πλάνη **αἱ πλάναι**	error	**ΠΛΑΝΗ** *roaming*
τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
σημαίνειν	to indicate	**ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *making indication*

ἀποσημαίνειν	to clearly signify	**ΑΠΟΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *making indication away*
ἀποσημαίνων *(ουσα, ον)*	clearly signifying	
ἡ ἔννοια **αἱ ἔννοιαι**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΙΑ** *seeing in*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
ἡ ἔντευξις **αἱ ἐντεύξεις**	encounter	**ΕΝΤΕΥΞΙΣ** *meeting within*

28.12 Metrodorus' Past Writings

The Epicurean work upon which it is suggested an opponent might seize is presumably one written by Metrodorus (possibly his book ***Πρὸς τοὺς Διαλεκτικούς****).*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 11 (col. 4)

...συλλογιζόμεθα... ἧττον... ...μυθο[ί]ης αύτοῦ [τὸ ἥδ]η λεγόμενον. ούκ ἔχει οὖν ούδὲ τοῦτο τ[ὸ]γ χαρα[κ]τῆρα κα[ὶ ὡς] ἄν τις λανθάν[ηι] αύτοῖ[ς] τι ἐναντι[ο]λογῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ...

...Συλλογιζόμεθα... ...ἧττον... ...Μυθοίης αὐτοῦ τὸ ἤδη λεγόμενον. οὐκ῎Εχει, οὖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸν χαρακτῆρα: καὶ ὡς ἄν Τις, λανθάνῃ αὐτοῖς, τι ἐναντιολογῶν – ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ...

...We infer... ...to a lesser extent... ...You [*Metrodorus*] would have related what is already being said about it. therefore, It does not even have this character: as if Someone, while contradicting something, would also evade their notice – just as also in the case of...

συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
μυθολογεῖν	to tell myths	**ΜΥΘΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *collecting speech / words*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
μυθεῖσθαι	to relate	**ΜΥΘΕΙΣΘΑΙ**
μυθῆσαι	to have related	**μυθησαι**
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
λεγόμενος *(η, ον)*	being said	**ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *speaking*
τὸ ἤδη λεγόμενον	what is already being said	
ὁ χαρακτήρ **οἱ χαρακτῆρες**	character	**ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ** *engraving*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	**ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *to be hidden*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἐναντιολογεῖν	to contradict	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *collecting in against*
ἐναντιολογῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	contradicting	

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. K (col.1)

...λέξ[εις]... ...[τοῖ]ς φα[ι]νομένοις σọφọῦ καὶ μὴ [σο]φọῦ... ...ἔμοιγε δὴ [δοκε]ῖ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦṿ... ...ἔχειν ὡ[ς] λέγεις... ...[κα]τανοεῖς ὅτι νῦṿ... ...ἡμεῖς τ[ὰ]ς λέξ[εις]...

…λέξεις… …τοῖς φαινομένοις σοφοῦ καὶ μὴ σοφοῦ… …ἔμοιγε, δή, Δοκεῖ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν… …ἔχειν ὡς Λέγεις… …Κατανοεῖς ὅτι νῦν… …Ἡμεῖς τὰς λέξεις…

…terms… …for what appears of the wise and of the unwise… …to Me, indeed, It seems, both in the past and now… …to have, as You [*Metrodorus*] say… …You fully conceive that now… …We [*use*] the terms…

ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *shining*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
λέγειν	to say	**ΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *speaking*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. K (col. 2)

…τ[α]ῦ̣τα… …[σημ]α̣ίνομεν τῶι… …[τὰς] αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴ̣ν… …[τῆ]ι διανοίαι ἐπιβλε[π]… …καὶ οὐ̣ μό[νον]… …διαφο̣ρὰς…

…ταῦτα… …Σημαίνομεν τῷ… …τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν… …τῇ διανοίᾳ Ἐπιβλεπ… …καὶ οὐ μόνον… …διαφορὰς…

…these things… …We indicate to… …the sensations and the… …[ ] Fully see with the [*mental*] perception… …and not only… …differences…

σημαίνειν	to indicate	**ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *making indication*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	**ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking upon*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 2)

…ἔλεγες… …[επ]ιβο[λ]ὴν… …κατὰ τ̣ὴ̣ν διδ[α]σ̣[καλί]αν̣ ᾠ̣ιχόμεθα ἐπὶ τ[οῖς]… …αἰσθητοῖς ἰδίο[ι̣ς]… …πλάνης δ[ηλ]οῦντ[ες]…

…[τ]ὸ ἀφαν̣ὲς… …ἐπ' αὐτῆ̣ς… …οὐ [μ]ὴν ἀ̣λ̣λ' ἐ̣[τύχομέ]ν̣ γε οὐδὲ̣ [κ]ακῶς ἐπ̣[ι̣νενοηκ]ότες τὴ̣ν διδ[ασ]καλ̣[ίαν]…

…π̣ρ̣[ο]φανοῦσα…

…Ἔλεγες… …ἐπιβολὴν… …κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν, Ὠιχόμεθα ἐπὶ τοῖς… …αἰσθητοῖς ἰδίοις… …πλάνης Δηλοῦντες… …τὸ ἀφανὲς… …ἐπ' αὐτῆς… …οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' Ἐτύχομέν γε οὐδὲ κακῶς ἐπινενοηκότες τὴν διδασκαλίαν… …προφανοῦσα…

…You [*Metrodorus*] were saying… …attention… …according to the teaching, We went toward the… …to what is sensible particular [*to each sense*]… …with [*us*] making clear an error… …the unseen… …upon it… …yet nevertheless, We happened to have objectively conceived about the teaching not at all badly… …coming to light…

ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
διδάσκειν	to teach	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *teaching*

ἡ διδασκαλία αἱ διδασκαλίαι	teaching	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑ *teaching*
οἴχεσθαι	to be gone	ΟΙΧΕΣΘΑΙ *having departed*
αἰσθητός *(ή, όν)*	(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ *perceiving*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ *roaming*
ἔνδηλος *(ον)*	(Θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ *clear within*
δηλοῦν	to make clear	ΔΗΛΟΥΝ *clear*
δηλῶν	making clear	ΔΗΛΩΝ
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing upon*
ἐπινενοηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ *saw upon*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
προφαίνειν	to appear	ΠΡΟΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining forth*
προφαίνων *(προφανοῦσα προφαῖνον)*	to come to light	ΠΡΟΦΑΙΝΩΝ *shining forth*

28.13 "All Errors Come from Language Conventions" (Former Teaching)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 3)

...ναι ἐπὶ πλείω συ[ν]οι[κει]οῦν ὧι αὐτοὶ βουλόμε[θα]. εἰ δὲ τότε [τα]ὐτό τι διαν[ο]ούμενοι ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κκειμένην ἑρμηνίαν τῶι ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἀμ[α]ρτία ἐστὶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶμ προλήψεων γιγν[ό]μενον καὶ τῶμ φαιν[ομ]ένων διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐ[θ]ισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ... ...δ[ι]ὰ τ[α]ῦτα ἢ δεδί[χαμεν]... ...προλήψεσι... ...πᾶν ῥήσεις...

...ναί, ἐπὶ πλείω συνοικειοῦν ὧ Αὐτοὶ βουλόμεθα ¬ εἰ δὲ τότε ταὐτό τι διανοούμενοι Ἐλέγομεν κατὰ τὴν ἐκκειμένην ἑρμηνίαν: τῷ ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ Ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν προλήψεων γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν φαινομένων διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐθισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ... ...διὰ ταῦτα ἢ Δεδίχαμεν... ...προλήψεσι... ...πᾶν Ῥήσεις...

...indeed, to integrate [*common terms into technical vocabulary*] to a larger [*extent*] with what We ourselves want ¬ but if at that time, thinking the same thing, We were speaking according to the interpretation [*then*] set-forth: in which [*we said*] that every human Error exists having no different shape than what is produced due to the multifaceted conventions of terms upon the preapprehensions and [*upon*] the appearances [*of objects*] , and... ...because of these things, We have split [*them*] into two... ...[*with the*] anticipations... ...every Saying...

[Sedley] ...‹›...If in those days we used to express an opinion equivalent, in the terminology which we then employed, to saying that all human error is exclusively of the form that arises in relation to preconceptions and appearances because of the manifold conventions of language... ‹ ›...

[Sedley] *In earlier years the attitude to language had been different in the Epicurean school, where they had altered the names of things if they judged them on an empirical basis to be false, and that they had regarded the inexactness of common parlance – and the consequent difficulty of identifying perceived objects with the correct name – as the source of all human errors of thinking.*

This attitude, summed up by the phrase "because of the manifold habituations of language," i.e., "due to the multifaceted conventions of terms," represents the young Epicurus' former view, which was still under the influence of the Democritean school which made these very same conventionalist claims.

πλείων (ον)	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ *more filling*
οἰκεῖος (α, ον)	compatible	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *appropriate*
οἰκείως	compatibly	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ *appropriate*
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate [common terms into technical vocabulary]	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ *appropriate together*
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ *council*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting together*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting*
ἐκκεῖσθαι	to set fourth	ΕΚΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting out*
ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ *Hermes / interpreting*
ἀναμάρτητος (ος, ον)	mistake-free	ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ *not missing the mark*
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark*
ἡ ἁμαρτία αἱ ἁμαρτίαι	mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΙΑ *missing the mark*
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ *roaming*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
ἕτερος (ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἙΤΕΡΟΣ *other*
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ *holding [a form]*
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•^] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold before*
γινόμενος (η, ον)	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
ἀποφαινόμενος (ομένη, όμενον)	representing	ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining away*
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
πολύτροπος	multifaceted [lit. "of many ways"]	ΠΟΛΥΤΡΟΠΟΣ *much direction*
ἰδιότροπος (ον)	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ *particular way*
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ *accustomed*
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ *result of being accustomed*
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ *speaking*
διχάζειν	to split into two	ΔΙΧΑΖΕΙΝ *two*

ῥηθείς (είσα, έν) **ῥηθέντες** (είσαι, έντα)	said	**ῬΗΘΕΙΣ** *said*
ἡ ῥῆσις **αἱ ῥήσεις**	saying	**ῬΗΣΙΣ** *said*

28.14 Unclear Evidence

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 5)

...[ού]κ ἐ̣πιμαρτυ[ρ]ήσεις γίγ[νον]ται πολλαὶ... ...άλλ' ἄγουσ̣[ι]... ...[ά]δήλους ἡμᾶς εἶναι [πό]ṭερα ὅλως ἐπελελήσμ[ε]θ̣α ταύτης τῆς δόξης καὶ ṭ[ὰ ἐν]α̣ντία ἡμ̣ῖ̣ν αὐτοῖς ἐλ̣[άβ]ομεν, ὥσπερ [κ]αὶ ἄλλοι π̣[ο]λλοὶ ἐμπολλοῖς, ἢ ἐ̣μεμνή̣μεθαμ̣έν, ού[δὲ]ν̣ δὲ ούδὲ [τὸ] ἀνα[γ]καῖο̣ν...

...οὐκ [M] Ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις γίγνονται πολλαὶ... ...ἀλλ' Ἄγουσι... ...ἀδήλους Ἡμᾶς εἶναι πότερα ὅλως Ἐπελελήσμεθα ταύτης τῆς δόξης καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς Ἐλάβομεν: ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἐμ πολλοῖς – ἢ Ἐμεμνήμεθαμέν. οὐδὲν δὲ, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον...

> ...not many [M] Attestations are produced... ...but They lead... ...Us being unclear as to whether We have entirely let this judgment be forgotten or [*whether*] We comprehended something opposing even to ourselves: just as many others [*have*] in many [*cases*] – or We remembered it. but in no way, not even what is necessary...
>
> [Sedley] ...‹ ›...that it is unclear whether we completely forgot this opinion and took the standpoint opposed to ourselves, as many others have also done in many cases, or remembered it, but ‹›...

ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
πολύς (ή, ύ)	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
συνάγειν	to gather	**ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ** *going together*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*
ἄδηλος (ον)	(0) unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΣ**
ὅλως	entirely	**ὉΛΩΣ** *whole*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	**ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *to be hidden*
ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι	to let X be forgotten about (+ genitive)	**ΕΠΙΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *to be hidden*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
τὸ ἐναντίον **τὰ ἐναντία**	what is opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ**
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
μιμνήσκειν	to recall	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** *thinking "again"*
μιμνήσκεσθαι	to be reminded	**ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ** *thinking "again"*

28.15 Metrodorus' Past Epistemology

…[τ]ίθηι τὸ παραθεῖναι τὸ… …[τ]οῦ τρόπ̣ο̣υ̣ τοῦ περὶ [τας ουκ] ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις [κα̣ὶ̣ αντι]μαρτυρήσεις πῶς… …ἢ̣ μ̣ανθάνειν…

….[ένα]ντίως περὶ τοῦ… …[προ]σδοξαζον… …καὶ φαίνεται… …δι̣ε̣λ[έ]γου… …[α]οράτας ἔφερ̣ε…

…Τίθηι τὸ παραθεῖναι, τὸ… …τοῦ τρόπου τοῦ περὶ [-M] τὰς οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις καὶ [W] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις, πῶς… …ἢ μανθάνειν… …ἐναντίως περὶ τοῦ… …[Δ+] προσδοξαζον… …καὶ Φαίνεται… …Διελέγου… …[0] ἀοράτας˝Εφερε…

…You put the [*act of*] juxtaposing [*conventional vs. natural usage*], which… …of the way which concerns the [-M] non-attestations and [W] contestations, how… …or to learn… …opposingly about the… …[which] adds [Δ+] judgment… …and It appears… …You were giving a discourse… …It carried [0] the unseen [things]…

συντιθέναι	to mutually agree	**ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing together*
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
τιθέναι	to put	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
παρατιθέναι	to juxtapose	**ΠΑΡΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing alongside*
ἡ παράθεσις **αἱ παραθέσεις**	juxtaposition	**ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of* *placing alongside*
τὸ παραθεῖναι	the [act of] juxtaposing	
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
τὸ προσμένον **τὰ προσμένοντα**	[O] what is still pending *[further attestation]*	**ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ** *remaining further*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	{M} to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα**	[M] what is attested	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *testifying upon*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of* *testifying upon*
τὸ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον	[-M] what is not attested	
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of* *testifying upon*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	{W} to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον **τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα**	[W] what is contested	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of testifying* *against*
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις**	contestation	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of* *testifying against*
μανθάνειν	to learn	**ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *thinking*
ὑπεναντίος *(α, ον)*	contrary	**ῩΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *over against*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἐναντίως	opposingly	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ** *in against*
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον **τὰ προσδοξαζόμενα**	[Δ+] an addition of judgement [i.e., "a theory"]	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of addition* *to seeming*
προσδοξάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	{Δ+} adding [one's] judgment to	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ** *addition* *to seeming*

φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
διαλέγειν	to give a discourse	**ΔΙΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ** *thoroughly speaking / choosing*
ἀόρατος *(ος, ον)*	unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ** *not looking*
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. L (col. 5)

...φεύγεις τὸμ β[ίον ὑπὸ] τ[ῶμ] πολλῶν εἰλη[μμένον]... ...δέ τ̣ι̣ς ṭαῦ[τα]... ...σοφοῦ...

...Φεύγεις τὸμ βίον ὑπὸ τῶμ πολλῶν εἰλημμένον... ...δέ Τις ταῦτα... ...σοφοῦ...

...You avoid the lifestyle acquired by the public... ...but Someone [] these []... ...of the wise man...

ἐκφεύγειν	to flow out from	**ΕΚΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ** *fleeing out*
φεύγειν	to avoid	**ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
εἰλημμένος *(η, ον)*	[intellectually] having been comprehended, [generally] having been acquired	**ΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ**

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 2 sup.)

...[ψ]ευδεῖ[ς]... ...ἐπεπιπτ[ει]... ...τούτοις τι [ὡς] λέγεις, Μητρόδ[ωρε] – ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία – τῶμ μὲν καθ̣' ἕκα[σ]τα οὐκ ἂμ φήσαιμ[ι τ]ότε γε συλλογισμόν, ἐ[φ' ὧι ἐσημ]α̣[ί]ωομέν τι, εἰδέναι...

*addidi [ει]

...ψευδεῖς... ...Ἐπεπίπτει... ...τούτοις τι ὡς Λέγεις, Μητρόδωρε – ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία! – τῶν μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐκ ἂν Φήσαιμι, τότε γε, συλλογισμόν (ἐφ' ᾧ Ἐσημαίωομέν τι) εἰδέναι...

...false... ...it falls upon... ...somewhat for those [*words*], just as You say, Metrodorus – but by Zeus! – I would not assert, at least at that time, to have known the inference of those [*words*] concerning each thing (by which We would indicate something)...

[Sedley] ...but I would not say that in those days you were familiar with reasoning about individual things, which was the basis on which we assigned meanings...

ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
πίπτειν	to fall	**ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling*
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	**ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling in*
ἐπιπίπτειν	to fall upon	**ΕΠΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling upon*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	**ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ** *gift [to] mother*
ὁ Ζεύς **(τοῦ διός)**	Zeus	**ΖΕΥΣ** *sky god / day*
μὰ Δία!	by Zeus!	
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*

φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *reasoning action together*
σημαίνειν	to indicate	ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ *making indication*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ *appearing*

28.16 Lack of Discernment in Linguistic Conventions

In his early days, Metrodorus had been establishing vocabulary while disregarding convention (probably in an attempt to only use the original appearance-based meaning of a particular word). In building up a private terminology in this way, Metrodorus had chosen some words without fully considering "the association of certain [linguistic] conventions."

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 2 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 3 sup.)

...κ[αὶ ἄ]νẹυ τῆς [τινω]ν *ἐθισμ̣[ῶν συ]ṿοικεώ[σεως ἐ]πιφέρω̣[ν τότε ἔτ]υχες, [μὴ] δῆλομ ποιώιης τὸ πάντα φθόγγον ἐπιφέρọντα δοξάζειν τόδε τι κạ[ὶ] τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτ[ω]ν κα[ὶ π]ραγμά|τω̣[ν | ἀ]δι[αλ]ηψία[ν ὁρ]ῶμ περ[ιν]οώιης.

**Orazi supplevit ἐσθισμ̣[ῶν], Sedley emendavit ad ἐθισμ̣[ῶν]*

...καὶ ἄνευ τῆς τινων ἐσθισμῶν συνοικεώσεως ἐπιφέρων τότε Ἔτυχες ¬ μὴ δῆλον Ποιῴης: τὸ πάντα φθόγγον ἐπιφέροντα Δοξάζειν τόδε τι – καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀδιαληψίαν ὁρῶν, Περινοῴης

...and You happened to be applying [*your choice of words*] at that time without the association of certain conventions [*which have been developed*] ¬ [*thus*] You would not have made clear: the [*fact that*] Judging every expression applies to a certain [*judgment** – *but you were*] still seeing [*the public*] indiscrimination of words vs. [*practical*] situations, [*and*] You were fully conceiving [*this issue*]

[Sedley] ...‹ ›...and you also used in those days to assign [names] without adapting certain conventional usages, in order that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses a particular opinion,* and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects.

** i.e., most words naturally apply to an originally specific concept.*

τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ *accustomed*
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ *result of being accustomed*
οἰκείως	compatibly	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ *appropriate*
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate *[common terms into technical vocabulary]*	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ *appropriate together*
ἡ συνοικεώσις αἱ συνοικεώσεις	association	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΩΣΙΣ *home together*
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing upon*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*

δῆλος *(η, ον)*	[(θ)] clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ *clear*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ *uttering*
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ *bringing upon*
ἐπιφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	applying to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΩΝ *bringing upon*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of* *doing / affair*
ἡ λῆψις *αἱ λῆψεις*	*comprehension*	*ΛΗΨΙΣ* *taking hold*
ἡ ἀδιαληψία αἱ ἀδιαληψίαι	indiscrimination	ΑΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΑ *not taking hold* *separation*
This word is only found in Epicurus and Philodemus (who uses it frequently)		
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ὁρῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	seeing	ὉΡΩΝ
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing*
περινοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΠΕΡΙΝΟΕΙΝ *seeing around*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of* *reasoning action* *upon*

28.17 Former Indiscrimination

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 3 sup.)

κά[γὼ] δ' ἔβλεπον ὅ[τ]ι ού ποιήσας διάφορα τά[δ]ε ἢ τάδε εἶναι λέγειν τάδε [φ]ῆς αἱρεῖσθαι τ[ῶι] δ[ὴ] βελ[τίο]ν εἶναι ἢ τάδε· ἄλλ' ονόμασιν οἷς δήποτε χρώμε[ν]ον οἷόν τε φ[ή]σας [ε]ἶναι [λέγει]ν τὰ πράγματα, πᾶ[σιν ἐνε]δικνύου ἡμῖν τε τοῖς [τε σοφίας] μετεσχηκόσιμ [μόνον ὅτι οἰ]κειότερόν ἐστ[ι]ν... ...τόδε τ[ι λ]έγε[ις]...

**Orazi supplevit ἐσθισμ[ῶν], Sedley emendavit ad ἐθισμ[ῶν]*

κἈγὼ δ' ἔβλεπον ὅτι, οὐ ποιήσας διάφορα τάδε ἢ τάδε εἶναι – λέγειν τάδε Φῆς αἱρεῖσθαι τῷ δὴ βελτίον εἶναι ἢ τάδε ¬ ἄλλ' ὀνόμασιν οἷς δήποτε χρώμενον οἷόν τε φήσας εἶναι λέγειν τὰ πράγματα, πᾶσιν ἐνεδικνύου ἡμῖν, τε τοῖς τε σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν, μόνον ὅτι οἰκειότερόν Ἐστιν... ...τόδε τι, Λέγεις...

and I was seeing that, [*with you*] not having made these [*words*] or those [*words*] to be different – [*and*] with You [*not*] asserting that these [*words*] are chosen for speaking because they are actually better than those [*words*] ¬ but with [*you*] using whatever words at any time, such as also asserting that it is possible to speak of [*practical*] situations [*in this way*], you were indicating to all of us, and to those others who also have partaken in wisdom, only that It is more compatible... ...this certain thing, You say...

[Sedley] And I too used to notice that you did not establish a difference between two sets of words and then say that you chose one set because it was better than choosing the other; instead, by saying that it was possible to use any name at all in speaking of things, you demonstrated to everyone, both to us and to those who have a share of wisdom, merely, that it is more suitable...

κἀγὼ = καὶ + ἐγώ	and I	ΚΑΙ + ΕΓΩ *myself*

βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ποιήσας *(ασα, αν)*	having made	**ΠΟΙΗΣΑΣ** *gathering*
διάφορος *(ον)*	differing	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *carrying apart*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
αἱρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	**ἉΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ**
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ὁπωσδήποτε	in any way	**ὉΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite* *in what way*
δήποτε	ever, at any time	**ΔΗΠΟΤΕ**
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	**ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as [here "as if"]	**ὉΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ** *showing in*
ἐνδεικνύναι	to indicate in	**ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing in*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ἡ σοφία **αἱ σοφίαι**	wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΑ** *knowledge*
μετέχειν	to partake	**ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold among*
μετεσχηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having partaken in	**ΜΕΤΕΣΧΗΚΩΣ** *hold among*
μετεσχηκέναι	to have partaken in	**ΜΕΤΕΣΧΗΚΕΝΑΙ** *hold among*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
οἰκειότερος *(α, ον)*	more compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *appropriate*

28.18 Appreciating Natural Constraints

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 3 inf.)

...τὸ σχῆμα... ...ἀναλογισμοῦ τοῦ... ...τ' ἔπρατ[τες] τότε, νῦ[ν] συνορῶ τότε δ' οὔ· καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος δὲ πιεσμοὺς τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἕκαστα λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος νῦν συνορῶ τότε δ' οὔ. καὶ...

...τὸ σχῆμα... ...ἀναλογισμοῦ τοῦ... ...τ'Ἔπραττες τότε, νῦν Συνορῶ, τότε δ' οὔ – καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος δὲ πιεσμοὺς τοῦ ὀρθῶςἝκαστα λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος – νῦν Συνορῶ, τότε δ' οὔ. καὶ...

...the shape [*of external objects*]... ...of analogical consideration [*i.e., conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen*]... ...and [*what*] You were accomplishing then, now I fully see, but not then – and also the constraints for each part of Each [*word choice*] being rightly spoken in regards to this form [*of words that are only mentally observable by analogy to the visible*], now I fully see, but not then. and...

[Sedley] ...[*what*] you were doing in those days I now see, although I did not at the time. And I also now see, although I did not at the time, the particular difficulties, with regard to this class, of using the correct names for individual things.* And [*nothing would be consistent with them*]...

> **As we have seen, by the time of this writing, Epicurus had given up this quest for an entirely accurate philosophical vocabulary.*

τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
ἀναλογικός *(ή, όν)*	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ** *reasoned again*
ἀναλογιστέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be analogized	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be reasoning action again*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα **τὰ ἀναλογίσματα**	analogous thought [*a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen*]	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of reasoning back*
ὁ ἀναλογισμός **οἱ ἀναλογισμοί**	analogical consideration [*conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen*]	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action again*
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ὁ πιεσμός **οἱ πιεσμοί**	constraint	**ΠΙΕΣΜΟΣ** *pressure*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*

28.19 Concession to Convention

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 4 sup.)

...οὐ ̣συσταίη̣ι ἄν τ̣ι πρὸς αὐτα ἢ δ̣ιαπορῆσαι ποικίλως νῦν ἐπιβλέβω, ὡς ἐγῷιμαι. ἐπε[ὶ] καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόμ που, [ὀρθῶς] ταῖς αὐταῖς αἱρέσε̣[σι] τ[ῶ]μ φωνῶ[ν] κατὰ τὴν διδ[α]σκαλίαν χρήσαιτό τις ἄν, εἴπ̣ερ ταῦτα ἡμ̣ῖμ βλέπο̣ι ἐκ το[ῦ α]ὐτοῦ γ[ε] ἰ̣δ̣ίου ε[ἴ]δ̣η, μὴ πολὺ παρηλ[λα]γμένα̣ι[ς] φύσεσι περι[π]έσοι. [τὸ] δ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὰ πρ[ά]γματα [ἠ]λέ̣[γχε]τ̣ο εἰ πολὺ παρηλλα- [γμέναις φύσεσ]ι̣ν... ...ἀν[αλόγ]ισ̣μ[α γὰ]ρ̣ ἡμεῖς... ...κατ̣ὰ τοὺ[ς] φ[θό]γγ[ους]...

[1] **...οὐ συσταί̣η ἄν Τι πρὸς αὐτα ‹—› ἢ διαπορῆσαι ποικίλως: νῦν Ἐπιβλέβω, ὡς Ἐγῷμαι**

...Something would not be composed in relation to them ‹—› or rather it would be uncertain in diverse ways: now, I believe, I fully see this

[Sedley] And nothing would be consistent with them. ‹Sedley thinks a line was skipped here when the text was copied› which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly.

2) **ἐπεὶ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν, που ὀρθῶς ταῖς αὐταῖς αἱρέσεσι τῶν φωνῶν κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν χρήσαιτό Τις ἄν: εἴπερ, ταῦτα, ἡμῖν, Βλέποι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε ἰδίου εἴδη – μὴ πολὺ παρηλλαγμέναις φύσεσι Περιπέσοι**

since, as is said [*by us*], Someone would perhaps rightly use the same choices of statements according to the teaching: IF indeed, like us, He would see that these [*choices of statements correspond to*] forms [*i.e., physical attributes*] from the SAME particular [*characteristic*] – so that He did not fall upon [*applying the same word to objects with*] very much varied natures

[Sedley] For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes.

Epicurus says that the philosopher may use words from ordinary language provided that he always keeps in view the distinguishing characteristics from which they draw their meanings, so as to avoid the pitfalls involved in completely changing the class of object referred to.

3) **Τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὰ πράγματα ἠλέγχετο – εἰ πολὺ παρηλλαγμέναις φύσεσιν… …ἀναλόγισμα γὰρ Ἡμεῖς… …κατὰ τοὺς φθόγγους…**

but The [*fact*] that it was not refuted according to the situations [*i.e., showed no practical consequences*] – if with very much varied natures… …for We [*use*] analogous thought [*i.e., a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen*]… …according to the expressions…

[Sedley] The fact that there was no factual refutation of someone who [*was ensnared*] by major qualitative changes…

συνιστάναι	to compose	**ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing together*
τὸ ἀπόρημα **τὰ ἀπορήματα**	question	**ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ** *result of doubting*
ἡ διαπορία **αἱ διαπορίαι**	uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ** *doubting across*
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
διαπορεῖν	to be in uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΕΙΝ** *doubting through*
ποικίλως	in diverse ways	**ΠΟΙΚΙΛΩΣ** *intricate*
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	**ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking upon*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
ἐγῷμαι = **ἐγώ** + **οἶμαι**	I believe	
	Part 2	
λεγόμενος *(η, ον)*	being said	**ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *speaking*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
ἡ αἵρεσις **αἱ αἱρέσεις**	choice	**ἉΙΡΕΣΙΣ**
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
διδάσκειν	to teach	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *teaching*
ἡ διδασκαλία **αἱ διδασκαλίαι**	teaching	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑ** *teaching*

χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
τὸ εἶδος **τὰ εἴδη**	form	**ΕΙΔΟΣ** *appearing*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
παρηλλαγμένος *(η, ον)*	having been varied	**ΠΑΡΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ**
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	**ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling around*
	Part 3	
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	**ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *confuting* *[with contrary proof]*
ὁ ἀναλογισμός **οἱ ἀναλογισμοί**	analogical consideration *[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]*	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action again*
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα **τὰ ἀναλογίσματα**	analogous thought *[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]*	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of reasoning back*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
ἡ διάλεκτος **αἱ διάλεκτοι**	way of speaking	**ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ** *speaking across*
τὸ ἰδίωμα **τὰ ἰδιώματα**	idiom	**ΙΔΙΩΜΑ** *particular*
ἡ ὁμιλία **αἱ ὁμιλίαι**	association	**ὉΜΙΛΙΑ** *company*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ἡ ὀνομασία **αἱ ὀνομασίαι**	designation	**ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ** *state of name*
ὁ φθόγγος **οἱ φθόγγοι**	[verbal] expression	**ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ** *uttering*

Generally speaking, a "linguistic conventionalist" thinks that languages come about only by convention. The conventionalist denies a word's intrinsic relationship to any class of objects and therefore asserts that any class of objects can be referred to by any word – and no particular word is better per se for this purpose. With no natural anchor, there can be no "incorrect usage."

In contrast, Epicurus recognizes that – even though linguistic conventions are increasingly added as a language matures and these conventions make it less objective – nevertheless there is an intrinsic relationship between a class of objects and the primary expression naturally used (specific to race and location) to identify that class in an objective (i.e., appearance-based) way. With a natural anchor, there can be a "correct usage."

28.20 Respecting Linguistic Associations

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 4 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 5 sup.)

...ὑπὸ τε [τοῖς] αὐ[τ]οῖ[ς] τρ[όποις τῶ]μ π̣ε̣ριπιπτόντ[ων] το[ύτ]οις, πέπεισμαι διαβλέπ̣ειν̣ ὡς διηροῦμεν, ὡς σ̣ο̣[ὶ ἐνο]ε̣ῖτο, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ τινὲς ἂν ἐγδέξαιντο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσ̣ω̣ς οὐκ εὔκαιρόν | ἐστ[ι ταῦ]τ[α] προφέροντα μηκύνει[ν]· [κ]αὶ μαλ' ὀρ̣θ̣ῶς [γε, ὦ] Μητρόδωρε·

...ὑπὸ τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόποις τῶν περιπιπτόντων τούτοις: Πέπεισμαι διαβλέπειν, ὡς Διηροῦμεν – ὡς σοὶ Ἐνοεῖτο ¬ καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Τινὲς ἂν ἐγδέξαιντο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρόν Ἐστι ταῦτα προφέροντα μηκύνειν: καὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Μητρόδωρε

> ...under the same ways of [*thinking as*] those falling upon these [*words*: *which ways of thinking*] I am persuaded that I discern, as We were differentiating [*back then*] – as It was conceived within you ¬ and not just as Some [*people*]* might accept. but perhaps It is not convenient to lengthen out these [*topics*] being offered: and very rightly so, Metrodorus
>
> [Sedley] ... ‹ ›...am convinced that I see them clearly in the way in which we used to distinguish them, as you took the meaning, and not in the senses in which certain people* would understand them. Perhaps, though, you might say that it is inappropriate to lengthen the discussion by citing these cases. Quite so, Metrodorus.

**probably the group in Megara led by Diódōros "Krónos" (who maintained a conventionalist view of language), rather than the group in Megara led by Stilpo (who held a more naturalist view).*

Epicurus' contemporary Diódōros "Krónos" tried (like Zeno of Elea about 150 years before him) to bring the skill of the dialectician to use in defense of the doctrines of Parmenides. For example, Diódōros had four arguments for the impossibility of motion:

1. *STUCK MINIMA PARADOX: Atomic minima can never move – because they are always "in the same place" relative to the surrounding minima.*
2. *EXACT LOCATION PARADOX: If something is moving, it is moving either "in the place it is in," or "in the place it is not in."*
3. *IMMOBILITY PARADOX: Everything that exists is "in a place," but being "in a place" means being at rest.*
4. *THE MINIMA MAJORITY PARADOX: If two moving parts out of three make "the body move," then continually adding more non-moving parts should not change the fact that the body is moving, even though it will become mostly composed of non-moving parts.*

ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
πίπτειν	to fall	**ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling*
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	**ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling around*
περιπίπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	falling [upon]	**ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΩΝ** *falling around*
πείθειν	to persuade	**ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ** *convincing*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *seeing*
διορᾶν	to distinguish	**ΔΙΟΡΑΝ** *seeing through*
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
διαβλέπειν	to discern	**ΔΙΑΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking through*
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	**ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping through*
νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἐνοεῖν = **ἐν** + **νοεῖν**	to conceive within	**ΕΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing in*

καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as* *thoroughly*
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον **τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα**	possibility [of]	
ἐγδέχεσθαι = **ἐνδέχεσθαι**	to be possible	**ΕΓΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** **ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
ἴσως	perhaps	**ΙΣΩΣ** *equal / likely*
καιριώτατος	most opportune	**ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *time*
εὔκαιρος *(ος, ον)*	convenient	**ΕΥΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *good time*
φέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	carrying	**ΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing*
προφέρων	offering	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing forward*
τό μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *length*
μηκύνειν	to lengthen out	**ΜΗΚΥΝΕΙΝ** *extent*
ὀρθῶς	[α] rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	**ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ** *gift [to]* *mother*

28.21 Examples of Absurd Language Usage

*Diódōros "Krónos," who's name literally means 'Gift of Zeus, "the Old Fool,"' gave some of his slaves extremely absurd names (imitating Hermogenes in Plato's Cratylus) – even naming one of his slaves "Yet indeed" (**Ἀλλὰ μὴν**) as his proof that language and grammar are purely conventional (and thus no word is inherently better than another as a label).*

*Nevertheless, naming a slave "Yet indeed" (**Ἀλλὰ μὴν**) does not prove language is purely conventional; it merely shows that absurd naming is possible, which was never in dispute.*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 5 sup.)

πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαί σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγκα σθαι ἃ ἐθεώρεις γελοίως [π]ώ[ς] τι[να]ς ἐγδεξαμένους καὶ π[άντα] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν ἰθισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν χρωμένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέντων ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ φανε[ρ]ῶν.

πάνυ γὰρ Οἶμαί Σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειν προενέγκασθαι ἃ Ἐθεώρεις γελοίως πώς Τινας ἐγδεξαμένους – καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὰς λέξεις: οὐκ ἔξω τῶν ἰθισμένων λέξεων Ἡμῶν χρωμένων ¬ οὐδὲ μετατιθέντων ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶν φανερῶν

for I wholly believe that You [*Metrodorus*] would have set forth many [*examples of words*] which You observed Certain [*people*] accepted [*the use of*] in some ridiculous way – and [*You saw*] every [*meaning accepted*] rather than what is [*clearly*] conceived according to the terms: while [*in contrast*] We are using the terms not out of their customary [*bounds of meaning*] ¬ nor while changing words for evident things

[Sedley] For I do not doubt that you could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses, and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we alter names with regard to the objects of perception.

ὅλως	entirely	**ΟΛΩΣ** *whole*

πᾶς (*πᾶσα, πᾶν*)	whole	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
πάνυ	wholly	**ΠΑΝΥ** *all*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**g** *perceive*
οἶμαί	I believe	
προφέρειν	to set forth	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	**ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning*
γελοίως	ridiculously	**ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ** *laughing*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
ἐγδεξάμενος = **ἐνδεξάμενος** (*η, ον*)	having accepted	**ΕΓΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ** **ΕΝΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepted in*
νοούμενος (*η, ον*)	conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
τὰ ἔξω	external objects	**ΕΞΩ** *outside*
ἔξω	out of bounds	**ΕΞΩ** *outside*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** (*εῖα, ύ*)	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἰθισμένος (*η, ον*)	customary	**ΙΘΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *direct*
χρώμενος (*η, ον*)	using	**ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary*
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing change*
μετατιθείς (*εῖσα, έν*)	changing	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΙΣ** *placing change*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
φανερὸς (*ά, όν*)	evident	**ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ** *shining*

28.22 Guiding Those Who Seek Wellbeing (Defense of Analogy)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 5 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 6 sup.)

καταγέλαστογ γὰρ [δή] τι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὅταμ… …ψε[ῦδος]… …μ[ὴ ἕ]τερο[ν]… …μεταφορὰς ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω[στα] ὑ[πὸ τῶγ γν]ωστῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὐ[τ]ῶμ πλάνας ἃς λέγ[ο]μεν ἐν το[ῖ]ς Περὶ Ἀμ[φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμ|μένοις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί τούτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διώρισται μέχρι πόσου φροντιστέον αὐτῶν ἄς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας, καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐμ ποίωι λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον. αἰ[εὶ] δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους π[οιη]τέον, ἐπειδὴ[π]ερ… …τὸμ β[ί]ον…

1) **καταγέλαστον γὰρ δή τι καὶ Τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὅταμ… …(-α) Ψεῦδος… …μὴ ἕτερον… …μεταφορὰς ποιεῖν φωνῶν [0] ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνωστα [θ] ὑπὸ τῶν γνωστῶν ¬ ἀλλὰ διὰ [∇] τὰς αὐτῶν πλάνας, ἃς Λέγομεν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας* ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμμένοις**

for This too is indeed something thoroughly ridiculous, whenever… …[-α] what is false… …not different… …[*not because other people are*] making [*metaphorical*] transfers of statements [0] onto unknown [*objects of thought*] [θ] from known [*objects of thought*] ¬ but because of their [∇] own errors, which We discuss in those [*books*] that have been written out by us [*entitled*] *On Ambiguity*

[Sedley] For another absurdity is when… [not because] others transfer words from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our work *On Ambiguity*.

2) **ἀλλὰ γάρ, Τί τούτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ, γάρ, Διώρισται μέχρι πόσου Φροντιστέον αὐτῶν: ἅς ποτ' ἂν Ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας – καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐν ποίῳ, λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον**

but indeed, What from these people [*is there*] for us? for, in many places, It has been differentiated up to what extent One must consider them: [*regarding*] whatever judgments They may have against us – and up to what extent and in what kind of [*issues*], One ought to hold onto none [*of their*] reasoning

[Sedley] But [you might say] why concern ourselves with these people? For we have frequently elsewhere defined to what extent we should heed whatever hostile opinions they hold towards us, and to what extent, and in what sort of circumstances, we should ignore them.

3) **αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους Ποιητέον, ἐπειδήπερ… …τὸμ βίον…**

but One must always make these reasonings for the purpose of those [*people*] well-composed and fully prepared for wellbeing, precisely because… …the lifestyle…

[Sedley] We ought always to aim our discussions at the benefit of those who are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of happiness, since life…

γελοίως	ridiculously	**ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ** *laughing*
καταγέλαστος (ον)	thoroughly ridiculous	**ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΣΤΟΣ** *thoroughly laughing*
τὸ ψεῦδος **τὰ ψεύδη**	[-α] what is false	**ΨΕΥΔΟΣ** *falsehood / lie*
ἕτερος (ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	**ἝΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
ἡ μεταφορά **αἱ μεταφοραί**	transfer	**ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying change*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
τὸ ἄγνωστον **τὰ ἄγνωστα**	unknown thing	**ΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΝ** *not knowing*
γνωστός (ή, όν)	known	**ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ** *distinguishing*
ἡ πλάνη **αἱ πλάναι**	error	**ΠΛΑΝΗ** *roaming*
τά ἄμφω	the pair	**ΑΜΦΩ** *both*
ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
ἡ ἀμφιβολία **αἱ ἀμφιβολίαι**	ambiguity	**ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ** *both throwing*
Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας	"On Ambiguity" a book by Epicurus	**ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ** *both throwing*
This book was not listed in Usener's list of Epicurus' works		
ἡ διαπορία **αἱ διαπορίαι**	uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ** *doubting across*

"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written out	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ *written again*
ἀναγεγραμμένος (η, ον)	having been written out	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ *written again*
	Part 2	
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
πολλαχοῦ	in many places	ΠΟΛΛΑΧΟΥ *many*
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ *between the border*
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ *until*
ὁπόσος (η, ον)	as much as	῾ΟΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain which*
πόσος (η, ον)	how much / how far	ΠΟΣΟΣ *some / certain*
μέχρι πόσου	up to what extent	
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	consideration	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ *mind*
φροντίζειν	to be considerate	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΖΕΙΝ *mind action*
φροντιστέον	one must consider	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣΤΕΟΝ
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
ποῖος (α, ον)	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ *gathering*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
οὐθείς = οὐδείς (οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ *holding*
ἑκτέον	it should be held	
	Part 3	
αἰεὶ Ionic for ἀεὶ	always	ΑΕΙ *forever*
εὐπαγής (ής, ές)	well composed	ΕΥΠΑΓΗΣ *fixing well*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing alongside*
κατασκευαζόμενος	being provided [here, "fully prepared"]	
ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ *since indeed certainly*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*

28.23 Past Errors: Practical vs. merely Linguistic

Epicurus has raised certain questions of inaccurate word-usage. Someone might use these questions against the school, by pointing to prior wittings of the kathēgemónes, and claim that these contain usages that are now considered to be incorrect.

...καὶ [ἐκῖ]νο ἔγωγε πολλάκις ἐνεθυμήθην τὸ ὅτι [εἰ, ἐ]μοῦ προφέροντος ἀπορήμ[α]τα ἅ τις ἂμ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔ[τρε]π̣εν, ἀποδιδ̣ῶιη ὃ ἐκ τῶν [λέ]ξεων συνοι̣κ̣ε[ιοῦν] ὡ̣ς ταὐτὸ συ̣νέβαινε μελε̣τ[ᾶν] ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς, πολλο[ῖ]ς ἂν ἴσως δόξειε τότε μὲν ἤτοι κατὰ τὸν ἐπι|β̣λητικὸν τρόπον ἢ περιληπ̣τ̣ικῶ̣ς ἢ φανταστικ[ῶς] ἢ δ[ι]ὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶς ψευδὴς ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖ[ς] λ̣έξεσ̣[ιν] ἐκίναις δόξα, ἤτοι κατ̣ὰ̣ τ̣ὸν οὐκ ἐ̣π̣ιβλ[ητ]ικὸμ μὲν οὐδ̣ὲ κ̣ατ̣ὰ μ̣ίαν τῶν ἐκκειμένων ἰδεῶν ἐξ ἐ[α]υ̣τοῦ δὲ μόνον κινητικόν

...καὶ ἐκεῖνο, Ἔγωγε πολλάκις ἐνεθυμήθην, Τὸ ὅτι εἰ, ἐμοῦ προφέροντος ἀπορήματα: ἅ Τις ἂν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔτρεπεν – Ἀποδιδῴη ὃ ἐκ τῶν λέξεων συνοικειοῦν ὡς ταὐτὸ, Συνέβαινε μελετᾶν ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς, πολλοῖς ἂν ἴσως Δόξειε τότε – (μὲν ἤτοι [Δ•] κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον ἢ [Δ◌] περιληπτικῶς ἢ [Δ•] φανταστικῶς ἢ [Δ◌] διὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶς) – [∇+] ψευδὴς ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖς λέξεσιν ἐκίναις Δόξα, ἤτοι [¬Δ•] κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικὸν, μὲν [¬Δ◌] οὐδὲ κατὰ μίαν τῶν ἐκκειμένων ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μόνον κινητικόν

...and that, I at least have often reflected upon, the fact that if, while I was offering questions [*in the work "On Ambiguity"*], Someone might turn those [*questions*] against us – that what [*we*] were integrating from the terms [*of conventional vocabulary*] He would demonstrate as the same [*words used in our philosophical vocabulary*, *and I reflected that if*] He persisted to study [*this issue*] regarding [*our*] writing, then perhaps It might have seemed to many at that time – (either [Δ•] in an objective way, or [Δ◌] in a completely comprehensible way or [Δ•] in an appearance-based way, or indeed [Δ◌] through reasoning in a speculative way) – that a [∇+] false Judgment had been assigned to those terms [*by us*], either [¬Δ•] according to the non-objective [*way of thinking*] or [¬Δ◌] not according to one of [*our*] set-forth ideas [*of how ways of thinking are divided*], but only motion-inducing from itself

[Sedley] I also frequently reflected that if, when I raised difficulties which someone might have turned against us, he should claim that what used to be assimilated from ordinary language was the same as used to be practiced in the written work, many might well conclude* that in those days false opinion was represented in that language, whether through an [1] empirical process, [2] [**ἢ περιληπτικῶς**] [3] an appearance-based process, or [4] a theoretical process, or through a non-empirical process, not following one of our current divisions, but simply arising from an internal movement⁂

* *The concession which Epicureans might mistakenly make to their opponent is to argue that certain expressions formerly represented false opinion, but that now the truth can be obtained owing to some change in the use of language. Epicurus' objection to this concession [as we will see] is that concrete evidence in the form of practical consequences is required to establish that a particular usage was correct or incorrect (rather than merely referencing logical definitions).*

⁂ *i.e., using words based only on logic – the mind's own movement – rather than based on sensation.*

ἐκεῖνος (*ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο*)	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
ἔγωγε	I indeed	**ΕΓΩΓΕ** *myself*
πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	**ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *spirit in*
προφέρων	offering	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing forward*
Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας	"On Ambiguity" a book by Epicurus	
ἡ ἀμφιβολία **αἱ ἀμφιβολίαι**	ambiguity	**ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ** *both*
ἡ διαπορία **αἱ διαπορίαι**	uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ** *doubting across*
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
τὸ ἀπόρημα **τὰ ἀπορήματα**	question	**ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ** *result of doubting*

τρέπειν	to turn	ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ *turning*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving away*
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ *speaking*
οἰκείως	compatibly	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ *appropriate*
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate *[common terms into technical vocabulary]*	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ *appropriate together*
συμβαίνειν	to endure *[here, "to persist"]*	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ *walking together*
ἀμέλει	doubtless	ΑΜΕΛΕΙ *not caring*
μελετᾶν	to study	ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ *caring*
ἡ γραφή αἱ γραφαί	[text of] writing	ΓΡΑΦΗ *writing*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	ΠΟΛΥΣ *much*
ἴσως	perhaps	ΙΣΩΣ *equal / likely*
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ *seeming*
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing upon*
ἐπιβλητικός *(ή, όν)*	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
ἀπερίληπτος *(ος, ον)*	not completely comprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ *not taken hold around*
περιληπτῶς	with complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ *taken hold around*
Epicurus shows above: ὁ [X]τικός τρόπος ≈ [X]τικῶς		
περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being taken hold around*
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of being taken hold around*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of appearing*
φανταστικῶς	in an appearance-based way	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of appearance*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ *envisioning*

θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	**ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ** *characteristic of [mentally] observing*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
διατάττειν	to arrange	**ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering across*
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	**ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering under*
ὑποτετάχθαι	to be assigned	**ὙΠΟΤΕΤΑΧΘΑΙ** *ordered under*
ἐκεῖνος *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ** *one*
ἐκκείμενος *(η, ον)*	set forth	**ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated out*
ἡ ἰδέα **αἱ ἰδέαι**	idea	**ΙΔΕΑ** *appearing*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
κινεῖν	to move	**ΚΙΝΕΙΝ** *moving*
κινητικός *(ή, όν)*	motion-inducing	**ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of moving*

28.24 True Interpretations

Words are naturally based upon perception and only subsequently organized by logic. Epicurus points out that error arises not from the external data that our senses perceive but from the internal movements of our own thought processes.

*Epicurus is careful to locate the cause of error as internal and eliminate the possibility that something in the external world is to blame: the mental movement (**κίνησις**) that leads to error it is entirely an internal and personal movement, not directly necessitated by external factors.*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 7 sup.)

νῦν δὲ τῆς ἑρμηνία[ς] ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἐπαγωγή τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς γίγνε[σ]θαι εἰς τἀληθές . ἀλλ' ὅμως *σοὶ μηδέποτε μὴ συμ[πλεκ]έτω μηδέ[ν τ]ις πειρώ[μενος ἐ]ξισοῦσθαι σοι ταύτης τ̣ῆς ὑποψίας· ἄλλ' εἰς ὅ[λη]ν [τὴν] ἐ̣π̣ιλ[ό]γι̣[σ]ι̣ν...

*Versio Sedley litteram Σ habet, quae necessaria est

νῦν δὲ, [Δ] τῆς ἑρμηνίας ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ ἐπ' [θ] ἄλλ' ἄττα: Ἐπαγωγή τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς γίγνεσθαι εἰς (α) τἀληθές

even though now, with [Δ] the interpretation [*of a word*] fitting also to [θ] other [*externally observed*] things: a certain Reference [*to what is actually observed*] out of a differentiation [*from what is observed vs. what is an addition of the mind*] is being produced into (α) what is true

[Sedley] but that now, because the means of expression is adapted to additional ends, discrimination provides a lead towards the truth.

ἀλλ' ὅμως: σοὶ μηδέποτε μὴ Συμπλεκέτω μηδέν Τις, πειρώμενος ἐξισοῦσθαι σοι, ταύτης τῆς ὑποψίας ¬ ἄλλ' εἰς ὅλην τὴν ἐπιλόγισιν...

still all the same: Do not let Someone, [*who is*] attempting to become equal to you, ever entangle anything to you with this suspicion ¬ rather, into the entire [*faculty of*] inductive consideration...

[Sedley] However, let no one ever try to get even with you* by linking with you any trace of this suspicion; but [turn] to the entire faculty of empirical reasoning...

** Epicurus urges Metrodorus to defend himself against the implication from the last section – even in his early years, when Metrodorus was disregarding convention in an effort to align a word with its natural and immediate sense, Metrodorus was not making the more serious mistake of the conventionalists such as Diodorus Cronus, who's subjectivist theory of language fully equates the meaning of a word only with the intention in the mind of the speaker while uttering it.*

Given that Epicurus relates the meaning of a word more to its natural, fundamental, and immediate usage rather than to its conventional usage, he is reluctant to accept any claim that the words under discussion have changed their meaning in the absence of incontrovertible evidence.

This is why 'inductive consideration' is brought in as a test. Epicurus demands evidence in the form of practical consequences as proof of correct or incorrect usage.

ἡ ἑρμηνεία **αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι**	interpretation	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ** *Hermes / interpreting*
ἐναρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting into	**ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting into*
ἐφαρμοττών *(οῦσα, όν)*	fitting	**ΕΦΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting upon*
ἡ ἐπαγωγή **αἱ ἐπαγωγαί**	reference [to observation]	**ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ** *result of* *going toward*
ἡ ἐπαγωγή is used technically by Aristotle as "induction" or "inductive reasoning" – and refers to the (Evidence-Based) process of moving from particular observations to broader generalizations. Inductive reasoning contrasts with (Logic-Based) deductive reasoning, where reasoning proceeds from general principles and is applied specific cases.		
ἡ στολή **αἱ στολαί**	pressure	**ΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping*
ἡ διαστολή **αἱ διαστολαί**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping apart*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice	**ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *to be hidden*
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
τἀληθές = **τὸ ἀληθές** **τὰ ἀληθῆ**	what is true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not hidden*
ὁμογενής *(ές)*	of the same kind	**ὉΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ** *same born*
ὅμως	all the same [i.e., nevertheless]	**ὉΜΩΣ** *same*
μηδέποτε	never	**ΜΗΔΕΠΟΤΕ** *but not ever*
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*
πειρᾶσθαι	to attempt	**ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ** *trail / attempt*
πειρώμενος	attempting	**ΠΕΙΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *trail / attempt*
ἴσος *(η, ον)*	equal	**ΙΣΟΣ** *equal*
ἐξισοῦσθαι	to be made equal	**ΕΞΙΣΟΥΣΘΑΙ** *out of equal*
ἡ ὑποψία **αἱ ὑποψίαι**	suspicion	**ὙΠΟΨΙΑ** *looking under*

ὅλως	entirely	**ὍΛΩΣ** *whole*
ὅλος *(η, ον)*	entire	**ὍΛΟΣ** *whole*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός **οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί**	[process of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *process of reasoning action upon*
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις **αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις**	[faculty of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*

28.25 Practical Analysis

The correct use of relative classifications must vary depending on the circumstances – for example how many people make a space "crowded" depends on the size of the space (the practical consequence of 10 people being in a small room is that is "crowded") and what makes something "just" depends on the circumstances (the application of the word "just" can only be judged to be correctly applied relative to practical consequences in specific circumstances).

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)

...[πιθανώτερ]ογ γίγνεσ[θαι ἂν τὸν τοῦτο] δὴ φανερὸμ ποιοῦντα [ἡνί]κα [ἢ] ἔπραττέ τις τουτὶ ἢ οὐκ [ἔπρα]ττεν, ἤπερ ἡνίκα οὐκ ἦν ἡ διάληψις ἀναλογιστ[ι]κὴ ὡς τῶιδέ τινι λέγει τοῦτο, τὸ ἐναντίον [ἐ]δοξάζετο.

...πιθανώτερογ γίγνεσθαι ἂν Τὸν τοῦτο δὴ φανερὸν ποιοῦντα [a] ἡνίκα ἢ ἔπραττέ Τις τουτὶ ἢ οὐκ ἔπραττεν ¬ [b] ἤπερ ἡνίκα οὐκ ἦν ἡ Διάληψις ἀναλογιστικὴ – (ὡς τῷδέ τινι Λέγει τοῦτο, Τὸ ἐναντίον Ἐδοξάζετο)

...That [*person*] who would make this [*change in word meaning*] in-fact evident would have been more persuasive [*in making his case*] [a] when Someone was either accomplishing or not accomplishing the very thing [*that would make the change evident*] ¬ [b] rather than when the [*logical*] Differentiation – (that while He says this [*word*] to a certain person, Something opposite was being judged) – was NOT analogistic [*i.e., NOT based the analogy to any evidence*]*

[Sedley] [*When it is suggested that a word has changed its meaning, always bear in mind that*] the man trying to prove this would have been more persuasive at a time when someone was either acting, or not acting, in a certain manner, than at a time when the distinction, that by using a certain word he [*means one thing but*] used to hold the opposite opinion, was not analogically reasoned.

**Someone trying to demonstrate that an error was made in the application of a word should reference the practical consequence of that supposed error. Merely referring to some logical distinction or formal definition that does not relate to any specific circumstance is insufficient to prove that any error has been made.*

πιθανός *(ή, όν)*	persuasive	**ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ** *probable*
πιθανώτερος *(α, ον)*	more persuasive	**ΠΙΘΑΝΩΤΕΡΟΣ** *probable*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced [here, "to come to be"]	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
φανερὸς *(ὰ, ὸν)*	evident	**ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ** *appearing*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ποιοῦν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	making	**ΠΟΙΟΥΝ** *gathering*
ἡνίκα	when	
πράττειν	to accomplish	**ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *doing / affair*

ἡ διάληψις **αἱ διαλήψεις**	differentiation	**ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold* *separation*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*
ἀναλογιστέος *(α, ον)*	ought to be analogized	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ** *ought to be reasoning action again*
ὁ ἀναλογισμός **οἱ ἀναλογισμοί**	analogical consideration *[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]*	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning action again*
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα **τὰ ἀναλογίσματα**	analogous thought *[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]*	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of reasoning back*
ἀναλογιστικός *(ή, όν)*	analogistic	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of action of reasoning back/again*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*

28.26 Suspending Judgment

An Epicurean understands that it is an error to form a judgment without repeated evidence – and because of this, he knows he may have to suspend judgment. While doing so, he should be careful not to adopt some purely logical argument in place of that suspended judgment. To define 'just' or 'crowded' in absolute terms critically ignores that such terms depend on context.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 8 sup.)

ἐπὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν τοιούτω[ν] οἶμαι μόνων ἂν ὑποπτεύσαιμι τόγ γ' ἀστῖομ μή ποτε ἐναντίως ἔμπροσθε ἐδοξάζε|το ἢ ὅλως [σοφώ]τερον ὑπελάμβανέ τ[ι ἐκ τ]ῶν ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]νων, ἐπεὶ οὐχὶ π[αρόν]των ο[ἶδ]α ἐπιβλητικὴν ἔχ[ει] δόξαν ἐν ὡιδήποτε τρόπωι.

ἐπὶ, γὰρ δὴ, τῶν τοιούτων Οἶμαι μόνων, ἂν Ὑποπτεύσαιμι τὸν γ' ἀστῖον: μή ποτε ἐναντίως ἔμπροσθε Ἐδοξάζετο – ἢ ὅλως σοφώτερον Ὑπελάμβανέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων: ἐπεὶ, οὐχὶ παρόντων, Οἶδα, ἐπιβλητικὴν Ἔχει δόξαν ἐν ᾧδήποτε τρόπῳ

for indeed, I believe that only in [*a case*] like this here [*i.e., where the practical consequences are not evident*], that I would ever suspect the cultured man: that He would not have ever been judging in opposition before – or [*ever*] Supposed some [*meaning of a word was*] entirely wiser from contrary [*logical arguments*]: since, I know, He does not hold an objective judgment of present [*circumstances*] in whatever way [*he is thinking*]

☘ [Sedley] For it is only, I think, on grounds such as these that I would suspect that the clever fellow held a contradictory opinion before he accepted some opposing belief as being in general wiser; for the opinion which he holds is, I know, by no means empirically based on current evidence.

τοιόσδι = **τοιόσδε** *(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)*	like this here (such a kind as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ** **ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ** *of this sort here*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
οἶμαί	I believe	

ὑποπτεύειν	to suspect	**ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ** *looking [suspiciously] under*
ἀστῖος *(α, ον)* = **ἀστικός** *(ή, όν)*	cultured	**ΑΣΤΙΟΣ** **ΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *of the city*
ἐναντίως	against	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ** *in against*
ἔμπροσθε	before	**ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕ** *in before*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*
ὅλως	entirely	**ὉΛΩΣ** *whole*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
σοφώτερος *(α, ον)*	wiser	**ΣΟΦΩΤΕΡΟΣ** *knowledge*
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping under*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *appearing*
οἶδα	I know	
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	**ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing upon*
ἐπιβλητικός *(ή, όν)*	objective	**ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ὁπωσδήποτε	in any way	**ὉΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite* *in what way*
δήποτε	ever, at any time	**ΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite*
ὅσδήποτε *(ἥσδήποτε, ὅτιδήποτε)*	whichever	**ΟΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite* *which*

28.27 Judgment's Boundary

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 8 sup.)
| P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 8 inf. – part 1)

είς τοῦτον [οὖ]ν δή φημι τὸν ὅρον ἀπο[β]λεπέ[τω πᾶσα] δόξα ἦ‹ι› τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν [ἔ]τ[ι μ]ὴ προστεθηκότες ἦιμεν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν οἶμαι εὐθὺ[ς] ἔστι δόξαν καὶ εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἄγειν· ἀλλ' ἱκανόν ἂν δύναμίν τις ἔχειμ μόνον τῆς ἐπ[ι]λογίσεω[ς] φθήσε[τ]αι ὅταν [ὁ] καιρὸ[ς π]αρα[δι]δῶι. [ὁ γ]ὰρ ἀν[ε]πιλογίστως [οὕ]τως πρὸς ταύτην λία[ν τε] τα[πι]νῶι τρόπωι [προσέχων ὅμως ἐ]πιλογ[ίσασθαι δυνήσεται]... | ...κέχρη[ται] τ[αύτ]ε[ι] τεῖ κ[ι]νή[σει]· καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττ[ον] ὑπὸ τὴμ φυγὴν ἢ αἵρεσιν [κα]τ' αὑτὴν ἀγόμενος τεύξεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ.

εἰς τοῦτον, οὖν, δή, Φημι – τὸν ὅρον ἀποβλεπέτω πᾶσα Δόξα (ἧ τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν ἔτι μὴ προστεθηκότες Ἦμεν): οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν Οἶμαι εὐθὺς Ἔστι δόξαν καὶ εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἄγειν

into this [*way of thinking*], then, indeed, I assert – let every Judgment look at this limit (insofar as We had not yet added the [*process of*] inductive consideration): I do not believe that it is possible for every judgment to also lead directly into a [*process of*] inductive consideration

[Sedley] I am saying, then, that every opinion to which we had not yet at that time applied an empirical assessment should be referred to the following rule: it is not possible, in my view, to subject every opinion immediately to an empirical assessment

ἀλλ' ἱκανόν ἂν δύναμίν Τις ἔχειν μόνον τῆς ἐπιλογίσεως φθήσεται – ὅταν ὁ Καιρὸς παραδιδῷ. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνεπιλογίστως οὕτως πρὸς ταύτην, λίαν τε ταπινῷ τρόπῳ, Προσέχων – ὅμως ἐπιλογίσασθαι δυνήσεται… …Κέχρηται [Δ] ταύτει τεῖ κινήσει – καὶ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπὸ τὴν φυγὴν ἢ αἵρεσιν, κατ' αὐτὴν ἀγόμενος, Τεύξεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ

but [*even though forming a judgment based in direct evidence is not always possible*], it is sufficient if Someone will succeed in only having the force of [*his faculty of*] inductive consideration – whenever the Opportunity allows. for the One Paying attention for this [*opportunity for observation of practical consequences*] in this way without inductive consideration, and in a very humble a manner – will nevertheless be able to inductively consider [*when the opportunity DOES allow for observation*]… …[*if*] He uses [Δ] this movement [*of his thought based in observation*] – and, while being led according to [*this inductive consideration*], He will happen to be right no less in regards to avoidance than [*in regards*] to choice

[Sedley] but it is sufficient that a man will be ready merely to display a capacity for reasoning empirically when the opportunity allows. For someone who examines it with this lack of empirical reasoning, and in an utterly inadequate fashion, will nevertheless be able to assess it empirically [*if it is an opinion that concerns actions, when he has the opportunity to observe someone who proceeds to action on the basis of it; he will see with what result the person*] performs this action, and under its guidance he will arrive at the truth just as much in [*the category of*] avoidance as in that of choice

If sufficient information is unavailable, forming a complete judgment through inductive consideration will not be possible. Often times, the best we can do is wait until more complete observation is possible.

For example, we know when to properly call a room 'crowded' or an action 'just' by observing the practical conditions that justify – or fail to justify – the use of those terms in any particular circumstance.

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ *firm standing*
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ *speaking*
φημι	I assert	
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ *finished*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	῾ΟΡΑΝ *looking*
ὁ ὅρος οἱ ὅροι	limit	῾ΟΡΟΣ *outline, definition*
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking*
διαβλέπειν	to discern	ΔΙΑΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking through*
ἀποβλέπειν	to look at	ΑΠΟΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ *looking out*
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
προστιθέναι	to add	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing toward*

προστεθηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	added to	**ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗΚΩΣ** *placing toward*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*
	Part 2	
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	**ἹΚΑΝΟΣ** *fitting / proper*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις **αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις**	[faculty of] inductive consideration	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *towards arriving*
φθάνειν	to succeed [first]	**ΦΘΑΝΕΙΝ** *overtaking*
ἂν... φθήσεται...	*note the use of the future indicative with ἄν*	
καιριώτατος	most opportune	**ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ** *time*
εὔκαιρος *(ος, ον)*	convenient	**ΕΥΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *good time*
ὁ καιρός **οἱ καιροί**	opportunity	**ΚΑΙΡΟΣ** *time*
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
ἀναδιδόναι	to deliver	**ΑΝΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving up*
παραδιδόναι	to hand over *[here, "to allow"]*	**ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving alongside*
ἀνεπιλογίστως	in a way without inductive consideration	**ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ** *not reasoning action upon*
λίαν	very	
ταπινός *(ή, όν)*	humble	**ΤΑΠΙΝΟΣ** *low*
προσέχειν	to pay attention	**ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold towards*
ὅμως	nevertheless	**ὉΜΩΣ**
ἐπιλογίσασθαι	to inductively consider	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ** *collecting (reasoning) action upon*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
ἡ φυγή **αἱ φυγαί**	avoidance	**ΦΥΓΗ** *fleeing*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
ἡ αἵρεσις **αἱ αἱρέσεις**	choice	**ἉΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *taking*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*

ἀγόμενος (η, ον)	being led	ΑΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ *going*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *happening*
ὀρθός (ή, όν)	right	ΟΡΘΟΣ *straight upright*

28.28 Errors of Speculative Judgment

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 8 inf. – part 2)

| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 9 sup. – part 1)

ὅσαι δὲ μὴ περὶ πράξεων εἰσὶν τῶν δοξ[ῶ]ν λέγω δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικῶν ἀλ[λ' ἐ]κ τοῦ θεωρετικοῦ μέρους οὖσαι αὗται δὲ ἁλώσονται, ἂμ [ψευδεῖς] ὦσι καὶ ἢ [ἀλόγως ἢ ἐ]κ συλλ[ο]|γισμ[ο]ῦ ἔχωσ[ι] τὸ διημαρτημέν[ο]ν, ἐν τῶι ἢ ἄλλο τι κατὰ ταύτας λέγεσθαι τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὃ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἢ ἧι ‹ἂμ› ἂμ πώρ[ρω]θέμ ποθεν εἰς πράξεως συναφὴν βαδίζωσιν εἰσάγωσιν εἰς τὴν [ἀ]νεπιτήδιομ πρᾶξιν.

Ὅσαι δὲ [¬•] μὴ περὶ πράξεων εἰσὶν [Δ] τῶν δοξῶν – Λέγω δὲ τῶν [¬Δ•] οὐκ ἐπιβλητικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ [Δ◌] τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ μέρους Οὖσαι: Αὗται δὲ ἁλώσονται ἂμ (-α) ψευδεῖς ὦσι – καὶ ἢ ἀλόγως ἢ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ Ἔχωσι [∇] τὸ διημαρτημένον ¬ ἐν τῷ ἢ [W1] ἄλλο Τι [∇◌] κατὰ ταύτας λέγεσθαι τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὃ (-α) οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν – ἢ ἧ ἂμ πώρρωθεν ποθεν εἰς [◌→•] πράξεως συναφὴν [∇◌] βαδίζωσιν, Εἰσάγωσιν εἰς [W2] τὴν ἀνεπιτήδιον πρᾶξιν

as Many [Δ] of one's judgments as are [¬•] not about [*external*] activities – I am speaking about [¬Δ•] those [*judgments*] that are not of the objective [*type of thinking*], but Those [*judgements that*] do exist from the [Δ◌] speculative part [*of thought*]: These [*judgments*] will be caught if they are (-α) false – and Have [∇] what is thoroughly mistaken either unreasonably or out of inference ¬ whether in [*the case*] that [W1] Something else may be said according to those [∇◌*incorrect judgements*] from the speculative [*parts of thought*] that is (-α) not true – or insofar as [∇◌] these [*incorrect speculative judgments*] may proceed from somewhere at a distance [◌→•] into union with activity, [*and*] They lead into [W2] an unsuitable activity

[Sedley] As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational either because [1] some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, [2] if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action.

the error in case 1 is that a [Δ◌] speculative judgment, which is a judgment about what is what is conceivable, is asserted that is (W) contested by further speculation – i.e., contrary evidence is conceivable. (For example "the void does not exist" is contested by the fact that we conceive that motion is not possible without it.)

the error in case 2 is that a [Δ◌] speculative judgment is asserted that (although being a judgment about what is only conceivable) is still (W) contested by the direct observation of the consequences that result from that error in judgment. (For example, people who say "motion is not possible" are contested by their own movement.)

ὅσος (η, ον)	as many as	ΟΣΟΣ *however great*
ἡ πρᾶξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ *action*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
λέγειν	to say [here "to speak"]	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing upon*
ἐπιβλητικός (ή, όν)	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*

θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of [mentally] observing*
θεωρητός *(ή, όν)*	observable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ *observing*
θεωρητικός *(ή, όν)*	speculative	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of observing*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
ἁλίσκεσθαι	to be caught	ἉΛΙΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ *being conquered*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ *deceiving*
εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ *being*
ὦσι	they may be	
ἀλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ *not reasoning*
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *reasoning action together*
ἀναμάρτητος *(ος, ον)*	mistake-free	ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ *not capable of missing the mark*
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark*
διαμαρτάνειν	to thoroughly make a mistake	ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark through*
διημαρτημένος *(η, ον)*	thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ *missing the mark through*
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking*
λέγεσθαι	to be said	ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ *speaking*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not concealed*
ᾗ	insofar as	ἙΙ *in/for which*
πώρρωθεν	from a distance	ΠΩΡΡΩΘΕΝ *distant*
ποθεν	from somewhere	
ἡ συναφή αἱ συναφαί	union	ΣΥΝΑΦΗ *joining together*
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ *walking*
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going*
εἰσάγειν	to lead into	ΕΙΣΑΓΕΙΝ *going into*
ἀνεπιτήδειος *(ος, ον)*	unsuitable	ΑΝΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ *not towards this here*

28.29 The "Concealed Father" Demonstration
ὁ Συγκεκαλυμμένος Πατήρ

The "Concealed Father" is a provocative demonstration used to publicly argue that real knowledge is impossible due to a fundamental epistemological paradox: that we can both know and not know the same thing.

This scenario presents a situation in which, in front of an audience, a Sophist covers a man with a blanket. Then, the Sophist brings in the man's son and asks him who is beneath the blanket. When the son admits he does not know, the Sophist reveals that the person under the blanket is actually his own father.

The paradox arises because when the son says he does not know WHO is under the blanket, it implies that he does not know WHO his father is – which is strange because he should know his own father.

Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously does NOT KNOW who is under the blanket and does KNOW who his father is.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 9 sup. – part 2)

ἂν δὲ μηδὲν τούτων, εὐσυνθεώρητον ἔσται ὡς οὔκ [ε]ἰσι ψ[ε]υδεῖς. διὸ καὶ ῥαιδίως ἅπαντες κ[α]ταγελῶσ[ι]ν ὅταν τις ὀμ[ολ]ογήσαντός τινος μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι προφέρ[ηι] τὸν συγκεκαλυμμένομ [πα]τέρα καὶ τὰ [τοι]αῦτα·

ἂν δὲ μηδὲν τούτων, εὐσυνθεώρητον Ἔσται ὡς (α) οὔκ Εἰσι ψευδεῖς

but if these [*i.e., instances of contrary evidence or negative consequences*] do not [*occur*], It will be well mutually observed that They are (α) not false

[Sedley] If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false.

i.e., [Δ҉] speculative judgment is only (α) true when it is {M} attested by evidence or {-W} not contested by contrary evidence (which includes the practical consequences of that speculative judgment)

διὸ, καὶ ῥαιδίως Ἄπαντες καταγελῶσιν ὅταν Τις – (ὁμολογήσαντός τινος μηδ' Ἐνδέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι) – προφέρῃ "τὸν Συγκεκαλυμμένον Πατέρα" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

therefore, All [*people*] together easily thoroughly laugh whenever Somebody – (when another person has agreed that It is not even possible to both understand and to NOT understand the same thing) – sets forth "the Concealed Father" and such things

[Sedley] For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind.

Consider the line from Lucian's **Βίων Πρᾶσις** (**Vitarum Auctio**)*, where the Stoic, after stating the riddle of 'The Crocodile and the Child,' lists some more riddles that he can recite:*

"The Reaper, the Master, and above all, the Electra and the Veiled Figure." (§ 22)

συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning together*
εὐσυνθεώρητος *(ος, ον)*	well mutually observed	**ΕΥΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ** *capable of properly observing together*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
ῥάδιος **ῥαιδιος** *(α, ον)*	easy	**ῬΑΙΔΙΟΣ** *easily*
ῥαδίως **ῥαιδίως**	easily	**ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ** *easily*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	**ἉΠΑΣ** *all together*

γελᾶν	to laugh	**ΓΕΛΑΝ** *deriding*
καταγέλαστος *(ον)*	thoroughly laughing	**ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΣΤΟΣ** *thoroughly deriding*
καταγελᾶν	to thoroughly laugh	**ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΝ**
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
στῆναι	to stand [already]	**ΣΤΗΝΑΙ** *standing*
ἵστασθαι	to be placed upright	**ἹΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing*
ἐπισταμένως	in an understandable way	**ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΩΣ** *standing upon*
ἡ ἐπιστήμη **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι**	understanding	**ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ** *standing upon*
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	**ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing upon*
προφέρειν	to set forth	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	**ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ** *completely covering*
ἡ κατακάλυψις **αἱ κατακαλύψεις**	obscurity	**ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΙΣ** *completely covering*
συγκαλύπτειν	to conceal	**ΣΥΓΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ** *covering together*
ὁ πατήρ **οἱ πατέρες**	father	**ΠΑΤΗΡ** *father*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*

The Concealed Father demonstration probably originated from Euboulídēs of Miletus, who was a pupil of the founder of the Megarian school, Euclid of Megara. The paradox remained popular among the Megarians, including Diódōros 'Krónos,' who made use of it as well.

The Megarian school in general subscribed to the Eleatic tradition of dialectic, and thus generally denied motion, change, plurality, and the value of sense evidence. Their riddles backed up the Eleatic thesis that there can be no true knowledge of the physical world.

Zeno of Citium was impressed with these riddles, and they eventually became associated with Stoicism as the Megarian school's popularity faded.

28.30 Practical Indication vs. False Equivocation

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 9 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup. – part 1)

[τοῦτ]ο γὰρ ού… |…τῆ[ι ἀγ]νώστει ἐξ [ἀρχῆς] αὐτοῦ ὁμ[ο]λογίαι ὅμως βλέπων ἐφ' ὧι ὡμολόγε[ι] τοῦτο γελᾶι ἐπ[ὶ] τῶ[ι] σοφίσματι ὡς ού συμπεριλαβὼν ἐν ἐκίνει τεῖ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἂν ἐφαρμοσθὲν ἔκ τινος ἐθισμοῦ λέξεως, ὥστε πίπτειν εἰς τὸ λέγειν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸν ‹ἐ›[πίσ]τασθαί τε | καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθα[ι], ούδ' ἀρνηθ[ῆναι] τοῦτο, [διὰ] τοῦ τρόπου ο[ὗ] ὁ σοφιστὴς προφέρει. διὸ καὶ π[άνυ] ἀντικειμένως ὁμολογήσας [τ]ις ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ [ο]ὐκ εὐλα[βού]μενος τοῦτο ὥσπερ τιν[ὲς] τῶν σοφιστῶν ούκ οἴετ[αι] πραγματικὸν ἔλεγχον λαμβάνειν.

τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ… …τῇ ἀγνώστει ἐξ ἀρχῆς ¬ αὐτοῦ ὁμολογίαι ὅμως βλέπων ἐφ' ᾧ ὡμολόγει: τοῦτο Γελᾷ ἐπὶ τῷ σοφίσματι ὡς οὐ συμπεριλαβὼν ἐν ἐκείνει τεῖ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἂν ἐφαρμοσθὲν ἔκ τινος ἐθισμοῦ λέξεως – ὥστε πίπτειν εἰς τὸ λέγειν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ Αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ¬ οὐδ' ἀρνηθῆναι τοῦτο, διὰ τοῦ τρόπου οὗ ὁ Σοφιστὴς προφέρει

for this [*will*] not… [*confound a son who waits to see the practical reality of the circumstance, even if*] …[*due*] to [*his*] ignorance at the beginning [*of the riddle's presentation* ¬ *the son*] nevertheless sees his own agreement in regards to what he had agreed to [*i.e., even though he does see his error in quickly agreeing that he did not know the covered man*]: He [*still*] laughs at this [*riddle*] in regards to [*its*] sophistry since he had not completely comprehended together in that response what also would have been adapted out of some convention of a term in this way *– so as to fall into saying that it is possible for the Same person to understand and also to not understand ¬ and to not deny that this [*paradox expresses a universal truth*], through the way in which a "Wise man" sets it forth

[Sedley] For this will not [*defeat anybody who… ..replies that the question is about actions and therefore cannot immediately be decided by mere empty words. By contrast, someone who is forced to contradict*] the assertion which he blindly made at the outset nevertheless laughs at the sophism when he sees the conditions under which he was making this assertion, and says that he did not include in his answer the example which could in this way be accommodated to it in consequence of a certain linguistic convention*– and that he is thus being tricked into asserting, instead of denying, that it is possible to know and not know the same thing, because of the way the sophist cites the riddle.

** i.e., the different ways that the words "knowing" and "understanding" are used. Although the son "does not know who" is under the blanket (in the sense that the identity of the man is a mystery) – the son "does know who" is under the blanket (in the sense that the son is aware of the identity of his father).*

διὸ, καὶ πάνυ ἀντικειμένως ὁμολογήσας Τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς – (καὶ οὐκ εὐλαβούμενος τοῦτο, ὥσπερ Τινὲς τῶν σοφιστῶν) – οὐκ οἴεται πραγματικὸν ἔλεγχον λαμβάνειν

therefore, even Someone who originally has agreed wholly in opposition [*that he* DID NOT *know the covered man*] – (and while he was not carefully comprehending this, as Some of the sophists do) – [*he still*] does not think [*that he is*] receiving a practical refutation [*when it is proven that he really* DID *know the covered man*]

[Sedley] So a man who at the start made quite the opposite assertion, and does not display the wariness on this score shown by certain of the sophists, does not consider the refutation which he undergoes to be one that concerns actions.

*[Sedley] The correct Epicurean retort to the sophist must be to say, "You have asked me a question about practical reality, and a purely verbal argument can never answer it satisfactorily. The only proof that I will accept is an empirical one (***ὁ ἐπιλογισμός***). Only when I see how one can lead one's life well according to the principle that it is possible to know and not know the same thing will I believe that the principle is true."*

In most circumstances IT IS IMPOSSIBLE *to know and not know the same thing, the sophist has merely played upon an exception to this rule.*

τὸ ἄγνωστον **τὰ ἄγνωστα**	unknown thing	**ΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΝ** *not knowing*
ἡ ἀγνώστεια **αἱ ἀγνώστειαι**	ignorance	**ΑΓΝΩΣΤΕΙΑ** *not knowing*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [here, "beginning"]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ἡ ὁμολογία **αἱ ὁμολογίαι**	agreement	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ**
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ὅμως	nevertheless	**ὉΜΩΣ**
βλέπειν	to see	**ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ** *looking*
γελᾶν	to laugh	**ΓΕΛΑΑΝ** *deriding*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*

τὸ σόφισμα τὰ σοφίσματα	sophistry i.e., what is considered wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑ** *considered to have knowledge*
συμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely comprehend together	**ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping around together*
ἐκίνος = **ἐκεῖνος** *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
ἀποκριθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	distinguished [already]	**ΑΠΟΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ** *dividing away from*
ἡ ἀπόκρισις **αἱ ἀποκρίσεις**	[chosen] response	**ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing away from*
ἐναρμόττων *(ουσα, ον)*	fitting into	**ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting into*
ἐφαρμοττών *(οῦσα, όν)*	fitting	**ΕΦΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting upon*
ἐφαρμόζειν	to fit	**ΕΦΑΡΜΟΖΕΙΝ** *adapting upon*
ἐφαρμοσθείς *(εῖσα, θέν)*	have been fit [here, "have been adapted"]	**ΕΦΑΡΜΟΣΘΕΙΣ** *adapting upon*
τὸ ἔθνος **τὰ ἔθνη**	ethnicity	**ΕΘΝΟΣ** *accustomed*
ὁ ἐθισμός **οἱ ἐθισμοί**	convention	**ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ** *result of being accustomed*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
πίπτειν	to fall	**ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	**ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing upon*
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	**ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *denying*
ἀρνηθῆναι	to deny [already]	**ΑΡΝΗΘΗΝΑΙ** *denying*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ σοφιστής **οἱ σοφισταί**	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ** *considered to have knowledge*
προφέρειν	to set forth	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
	Part 2	
πάνυ	wholly	**ΠΑΝΥ** *all*
ἀντικειμένως	in opposition	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΩΣ** *situated against*
ὁ ὁμολογήσας **οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες**	he who has agreed	**ῈΟΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ** *same reasoning*
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	**ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ** *in the first order*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
εὐλαβούμενος *(η, ον)*	carefully comprehending	**ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *properly grasped*
ὁ σοφιστής **οἱ σοφισταί**	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ** *considered to have knowledge*

πραγματικός (ή, όν)	practical	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of result of doing / affair*
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	**ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ** *confuting* *[with contrary proof]*
ἐλεγχόμενος (η, ον)	being refuted	**ΕΛΕΓΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ**
ὁ ἔλεγχος **οἱ ἔλεγχοι**	refutation	**ΕΛΕΓΧΟΣ**

28.31 Specific Objective Judgment

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup. – part 2)

καίτọ[ι] γε οὐκ ἐπελελόγιστο ὅτι πλὴν τῶν τοιούτων ὧν ὁ σοφιστὴς πṛοφέρει ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ ἀγν[οε]ῖṿ . ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν τι ἂν ἔδọξε πεπονθέναι τοῖς μὴ συλλογιζομένοις τὴν διαφορὰν ὥσπερ ἄν τις καὶ καθọ́λου τοῦ[τ]ọ ὡμολο[γηκέναι] τọ̀ [σό]φισμ[α] ἀ̣[ναγκ]ασ[θῆι]...

καίτοι γε, οὐκ Ἐπελελόγιστο ὅτι – πλὴν τῶν τοιούτων ὧν ὁ Σοφιστὴς προφέρει – ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ Ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ Ἀγνοεῖν

and yet indeed, [*the son*] had not inductively considered* that – besides such things as the Sophist sets forth – It is impossible to both Understand and Not know the same thing

[Sedley] His mistake is that he did not work out empirically* that apart from the sort of case cited by the sophist it is impossible to know and not know the same thing.

**The son may initially be fooled by the riddle while referencing logic or language – but he will not be fooled by the riddle while referencing his directly sensed experience of the entire event.*

ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν τι ἂν Ἔδοξε πεπονθέναι τοῖς μὴ συλλογιζομένοις τὴν διαφορὰν – ὥσπερ ἂν Τις καὶ (κ) καθόλου τοῦτο ὡμολογηκέναι τὸ σόφισμα Ἀναγκασθῇ...

but [*the son*] would seem to have experienced something similar to those who do not infer the difference* – just as if Someone were also Forced to have agreed (κ) universally to this sophistry

[Sedley] However, people not reasoning out the difference* might think that he has suffered a fate similar to that of someone who is forced to assert this sophism as being also universally true.

i.e., the difference between specific objective judgments vs. universal speculative judgments.

We have to be cautious about invalid generalizations – there may well be cases in which something is objectively true, but that does not make it universally true unless the speculative judgment is based on necessary qualities.

καίτοι	and indeed	**ΚΑΙΤΟΙ**
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	**ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *process of reasoning action upon*
πλὴν	besides	
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὁ σοφιστής **οἱ σοφισταί**	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ** *considered to have knowledge*
προφέρειν	to set forth	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	**ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *not powerful*

ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	**ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *standing upon*
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	**ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ** *not distinguishing*
	Part 2	
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
πάσχειν	to experience	**ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ** *enduring*
πεπονθέναι	to have experienced [already]	**ΠΕΠΟΝΘΕΝΑΙ** *endured*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
συλλογιζόμενος *(η, ον)*	inferring	
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
καθόλου	(κ) universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ὡμολογηκέναι	to have agreed [already]	
σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*
σοφιστεύων *(ουσα, ον)*	engaging in sophistry i.e., engaging in what is considered to be wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΩΝ** *considered to have knowledge*
ὁ σοφιστής **οἱ σοφισταί**	sophist i.e., a man considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ** *considered to have knowledge*
τὸ σόφισμα **τὰ σοφίσματα**	sophistry i.e., what is considered wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑ** *considered to have knowledge*
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ** *necessary*

28.32 Universal Speculative Judgment

Epicurus distinguishes between those who accept the paradox (that it is possible to both know and to not know the same thing) as valid in particular logical cases posed by the sophists, and those who accept it as universally true.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 10 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 11 sup. – part 1)

...καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἐκίνωι γε τῶι τρόπωι ὧι καθόλου ὁμολογεῖται, ούκ ἐπιβάλλοντος τοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐφ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶμ πραγμάτων, ούδ' ἐν τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ ἀρνηθέντος. ἔδοξεν οὖν ἂν δή φη|μι τῶι μὴ [σ]υνορῶντι τὴν διαφοραν τούτω[ν] ὅμοιόν τι ποιεῖν.

...καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ (κ) καθόλου Ὁμολογεῖται – οὐκ ἐπιβάλλοντος τοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐφ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πραγμάτων ¬ οὐδ' ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ ἐπὶ (κ) πάντων ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ ἀρνηθέντος

…[*nevertheless, a universally true speculative judgment is based*] in accordance with each one [*specific situation*], but in that way in which it is [κ] universally agreed*– while [*the son who*] agrees [*that the paradox is true*] does not objectively focus upon each one of the situations ¬ nor while having agreed or having denied what [*exists*] in regards [κ] all things [*universally*] in this way *

[Sedley] [*The difference which they do not see is that the man who expresses a universal opinion does so, possibly by empirical examination of*] individual cases, but at any rate in the manner of a universal assertion,* whereas our man who concedes the sophism does not empirically examine individual factual cases, and does not make any generally applicable affirmation or denial in the manner of a universal assertion.*

* *Of course, all* [ακ] *universally true* [Δ◌] *speculative judgments must necessarily be based upon the sense data from only* [-κ] *specific cases – observing every case is neither possible nor required to form true speculative judgments.* * *A universal* [Δ◌κ] *speculative judgment is only* [α] *true when based in* [M] *attested necessary qualities that are never* [W] *contested by contrary* [-κ] *specific evidence*

Ἔδοξεν οὖν ἄν, δή, Φημι – τῷ μὴ συνορῶντι τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων – ὅμοιόν τι ποιεῖν

therefore, I assert, It might seem – for the one who does not [*mentally*] see the difference between these – that [*the son*] does do something similar [*to really agreeing to a universal judgement in a practical way*]

[Sedley] So, I repeat, anyone blind to this difference might have supposed our man to be acting in a similar way.

i.e., For those that do not perceive the distinction, it may seem that by agreeing with the specific judgment that he both "does not know who" and "does know who" is under the blanket – he seems to also have agreed to the universal judgment "in general, what we know, we also do not know."

ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**ἝΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*
ἐκίνος = **ἐκεῖνος** *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
καθόλου	[κ] universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	**ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing upon*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὁ ὁμολογήσας **οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες**	he who has agreed	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ** *same reasoning*
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	**ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *denying*
ἀρνηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	having denied [already]	**ΑΡΝΗΘΕΙΣ** *denying*
	Part 2	
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*

φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
συνορῶν *(ῶσα)*	fully seeing [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ** *seen together*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to do"]	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*

28.33 Universal vs. Specific Facts

*A man who is persuaded that some proposition is universally true is bound to reflect this belief in his behaviour ("**μαρτυρεῖ, δ', Αὐτὸς αὐτῷ**, He attests for himself"). Yet, as we know from our own experience, people who agree with such paradoxical assertions are still unable to act as though the assertions are true. In this case, it is not possible to live for very long while suspending all judgment.*

It is no more likely that the man who is forced to concede that it is possible to know and not know the same thing will adjust his behaviour to fit this principle than, for instance, the man who cannot refute Zeno's or Diódōros Krónos' paradoxes of the impossibility of motion will stop moving. By not acting in accordance with the sophist's paradoxical assertions, the man shows that he does not really accept it as a universal truth.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 11 sup. – part 2)

ἀλλ' οὐ πο[ιεῖ], μα[ρτυ]ρεῖ δ' αὐτὸς αὑτῶι ὅ[ταν τ]ε καθόλου τι ὁμολ[ο]γήσει, [κἃ]μ μυριάκις μὴ παρ' ἕκαστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ἀρνηθείη ἐπινεύσει, καὶ ὅταμ μή. ἔνθα μὲγ γὰρ βαδίζει εὐθὺς εἰς πρᾶξιν τοιαύτην οἵαν εἰ καὶ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ὡμολογήκει τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἢ ἤρνητο, ἅμπερ εἶ πραγματικὴ ἡ δόξα, ἔνθα δ' οὐ βαδίζει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν, ἔνθα μέν τι ἀλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸν [ἐ]πιβλητικὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπιμ[αρ]τυρηθησο[μένου εὐθὺς ὡμολόγησε]...

ἀλλ' οὐ Ποιεῖ. μαρτυρεῖ, δ', Αὐτὸς αὐτῷ [1] ὅταν τε (κ) καθόλου τι ὁμολογήσει – (κἂν μυριάκις μὴ, παρ' [-κ] ἕκαστον [Δ•] ἐπιβλητικῶς, Ἀρνηθείη Ἐπινεύσει) – καὶ [2] ὅταν μή

however the [*son*] does not [*act in a way that shows that he believes the paradox is universally true*]. but, He attests for himself [*in his actions*] [1] whenever it happens that he will also agree to something (κ) universally – (even if innumerable times [*in his words*] He will consent [*that it is universally true*] so that He does not have to deny [*this incorrect judgment*] in [Δ•] an objectively focusing way for [-κ] each single [*practically observable example*]) – and [*He attests for himself in his actions*] [2] whenever [*he will*] not [*agree to something as universally true*]

[Sedley] But this is not how he acts; and he bears witness for himself (1) whenever he makes a universal assertion (even if he should make ten thousand statements of its truth for fear that by empirical examination of an individual case he might admit its falsity) and (2) when he does not.

The parenthetical statement above suggests that Epicurus distrusts generalizations and sees them as a means of shutting one's eyes to factual evidence.

*When someone makes a universal (**καθόλου**) assertion which he believes to be true about something, he will proceed to think just as if he had also empirically asserted (or denied) in EACH SINGLE CASE (**καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον**), that each case is LIKE THAT (**τοιόνδε**) OBJECT OR CIRCUMSTANCE which he based his universal assertion upon.*

*Consider "practical syllogism" of Aristotle which tries to show the exact logical sequence between the acceptance of a universal (**καθόλου**) principle and acting in accordance with it. Aristotle does demand the recognition of a minor premise – the principle's applicability in a particular instance (**καθ' ἕκαστονκαθ' ἕκαστον**) – before an action can follow.*

Epicurus sees this process as more immediate: for all practical purposes a universal opinion is one that can affect our behaviour at any time. If someone expresses such an opinion such as "all actions are causally necessitated," or "all perception is illusory" – but does not act in every instance as if it were true – then it cannot be said to be a universal opinion, since there is at least one situation in which he manifestly does not believe that it applies.

[κ] ἔνθα μὲν, γὰρ Βαδίζει εὐθὺς εἰς πρᾶξιν τοιαύτην οἵαν εἰ καὶ καθ' [-κ] ἓν ἕκαστον [Δ•] ἐπιβλητικῶς Ὡμολογήκει τοιόνδε τι εἶναι, ἢ Ἤρνητο – ἅμπερ εἶ πραγματικὴ ἡ Δόξα ¬ [-κ] ἔνθα δ' οὐ Βαδίζει

[κ] in the first case [*where he asserts that something is universally true or false*], He proceeds directly into an activity like this such as if He had [*already*] agreed in [Δ•] an objectively focusing way that something exists according to [-κ] each single [*case*] like this [*case in front of him*], or [*as if*] He had denied [*it*]– if indeed the Judgment is practical ¬ [-κ] but in the second case [*where he does not assert that something is universally true or false*], He does not proceed [*to take action as though he understood the nature of every case*]*

[Sedley] For in case (1) he embarks immediately upon an action such as if he had also accepted empirically that in a particular instance something was or was not of a certain kind; whereas in case (2) he does not. This is if the opinion is of the kind that concerns actions.

(For case 1) If a man recognizes the major premise of a practical syllogism (for example, 'it is good to pursue pleasure'), he will immediately act as if he also recognized the minor premise (for example, 'resting after working will bring me pleasure') – and so, he rests after working, without needing to always think out the full syllogism logically. In this way, a change in reasoning about values and facts often leads to a change in behavior.

ὡσαύτως δὲ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν [Δ○] θεωρητικῶν, [κ] ἔνθα μέν, τι ἀλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸν [Δ•] ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον τοῦ [◇M] ἐπιμαρτυρηθησομένου εὐθὺς Ὡμολόγησε…

but likewise, [κ] in the first case [*where he asserts that something is universally true or false*] in accordance with [Δ○] speculative [*judgment*], He simply IMMEDIATELY agreed to something in a foreign way according to an [Δ•] objective way of [*of judging*] [◇M] what is TO BE attested

⁂ [Sedley] But so too in the theoretical field, in case (1) he at once goes outside his subject and asserts in empirical terms the [truth of some opinion] which awaits positive confirmation [Sedley takes **τι** with **τοῦ ἐπιμαρτυρηθησομένου**]

[Δ○] Speculative judgment can only correctly be used to form (κ) universally true judgments when it is based upon [θ] empirical observation of necessary characteristics. Forming a [Δ○] speculative judgment and then ignoring [θ] contrary evidence is obviously a use of speculation that is incompatible with forming true judgments about the real world.

ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to do"]	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying upon*
καθόλου	(κ) universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*
μυριάκις	innumerable times	**ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ** *ants*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*

ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *denying*
ἑρμηνεύειν	to interpret	῾ΕΡΜΗΝΕΥΕΙΝ *Hermes nod, interpreting sign*
ἐπινεύειν	to consent	ΕΠΙΝΕΥΕΙΝ *nod towards*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	῾ΟΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *same reasoning*
	Part 2	
ἔνθα μὲν… ἔνθα δὲ	in the first case… in the other case…	
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ *walking*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
ἡ πρᾶξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ *action*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	῾ΟΙΟΣ *of this sort*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	῾ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ *each*
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	῾ΟΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ *same reasoning*
τοιόσδὶ = τοιόσδε *(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)*	like this here (such a kind as this)	ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ *of this sort here*
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ *denying*
ἤρνητο	he had denied [already]	
ἄμπερ = ἄνπερ	if indeed	ΑΝΠΕΡ *"if" indeed*
πραγματικός *(ή, όν)*	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of result of doing / affair*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
	Part 3	
ὡσαύτως	likewise	῾ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ *as self*
θεωρητικός *(ή, όν)*	speculative	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of observing*
ἀλλοτρίως	in a foreign way	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ *different other*
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing upon*
ἐπιβλητικός *(ή, όν)*	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of being thrown upon*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying upon*
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρηθησόμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρηθησόμενα	[◇M] what is to be attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ *will be testified upon*

ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	**ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ** *same reasoning*

To underline the difference between being forced to concede to the specific paradoxes of the sophists vs. incorrectly accepting that these riddles betray the universal truth that knowledge is not possible, Epicurus now proceeds to describe the behavior which typically accompanies universal assertions, but which is absent when the assertion is not universal. In doing so, he reverts to the division which he has laid down above for the manifestations of true and false opinions:

(1) if it is [Δ•] an objective judgment, it will DIRECTLY lead to some practical consequences.

(2) if it is [Δ:] a speculative judgment, it will either lead to some statement about the perceptible world, or it will INDIRECTLY lead to some practical consequences. (For example, one believing in an incorrect theory of soul – which taught that the soul was never liable to disintegrate – might be expected to worry about their afterlife; but knowledge of the true nature of the soul will allow one to eliminate this worry and to enjoy life.)

28.34 Invalid Generalizations

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col 11 inf.)
| 1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 1)

...το[ῖς κ]αθ[ό]λου ἀκολο[υθο]μ [βο]υλόμενός τι ποιεῖν, καὶ ἧι ἄμ ποτε πρᾶξίς τις αὐτῶι συνάπτηται, διήμαρτεν, ἔνθα δ' ούδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐποίησεν. οἷς δὴ δεῖ σημίοις χρώμενον συνορᾶν τὴν διαφοράν. κἂν τοῦτο πράττωμεν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν | λόγων, ού δυσωπηθησόμεθα τὸ [μ]έρος ὃ προ[ε]ίρηκα.

...(κ) καθόλου ἀκολουθον Βουλόμενος τι ποιεῖν, καὶ ᾗ ἂν ποτε Πρᾶξίς τις αὐτῷ συνάπτηται – Διήμαρτεν. (-κ) ἔνθα δ' οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον Ἐποίησεν

...[*he agreed to a fact that is not empirically supported*] because He wanted to make some [*judgment*] that follows (κ) universally, and insofar as a certain Activity might be connected to him – He thoroughly made a mistake. (-κ) in the second case [*where he does not agree to a universal fact*], He did nothing like this [*i.e., making a mistake in his actions based on his mistaken generalization*]

[Sedley] [*he asserts in empirical terms the truth of some opinion which awaits positive confirmation and which in fact turns out to be false*] through a desire to do something in accordance with his generalization, and wherever some action linked with the assertion occurs, he acts wrongly; whereas in case (2) he does nothing of this kind.

οἷς δὴ Δεῖ σημίοις χρώμενον, συνορᾶν τὴν διαφοράν. κἂν τοῦτο Πράττωμεν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν λόγων ¬ οὐ Δυσωπηθησόμεθα τὸ μέρος ὃ Προείρηκα

therefore It is necessary, while using these signs [*of objective qualities and practical consequences*], to fully [*mentally*] see the difference [*between a universal judgment and a specific judgment*]. and if We accomplish this [*awareness of the difference*] in regard to all reasonings ¬ We will not be troubled by the part [*of epistemology*] which I have spoken about [*i.e., using only necessary qualities as the basis for universal judgments*]

[Sedley] These are the indications which you must heed in order to see the difference. And if we follow the same procedure in examining all utterances, we shall have no cause for shame with regard to the field of study of which I have spoken.

καθόλου	(κ) universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following*

ἀκόλουθος (ον)	follows	
βουλόμενος (η, ον)	wanting	ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ *council*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ᾗ	insofar as	ἩΙ *in/for which*
ἡ πρᾶξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ *action*
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening together*
διαμαρτάνειν	to thoroughly make a mistake	ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark through*
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
	Part 2	
τὸ σημίον = τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ *state of indication*
χρώμενος (η, ον)	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ *necessary*
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ *looking together*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ *carrying apart*
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ *doing / affair*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ἡ ὤψ	face	ὤψ *face*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
δυσωπεῖν	to trouble	ΔΥΣΩΠΕΙΝ *difficult face*
δυσωπηθήσεσθαι	to be going to be troubled by	ΔΥΣΩΠΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ *difficult face*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
προλέγειν	to say before	ΠΡΟΛΕΓΕΙΝ *speaking before*
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	ΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ *having said*
προειρηκέναι	to have said before [in the past]	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ *having said before*

28.35 Effective Use of the Canon

By carefully using sensation as a measure of truth for both objective and speculative judgments, and by keeping in mind the difference between universal and specific judgements, we can act on our true understanding of the world in a way that is advantageous to our wellbeing.

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, 1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 2)

κ[αὶ] ἧι δ' [ἂν] οὕτω [ἧι τ]ọ̀ ἡμαρτημένον, [τὰ γιγνόμενα δεῖ σ]υναισθάνεσθαι κ[άκ] πṛρ[ώ]του, ὥσπερ εἴ τινα εἰς ἐṇ[ά]ṛγειαν αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν, ἧ[ι] κạὶ εὐθὺς μὴ ἀθρόαι τις διισχυρίσει ἐπ' αὐτὸ πορεύη[τ]αι, ἀλλ' εὐλạβούμ[ε]νος, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμπẹριλαμβạ́νọν [τὰ] καθόλου δὲ μὴ δοξ[ά]ζωṿ οὕτω, ἀλλά τιν' ἔχωμ [πα]ρ' ẹ̓[α]ụτῶι κανόνα ἐξ οὗ, μέχρ[ι τ]ῆς οἱονὶ ἐνεργηṭικῆς ἰδέας ἢ ἀναλόγου ταύτηι κειμένης, οὐ βαδιεῖ[τ]αι ἐπὶ τῶμ ψευδῶν. κἂν οὕτως οὖν δḥ́, φηṃι ἧι τι διημαρτημένον, δεῖ συνορᾶν...

καὶ ἧ δ' ἂν οὕτω ἧ [∇] τὸ Ἡμαρτημένον: τὰ γιγνόμενα Δεῖ συναισθάνεσθαι, κάκ πρώτου – ὥσπερ εἴ Τινα εἰς ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν. ἧ καὶ εὐθὺς (-κ) μὴ ἀθρόαι Τις διισχυρίσει, ἐπ' αὐτὸ Πορεύηται

but even insofar as [∇] What is mistaken may exist in this way [*without making the distinction between universal and specific*]: It is necessary to fully perceive what [*practical consequences*] occur, even from the start – just as if Some [*of those consequences*] were to come into his detectible reality. and insofar as Someone will directly thoroughly confirm (-κ) NOT in an aggregated [*way, i.e., NOT relating to a universal generalization*], He could proceed toward that [*action based on that specific judgment without making the errors that are involved in a universal judgment*]

but even insofar as [∇] What is mistaken may exist in this way: It is necessary to fully perceive what occurs, even from the start – just as if Some were to come into his detectible reality. and insofar as Someone will directly thoroughly confirm (-κ) NOT in an aggregated [*way*], He could proceed towards it

[Sedley] so too wherever there is error of this kind, it is necessary right from the start to observe events, as if to come to some sort of clear picture of it, so that a person can immediately approach it not with a generalization

ἀλλ' εὐλαβούμενος καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην [-α] τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμπεριλαμβάνων ¬ [κ] τὰ καθόλου δὲ μὴ {Δ} δοξάζων οὕτω ¬ ἀλλά τιν' ἔχων, παρ' ἑαυτῷ, κανόνα ἐξ οὗ – (μέχρι τῆς οἱονὶ ἐνεργητικῆς ἰδέας ἢ ἀναλόγου ταύτῃ κειμένης) – οὐ Βαδιεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν ψευδῶν

but [*he could form a true judgment about something specific, while*] carefully comprehending one [*idea*] after another [*idea*] as [-α] what is false ¬ yet not {Δ} judging [*and accepting each true idea as being*] [κ] what is universal in the way [*described above*] ¬ but having, beside oneself, a certain Standard [*i.e., a canon*] with which – (up to a kind of activating idea or [*up to*] what is placed as analogous to [*an idea that effects actions*]) – He will not proceed toward falsities

[Sedley] but with caution – encompassing the falsehood this way and that, and not forming a universal opinion in the manner which I have described, but keeping at his side a yardstick with the help of which, until he forms the so-to-speak activating notion, or one of similar stamp, he will not proceed in the direction of falsehood.

κἂν οὕτως, οὖν δή, Φημι ἧ τι διημαρτημένον, Δεῖ συνορᾶν...

and in this way, therefore, I say that insofar as something [*is*] thoroughly mistaken, It is necessary to see...

[Sedley] and so I say that if there is some error of this kind we must see...

*The activating idea (**ἐνεργητικὴ ἰδέα**) is the correct end-product of a chain of philosophical reasoning: a thought that results in action. Elsewhere Epicurus regards the entire study of philosophy as being an activity (**ἐνέργημα**) resembling the practical application of a skill. In the letter to Herodotus, he recommends "continuous activity in physics (**τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ**)."*

Consider also Demetrius Laco:

Let us persist in activity in accordance with philosophy – and especially in [mental] observation in accordance with physics

Συνεχίζωμέν τε ἐν τῷ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐνεργήματι – καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς κατὰ φυσιολογίαν θεωρήμασιν *(The Harms of Drifting Thought, P.Herc. 831, col. 8)*

ἧ	insofar as	ἩΙ *in/for which*

ἧ…	insofar as… so that…	ἩΙ *in/for which*
ἦ	It may be	ΗΙ
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ *roaming*
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark*
ἡ ἁμαρτία αἱ ἁμαρτίαι	mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΙΑ *missing the mark*
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	[∇] what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ *result of fully missing the mark*
τὸ ἡμαρτημένον τὰ ἡμαρτημένα	[∇] what is mistaken	ΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ *missing the mark*
τὸ γιγνόμενον τὰ γιγνόμενα	what happens	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *birthing*
ἐπαισθανόμενος *(η, ον)*	sensing	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *result of perceiving upon*
συναισθάνεσθαι	to fully perceive	ΣΥΝΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ *perceiving together*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	[E] detectible fact	
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ *within clear*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ *in groups*
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ *strength*
διισχυρίζεσθαι	to thoroughly confirm	ΔΙΙΣΧΥΡΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *strength through*
πορεύεσθαι	to proceed	ΠΟΡΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ *traveling*
	Part 2	
εὐλαβεῖσθαι	to carefully comprehend	ΕΥΛΑΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ *properly grasped*
εὐλαβούμενος *(η, ον)*	carefully comprehending	ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *properly grasped*
τὸ ψεῦδος τὰ ψεύδη	[-α] what is false	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ *falsehood / lie*
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	⁂ to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping around in*
ἐμπεριειλημμένος *(η, ον)*	⁂ completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ *being grasped around in*
τὸ καθόλου τὰ καθόλου	[κ] what is universal	ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ *completely*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
ὁ κανών οἱ κανόνες	standard	ΚΑΝΩΝ *measuring stick (ruler)*
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ *until*
οἱονὶ	of what sort [here, "a kind of"]	ΟΙΟΣ + ΝΙ *such as*
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	an activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ *result of working within*

ἐνεργητικός (ή, όν)	activating	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of working within*
ἡ ἰδέα **αἱ ἰδέαι**	idea	**ΙΔΕΑ** *appearing*
οἱονὶ ἐνεργητικὴ ἰδέα	a kind of activating idea	
ἀναλόγως	analogously	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ** *reasoning again*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
ἀναλόγος (ον)	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning back/again*
ἀντικείμενος (η, ον)	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
ἐκκείμενος (η, ον)	set forth	**ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated out*
συνκείμενος	composed together	**ΣΥΝΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated together*
κείμενος (η, ον)	being placed	**ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated*
βαδίζειν	proceed	**ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *walking*
	Part 3	
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
ᾖ	It may be	
τὸ διημαρτημένον **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	what is thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *missing the mark through*
διημαρτημένος (η, ον)	thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ**
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ** *looking together*

28.36 Actively Exposing Errors

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 12 inf.)

...ἦι δ' ἐτὶ τοιοῦ[το ἡμ]ῖν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀκνήσ[ω σ]οί τε κα[ὶ] τοῖσδε πολλάκις προφέρειν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δέ, τὰ μὴ ἦι τοιαῦτα, δόξαντα δ' ἂν διημαρτῆ[σθ]αι. ἀλλ' οὐ βούλομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προφέρεσθαι αὐτά, μὴ ἀρχὴμ ποιησώμεθα μῆκος ἐχόντων ἱκανὸν λόγων.

...ᾖ δ' ἐτὶ τοιοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστίν, οὐκ Ὀκνήσω σοί τε καὶ τοῖσδε πολλάκις προφέρειν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ¬ δέ τὰ μὴ ᾖ τοιαῦτα, δόξαντα δ' ἂν διημαρτῆσθαι

...but insofar as [*incorrect judgments*] like this [*from the lack of distinction between universal and specific*] exist for us, I will not hesitate to often set forth to you and also to these [*students*] the remaining [*sources of those errors*] – but also [*I will not hesitate*] insofar as the [*remaining sources of errors are*] NOT like those, but still would seem to have been thoroughly mistaken

[Sedley] Nor shall I hesitate to cite repeatedly, to you and to these others, cases where there is still error of this kind among us; and so too all other cases, which are not of this kind, but which we would nevertheless consider to involve error.

ἀλλ' οὐ Βούλομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προφέρεσθαι αὐτά: μὴ ἀρχὴν Ποιησώμεθα μῆκος ἐχόντων ἱκανὸν λόγων

but I do not want to bring them forward at present: so that We do not make a [*new*] foundation of this reasoning [*which already*] has sufficient length

[Sedley] For the present, however, I do not wish to cite them, to avoid making a new start in a discussion which has already reached sufficient length.

ᾗ	insofar as	**ἩΙ** *in/for which*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	**ΟΚΝΕΙΝ** *hesitating*
πολλάκις	often	**ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ** *many times*
προφέρειν	to set forth	**ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing forward*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
δόξας *(ασα, αν)*	seems	**ΔΟΞΑΣ** *seeming*
τὸ διημαρτημένον **τὰ διημαρτημένα**	what is thoroughly mistaken	**ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ** *fully missing the mark*
διημαρτάνεσθαι	to thoroughly mistake	
διημαρτῆσθαι	to thoroughly mistake [already]	
	Part 2	
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *wishing*
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	**ΠΑΡΩΝ** *to be beside*
προσφέρεσθαι	to bring forward [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing as well*
ἡ ἀρχή **αἱ ἀρχαί**	foundation [in time]	**ΑΡΧΗ** *first order*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
τό μῆκος **τὰ μήκη**	length	**ΜΗΚΟΣ** *length*
ἱκανός *(ή, όν)*	sufficient	**ἹΚΑΝΟΣ** *fitting / proper*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*

28.37 Let This Writing Continue Speaking

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 13 sup. – part 1)

[ἱκ]ανῶ[ς] οὖν ἡμῖν ἠδολεσχήσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ὑμεῖς [μ]υ[ρι]άκι[ς μνημο]νẹύε[ι]μ π̣[ειρᾶ]σθε τὰ ἐμοί τẹ καὶ Μητρ[ο]δώρωι τῶιδε ν[εωστὶ εἰ]ρημένα. οἶμαι δ' ὑμῖν ὄ[γδο]ον καὶ ẹἰκοστὸν εἶδος ἀκ[ρο]άσεως τῆ[ς] ἐξῆς περαιν[ο]μένης τουτὶ ν[ῦ]ν ἠδολε[σ]χῆσθαι

ἱκανῶς οὖν ἡμῖν Ἠδολεσχήσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ Ὑμεῖς: μυριάκις μνημονεύειν Πειρᾶσθε τὰ ἐμοί τε καὶ Μητροδώρῳ τῷδε νεωστὶ εἰρημένα

therefore, Let [*this writing*] sufficiently prattle on for us at present. and [*all*] You [*readers*]: Attempt innumerable times to remember what has been said just now by me and also by Metrodorus here

[Sedley] So let the words which we have prattled suffice for the present. And you others, try ten thousand times over to commit to memory what I and Metrodorus here have just said.

Οἶμαι δ' ὑμῖν, ὄγδοον καὶ εἰκοστὸν Εἶδος ἀκροάσεως, τῆς ἑξῆς περαινομένης, τουτὶ νῦν ἠδολεσχῆσθαι

but I believe that for you all, this eighth-and-twentieth Volume of our instruction, [which is] being accomplished in succession, even now has prattled on

[Sedley] And now I think I have finished prattling to you this twenty-eighth instalment of our consecutive lecture series.

ἱκανῶς	sufficiently	ἹΚΑΝΩΣ *fitting / proper*
ἀδολεσχεῖν	to prattle	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΕΙΝ *chattering*
ἀδολεσχήσασθαι	to have prattled on [for oneself]	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ *chattering*
ἠδολεσχήσθω	Let X prattle on for Xself	ΗΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΘΩ
παρών *(παρουσα, παρόν)*	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ *to be beside*
μυριάκις	innumerable times	ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ *ants*
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ *"addition to" thinking*
πειρᾶσθαι	to attempt	ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ *trail / attempt*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ *gift [to] mother*
νεωστὶ	just now	ΝΕΩΣΤΙ *new*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ *spoke*
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ *spoke*
τὸ εἰρημένον τὰ εἰρημένα	what has been said	ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΝ
	Part 2	
οἴεσθαι	to believe	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ *perceive*
ὄγδοος *(η, ον)*	eighth	ΟΓΔΟΟΣ *eight*
εἰκοστός *(ή, όν)*	twentieth	ΕΙΚΟΣΤΟΣ *twenty*
ἡ εἰκάς αἱ εἰκάδες	20th day of the month	ΕΙΚΑΣ *twenty*
τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον τὰ εἰκοσάεδρα	icosahedron *(20 faced polyhedron)*	ΕΙΚΟΣΑΕΔΡΟΝ *twenty-face*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form [here, "volume"]	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	the highest point	ΑΚΡΟΝ *highest*
ἡ ἀκρόασις αἱ ἀκροάσεις	instruction	ΑΚΡΟΑΣΙΣ *highest*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*
τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ *seeming*
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ *possessing*
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ *extremity*
περαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	being accomplished	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *extremity*
ἀδολεσχήσασθαι	to have prattled on [for oneself]	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ *always chattering*
ἠδολεσχῆσθαι	to have been prattling on [for oneself]	ΗΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΘΑΙ

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (13 sup. – part 2)
| P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 13 inf.)

Ἐπ[ικ]ούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΚΗ' [ἐκ] τῶν ἀρχαίων... ἐγ[ρ]άφη ἐπὶ Νικίου τοῦ μ[ετ]ὰ Ἀν[τι]φάτην

Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΚΗ', ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων... ...Ἐγράφη ἐπὶ Νικίου, τοῦ μετὰ Ἀντιφάτην

Epicurus' *On Nature Book 28*, from the early writings... ...[*This was*] written in [*the period*] of Nicias, who followed Antiphátēs

[Sedley] Epicurus On Nature Book XXVIII From the old exemplars written in the archonship of Nicias the successor of Antiphátēs.

In 297 BCE, Demetrius Poliorcetes learned the wealthy Athenian Lacháres was working (with Cassander's support) to undermine the democracy that Demetrius had allowed the Athenians to reestablish after his conquest, back in 307, of the regime (which was also supported by Cassander) that had been controlling Athens.

Demetrius responded with a fraught but ultimately successful operation against Cassander's forces that were holding Athens. It was at this time that "the philosopher Epicurus sustained the lives of his associates with beans, which he counted out and distributed among them" (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 34)

Nicias was eponymous archon in 296/295 BCE, following Antiphátēs who was eponymous archon in 297/296. Therefore, book 28 was probably written in 296, when Epicurus was 45 years old.

[Book 29]

[Book 30]

[Book 31]

Book 32

32.1 Detectible Reality of the Gods

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911

...πᾶν γὰ[ρ]... ...οἴεται καθάπ[ερ ὀρί]ζεται χρό[νος, εἶναι] πρόληψιν· [καὶ κα]θάπερ κἀν [τῶι δευ]τέρωι καὶ [τριακοσ]τῶι, καὶ τῶν [θεῶν ἐ]ναργείαι φησ[ὶν κατα]λαμβάνεσθα[ι τὸ ὄν], καίπερ ἓν τῶν [ἐν ὑπο]κειμένοις ὄν, [τὴν δὲ] φύσιν διανο[ητὴν] [ἧ]ττον ἔχον [τῶν] ἄλλων ὄντων [καὶ καθόλ]ου πρὸς τὴ[ν]...

...πᾶν γὰρ... ...οἴεται, καθάπερ ὁρίζεται Χρόνος εἶναι πρόληψιν: καὶ καθάπερ κἀν τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ, καὶ τῶν θεῶν Ἐναργείαι, Φησὶν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ὄν – καίπερ ἓν τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄν ¬ τὴν δὲ φύσιν διανοητὴν ἧττον ἔχον τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων. καὶ (κ) καθόλου, πρὸς τὴν...

...for all [*the infinite universe*]... ...is thought of, just as Time is distinguished to exist as an anticipation: and just as in the Second-and-Thirtieth [*book 32 On Nature*, *Epicurus*] says, the detectible Realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing – even though existing as a single [*object of thought*] among those [*other objects of thought*] in the original sources [*of the films from their bodies*] ¬ nevertheless [*these detectable realities of the gods*] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things. and (κ) universally, in relation to the...

[Obbink] ...For all [*infinity*] is thought of, just as time is defined, as being a naturally formed generic conception; and just as also in book 32 he says that because the existence of the gods is apprehended with clarity [*i.e., vivid knowledge*], although as a unified entity among underlying existents, and their nature is less able to be perceived by thought than other existents [*lit. having its nature less conceivable than the other entia*], and generally towards...

> [Obbink] *The fact that the gods exist as conceptualized by humans is illustrated by comparison to the ontological status of time.*
>
> *Time, according to Epicurus, is not even an entity per se (but rather an accident or attribute of other entities). Time is an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects – yet is not in consequence any less real.*

ὁρίζειν	to set a limit [here, "to distinguish"]	**ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ἡ πρόληψις **αἱ προλήψεις**	[•Λ] anticipation	**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold before*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[Ε] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	**ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *thoroughly grasping*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of situated under*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
διανοητὸς (ή, όν)	[mentally] perceptible	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ** *saw through*
καθόλου	(Κ) universally	**ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ** *completely*

32.2 Polyaenus' *On Limits*

Auctor ignotus [Philodemus?], Opus ignotum, P.Herc. 998, fragment 11, 12, & 16

...τικόν. Σύντομον δέ τινα καὶ κεφαλαιώδ[η] καὶ ἐπιτομικὸν τῶν διὰ πλε[ι]όνων τε θεωρημένων ὅρον τινὰ προφέρεται ἐν τῶι Β καὶ Λ. Ῥηθείηι γὰρ ἄν, φ[η]σίν, ψυχὴ φύσις τις εἶναι ταῖς υματι... | ...λόγον οὔτε τῶν λ τω[ν ἀ]ποδιδόνα[ι]... ...ναδιλωνωσις εν... ...τῆι Α καὶ... ...καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι δ' ἐν τῶι περὶ ὅρων τόνδε συν... | ...[α]ὐτὸς οὗτος [δ'] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδήλου διεξιὼν, ὄντως νομίσα[ς] τὸν ακούσ[ας]. . . δῆτα τοιαῦτ[α] προπνω... ...τὸ ἄδηλο[ν]...

*Addidi [ας]

...σύντομον δέ τινα καὶ κεφαλαιώδη καὶ ἐπιτομικὸν τῶν διὰ πλειόνων τε θεωρημένων ὅρον τινὰ Προφέρεται ἐν τῶι Β καὶ Λ – Ῥηθείηι γὰρ ἂν, Φησίν, Ψυχὴ Φύσις τις εἶναι ταῖς...

but [*Epicurus*], in the 2nd and 30th [*i.e., book 32 On Nature*], puts forth a brief, principal, and epitomized certain limit of mental observations for many things – for, He says, It might be said that the Soul exists as some Nature in relation to the...

...λόγον οὔτε τῶν... ...ἀποδιδόναι... ...τῆι Α καὶ... ...καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι δ' ἐν τῶι Περὶ Ὅρων, τόνδε...

...to give a reasoning nor of the... ...to render... ...in [*book*] 1 and... ...and also in Polyaenus, in his book *On Limits*, this very [*example is discussed*]...

...Αὐτὸς οὗτος δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδήλου διεξιών, ὄντως νομίσας τὸν ακουσας δῆτα τοιαῦτα... ...τὸ ἄδηλον...

...but He himself, while going through what is unclear, truly having thought the one who certainly heard such things... ...what is unclear...

Compare with "Although Epicurus used examples (αἱ ὑπογραφαί) all the time – he shows that limits (οἱ ὅροι) are more valuable, because he used limits instead of examples in his work of his natural philosophy lecture" (U92)

τὸ θεώρημα **τὰ θεωρήματα**	*[a mental]* observation	**ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ** *result of envisioning*
ὁ ὅρος **οἱ ὅροι**	limit	**ὍΡΟΣ** *outline, definition*
τὸ ἄδηλον **τὰ ἄδηλα**	[0] what is unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΝ** *not clear*

[Book 33]

Book 34

Book 34 examines the origin and nature of images from objects that are only subtly perceived.

34.1 Limit of Instruction & Limit of Doubt

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 3 (1)

...ἀγωγῆς [πα]ρạλαβẹ[ῖ]ṿ, ἀḷλ' [ὄ]ψιν μὴ π̣[εῖ]σ̣αι ούδ' [ἐ]τọιμοτ[ά]τοις, πᾶ[ν] άπολειπ̣[ό]μ̣[ενο]ν πρὸς ὑπολ̣[ή]ψει ούθὲν ἄ[ν] π̣οιή[σ]αι φοβερόν, ά[λ]λὰ... ...δ̣ιανο[ία]ς...

...ἀγωγῆς παραλαβεῖν ¬ ἀλλ' ὄψιν μὴ πεῖσαι – οὐδ' ἑτοιμοτάτοις. Πᾶν ἀπολειπόμενον πρὸς ὑπολήψει οὐθὲν ἂν ποιήσαι φοβερόν, ἀλλὰ... ...διανοίας...

> ...to comprehend the guidance from another ¬ but not to persuade [another's] vision – not even for those most prepared. Everything being left behind for supposition would make nothing fearful, but... ...of [mental] perception...

"Everything being left behind for supposition would make nothing fearful" is probably an allusion to the fact that (although many things are pending definitive specific judgment) the most critical issues ARE *settled by our definitive universally true judgments – which is a sufficient basis to live without fear.*

ἡ ἀγωγή **αἱ ἀγωγαί**	guidance	**ΑΓΩΓΗ** *going*
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	**ΛΑΒΕΙΝ** *grasped*
παραλαβεῖν	⁂ to comprehend *[gen.]* from another	**ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ**
ἡ ὄψις **αἱ ὄψεις**	vision	**ΟΨΙΣ** *eye*
πείθειν	to persuade	**ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ** *convincing*
ἕτοιμος *(η, ον)*	prepared	**ἙΤΟΙΜΟΣ** *ready*
ἑτοιμότατος *(η, ον)*	most prepared	**ἑτοιμότατος** *most ready*
λείπειν	to leave	**ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving*
ἀπολείπειν	to leave out	**ΑΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving away/out*
ἀπολειπόμενος *(η, ον)*	being left behind	
ἡ ὑπόληψις **αἱ ὑπολήψεις**	supposition	**ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ** *taking hold under*

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
φοβερός *(ά, όν)*	fearful	ΦΟΒΕΡΟΣ *tendency toward fleeing*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*

34.2 Shifting Forms

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 2 (column 5)

...ὑποψίας τοῦ εἴδο[υς] ἔχουσαν, καὶ γ[ὰρ αὐ]τὸ τοῦτο πάλ[ιν δὲ] μετέπ[εσ]εν ἐπὶ β[ρα]χύ τι...

...ὑποψίας τοῦ εἴδους ἔχουσαν – καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ Τοῦτο, πάλιν δὲ, μετέπεσεν ἐπὶ βραχύ τι...

...having a suspicion of its form – for even This very thing, again, shifted for a short bit...

ἡ ὑποψία αἱ ὑποψίαι	suspicion	ὙΠΟΨΙΑ *looking under*
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἴδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ *appearing*
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling*
μεταπίπτειν	to shift	ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling differently*
βραχύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ *brief*

34.3 Developing Fearlessness

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 8 (3)

...λάχθαι φό[β]ων οὐδέπ[ο]τ' ὡς νομίζων, οὐδ' ὡς κατανεν[ο]ηκὼς ὅτι ταυτὶ μὲν δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν ἄφοβον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄττα π[οι]ῶν, [ο]ὗτος εὐφραινόμ[ενος] ἄλλο οὔτ' ἔχων ὄ[χλη]μα οὔτ' ἐπ[ιθυμίαν]...

...φόβων, οὐδέποτ' ὡς νομίζων, οὐδ' ὡς κατανενοηκὼς ὅτι: ταυτὶ μὲν Δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν ἄφοβον Ἐσόμενον, καὶ – Ὁ μὲν ἄττα ποιῶν – Οὗτος, εὐφραινόμενος, ἄλλο οὔτ' ἔχων ὄχλημα οὔτ' ἐπιθυμίαν...

...[*in terms*] of fears, never as if thinking, nor as if having fully conceived that: It is necessary for the One who is to be unafraid to do these very things, and – the One doing some [*of these things*] – this One, while making himself glad, has neither another disturbance nor desire...

> *"These very things" seems to be a reference to distinguishing what needs to be determined with certainty for a pleasurable life.*

λαγχάνειν	to obtain (by lot)	ΛΑΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ *obtaining by lot*
λάχθαι	to have obtained (by lot)	ΛΑΧΘΑΙ *obtaining by lot*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ *not even at some point*
νομίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	thinking	ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ *custom*

ἐπινενοηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having objectively conceived	**ΕΠΙΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ** *saw upon*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*
κατανενοηκώς	having fully conceived	**ΚΑΤΑΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ** *thoroughly saw*
ἄφοβος *(ος, ον)*	not dreadful	**ΑΦΟΒΟΣ** *not fleeing [in fear]*
ἐσόμενος *(η, ον)*	[about] to be	**ΕΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *will be*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἄττα	some	**ΑΤΤΑ** *is an alternative form of* **ΤΙΝΑ**
τινά	certain	
εὐφραίνειν	to become glad	**ΕΥΦΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *good mind*
εὐφραινόμενος	making oneself glad	
ὁ ὄχλος **οἱ ὄχλοι**	crowd	**ΟΧΛΟΣ** *crowd of people*
ἡ ὄχλησις **αἱ ὀχλήσεις**	[feeling of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of a crowd of people*
τό ὄχλημα **τά ὀχλήματα**	[cause of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of a crowd of people*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*

34.4 [Distorted Myths, Fulfilled Vengeance]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 9 (4)

...παραδεδομ[έ]ν̣ων μύθω̣ν κα̣[ὶ ἐπὶ] τούτο̣ις τοῖς ἔρ̣[γοι]ς ἢ ἄλλος διαστρέ̣φει ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπτώσεων· αὗται δὴ συντελο̣ῦν̣ται τιμωρίαι τ[οῖ]ς ὑ[πὲρ] τοῦ παντὸ̣[ς]...

...παραδεδομένων μύθων. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις, ἢ Ἄλλος διαστρέφει ἢ Αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπτώσεων· Αὗται, δὴ, συντελοῦνται Τιμωρίαι τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς...

...while the myths [*lit. stories*] have been handed down. and in regard to these [*mythic*] deeds, either Another person distorts [*them*] out of contrary occurrences or He himself [*does so*]. These, therefore, are the Vengeances that are altogether fulfilled for those [*people*] on behalf of the whole...

παραδιδόναι	to hand over [here, "to hand down"]	**ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving alongside*
παραδεδομένος *(η, ον)*	handed down	**ΠΑΡΑΔΕΔΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *gave alongside*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task [here, "deed"]	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *thoroughly turning*
διαστρέφειν	to distort	**ΔΙΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *turning through*
ἡ περίπτωσις **αἱ περιπτώσεις**	incident	**ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling around*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις **αἱ ἐμπτώσεις**	collision	**ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling into*
ἡ ἀντίπτωσις **αἱ ἀντιπτώσεις**	contrary occurrence	**ΑΝΤΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling against*

συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ *completing together*
ἡ τιμωρία αἱ τιμωρίαι	vengeance	ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑ *guarding honor*

34.5 Mental Attention towards the Unseen

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 11 [(5)]

...ὥστε καὶ [π]ά[σας φ]ύσεις τὰς [ἐ]κ [τῶν ἐπι]βολῶν [τῶν ἐπὶ τ]ὸ ἀόρατον ἤδ[η βαδ]ιζουσῶν ὀ[ψ]όμ[ε]θ' ἄ[ν] εἰς ὁμοιό[τ]ητα[ς] ἴδωμεν ἅς...

...ὥστε καὶ πάσας φύσεις τὰς ἐκ [Β'] τῶν ἐπιβολῶν τῶν ἐπὶ [0] τὸ ἀόρατον ἤδη βαδιζουσῶν Ὀψόμεθ' ἂν εἰς [κ] ὁμοιότητας – Ἴδωμεν ἅς...

> ...so that We would also see for ourselves all the natures from [Β'] attentions directed at [0] the unseen that are already proceeding into [κ] the similarities – Let us see which ones...

"Our attentions directed at [0] the unseen that are already proceeding into the [κ] similarities" could be a reference to only using shared [κ] universal qualities for [Δ◌] speculative judgments (which concern [0] objects we cannot observe).

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[Β'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ *throwing upon*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ἀόρατος *(ος, ον)*	unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ *not looking*
βαδίζων *(ουσα, ον)* βαδίζοντες *(ουσαι, οντα)*	proceeding	ΒΑΔΙΖΩΝ
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ὀψόμεθα	we will see [for ourselves]	ΟΨΟΜΕΘΑ *will look*
ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ *seen*
ἰδῶμεν	let us see	ΙΔΩΜΕΝ *seen*
ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ *condition of being similar*

34.6 Inductive Consideration of Specific Characteristics

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 12 [(6)]

...ὅθεν ἂν [τ]ύχηι καθ' ἕν τι πρα[γ]μ[ά]των κ[α]ὶ οὐχ ἅπαντ[α] ἐπιλογισάμενος τ[ὰ] κατὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τ[οῦ] εἰδ[ώ]λου συναπτο[μέν]ην αὐτῶι [ὀξυδέ]ρκειαν...

...ὅθεν ἂν Τύχῃ, καθ' [-κ] ἕν τι πραγμάτων καὶ οὐχ [κ] ἅπαντα, ἐπιλογισάμενος, τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ εἰδώλου συναπτομένην αὐτῷ ὀξυδερκείαν...

> ...from wherever It may happen that, having inductively considered the things according to a sharp perception connected to him concerning the film, according to [-κ] a certain one of the situations and not [κ] all things [together]...

*Inductive consideration (**ὁ ἐπιλογισμός**) distinguishes [-κ] specific characteristics from [κ] universal characteristics, so that we are able to then use [κ] universal characteristics for our analogical consideration (**ὁ ἀναλογισμός**) in forming [Δ◌] speculative judgements.*

ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ *happening*
τύχῃ	it may happen	ΤΥΧΗΙ *happening*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	ΠΑΝ *all*
τό ἅπαν τά ἅπαντα	everything [together] all things [together]	ἍΠΑΝΤΑ *all together*
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *process of reasoning action upon*
ἐπιλογισάμενος *(η, ον)*	having inductively considered [for oneself]	
τὸ εἴδωλον τὰ εἴδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ *object from appearing*
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *fastening together*
συναπτόμενος *(η, ον)*	being connected	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ *fastening together*
ὀξυδερκείη *ionic* ἡ ὀξυδερκία αἱ ὀξυδερκίαι	sharp perception	ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ *sharp seeing*

34.7 [Nothing would be Terrible]

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 13 (7)

...[τῆς συνκ]ρ[ο]ύσεως· καὶ αὐτόθεν μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἀντικοπῆς καθ' ὃν λέγω τρόπον οὐθὲν [α]ν η δειν[ό]ν· νῦν δὲ ταῦτα...

Forma "η" hic probabiliter contrahitur ex "εἴη," optativo verbi "εἶναι,"

quod constructionem cum ἄν complet ad sensum possibilitatis exprimendum

...τῆς συγκρούσεως – καὶ αὐτόθεν μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἀντικοπῆς, καθ' ὃν Λέγω τρόπον: Οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη δεινόν ¬ νῦν δὲ, Ταῦτα...

...of the mutual impact – and with the collision being produced from that place, in the way I am describing: Nothing would be terrible ¬ but as it is, These things...

For "mutual impact," consider Epicurus: *"Nature of the void, which separates every single atom, prepares this atomic movement (not being able to make any support) – secondly, the firmness which already exists in the atoms creates a rebound upon their mutual impact (to the extent that their intertangling allows reestablishment from their mutual impact)."* *(10.44a)*

ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ *hitting together*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ *from all places*
αὐτόθεν	from that place	ΑΥΤΟΘΕΝ *from self*

γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἡ ἀντικοπή **αἱ ἀντικοπαί**	collision [against]	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ** *beating against*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
δεινός *(ή, όν)*	terrible	**ΔΕΙΝΟΣ** *terrifying*

34.8 The Stirring of Opinion into Myths

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 14 (8)

...[ἐπι]κρατείας [καὶ] π̣άνθ' ὅλως μία τις κύκησις ὑπ[ῆ]ι̣ ἐν αὐτα̣ῖς καὶ μηδ' αἱ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν δόξαι γίνωνται· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς μυθώδεις διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κ[α]ὶ οὗτος πάλιν [δ]ό̣ξα̣ς βα[δ]ίζ[ει]...

*ἐπι addidi

...ἐπικρατείας, καὶ πάνθ' ὅλως μία τις Κύκησις ὑπῇ ἐν αὐταῖς ¬ καὶ μηδ' αἱ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν Δόξαι γίνωνται. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς μυθώδεις, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ Οὗτος πάλιν δόξας βαδίζει...

> ...of the prevailing opinion, and altogether one certain Agitation [*of confusion*] might exist among them ¬ and not even the Judgments according to the prevailing opinion would be produced. due to this cause [*of stirred-up mental confusion*], He also turns [*his*] judgments again toward the mythical [*interpretations*]...

κρατεῖν	to prevail	**ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ** *power*
ἡ ἐπικράτεια **αἱ ἐπικρατεῖαι**	prevailing opinion	**ΕΠΙΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ** *power upon*
πάνθ' ὅλως	altogether	
ὁ κύκλος **οἱ κύκλοι**	sphere	**ΚΥΚΛΟΣ** *circular*
ἡ κύκησις **αἱ κυκήσεις**	agitation [*of confusion*]	**ΚΥΚΗΣΙΣ** *process of circular*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ὑπῇ	it might exist	
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ μῦθος **οἱ μῦθοι**	myth	**ΜΥΘΟΣ** *speech / word*
μυθώδης *(ης, ες)*	mythical	**ΜΥΘΩΔΗΣ** *full of speech / word*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
βαδίζειν	proceed	**ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *walking*

34.9 Active Error Comes from the Self – Passive Error comes from Convention

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Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 15 (9)

...οὐ πολλ̣[ο]ὺ̣ς [ο]ὕτως ἐκκαθαίρεσθαι· τὸ δ' ἐ̣κ τῆς συναπτομένη[ς ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀπογεννᾶ[ν] μὲν καὶ τὰς ἀ̣[λόγ]ους δεῖν νομίζε[ιν κα]τὰ τὰς τῶ̣[ν] π̣ρα[γμάτ]ων φωνὰ[ς αὐ]τὰς χω[ροῦντας]...

...ού Πολλοὺς οὕτως ἐκκαθαίρεσθαι: τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς συναπτομένης ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κινήσεως Αἴτιον ἀπογεννᾶν – μὲν καὶ τὰς Ἀλόγους Δεῖν νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων φωνὰς αὐτὰς χωροῦντας...

> ...not Many [*people*] are made fully clear in this way: but what Causes the connected movement fully generates from us ourselves – and It is necessary that the Unreasoning [*mental movements*] themselves are advancing according to the statements of the situations...

For "according to the statements of the situations," consider Epicurus:

"...to such an extent produces linguistic conventions by your memory through the use of a term – oh, by gods! – that you see these conventions as an established thing... with you proceeding according to your judgements as practical situations arise in various ways, anyone could disturb those practical situations – for they are always empty..." (On Nature, Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 5)

καθαίρειν	to clarify	**ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleansing*
ἐκκαθαίρειν	to make fully clear	**ΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *cleaning out*
συναπτόμενος *(η, ον)*	being connected	**ΣΥΝΑΠΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *fastening together*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
τὸ αἴτιον **τὰ αἴτια**	what is the cause	**ΑΙΤΙΟΝ** *blame*
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	**ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ** *generating out*
ἄλογος *(ον)*	unreasoning	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
νομίζειν	to think	**ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ** *custom*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*
χωρεῖν	to advance	**ΧΩΡΕΙΝ** *place / location*
χωρῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	advancing	

34.10 Signs as a Partial Indication

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 17 (17)

...ση[μεῖον] οὐχ ἅπαντος δ[ήλου γι]γνομέν[ο]ụ λέγεται, ἀλλά τι[νος] μέν, τινὸς δ' οὔ, [τὴ]ν δὲ δ[ι]αφ[ο]ρὰν μ[ή τι]νες [εὐ]κρ[ι]νοῦντε[ς οὔ]τως ο[ὐ]...

...Σημεῖον οὐχ ἅπαντος δήλου γιγνομένου λέγεται, ἀλλά τινος μέν ¬ τινὸς δ' οὔ: τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν, μή τινες εὐκρινοῦντες, οὕτως οὐ...

> ...a Sign is not said [*to be a sign*] of everything [*together*] becoming clear, but only [*a sign*] of some things [*becoming clear*] ¬ and not of others things: and the difference, unless Some people are distinguishing well, is not [*recognized*] in this way...

Consider Epicurus:

"While using signs of objective qualities and practical consequences, it is necessary to fully see the difference between a universal judgment and a specific judgment. And if we accomplish this awareness of the difference in regard to all reasonings, then we will not be troubled by the part of epistemology which I have spoken about." *(Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13, col. 12 sup. – part 1)*

τὸ σημεῖον **τὰ σημεῖα**	sign	**ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ** *state of indication*
τό ἅπαν **τά ἅπαντα**	everything [together] all things [together]	**ἍΠΑΝΤΑ** *all together*
δῆλος *(η, ον)*	(θ) clear	**ΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear*
γιγνόμενος *(η, ον)*	happening	**ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *birthing*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
ἐπικρίνειν	to discriminate	**ΕΠΙΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *dividing upon*
εὐκρίνων *(οῦσα, ον)*	distinguishing well	**ΕΥΚΡΙΝΩΝ** *dividing upon*

34.11 Linguistic Indistinction

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 18 (11)

...δήποτε ὅδ' [ἐ]γβιάζετ' ἀντιτ[είνων] καὶ μὴ ἀκο[λούθοις] συνκατα[τιθέμε]νος, τοῦ ψεύδο[υς πρ]οσαγορεύω αὐτὸν [ἄ]ξιον· ἀδιάφορον [γὰρ] ταῦτα [ἀ]γορεύε[σθ]αι πράγματ[α]...

...δήποτε Ὅδ' ἐγβιάζετ' ἀντιτείνων καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθοις συνκατατιθέμενος: τοῦ ψεύδους Προσαγορεύω αὐτὸν ἄξιον! – ἀδιάφορον γὰρ ταῦτα ἀγορεύεσθαι Πράγματα...

...any time This man insists on pushing back and not fully assenting to consistent [*reasoning*]: I refer to him as deserving of what is false! – for these Situations are declared in an undifferentiated way...

δήποτε	ever, at any time	**ΔΗΠΟΤΕ** *indefinite*
ὅδ' **ὅδε**	this one	
βιάζειν	to force	**ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ** *violence*
βιάζεσθαι	to be forced	**ΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *violence*
ἐκβιάζεσθαι	to insist	**ΕΚΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *violence (forcing) out*
τείνειν	to extend	**ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending*
ἀντιτείνειν	to push back	**ΑΝΤΙΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *extending against*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκόλουθος *(ος, ον)*	consistent	
τιθέναι	to put [here, "to set up"]	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
συνκατατίθεσθαι	to fully assent	**ΣΥΝΚΑΤΑΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ** *thoroughly placing together*
συνκατατιθέμενος *(η, ον)*	fully assenting	
τὸ ψεῦδος **τὰ ψεύδη**	[-α] what is false	**ΨΕΥΔΟΣ** *falsehood / lie*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*

ἀγορεύειν	to declare	**ΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	**ΑΞΙΟΣ** *counterbalancing*
ἀδιάφορος *(ος, ον)*	undifferentiated	**ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *not carrying apart*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*

34.12 Mechanism of Thought

Consider Aristotle:

*"...when something has caused motion in water or air, and such motion propagates itself to a certain point – even though the initial cause of movement is not present: in the same way, it may well be that a movement and a consequent sense-perception should reach sleeping souls from the objects from which Democritus represents as 'films' (**εἴδωλα**) and 'emanations' (**ἀπορροαί**). Such movements, in whatever way they arrive, should be more perceptible at night [than by day], because when proceeding in the daytime they are more liable to dissolution (since at night the air is less disturbed, because there is less wind at that time). These films would be perceived within the body while sleeping – since people are more sensitive even to slight sensory movements when asleep than when awake: it is these movements then that cause mental-impressions (**φαντάσματα**)."*

(On Prophesying by Dreams, 464a)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 19 (12)

...ῥηθέναι κινητικά· οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα φήσομεν εἰ αἱ, τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' ἐπείσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περ[ι]έχον[το]ς, ἄλλα παντὶ τῶ[ι φα]ντασtικῶι παρακ[ο]λουθοῦντα...

...ῥηθέναι κινητικά ¬ οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα Φήσομεν: εἰ αἱ [1] **τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' ἐπείσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος –** [2] **ἄλλα παντὶ τῷ φανταστικῷ παρακολουθοῦντα...**

...[*these thoughts*] are said [*to be*] motion-inducing ¬ nor would We assert these few [*thoughts alone are motion-inducing*]: if indeed [1] the greatest part [*of our thoughts come in*] by penetration [*of films*] from the surrounding [*environment*] – [2] the rest [*of our thoughts*] follow along with the whole appearance-based [*way of thinking*]...

Thinking can only be IMPRESSION-BASED *due to the penetration of* SENSIBLE *films. Some mental impressions are caused by immediate sensory inputs, while other mental impression (that are produced by the mind's own activity) are based upon those previous sensory inputs.*

More generally, the fact that the content of your thoughts comes in through the penetration of films from the surrounding environment can be easily appreciated by imagining what the content of your thoughts would be if you had spent your entire life only in a room with no light, sound, smell, or any other film integrating into your body and mental experience.

ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὁ φαντασμός **οἱ φαντασμοί**	what appears	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ** *process of appearing*
τὸ φάντασμα **τὰ φαντάσματα**	mental impression	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ** *result of appearing*
ῥηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)*	said	**ῬΗΘΕΙΣ** *said*
ῥηθέναι	to be said	**ῬΗΘΕΝΑΙ**
κινητικός *(ή, όν)*	motion-inducing	**ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of moving*

ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*
φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
πλεῖστος *(η, ον)*	the greatest [the most]	**ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ** *most*
ἡ ἐπείσοδος **αἱ ἐπεισόδοι**	penetration	**ΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ** *upon course into*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
φανταστικός *(ή, όν)*	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
παρακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along	**ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following alongside*

34.13 Practical Equivalency of the Term "Phlebopalía"

Consider Galen:
*"For not only is the arterial pulsation (***φλεβοπαλία***) of children bad in an old man, but an old man's [arterial pulsation] is [bad] in a child. So if ever the interval between two beats were of ten primary time-units (as Herophilus measured pulses) it is a sign of extreme chilling and therefore death. Again just as for an old man – the pulse of children (in which the time of dilation is equal to that of contraction) means his nature is aflame."* *(Synopsis De Pulsibus 21, 9.499K)*

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 20 [(13)]

...μένοις ἃ ἀληθῆ[ι προσ]άγορεύομεν· έν[νοού]μεθα δ' ὡς ούδ[ὲν ἄλ]λ' ἤ φασιν οἱ τὴν φλε[β]οπαλίαν ὀνομάζοντες τῶν ἀρχαίων φυ[σ]ιολόγων τὸ πρᾶ[γμ]α ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...

...ἃ ἀληθῆ Προσάγορεύομεν· Ἐννοούμεθα δ' ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἤ φασιν Οἱ "τὴν φλεβοπαλίαν" ὀνομάζοντες τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων τὸ Πρᾶγμα ὃ Ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...

...the things We refer to in truth. and We understand that the Situation which We describe is nothing other than what Those among the ancient natural scientists called by the word "phlebopalía [*i.e, arterial pulsation*]"...

*Epicurus is discussing an older school of physicists (***οἱ φυσιολόγοι***) who referred to "phlebopalía" (***ἡ φλεβοπαλία***), literally "arterial pulsation" in their explanation of the physical mechanics of psychological operation via excitement by the films.*

Epicurus says his school does not use this term when explaining this same mechanism.

τἀληθές = **τὸ ἀληθές** **τὰ ἀληθῆ**	what is true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not hidden*
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	**ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly toward*
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	**ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing within*
ἡ φλεβοπαλία **αἱ φλεβοπαλίαι**	arterial pulsation "phlebopalía"	**ΦΛΕΒΟΠΑΛΙΑ** *vein shaking*
it is not clear how Democritus used the term, *(The Diels–Kranz fragment "DK 68 B120" preserves this word alone, without any context)*		
ὀνομάζων *(ουσα, ον)*	using the word *[here, "calling by the word"]*	**ΟΝΟΜΑΖΩΝ** *naming*
ἄρχειν	to begin	**ΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning*

ἀρχαῖος *(α, ον)*	ancient	**ΑΡΧΑΙΟΣ** *beginning*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning* *of producing*
ὁ φυσιολόγος **οἱ φυσιολόγοι**	natural scientist	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning* *of producing*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*

34.14 Rejection of the Term "Phlebopalía"

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 21 (14)

...ἢ καὶ ὁτι[ο]ῦν τὸ ὡμοιωμέ[ν]ον τούτωι καλέσο[μ]εν ἐνάργειαν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ περιεχοντο[ς] ὄν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴ[ν] φλεβοπαλίαν· [ἐ]ὰν δὴ καὶ ἀγορε[ύω]σ[ι]ν καὶ...

...ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τὸ ὡμοιωμένον τούτῳ Καλέσομεν "ἐνάργειαν" ¬ μὴ "ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος" ὄν, ἀλλὰ "κατὰ τὴν φλεβοπαλίαν" – ἐὰν δὴ καὶ Ἀγορεύωσιν...;

> ...or shall We call what is formed similar to this "the detectible reality" ¬ not existing "from the surrounding environment," but "according to phlebopalía [*i.e., arterial pulsation*]" – if indeed They also declare it so...?

Epicurus is contrasting his wording with the wording from older schools.

*Both phrases relate to the "motion-inducing" (***κινητικά***) contact of films upon the body that causes sensation. Epicurus prefers to reference "the [E] detectible reality from the surrounding environment" pointing more to the external source of the contact and the older phrase (probably of Democritus) references "the [E] detectible reality according to arterial pulsation" pointing more to the internal ramifications of the contact.*

ὁτιοῦν = **ὅ τι + οὖν**	anything whatsoever	
ὡμοιωμένος *(η, ον)*	having been formed similar	**ὉΜΟΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *similar*
καλεῖν	to call	**ΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
περιέχων *(ουσα, ον)*	surrounding	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ** *holding around*
τὸ περιέχον **τὰ περιέχοντα**	surrounding environment	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ** *hold around*
ἡ φλεβοπαλία **αἱ φλεβοπαλίαι**	arterial pulsation "phlebopalía"	**ΦΛΕΒΟΠΑΛΙΑ** *vein shaking*
ἀγορεύειν	to declare	**ΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ** *speaking publicly*

34.15 Symmetric Impingement of Films

Symmetry refers to the level of accurate correspondence between:
(1) the actual qualities of a particular object
and
(2) The qualities of that object its films preserve after reaching the viewer

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 22 (15)

...[π]α̣ρὰ τὰς μ[ετ]α[βάσεις] κ̣αὶ τ̣ὰς δ̣[ι]ήξε[ις] τῶν πόρων γίγνεσθαί τις συμ[με]τρία, καί τισιμ μὲν [ε]ὐθὺς ἑτοίμως

δι[α]κ̣ειμένοις, τισὶν... ...ε̣[ἰ]σ̣ιν, φημί... ...δ[ι]ανοία̣ς... ...[ἀ]τα[ρ]άχως...

...παρὰ τὰς μεταβάσεις καὶ τὰς διήξεις τῶν πόρων, γίγνεσθαί τις Συμμετρία – καί τισιν μὲν εὐθὺς ἑτοίμως διακειμένοις ¬ τισὶν... ...Εἰσιν, Φημί... ...διανοίας... ...ἀταράχως...

...through the spatial extensions [*of the films out in every direction*] and [*through the*] traversals of their passageways, a certain Symmetry is also produced for some people who are directly readily inclined [*to focus* ¬ *but*] for others... ...They are, I say... ...[*of*] mental perception... ...without disturbance...

Spatial extension is a reference to 'three-dimensional' quality of an object. Consider Epicurus "It is necessary to fully conceive the minimum thing visible in sensation: it is neither just like that which we see has spatial extensions, nor all-in-all dissimilar" (10.58a)

For Symmetry, consider "Transmissions of films demonstrate the image of a single continuous thing – they are also preserving the correspondence of qualities from the original source according to the symmetric impingement [of the transmissions of films upon us] from that location, coming out of the vibration of the atoms deep in that solid object" (10.50a)

For "traversals of passageways," consider "the causes [of movement] through the difference of atoms and the preexisting passageways." (Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 3, fr. B 11)

ἡ μετάβασις **αἱ μεταβάσεις**	[spatial] extension	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ** *stepping beyond*
ἡ ἐπείσοδος **αἱ ἐπεισόδοι**	penetration	**ΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ** *upon course into*
ἡ διήξις **αἱ διήξεις**	traversal	**ΔΙΗΞΙΣ** *going through*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure* *together*
ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure* *together*
ἰθύς *ionic for* **εὐθύς** *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
ἑτοιμάζειν	to make ready	**ἙΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing*
ἑτοῖμος *(ίμη, ῖμον)*	made ready	**ἙΤΟΙΜΟΣ** *preparing*
ἑτοίμως	readily	**ἙΤΟΙΜΩΣ**
τιθέναι	to put [here, "to set up"]	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
ἀντικείμενος *(η, ον)*	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
διακείμενος *(η, ον)*	inclined	**ΔΙΑΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated apart*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without* *agitating*
ἀταράχως	without disturbance	**ΑΤΑΡΑΧΩΣ** *without* *agitating*

> *Consider Epicurus:*
> *"It must be the case that we see and mentally perceive shapes by something entering us from external sources."* (10.49a)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 23 [16]

…ἀ[να]γκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸ[ς] ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῆι πρώτηι γραφῆι εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἧττον παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ις] σ[υμ]μετρ[ία] αὐτ[αῖ]ς γίγνε[σθαι]…

…Ἀναγκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται: οὐθὲν ἧττον παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἡμῶν τις Συμμετρία αὐταῖς γίγνεσθαι…

> …It is necessary for [*sensations*] to exist according to the mutual impacts [*of the films and of ourselves*] – as has been said in the first writing: a certain Symmetry is produced not to a lesser extent for [*the sensations*] than in relation to the [*impacts*] from us…

> *Consider Epicurus:*
> *"External objects would not imprint inside us their own nature of both color and shape through the air that is between us and them – either through rays, or through flows of any kind originating from us to them – nearly so well as with certain impressions entering into us from the situation: impressions of the same color and similarly formed entering us according to the size that fits into our vision or our mental perception…"* (10.49b)

ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning* *under (before)*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
ἡ κρούσις **αἱ κρούσεις**	impact	**ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ** *strike*
πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	**ΠΡΩΤΟΣ** *first*
ἡ γραφή **αἱ γραφαί**	[text of] writing	**ΓΡΑΦΗ** *writing*
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	**ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *spoke*
ἧττον	to a lesser extent	**ἩΤΤΟΝ** *inferior*
ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure* *together*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*

34.17 Symmetries in the Passageways of the Films

> *Consider Epicurus:*
> *"Nothing among visible things contests the fact that films are endowed with unsurpassable subtlety – from this subtlety, films also have unsurpassable speeds (having every symmetric passageway in relation to their infinite nature), colliding against nothing (or colliding against a few things: for among many and infinite atoms, films are immediately colliding against something)."* (10.47b)

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 24 [24]

…[πυκ]νότηῃς κἂ[ν] μὴ σ[υ]ν[ῆι] αἱ [συμμ]ετ[ρί]αι [τῶν] πόρ[ω]ν ποιοῦσ[ι]ν ὥ[στε] τ[ὰς] περὶ τὰς ἐν[πτώ]σεις ταύτα[ς καὶ αὐταῖς] μετα[β]ά[σεις ὑ]πάρχ[ε]ιν· ὅσ[α] δὴ καὶ…

...πυκνότητος. κἂν μὴ συνῇ αἱ Συμμετρίαι τῶν πόρων – Ποιοῦσιν ὥστε τὰς περὶ τὰς ἐντπώσεις ταύτας καὶ αὐταῖς μεταβάσεις ὑπάρχειν· Ὅσα, δή, καὶ...

...of concentration. even if the Symmetries [*of the films*] in the passageways [*both through air and into the body*] are not coexistent – those [*Symmetries*] make [*it happen*] that [*both*] those [*extensions of the films out in every direction*] around these collisions and those extensions [*of the films up to us*] come to exist for [*our sensations*]. indeed, As many as also...

Consider "It is necessary to think that smell, like sound, would never produce any experience unless certain particles exist that are carried away from those situations, which are symmetric [in proportion] for moving that sense-organ" (10.53c)

ἡ πυκνότης **αἱ πυκνότητες**	concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ** *condition from compacting*
ἐνεῖναι	to implant	**ΕΝΕΙΝΑΙ** *being inside*
σύνειναι	to coexist	**ΣΥΝΕΙΝΑΙ** *being together*
ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure together*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ἡ περίπτωσις **αἱ περιπτώσεις**	incident	**ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling around*
ἡ ἀντίπτωσις **αἱ ἀντιπτώσεις**	contrary occurrence	**ΑΝΤΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling against*
ἡ ἔνπτωσις = **ἡ ἔμπτωσις** **αἱ ἐμπτώσεις**	collision	**ΕΝΠΤΩΣΙΣ** **ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling into*
ἡ μετάβασις **αἱ μεταβάσεις**	[spatial] extension	**ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ** *stepping beyond*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*

34.18 Interpreting the Unseen with Reasoning

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, column 25 (17)

...ἂγ γὰρ τα[ύ]τό τις συνθεωρῆι καὶ τῶν ἐν λόγω[ι] ὃν τρόπον ἐχόμενος ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διηρμήνευκεν οὔποτẹ μὲν δόξẹι πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ φυσικὸν ἄλλας οἰ[κ]ειοτέρας φω[ν]ὰς...

...ἂν γὰρ [θ] ταὐτό Τις [Δ◌] συνθεωρῇ καὶ [θ] τῶν ἐν λόγῳ – ὃν τρόπον ἐχόμενος ὁ Λόγος περὶ [0] τῶν ἀδήλων διηρμήνευκεν – οὔποτε μὲν Δόξει πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ φυσικὸν ἄλλας οἰκειοτέρας φωνὰς...

...for if Someone [Δ◌] mutually observes [θ] the same [*object*] with [θ] the [*objects*] in reasoning – in the way that the subsequent Reasoning has thoroughly interpreted about [0] what is unclear* – He will never seem [*to have*] other statements more fitting [*than these*] for the fulfillment which is natural [*lit. "for the physical telos"*]...

**i.e., using the canon and employing the recommended mental techniques such as determining which issues demand certainty or determining which qualities are universal.*

συνθεωρεῖν	to mutually observe	**ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ** *envisioning together*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἐχόμενος *(η, ον)*	holding on to [here, "subsequent"]	**ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *holding*
τὸ ἀόρατον **τὰ ἀόρατα**	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
τὸ ἄδηλον **τὰ ἄδηλα**	[0] what is unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΝ** *not clear*
ἑρμηνεύειν	to interpret	**ἙΡΜΗΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *Hermes nod, interpreting sign*
διερμηνεύειν	to thoroughly interpret	**ΔΙΕΡΜΗΝΕΥΕΙΝ** *thoroughly interpreting sign*
οὔποτε	never	**ΟΥΠΟΤΕ** *not ever*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
οἰκειότερος *(α, ον)*	more fitting	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἡ φωνή **αἱ φωναί**	statement	**ΦΩΝΗ** *speaking*

34.19 Subscriptio

Epicurus, On Nature, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, title subscriptio (26)

Ἐπικ[ο]ύρου Περὶ Φύσ[ε]ως ΛΔ

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΔ*

Epicurus' *On Nature Book 34*

[U91]

Book 35

Benefits from a God

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.36.1040 –37.1060

ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ] Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐσ]τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ανθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογρά]φει διὰ πλεό[νων]. Ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ισκαι]δεκάτωι, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἥ[ν πρός] τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος.] ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ] τριακ[οσ]τῶ[ι, φησι], σὺν τῶι τι [ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διό[ι νομι]ζον...

ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Περὶ Θεῶν ποία τίς ἐστιν Αἰτία νεμέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειπτέον, Ὑπογράφει διὰ πλειόνων – ἔν τε τῷ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ, περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἣν πρός τινας ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος. ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ, Φησι, σὺν τῷ τι ταύτης τῆς ὠφελίας, διασαφεῖν, καὶ διότι Νομίζον…

and in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of Cause for vengeance and security exists through a god that must be thoroughly left behind for men, [*Epicurus*] writes with many [*details*]. and in the thirteenth [*book On Nature, Epicurus writes*] regarding the familiarity that a God [*in general*] has with certain [*people*] and regarding their alienation. and in the five-and-thirtieth [*i.e., Book 35 On Nature, Epicurus*] says that he clarifies, along with a little bit of this benefit, also why It is believed that…

[Obbink] And in *On Gods* what kind of source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity must be accepted he outlines in some detail. And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people. And in book 35, in addition to clarifying somewhat this benefit, he says that even on account of thinking…

[Book 36]

[Book 37]

Uncertain Book Number

[Possibly] Epicurus' On Nature, P.Herc. 1639 fr. 4

…μο[ρ]φῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραλλαγ[μ]άτων ἐπὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐλθ[εῖν] ἠθέλησεν, μήπως οὐκ ἐχ[ρ]ῆν γενομένους αὐτοὺς εὐδαίμον[ας] ποιῆσαι. Τότε γὰρ…

…μορφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραλλαγμάτων ἐπὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐλθεῖν Ἠθέλησεν – μήπως οὐκ Ἐχρῆν (γενομένους) αὐτοὺς εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. τότε, γὰρ…

…He wanted the shapes and the other variations to come to mutual fulfillment – so that It was not necessary (with them having already been produced) to make them good-spirited. for, at that time…

ἡ μορφή **αἱ μορφαί**	shape	**ΜΟΡΦΗ** *form*
τὸ παράλλαγμα **τὰ παραλλάγματα**	variation	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ** *changing across*
συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing together*
ἡ συντέλεια **αἱ συντέλειαι**	mutual fulfillment	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *completing together*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	**ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving*
ἐλθεῖν	to come / go [once, completed]	**ΕΛΘΕΙΝ** *moved*
ἐθέλειν	to want	**ΕΘΕΛΕΙΝ** *wishing*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
ἐχρῆν	it was necessary	**ΕΧΡΗΝ** *was necessary*
γενόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced [already]	**ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *come into being*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
εὐδαίμων *(ων, ον)*	good-spirited	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ** *good spirit*

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*

[U92]

Limits vs. Examples

Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax (fl. 130 BCE), The Art of Grammar

Karl Bekker, Anecdota Graeca, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1816, page 660, line 25)

Dionysius Thrax was a very influential Greek grammarian.

Καὶ Ἐπίκουρος – δὲ ἀεὶ ὑπογραφαῖς κεχρημένος – δηλῶν ὅτι τιμιώτεροι οἱ ὅροι, ὅροις ἀντὶ ὑπογραφῶν ἐν τῇ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως πραγματείᾳ Ἐχρήσατο: διαιρῶν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν εἴς τε ἄτομον καὶ κενὸν ὅροις ἐχρήσατο – λέγων ὅτι ἄτομόν ἐστι σῶμα στερεὸν ἀμέτοχον κενοῦ παρεμπλοκῆς. κενόν ἐστι φύσις ἀναφής, τουτέστιν, ἀψηλάφητος

And Epicurus – although he used examples all the time – he shows that limits are more valuable, [*because he used*] limits instead of examples in his work of his natural philosophy lecture: while dividing everything into atom and void by using limits – and while saying that an atom is a solid body having no share of interposition with the void. Void is an intangible nature, that is, untouchable

And although Epicurus always made use of general outlines [of the senses of words], he showed that definitions are more worthy of respect by using definitions instead of general outlines in the treatise *On Nature*; for he used definitions when he divided the totality [of existence] into the atomic and the void, saying that "the atomic is a solid body which has no share of void included in it; void is an intangible nature" i.e., not subject to touch

Limits (i.e., definitions) say what something is NOT, and examples say what something IS.

The scholiast is saying that by explaining the atom as something with "no share of interposition with the void" and by explaining the void as something "not touchable," Epicurus is not explaining by giving examples, but is explaining by giving limits (i.e., providing definitions).

ἡ ὑπογραφή αἱ ὑπογραφαί	example	ὙΠΟΓΡΑΦΗ *writing under* *(i.e, to copy)*

[U93]

Slavish "Wise Men"

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.7

Τιμοκράτης… καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* τὰ πλεῖστα ταὐτὰ λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἄλλοις τε καὶ Ναυσιφάνει, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ αὐτῇ λέξει φάσκειν οὕτως:

Timocrates [*also claims*]… in the thirty-seven books *On Nature*, [Epicurus] says mostly the same things and writes back against those others and particularly against Nausiphanes, and asserts most things in such terminology as:

Timocrates [*also alleges*]… that in his thirty-seven books *On Nature*, Epicurus uses much repetition and writes largely in sheer opposition to others, especially Nausiphanes, and here are his own words:

"ἀλλ᾽ Ἴτωσαν: εἶχε γὰρ Ἐκεῖνος, ὠδίνων, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος καύχησιν τὴν σοφιστικήν, καθάπερ καὶ Ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων"

"but Let them be gone: for that Man, while laboring [*with an idea*], had the boasting from the mouth that is sophistic – just like many Others among the slaves"

"but Away with them: for he, in his throes, had that mouth-born, sophistic boasting – just like the usual Herd of the bipeds"

Hicks translates **Ἴτωσαν** *as "let them go hang," but the word has no implication of hanging – but only an implication of "forget them," and literally means "let them be gone"*

*Some translators take this to be a quote of Timocrates, but if (***λέξει***) is taken as the dative noun instead of the third-person verb (which is natural, given its pairing with* **αὐτῇ***), then "asserts" refers back to Epicurus, who is quoted speaking about Nausiphanes.*

ἰέναι	to go	**ΙΕΝΑΙ** *going*
ἴτωσαν	let them be gone	**ΙΤΩΣΑΝ** *going let them*
κἀκεῖνος = **καὶ ἐκεῖνος** *(η, ο)*	and that	**καὶ ἐκεῖνος** *and that*
ὠδίνειν	to suffer birth-pangs	**ΩΔΙΝΕΙΝ** *suffering during childbirth*
τὸ στόμα **τὰ στόματα**	mouth	**ΣΤΟΜΑ** *opening*
ἡ καύχησις **αἱ καύχησεις**	boasting	**ΚΑΥΧΗΣΙΣ** *exulting*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as thoroughly*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
ὁ πούς **οἱ πόδες**	foot	**ΠΟΥΣ** *foot*
ὁ ἀνήρ **οἱ ἄνδρες**	man	**ΑΝΗΡ** *man*
τὸ ἀνδράποδον **τὰ ἀνδράποδα**	slave	**ΑΝΔΡΑΠΟΔΟΝ** *man-footed*
Andrápodon is generally used in contrast with Tetrápodon, "quadruped" (i.e., livestock)		

[U94]

Marriage

[=U19] *Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119*

καὶ μη{δὲ} καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσειν τὸν Σοφόν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς *Διαπορίαις* – καὶ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως*, κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου γαμήσειν καὶ διατραπήσεσθαί Τινας

and the wise Man is not even going to marry and sire children, as Epicurus says in his '*Uncertainties*' – and [*he says*] in '*On Nature*,' that [*some wise men*] will marry at some point according to their circumstance in life and Some will refuse [*to marry*]

γαμεῖν	to marry	**ΓΑΜΕΙΝ** *marriage*

γαμήσειν	going to marry	
τεκνοποιεῖν	to sire children	**ΤΕΚΝΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *child gathering*
τεκνοποιήσειν	going to sire children	
ὁ σοφός **οἱ σοφοί**	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ἡ διαπορία **αἱ διαπορίαι**	uncertainty	**ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ** *doubting across*
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epicurus	
ἡ στάσις **αἱ στάσεις**	stationary position	**ΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
διατρέπειν	to refuse	**ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ** *turning thoroughly*

On Procreation

1. Displaced Variation

Epicurus [or Demetrius Lacon], P.Herc. 908, On Procreation, col. 1 (4)

...της παρα[λαμ]βανόντων είς τὴν τọ[ῦ παρ]εκκειμένου παρα[λλά]γματος αἰτίαν καὶ [τὸ]ν τόπον τὸν [δ]εχόμε[ν]ον τὸ σπέρμα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρρην τις δύναται πολλὴν ὕλην ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῶ σπ[έρμ]ατος [γ]εννη[τ]ι[κοῦ ὡς] καὶ αἵ[μ]ατος καὶ χο[λῆς] ἔχου[σ]ιν πολλοὶ· δ[ιὸ κα]ὶ κατα[β]άλλειν... ...[κ]αὶ κατὰ... ...ὀλίγ[ον] διὸ [καὶ κατα]βάλλειν...

...τῆς παραλαμβανόντων είς τὴν τοῦ παρεκκειμένου παραλλάγματος αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν δεχόμενον τὸ σπέρμα·

> ...of those [ ] receiving [ ] into the cause [*of motion*] for the displaced variation and into the place receiving the seed.

*The "displaced variation" (**τὸ παρεκκείμενον παράλλαγμα**) is probably a reference to differences in position (as opposed to anatomical differences, which are also covered in this text).*

καὶ γὰρ Ἄρρην Τις δύναται πολλὴν ὕλην ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σπέρματος γεννητικοῦ ὡς καὶ αἵματος καὶ χολῆς ἔχουσιν Πολλοί· διὸ καὶ καταβάλλειν... ...καὶ κατά... ...ὀλίγον διὸ, καὶ καταβάλλειν...

> and a certain Male can have in himself much material of generative seed, just as Many [*people*] have of blood and of bile. therefore to also discharge... ...and according to... ...little by little therefore, also to discharge...

λαμβάνων *(ουσα, ον)*	comprehending	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
παραλαμβάνειν	to receive	**ΠΑΡΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping alongside*
παραλαμβάνων	receiving	**ΠΑΡΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping alongside*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	**ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting*
παρέκεισθαι	to displace	**ΠΑΡΕΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting alongside*
παρεκκείμενος *(η, ον)*	displaced	**ΠΑΡΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *set alongside*
ἡ παραλλαγή **αἱ παραλλαγαί**	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*

τὸ παράλλαγμα **τὰ παραλλάγματα**	variation	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ** *changing across*
ἡ συντέλεια **αἱ συντέλειαι**	mutual fulfillment	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *completing together*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	room [here, "place"]	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
ἐνδεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	possible	**ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting in*
δεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	**ΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting*
τὸ σπέρμα **τὰ σπέρματα**	seed	**ΣΠΕΡΜΑ** *seed*
	Part 2	
ἄρρην *(εν)*	male	**ΑΡΡΗΝ** *[not speaking]*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
ἡ ὕλη **αἱ ὕλαι**	material	**ῩΛΗ** *forest, wood ›* *raw material ›* *matter*
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
γεννᾶσθαι	to be created	**ΓΕΝΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *being born*
γεννητικός *(ή, όν)*	generative	**ΓΕΝΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being born*
τό αἷμα **τά αἵματα**	blood	**ἉΙΜΑ**
ἡ χολή **αἱ χολαί**	bile	**ΧΟΛΗ** *gall*
βάλλειν	to throw	**ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing*
καταβάλλειν	to discharge	**ΚΑΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *thoroughly throwing*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*

2. Contraceptive Collision & Dispersion

Epicurus [or Demetrius Lacon], P.Herc. 908, On Procreation, col. 2 (5)

…ὀ̣λίγον|εμένου τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διὰ τοῦ̣το σκεδασμὸν λανβάνοντος· καὶ παρὰ τὸ σχεῖ̣σμα δ' ἂν γένοιτο τ[οῦ] πόρο̣[υ τ]ὸ τοιοῦτο· δῆ[λον] γὰ[ρ] ὅ[τι εὐ]θυτενῶς μὲ[ν] κ[είμεν]ος ὁ πόρος τὴν π̣[ᾶσα]ν ἢ τὴν πλε[ίστην δυνή]σεται καταβ[άλλειν τ]ὴν ὕλην κατ' [ἀντικρὺ(?) ἀ]ντικοπτομένου [καὶ δ]ιαφερομένου κα[τὰ τοὺς] κλασμούς… …π[αρ]έχοντα…

…ὀλιγονεμένου ¬ τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ἀντικοπτομένου – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, σκεδασμὸν λαμβάνοντος· καὶ παρὰ τὸ σχεῖσμα δ' ἂν γένοιτο τοῦ πόρου τὸ Τοιοῦτο·

> …[*when the Passageway from the penis to the uterus is not short and straight*, *the lesser amount of seed*] is scarcely conceived ¬ but the greater [*amount of seed*] collides against [*the ridges of the vaginal walls*] – and because of this, receives dispersion [*before entering the uterus*]. and Such a thing may arise from a split of the passageway [*i.e., a deflection from the path into the uterus*].

δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εὐθυτενῶς μὲν κείμενος ὁ Πόρος, τὴν πᾶσαν ἢ τὴν πλείστην δυνήσεται καταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην κατ' ἀντικρὺ – ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διαφερομένου κατὰ τοὺς κλασμοὺς… …παρέχοντα…

for [*it is*] clear that, when the Passageway [*from the penis to the uterus*] is lying directly STRAIGHT, [*the man*] WILL have the force to discharge all or the greatest part of the material straight through – [*yet the material*] is collided against and carried apart along the ridges [*when the passageway to the uterus is not straight*]… …yielding…

Pleasure-focused movements can interfere with conception, especially in ways that angle or twist the woman's body in positions that discourage semen retention.

Consider Lucretius:

"…Wives are thought generally to conceive better after the manner of wild beasts and quadrupeds, because in that position, breast down and loins up, the seeds can occupy the proper places. Lascivious movements are of no use whatever to wives.

For a woman forbids herself to conceive and fights against it, if in her delight she thrusts against the man's penis with her buttocks, making undulating movements with all her body limp, for she turns the share clean away from the furrow and makes the seed fail of its place.

Whores indulge in such motions for their own purposes, that they may not often conceive and lie pregnant…" (DRN 4.1126, Translated by W. Rouse)

ὀλίγος (η, ον)	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*
νοούμενος (η, ον)	conceived	**ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing*
ὀλιγονοεῖν	*to scarcely conceive *[an apparent hapax legomenon]*	**ΟΛΙΓΟΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing little*
	if **ὀλίγονεμένου** = **ὀλιγονοουμένου**, *then*	
ὀλιγονοούμενος (η, ον)	*being scarcely conceived	**ΟΛΙΓΟΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing little*
πλείων (ον)	more / greater	**ΠΛΕΙΩΝ** more *filling*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	**ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ** *beating against*
ὁ σκεδασμός **οἱ σκεδασμοί**	dispersion	**ΣΚΕΔΑΣΜΟΣ** *an act of scattering*
λαμβάνων (ουσα, ον)	comprehending	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ** *grasping*
ἀποσχίζειν	to detach	**ΑΠΟΣΧΙΖΕΙΝ** *splitting away*
τό σχεῖσμα **τά σχήματα**	a split	**ΣΧΕΙΣΜΑ** *result of splitting*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ὁ πόρος **οἱ πόροι**	passageway	**ΠΟΡΟΣ** *piercing*
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
	Part 2	
δῆλος (η, ον)	(θ) clear	**ΔΗΛΟΣ** *clear*
ἰθύς ionic for **εὐθύς** (εῖα, ύ)	simply / directly	**ΙΘΥΣ** **ΕΥΘΥΣ** *well straight*
εὐθυτενῶς	directly straight	**ΕΥΘΥΤΕΝΩΣ** *stretched well straightly*
ἀντικείμενος (η, ον)	contrary	**ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated against*
ἐκκείμενος (η, ον)	set forth	**ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated out*
κείμενος	situated / lying	**ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *situated*

ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ *piercing*
πλεῖστος (η, ον)	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ *most*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ *power*
καταβάλλειν	to discharge	ΚΑΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *thoroughly throwing*
ἡ ὕλη αἱ ὕλαι	material	῞ΥΛΗ *matter*
ἀντικρύ	directly opposite	ΑΝΤΙΚΡΥ *[possibly pre-Greek]*
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ *beating against*
φερόμενος (η, ον)	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bringing*
ἡ κλάσις αἱ κλάσεις	class	ΚΛΑΣΙΣ *dividing*
ὁ κλασμός οἱ κλασμοί	offshoot [here, "ridge"]	ΚΛΑΣΜΟΣ *dividing*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
παρέχων	yielding	ΠΑΡΕΧΩΝ *hold beside*

3. Secretion & Passage

Epicurus [or Demetrius Lacon], P.Herc. 908, On Procreation, col. 3 (6)

...τ̣ὴν [σώ]ματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν· εἰς ταὐτὸ δὲ παραλανβάνεσθ̣αι δ[ύν]αται καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ θηλείαι ἀνγεῖον· εἰ γὰρ [σ]τε[ν]ὸν ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέ[ξ]ασθαι, μέγα δὲ πο[λύ, σύ]νμετρον ἐὰν ἔχηι τὸ [μ]έγε[θ]ος... ...το[ῦ δ]εχ[ο]μένου [π]άν[τ]ως... ...αἰτί[α]ν ὡς ἐν ὀπι[σ]θορροία[ι λ]αν[β]άνοντος...

...ποδίζ[ο] υ̣[σι γ]ὰ̣ρ̣ τ̣ὴν [το]ῦ̣ σ̣π̣έ̣ρματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν. εἰς τ̣ά̣τὸ δὲ π̣αραλανβάνεσθαι δ̣ύ̣ναται καὶ τὸ ἐν τῆι θηλεί̣α̣ ἀνγῆον. {ή} ‹εἰ› γὰρ στεν̣όν, ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέχεσθαι, μέγα δέ, πολ̣ύ, σύνμετρον ἐὰν ἔχ̣η̣ τὸ μ̣έγεθ̣ος· ἂν δὲ λε[ία]ν μέγα, κἂν δέξητ[αι] π̣ολύ, τούτ̣[ο]υ̣ δ̣ι̣ὰ {ι} τὴν [βαρ/εὐρ/βαθ]ύτη̣τ̣α̣ τοῦ̣ δ̣εχ̣ο̣μένου πάντως οὐ κ̣ρ̣α̣τ̣[ή]σει. κ̣αὶ δ̣ι̣ὰ ταύτην τ̣ὴ̣ν αἰτίαν ὡς [ἐ]ν ὀπιc̣θορροίαι̣[ς] λανβ̣άνοντος του...

...Ποδίζουσι γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν – εἰς ταὐτὸ δὲ παραλανβάνεσθαι δύναται καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ θηλείᾳ Ἀνγεῖον

> ...[*such obstructions*] hinder the secretion of all the seed – but in the same [*way*] the Vessel [*i.e., uterus*] in the female can also receive for itself [*the seed*].
>
> [Nijs] For they prohibit the secretion of all the semen. In the same context the uterus within the female can be taken up.

εἰ γὰρ στενόν, ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέχεσθαι. μέγα δέ, πολύ – σύνμετρον ἐὰν ἔχῃ τὸ Μέγεθος: ἂν δὲ λεῖαν μέγα, κἂν δέξηται πολύ τούτου, διὰ τὴν εὐρύτητα τοῦ δεχομένου, πάντως οὐ κρατήσει. καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν – ὡς, ἐν ὀπισθορροίαις λανβάνοντος...

> if [*the uterus*] is narrow, it naturally exists to receive little. but if [*it is*] large, [*it naturally receives*] much [*seed*] – provided its Size is in proportion: but if [*the uterus*] is very large, even if it receives much of this [*seed*], because of the [*width*] of the receiving [*uterus*], it certainly will not prevail [*in pregnancy*]. and for this cause [*of movement*] – that is, in the backward flows of [*the seed*] that is acquired...
>
> [Nijs] For if it is narrow, it receives little by nature; however, if it is large, it receives a lot, provided that its size is proportionate [*sc. to that of the penis*]; but if it is too large, even though it receives a lot, because of the [depth] of the receiving organ, it will not prevail over that at all. And because of that reason, receiving it as if in streaming back...

[Nijs] *Proportionality is crucial when it comes to the uterus' ideal size. If it is too narrow, only a small amount of semen can pass, which, understandably, means that the chances of conceiving will be relatively slim. In a uterus that is too broad, the semen falls back through the free space between the penis and the sides of the cervix uteri.*

ἐνποδίζειν = **ἐμποδίζειν**	to hinder	**ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** **ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *in foot*
τὸ σπέρμα **τὰ σπέρματα**	seed	**ΣΠΕΡΜΑ** *seed*
ἡ ἀπόκρισις **αἱ ἀποκρίσεις**	[chosen] response [here, "secretion"]	**ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing away from*
παραλαμβάνειν	to receive	**ΠΑΡΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping alongside*
παραλαμβάνεσθαι	to be received	**ΠΑΡΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *grasping alongside*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
θῆλυς *(εία, υ)*	female	**ΘΗΛΥΣ** *breast*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*
τὸ ἀγγεῖον **τὰ ἀγγεῖα**	vessel [here, "uterus"]	**ΑΓΓΕΙΟΝ** *instrument of going / carrying*
	Part 2	
στενός *(ή, όν)*	narrow	**ΣΤΕΝΟΣ** *tight*
ὀλίγος *(η, ον)*	few, short [of time]	**ΟΛΙΓΟΣ** *little*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
φύειν	to naturally come to exist	**ΦΥΕΙΝ** *producing*
πέφυκε	[here, "it naturally exists"]	**ΠΕΦΥΚΕ** *produced*
ἐγδεξάμενος = **ἐνδεξάμενος** *(η, ον)*	having accepted	**ΕΓΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ** **ΕΝΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepted in*
δέξασθαι	to receive [already]	**ΔΕΞΑΣΘΑΙ** *accepted*
δέχεσθαι	to recieve	**ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting*
πολύς *(ή, ύ)*	many / long	**ΠΟΛΥΣ** *much*
σύνμετρος = **σύμμετρος** *(ον)*	symmetric [in proportion]	**ΣΥΝΜΕΤΡΟΣ** **ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ** *measure together*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
λεῖος *(α, ον)*	smooth	**ΛΕΙΟΣ** *smooth*
λεῖαν = **λίαν**	very	**ΛΕΙΑΝ** **ΛΙΑΝ**
δέχεσθαι	to recieve	**ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting*
ἡ βαθύτης **αἱ βαθύτητες**	deepness	**ΒΑΘΥΤΗΣ** *deep*
ἡ εὐρύτης **αἱ εὐρύτητες**	width	**ΕΥΡΥΤΗΣ** *broad*
δεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	**ΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting*
κρατεῖν	to prevail	**ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ** *power*

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἡ ἀπόρροια αἱ ἀπόρροιαι	effluence	ΑΠΟΡΡΟΙΑΙ *flow off*
ἡ ὀπισθορροία αἱ ὀπισθορροίαι	backward flows	ΟΠΙΣΘΟΡΡΟΙΑ *flow behind*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping*

4. Blocked Reception

Consider Soranus of Ephesus, a Greek physician, fl.c. 100 CE, whose four-volume treatise on gynecology survives. (Soranus also refers at least once to Zeno of Sidon in his works.) In the following passage, Soranus discusses the position of the cervix:

*"...those women in whom the orifice of the uterus (**τὸ στόμιον τῆς ὑστέρας**) is comparatively far forward (**προκοπώτερον μᾶλλον**) and lies in a straight line (**κατ' εὐθὺ κείμενον**) ¬ for an orifice of the uterus deviated even in its natural state and lying farther back in the vagina (**κόλπος**) is less suited for the attraction and acceptance of the seed (**σπέρμα**)..."*

Epicurus [or Demetrius Lacon], P.Herc. 908, On Procreation, col. 4 sup [(7)]

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν ποιήσουσιν· καὶ ἐξεναντ[ίω]ς μὲν [κ]ειμένου πρὸς [πα]ραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέ[του] ἔχον[τ]ος του ἀνα... ...τὴν θέσιν ἔχοντ[ος] καταντῆ‹ι› πρὸς τοῦ[τ' ἐν]ποδίζοντος... ...ἀντικο[πὴν]...

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν ποιήσουσιν˙ καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίας μὲν κ̣ειμένου πρὸς παραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέτως ἔχοντος, τοῦ δ̣' ἀνά[ν]τ̣η̣ τὴν θ̣έσιν ἔχοντ̣ος ἢ κατάντη πρὸς τοῦτ̣ο ἐνποδίζοντος κατ̣ὰ ἀντικοπὴν τοῦ μ̣ὴ κατ' ε̣ὐθ̣ὺ παρεν[π]ει̣π̣τοντ̣ος˙

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν Ποιήσουσιν˙ καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίας μὲν κειμένου πρὸς παραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέτως ἔχοντος ¬ τοῦ δ' ἀνάντη τὴν θέσιν ἔχοντος ἢ κατάντη πρὸς τοῦτο ἐνποδίζοντος κατὰ ἀντικοπὴν – τοῦ μὴ κατ' εὐθὺ παρενπείπτοντος˙

...They will make the analogous variety: and while [*the uterus*] is set [*directly*] from the opposite side [*of the penis*] toward the reception of all [*the seed*] that is well-positioned ¬ but with [*the uterus*] having a position back-against or down-against [*the penis*], it will be hindering in regards to that [*seed*] by a collision – with [*the seed*] not intruding directly in

[Nijs] ...they will produce the analogous difference: if [*the uterus*] lies facing it, then [*it*] is well placed for the reception of all [*the semen*], but if its position is tilted upwards or downwards, it hinders it in on that point through the resistance to that what does not penetrate straightforwardly [*sc. the semen*].

The more sperm that are released closer to the cervix, the shorter their path to the uterus and the less time they spend in the vagina's acidic environment – so more of them survive to reach the egg.

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning* *back/again*
ἀνάλογος *(ος, ον)*	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ *reasoning* *back/again*
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ *changing across*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ *in against*
ἡ ἐναντία αἱ ἐναντίαι	the opposite side	
ἐξ ἐναντίας	from the opposite side	

κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ *setting*
δεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	ΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ *accepting*
ἡ παραδοχή αἱ παραδοχαί	reception	ΠΑΡΑΔΟΧΗ *accepted across*
This word is also used by Philodemus for the reception of films (Sign .22)		
τιθέναι	to put [here, "to set up"]	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
εὐθετεῖν	to be well positioned	ΕΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ *placing well*
εὐθετός *(ή, όν)*	well-positioned	ΕΥΘΕΤΟΣ *placing well*
εὐθέτως	in a well-positioned way	ΕΥΘΕΤΩΣ
ἀνά + ἀντί = ἀνάντη	back against	ΑΝΑΝΤΗ *back/again against*
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ *process of placing*
κατά + ἀντί = κατάντη	down against	ΚΑΤΑΝΤΗ
ἐνποδίζειν = ἐμποδίζειν	to hinder	ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ *in foot*
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ *beating against*
ἰθύς *ionic for* εὐθύς *(εῖα, ύ)*	simply / directly	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ *well straight*
παρεμπίπτειν	to intrude [in/upon]	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *beside in falling*

5. The Nature of a Woman

Epicurus [or Demetrius Lacon], P.Herc. 908, col. 4 inf [(7)] | *col. 5* | *col. 6*

...ἤ τε φύσ[ις] τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς ἀνφ[ό]τερα δύναται εὐθετεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ [ἀ]νάλογον τῶι ἄρρενι...

...τε φυσ[ικὰ τῆ]ς γυναικὸς πρὸς [ἀμφότ]ε[ρ]α δύναται εὐθε[τεῖ]ν κα[ὶ] πάλιν ἐναντ[ι]οῦσθαι· κ[αὶ] γὰρ κατὰ τὸ [εἶ]ναι [τ]όπον [τῷ ἄ]ρρενι | καταβαλλόμενο[ς π]ρὸς τά, ποτὲ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τ' εἰ[σφέρ]εσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς [τ]ὸ [μ]ὴ πολὺ μηδὲ πάν[τ]ως· [ἀ]πό ταύτη[ς] τῆς [πα]ρα[λ]λαγῆς [τὴν] διαφορὰν γείνεσθα[ι] τῶν [μ]εγάλων ἀπο[τε]λεσ[θέν]των σωμάτ[ων]... ...[γυναι]κῶν... ...[μι]κρῶ[ν]... ...[πε]ριέχεσ[θαι]... ...φύσ[ει]ς... ...[κλ]ασμῷ... | ...δι' ἀφῆς... ...ἐνποδίζοντος διὰ ἀκεινησίας εἰς τὴν τῶν... ...δὴ τῷ τρόπ[ω]... ...οὐ τὸν τρόπον...

...ἥ τε Φύσις τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς ἀνφότερα δύναται: εὐθετεῖν, καὶ πάλιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. καὶ, γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον τῷ ἄρρενι | καταβαλλόμενος πρὸς τά – ποτὲ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τ' εἰσφέρεσθαι ¬ ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μὴ πολὺ, μηδὲ πάντως·

> ...and the Nature of a woman [*in general*] has the force towards both: to be well positioned, and to oppose against. indeed, according to what is analogous for the male while he is discharging in regards to [*both situations*] – sometimes [*the seed*] is carried in [*to the uterus*] through pleasure ¬ but sometimes [*it is carried in only*] to a limited extent, or entirely not at all.
>
> [Nijs] And the nature of the woman is capable of both: being well positioned and, on the other hand, to be adverse. And, indeed, analogous to the male...

ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς παραλλαγῆς, τὴν διαφορὰν γείνεσθαι τῶν μεγάλων ἀποτελεσθέντων σωμάτων... ...γυναικῶν... ...μικρῶν... ...περιέχεσθαι... ...φύσεις... ...κλασμῷ... ...δι' ἀφῆς... ...ἐνποδίζοντος, διὰ ἀκεινησίας εἰς τὴν τῶν... ...δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ... ...οὐ τὸν τρόπον...

from this variety [*in size*], the difference is produced among the large bodies that have been fully produced… …of women… …of small… …are contained… …Natures… …through an offshoot [*i.e. in the passageway to the uterus*]… …through touch… …with [ ] hindering, because of motionlessness into the [ ] of… …clearly in the way… …not the way…

> [Nijs] On Procreation *clearly aims to be a source of information on gynecological matters, operating through the approved Epicurean mechanism of multiple explanations, presumably to prevent people from experiencing irrational fears or, as one would imagine, from ascribing their inability to conceive to some kind of malevolent divine intervention.*

φυσικός (ή, όν)	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ἡ γυνή αἱ γυναῖκες	woman	**ΓΥΝΗ** *wife*
ἀμφότερος (ος, ον)	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is on both sides*
δύνασθαι	to have the force	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
εὐθετός (ή, όν)	well positioned	**ΕΥΘΕΤΟΣ** *placing well*
εὐθετεῖν	to be well positioned	**ΕΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ** *placing well*
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ἐναντιοῦσθαι	to oppose	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΥΣΘΑΙ** *in against*
ἀνάλογος (ος, ον)	analogous	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning back/again*
ἄρρην (εν)	male	**ΑΡΡΗΝ** *[not speaking]*
καταβάλλειν	to discharge	**ΚΑΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *thoroughly throwing*
καταβαλλόμενος (η, ον)	being discharged	**ΚΑΤΑΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *thoroughly throwing*
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	**ΗΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	**ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ** *bringing*
εἰσφέρεσθαι	to be carried into	**ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ**
	Part 2	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	**ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing across*
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
γείνεσθαι = **γίνεσθαι** = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing out*
ἀποτελεσθείς	having fully produced	**ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕΙΣ**
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἔχειν	to have	**ΕΧΕΙΝ** *holding*
ἔχεσθαι	to be held	**ΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *holding*
περιέχεσθαι	to be contained	**ΠΕΡΙΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *holding around*

ἡ **φύσις** αἱ **φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ὁ **κλασμός** οἱ **κλασμοί**	offshoot [here, "ridge"]	**ΚΛΑΣΜΟΣ** *dividing*
ἅπτειν	to touch	**ἍΠΤΕΙΝ** *fastening*
ἡ **ἀφή** αἱ **ἀφαί**	touch	**ἈΦΗ** *fastening*
ἐνποδίζειν = **ἐμποδίζειν**	to hinder	**ΕΝΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** **ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *in foot*
κινεῖν	to move	**ΚΙΝΕΙΝ** *moving*
ἡ **ἀκεινησία** αἱ **ἀκεινησίαι**	motionlessness, stillness	**ΑΚΕΙΝΗΣΙΑ** *state of not moving*
ὁ **τρόπος** οἱ **τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

[49. Summary of Objections to the Physicists]

Ἐπιτομὴ Τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

…Περὶ Ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς…

…On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians…

[50. Chairedemus]

Χαιρέδημος

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.27

…Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών. Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν…

…On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairedemus. On the Gods…

Extra Books

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 7/10

…[ἐν τοῖς Πε]ρ̣[ὶ τῆς τῶν ἀ]τ̣ό̣[μων ἀ]ν̣ομοι[ό]τητο̣ς καὶ π̣ε̣ρ̣ὶ παρεγκλίσεως καὶ τῆς τ̣οῦ ἀθρόου προκαταρχῆ[ς], καὶ περὶ τελειώ̣σ̣εως [ἄκρας] καὶ τ̣[ῆ]ς̣ [εὐδαιμ]ον[ίας ἐν] τοῖς Περὶ τελῶν. πρός γε̣ | μὴν τὰ κατηγορούμ̣ε̣να τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ βίου τ̣ῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, δι' αὐτῶν ἀπελογήθη τῶν ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις ἀμ̣ύθητα περὶ ἑκάστου παρατιθείς, ὡς Περὶ γραμματικῆς καὶ Περὶ ἱστορίας καὶ Περὶ παροιμιῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ Περὶ λ[έ]ξεως καὶ Περὶ ποιημάτων χρή[σεως κ]αὶ Περὶ εὐσεβ̣ε̣[ίας]…

…ἐν τοῖς [1] *Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀτόμων Ἀνομοιότητος* καὶ [2] *Περὶ Παρεγκλίσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀθρόου Προκαταρχῆς* – καὶ [3.1] *Περὶ Τελειώσεως Ἄκρας καὶ τῆς Εὐδαιμονίας* ἐν τοῖς [3.0] Περὶ Τελῶν

…in the [1] *On the Dissimilarity of Atoms* and [2] *On the Swerve and the Initial Beginning of the Aggregate* – and [3.1] *On the Highest Perfection and Wellbeing* in the [3.0] *On Fulfillments*

πρός γε μὴν τὰ κατηγορούμενα τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ βίου τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον – δι' αὐτῶν, Ἀπελογήθη τῶν ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις ἀμύθητα περὶ ἑκάστου παρατιθείς: ὡς [4] *Περὶ Γραμματικῆς* καὶ [5] *Περὶ Ἱστορίας* καὶ [6] Περὶ Παροιμιῶν καὶ τῶν Ὁμοίων καὶ [7] Περὶ Λέξεως καὶ [8] *Περὶ Ποιημάτων Χρήσεως* καὶ [9] *Περὶ Εὐσεβείας*…

but also, in response to the accusations against the reasoning and the way of life of those around Epicurus – through these [*writings*], He [*i.e., Zeno of Sidon*]? made his defense – supplying incredible [*amounts of material*] of the things in [*Epicurus'*]? books concerning each: such as [4] *On Grammar*, [5] *On History*, [6] *On Proverbs and Similar Things*, and [7] *On Terminology*, and [8] *On the Usage of Poems*, and [9] *On Piety*...

In the succeeding surviving columns, Philodemus is talking about his time with Zeno, and their frustration that "most of the Epicureans" have "inaction in the books"

τὸ ἄτομον **τὰ ἄτομα**	atom *("what is indivisible")*	**ΑΤΟΜΟΝ** *not cut*
ἀνόμοιος *(ον)*	dissimilar	**ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ** *not similar*
ἡ ἀνομοιότης **αἱ ἀνομοιότητες**	dissimilarly	
ἡ παρέγκλισις **αἱ παρεγκλίσεις**	swerve	**ΠΑΡΕΓΚΛΙΣΙΣ** *bending out beyond*
	LSJ "Epicur.Fr.280"	
ἀθρόος *(α, ον)*	aggregated	**ΑΘΡΟΟΣ** *in groups*
τὸ ἀθρόον **τὰ ἀθρόα**	aggregate	
ἡ προκαταρχή **αἱ προκαταρχαί**	initial beginning	**ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΡΧΗ** *thoroughly before beginning*
	LSJ "origin, **Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀθρόου Προκαταρχῆς**, *title of work by Zeno Epicureus, Phld.Herc.1005.7"*	
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
ἡ τελείωσις **αἱ τελειώσεις**	perfection	**ΤΕΛΕΙΩΣΙΣ** *result of the process of completing*
τὸ ἄκρον **τὰ ἄκρα**	the highest point	**ΑΚΡΟΝ** *highest*
ἄκρος *(α, ον)*	highest	**ΑΚΡΟΣ** *highest*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
	Part 2	
τὸ σύγγραμμα **τὰ συγγράμματα**	composition *[i.e., a piece of written work]*	**ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑ** *result of writing together*
ἡ γραμματική **αἱ γραμματικαί**	grammar	**ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ** *characteristic of the result of writing*
ἡ ἱστορία **αἱ ἱστορίαι**	history [systematic inquiry]	**ἹΣΤΟΡΙΑ** *wise one*
ἡ παροιμία **αἱ παροιμίαι**	proverb	**ΠΑΡΟΙΜΙΑ** *tale alongside* *"saying along the path"*
ὅμοιος *(α, ον)*	similar	**ὉΜΟΙΟΣ** *similar*
ἡ λέξις **αἱ λέξεις**	term / terminology	**ΛΕΞΙΣ** *speaking*
χρῆσθαι	to use	**ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ** *necessary*
ἡ χρῆσις **αἱ χρήσεις**	usage	**ΧΡΗΣΙΣ** *the process of necessary*

ἡ εὐσέβεια **αἱ εὐσέβειαι**	loyalty	**ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑ** *good loyalty*

List 1
(P.Herc. 1005, col. 7/10)

1	**Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀτόμων Ἀνομοιότητος**	On the Dissimilarity of Atoms
2	**Περὶ Παρεγκλίσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀθρόου Προκαταρχῆς**	On the Swerve and the Initial Beginning of the Aggregate
3	**Περὶ Τελῶν**	On Fulfillments *("On Ends")*
	which contains	
3.1	**Περὶ Τελειώσεως Ἄκρας καὶ τῆς Εὐδαιμονίας**	On the Highest Perfection and Wellbeing
4	**Περὶ Γραμματικῆς**	On Grammar
5	**Περὶ Ἱστορίας**	On History *(i.e., On Systematic Inquiry)*
6	**Περὶ Παροιμιῶν καὶ τῶν Ὁμοίων**	On Proverbs and Similar Things
7	**Περὶ Λέξεως**	On Terminology
8	**Περὶ Ποιημάτων Χρήσεως**	On the Usage of Poems
9	**Περὶ Εὐσεβείας**	On Piety

List 2

(P.Herc. 1005, col. 8/11)

1	**[τινές ἐπιστολαί]**	[some letters]
2	**ἡ περὶ Μετεώρων Ἐπιτομή**	the Summary on Celestial Phenomena *(to Pythocles)*
3	**Περὶ Ἀρετῶν**	On Virtues
4	**αἱ Ἀναφερόμεναι Ὑποθῆκαι**	the Recommended Precepts *(dedicated to Metrodorus)*
5	**αἱ Μαρτυρίαι**	the Testimonies *(i.e., "the Proofs")*
6	**Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν**	Against Plato's Gorgias *(in at least two books)*
7	**Πρὸς τοὺς Ῥήτορας**	Against the Rhetors *(dedicated to Polyaenus)*
8	**Περὶ Σελήνης**	On the Moon *(dedicated to Polyaenus)*
9	*n/a*	[other works] *(dedicated to Hermarchus)*

"List" 3

1	**πρὸς Ἡρακλείδην**	Against Heracleides	P.Herc. 1471 fr. 20, col. 123 (U16)

End of Fragments from Known Books

LETTERS
Ἐπιστολαί

Fragments from Known Letters

1.	**Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους**		To Important Persons
2.	**Epistulae Spūriae**		Spurious Letters
3.	**Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους**		To Friends Living In Egypt
4.	**Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους**		To Friends Living In Asia
5.	**Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους**		To Friends Living In Lampsacus
6.	**Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους**		To the Philosophers of Mytilene
7.	**Πρὸς Ἀθηναίον**	To Athenaeus	*"Of Athena"*
8.	**Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον**	To Anaxarchus	*"Ruler of Kings"*
9.	**Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν**	To Apelles	
10.	**Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην**	To Apollonides	*"Son of Apollo"*
11.	**Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον**	To Aristobuolos	*"Best Counsel"*
12.	**Πρὸς Δωσίθεον**	To Dositheus	*"God's Gift"*
13.	**Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον**	To Hermarchus	*"Leader guided by Hermes"*
14.	[**Πρὸς Ἑταίρας**]	[To A Companion]	
15.	**Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον**	To Eurylochus	*"Far-Reaching Defender"*
16.	**Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον**	To Herodotus	*"Given by Hera"*
17.	**Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν**	To Themista	*"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"*
18.	**Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα**	To Idomeneus	*"Strength of Mount Ida"*
19.	**Πρὸς Κράτερον**	To Craterus	*"Powerful"*
20.	**Πρὸς Κωλώτην**	To Colotes	
21.	**Πρὸς Λεόντιον**	To Leontion	*"Little Lion"*
22.	**Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον**	To Metrodorus	*"Mother's Gift"*
23.	**Πρὸς Μίθρην**	To Mithres	
24.	**[Πρὸς Μῦν]**	[To Mys]	*"Mouse"*
*	**Πρὸς Λεοντέα**	To Leonteus	*"Lion"*
25.	**Πρὸς Πολύαινον**	To Polyaenus	*"Much Praised"*
26.	**Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα**	To Pythocles	*"Glory of Apollo"*
27.	**Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη**	To Timocrates	*"Power of Honor"*
28.	**Πρὸς Φυρσῶνα**	To Phyrson	
29.	**Πρὸς Χαρμίδην**	To Charmides	*"Grace"*
30.	**Περὶ Ἐπιτηδευμάτων**	On Occupations	
31.	**Dē Stilpōne**	On Stilpo	
32.	**Ad Āpiam**	To Apia	
33.	**Supremōrum Diērum**	From His Last Days	

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.28

...Περὶ Βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί...

...On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters...

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

...τὸ δὲ Φυσικὸν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βίβλοις ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχεῖον ¬ τὸ δὲ Ἠθικὸν [ἔχει] τὰ περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Βίων* βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*...

...The Physical [*part of Epicurus' teaching is*] the entire theory about nature, and exists in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in the letters according to [*their*] basic components [*i.e., in an abridged form*] ¬ but the ethical Part [*concerns*] things relating to choice and avoidance, and it is in the books *On Lifestyles*, in the letters, and in the book *On Fulfillment*...

1. Affectionate Community

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.20.65

at vērō Epicūrus, ūnā in domō – et eā quidem angustā – quam magnōs, quantāque amōris cōnspīrātiōne cōnsentientis, tenuit amīcōrum gregēs! Quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicūrēīs

(Torquatus) but indeed Epicurus, in a single house – and in one quite small – maintained, in such harmony of loving affection, so great a pack of friends! Which is done even now by the Epicureans

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Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica, 2.36.115

Epicūrēōs, tot meōs familiārīs – tam bonōs, tam inter sē amantīs virōs!

the Epicureans, so many are my friends – such good, such affectionate men among themselves!

2. Frankness towards Friends

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 15 (column 116)

...καὶ δ[ιὰ] τί παụσαμένụων ἐπὶ τọ[ὺ]ς ὕμṿ[ου]ς μεṭ[α]βήσεται καὶ τού[τοις] δὲ ṇῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀ̣[νακ]άκχεσιν ἐṿηνοχόṭ[ας] ἐ̣π̣ιδείξει; σ̣ụνελ[όν]τι δ' εἰπεῖν οὕṭῳ παρρησίαι ‹χρήσεται› σοφὸς ἀνὴρ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ὡς Ἐπίκọυρος καὶ Μητρọ́δω[ρος εἰώθεσαν π]ρὸς...

...καὶ διὰ τί, παυσάντων, ἐπὶ τοὺς ὕμνους Μεταβήσεται; καὶ τούτοις δὲ πῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνακάκχεσιν ἐνηνοχότας Ἐπιδείξει;

...and why, when [*his criticisms*] have stopped, will [*the Teacher*] turn to the hymns [*of praise*]? and how will He also demonstrate to these [*students*] those [*other students*] who have endured his repeated teasing [*i.e., corrective ridicule*]?

συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν: οὕτω παρρησίαι χρήσεται σοφὸς Ἀνὴρ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους – ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος [εἰώθεσαν πρὸς]...

but to sum up is to say: a wise Man will use frankness toward his friends in the way Epicurus and Metrodorus were [*accustomed to do towards*]...

ἀνακακχάζειν	to tease again	**ΑΝΑΚΑΚΧΑΖΕΙΝ** *cackling back/again*

ἡ ἀνακάκχεσις	repeated teasing *hapax legomenon*	ΑΝΑΚΑΚΧΕΣΙΣ *cackling back/again*
ῥηθείς *(εἶσα, ἐν)*	said	ῬΗΘΕΙΣ *said*
ἡ παρρησία αἱ παρρησίαι	frankness	ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ *state of being said alongside*

[U95]

3. "Carry On Well" & "Live Eagerly"

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.14

καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ἀντὶ τοῦ "Χαίρειν" – "εὖ Πράττειν" καὶ "σπουδαίως Ζῆν"

and in his letters, instead of "Rejoice" – [*Epicurus writes*] "Do well" and "Live eagerly"

ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ *making ready away*
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ *equipping*
ἡ ἐπιστολή αἱ ἐπιστολαί	letter *[i.e., a sent message]*	ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ *equipping upon*
σπουδαῖος *(α, ον)*	eager	ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΣ *being eager*
σπουδαίως	eagerly	ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΣ

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 3.60 (On Plato)

Ἐπιστολαὶ τρεισκαίδεκα ἠθικαί, ἐν αἷς, Ἔγραφεν "εὖ Πράττειν" ¬ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ "εὖ Διάγειν" – Κλέων, "Χαίρειν"

[*Plato's*] thirteen letters are about ethics, in these, he writes "Do well" ¬ but Epicurus "Carry on well" – Cleon [*writes*] "Rejoice"

χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ *being cheerful*

The Suda, Χαίρειν (chi 166, greetings)

"Χαίρειν," οὕτως ἐπέγραφε Κλέων ¬ ὁ δὲ Πλάτων "εὖ Πράττειν" – ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος "εὖ Διάγειν"

"Rejoice," Cleon headed [*his letters*] in this way ¬ but Plato used "Do well" – Epicurus "Carry on well"

The Suda is probably paraphrasing Diogenes Laertius.

The Suda, Εὖ πράττειν (epsilon 3664, do well)

"εὖ Πράττειν," οὕτως ἡ Ἐπιγραφὴ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν Πλάτωνος. Ἔγραψε δὲ ἐπιστολὰς ιγʹ. Εἰσὶ δὲ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἴδους.

"Fare well," the Heading of Plato's letters are in this way. He wrote 13 letters. They are of the ethical form.

"εὖ Διάγειν," οὕτως Ἐπίκουρος ἐπέγραφε· "Χαίρειν" δὲ ἐπέγραφε Κλέων.

"Carry on well," Epicurus used to head [*his letters*] in this way; but Cleon headed [*his letters*] with "Rejoice."

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), Pro Lapsu Inter Salutandum (A Slip of the Tongue in Salutation), §6 sup.

καὶ τί σοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς Λέγω, ὅπου καὶ Ἐπίκουρος; ἀνὴρ πάνυ χαίρων τῷ χαίρειν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν πρὸ ἁπάντων αἱρούμενος: ἐν ταῖς σπουδαιοτέραις ἐπιστολαῖς (εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται ὀλίγαι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φιλτάτους μάλιστα – "Ὑγιαίνειν" εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ Προστάττει. πολὺ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀρχαίᾳ Κωμῳδίᾳ εὕροις τὸ "Ὑγιαίνειν" πρῶτον εὐθὺς Λεγόμενον

> and why do I speak to you of the ancients, when there is also Epicurus? a man very much cheerful in cheer and choosing pleasure above all else: in his more serious letters (and these are few), and especially in those to his dearest friends – He commands "Be Healthy" straightaway at the beginning. and very often in tragedy and in Old Comedy you would also find "Be Healthy" immediately said first

σπουδαῖος *(α, ον)*	serious	**ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΣ** *being eager*
σπουδαιότερος *(α, ον)*	more serious	**ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *being more eager*
ὑγιαίνειν	to be healthy	**ὙΓΙΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *making good life*

*Lucian's slip of the tongue was to say "Be Healthy" (**Ὑγιαίνειν**) in his first morning salutation to a friend. However this expression was not typically used in the morning (or at first greeting) – where "Rejoice" (**Χαίρειν**) would be expected.*

Lucian then considers the nuances of this custom and unapologetically explores his accidental error. Lucian shows that the greeting "Be healthy" had only more recently become established as a conventional farewell.

As part of his proof, Lucian says that Epicurus started some of his letters with "Health to you."

5. Philonides of Laodicea

*Philonides (**Φιλωνίδης**, "the descendant of the loving one") of Laodicea (fl.c. 160 BCE) was a proponent of Epicureanism.*

Philonides lived at the Seleucid royal court in Antioch. He was friends with Antiochus IV Epiphanes (a fifth-generation descendant of Seleucus I Nicator) and he also taught philosophy to Antiochus' nephew, Demetrius I Soter.

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 13, 14 (29)

…διαστικ[ὰ]… …[ποι]κίλα. Καὶ γὰρ πρὸ[ς τοὺς δο]ξάζοντας διεγ[έγ]κα[ι ποι]κίλως γεωμετρίας δ[ια]λεκτικ[ὴν] ῥήτορας δ[υσφ]η[μεῖ]… …[φιλ]ονικοῦν[τ]ες… …[λ]ελυκέναι ὑπὲρ… …[δὲ τοῦ ὀγ]δόου περὶ φύσεως καὶ ἄλλας παντοδα|πὰς εἰς τὰ δόγματ' α[ὐτοῦ] γεωμετρικὰς περὶ ἐλα[χίσ]του πολλάς. Πεπόηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους καὶ [τ]ὰς ἐπιτομὰς τ[ῶν] ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρ[ου,] Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου καὶ τῶν σ[υνηγ]μέ[νω]ν κατὰ γένος ἐπ[ι]στο[λῶν]…

…διαστικὰ… …ποίκιλα. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς δοξάζοντας διενέγκαι ποικίλως: γεωμετρίας, διαλεκτικὴν, ῥήτορας Δυσφημεῖ· …Φιλόνικούντες… …Λελυκέναι ὑπὲρ… …δὲ τοῦ ὀγδόου *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἄλλας παντοδαπὰς εἰς τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ – γεωμετρικὰς, περὶ ἐλαχίστου πολλάς.

> …punctuated… …diverse things. for indeed, to respond to those who holding opinions in various ways: [*Philonides*] is disparaging of geometry, dialectic, rhetors… …Quarrelers… …He had refuted on behalf of… …and of [*Epicurus'*] eighth [*book*] *On Nature* and many other assorted ones among his doctrines – many of them related to geometry, concerning the minimum.

Πεπόηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους – καὶ τὰς ἐπιτομὰς τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρου, Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου, καὶ τῶν συνηγμένων κατὰ γένος ἐπιστολῶν…

He produced useful works for idle youths – including abridgments of the letters of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, Hermarchus, and *[abridgments]* of those letters collected by type…

Dated Letters

[Obbink] The archon-dates attached to the Epistles and On Nature were likely not original – there is no parallel for such dating in the original Epicurean corpus. Instead, they seem to be later editorial additions, probably from a doctrinal compilation of the school from the 2nd century BCE.

Who added the dates is unknown. The strongest candidate is Philonides of Laodicea.

Caerimus (also spelled Charinus) is unfortunately often confused with the eponymous archon of 291–290 BCE, who was also named Charinus. Because of this confusion, it is possible some of these letters actually date 17 years later.

308 BCE

Under Caerimus

118th Olympiad

when Epicurus was about thirty-three

308/7 BCE was one year before Epicurus' return to Athens to establish the Garden. It was notable as a significant period of transition in Athenian politics.

During Caerimus' Archonship, Demetrius of Phalerum, the governor supported by the Macedonian regent Cassander, continued to hold sway over Athens. However, towards the end of Charinus' archonship, Demetrius Poliorcetes (Demetrius I, the Besieger), son of Antigonus I Monophthalmus, launched a successful military campaign to liberate Athens from Cassander's control.

In this year, Demetrius Poliorcetes ended Demetrius of Phalerum's (and thus Cassander's) control over Athens.

This began a new political era under Antigonid influence.

1. Scheduled Days for Light Eating

[=U158] Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 18.9

certōs habēbat diēs ille Magister voluptātis, Epicūrus, quibus malīgne famem exstinguēret: vīsūrus an aliquid dēesset ex plēnā et cōnsummātā voluptāte – vel quantum dēesset – et an dignum quod Quis magnō labōre pēnsāret.

that Master of pleasure, Epicurus, had certain days on which he would parsimoniously extinguish his hunger: to see whether anything was missing from full and complete pleasure – or how much was missing – and whether *[it was]* something worth someone paying with great effort.

hoc certē in iīs epistulīs Ait – quās scrīpsit Charīnō magistrātū ad Polyēnum. et quidem, Glōriātur nōn tōtō assē sē pāscī ¬ Metrodorum, quī nondum tantum prōfēcerit – tōtō.

He certainly says this in those letters – which he wrote during Charinus' magistracy *[in 308 BCE]* to Polyaenus. and indeed, He boasts of feeding himself on less than a full assarius ¬ Metrodorus, who had not yet advanced so far – on a full *[assarius]*.

[U96]

2. General Invitation to Feast – Public Generosity

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Epicurus, Book 1, P.Herc. 1232, f. 2 (col. 27) | f. 9 (col. 28)

…[ἐπὶ δὲ] Χαρίνου π[ρὸς Πολύαινον]… …κίνδυν[ο]ν… …καὶ σύμβολ[ον]… …πότον ὀρε[γεσθαι]… …τοὺς πότους καὶ… …[ὀρέξ]εις ἀφροδισί[ων]… …ολος ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ… …[ἐν τῶι] Συμποσίωι, κατα[δέδεικται] γὰρ Ἐπικούρωι… | μή[τε τοῖς] διὰ ταράχους

μ[οχ]θοῦσι τὰς π[ε]ρ̣ὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ μακαριϲ̣[το]τά[των] φύσεω[ν] ἐνν[οίας· λέγει δὲ κα]λεῖν εὐωχ[εῖ]σθαι αὐτούς τε κ̣αλ̣ῶς καὶ τ[οὺς] ἄλλους τούς τε [κ]ατὰ τὴν οἰκ[ίαν] ἅπ̣α̣ντας καὶ [τ]ῶν ἔξωθεν [μηδέν]α παραλείποντας, ὅσοι τ[ὰ]ς [εὐ]νοίας [καὶ] [τὰς] ἑαυτοῦ [κα]ὶ τὰ[ς τῶ]ν ἑαυ[τ]οῦ φίλων ἔχουσιν· οὐ γὰρ δημαγωγήσειν το[ῦ]το πράττοντας, τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυσιολ̣ό[γη]τ[ον] δ[η]μαγ[ωγ]ίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεω[ς οἰ]κείοις ἐνεργοῦντας μ[ν]η̣[σθ]ήσεσθαι πάντων τῶν τὰς εὐν[οίας] ἡμῖν ἐχόντων, ὅπως συ[γκαθ]αγίζωσιν τὰ ἐπὶ τῆι ἑαυτ[ῶν μα]καρίαι… …[καθ]ήκοντα…

…ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου πρὸς Πολύαινον… …κίνδυνον… …καὶ σύμβολον… …πότον ὀρεγεσθαι… …τοὺς πότους καὶ… …ὀρέξεις Ἀφροδισίων… …ὅλος ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ… …ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ, Καταδέδεικται γὰρ Ἐπικούρῳ…

…under [*the archonship in 308*[BCE]] of Charinus [*Epicurus wrote*] to Polyaenus… …danger… …and a symbol… …desired a drink… …the drinks and… …for the desires for Aphrodisian activities… …entirely based on reasoning… …at the Symposium, for it has been fully demonstrated by Epicurus…

…μήτε τοῖς διὰ ταράχους μοχθοῦσι τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ μακαριστοτάτων φύσεων ἐννοίας: Λέγει δὲ καλεῖν εὐωχεῖσθαι αὐτούς τε καλῶς καὶ τούς ἄλλους – τούς τε κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἅπαντας, καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν μηδένα παραλείποντας – Ὅσοι τὰς εὐνοίας καὶ τὰς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ φίλων ἔχουσιν·

…[*Epicurus does not exclude them*] nor those people who toil through their disturbances over thoughts concerning the best and most blessed natures: but [Epicurus] says that he calls them to feast well and also the others – all those in the household, with no one excluded from outside – as many as have goodwill both toward himself and toward his friends.

[Obbink] …as concerns those who do not experience turmoil and difficulty in their conceptions of natures that are best and most blessed. And he [*sc. Epicurus*] says that he invites them to join in a feast, just as he invites others – all those in the house and who leave out none [masc.] of those outside, as many as are well disposed both to him and to his friends.

οὐ γὰρ δημαγωγήσειν τοῦτο Πράττοντας – τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυσιολόγητον δημαγωγίαν – ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως οἰκείοις ἐνεργοῦντας: μνησθήσεσθαι πάντων τῶν τὰς εὐνοίας ἡμῖν ἐχόντων, ὅπως Συγκαθαγίζωσιν τὰ ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν μακαρίαι… …καθήκοντα…

for [*Epicurus says that the Kathēgemónes*] doing this is not engaging in demagoguery – the empty and unphysiological kind of demagoguery – but they are acting within what is proper for nature: [*they are*] remembering all those who possess goodwill toward us, so that they may join together in sacredly cooking what for all their own blessedness… …is fitting…

[Obbink] In doing this [he says] they will not be engaged in gathering the masses, something which is a form of meaningless "demagogy" and unworthy of the natural philosopher – rather, in practising what is congenial to their nature: they will remember all those who are well disposed to us so that on their blessed day they can join in making the sacrificial offerings that are fitting to…

> *Some people objected to Epicurus' use of religious language. Consider Plutarch "[Epicurus] speaks words contrary to what he philosophizes: and while sacrificing – he stands by the slaughtering priest as if [he was standing] by a cook."* (Non Posse, 1102 B)

ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning* *of producing*
ἀφυσιολόγητος *(ον)*	unphysiological *(i.e., not to be explained by science)*	**ΑΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΗΤΟΣ** *not capable of* *reasoning about* *producing*
συγκαθαγίζειν	to sacredly cook	**ΣΥΓΚΑΘΑΓΙΖΕΙΝ** *together fully* *sacred burning*

[U97]

3. Differentiating Types of Poverty

[= U160] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 3 [34]

...ὅ[τ]αν δ[ιανοῶν]ται περι[γ]ίνοντ[αι] τῶ[ν] κατὰ [τὴ]ν [ἔ]νδειαν κα[ὶ] πε[νί]αν καὶ δέ[ησι]ν· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...[π]άντ[α]... ...πενίαν μηδὲ... ...τὸ δὴ λέγομε[ν]... ...εἰς με[τ]άθεσιν ὅλ[η]ν τῆς ὅλ[ης] ὑπ[άρξεως ἄ]ξει· [κ]αὶ πρὸς [Πολ]ύαι[νον]... ...τὴν πενίαν ἀδι[άφορον] Ἐπίκ[ουρος]... ...[ἔνδει]αν ἢ προσδέ[ησιν]... ...κατ[ακ]ολουθεν... ...ὑπα[ρξ]...

...ὅταν Διανοῶνται: Περιγίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν καὶ πενίαν καὶ δέησιν· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...πάντα... ...πενίαν μηδὲ... ...τὸ δὴ Λέγομεν... ...εἰς μετάθεσιν ὅλην τῆς ὅλης ὑπάρξεως ἄξει·

...whenever they intend to: they prevail over what relates to want and poverty and need. during [*the archonship in 308*BCE] of Charinus... ...all things... ...poverty in no way... ...what we say... ...[*such a view*] will lead into a complete transformation of one's whole existence.

καὶ πρὸς Πολύαινον... ...τὴν πενίαν ἀδιάφορον Ἐπίκουρος... ...ἔνδειαν ἢ προσδέησιν... ...κατακολουθεῖν... ...ὕπαρξιν...

and also to Polyaenus... ...Epicurus [*says*] poverty is undifferentiated [*i.e., refers to different types of circumstances*]... ...want or additional need... ...to fully follow... ...existence...

ἀδιάφορος *(ος, ον)*	undifferentiated	**ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *not carrying apart*

[U98]

4. The Idle Man

[see U108] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 4 [35] sup.

...[πεν]ίαν καὶ... ...[πεν]ίαν κακὸν... ...[ἐπὶ] Χαρίνου... [30 lines missing] ...[λα]μβάνει [διὰ τὸ μη]δὲν ὅλως ἀπεργά[ζε]σθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἐάσομεν·

...πενίαν καὶ... ...πενίαν κακὸν... ...ἐπὶ Χαρίνου... "...Λαμβάνει διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι ¬ μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας Ἐάσομεν!"

...poverty and... ...poverty as an evil... ...under [*the archonship in 308*BCE] of Charinus... [*Epicurus wrote*] "...He accepts it because of absolutely not working at all ¬ we will allow him to remain in the countryside!"

This is from a section where Philodemus is quoting from letters that Epicurus wrote about dispensing money to various friends based on their specific circumstances and needs. For the case of this man, it is unclear if he received no dispensation or if "allowing him to remain in the countryside" was itself a gift.

[U99]

5. Security through Mutual Generosity

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.33

"κἂν πόλ[ε]μ[ος ἦι] δεινὸν οὐκ ἂ<νἔ>θ()εσθαι, θεῶν εἵλο()[ων ὄν]των·" καὶ Π[ολυαίνωι·] "καθαρὰν τ[ὴν ζωὴν] διηχέναι κ[αὶ διά]ξειν σὺν αὐτ[ῶι] Μάτρωνι, θε[ῶν εἵ]λεων ὄντων·" [καὶ] πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν [ἐ]πὶ Χαρίνου· "τῆ[ι] φ[ιλί]αι φί[λων] αὐτῶν·" μεν... ...ἔξωθ[εν ἐ]πιφέρον[τ]ος· [ὁ δ' ἀ]δελφὸς α[ὐτ]οῦ [κ]αὶ ζηλωτὴς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐσχηκὼς ἐν τοῖς λόγ[οις] [π]ροκοπήν φη[σιν] "εἶναι τὴ[ν] ἀπ' ἀρ[χυ]ρείου β[ο]ήθειαν [θεοῖς] ὁσίως δέον [ν]έμ[ειν]" οὐ πρὸς ἰδιώτη[ν γρά]φων ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φ[ύρ]σω[να] τὸν Κολοφ[ώνιον, ἄν]δρα καὶ οὐ[δενὸς κατὰ] τὰ πολ[ιτ]...

"κἂν Πόλεμος ἦ – δεινὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔσεσθαι, '*θεῶν εἵλεων ὄντων*'"

[*to Metrodorus, Epicurus writes*] "even if there were a war – it would not be dreadful, '*while the gods are gracious*'"

[Obbink] *Traditional expressions stressed that success was impossible except "with the gods" and that nothing could be achieved without them. The form of the prayer in the genitive absolute, much like "God Willing" in English, is seen in Euripides and Menander.*

καὶ Πολυαίνῳ "καθαρὰν τὴν ζωὴν διηχέναι καὶ διάξειν σὺν αὐτῷ Μάτρωνι, θεῶν εἵλων ὄντων·"

and [*Epicurus writes*] to Polyaenus "[*that you have*] passed through and continue to live a clear life with Matron himself, '*while the gods are gracious*'"

*"clear (**καθαρὰν**)" of all vain care. Epicurus probably held that this is what all people actually (or originally) intended to express when they used such language or engaged in rituals of purification.*

Matron is mentioned in a letter (probably to Metrodorus' daughter) "...you are doing well, especially if you are healthy and your mama too – and while you are obeying your father and Matron in everything (just as before)."

*It is possible that Matron was the tutor (**παιδαγωγός**) of Polyaenus – who was a tutor to Pythoclês – who, in turn, became a tutor to the sons of a man named Cronius. (P.Herc. 1418)*

καὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ Χαρίνου "τῇ φιλίαι φίλων αὐτῶν... ...ἔξωθεν ἐπιφέροντος·

and again to the same [*Polyaenus*], during [*the archonship in 308*[BCE]] of Charinus [*Epicurus says*] "through the friendship of their friends... ...while supplying from an external source."

ὁ δ' Ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ζηλωτὴς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐσχηκὼς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "προκοπήν" φησιν "εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀργυρείου βοήθειαν θεοῖς ὁσίως Δέον νέμειν," (οὐ πρὸς ἰδιώτην γράφων ¬ ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φύρσωνα τὸν Κολοφώνιον, ἄνδρα καὶ οὐδενὸς κατὰ τὰ πολιτικά)...

his Brother [*Neocles*], both an admirer and having achieved divine advancement in [*Epicurus'*] reasonings, says that "It is necessary to piously distribute to the gods the assistance from silver reserves," (writing not to a private individual ¬ but to Phyrson of Colophon, a man not insignificant in terms of civic standing)...

[Obbink] *Philodemus apparently had access to the letters of Epicurus' brothers.*

εἴλεος = **ἵλαος** *(ος, ον)*	gracious	**ΕΙΛΕΟΣ** *favoring / merciful*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*

[U100]

6. Festival on the 20th – Oaths without Euphemisms

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.28.806 – 1.30.846

...τὴν τω[ν] Χοῶν ἑορτὴν [συν]εορτάζων καὶ [τὰ] μυστήρια τά[στι]κὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλ[λας ἐπὶ τὸν τε]θλιμμένον [δεῖπν]ον, αὐτόν τε [δεῖν τ]αύτην ἄγειν [τὴν ταῖς] εἰκά<σ>ι διαφό[ροις εἰλ]απινα[σ]ταῖς, [τῶν κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν ὅ[λως ὁσί]αν ἐπιλαμπρυ[νάντω]ν, καὶ καλέσαν[τα πάντ]ας εὐωχῆσαι· [μετ]ὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν [ὅτι μ]ὲν ὅρκοις καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήσεσιν ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆσθαι γελοῖον ὑπομιμνήσκειν ἀναμέστου τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὔσης· προσῆκον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι παρῄνει τὰς δι' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πί[σ]τεις φυλάττειν καὶ μάλ[ι]στα πάντων αὐτῶι γ[ε] Δι[ὶ] φυλάττειν τόνδε τ[ὸν] φανερὸν τρόπ[ον], καὶ οὐ γράφων "ναὶ τ[ὼ] ὅζω" καὶ "τί γάρ;" [ἔμελε δὲ] καὶ Κωλώτηι [πάντω]ν τε ὅρκων καὶ [πάσης] θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρί[νου καὶ ἐπὶ] Διοτίμ[ου παραινεῖ] τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶς τρα]πέζης [συνθήκην μὴ] παραβαί[νειν· καὶ] μὴν...

...[1] τὴν τῶν Χοῶν ἑορτὴν συνεορτάζων καὶ [2] τὰ Μυστήρια τἀστικὰ καὶ [3] τὰς ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὸν τεθλιμμένον δεῖπνον: αὐτόν τε δεῖν ταύτην ἄγειν τὴν ταῖς εἰκάσι διαφόροις εἰλαπινάσταις – τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὅλως ὁσίαν ἐπιλαμπρυνάντων – καὶ καλέσαντα πάντας εὐωχῆσαι·

…and that while [*Epicurus*] was joining in celebrating [1] the festival of the Choes [*at the Anthesteria*] and the [2] urban Mysteries [*i.e., the Attic Dionysia*] and [3] the other [*festivals*] at a meagre dinner: and that it was necessary for ⁎him to lead this [*festival*] on the twentieth for distinguished revelers – while those in the house decorated it most piously – and having invited all to feast.

⁎this may be a reference to Epicurus himself doing the hosting and inviting ¬ or it may be a reference to Phyrson of Colophon's friend Theodotus of Colophon (Theodotus was mentioned in the text preceding this quote). Theodotus was, like Phyrson, a contemporary with the **Καθηγεμόνες**, *and a native of Colophon – but probably a member of the Epicurean community at Athens.*

The **Anthesteria, Ἀνθεστήρια** *was a three-day Halloween-like festival dedicated to Dionysus and the dead, celebrated from the 11th to the 13th of Anthesterion (late February to early March) in Athens:*

- *Day one,* **Pithoigia, Πιθοιγία** (Cask Opening Day) *focused on opening new jars of wine.*

- *Day two,* **Choes**, **Χοαί** (Jug Drinking Day) *centered around silent drinking contests – to speak was to be eliminated from the competition – everyone got a personal chous,* **χοῦς** *(wine jug) to participate in the drinking competition, including children and slaves – often provided by the state.*

[Obbink] *Epicurus' interest in this festival can be seen from the fact that it was an important time for private cult ceremonies. Teachers customarily received a present on the day of the Choes.*

- *Day three,* **Chytroi, Χύτροι** (Cooking-Pot Day) *dedicated to rituals appeasing the dead and cooking in ritual pots. At the end of this day, there was a ritual of expulsion, asking the dead to leave the festival.*

The urban rites were an extension of the Dionysian mysteries adapted to fit the urban setting of Athens. The rites were in honor of Dionysus, and could reference to either:

- ***the Lenaea*** *(in the month of Gamelion), or*
- ***the Lesser Mysteries*** *(20-26 Anthesterion)*

μετὰ ταῦτα, τοίνυν, ὅτι μὲν ὅρκοις καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήσεσιν Ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆσθαι γελοῖον Ὑπομιμνήσκειν – ἀναμέστου τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὔσης·

after these things, then, it is ridiculous to recall that they used to employ oaths and epithets of the gods – since such things are wholly beside my effort [*in writing this*].

[Obbink] *For example* **μὰ Δία**, *or* **νὴ Δία**, *or* **πρὸς τῶν Θεῶν**. *Epicurus' recorded oaths are usually occasioned in polemics against adversaries, or by the importance of the argument being treated.*

*But for Epicurus, whose rejection of divination (***μαντική***) was necessitated in part by his denial of bivalence in future contingency, an oath (or command or prayer) has a special status in so far as it deals with the future. In order to avoid universal necessitation in unbroken chains of physical and logical causation, certain future-tense locutions are exempt from the principle of bivalence (according to which every proposition must be true or false).*

Προσῆκον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι Παρήνει τὰς δι' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πίστεις φυλάττειν: καὶ μάλιστα πάντων αὐτῷ γε Διὶ φυλάττειν τόνδε τὸν φανερὸν τρόπον ¬ καὶ οὐ γράφων "ναὶ τὼ ὄζω" καὶ "τί γάρ;"

and it is proper to say that he advised guarding the beliefs through them and their kind [*of expressions*]: and most of all guarding this evident way [*of swearing*] by Zeus himself ¬ and not writing [*euphemistically, for example*] "By the twin shoots! [*i.e., Castor and Pollux*]" and "So what?"

[Obbink] *Speaking euphemistically in reference to the gods, implies a fear of the gods. Epicurus dissuaded from both. Philodemus' contention here is that an oath sworn by the "twin shoots" is ambiguous – it is a circumlocution to avoid naming any specific divinity. This euphemistic form of oath was accordingly avoided by Epicurus, in favour of the straightforward "by Zeus! (***νὴ Δία***)."*

Ἔμελε δὲ καὶ Κωλώτῃ πάντων τε ὅρκων καὶ πάσης θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου καὶ ἐπὶ Διοτίμου: Παραινεῖ τὴν καθ' ἱερᾶς τραπέζης συνθήκην μὴ παραβαίνειν·

> [Epicurus] was careful also with Colotes with all oaths and all theology. and during [*the archonship in 308*BCE] of Charinus and also *during* [*the archonship in 285*BCE] of Diotimus: He advised not to violate the pact in accordance with the sacred table.

[Obbink] *It may be said that for an Epicurean, the swearing of an oath can exhibit or even create a disposition (**διάθεσις**), in one's soul to fulfil it.*

For Epicurus an oath may, depending on the disposition of the swearer, 'be felicitous' regardless of its literal fulfilment and without its contrary necessarily being a false statement – i.e., to this extent, he accepted the conventional usage over the natural direct meaning (a view which in some respect anticipates modern theories of the pragmatics of speech).

*Similarly, Hermarchus denies the validity of oaths in courtroom rhetoric. For they cannot in fact provide a belief based on experience (**πίστις**) of their fulfilment which has not yet occurred.*

An oath only reflects the swearer's current intention or will – which is not determined or necessary in outcome. But the mental state of expressing an oath may influence one's future physical actions – thus shaping reality.

(Philodemus, Rhetoric, Book 2)

[U101]

In 297 BCE, Demetrius Poliorcetes learned the wealthy Athenian Lacháres was working (with Cassander's support) to undermine the democracy that Demetrius had allowed the Athenians to reestablish after his conquest, back in 307, of the prior regime (which was also supported by Cassander).

Demetrius responded with a fraught but ultimately successful operation against Cassander's forces that were holding Athens. It was at this time that "the philosopher Epicurus sustained the lives of his associates with beans, which he counted out and distributed among them" (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 34)

294 BCE
Under Olympiodorus
121th – 122th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about forty-seven

Olympiodorus served for two terms (therefore his archonship spanned from 294 to 292 BCE).

During this time, Demetrius Poliorcetes defeats Archidamus, the king of Sparta in a pitched battle. He enters Laconia and takes 500 Spartan prisoners.

Alexander V of Macedon (son of Cassander) asks Demetrius for his support – but once in the Macedonian court Demetrius is warned of a plot to assassinate him. He preemptively has his guards kill Alexander V.

Demetrius takes the Macedonian throne, and Lysimachus consents to Demetrius' kingship.

After the famous "Lovesickness of Antiochus," Seleucus consents to Antiochus' marriage to Stratonice (who was Demetrius' daughter, Seleucus' wife, and Antiochus' stepmother).

The preceding columns preserve part of a letter that shows Epicurus, with praise and optimism, urging Timocrates to support others in philosophy.

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 14

...ἀδελφὸς μὲν [αὐτ]ọῦ Τιμοκράτης, μηθὲν ἐλόṇτων αὐτῶν αὐτούς, καὶ γὰρ αὐ[τὸς] μηδ' ἐπι[ταθ]εὶς {ἂν} ἐὰν ἥκοι καὶ [ἔς] τι πρὸς [τ]ὸ εὔνο[υν] ἐκτενεῖ σώ[ιζων] τὸν... καὶ \δί/ αὐτὸ... γνοὺς [τὴ]ν ἐπ̣[ιμέ]λειαν ἡ[μῶν αὐ]τῶν ποιεῖσθαι.' δηλοῦται, δ' ἀμέλει, καὶ γ[ε]γονυῖά τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπί[κουρ]ο[ν φ]ροντίς. ἐπ' Ὀλυμπιοδώρου γ[ράφει ἤ]τοι γε [τινὰ] δεῖ τόνων [ἀντέχεσθαι]... ...καταμ[αθόν]τα τὰ πρὸς...

...ἀδελφὸς μὲν αὐτοῦ, Τιμοκράτης – μηθὲν ἐλόντων αὐτῶν αὐτούς – καὶ γὰρ Αὐτὸς, μηδ' ἐπιταθεὶς, ἐὰν ἥκοι καὶ ἔς τι πρὸς τὸ εὔνουν – Ἐκτενεῖ σώιζων τὸν...

...[*along with*] his brother, Timocrates – because they in no way took it upon themselves – for even if He, not having been urged, had also come with something relating to goodwill – He would have shown zeal while preserving the...

Timocrates did not take advantage of opportunities to act with goodwill.

"...Γνοὺς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι." Δηλοῦται, δ' ἀμέλει: καὶ γεγονυῖά τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον Φροντίς. ἐπ' Ὀλυμπιοδώρου, Γράφει "ἤτοι, γε τινὰ Δεῖ τόνων ἀντέχεσθαι... ...καταμαθόντα τὰ πρὸς..."

"...Having realized that the responsibility was our own." but it is evident without a doubt: a certain concern about the things regarding Epicurus also had come into being regarding him [*i.e., Timocrates*]: during [*the archonship in 294 BCE*] of Olympiodorus, He [*i.e., Epicurus*] writes "either, one must maintain a certain [*aspect*] of tone [*i.e., the tenor of one's way*]... ...having fully grasped the matters concerning..."

The next column continues with "...trainings of such a kind, and no one, as [together] with Timocrates we... as youths, remained among so many, just as even now a very [] figure has entered in, and as [being] of the same character... in their love of wisdom, I praise you..."

292 BCE
Under Philippus
122th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about forty-nine

In 292/1 BCE the Boeotians (with help from the Aetolians and the Spartans) revolt against Demetrius.

Demetrius delegates command of his forces in Boeotia to his son, Antigonus II Gonatas who defeats the Boeotians – by sieging Thebes.

Seleucus appoints his son Antiochus I Soter as co-regent of the new Seleucid empire.

1. Dispersing Funds

[=U98] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 4 (35) fin.

...[πεν]ίαν καὶ... ...[πεν]ίαν κακὸν... [30 lines missing] ...τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺ[ς] ἐṇ Λαμψάκωι φί[λους ἐπ]ὶ Φιλίππου καὶ πάν[τως ἀ]π̣οδεξόμεθα· κα[ὶ] γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν ειπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐ[ργα]σίας [κ]αὶ λατρείας...

...πενίαν καὶ... ...πενίαν κακὸν... [...] ...τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκωι φίλους ἐπὶ Φιλίππου "καὶ πάντως Ἀποδεξόμεθα – καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν Εἴπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐργασίας καὶ λατρείας..."

...poverty and... ...poverty as an evil... [...] ...as for the matter concerning the friends in Lampsacus under [*the archonship in 292 BCE*] of Philippus [*Epicurus wrote*] "We will absolutely approve it – for He mentioned not only poverty, but also labors and services..."

Here Epicurus appears to be approving for money to given people in Lampsacus.

3. Lýkos, the Young Student

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 10

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαρ[ιδή]μωι [γ]ράφ[ων]· 'ἤκουσα Λύκ[ου] φησίν (ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' ὅτι ν[εα]νίσκον... ...Θεμίστ<ι> δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππου· 'Λύκον φὴ[ς] πιστ[ὸν] εὔτακτόν... ...κατ' αὐτὰ παρακ[αλοῦ]ντα...'

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαριδήμωι γράφων· "Ἤκουσα Λύκου" Φησίν "Ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' – ὅτι νεανίσκον..."

...writing to Charidemus about his presence in Athens, [*Epicurus*] says "I heard of Lycus, for He has come to us – that the young man..."

*I am unsure of the full identification of Charidemus (**Χαρίδημος**) "Grace of the People." Presumably he is another friend and member of the school. Epicurus had (along with his brothers Neocles and Aristobuolos) a brother named Chairedemus (**Χαιρέδημος**) "Joy of the People."*

***Λύκος** seems to be a young student that has joined the school.*

...Θεμίστι δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππου "Λύκον Φὴς πιστὸν, εὔτακτόν... ...κατ' αὐτὰ παρακαλοῦντα..."

...and to Themista during [*the archonship in 292BCE*] of Philippus "You say Lycus is trustworthy, well-ordered... ...inviting in accordance with those very things..."

4. Stoa Poikile

[see U156] Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176, fr. 5 col. 24

...ἐπειδὰν μεθ' Ἕρμαρχον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄ[λλων] Ἐπι[κού]ρου φίλων ποιῶμαι τὴν γραφὴν. ὅλως δὲ τοιούτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς π[ρ]ὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίοις ὁμιλίαις ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οὐ μόνο[ν τ]οὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπί τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸ[ν] καὶ [Λ]εον[τέα, ἀλ]λὰ [καὶ τοὺς]... ...καὶ π[ρο]βάς· ...[Πο]λυαιν[ος]...

...ἐπειδὰν, μεθ' Ἕρμαρχον, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἐπικούρου φίλων Ποιοῦμαι τὴν γραφὴν.

...when, along with Hermarchus, I undertake the writing about the other friends of Epicurus also.

ὅλως δὲ, τοιούτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι, καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίοις ὁμιλίαις, ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος – ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς Κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν:

and in general, Polyaenus conducted himself with such dispositions and feelings and with gracious conversations toward each person – that He made those from other philosophers well-disposed toward him:

οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς – ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπί τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ Λεοντέα – ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς... ...καὶ προβάς... ...Πολυαινος...

not only those from the Stoa Poikile – concerning [*all of*] whom even Epicurus wrote during [*the archonship in 292BCE*] Philippus, both to [*Polyaenus*] and to Leonteus – but also those... ...and [*he who*] advanced... ...Polyaenus...

*It also seems that, while in his early fifties, Epicurus was writing about "those from the Stoa Poikile (**τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς**)"*

[288 BCE]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 1008, col. 13 med.

[pior text] τ̣[ο]ὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀνθρ[ώποις πρᾴ]ως διὰ λόγων ἢ ἔργων ὁμιλήσαντας· καὶ πάλι τοὺς ἐναντίως δι' ἓν ῥῆμα βαρὺ δυσχέρειαν ἐπισπασαμέ[ν]ους, ὡς Δημήτριον, ὅτε Μακε[δ]όνε[ς] ἀπο[λιπ]όντες αὐτὸν πρὸς Πύ̣[ρον] μετ̣έστησαν [contintues]

τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀνθρώποις πρᾴως διὰ λόγων ἢ ἔργων ὁμιλήσαντας ¬ καὶ, πάλι, τοὺς ἐναντίως δι' ἓν ῥῆμα βαρὺ δυσχέρειαν ἐπισπασαμένους – ὡς Δημήτριον (ὅτε Μακεδόνες ἀπολιπόντες αὐτὸν, πρὸς Πύῤον μετέστησαν)

> those others who associated gently with people through words or actions ¬ and, in contrast, those who opposingly provoked resentment with a single harsh word – just like Demetrius (when the Macedonians, abandoning him, defected to Pyrrhus)

285 BCE
Under Diotomus
124th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about fifty-six

Demetrius Poliorcetes and his army had been chased across Asia Minor to the Taurus Mountains by the armies of Lysimachus and Seleucus.

In 285/4 BCE Demetrius is deserted by his troops and surrenders to Seleucus at Cilicia, where Seleucus keeps him as a royal prisoner.

Theophrastus dies.

Sacred Dining Tables

[see U100] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.29.838 – 1.30.846

[ἔμελε δὲ] καὶ Κωλώτηι [πάντω]ν̣ τε ὅρκων καὶ [πάσης] θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρ̣ί[νου καὶ ἐπὶ] Διοτίμ[ου παραινεῖ] τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶς τρα]πέζης [συνθήκην μὴ] παραβαί[νειν·]

Ἔμελε δὲ καὶ Κωλώτῃ πάντων τε ὅρκων καὶ πάσης θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου καὶ ἐπὶ Διοτίμου: Παραινεῖ τὴν καθ' ἱερᾶς τραπέζης συνθήκην μὴ παραβαίνειν·

> [Epicurus] was careful also with Colotes for all oaths and all theology. and during [*the archonship in 308BCE*] of Charinus and also [*during the archonship in 285BCE*] of Diotimus: He advised not to violate the pact in accordance with the sacred table.

*[Obbink] The sacred dining-table (**τράπεζα ἱερά**) was table dedicated to the gods at feasts and festivals, on which meats and offerings were set out. They were especially associated with the consumed meat of animal sacrifices and with communal dining.*

*These sacred dining-tables (**τράπεζαι ἱεραί**) were important accessories of the cults of heroes in Greece. The Epicureans were known to use them and associated them with their sacred celebrations in honor of dead members of the school.*

(Plutarch, De Latenter Vivendo, 1129A)

*For the Epicureans, these common meals defined their civic status as a philosophical fellowship (**θίασος**).*

"Regarding Those Who Are Occupied"

[=U168] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 24

…[τὸ]ν ἀγαθ[ὸν]… …τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀσχ[όλο][υς]… …α̣ὐτῶι καὶ μνημονεύ[ει] κατὰ Δι[ό]τιμο[ν] Ἐπίκουρος ἄρ[χο]ντα τοῦ βυβλ[ίου] Φύρσωνι γο[ῦν] γράφων· Ἀπέστει[λε]ν δ[ὲ] ἡ[μῖν] καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺ[ς ἀσ]χ[όλους' κ]αὶ 'κἂ[ν ἠ]ναγκασμέν[ος]… …[ές μεγ]ιστ' ἂν ἥκοις κ[α]κὰ… …τὸν τρό[πον] τ[οῦτο]ν καὶ τοσ[οῦτ]όν τε… …εἰ καὶ Νικάν[ο]ρ…

…τὸν ἀγαθὸν… …τὸ 'Πρὸς Τοὺς Ἀσχόλους'… …αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύει, κατὰ Διότιμον Ἐπίκουρος, ἄρχοντα τοῦ βυβλίου – Φύρσωνι γοῦν γράφων "Ἀπέστειλεν δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ 'Πρὸς Τοὺς Ἀσχόλους' καὶ κἂν ἠναγκασμένος… …ές

μέγιστ' ἂν Ἥκοις κακὰ... ...τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτόν τε... ...εἰ καὶ Νικάνορ..."

> ...a good man... ...that [*work*] 'Regarding Those who are Occupied'... ...Epicurus also reminds him, during [*the archonship in 285*^{BCE}] of Diotimus, the archon of the book's [*composition*] – in any case [*Epicurus*] writes to Phyrson [*of Colophon*] "He sent to us that [*work*] 'Regarding Those who are Occupied' and even if being forced... ...You would fall into the gravest evils... ...this way and so great... ...even if Nīkánor..."

Funds were raised by friends of Epicurus and placed at his disposal. *(U 101, 130)*

We know that Nīkánor was supported by Epicurus, as Epicurus wrote in his will "Let them provide for Nīkánor as I have thus far done."

The identity of the author of "Regarding Those Who Are Occupied" is unclear.

ἡ σχολή **αἱ σχολαί**	school	**ΣΧΟΛΗ** *leisure*
ἡ ἀσχολία **αἱ ἀσχολίαι**	occupation	**ΑΣΧΟΛΙΑ** *not leisure*

284 BCE
Under Isaeus
124th Olympiad, 284/3 BCE
when Epicurus was about fifty-seven

In 284/3 BCE Lysimachus has his son, Agathocles, put to death. This causes public outrage and much loss of political support. Agathocles' immediate family flees to the Seleucid court.

Seleucus invades Lysimachus' territory in Asia Minor.

Antigonus II Gonatas offers everything he has to Seleucus for the release of his father Demetrius. Seleucus refuses.

Hostile Macedonians

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* Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On the Philosophers, VH[1] VIII cap. 5, 7
P.Herc. 1057? *I am not able to find any source for this beyond Usener*

...εἶθ' [ὕ]στερον [τοὺς ἐχθίσ]τους κατα[λ]ύει[ν] Μακε[δόνας], ὡς τ[ό]τε ἐπ' [Ἰσα]ίου γρά[φει]...

...εἶθ' ὕστερον τοὺς ἐχθίστους καταλύειν Μακεδόνας – ὡς τότε ἐπ' Ἰσαίου Γράφει...

> ...then afterward to overthrow the most hostile Macedonians – as he writes was done at times during [*the archonship in 284*^{BCE}] of Isaeus...

This was about the same time as the death of Demetrius Poliorcetes (while in royal detainment under his son-in-law Seleucus). The "hostile Macedonians" probably refers to the ani-Antigonid alliance (Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy, & Pyrrhus), which split control of his former territories.

[U102]

283 BCE
Under Euthius
124th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about fifty-eight

In $283^{/2}$ BCE Demetrius Poliorcetes dies from overindulgence while a royal captive of the Seleucid regime.

Demetrius's son Antigonus II Gonatas assumes the title of King of Macedonia (at first, in name only, as Lysimachus now controls Macedonia)

Demetrius' remains are given to Antigonus II and he is honored with a grand funeral in Corinth. After this, Demetrius is interred in the town of Demetrias which he had founded.

Support for Leonteus

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 7

...ἐπιμεληθείσ’ ἐπ' Εὐθ[ίου] δὲ περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὑτοῦ διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκωι φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων· "ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ [ὅτι] δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα... ...συ[να]χθόμεθα τῆι παρὰ | τἀνδρ[ὸς]... ...Λ[ε]οντε[ῖ δ]ὲ...

...ἐπιμεληθείς ἐπ' Εὐθίου – δὲ περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὑτοῦ Διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων "Ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ ὅτι δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα... ...Συναχθόμεθα τῇ παρὰ τἀνδρὸς... ...Λεοντεῖ δὲ..."

> ...when it had been taken care of during [*the archonship in 283BCE*] of Euthius – and [*Epicurus decided*] he will explain to his friends in Lampsacus about his choice, sending a letter [*saying*] "indeed, we heard that Leonteus [ ] everything... ...We will be gathered by the man's side... ...but for Leonteus..."

Civic Illusions vs. True Freedom

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), *Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 32*

(DCLP) ...γρά[φων Ἐ]πίκουρος... ...ἀγοραία[ς μηθὲ]ν [ἐνόμισ]ας τὰς π[ρὸς ε]ὐδ[αίμον]α βίον [σ]υντεινούσας ἰδ[έ]ας τοῦ [βιοῦ].' καὶ πάλιν· 'ἄξιος γὰρ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν τῶ[ι] ὅλωι ἤθει [ε]ἶναι οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς.' τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ τούτου προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δἰ ἃς αἰτίας ἔφαμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους· λέγωμεν δ' ἡμεῖς ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς μνημονεύει τ[ο]ῦ συνγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ...ἐ[πὶ] δ' {Ὁρίου / Εὐ[θ]ίου} Λεοντεῖ προγρά[ψας, ἐ]πέσταλκ[ε] δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρ[ος πρὸς] Μιθρῆν ἐ[πι]στ... ...ολὴν [ὑ]πὲρ [τῶν] μερῶν τούτων.... ...γράμμ[ατα δ]ὲ τῶ... ...βοηθεια... ...[τὸ]ν... ...Ἰδομεν[έα]... ὥς φησιν... ...[Μιθ]ρῆν πρὸς...

...γράφων Ἐπίκουρος... "...ἀγοραίας μηθὲν Ἐνόμισας τὰς πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον συντεινούσας ἰδέας τοῦ βιοῦ"

> ...Epicurus writes... "...You consider the ideas of lifestyle that contribute to a good-spirited lifestyle in no way vulgar"

καὶ πάλιν "ἄξιος γὰρ – νὴ τοὺς Θεοὺς! – Ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν, τῷ ὅλῳ ἤθει, εἶναι ¬ οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς"

> and again "by the Gods! – through your disposition, you revealed to us that you were deserving ¬ not according to the laws of a free livelihood"
>
> " ¬ not merely in the conventions of civic freedom"

It is not clear who Epicurus is complimenting.

τὰ, μὲν δὴ, περὶ τούτου Προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δι' ἃς αἰτίας Ἔφαμεν – καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους

> therefore, let these matters concerning this be additionally assigned for now for the reasons we mentioned – along with those concerning Mithres

λέγωμεν δ' Ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς Μνημονεύει τοῦ συνγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ...ἐπὶ δ' Εὐθίου Λεοντεῖ προγράψας. ἐπέσταλκε δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Μιθρῆν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μερῶν τούτων... ...γράμματα... ...βοήθεια... ...Ἰδομενέα... ὥς Φησιν... ...Μιθρῆν, πρὸς...

let us say, then, that he mentions this composition also in many other places. He also wrote during [*the archonship in 284*^BCE] of Isaeus… …and during [*the archonship in 283*^BCE] of Euthius, having made a proclamation to Leonteus. and Epicurus also sent a letter to Mithres concerning these matters… …writings… …help… …Idomeneus… as He says… …Mithres, to…

ἀγοραῖος *(α, ον)*	common *["of the marketplace"]*	**ΑΓΟΡΑΙΟΣ** *market*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
εὐδαίμων *(ων, ον)*	good-spirited	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ** *good spirit*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
ἡ βιοτή **αἱ βιοταί**	livelihood	**ΒΙΟΤΗ** *life*
συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*
συντείνων	contributing	
ἡ ἰδέα **αἱ ἰδέαι**	idea	**ΙΔΕΑ** *appearing*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	**ΑΞΙΟΣ** *counterbalancing*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ἐμφαίνειν	to reveal	**ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining in*
ὅλος *(η, ον)*	entire	**ὉΛΟΣ** *whole*
ὁ χαρακτήρ **οἱ χαρακτῆρες**	character	**ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ** *engraving*
τὸ ἦθος **τὰ ἤθη**	disposition	**ΗΘΟΣ** *custom*
ὁ νόμος **οἱ νόμοι**	law	**ΝΟΜΟΣ** *allotting*
ἐλεύθερος *(α, ον)*	free	**ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ** *from a tribe* *(with the rights and responsibilities of a free man)*
ἡ σύστασις **αἱ συστάσεις**	composition *[i.e., material conglomeration]*	**ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing together*
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written out	**ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ** *written again*
τὸ σύγγραμμα **τὰ συγγράμματα**	composition *[i.e., a piece of written work]*	**ΣΥΓΓΡΑΜΜΑ** *result of writing together*

280 ^BCE
Under Telocles
125th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about sixty-one

In the year prior, Seleucus' forces killed Lysimachus during the battle.

Seleucus, in turn, was assassinated by Ptolemy Keraunos (son of Ptolemy I Soter), who is then king of Macedonia for seventeen months.

In 280/79 BCE the Gauls – amounting to about 85,000 warriors – invade Greece and attack Delphi.

Gauls kill Ptolemy Keraunos.

Antigonus II Gonatas fights the Gauls and continues to claim Macedonia. His claim is now disputed by Seleucus' son Antiochus I.

Colossus of Rhodes is completed.

[see U154] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 5 (36)

...[μὴ ἐνοχλή]σεσθαι... ...μικρᾶς ἕνεκεν ἐλα[ττ]ώσ[ε]ως πρὸς Πυθ[οκ]λέα [λ]έγειν· "ἂν [ἀνε]χώμεθα... ...τὴν μ[ετάπ]τωσ[ι]ν, οὐκ [ἐ]νο[χ]λήσει·" καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆ[ν] ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· κ[αί]τοι [ἀ]ν[εκτέο]ν τὸν τρόπ[ο]ν· οὐ [γὰ]ρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν ἐνόχλημα, κἂν [δια]ίτης οὐ πάντα... ...κατ' ἔνδειαν... ...[ἐξ]αι[ρ]ούμενον... ...[θ]υμ[ὸ]ν... ...τὴν πενίαν... ...[α]ἱρε‹ῖ›σ[θαι]... ...αὐτῶι...

...μὴ ἐνοχλήσεσθαι... ...μικρᾶς ἕνεκεν ἐλαττώσεως πρὸς Πυθοκλέα λέγειν· "ἂν Ἀνεχώμεθα... ...τὴν μετάπτωσιν, οὐκ Ἐνοχλήσει·"

> ...not to be disturbed... ...on account of a small depreciation, he says to Pythocles – "if We endure... ...the transition, It will not be disturbing."

καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆν, ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους "καίτοι, ἀνεκτέον τὸν τρόπον: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν Ἐνόχλημα – κἂν διαιτης οὐ πάντα... ...κατ' ἔνδειαν... ...ἐξαιρούμενον... ...θυμὸν... ...τὴν πενίαν... ...αἱρεῖσθαι... ...αὐτῶι..."

> and to Mithres, during [*the archonship in 280BCE*] of Telocles [*Epicurus says*] "nevertheless, the way must be endured: for Disturbance from transition is not deserving of fear – even if not everything in the way of living [*stays the same*]... ...through lack... ...removing... ...anger... ...poverty... ...to choose... ...for himself..."

ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	**ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ** *in a crowd of people*
ἐλάττων *(ων, ον)*	smaller	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ** *lesser*
ἡ ἐλάττωσις **αἱ ἐλατώσεις**	depreciation	**ΕΛΑΤΤΩΣΙΣ** *lesser*
[lit. "diminution," but Philodemus' uses the word with the idea of "fault" or "defect"]		
ἀνέχειν	to hold oneself up [here, "to endure"]	**ΑΝΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold up*
τὸ σύμπτωμα **τὰ συμπτώματα**	*[temporary for its compound]* symptom *(separable quality)*	**ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ** *to fall together*
ἡ μεταλλαγή **αἱ μεταλλαγαί**	exchange	**ΜΕΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ** *changing change*
ἡ μετάπτωσις **αἱ μεταπτώσεις**	transition	**ΜΕΤΑΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *to fall change*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	**ΑΞΙΟΣ** *counterbalancing*
ὁ φόβος **οἱ φόβοι**	fear	**ΦΟΒΟΣ** *fleeing*
τό ὄχλημα **τά ὀχλήματα**	[cause of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of a crowd of people*
ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	**ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ** *in a crowd of people*
τό ἐνόχλημα **τά ἐνοχλήματα**	[feeling of] disturbance	**ΕΝΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of [being] in a crowd of people*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
ἡ βιοτή **αἱ βιοταί**	livelihood	**ΒΙΟΤΗ** *life*
ἡ αἰτία **αἱ αἰτίαι**	cause	**ΑΙΤΙΑ** *responsibility*
ἡ δίαιτα **αἱ δίαιται**	way of living	**ΔΙΑΙΤΑ** *through the responsibility*
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ΕΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*

ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking out*
ἐξαιρούμενος *(η, ον)*	removing	ΕΞΑΙΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ὁ θυμός οἱ θυμοί	anger	ΘΥΜΟΣ *spirit*
ἡ πενία αἱ πενίαι	poverty	ΠΕΝΙΑ *need*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
αἱρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	ἉΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ

[U103]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 7 (38)

...[ἐ]κεῖνα, κακὸν ὅσον ἐ[πὶ] τῆι φύσει ῥαίδιον ἤδη συνιδεῖν· ἐπ[ὶ]... λαιου διακ[ρι]βω[σας]... ...διακ[ρι]βω... ...ὕστερον... ...πλοῦτον... ...τοῖς κακ[ὸν]... ...λέγουσιν... ...αὔξεται...

...ἐκεῖνα: κακὸν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει ῥαίδιον ἤδη συνιδεῖν... ...διακριβώσας... ...Διακριβω... ...ὕστερον... ...πλοῦτον... ...τοῖς κακὸν... ...Λέγουσιν... ...Αὔξεται...

...those things: how much of an evil *[exists]* in relation to nature is already easy to fully perceive... ...making thoroughly precise... ...I make thoroughly precise... ...later... ...wealth... ...for those an evil... ...They say... ...It increases...

ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ *seen*
συνιδεῖν	to have fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΙΔΕΙΝ *seen together*
ἐπακριβοῦν	to make more precise	ΕΠΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *pointed upon*
διακριβοῦν	to make thoroughly precise	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ *pointed through*

278 BCE
Under Democles
125th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about sixty-three

Those Who Misunderstand Inferences from Sensation

[=U212] *Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 29*

...Μιθρῆν πονοῦ[ντα] ἢ τῆ[ς μνή]μης... ...ἐκ Πειρ[α]ιέως καὶ... ...ἀναγγελλοντ... ...φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ὃν ἐπεπόησο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι μήτε τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα [ἐν] τοῖς ἀοράτοις ο[ὖσα]ν ἠδύναντο συνιδεῖν μήτε τὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ πάλιν ἀντιμ[α]ρτυρ[οῦ]σιν" [ἐπὶ] δὲ Δημοκλέ\ο/υ[ς αὐ]τῶι γρά[φων· ὁ δ]ια[κε]χαρισμέν[ος ἐ]κάσ[τωι]... ... ...ποτε μ[ί] αν ἢ τε... δί ἑτέρας... ...κα[ὶ] ἔτη... ...ἡμῖν ὅτι τὰ κατὰ νῦ[ν]... ...καὶ τ[ῶ]<ι> μέρει πράγματα... ...καὶ διὰ τοῦ... ...[π]αρ' [ἡ]μῶν τι...

...Μιθρῆν, πονοῦντα ἢ τῆς μνήμης... ...ἐκ Πειραιέως καὶ... ...ἀναγγελλοντα...

...Mithres, suffering either from the memory of... ...from Peiraeus and... ...reporting...

"...φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ὃν Ἐπεπόησο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων –Ὅσοι μήτε (1) τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις οὖσαν ἠδύναντο συνιδεῖν, μήτε (2) τὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ (3) πάλιν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσιν."

…bringing the letter from you and the thorough reasoning which you had made concerning those people – as many [*of them*] as were not able to have fully seen [(1)] the analogy that exists in accordance what is apparent for what is unseen, nor [(2)] the agreement existing among the sensations toward the unseen, and [(3)] when [*the sensations*] again contest [*in a particular case to a full agreement or even just an analogy between the seen and the unseen*].

[Anderson] …bringing your letter and the reasoning which you had carried out concerning men who could see neither [(1)] the analogy which obtains between the phenomena and the unseen [*realities*] nor [(2)] the consistency which exists between the senses and the senses [*realities*] and again [(3)] the counterfactuals…

ἐπὶ δὲ Δημοκλέους αὐτῷ γράφων· "ὁ Διακεχαρισμένος ἑκάστῳ… … …ποτε μίαν ἤ τε… …δὶ ἑτέρας… …καὶ ἔτη… …ἡμῖν ὅτι τὰ κατὰ νῦν… …καὶ τῷ μέρει πράγματα… …καὶ διὰ τοῦ… …παρ' ἡμῶν τι…"

and writing to him during [*the archonship in 278*[BCE]] of Democles: "he who has thoroughly cheered each… … …one at some time or… …through different… …and years… …to us that the things at present… …and the situation in part … …and through the… …something from us…"

φέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	carrying	**ΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing*
ἡ ἐπιστολή **αἱ ἐπιστολαί**	letter *[i.e., a sent message]*	**ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping upon*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning through action*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**῾ΟΣΟΣ** *however great*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἀόρατος *(ος, ον)*	unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ** *not looking*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
συνιδεῖν	to have fully seen [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΙΔΕΙΝ** *seen together*
ἡ συμφωνία **αἱ συμφωνίαι**	agreement	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ** *speaking together*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	**῾ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
τὸ ἀόρατον **τὰ ἀόρατα**	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
πάλιν	again	**ΠΑΛΙΝ** *back*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	[W] to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
	Part 2	
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	favor	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *charming / gracious*
ὁ διακεχαρισμένος [+ dat] **οἱ διακεχαρισμένοι**	he who has thoroughly cheered	**ΔΙΑΚΕΧΑΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *through having charmed / graced*

ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**ἙΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἙΝ** *one*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**ἙΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τό ἔτος **τά ἔτη**	year	**ΕΤΟΣ** *year*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of* *doing / affair*

277 BCE
Under Aristonymus
126th Olympiad
when Epicurus was about sixty-four

In 277/6 BCE Antigonus II Gonatas defeats Gauls in Thrace and earns the title Soter.

After this success, he becomes king of Macedon.

Antigonus continues the pro-Athens stance of his father and grandfather, and supports philosophers in Athens:

"Antigonus [II Gonatas] also favored him [Zeno], and whenever he came to Athens he would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court." (D.L. Zeno 7.6)

Participation in Sacred Practices

[see U169] *Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.28.785*

...τινων ἀμε[ίνο]νας ἢ [τῶι φυλάτ]τειν ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι] τὰς ἐπινο[ίας τῶν] θεῶν διά τ[ινων] χρόνων· οὐ [μόνον] δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδο[γμάτι]σεν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν] ἔργων αὐτῶν ε[ὑρίσ]κεται πάσαις ταῖς πατρίοις ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις κε[χ]ρ[η]μένος. ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μὲγ γὰ[ρ] Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν [φησι] πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ]ναι...

..τινων ἀμείνονας ἢ τῷ φυλάττειν ἐνεργείᾳ τὰς ἐπινοίας τῶν θεῶν διά τινων χρόνων

...with some [*religious rites*] better [*dealt with*] than others by preserving in action the notions of the gods during certain periods of time

Epicurus may be saying that actions in religious rites (during certain times such as festivals and sacrifices) are worse when guided by false ideas of the gods, and better when performed with correct conceptions.

[Obbink] *Traditionally, evading a charge of impiety entailed showing that one had in fact performed such acts and performed them according to the laws (**κατὰ νόμους**).*

οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτ' Ἐδογμάτισεν ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν Εὑρίσκεται πάσαις ταῖς πατρίοις ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις κεχρημένος

not only did [*Epicurus*] lay down these doctrines ¬ but he is also found to have participated in all the ancestral festivals and sacrifices through their [*i.e., the Kathēgemónes*] own deeds

ἐπ' Ἀριστωνύμου μέγ γαρ Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου, Θεοδότου, γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν Φησι πασῶν μετεσχηκέναι...

during [*the archonship in 287BCE*] of Aristonymus, while writing to Phyrson [*of Colophon*] about a certain fellow countryman of his, Theodotus [*of Colophon*, *Epicurus*] says that he had participated in all the festivals...

271 BCE

Under Pytharatus

127th Olympiad

when Epicurus was about seventy

In 271/0 BCE was the Olympiad of Epicurus' death, for this period we have: U122, U138, U177, & U191

Antigonus II Gonatas becomes the chief of the Thessalian League and continues securing the position of the Antigonid Regime – which would last until 168 BCE – when King Perseus (the great-great grandson of Demetrius Poliorcetes) was defeated by the Romans.

Collections Of Letters

1. Letters to Important Persons

Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους

[U104]

Phyrson of Colophon

Phyrson means "mixer" as in "one who mingles in society."

Colophon lies northeast of Samos (about 16 miles across the sea) and 3 miles inland from the coast, on Asia Minor.

After the Athenian defeat in the Lamian War, when Epicurus was twenty, Perdiccas expelled the Athenian settlers that had been living on Samos over to Colophon – including the family of Epicurus.

However, only twenty years later (302 BCE), Lysimachus destroyed Colophon – and forced its inhabitants to move to Ephesus, which he was rebuilding as a major fortified city.

Colophon failed to recover as a significant city.

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.33.944

ὁ δ' Ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ζηλωτὴς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐσχηκὼς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, "προκοπήν" φησιν "εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀργυρείου βοήθειαν θεοῖς ὁσίως Δέον νέμειν" (οὐ πρὸς ἰδιώτην γράφων ¬ ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φύρσωνα τὸν Κολοφώνιον, ἄνδρα καὶ οὐδενὸς κατὰ τὰ πολιτικά)...

> his Brother [*Neocles*], both an admirer and having achieved divine advancement in [*Epicurus'*] reasonings, says that "It is necessary to piously distribute to the gods the assistance from silver reserves," (writing not to a private individual ¬ but to Phyrson of Colophon, a man not insignificant in terms of civic standing)...

We know that Phyrson's father was Dositheus and his brother was Hegesianax. We know Epicurus wrote to Dositheus about his son Hegesianax's early death.

*[Obbink] There may be an implication that Phyrson of Colophon is an Epicurean 'master' at Colophon – whether a title conferred by the founders, perhaps in return for payment of the annual 120-drachma (2 mina) contribution (**σύνταξις**), or whether these titles were assigned to the early Epicureans by later adherents documenting the history of the school, I cannot tell (but the latter seems more likely in view of the fact that there are no certain examples of the founders referring to themselves as **Ἄνδρες, Καθηγεμόνες**, etc.)*

Eudemos

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, column 18

...[ἐ]ν ἄ[λλαις καὶ ἐ]ν τῆ[ι πρὸς] Ἀριστόβουλον... ...ἀπάσηι, καὶ τῆι πρὸς [Κω]λώτην, καὶ τῆι νῦν πρὸς Εὔδ[ημο]ν. επιδεχιμ... ...καρους ἀ[κού]σας ο[ὖ]ν φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ ἐμ[οῦ] πρὸς αὐτὸν μιμνήσκοιο [γ]εγρ[αφέ]ναι, συνιστὰς φίλον σαυ[το]ῦ καὶ Ἐπικούρου πάλι τὸν Ἱπποκλεί[δην], συνειληφέναι δὲ καὶ ταῦτ[α πάν]τα καθ' ἕκαστα πυθόμενος π[α]ρ' Εὐβούλου ' συ[νίσ]τησι δ' ἔτι αὐ[τῶι] Πρώταρχον. γράφει δὲ [κ]αὶ ταυ[τί·] "Εὐδή[μ]ου τεθαύμακα [ὅτι]... ...τωι μακρὰν ἀπηρτήθη τ[οῦ γεγο]νότος χωρίσας ἑαυτὸν...

...ἐν ἄλλαις καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον... ...ἀπάσῃ, καὶ τῇ πρὸς Κωλώτην – καὶ τῇ νῦν πρὸς Εὔδημον

...in other [*letters*] and in the one to Aristobuolos... ...in full, and in the one to Colotes – and now in the one to Eudemos

"...ἐπιδεχίμους... ...ἀκούσας, οὖν, φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ: πρὸς αὐτὸν Μιμνήσκοιο γεγράφεναι – συνιστὰς φίλον σαυτοῦ καὶ Ἐπικούρου πάλι τὸν Ἱπποκλείδην – συνειληφέναι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, πάντα καθ' ἕκαστα, πυθόμενος παρ' Εὐβούλου"

"...favorable [*things*]... ...therefore, after kindly hearing the points on my behalf: you should remember to have written to him – recommending Hippocleides again as a friend both of yourself and of Epicurus – and also to have gathered these things, each in detail, [*with you*] having learned them from Euboulos"

Συνίστησι δ' ἔτι αὐτῷ Πρώταρχον. Γράφει δὲ καὶ ταυτί "Εὐδήμου Τεθαύμακα ὅτι... ...τῷ μακρὰν Ἀπηρτήθη τοῦ γεγονότος – χωρίσας ἑαυτὸν..."

He also recommends Protarchus to him. and He also writes the following "I have marveled at Eudemos because... ...in [*the fact*] that He separated himself far away from what had happened – detaching himself...."

There was a Eudemos [of Pergamon] who was an Epicurean that wrote commentaries on Epicurus' work On Nature. However, he was a teacher of Philonides of Laodicea (and therefore was active around 180 BCE) – so could not also have been a contemporary of Epicurus.

2. Spurious Letters

1. Diotimos the Stoic's Fifty Counterfeit Letters
(Prosecution and Execution)

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.3

Διότιμος δ᾽ ὁ Στωικὸς, δυσμενῶς ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν, πικρότατα αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν – ἐπιστολὰς φέρων πεντήκοντα ἀσελγεῖς, ὡς Ἐπικούρου – καὶ Ὁ τὰ εἰς Χρύσιππον ἀναφερόμενα ἐπιστόλια ὡς Ἐπικούρου συντάξας

Diotimos the Stoic, being hostile toward him, assailed him with bitter slanders – bringing fifty lewd letters, as though [*written*] by Epicurus – and so too did he who composed the little letters addressed to Chrysippus as though [*written*] by Epicurus

Athenaeus (who spells the Stoic's name "Theotimus") says "Theotimus, who wrote the books against Epicurus, was accused by Zenon the Epicurean, and was put to death – as is related by Demetrius of Magnesia, in his treatise on People and Things Which Go By The Same Name." (Deipnosophists 13.92)

2. Questions Arising from the Desire for Precision

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 8/11

...[ἐρχόμενον ἀκριβεί]αι πρὸ[ς τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πε]ρὶ πολλῶν ἡγ[εῖσ]θαι [τὰ] κε[ί]νοις ἀρέ[σ]κοντ', [ἐκ] τῆς ἀ[ρ]χῆς ὑποψί[α]ν τινὰ [λ]αμβάν[ει]ν ὡς περί τινων ἐπιστολῶν καὶ τῆς [Πρὸς Πυ]θοκλέα περὶ μ[ε]τεώρων ἐπιτομῆς καὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀρ[ετ]ῶ[ν], καὶ

...ἐρχόμενον ἀκριβείᾳ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν – περὶ πολλῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ κείνοις ἀρέσκοντ' ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς – ὑποψίαν τινὰ λαμβάνειν ὡς περί [1] τινων ἐπιστολῶν

> [*Zeno of Sidon*? *because he was*] approaching the [*writings*] of the men [*i.e., the founders of the school*] with precision – regarded those [*precise points*] that were accepted by them from the foundation [*of the school*] as very important – therefore he acquired some uncertainty regarding [1] some letters

καὶ [2] τῆς Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα περὶ Μετεώρων Ἐπιτομῆς καὶ τοῦ [3] Περὶ Ἀρετῶν – καὶ [4] Τῶν εἰς Μητρόδωρον Ἀναφερομένων Ὑποθηκῶν

> and [*regarding*] [2] the Summary on Celestial Phenomena to Pythocles and the [*work*] [3] *On Virtues* – and [4] *The Recommended Precepts* to Metrodorus

καὶ [5] Τῶν Μαρτυριῶν – καὶ μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ [6] Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν δευτέρου – καὶ τῶν εἰς Πολύαινον: τοῦ [7] Πρὸς τοὺς Ῥήτορας καὶ τοῦ [8] Περὶ Σελήνης καὶ τῶν εἰς Ἕρμαρχον. Ἐξέλεξεν δὲ καὶ...

> and [*regarding*] [5] The Testimonies [*i.e., "The Proofs"*] – and more so the second [*book*] [6] Against Plato's Gorgias – and those to Polyaenus: the [7] Against the Orators, and the [8] On the Moon, and those to Hermarchus. and he also selected...

1	**[τινές ἐπιστολαί]**	[some letters]
2	**ἡ περὶ Μετεώρων Ἐπιτομή**	the Summary on Celestial Phenomena *(to Pythocles)*
3	**Περὶ Ἀρετῶν**	On Virtues
4	**αἱ Ἀναφερόμεναι Ὑποθῆκαι**	the Recommended Precepts *(dedicated to Metrodorus)*
5	**αἱ Μαρτυρίαι**	the Testimonies *(i.e., "the Proofs")*
6	**Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν**	Against Plato's Gorgias *(in at least two books)*
7	**Πρὸς τοὺς Ῥήτορας**	Against the Rhetors *(dedicated to Polyaenus)*
8	**Περὶ Σελήνης**	On the Moon *(dedicated to Polyaenus)*
9	*n/a*	[other works] *(dedicated to Hermarchus)*

ἡ ὑποθήκη **αἱ ὑποθῆκαι**	precepts	**ὙΠΟΘΗΚΗ** *placing under*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	[M] attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις**	[W] contestation	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying against*
ἡ μαρτυρία **αἱ μαρτυρίαι**	testimony [i.e., proof]	**ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ** *testifying*

[U105]

3. Aelius Theon's Doubt

[=U131] *Aelius Theon (fl.c. 75 CE), Preliminary Exercises, 2.168*

Aelius Theon wrote "Preliminary Exercises" (Progymnasmata), a training manual for orators.

Ἐπιμελητέον δὲ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων πάντα διδάσκοντα ἐξ ὧν Διαφεύξονται τὸ κακῶς συντιθέναι – καὶ μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν – ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Ἡγησίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, καὶ τῶν Ἀσιανῶν καλουμένων ῥητόρων, καί τινα τῶν Ἐπικούρου:

It is also necessary to take care while teaching everything regarding the composition of words with which [*students*] will escape composing poorly – and especially the metrical and rhythmical style – as many [*works*] of Hegesias the rhetor, and [*the works*] of the so-called Asiatic rhetors, and certain [*works*] of Epicurus

οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα Γράφει "Ὦ, πάντα τἀμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου" καὶ τῶν περιφερομένων δ' ὡς ἐκείνου (Ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν αὐτὰ Εὑρίσκομεν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν αὐτοῦ) "Λέγε δή μοι, Πολύαινε – Συναπέριμεν – μεγάλη Χαρὰ γένηται. ὡς Χαρῶ! ὡς Τέρψωμαι!"

such as He apparently writes to Idomeneus "O, [*you who*] perceived all my movements enjoyable from youth" and of those circulating as his (we have not yet even now found these in his writings) "Tell me, Polyaenus – when we journey together – that great Cheer arises. how cheerful I am! how I enjoy!"

τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἐπίμεμπτα – καὶ πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν κακίαν τῆς συνθέσεως: συγγνώμης δ' ἄξιον ὅταν εἰς ἐκεῖνά Τις ἐμπέσῃ ποτὲ τὰ μέτρα – Ἅπερ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ πεζόν (οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἰαμβικόν)

such things therefore are completely blameworthy – and evidently possess the badness of composition: but worthy of pardon when Someone occasionally falls into those meters – Which have a similarity to prose (such as the iambic)

> *[Gordon] Some circumlocutions and exuberant language attributed to Epicurus may be parodies, as Theon apparently suspects. He is not sure where he read the line to Idomeneus, and he has never found a source for the letter to Polyaenus.*
>
> *The text of the examples quoted by Theon is apparently corrupt, so no particular lyric meter can be identified, but the extravagance of the language attributed to Epicurus is clear.*
>
> *The "so-called Asian orators" were labeled "effeminate" by writers who strove for a style, often identified as "Attic," that was considered leaner and purer.*

[U106]

To Several Persons

3. To Friends Living in Egypt

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους

[included in part 4 below] [U107]

4. To Friends Living in Asia

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους

Live Unnoticed *(Politically)*

Epameinṓndas	Theban General: *Shattered Spartan dominance* *Freed Messenian helots,* *at the Battle of Leuctra*
Lykoûrgos	Spartan Lawgiver: *credited with founding the military-oriented constitution of Sparta*

Thrasýboulos	Athenian Democrat: *led the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants and restored democracy*
Pythagoras	Mathematician: *founded a mystical school at Croton in southern Italy*
Socrates	Athenian Philosopher: *argued with, but ultimately obeyed, his mental "demonic voice (**δαιμόνιον**)"*

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1128 F

καὶ μὴν εἴ γε τοῖς χρηστοῖς λανθάνειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖσθαι Παραινεῖς: Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ Λέγεις "μὴ Στρατήγει" – καὶ Λυκούργῳ "μὴ Νομοθέτει" – καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ "μὴ Τυραννοκτόνει" – καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ "μὴ Παίδευε" – καὶ Σωκράτει "μὴ Διαλέγου"

and indeed, if You are advising useful men to go unnoticed and to be unknown: then You say to Epameinṓndas "Take no command!" – to Lykoûrgos "Frame no laws!" – to Thrasýboulos "Slay no tyrants!" – to Pythagoras "Do not teach!" – to Socrates "Do not converse!"

καὶ σεαυτῷ πρῶτον Ἐπίκουρε, "μὴ Γράφε τοῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ φίλοις" – "μηδὲ τοῖς ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου Ξενολόγει" – "μηδὲ τοὺς Λαμψακηνῶν ἐφήβους Δορυφόρει!"

indeed, Epicurus [*say*] to yourself first "Do not to write your friends in Asia!" – "Do not internationally converse with those [*friends*] from Egypt!" – "Do not keep guard over the youth of Lampsacus!"

"μηδὲ Διάπεμπε βίβλους πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν – "μηδὲ Διατάσσου περὶ ταφῆς!"

"Do not to send out books to every man and to every woman while you advertise your wisdom!" – "Do not to leave instructions about [*your*] burial!"

τί γὰρ αἱ κοιναὶ Τράπεζαι; τί δ᾽ αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ καλῶν Σύνοδοι;

what are the public Tables for? what are those Gatherings of the suitable and correct [*people*] for?

τί δ᾽ αἱ τοσαῦται Μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον – ἐπ᾽ Ἀριστόβουλον – ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον – γραφόμεναι καὶ συντασσόμεναι φιλοπόνως; ἵνα μηδ᾽ ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν;

what are the many Myriads of lines about Metrodorus – about Aristobuolos – about Chairedemus – being written and composed industriously for? So that even having died they may not escape notice?

ἢ ἵν᾽ ἀμνηστίαν Νομοθετῇς ἀρετῇ; – καὶ ἀπραξίαν τέχνῃ; – καὶ σιωπὴν φιλοσοφίᾳ; – καὶ λήθην εὐπραγίᾳ;

or so that You can institute permissiveness to virtue? – and inactivity in art? – and silence in philosophy? – and inattention to success?

Regarding added "international" aspect when referring to Egypt: when Epicurus was writing, Egypt was controlled by the Ptolemies and was more politically distinct than Asia (where control shifted several times during Epicurus lifetime).

ἡ ὑποθήκη **αἱ ὑποθῆκαι**	precepts	**ὙΠΟΘΗΚΗ** *placing under*
ἡ τράπεζα **αἱ τράπεζαι**	table	**ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ** *three feet* *"tri-pod"*
ἐπιτήδειος *(α, ον)*	suitable	**ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ** *towards this here*

καλός (ή, όν)	correct / beautiful	**ΚΑΛΟΣ** *lovely*
ἡ πρόσοδος **αἱ προσόδοι**	addition	**ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ** *path toward*
ἡ ἄφοδος **αἱ ἀφόδοι**	departure	**ΑΦΟΔΟΣ** *path away*
ἡ σύνοδος **αἱ σύνοδοι**	gathering	**ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ** *path together*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ἡ πρᾶξις **αἱ πράξεις**	activity	**ΠΡΑΞΙΣ** *action*
ἡ ἀπραξία **αἱ ἀπραξίαι**	inactivity	**ΑΠΡΑΞΙΑ** *without action*
ἡ τέχνη **αἱ τέχναι**	art	**ΤΕΧΝΗ** *technique*

5. To Friends Living in Lampsacus

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους

1. Idomeneus & Leonteus: Lampsacenian Aristocracy

Strabo (fl.c. 25 BC), Geography, 13.1.19

ἐκ Λαμψάκου δὲ Χάρων τε ὁ συγγραφεὺς, καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ὁ ῥήτωρ, καὶ Μητρόδωρος, ὁ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου ἑταῖρος

Charon the historian, and Adeimantus, and Anaximenes the rhetorician, and Metrodorus, the companion of Epicurus, [*were*] from Lampsacus

καὶ αὐτὸς δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος τρόπον τινὰ Λαμψακηνὸς ὑπῆρξε: διατρίψας ἐν Λαμψάκῳ καὶ φίλοις χρησάμενος – τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ – τοῖς περὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Λεοντέα

and Epicurus himself was in some way a Lampsacenian: having lived in Lampsacus and having engaged with friends – who were the most distinguished of those in this city – those around Idomeneus and Leonteus

ἐντεῦθεν δὲ μετήνεγκεν Ἀγρίππας "τὸν πεπτωκότα λέοντα" – Λυσίππου ἔργον:

[*it was*] from here that Agrippa transported "the Fallen Lion" – a work of Lýsippos

ὁ ἑταῖρος **οἱ ἑταῖροι**	companion	**ἙΤΑΙΡΟΣ** *comrade*

[U108]

2. Funds for Lampsacenian Friends

[see U101] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, Book 1, P.Herc. 163 col. 4 (35)

...[πεν]ίαν καὶ... ...[πεν]ίαν κακὸν... ...[ἐπὶ] Χαρίνου... [30 lines missing] ......[λα]μβάνει [διὰ τὸ μη]δὲν ὅλως ἀπεργά[ζε]σθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἐάσομεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺ[ς] ἐν Λαμψάκωι φί[λους ἐπ]ὶ Φιλίππου καὶ πάν[τως ἀ]ποδεξόμεθα· κα[ὶ] γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν ειπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐ[ργα]σίας [κ]αὶ λατρείας...

...πενίαν καὶ... ...πενίαν κακὸν... ...ἐπὶ Χαρίνου... "...Λαμβάνει διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι ¬ μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας Ἐάσομεν!" τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκωι φίλους ἐπὶ Φιλίππου "καὶ πάντως Ἀποδεξόμεθα – καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν Εἶπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐργασίας καὶ λατρείας..."

...poverty and... ...poverty as an evil... ...under [*the archonship in 308*BCE] of Charinus... [*Epicurus wrote*] "...He accepts it because of absolutely not working at all ¬ We will allow him to remain in the countryside!" as for the matter concerning the friends in Lampsacus under [*the archonship in 292*BCE] of Philippus [*Epicurus wrote*] "We will absolutely approve it – for He mentioned not only poverty, but also labors and services..."

[U109]

3. Discussing Leonteus

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 7

...κατὰ τὰ ἐν Κυ[ζίκωι]... ...ἐπιμεληθείσ' ἐπ' Εὐθ[ίου] δὲ περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτοῦ διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκωι φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων· "ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ [ὅτι] δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα... ...συ[να]χθόμεθα τῆι παρὰ | τἀνδρ[ὸς]... ...Λ[ε]οντε[ῖ δ]ὲ...

...κατὰ τὰ ἐν Κυζίκῳ... ...ἐπιμεληθείς ἐπ' Εὐθίου – δὲ περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτοῦ Διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων "Ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ ὅτι δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα... ...Συναχθόμεθα τῇ παρὰ τἀνδρὸς... ...Λεοντεῖ δὲ..."

...according to those in Cyzicus... ...when it had been taken care of during [*the archonship in 283*BCE] of Euthius – and [*Epicurus decided*] he will explain to his friends in Lampsacus about his choice, sending a letter [*saying*] "for We heard that indeed Leonteus [ ] everything... ...We will be gathered by the man's side... but for Leonteus..."

Epicurus mentions Cyzicus in another letter below – to Athenaeus, about Polyaenus (which references an unnamed man from Cyzicus). U115

*Laertius reports that Epicurus called the Cyzicenes "the Enemies of Greece" – probably in reference to the students of Eudoxus of Cnidos (**Κνίδος**), the mathematical astronomer and associate of Plato, who is also cited by Aristotle. Eudoxus taught at Cyzicus (**Κύζικος**) and set up a school there. His teaching on pleasure where similar to Epicurus. He died right around when Epicurus was born, but left many influential pupils.*

[U110]

4. Lampsacenian Youth

[see U107] Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129 A

"μηδὲ τοὺς Λαμψακηνῶν ἐφήβους Δορυφόρει!"

"Do not keep guard over the youth of Lampsacus!"

[U111]

6. To the Philosophers in Mytilene

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους

1. Established Pleasure

[=U1] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.136

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει ¬ Ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος (ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Αἱρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς* καὶ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ Βίων* καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ)

> [*Epicurus*] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure: [*the Cyrenaics*] do not include that [*pleasure*] which is established, but only that which consists in motion ¬ He [*admits*] both: [*pleasure*] of mind and of body (as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End* and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene)

[U112]

2. Mina within a Day – for the Shared Table

[=U145] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἠγνοηκέναι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα ἐλεεινῶς διακεῖσθαι – ὡς πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φορείου διαναστῆναι – μνᾶν τε ἀναλίσκειν ἡμερησίαν εἰς τὴν τράπεζαν, ὡς Αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Λεόντιον ἐπιστολῇ γράφει καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους

> Timocrates [*also claims that*]... Epicurus was greatly ignorant in reasoning and even more so in life, that his body was in a pitiful condition – [*so much so*] that he was unable to rise from his portable chair for many years – and that he spent a mina within a day on his table, as he himself writes in a letter to Leontion and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene

ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
τὸ φορεῖον **τὰ φορεῖα**	portable chair	**ΦΟΡΕΙΟΝ** *instrument of carrying*
ἡ τράπεζα **αἱ τράπεζαι**	table	**ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ** *three feet* *"tri-pod"*

A mina was equivalent to 100 drachmas.

A drachma was about 4.3 grams of silver and was an average daily wage for average labor and had the purchasing power of around $50–$150 during Epicurus lifetime. Still, a full meal with meat, cheese and wine could easily cost a drachma.

Therefore a mina had a silver price around $500 but a purchasing power over ten times that, at least $5,000. Epicurus probably only spent so much as a mina on special occasions when hosting many people.

If we compare this to Epicurus scheduled days for light eating, where Cicero says Epicurus "boasts of feeding himself on less than a full assarius." By the 1st century BCE (when Cicero was writing) the weight of the assarius was around 10 grams of bronze (which was equivalent to about 0.4 grams of silver). Therefore a mina would be about 1,000 assarii.

[U113]

3. Nausiphanes: The Broken Connection with Democritus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8 sup.

καὶ αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς περὶ Ναυσιφάνους λέγειν "Ταῦτα ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν εἰς ἔκστασιν τοιαύτην – ὥστε μοι λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν διδάσκαλον"

[*Timocrates claims*]… also that Epicurus himself in his letters says of Nausiphanes "These things brought him into such an astonishment – that he yelled at me and called me a teacher"

πλεύμονά τε αὐτὸν Ἐκάλει – καὶ ἀγράμματον, καὶ ἀπατεῶνα, καὶ πόρνην

[*Epicurus*] used to call him a jellyfish – and illiterate, and a swindler, and a prostitute

*Nausiphanes (**Ναυσιφάνης**, meaning "appearing on a ship," fl.c. 310 BCE) was a direct student of Pyrrho and (through texts or tradition) a student of Democritus.*

Nausiphanes became a Skeptic and a Rhetor.

*The phrasing "to yell at and call (**λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν**)" suggests that by Nausiphanes calling his student, Epicurus, "a teacher" he was being ironic or insulting.*

*In ancient Greece, "companions (**ἑταῖραι**)" were Greek women skilled in conversation, music, and philosophy – and were often wealthier than an average citizen.*

*On the other hand, "prostitutes (**πόρναι**)" were often foreign and were involved direct transactional sexual relationships with little social status or independence.*

διδάσκειν	to teach	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *teaching*
ὁ διδάσκαλος **οἱ διδάσκαλοι**	teacher	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΟΣ** *person related to teaching*
οἱ πλεύμονες	lungs *also, "sea-lungs," i.e., jellyfish*	**ΠΛΕΥΜΩΝ** *sides*
ἡ γραμματική **αἱ γραμματικαί**	grammar	**ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΗ** *characteristic of the result of writing*
ἀγράμματος (ον)	illiterate	**ΑΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ** *not the result of writing*
ὁ ἀπατεών **οἱ ἀπατεῶνες**	swindler	**ΑΠΑΤΕΩΝ** *deceiving agent*
ἡ πόρνη **αἱ πόρναι**	prostitute	**ΠΟΡΝΗ** *selling*

[U114]

4. Nausiphanes: Student of Pyrrho, Oppressive Rhetorician, Jellyfish

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 4-5

Sextus Empiricus notes, at the very beginning of his "Against The Professors," that "the case against the educators for the professions has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epicurus and by the School of Pyrrho, although the standpoints they adopt are different."

τάχα δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν – πολυμιαθεῖς γεγονότας

perhaps [*Epicurus made a case against professors*] also because of his hostility towards those around Plato and Aristotle and their like – who were polymaths

οὐκ Ἀπέοικε δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ναυσιφάνην (τὸν Πύρρωνος ἀκουστὴν) ἔχθραν – πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων Συνεῖχε καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως Ἐπεμελεῖτο – μάλιστα δέ ῥητορικῆς

It is not unlikely, too, that he was moved by his enmity against Nausiphanes (the disciple of Pyrrho) – who kept his hold on many of the young men and devoted himself earnestly the professions – especially to Rhetoric

γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητὴς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυὴς φιλόσοφος ἠρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου – τήν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν Ἔσπευδε – πολύς τε Ἐγίνετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος ἐν οἷς Ἐκεῖνος ἐσεμνύνετο

Epicurus, then, having become one of this man's students, denied it in every way in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher – and he was eager to erase the fame of [*Nausiphanes*] – and he became a great critic of those professions in which [*Nausiphanes*] prided himself

Φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τούς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ "Οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς Βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητήν Με δόξειν τοῦ Πλεύμονος εἶναι: μετὰ μειρακίων τινῶν κραιπαλώντων ἀκούσαντα" (νῦν "Πλεύμονα" καλῶν τὸν Ναυσιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον)

thus [*Epicurus*] says in his Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilenê "I myself quite suppose that those Groaners even think that I am a disciple of the Jellyfish: because I listened [*to him*] among some intoxicated young men" (now calling Nausiphanes a "Jellyfish" as being without sense)

καὶ πάλιν, προβὰς πολλά, τε κατειπὼν τἀνδρὸς: Ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν, λέγων "καὶ γὰρ, πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος Ἦν – καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκὼς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ Δυνατὸν εἰς σοφίαν ἐλθεῖν!" (αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα)

and again, having advanced very far, and having said things about the man: [*Epicurus*] hints at [*Nausiphanes'*] progress in his professions, saying "for indeed, he was an oppressive man – and practiced such things out of which it is not possible to come to wisdom!" (hinting at the professions)

πλὴν, ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος (ὡς ἄν Τις εἰκοβολῶν εἴποι) ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν πολεμεῖν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἠξίου

however, (as Someone throwing out a guess might say [*i.e., probably*]) Epicurus thought it right to wage war on the professions on the basis of such pretexts

"Those Groaners" may refer to the followers of Theophrastus.

ὁ μαθηματικός **οἱ μαθηματικοί**	professor	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of the result of learning*
τὸ μάθημα **τὰ μαθήματα**	profession	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑ** *the result of learning*
ὁ βαρύστονος	the deep-voiced one [here, "loudmouth"]	**ΒΑΡΥΣΤΟΝΟΣ** *heavy tone*
οἱ πλεύμονες	lungs *also, "sea-lungs," i.e., a jellyfish*	**ΠΛΕΥΜΩΝ** *sides*
τὸ μειράκιον **τὰ μειράκια**	lad	**ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΟΝ** *little young man*
κραιπαλῶν (ῶσα)	drunk	**ΚΡΑΙΠΑΛΩΝ** *achieve struggle*

Plato (fl.c. 388 BCE), Philebus 21c

[Σωκράτης] **καὶ μὴν, ὡσαύτως, μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον: Ἀνάγκη δήπου μηδ᾽ ὅτι ποτὲ Ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι – τῆς τ᾽ ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν!**

[Socrates] and indeed, in the same way, not possessing memory: it would be necessity that you would not even recall that at some point you were glad – no memory of pleasure occurring in the moment remains!

δόξαν δ᾽ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ: μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν – χαίροντα!

and again, not having a true judgment: you could not think that you were enjoying – while you were enjoying!

λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον ¬ μηδ᾽ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς Χαιρήσεις Δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι: Ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν (Ὅσα θαλάττια μετ᾽ ὀστρεΐνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι) σωμάτων

while deprived of reasoning ¬ It would not be possible to calculate that You would enjoy it in the future: but Living [*in this way*] is not the life of a man but of some jellyfish or of other bodies (Whatever is marine life, like oysters)

The primary topic of the Philebus is pleasure. After Protarchus agrees that pleasure is all he wants, Socrates points out that Protarchus would also need memory and reason to enjoy pleasure – and therefore pleasure is not all Protarchus wants. In this way, Socrates thinks he has demonstrated that pleasure alone is not the highest good.

ὁ λογισμός **οἱ λογισμοί**	[process of] reasoning	**ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *action of collecting*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	**ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *action of collecting*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*

To Individual People

7. To Athenaeus

Πρὸς Ἀθηναίον

"The Athenian"

[U115]

Guardianship before Self-Navigation

Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 22

...λόγου[ς] καὶ κ[α]τὰ πάντας τρόπου[ς] ἐκπολυωρηθεὶς μέχρι ὅσου τὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τὸ [σ]εαυτὸν κυβερνᾶν ⟦αν⟧ ἡλι<κί>αν ἔσχες. Ἀθηναίωι δέ· Πολυαίνου παραγεγονότος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὗ τὸν πατέρ[α] ὁμώνυμον οὐκ ἐφίλεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] ἐ[σέβο]υ συντραφεὶς, ὑ<π' αὐ>· τοῦ κα[ὶ] πρὸς [πά]ντα τὰ [χρ]ήσιμα τῶ(*) τέ[λει, οὐ μό]νον προαχθεὶ[ς ὃν εὖ γιν]ώσκεις τρόπ[ον κατὰ τὴ]ν ὅλην κηδεμονί[αν, ἀ]λλὰ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ... ...σύμβιον... ...Κυζ[ικηνῶι]...

"...λόγους – καὶ κατὰ πάντας τρόπους ἐκπολυωρηθεὶς, μέχρι ὅσου τὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τὸ σεαυτὸν κυβερνᾶν ἡλικίαν Ἔσχες."

"...reasonings – and according to all the thoroughly examined ways [*of thinking*], up to the point that You attained a self-sufficient age to navigate yourself."

See chart 10 (in the introduction) for a reconstructed list of over twenty **τρόποι** *(ways of thinking) – divided into three sections: objective, speculative, and logical.*

Ἀθηναίῳ δέ "Πολυαίνου παραγενομένου πρὸς ἡμᾶς – οὗ τὸν πατέρα ὁμώνυμον οὐκ Ἐφίλεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐσέβου, συντραφεὶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ – καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα τῷ τέλει, οὐ μόνον προαχθεὶς ὃν εὖ Γινώσκεις τρόπον κατὰ τὴν ὅλην κηδεμονίαν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ… …σύμβιον… …Κυζικηνῷ…"

> but to Athenaeus "when Polyaenus had arrived with us – whose same-named father You not only loved, but You also revered, having been nurtured together by him – [*he arrived*] also with all the useful things for fulfillment, not only having been led forward in the way You are coming to well know, according to [*your*] entire guardianship, but even by… …the spouse… …for the Cyzicene…"

It seems that Epicurus is writing a letter to Athenaeus – who was a childhood friend of Polyaenus' father, Polyaenus the Elder.

Epicurus also mentioned the city of Cyzicus in a letter above, where Leonteus is the topic of the letter. U109

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ *manner / direction*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἡ τιμωρία αἱ τιμωρίαι	vengeance	ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑ *guarding honor*
ἐκπολυωρεῖν	to thoroughly examine	ΕΚΠΟΛΥΩΡΕΙΝ *much guarding out*
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ *until*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	ὉΣΟΣ *however great*
μέχρι ὅσου	up to the point that	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ἀνύπαρκτος (ον)	non-existent	ΑΝΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ *not beginning before*
ὑπαρκτός (ή, όν)	existent	ΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ *beginning before*
αὐτοτελῶς	independently	ΑΥΤΟΤΕΛΩΣ *self-goal*
αὐτάρκης *(ες)*	self-sufficient	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ *self-sufficing*
κυβερνᾶν	to navigate	ΚΥΒΕΡΝΑΝ *non-Indo-European nautical term*
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age *(stage of life)*	ἩΛΙΚΙΑ *comrade*
	Part 2	
Πολύαινος	Polyaenus	ΠΟΛΥΑΙΝΟΣ *much praise*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
παραγίγνεσθαι	to arrive	ΠΑΡΑΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being across*
ὁ πατήρ οἱ πατέρες	father	ΠΑΤΗΡ *father*
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ *name*

ὁμώνυμος *(ον)*	same-named	**ὉΜΩΝΥΜΟΣ**
φιλεῖν	to love	**ΦΙΛΕΙΝ** *loving*
σέβεσθαι	to revere	**ΣΕΒΕΣΘΑΙ** *yielding to*
τρέφειν	to nurture	**ΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *raising*
ἐντρέφεσθαι	to be nurtured in	**ΕΝΤΡΕΦΕΣΘΑΙ** *raising in*
συντρέφειν	to nurture together	**ΣΥΝΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *raising together*
χρήσιμος *(ον)*	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
τό χρήσιμον **τά χρήσιμα**	useful things	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ** *necessary*
τὸ τέλος **τὰ τέλη**	fulfillment	**ΤΕΛΟΣ** *goal*
ἄγειν	to lead	**ΑΓΕΙΝ** *carrying / going*
προαχθείς	having been led forward	**ΠΡΟΑΧΘΕΙΣ** *went before*
γινώσκειν = **γιγνώσκειν**	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
ὅλος *(η, ον)*	entire	**ὉΛΟΣ** *whole*
ἡ κηδεμονία **αἱ κηδεμονίαι**	guardianship	**ΚΗΔΕΜΟΝΙΑ** *charge / care*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
τό σύμβιον **τά σύμβια**	spouse / partner	**ΣΥΜΒΙΟΝ** *life together*

[U116]

8. To Anaxarchus

Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον

"Ruler of Kings"

Continuous Pleasures vs. Empty Virtues

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1117A fin.

Ὃς, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐπιστολῇ, ταυτὶ γέγραφεν "Ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ – καὶ οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας"

[*Epicurus*] who, in the letter to Anaxarchus, wrote this "I encourage toward continuous pleasures – and not toward virtues which hold hopes of fruits [*that are*] empty and pointless and disturbing"

ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	**ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ** *holding together*
παρακαλεῖν	to encourage	**ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning beside*
ἡ ἀρετή **αἱ ἀρεταί**	virtue	**ΑΡΕΤΗ** *excellence*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
μάταιος *(α, ον)*	pointless	**ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ** *folly*

ταραχώδης (ης, ες)	disturbing	ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ *agitating*
ὁ καρπός οἱ καρποί	fruit	ΚΑΡΠΟΣ *harvest*
ἡ ἐλπίς αἱ ἐλπίδες	hope	ΕΛΠΙΣ *expecting*

[U117]

9. To Apelles

Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν

Good to Avoid the Professions

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 12, 1094D

Ἀπελλῆν δέ τινα θαυμάζοντες καὶ ὑπερασπαζόμενοι, Γράφουσιν ὅτι – τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς – καθαρὸν ἑαυτὸν Ἐτήρησε

admiring and embracing a certain Apelles, they write that – because he kept himself far away from the professions from the beginning – he kept himself clear

*For "clear" consider "if someone is not proceeding towards all these [most pivotal topics] through the precise details according to each part ¬ he will [nevertheless] acquire unmatched fullness in comparison to the rest of humanity: for indeed he will also by himself make many of the fully precise details clear (**καθαρὰ**) according to each part" (Lives 10.83a, Letter to Herodotus)*

τὸ μάθημα τὰ μαθήματα	profession	ΜΑΘΗΜΑ *the result of learning*
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ *cleansing*
ἡ κάθαρσις αἱ καθάρσεις	clarification	ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ *cleansing*
καθαρός (ά, όν)	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ *cleaning*

Burden of Conventional Education

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, Μνησθήσομαι τοῦ φιλαληθεστάτου Ἐπικούρου: Ὅστις ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὢν – Ἐμακάριζε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν παρερχομένους ¬ τοιαύτας φωνὰς προϊέμενος:

and first, I shall recall the most truth-loving Epicurus: who, though he was uninitiated in general education – he considered those people blessed who were proceeding toward philosophy similarly to himself ¬ uttering such words:

"Μακαρίζω σε, Ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι – καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας – ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν Ὥρμησαι!"

"I bless you, O dear one, because – clear of all education – You have rushed toward philosophy!"

ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ ὁ Τίμων φησὶν "γραμμοδιδασκαλίδην ἀναγωγότατον ζωόντων"

on which account Timon calls him "the most untrained little grammar-teacher living"

*Timon of Phliasia (**Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος**, fl. c. 280 BCE) was a student of Pyrrho. He wrote "satiric dramas (thirty comedies and sixty tragedies), lampoons, and obscene verse."* *(Lives 9.110)*

He traveled around the Hellespont, Lampsacus, and Chalcedon (Istanbul) as a sophist, where "he increased his reputation still further and, having made his fortune, went to Athens, where he lived until his death" *(Lives 9.109)*

Also "he was known to King Antigonus [II Gonatas] and to Ptolemy [II] Philadelphus" *(Lives 9.110)*

φιλεῖν	to love	**ΦΙΛΕΙΝ** *loving*
τἀληθές = **τὸ ἀληθές** **τὰ ἀληθῆ**	what is true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not hidden*
φιλαληθέστατος *(η, ον)*	most truth-loving	**ΦΙΛΑΛΗΘΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *loving* *what is not hidden*
ἡ μακαριότης **αἱ μακαριότητες**	blessedness	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from* *greatness*
μακαρίζειν	to bless	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *greatness action*
καθαρός *(ά, όν)*	clear	**ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ** *cleaning*
ἡ παιδεία **αἱ παιδεῖαι**	education	**ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ** *child*
ἡ σοφία **αἱ σοφίαι**	wisdom	**ΣΟΦΙΑ** *knowledge*
ὁ φιλόσοφος **οἱ φιλόσοφοι**	philosopher	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ** *loving knowledge*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ** *loving knowledge*
ὁρμᾶν	to rush	**ὉΡΜΑΝ** *setting in motion*

[U118]

10. To Apollonides

Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην

"Son of Apollo"

Frank Criticism for the Powerful
(If They Ask)

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 73

...[νουθε]τεῖν, ἐπειδὴ [προσηκόν]τω[ς δια]τίθεται, καθάπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐπ[ιφο]ράς τ[ι]ν[ας] πρὸς Ἀπο[λλ]ωνίδην ἐπόησεν, ὥστε καὶ τοι[αῦτ'] α[ἰ]τιώμε[νος, ἐ]άν [γ' ἀλη]θινὸς ἦι, π[είθειν ἄλλους] δ' οἰκειῶσαι * πολλά [τε, κἄ]ν ὄντες μεγάλοι προσ[επέ]λθωσι[ν, ὥ]σπερ ἀν[α]ξιοπαθήσαντες καὶ [ἀπάντησιν κυ]νι[κω]τέραν ἐπ[ιφωνοῦντες]...

...νουθετεῖν, ἐπειδὴ προσηκόντως Διατίθεται – καθάπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐπιφοράς τινας πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐποίησεν:

> ...to admonish [*him*], since he is appropriately disposed – just as Epicurus made certain implications against Apollonides:

ὥστε – καὶ τοιαῦτ' αἰτιώμενος, ἐάν γ' ἀληθινὸς Ἦ – πείθειν ἄλλους δ' οἰκειῶσαι πολλά: τε κἂν Ὄντες Μεγάλοι προσεπέλθωσιν ¬ ὥσπερ ἀναξιοπαθήσαντες, καὶ ἀπάντησιν Κυνικωτέραν ἐπιφωνοῦντες...

so that – even while accusing [*Apollonides*] of such things, although [*Epicurus*] is truthful [*in his frank criticism*] – he could persuade others and make them familiar with many things [*i.e., the teaching of the school*]: even if those who are great come forward ¬ as though having suffered indignities, and they call out for a more Cynic-like [*i.e. brutally honest*] response...

We hear of Apollonides again below "and Polyaenus too was such a man, who (even when Apollonides was being negligent) went frequently to Epicurus [to disclose his faults to Epicurus]..." *[U170]*

*Presumably Apollonides was being negligent about frankly disclosing his faults (***αἱ ἁμαρτίαι***).*

ἡ ἐπιφορά **αἱ ἐπιφοραί**	application *[here, "implication"]*	**ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ** *carrying upon*

[U119]

11\. To Aristobuolos

Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον

"Best Counsel" Brother of Epicurus

Epicurus reports about the Macedonian Court
(Antigonus Gonatas' respect for Zeno of Citium)

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 7.6 & 10 (Zeno of Citium)

ἀπεδέχετο δ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀντίγονος, καὶ – εἴ ποτ᾽ Ἀθήναζε Ἥκοι: Ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ πολλά τε Παρεκάλει ἀφικέσθαι ὡς αὐτόν. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν παρῃτήσατο...

and Antigonus [*Gonatas*] esteemed [*Zeno of Citium*], and – whenever [*Gonatas*] came to Athens: He would hear [*Zeno*] lecture and He often invited [*Zeno*] to come to him. [*Zeno*] declined this [*offer*]...

...Ἀπέστειλε δὲ Περσαῖον καὶ Φιλωνίδην τὸν Θηβαῖον – ὧν ἀμφοτέρων Ἐπίκουρος μνημονεύει ὡς συνόντων Ἀντιγόνῳ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐπιστολῇ

...but instead [*Zeno*] sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban [*to Gonatas*] – both of whom Epicurus mentions in his letter to his brother Aristobuolos as associating with Antigonus [*Gonatas*]

Antigonus Gonatas said in his letter to Zeno of Citium that "...clearly you will not be the instructor of myself alone, but of all the Macedonians taken together. For it is obvious that whoever instructs the ruler of Macedonia and guides him in the paths of virtue will also be training his subject to be good men..." *(Lives 7.7)*

Epicurus clearly took some interest in the fact that agents of Zeno were now prominent in the Macedonian court with the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes.

[U120]

12\. To Dositheus

Πρὸς Δωσίθεον

"God's Gift"

Sadness is not as Harmful as Cruelty or Rage

[part of U27] Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1101A,B

τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, Μάχονται καὶ Λέγουσι

those who remove distress and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, they oppose and say that

"τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν – ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, Πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι: καὶ Λυπεῖσθαι καὶ – νὴ Δία! – Λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ Τήκεσθαι"

"impassivity established in apathy exists from another greater evil – of cruelty or of unrestrained vanity and of rage – therefore, to experience something is better: and to be distressed and – by Zeus! – to anoint the eyes and to melt"

καὶ – ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες – ὑγροί Τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι!

indeed – while experiencing and writing such things – they seem to be moist [*i.e., tipsy*] and friendly!

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε – καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν, τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολὰς Διῆλθον αὐτοῦ...

for Epicurus has said these things in many other contexts – and also while writing about the death of Hegesianax to Dositheus, the father, and to Phyrson [*of Colophon*], the brother of the deceased: for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ ἀπάθεια **αἱ ἀπάθειαι**	absence of experience	**ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ** *not experiencing*
ἀπαθής *(ές)*	apathetic	**ΑΠΑΘΗΣ** *not experiencing*
τὸ ἀπαθὲς **τὰ ἀπαθῆ**	apathy *"the apathetic state"*	**ΑΠΑΘΕΣ** *not experiencing*
καταστηματικός *(ή, όν)*	established	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of thoroughly standing*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
λυπηρός *(ά, όν)*	distressing	**ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ** *vexation*
ἡ λύπη **αἱ λῦπαι**	distress	**ΛΥΠΗ** *vexation*
ἡ ἀλυπία **αἱ ἀλυπίαι**	impassivity	**ΑΛΥΠΙΑ** *no vexation*
λυπεῖσθαι	to be distressed	**ΛΥΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *vexation*
ἡ ἀπονία **αἱ ἀπονίαι**	non-suffering	**ΑΠΟΝΙΑ** *no toil*
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
ἡ ὠμότης **αἱ ὠμότητες**	cruelty	**ΩΜΟΤΗΣ** *condition from being savage / raw*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἡ δοξοκοπία **αἱ δοξοκοπίαι**	vanity	**ΔΟΞΟΚΟΠΙΑ** *striving toward seeming*
κρατεῖν	to prevail	**ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ** *power*

ἄκρατος (ον)	unrestrained	ΑΚΡΑΤΟΣ *no power*
ἡ λύσσα αἱ λύσσαι	rage	ΛΥΣΣΑ *fury / frenzy*
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ *enduring*
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
βελτίων (ων, ον)	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ *greater*
λιπαίνειν	to anoint	ΛΙΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ *fat / oil*
ὁ ὀφθαλμός οἱ ὀφθαλμοί	eye	ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΣ *eye chamber*
κατ' ὀφθαλμούς	directly observable	
τήκεσθαι	to melt	ΤΗΚΕΣΘΑΙ *melt down / pine away*

[U121]

13. To Hermarchus

Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον

"Leader guided by Hermes"

1. Leontion Consorting in the Gardens

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53

οὗτος οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐ Λεόντιον εἶχεν ἐρωμένην – τὴν ἐπὶ ἑταιρείᾳ διαβόητον γενομένην;

well did not this same Epicurus have Leontion as a mistress – the woman who had become notorious as a courtesan?

Ἦ, δὲ οὐδ᾽ – ὅτε φιλοσοφεῖν ἤρξατο – ἐπαύσατο ἑταιροῦσα: πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς Κήποις!

Who, did not – when she began to philosophize – cease consorting: but she was with all the Epicureans in the Gardens!

Ἐπικούρῳ δὲ, καὶ ἀναφανδόν! ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνον – πολλὴν φροντίδα ποιούμενον αὐτῆς – τοῦτ᾽ ἐμφανίζειν διὰ τῶν πρὸς Ἕρμαρχον ἐπιστολῶν

and for Epicurus, openly too! so that he – while taking much care for her – reveals this in the letters to Hermarchus

*It is notable that we have "The Gardens (**οἱ Κῆποι**)" given in the plural.*

We know that the "Little Lioness" Leontion wrote a book against Theophrastus. She was the wife of Metrodorus and may also have been the mother of Metrodorus' son, who was named after Epicurus.

ἡ ἐρωμένη αἱ ἐρωμέναι	mistress [i.e., female lover]	ΕΡΩΜΕΝΗ *having been loving*
ὁ ἑταῖρος οἱ ἑταῖροι	companion	ἙΤΑΙΡΟΣ *comrade*
ἡ ἑταιρεία αἱ ἑταιρεῖαι	courtesan	ἙΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ *comrade*
ἑταιρεῖν	to consort	
Ἐπικούρειος (α, ον)	Epicurean	ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΣ *running toward [to assist]*

ὁ κῆπος οἱ κῆποι	garden	ΚΗΠΟΣ *plantation*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
ἀναφαίνειν	to display	ΑΝΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining out*
ἀναφανδόν	visibly [here, "openly"]	
ἐμφαίνειν	to reveal	ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining in*

[U122]

2. Happy, Although in Pain

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.31.88

Ordiāmur ab eō (sī Placet) quem mollem, quem voluptārium Dīcimus. Quid?

Let us begin with him (if it pleases) whom we call soft, whom we call pleasure-loving. Why?

Is tibī mortemne vidētur aut dolōrem timēre? Quī eum diem, quō morītur, "beātum" appellat – maxumīsque dolōribus adfectus, eōs ipsōs inventōrum suōrum memoriā et recordātiōne confūtat? nec haec sīc agit, ut ex tempore quasi effuttīre videātur

does he seem to you to fear death or pain? He who calls that day, on which he was dying, "happy" – and, afflicted by the greatest pains, refutes those very pains through the memory and recollection of his discoveries? nor does he do this in such a way that he seems as if he is babbling at random

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Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.30.96 (refuting "Torquatus")

Audī (nē longē Abeām!) moriēns quid dicat Epicūrus – ut Intellegās facta eius cum dictīs discrepāre:

Listen (so that I do not stray too far!) to what Epicurus said while dying – so that you can understand that his actions disagree with his words:

"Epicūrus Hērmarchō, salūtem. cum Agerēmus" Inquit "vītae beātum et eundem suprēmum diem, Scrībēbāmus haec. tantī autem aderant vēsicae et torminum Morbī – ut Nihil ad eōrum magnitūdinem posset accēdere"

"Epicurus to Hermarchus, hello. as we were spending" he says "a happy day and also the last of my life, we were writing this. so great, however, were the Diseases of the bladder and of colic – that Nothing could come near to their severity"

miserum hominem! (sī Dolor Summum Malum est – dīcī Aliter nōn potest)

miserable man! (if Pain is the Chef Evil – there is nothing else that can be said)

sed Audiāmus ipsum "Compēnsābātur" inquit "tamen, cum hīs omnibus, animī laetitiā quam Capiēbam memoriā ratiōnum inventōrumque nostrōrum"

but let us hear the man himself "It was being compensated" he says "however, along with all these [*pains*], by the gladness of mind which I was taking in the memory of our reasonings and discoveries"

"sed Tū, ut dignum est tuā – ergā mē et philosophiam – voluntāte, ab adolēscentulō susceptā: fac ut Metrodōrī tueāre līberōs"

"but you, as is worthy of your goodwill – toward me and philosophy – that was taken up from youth: see to it that you protect Metrodorus' children"

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.19.45

Omittāmus hunc igitur nihil prorsus dīcentem, Cōgāmusque cōnfitērī nōn esse ab eō dolōris remedia quaerenda Quī dolōrem malōrum omnium maxumum dīxerit ¬ quamvīs Idem forticulum sē in torminibus et in strangūriā suā praebeat

Let us therefore disregard this man who says absolutely nothing, and let us compel him to confess that remedies for pain are not to be sought from one who has called pain the greatest of all evils ¬ even though the same man presents himself as rather brave in his colic and strangury

3. Blocking Fortune's Entry Points

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.9.26

Nihil gravius, nihil philosophiā dignius: nisi idem hoc ipsum – honestē, sapienter, iūstē – ad VOLUPTATEM, Referret. Quid melius quam "fortūnam exiguam intervenīre sapientī"?

Nothing [*would be*] more serious, nothing more worthy of philosophy: if only he did not refer this very thing itself – [i.e., *living*] honestly, wisely, justly – to PLEASURE. What is better than [*his saying*] "a slight fortune intervenes upon the wise"?

The beginning of PD16 is "in a few things, chance intrudes upon the wise man (**βραχέα, σοφῷ Τύχη παρεμπίπτει**)*"*

sed hoc Isne dīcit? Quī, cum dolōrem nōn modo maxumum malum, sed sōlum malum etiam Dīxerit – tōtō corpore opprimī possit dolōribus acerrumīs tum cum maximē contrā fortūnam gloriētur?

but is it this man who says this? He who, after having called pain not only the greatest evil, but even the only evil – can be overwhelmed in his whole body by the sharpest pains at the moment when he most boasts against fortune?

quod idem meliōribus etiam verbīs Metrodōrus: "Occupāvī tē" inquit, "Fortūna, atque Cēpī omnīsque aditūs tuōs Interclūsī – ut ad mē āspirāre nōn Possēs"

which the same Metrodorus expressed in even better words: "I have taken hold of you" he says "Fortune, and I have captured and blocked all your entrances – so that you cannot breathe on me"

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.74

nec vērō illā sibi remedia comparāvit ad tolerandum dolōrem – firmitātem animī, turpitūdinis verecundiam, exercitātiōnem consuētūdinemque patiendī, praecepta fortitūdinis, dūritiām virilem – sed ūnā sē Dīcit recordātiōne adquiescere praeteritārum voluptātium:

nor indeed in that way did [*Epicurus*] acquire for himself the remedies for enduring pain – strength of mind, a sense of shame before disgrace, the practice and habit of enduring, the precepts of fortitude, manly toughness – but he says that he finds rest in a single recollection of past pleasures:

ut sī Quis, aestuāns, cum vim calōris nōn facile Patiātur, recordārī Velit sēsē aliquandō in Arpinātī nostrō gelidīs flūminibus circumfūsum fuisse!

as if someone, sweltering, when he cannot easily bear the force of the heat, should wish to recall that he had at one time been surrounded in the cold rivers of our Arpinum!

Cicero was born in Arpinum (60 miles southeast of Rome).

Epicurus never denied the reality of pain – he proved that even at its worst, the memory of pleasure could still hold the soul steady. He did not clench his fists against circumstance – he smiled back, remembering why life had been worth it.

14. To a Courtesan

Metrodorus & Leontion

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.6

…καθά φησι Θεόδωρος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν *Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον* – καὶ ἄλλαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἑταίραις γράφειν, καὶ μάλιστα Λεοντίῳ, ἧς καὶ Μητρόδωρον ἐρασθῆναι

…just as Theodorus says in the fourth book of his work *Against Epicurus* – and that [*Epicurus*] wrote to many other courtesans, especially to Leontion, whom Metrodorus also loved

All evidence points to this referring to Theodorus of Cyrene – famously called "the Atheist" – as the Theodorus who wrote the polemic Against Epicurus (in at least four books). He was a younger contemporary of Epicurus and a prominent Cyrenaic hedonist who often polemicized against rival views.

Consider: "The Theodoreans derived their name from Theodorus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject." (D.L. 2.97)

To the extent that Epicurus and Theodorus were speaking about the conventional ideas about the gods, their material could have been very similar – yet clearly, on the fine points, they fundamentally disagreed.

ἡ ἑταιρεία **αἱ ἑταιρεῖαι**	courtesan	**ἙΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ** *comrade*
ἐρᾶν *+ gen.*	to love	**ΕΡΑΝ** *resting*

[U123]

15. To Eurylochus

Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον

"Far-Reaching Defender"

Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes: Obstacles, Not Guides

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.13

τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς Ναυσιφάνους ἀκοῦσαί φησι καὶ Πραξιφάνους ¬ Αὐτὸς δὲ οὔ φησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον ἐπιστολῇ

Apollodorus in his Chronology says that [*Epicurus*] was a student of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes ¬ but, in his letter to Eurylochus, he himself does not say this, but that [*he was a student*] of himself

Apollodorus "of Athens" (fl.c. 140 BCE) was educated by the Stoic Scholarch Diogenes of Babylon (who, as we know, was on friendly terms with Philonides of Laodicea). Apollodorus' "Chronology" is a historical account covering events from the Trojan War to his own era. Epicurus remained influential enough, even 130 years after his death, to merit inclusion in a general history of Greece.

He is probably the same person as Apollodorus the Epicurean – the so-called "Tyrant of the Garden (**Κηποτύραννος**)*"*

*Nausiphanes (**Ναυσιφάνης**, meaning "appearing on a ship," fl.c. 310 BCE) was a Pyrrhonian Skeptic and Rhetor. He drew scientific ideas from Democritus and argued that political honor comes from persuasive skill, which he linked to scientific knowledge.*

*Praxiphanes (**Πραξιφάνης**, meaning "showing results," fl.c. 300 BCE) was a Peripatetic and Grammarian – a pupil of Theophrastus and "showed his results" as a pioneer in grammar. Praxiphanes thus represents the Aristotelian tutelage Epicurus allegedly received.*

This Eurylochus is otherwise unknown.

ἀκούειν	to hear [i.e., to be a student of]	**ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ** *listening*

[U124]

16. To Herodotus

Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον

"Given by Hera"

Praise for Herodotus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.5

...ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα, καὶ Ἡρόδοτον, καὶ Τιμοκράτην (τοὺς ἔκπυστα αὐτοῦ τὰ κρύφια ποιήσαντας) ἐγκωμιάζειν – καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο

but [*it is said that* Epicurus] praised Idomeneus, and Herodotus, and Timocrates (the very ones who made his hidden teachings public) – and that he flattered this very thing

μαίνειν	to be mad	**μαίνειν** *raging*
ἀκούειν	to hear [i.e., to be a student of]	**ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ** *listening*
κρύφιον *(α, ον)*	hidden	**ΚΡΥΦΙΟΝ** *concealed*
τὰ κρύφια	the hidden things	
ἔκπυστος *(ον)*	disclosed *[here, "public"]*	**ΕΚΠΥΣΤΟΣ** *learning out of*

17. To Themista

Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν

"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"

1. Wife of Leonteus of Lampsacus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.25

...Λεοντεύς τε Λαμψακηνὸς ὁμοίως, καὶ ἡ τούτου γυνὴ Θεμίστα – πρὸς ἣν καὶ γέγραφεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος.

...likewise Leonteus of Lampsacus, and his wife Themista – to whom Epicurus also wrote.

[U125]

2. Going Where Themista Wishes

πρὸς δὲ Θεμίσταν τὴν Λεοντέως γυναῖκα "Οἷός τε" Φησίν "εἰμί, ἐὰν μὴ Ὑμεῖς πρός με ἀφίκησθε – αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος – ὅπου ἂν Ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμίστα παρακαλῆτε ὠθεῖσθαι"

and to Themista, the wife of Leonteus, [*Epicurus*] says "I am able, if you all do not come to me – myself thrice-rolled* – to be pushed wherever you all and Themista may encourage"

** or, "myself thrice-twined"*

Possibly meaning "crowned with three different plants" i.e., honored in different ways by Themista' compliments.

*Consider Philonides of Laodicea – who was honored with three distinct wreaths (***στέφανοι***):*

"...the people honored him: both [the elder] Philonides himself and his sons Philonides and Dicaearchus – with citizenship, and crowned them with (1) a wreath of laurel and again with (2) a golden wreath...
...to praise [the elder] Philonides of Laodicea and his sons Philonides and Dicaearchus, and to crown each of them with (3) a wreath of myrtle, which it is customary to use when crowning their own benefactors."

Οἷός τε εἰμι	I am able	*idiomatic*
ἡ γυνή **αἱ γυναῖκες**	woman	**ΓΥΝΗ** *wife*
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive [here, "come to"]	**ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *come towards*
παρακαλεῖν	to encourage	**ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΝ** *summoning beside*
ὠθεῖν	to push	**ΩΘΕΙΝ** *striking*
ὠθεῖσθαι	to be pushed	**ΩΘΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *striking*
ὁ στέφανος **οἱ στέφανοι**	wreath	**ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ** *encircling*
κυλινδεῖν	to roll	**ΚΥΛΙΝΔΕΙΝ** *turning over*
κυλιστός *(ή, όν)*	twined *LSJ "twined in a circle, epithet of a kind of garland"*	**ΚΥΛΙΣΤΟΣ** *turning over*
ὁ κυλιστός **οἱ κυλιστοί**	a twine [wreath]	
τρικύλιστος *(ον)*	"thrice-rolled" "thrice-twined" *LSJ glosses this hapax legomenon as "easily influenced" (presuming a colloquialism from the context)*	**ΤΡΙΚΥΛΙΣΤΟΣ** *turning over* *three [times]*

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), The Learned Banqueters, 15.23

Εὑρίσκω δὲ καὶ, παρὰ τοῖς κωμικοῖς, "κυλιστὸν" τινα καλούμενον στέφανον:

I find also, in the comic poets, a kind of wreath called "twined":

..."ὁ τρίτος οὗτος δ᾽ ἔχει σύκων κυλιστὸν στέφανον"...
..."περιφοραῖς κυκλούμενος – ὥσπερ κυλιστὸς στέφανος"...

..."This third man has a twined garland of fig-leaves"...
..."being turned into circles – just like a twined wreath"...

Τίς, οὖν οὗτος ὁ κυλιστός; Οἶδα γὰρ τὸν Θυατειρηνὸν Νίκανδρον, ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς Ὀνόμασι, λέγοντα τάδε 'ἐκκύλιστοι Στέφανοι –πκαὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ ῥόδων"

What, then, is this twine [*wreath*]? I am aware that Nicander of Thyatira, in his *Attic Words*, says this "fully-twined wreaths – and especially those [*made*] from roses"

> *Thus laurel, myrtle, rose, and fig plants were all used to form wreaths.*

[U126]

3. Themista's Advice

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.5

…καὶ πάλιν, πρὸς Θεμίσταν γράφων, νομίζειν αὐτὴν παραινεῖν – καθά φησι Θεόδωρος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον

….and again, writing to Themista, [*he is said*] to have thought that she advises – just as Theodorus [*the Cyrenaic*] says in the fourth book of his work *Against Epicurus*

> *Some editors instead take* **νομίζειν αὐτῇ παραινεῖν** *"he thinks that he advises her"*

[U127]

4. Discussing Lycus

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 10 fin.

…περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαρ[ιδή]μωι [γ]ράφ[ων]· 'ἤκουσα Λύκ[ου] φησίν (ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' ὅτι ν[εα]νίσκον… …Θεμίστ<ι> δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππου· 'Λύκον φὴ[ς] πιστ[ὸν] εὔτακτόν… …κατ' αὐτὰ παρακ[αλοῦ]ντα…'

…περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαριδήμωι γράφων· ""Ἤκουσα Λύκου" Φησίν ""Ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' – ὅτι νεανίσκον…"

…writing to Charidemus about his presence in Athens, [*Epicurus*] says "I heard of Lycus, for he has come to us – that the young man…"

…Θεμίστι δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππου "Λύκον Φὴς πιστὸν, εὔτακτόν… …κατ' αὐτὰ παρακαλοῦντα…"

…and to Themista during [*the archonship in 292 BCE*] of Philippus "You say Lycus is trustworthy, well-ordered… …inviting in accordance with those very things…"

> *Here we have Charidemus (***Χαρίδημος***) "Grace of the People" – which is distinct from Epicurus' brother, who was named Chairedemus (***Χαιρέδημος***) "Joy of the People."*

18. To Idomeneus
Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα
"Strength of Mount Ida"

1. Praise for Idomeneus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.25

…πρὸς ἣν καὶ γέγραφεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος: ἔτι τε Κολώτης καὶ Ἰδομενεύς, καὶ αὐτοὶ Λαμψακηνοί

…to whom Epicurus also wrote: and likewise Colotes and Idomeneus – both themselves Lampsacians

[U128]

...ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα... ...ἐγκωμιάζειν

...but also [*it is said that* Epicurus] praised Idomeneus...

[U129]

2. Dangers of Frankness with the Powerful

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 72, col. 179

...διὸ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει μέχρι τούτου ζῆν εὔ[χ]εσθαι· * καὶ παραδείξει πόσοι κακῶς ἀ[π]ώλοντο παντὸς στερόμενοι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τοῦ * μετὰ παρρησία[ς] ὁμιλῆ[σαί τισι] καὶ πάντα δ' ὅσα προ[σενεγκό]ντες [με]τ[ά]γομεν, [κατ]α[φή]σει...

...διὸ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει μέχρι τούτου ζῆν εὔχεσθαι: καὶ Παραδείξει πόσοι κακῶς ἀπώλοντο – παντὸς στερόμενοι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τοῦ μετὰ παρρησίας ὁμιλῆσαί τισι

...therefore even Epicurus writes to Idomeneus that he wishes to live up to this point: and He will fully show how many came to ruin badly – bereft of everything because of such a disposition of conversing with frankness with certain people

καὶ πάντα δ' ὅσα (προσενεγκόντες) Μετάγομεν Καταφήσει...

and he will declare everything whatsoever that we (having contributed) transferred...

δείκνυναι	to prove	**ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ** *showing*
ἡ παρρησία **αἱ παρρησίαι**	frankness	**ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ** *state of being* *said alongside*

[U130]

3. First-Fruits for Therapy

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1117D

εἰ δὲ τοιαύταις, ὦ Κωλῶτα, Σωκράτους φωναῖς Περιέπεσες, οἵας Ἐπίκουρος γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα:

but if, Colotes, you had encountered such expressions of Socrates as Epicurus writes to Idomeneus:

"Πέμπε, οὖν, ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν, ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καί τέκνων – οὕτω γάρ μοι λέγειν Ἐπέρχεται!"

"Send, then, first-fruits to us for the therapy of the sacred body, on behalf of yourself and your children – for thus it comes upon me to speak!"

τίσιν ἂν ῥήμασιν ἀγροικοτέροις Ἐχρήσω;

what more rustic sayings could one use?

The **ἀπαρχαί** *("first-fruits") were traditionally offerings made to the gods from one's harvest, typically in gratitude or to secure future favor. Here, Epicurus uses that religious and cultic language metaphorically.* *Plutarch likens Epicurus' request for physical support (e.g., food or supplies) to a quasi-priestly demand, elevating his body to something sacred (***τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος***), which Plutarch finds objectionable.*

ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying out*
πέμπειν	to send	ΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ *conveying*
ἄρχειν	to begin	ΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning*
ἀρχαῖος *(α, ον)*	ancient	ΑΡΧΑΙΟΣ *beginning*
ἡ ἀπαρχή αἱ ἀπαρχαί	first-fruit [i.e., offerings]	ΑΠΑΡΧΗ *beginning from*
ἱερός *(ά, όν)*	sacred	ἹΕΡΟΣ *holy*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ *body*
ἡ θεραπεία αἱ θεραπεῖαι	therapy	ΘΕΡΑΠΕΙΑ *healing*
τό τέκνον τά τέκνα	child	ΤΕΚΝΟΝ *descendant*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving*
ἐπέρχεσθαι	to come upon	ΕΠΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 279F

ταύτης γὰρ [τῆς γαστρὸς] ἕνεκεν, ὁ Ἀνήρ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἐκολάκευεν καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Μητρόδωρον

indeed, for the sake of this belly, and the other pleasure that exists according to the flesh, the man flattered both Idomeneus and Metrodorus

[U131]

4. Idomeneus' Noble Youth & Fame

[see U105] Aelius Theon (fl.c. 75 CE), Preliminary Exercises, 2.168

οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα Γράφει "Ὦ, πάντα τἀμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου"

such as he apparently writes to Idomeneus "O, [*you who*] perceived all my movements delightful from youth"

ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
τὸ κίνημα τὰ κινήματα	[specific] movement	ΚΙΝΗΜΑ *result of moving*
τέρπειν	to delight	ΤΕΡΠΕΙΝ *satisfying*
τερπνός *(ή, όν)*	delightful	ΤΕΡΠΝΟΣ *satisfying*

[U132]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, letter 21, section 3

Stūdia tē tua clārum et nōbilem efficiēnt – exemplum Epicūrī referam

your studies will make you distinguished and noble – I will bring forward the example of Epicurus

cum Idomeneō Scrīberet et illum ā vītā speciōsā ad fīdelem stabilēmque glōriam revocāret – rīgidae tunc potentiae ministrum et magna tractantem:

when he was writing to Idomeneus and calling him back from a brilliant life in faithful and steadfast glory – then a minister of rigid power and engaged in great affairs:

"sī glōriā" Inquit "Tangeris, notiōrem tē Epistulae meae facient quam omnia ista quae Colis et propter quae Coleris"

He said "if you are affected by glory, my Letters will make you more famous than all those things which you cherish and because of which you are cherished"

numquid, ergō, mentītus Est! Quis Idomeneā nōsset ¬ nisi Epicūrus illum litterīs suīs incīdisset? omnēs illōs megistanās et satrapās et rēgem ipsum (ex quō Idomeneī Titulus petēbātur), Oblīviō alta suppressit!

surely, then, he did not lie! Who would have known of Idomeneus ¬ had Epicurus not engraved him in his letters? all those nobles and satraps, and even the king himself (from whom Idomeneus' title was being sought), deep oblivion has suppressed!

[U133]

5. Flee the Professions *(Stay Alert for Good Opportunities)*

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, Letter 22, sections 1-5

Seneca Lūciliō suō, salūtem.

Seneca to his Lucilius, greetings.

iam Intellegis ēdūcendum esse tē ex istīs occupātiōnibus speciōsīs et malīs ¬ sed quō modō id cōnsequī possīs Quaeris. Quaedam nōn nisi ā praesente mōnstrantur…

You now understand that you must be led out of those flashy and harmful occupations ¬ but you ask how you might achieve that. Some things can only be shown by someone present…

[2] **Quid fierī soleat, Quid oporteat, in ūniversum et mandārī potest et scrībī: tāle Cōnsilium nōn tantum absentibus, etiam posterīs datur. Illud alterum – quandō fierī debeat aut quemadmodum – ex longinquō Nēmō suādēbit, cum rēbus ipsīs dēliberandum est**

What generally happens, and what ought to be done, can be passed on and written down in universal terms: such counsel can be given not only to those who are absent, but even to future generations. but that other kind – when something ought to happen, or in what way – no one will advise from afar, since it must be deliberated with the circumstances themselves

[3] **nōn tantum praesentis, sed vigilantis Est occāsiōnem observāre properantem.**

It is necessary not only for someone who is present, but for one who is alert, to notice the opportunity as it rushes by.

itaque hanc circūmspice – hanc sī Vīderis, Prende et tōtō impetū, tōtīs vīribus id: Age ut tē istīs officiīs Exuās. et quidem quam sententiam feram Attende: Cēnseō aut ex istā vītā tibī, aut ē vītā exeundum.

so look around for this – if you see this, grab it with full force and all your strength: strive to strip yourself from those duties. and now, pay attention to the opinion I am about to give: I believe it is necessary for you to either depart from that life, or from life [*itself*].

sed idem illud Existimō: lēnī Eundum viā – ut quod male implicuistī, Solvās potiūs quam Abrumpās – dummodō, sī alia solvendi Ratiō nōn erit: vel Abrumpās.

but I think this as well: it is necessary to go by the gentle path – so that what you've badly entangled, you may untie rather than tear apart – however, if there is no other method of untying it: then do tear it apart.

Nēmō tam timidus est ut Mālit semper pendēre quam semel cadere!

No one is so timid that he prefers hanging forever to falling once!

[4] interim – Quod prīmum est – impedīre tē nolī: Contentus estō negōtiīs, in quae dēscendistī (vel, quod vidērī Māvīs, "Incidistī").

in the meantime – and this is the first thing – do not entangle yourself further: Be content with the business in which you have entered (or, as you'd rather have it seem, "[*in which*] you stumbled").

nōn est Quod ad ulteriōra Nītāris – aut, Perdēs excūsātiōnem ¬ et Apparebit tē nōn incidisse.

There is no reason for you to strive for greater things – otherwise, you will lose the excuse ¬ and it will become apparent that you did not just stumble into it.

ista, enim, quae dīcī solent, falsa sunt: "nōn Potuī aliter" "quid sī Nōllem?" "necessē Erat"

yes, those things that are usually said are false: "I couldn't do otherwise" "what if I hadn't wanted to?" "It was necessary"

nūllī necessē Est fēlīcitātem cursū sequī: est Aliquid – etiam sī nōn repugnāre – subsistere, nec īnstāre fortūnae ferentī.

for no one is it is necessary to chase after happiness at a run: there is something [*of value*] – even if not in resisting – in stopping, and not pressing forward with fortune as she drives.

[5] numquid Offendēris, sī in cōnsilium nōn Veniō tantum, sed Advocō et quidem prudentiōrēs quam ipse sum – ad quōs Soleō dēferre, sī quid Dēlīberō:

surely you would not be offended, if I not only join in counsel, but also call in men indeed wiser than I am – to whom I usually refer, when I am deciding something:

Epicūrī epistulam ad hanc rem pertinentem Lege, Idomeneō quae īnscrībitur, quem Rogat ut quantum potest fugiāt et properet – antequam aliqua Vīs māior interveniat ¬ et auferat lībertātem recedendī.

Read the letter of Epicurus that pertains to this very issue, the one addressed to Idomeneus, whom [*Epicurus*] urges to flee as much as he can and to hurry – before some greater force intervenes ¬ and takes away the freedom to withdraw.

[6] Idem tamen subiicit nihil esse temptandum nisi cum aptē poterīt tempestīvēque temptārī.

He nevertheless adds that nothing should be attempted unless it can be done suitably and at the right time.

sed cum illud Tempus captātum diū vēnerit: exiliendum ait.

but when that long-awaited time finally comes: he says one must leap out.

dormītāre dē fugā cōgitantem Vetat – et Sperat salūtārem etiam ex difficillimīs exitum: sī nec Properēmus ante tempus ¬ nec Cessēmus in tempore

He forbids the one thinking about flight to fall asleep – and he hopes for a saving exit even from the most difficult things: if only we do not rush before the right time ¬ nor delay in the right time

Step away from oppressive obligations – but only when doing so opens a smoother path to freedom.

[U134]

6. Practical Consequences

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 34.1127D

πάλιν δέ (Οἶμαι, γράφων πρὸς Ἰδομενέα) Διακελεύεται "μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν – ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἂν μὴ τὴν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν Παρασκευάζωσιν"

again (I think, while writing to Idomeneus) he urges "not to live enslaved to laws and judgments – insofar as it does do not produce a disturbance from a strike from those nearby"

One should not remain bound by laws or the judgments of other people unless such submission genuinely serves to prevent tangible harm.

ὁ νόμος **οἱ νόμοι**	law	**ΝΟΜΟΣ** *allotting*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
δουλεύειν	to be a slave	**ΔΟΥΛΕΥΕΙΝ** *slave*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**ὉΣΟΣ** *however great*
πέλας	nearby	**ΠΕΛΑΣ** *approaching*
ὁ πέλας **οἱ πέλας**	he who is nearby	
ἡ πληγή **αἱ πληγαί**	strike	**ΠΛΗΓΗ** *to hit*
τό ὄχλημα **τά ὀχλήματα**	[cause of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΜΑ** *result of* *a crowd of people*
ἡ ὄχλησις **αἱ ὀχλήσεις**	[feeling of] disturbance	**ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ** *process of* *a crowd of people*
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing* *alongside*

[U135]

7. Remove Desire *(Advice for Supporting Pythocles)*

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 21.7

nē grātīs Idomenēus in epistulam meam vēnerit – Ipse eam dē suō redimēt

so that Idomeneus does not come into my letter for free – he will buy it back from his own [*account*]

ad hunc Epicūrus illam nobilem sententiam scrīpsit, quā hortātur ut Pythoclēa locuplētem nōn pūblicā nec ancipitī viā faciāt:

to this man Epicurus wrote that famous saying, in which he urges that Pythocles be made substantial not by a public or uncertain path:

"sī Vīs" Inquit "Pythoclēa dīvitem facere: nōn pecūniae adiciendum – sed cupiditātī dētrahendum est"

"if you wish" he says "to make Pythocles rich: It is necessary not to add to money, but to subtract from desire"

This quote, as translated from Seneca into Latin, is famous ¬ but Stobaeus preserves the original quote in Greek:

Johannes Stobaeus (fl. f. 450 CE), Anthology: volume 3, chapter 17, section 23 Wachsmuth–Hense p. 495

"εἰ Βούλει πλούσιον Πυθοκλέα ποιῆσαι: μὴ χρημάτων Προστίθει ¬ τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας Ἀφαίρει"

"if you want to make Pythocles rich: do not add property ¬ but remove desire"

ἡ βούλησις **αἱ βουλήσεις**	intention	**ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ** *wishing*
βούλεσθαι	to want	
πλούσιος *(α, ον)*	rich	**ΠΛΟΥΣΙΟΣ** *wealth*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
χρήσιμος *(ον)*	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
τὸ χρῆμα **τὰ χρήματα**	property	**ΧΡΗΜΑ** *necessary*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
ἀναιρεῖν	to confute	**ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping back*
ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping away*

8. Self-Sufficiency: A Secure *Basis*

Johannes Stobaeus (fl. f. 450 CE), Anthology: volume 3, chapter 17, section 13 Wachsmuth–Hense p. 492

51 Arrighetti

"Ἐζηλώσαμεν τὴν αὐτάρκειαν ¬ οὐχ ὅπως τοῖς εὐτελέσι καὶ λιτοῖς πάντως Χρώμεθα: ἀλλ' ὅπως Θαρρῶμεν πρὸς αὐτά"

"We admire self-sufficiency ¬ not so that we always use plain and simple things: but so that we might be confident in relation to them"

καταζηλοῦν	* to zealously emulate	**ΚΑΤΑΖΗΛΟΥΝ** *thoroughly* *envying*
ζηλοῦν	to admire [here gnomic aorist]	**ΖΗΛΟΥΝ** *envying*
αὐτοτελῶς	independently	**ΑΥΤΟΤΕΛΩΣ** *self-goal*
αὐτάρκης *(ες)*	self-sufficient	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ** *self-sufficing*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια **αἱ αὐτάρκειαι**	self-sufficiency	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ** *state of* *self-beginning*
εὐτελής *(ές)*	low-cost	**ΕΥΤΕΛΗΣ** *good completing*
λιτός *(ή, όν)*	plain	**ΛΙΤΟΣ** *simple*

πάντως	absolutely / in every way [here, "always"]	ΠΑΝΤΩΣ *all*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
θαρρεῖν	to be confident	ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ *taking courage*

9. Pruning Use

Johannes Stobaeus (fl. f. 450 CE), Anthology: volume 3, chapter 17, section 36 Wachsmuth–Hense p. 502

Ἐπίκουρος, ἐρωτηθεὶς πῶς ἄν Τις πλουτήσειεν: "οὐ τοῖς οὖσι προστιθεὶς" Ἔφη "τῆς δὲ χρείας τὰ πολλὰ περιτέμνων"

Epicurus, when asked how Someone might become rich: "not by adding to existing things" He said "but by pruning away most of their use"

προστιθέναι	to add	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing toward*
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
τὸ χρῆμα τὰ χρήματα	property	ΧΡΗΜΑ *necessary*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ *necessary*
ἐπιτέμνειν	to cut short	ΕΠΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ *cutting upon*
τέμνειν	to divide	ΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ *cutting*
περιτέμνειν	to prune	ΠΕΡΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ *cutting around*

10. Insatiability

Johannes Stobaeus (fl. f. 450 CE), Anthology: volume 3, chapter 17, section 29 Wachsmuth–Hense p. 497

Ἐπίκουρος ὁ Γαργήττιος ἐκεκράγει, λέγων:

Epicurus of Gargettios used to call out, saying:

"ᾧ ὀλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν – τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν ἱκανόν!"

"for whom a little is not sufficient – for him nothing is sufficient!"

Ἔλεγε δὲ ἑτοίμως ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας διαγωνίζεσθαι – μᾶζαν ἔχων καὶ ὕδωρ

and he used to say that he is readily able to compete even with Zeus for wellbeing – while he has bread and water

ὀλίγος (η, ον)	few, short [of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ *little*
ἱκανός (ή, όν)	sufficient	ἹΚΑΝΟΣ *fitting / proper*
ἑτοιμάζειν	to make ready	ἙΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ *preparing*
ἑτοῖμος (ίμη, ῖμον)	made ready	ἙΤΟΙΜΟΣ *preparing*
ἑτοίμως	readily	ἙΤΟΙΜΩΣ *preparing*
ὁ Ζεύς (τοῦ διός)	Zeus	ΖΕΥΣ *sky god / day*

ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
διαγωνίζεσθαι	to compete	**ΔΙΑΓΩΝΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ**
ἡ μᾶζα **αἱ μᾶζαι**	bread / barley-cake	**ΜΑΖΑ** *kneading*
τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ὙΔΩΡ** *rain / water*

[U136]

11. Remember Polycrates: Riches Without Refuge

The Suda, Pythia and Delia (pi-3128)

Φασὶ Πολυκράτη, τὸν Σάμου τύραννον, Πύθια καὶ Δήλια ποιήσοντα ἅμα, ἐν Δήλῳ πέμψαι εἰς θεοῦ χρησόμενον εἰ τὰ τῆς θυσιας ἄγοι κατὰ τὸν ὡρισμένον χρόνον

They say that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, intending to simultaneously make both the Pythian and Delian [*sacrifices*], sent [*an embassy*] to Delos to consult in the god [*Apollo*] if he was preforming the [*rights*] of the sacrifice at the appointed time

τὴν δὲ Πυθίαν ἀνελεῖν "Ταῦτά σοι καὶ Πύθια καὶ Δήλια" – βουλομένην δηλοῦν ὅτι ἔσχατα: μετ' ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον, αὐτὸν ἀπολέσθαι Συνέβη

The Pythia answered "These are Pythia and Delia for you" – withing to make clear that [*they were his*] last: after a short time, it did occur that he was utterly destroyed

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ, ἔν τινι τῶν πρὸς Ἰδομενέα ἐπιστολῶν, ταῦτα

and Epicurus, in a certain one of the letters to Idomeneus, [*mentions*] these things

Polycrates (fl. 540 BCE) was a famous tyrant that ruled Samos two hundred years before Epicurus' birth.

Polycrates turned Samos into a dominant naval force – and for a while he had the most powerful army in the Greek world.

Polycrates also sponsored the reconstruction of Samos' massive Heraion, to which his ally the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis dedicated many gifts.

Eventually, Polycrates was lured into a meeting with the Persian satrap Oroetes (who told Polycrates that he wanted to pay for the option to use Samos as a place of refuge). Instead, Oroetes had Polycrates impaled and crucified.

[U137]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 28

*"καὶ δεηθέντος μου φιλανθ[ρω] πεύ[εσ]... ...δ[ιὰ παντὸ]ς πρὸς Μ[ι]θρῆ[ν]. ἡνίκα ἔζη [Λ]υσίμαχο[ς] χρήσιμον οἰόμενο[ι] τοῦ... ...ὑμῖν εἶν[αι] ἢ π[ροπ]... ...δὲ καὶ τὰ [κα]τὰ τὴν ἔξωθε[ν] φα[ν]τασίαν ἐφ' ὃ ἂν ἀνέ[κ]... ...τι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς ἡμᾶς." καὶ Ἰδομενεῖ δὲ παραπλήσια [κα]... ...Κωλώτει· τούτωι δὲ ὅτι· 'καὶ [υ]πέρτερ[ο]ν ἐγένετ... ...[χρ]ήσιμ[ο]... ...μ[ιθ]ρῆ[ς] *φίλαι τε, τῆι μετρὶ τῆι Κρατέρ[ο]υ, καὶ [α]ὑτῶι Κρατέρωι, ὡς αὐ[τὸ]ς ἀπολογίζεται ΜΙΘΡΗΣ. ' Μιθρε<ῖ> δέ· "ἀνήγγελλέ μοι... ...τοῦ [ἄ]ρχειν κα[ὶ] μὲ[ν τ]ὰ ἴδια...*

...καὶ Ἰδομενεῖ δὲ παραπλήσια...

...but also to Idomeneus the nearly equal [*things*]...

This section is mostly about Mithres, and the part about Idomeneus is broken off.

[U138]

Note that Cicero translates the beginning of this letter accurately – but, as seen above – records the recipient as Hermarchus: "Epicurus to Hermarchus, hello…"

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.22

ἤδη δὲ, τελευτῶν, Γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα τήνδε ἐπιστολήν:

already, as he was dying, He writes this letter to Idomeneus:

"τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου, Ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. Στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει – καὶ δυσεντερικὰ Πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους"

"while spending a blessed and at the same time the final day of my life, we were composing these things to you all. Strangury has also followed along – and dysenteric feelings do not leave out the excess of their extent"

"ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν Χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. Σὺ δ᾽ – ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν: Ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."

"yet, arranged along against all these, was what is joyful in the soul based in the memory of our reflections on what has happened. but you – in a manner deserving of your proximity to me and to philosophy since youth: take care of the children of Metrodorus."

μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
τελεῖν	to fulfill	**ΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing*
τελευταῖος *(α, ον)*	final	**ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΟΣ** *terminating*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
στραγγουρικός *(ή, όν)*	strangury-like	**ΣΤΡΑΓΓΟΥΡΙΚΟΣ** *straining urinating*
ἡ στραγγουρία	strangury	**ΣΤΡΑΓΓΟΥΡΙΑ** *straining urinating*
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	**ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following beside*
δυσωπεῖν	to trouble	**ΔΥΣΩΠΕΙΝ** *difficult face*
δυσεντερικός *(ή, όν)*	dysenteric	**ΔΥΣΕΝΤΕΡΙΚΟΣ** *difficult intestines*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἡ ἐπιβολή **αἱ ἐπιβολαί**	[B'] attention	**ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ** *throwing upon*
ἡ ὑπερβολή **αἱ ὑπερβολαί**	excess	**ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗ** *throwing above*
ἀπολείπειν	to leave out	**ΑΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *leaving away/out*
τὸ μέγεθος **τὰ μεγέθη**	size / extension	**ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ** *largeness*
	Part 3	
ἀντιπαρατάττειν	to arrange along against	**ΑΝΤΙΠΑΡΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *arranging against alongside*
οὗτος *(αὕτη, τοῦτο)*	this	**ὉΥΤΟΣ** *this*

ἡ ψυχή **αἱ ψυχαί**	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
χαῖρων *(ουσα, ον)*	rejoicing	**ΧΑΙΡΩΝ** *being cheerful*
τὸ χαῖρον **τὰ χαῖροντα**	what is joyful	**ΧΑΙΡΟΝ** *being cheerful*
τὸ γεγονός **τὰ γεγονότα**	what has happened	**ΓΕΓΟΝΟΣ** *came into being*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning through action*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	**ΑΞΙΟΣ** *counterbalancing*
ἀξίως	worthily	
τὸ μειράκιον **τὰ μειράκια**	lad	**ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΟΝ** *little young man*
ἡ παράστασις **αἱ παραστάσεις**	representation [here, "proximity"]	**ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *placed next to*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ** *loving knowledge*
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι	to take care of	**ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *caring upon*
ὁ παῖς **οἱ παῖδες**	child / slave	**ΠΑΙΣ** *son*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	**ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ** *gift [to] mother*

13. Endurance of the Bad

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 66.47,48

[47] **Dābō apud Epicūrum tibi etiamnunc simillimam huic nostrae dīvīsiōnem bonōrum: Alia enim sunt, apud illum, quae Mālit contingere sibi – ut corporīs quiētem ab omni incommodo līberam – et animī remissiōnem bonōrum suōrum contemplātiōne gaudentis**

I will give you even now a division of goods from Epicurus very similar to our own: for there are some things, according to him, that he would prefer to happen to himself – such as peace in the body that is free from all trouble – and the relaxation of the rejoicing mind in the contemplation of its own blessings

Alia sunt, quae, quamvīs Nōlit accidere, nihilominus Laudat et Cōnprobat: tamquam illam (quam paulō ante dīcēbam) malae valētūdinis et dolōrum gravissimōrum perpessiōnem, in quā Epicūrus fuit illō summō ac fortūnātissimō diē suō

Other things exist, which, although he does not want them to happen, nevertheless he praises and approves: such as that endurance of ill health and the most severe pains (which I was just mentioning a moment ago) which Epicurus was in on his ultimate and most fortunate day

Ait enim sē vēsicae et exulcerātī ventris tormenta tolerāre – ulteriōrem dolōris accessionem nōn recipientia: esse nihilominus sibi illum beātum diem

for he says that he endures the pains of the bladder and an ulcerated stomach – which do not admit further addition of pain: and that nevertheless that day is for him a blessed one

beātum autem Agere – nisi Quī est in summō bonō – nōn potest:

but to live blessed – if one is not in the highest good – is not possible:

[48] **ergo, et apud Epicūrum, sunt haec Bona quae Mallēs nōn experīrī ¬ sed quia ita Rēs tulit: et amplectanda et laudanda et exaequanda summīs sunt**

therefore, even with Epicurus, there are goods [*e.g., the endurance of ill health*] which you would rather not experience ¬ but because the situation turns out that way: they are to be embraced, praised, and ranked alongside the highest goods

nōn Potest dīcī hoc nōn esse pār maximīs bonum – Quod beātae vītae clāusulam inposuit ¬ cui Epicūrus extrēmā vōce grātiās ēgit

It cannot be said that this is not a good equal to the greatest – which sets the seal on a blessed life ¬ for which Epicurus gave thanks with his final breath

14. Gratitude

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 92.25

Quid est in virtūte praecipuum? Futūrō nōn indigēre, nec diēs suōs computāre: in quantulō libet tempore, bona aeterna cōnsummat. incrēdibilia nōbīs Haec videntur et suprā hūmānam nātūram excurrentia

What is foremost in virtue? to not need the future, nor counting its days: in however small a span of time it pleases, it completes eternal goods. These things seem incredible to us and extending beyond human nature

maiestātem enim eius ex nostrā inbecillitāte Metīmur et vitiīs nostrīs nōmen virtūtis Impōnimus. Quid porrō? Nōn aequē incrēdibile vidētur aliquem in summīs cruciātibus positum dīcere "beātus sum"?

for We measure its majesty by our own weakness and Assign the name of virtue to our vices. What then? Does it not seem equally unbelievable that someone placed in the greatest torments should say "I am blessed"?

atquī haec Vōx in ipsā officīnā voluptātis audīta est "beātissimum" inquit "hunc et: hunc diem Agō" Epicūrus – cum Illum hinc ūrīnae Difficultās torquēret, hinc īnsānābilis exulcerātī Dolor ventris

and yet this statement was heard in the very workshop of pleasure "most blessed" Epicurus said "is this indeed: this day I am living" – even while on one side difficulty of urination was tormenting him, and on the other side the incurable Pain of an ulcerated stomach

15. Implications of Vice from Opposing Schools

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Letters to Friends, 7.26,1

To Marcus Fadius Gallus, ca. 57 BCE

Egō autem, quom omnis morbōs reformīdō, tum in quō Epicūrum tuum Stoicī male accipiunt, quia dicat "στραγγουρικὰ καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη" sibi molesta esse – quōrum alterum morbōm ēdācitātis esse putant ¬ alterum etiam turpioris intemperantiae

but I, although I shrink from all diseases, especially in those the Stoics take your Epicurus badly, because he says "strangury-like and dysenteric feelings" are troublesome to him – of which sufferings they think one disease is of gluttony ¬ the other of an even more disgraceful lack of restraint

*Note that Cicero's Greek says "strangury-like and dysenteric feelings (**στραγγουρικὰ καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη**)" – the version given by Laertius reads "Strangury has also followed along – and dysenteric Feelings (**Στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει – καὶ δυσεντερικὰ Πάθη**)."*

[Gordon] Momentary code-switching from Latin to Epicurus' description of his own disease in Greek serves to authenticate Cicero's tacit claim about the sexual and dietary habits of Epicurus (strangury being a sexually transmitted disease according to Hippocrates and Galen). Then, toggling back to Latin, Cicero adds an interpretation not implied by Epicurus.

στραγγουρικός (ή, όν)	strangury-like	**ΣΤΡΑΓΓΟΥΡΙΚΟΣ** *straining urinating*
δυσωπεῖν	to trouble	**ΔΥΣΩΠΕΙΝ** *difficult face*
δυσεντερικός (ή, όν)	dysenteric	**ΔΥΣΕΝΤΕΡΙΚΟΣ** *difficult intestines*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*

16. Unpreventability of Pain

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1089E

ἑαυτῷ δ' ἔχον ἀρχὰς κακῶν – ἃς οὐκ ἀποτρέπει Λογισμός

but [*the body*] has in itself the beginnings of evils – which reason does not turn away

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν προσέπιπτεν ἀνδράσι νοῦν ἔχουσι στραγγουρικὰ Πάθη καὶ δυσεντερικὰ καὶ Φθίσεις καὶ Ὕδρωπες – ὧν τοῖς μὲν αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος συνηνέχθη, τοῖς δὲ Πολύαινος ¬ τὰ δὲ Νεοκλέα καὶ Ἀγαθόβουλον ἐξήγαγε

for [*if reason could remove ailments*], strangury-like and dysenteric feelings and consumptions and dropsies would not also have fallen upon men possessing reason – of which some Epicurus himself endured, others Polyaenus [endured] ¬ and other [*diseases*] carried off Neocles and Agathoboulos

The ending is a botched reference to "Neocles and Aristobuolos" (brothers of Epicurus).

[Gordon] Plutarch implies that Epicurus' illness disproves the validity of Epicurean optimism about the power of the intellect. Plutarch adds that he does not mean to reproach the Epicureans for their poor health, since other philosophers also had ailments, but this rhetorical concession scarcely detracts from his listing of "Epicurean" illnesses.

With Plutarch, Epicurus' poor health has spread to his followers. As we have seen, Diogenes Laertius and Timocrates attribute illness and infirmity to Epicurus, and the statues portray him with a thin, unfit body. But neither statues nor early texts attribute infirmity to other Epicureans.

17. Memory is Not a Passive Image

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1099D

εἰ τοίνυν (ὥσπερ Λέγουσι) τὸ Μεμνῆσθαι τῶν προτέρων ἀγαθῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν:

even if (as they say) remembering earlier goods is the greatest thing for living pleasantly:

Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν Εἷς ἡμῶν πιστεύσειεν ὅτι – ταῖς μ εγίσταις ἀλγηδόσι καὶ νόσοις ἐναποθνήσκων – Ἀντιπαρεπέμπετο τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν ἐναπολελαυσμένων πρότερον ἡδονῶν

not even one of us would believe Epicurus that – while dying amid the greatest pains and illnesses – he was counterbalancing with the memory of pleasures formerly fully enjoyed

εἰκόνα γὰρ ὄψεως ἐν βυθῷ συνταραχθέντι καὶ κλύδωνι μᾶλλον ἄν Τις ἢ μνήμην ἡδονῆς διαμειδιῶσαν ἐν σφυγμῷ τοσούτῳ καὶ σπαραγμῷ σώματος ἐπινοήσειε!

> for, someone would more likely perceive the image of his appearance in the [*ocean's*] disturbed depth and surge than a memory of pleasure smiling gently amid such throbbing and bodily torment!

Memory is not a passive image, like a reflection on water; it is a physiological process, rooted in impressions stored in the brain. When we vividly recall a pleasure, the emotional trace of that experience can counteract present suffering, even in extreme conditions. *A person who has trained their mind to focus on past experiences of genuine satisfaction can access a form of cognitive buffering, even when the body is under stress.*

ἡ εἰκών **αἱ εἰκόνες**	image	**ΕΙΚΩΝ** *portraying*
ἡ ὄψις **αἱ ὄψεις**	vision [here, "appearance"]	**ΟΨΙΣ** *eye*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive [here, "perceive"]	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*

18. The Will Is Based In The Body

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.21

Τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἡ Σὰρξ ἢ ἡ Προαίρεσις;

> Which one wrote, when it was dying, that it "was spending the last and at the same time also a blessed day?" was it your Flesh or your Choice?

εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν Ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ Μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς Εἶ;

> then you agree to having something [*i.e., choice*] superior to this [*i.e., the flesh*]! are you not insane? Are you so blind and deaf to the truths?

προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping before*
προαιρεῖσθαι	to choose [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *grasping before*
ἡ προαίρεσις **αἱ προαιρέσεις**	choice	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ** *grasping before*

19. To Craterus

Πρὸς Κράτερον

"Powerful"

[U139]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 28 [partial]

...μ[ιθ]ρῆ[ς] *φίλαι τε, τῆι μετρὶ τῆι Κρατέρ[ο]υ, καὶ [α]ὐτῶι Κρατέρωι, ὡς αὐ[τὸ]ς ἀπολογίζεται ΜΙΘΡΗΣ.

...Μιθρῆς Φίλαι τε, τῇ μετρὶ τῇ Κρατέρου – καὶ αὐτῷ Κρατέρῳ – ὡς αὐτὸς ἀπολογίζεται Μίθρης.

> ...[*Epicurus wrote*] of Mithres to Phila, the mother of Craterus – and to Craterus himself – as Mithres himself explains.

20. To Colotes

[U140]

1. Universal Errors of Youth

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 9 (col. 108)

...[καθ]όλου [δ’ ἀμαρτημάτων ἐκεί]νων τ[ά]δε καὶ τάδ[ε] καὶ ἅπε[ρ ὁ] Ἐπίκουρος Λεοντίου πυνθά[ν]εται πρ[οσυ]ποστήσεται πρὸς Κολώτην. ἐπεὶ καὶ μετάξει ποτ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ὁ σοφός θ’ ἁμαρτημ’ ἄνετον ἐν τ[ῆι] νεότητι γε[γ]ονέ[ν]αι...

...καθόλου δ’ ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκείνων – τάδε καὶ τάδε, καὶ ἅπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος Λεοντίου πυνθάνεται – προσυποστήσεται πρὸς Κολώτην: ἐπεὶ καὶ μετάξει ποτ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ὁ Σοφός θ’ ἁμαρτημ’ ἄνετον ἐν τῇ νεότητι γεγονέναι...

...but of what is mistaken universally by those [*students*] – these and those [*mistakes*], and the very ones Epicurus learns by asking Leontion – he will undertake in advance in regards to Colotes: for even the wise man will at some point divert to himself that he had made an intemperate mistake in his youth...

[*Society of Biblical Literature*] ...in general such and such of their [*sc. the students'*] errors and what Epicurus learns from Leontion he will [*hypothetically*] ascribe to Colotes. Since the wise man will also sometimes transfer to himself an intemperate error, [*saying*] that it occurred in his youth...

This passage shows a balanced approach: the teacher not only corrects his students by addressing their common mistakes – but also admits that he, too, once made such errors in his youth.

καθόλου	(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ *completely*
ἡ ἁμαρτία αἱ ἁμαρτίαι	mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΙΑ *missing the mark*
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἉΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ *missing the mark*
τὸ ἁμάρτημα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα	what is mistaken	
ἐκεῖνος (*ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο*)	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ *that there*
ὅσπερ (*ἥπερ, ὅπερ*)	the very thing which	ὉΣΠΕΡ *relative pronoun* *emphatic particle*
μανθάνειν	to learn	ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *thinking*
πυνθάνεσθαι	to learn by asking	ΠΥΝΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ *learning*
ἱστάναι	to stand	ἹΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing*
προσυφιστάναι	to undertake in advance	ΠΡΟΣΥΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *before with under standing*
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going*
μετάγειν	to divert	ΜΕΤΑΓΕΙΝ *going after*
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ *knowledge*
ἄνετος	relaxed [here, "intemperate"]	ΑΝΕΤΟΣ *not going*
ἡ νεότης αἱ νεότητες	youth	ΝΕΟΤΗΣ *new*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

[U141]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1117B & C

Κωλώτης δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀκροώμενος Ἐπικούρου φυσιολογοῦντος, ἄφνω τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτοῦ προσέπεσε – καὶ ταῦτα Γράφει, σεμνυνόμενος, αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος

Colotes himself while listening to Epicurus on the study of nature, suddenly fell to his knees – and this is what Epicurus himself, while taking pride, writes about:

"ὡς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τόθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν λεγόμενα: προσέπεσεν Ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον τοῦ περιπλακῆναι ἡμῖν γονάτων ἐφαπτόμενον – καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις τιμῶν καὶ λιτάς. Ἐποίεις οὖν" Φησί "καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι"

"since to you who was venerating what was being said by us at that time: an unphysiological desire fell upon *[you]* to become entwined, grabbing on to our knees – and producing the whole embrace of the accustomed kind in accordance with reverences, honors, and prayers. so you made" he says "us counter-bless and counter-revere you yourself"

συγγνωστὰ – νὴ Δία! – τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς παντὸς ἂν Πρίαιντο τῆς ὄψεως ἐκείνης εἰκόνα γεγραμμένην θεάσασθαι: τοῦ μὲν προσπίπτοντος εἰς γόνατα καὶ περιπλεκομένου – τοῦ δ᾽ "ἀντιλιτανεύοντος" καὶ "ἀντιπροσκυνοῦντος!"

they are forgivable – by Zeus! – those who say that they would give anything to behold a painted representation of that sight: of the one falling to his knees and entwining himself – and of the other "countersupplicating" and "counterprostrating!"

οὐ μέντοι τὸ Θεράπευμα τοῦτο, καίπερ εὖ τῷ Κωλώτῃ συντεθέν, ἔσχε καρπὸν ἄξιον: οὐ γὰρ Ἀνηγορεύθη σοφὸς ¬ ἀλλὰ μόνον "ἄφθαρτός μοι περιπάτει" Φησὶ "καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους Διανοοῦ"

yet this Homage, though well composed by Colotes, did not bear worthy fruit: for he was not declared wise ¬ but [*Epicurus*] only said "Walk around with me as indestructible and perceive us as indestructible"

*For "unphysiological desire (**Ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον**)" consider "unphysiological' as used by Philodemus for demagoguery in "the empty and unphysiological kind of demagoguery (**τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυσιολόγητον δημαγωγίαν**)"U96*

σέβεσθαι	to revere	**ΣΕΒΕΣΘΑΙ** *yielding to*
ἡ σέβασις **αἱ σεβάσεις**	reverence	**ΣΕΒΑΣΙΣ** *yielding to*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	**ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling toward*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία **αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι**	desire	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ** *toward spirit*
τό ἐπιθύμημα **τὰ ἐπιθυμήματα**	what is desired	**ΕΠΙΘΥΜΗΜΑ** *result of* *toward spirit*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning* *of producing*
ὁ φυσιολόγος **οἱ φυσιολόγοι**	natural scientist	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning* *of producing*
ἀφυσιολόγητος *(ον)*	unphysiological *(i.e., not to be explained by science)*	**ΑΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΗΤΟΣ** *not capable of* *reasoning about* *producing*
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	**ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ** *weaving together*

περιπλέκειν	to entwine	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ *weaving around*
τό γόνυ τὰ γόνατα	knee	ΓΟΝΥ
ἀνάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ *thoroughly fastening*
ἐφάπτεσθαι	to grab on	ΕΦΑΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ *fastening upon*
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ *accustomed action*
ἐθίζειν	to accustom	ΕΘΙΖΕΙΝ *accustomed action*
εἰθισμένος (η, ον)	accustomed	ΕΙΘΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *accustomed action*
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ΥΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold under*
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
ἡ ἐπίληψις αἱ ἐπιλήψεις	an embrace	ΕΠΙΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold upon*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	honor	ΤΙΜΗ *value*
λιτός (ή, όν)	plain	ΛΙΤΟΣ *simple*
λιτός and λιτή are not etymologically related		
ἡ λιτή αἱ λιταί	prayer	ΛΙΤΗ *supplication*
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ἀνθιεροῦν	to counter-bless	ΑΝΘΙΕΡΟΥΝ *against (instead of) a priest*
apparently a hapax legomenon LSJ glosses this usage as "consecrate in return"		
ἀντισέβεσθαι	to counter-revere	ΑΝΤΙΣΕΒΕΣΘΑΙ *against (instead of) yielding to*
ἄφθαρτος (ον)	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ *not decaying*
περιπατεῖν	to walk around	ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΕΙΝ *walking around*
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ *seeing through*

3. Only the Wise Are Unshaken

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1117F

ἦν γάρ ἐστι τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων: τὸ μηδὲν ἀμεταπείστως πεπεῖσθαι Μηδένα πλὴν τὸν σοφόν.

which is [*one*] of Epicurus' doctrines: that Nobody is irrefutably convinced of anything except the wise man.

ἐπεὶ, τοίνυν, ὁ Κωλώτης οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ¬ οὐδὲ μετὰ τὰς σεβάσεις ἐκείνας – Ἐρωτάτω πρῶτον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐρωτήματα...

since, then, Colotes was not wise ¬ not even after those acts of reverence –
Let him first address these questions...

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100A

...σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης, μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα, Προσκυνήσειε, γονάτων ἀψάμενος...

[*Epicurus used*] to say that no one had become wise except himself and his students ¬ but also used to write that Colotes, upon seeing him engaged in natural philosophy, fell, having grasped his knees.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100C

οὐ γὰρ ἄν τινα Πείσειεν ἀνθρώπων (Ὁ τὴν Νεοκλέους μαρτυρίαν καὶ τὴν Κωλώτου προσκύνησιν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ τιθέμενος καὶ ἀγαπῶν) ὡς οὐκ ἂν – ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κροτηθεὶς Ὀλυμπίασιν – Ἐξεμάνη καὶ Ἀνωλόλυξε, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅλως ὑπὸ χαρᾶς Ἤρθη κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα "γραίας ἀκάνθης Πάππος ὡς φυσώμενος"

for he would not persuade anyone who is alive (he who places and delights in the testimony of Neocles and the prostration of Colotes in such a lengthy speech) that he would not – if he had been applauded by the Greeks at Olympia – have gone mad and cried aloud, or rather have been entirely carried away by joy, as Sophocles says "like the puffed-up pappus of the 'old woman's thistle'"

[Goodwin] For he will never induce any mortal to believe, that he that could so highly value and please himself with the attestation of his brother Neocles and the adoration of his friend Colotes would not, were he clapped by all the Greeks at the Olympiads, go quite out of his wits and even hollow for joy, or rather indeed be elated in the manner spoken of by Sophocles: Puffed like the down of a gray-headed thistle.

The line uses the image of a thistle's pappus (fluffy seed tuft) – light and easily blown away – to describe someone insubstantial or easily swayed.

[U142]

4. Use of Oaths

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.29.838

[ἔμελε δὲ] καὶ Κωλώτηι [πάντω]γ τε ὅρκων καὶ [πάσης] θεολογίας.

Ἔμελε δὲ καὶ Κωλώτῃ – πάντων τε ὅρκων καὶ πάσης θεολογίας·

[*Epicurus*] was careful also with Colotes – for all oaths and all theology.

21. To Leontion
Πρὸς Λεόντιον
"Little Lion"

1. Relationship with Metrodorus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.6

...καθά φησι Θεόδωρος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν *Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον* – καὶ ἄλλαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἑταίραις γράφειν, καὶ μάλιστα Λεοντίῳ, ἧς καὶ Μητρόδωρον ἐρασθῆναι

...just as Theodorus [*the Cyrenaic*] says in the fourth book of his work *Against Epicurus* – and that [*Epicurus*] had also written to many other courtesans, especially to Leontion, whom Metrodorus also loved

2. Epipoliórkētēs – *The Courtesan Connection*

In the following fictitious letter (16) Alciphron depicts Lamia writing to Demetrius Poliorcetes – and in this letter (17) Alciphron fictitiously depicts Leontion writing to Lamia.

Lamia of Athens was a famous flutist, courtesan, and contemporary of Epicurus.

Demetrius Poliorcetes famously had a long-standing relationship with Lamia.

Alciphron is certainly implying (or working under the assumption) that Epicurus and Demetrius shared the same social circles in Athens.

(Leontion scribentem ad Lamiam facit) **οἷά με Ἐπίκουρος οὗτος διοικεῖ: πάντα λοιδορῶν, πάντα ὑποπτεύων, ἐπιστολὰς "ἀδιαλύτους" μοι γράφων – ἐκδιώκων ἐκ τοῦ Κήπου!**

(Leontion depicted writing to Lamia) the way this Epicurus manages me: criticizing everything, suspecting everything, writing those "indissoluble" letters to me – driving me out of the Garden!

...ὄντως ἐπιπολιορκητὴν ἔχω τοιοῦτον – οὐχ οἷον σὺ, Λάμια, Δημήτριον – μὴ γὰρ ἔστι σωφρονῆσαι διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον!

indeed, I have just such a *gray-haired* "persistent besieger" – not like you [*have*], Lamia, with Demetrius – for it is not possible to stay temperate because of this man!

καὶ Σωκρατίζειν καὶ στωμυλεύεσθαι θέλει καὶ εἰρωνεύεσθαι – καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην τινὰ τὸν Πυθοκλέα νομίζει ¬ καὶ Ξανθίππην ἐμὲ οἴεται ποιήσειν!

He wants to be a Socrates and to talk on and on and to be ironic – and he regards Pythocles as an Alcibiades ¬ and counts on making me Xanthippe!

ἀδιάλυτος *(ον)*	indissoluble	**ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ** *not fully loose*

*Demetrius' epithet was Poliorcetes (**Πολιορκητής**), which means "the besieger."*

*Alciphron combines this with Epicurus' name to form the portmanteau Epipoliorcetes (**Ἐπιπολιορκητής**) – which means "persistent besieger" and holds a further pun – with **ἐπιπόλιος** meaning "gray-haired."*

Alciphron thinks his readers will find humor and meaning in the combination of the names of Demetrius and Epicurus – and by doing so, he forms a word approximately meaning "the (gray-haired) persistent besieger"

[U143]

3. Lord Paean *(Healing Apollo)*

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.5

The Suda, Κροτοθορύβου ("loud applause") kappa-2480

ἔν τε ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πρὸς μὲν Λεόντιον "Παιὰν Ἄναξ – φίλον Λεοντάριον! οἵου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον!"

and in the letters to Leontion "by Lord Paean – dear little Leontarion! what a clapping uproar you filled us with when we read your little letter!"

Παιάν *(τοῦ Παιᾶνος)*	Paean	**ΠΑΙΑΝ** *physician* *(title of Apollo)*
ὁ ἄναξ **οἱ ἄνακτες**	Lord	**ΑΝΑΞ** *king*

Lord Paean is a reference to Apollo – specifically in his role as god of healing. According to Obbink, this combination is only preserved in Epicurus' writings.

4. Clapping Uproars

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On Listening to Lectures, 15 sup.

Δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ ταῖς φωναῖς τῶν ἐπαίνων ὡς ἔτυχε χρῆσθαι: καὶ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἐπιστολίοις, κροτοθορύβους γίγνεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν λέγων ἀηδής ἐστιν

One must not use statements of praise haphazardly: for Epicurus is indeed graceless while saying that clapping uproars occurred among them, in response to letters from his friends

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Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1117A sup.

εἰ, τοίνυν, ὁ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτου γενομένου, Χρησμὸς ἀνενεχθεὶς ὡς σοφοῦ, "φορτικὸς" ἦν καὶ "σοφιστικός" – τίνι Προσείπωμεν ἀξίως ὀνόματι τοὺς ὑμετέρους "βρόμους" καὶ "ὀλολυγμούς" καὶ "κροτοθορύβους" καὶ "σεβάσεις" καὶ "ἐπιθειάσεις" – αἷς Προστρέπεσθε καὶ Καθυμνεῖτε τὸν ἐφ᾽ ἡδονὰς παρακαλοῦντα "συνεχεῖς" καὶ "πυκνάς";

if, then, the Oracle concerning Socrates, a man who became divinely inspired toward virtue, pronounced [*him*] as wise – is [*according to you*] "odious" and "sophistic" – by what name shall we appropriately call your "roars" and "howlings" and "noisy shouts" and "veneratings" and "invocations" – with which You extol and You celebrate him who exhorts to "continuous" and "dense" pleasures?

φορτικός *(ή, όν)*	odious	**ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of coarse / vulgar*
σοφιστικός *(ή, όν)*	sophistic i.e., considered wise	**ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *considered to have the characteristic of knowledge*
τό ὄνομα **τά ὀνόματα**	word	**ΟΝΟΜΑ** *name*
ὁ βρόμος **οἱ βρόμοι**	roar	**ΒΡΟΜΟΣ** *boom*
ὁ ὀλολυγμός **οἱ ὀλολυγμοί**	howlings	**ΟΛΟΛΥΓΜΟΣ** *ololoo!*
ὁ κροτοθόρυβος **οἱ κροτοθόρυβοι**	noisy shouts	**ΚΡΟΤΟΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ** *noise uproar*
ὁ σεβασμός **οἱ σεβασμοί**	veneration	**ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΣ** *instance of revering*
ἡ σεβάσις **αἱ σεβάσεις**	venerating	**ΣΕΒΑΣΙΣ** *action of revering*
ἡ ἐπιθείασις **αἱ ἐπιθειάσεις**	invocation	**ΕΠΙΘΕΙΑΣΙΣ** *upon divine power*
συνεχής *(ές)*	continuous	**ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ** *holding together*
ἡ πύκνωσις **αἱ πυκνώσεις**	a concentrating	**ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ** *action of compacting*
τὸ πύκνωμα **τὰ πυκνώματα**	a concentration	**ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ** *the result of compacting*
πυκνός *(ή, όν)*	dense	**ΠΥΚΝΟΣ** *compacting*

[U144]

5. Asking Leontion

[=U140] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 9 (col. 108)

...[καθ]όλου̣ [δ’ ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκεί]νων τ[ά]δε καὶ τάδ[ε] καὶ ἅπ̣ε̣[ρ ὁ] Ἐπίκουρος Λεοντίου π̣υ̣νθά[ν]εται πρ̣[οσυ]ποστήσεται πρὸς Κολ̣ώτην. ἐπεὶ καὶ μετάξει ποτ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ὁ σοφός θ’ ἁμαρτημ’ ἄ̣γετον ἐν τ[ῆι] νεότητ̣ι γε[γ]ονέ̣[ν]αι...

...καθόλου δ’ ἁμαρτημάτων ἐκείνων – τάδε καὶ τάδε, καὶ ἅπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος Λεοντίου πυνθάνεται – προσυποστήσεται πρὸς Κολώτην: ἐπεὶ καὶ μετάξει ποτ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν ὁ Σοφός θ’ ἁμαρτημ’ ἄνετον ἐν τῇ νεότητι γεγονέναι...

> ...but of what is mistaken universally by those [*students*] – these and those [*mistakes*], and the very ones Epicurus learns by asking Leontion – he will undertake in advance in regards to Colotes: for even the wise man will at some point divert to himself that he had made an intemperate mistake in his youth...

[U145]

6. a Mina in a Day

[=U112] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἠγνοηκέναι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα ἐλεεινῶς διακεῖσθαι – ὡς πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φορείου διαναστῆναι – μνᾶν τε ἀναλίσκειν ἡμερησίαν εἰς τὴν τράπεζαν, ὡς Αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Λεόντιον ἐπιστολῇ γράφει καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους

> Timocrates [*also claims that*]... Epicurus was greatly ignorant in reasoning and even more so in life, that his body was in a pitiful condition – [*so much so*] that he was unable to rise from his portable chair for many years – and that he spent a mina within a day on his table, as He himself writes in a letter to Leontion and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene

The Attic mina was 436 grams of silver. With a modern melt value of around $500, it had a historical purchasing power of at least $5,000 during Epikouros’ lifetime.

[U146]

22. To Metrodorus

Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον

"Mother's Gift"

Professing Wisdom

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.3.7

[Cicero] **"an Haec ab eō nōn dīcuntur?"**

> "or are these things not said by [Epicurus]?"

"quāsī vērō mē Pudeat" Inquit "istōrum – aut nōn possim quem ad modum ea dīcantur ostendere!"

> "as if I should truly be ashamed" [*Torquatus*] said "of all of that – or could not explain in what way they are meant!"

[Cicero] **"Ego vērō nōn dubitō" Inquam "quīn facile Possīs ¬ nec est quod tē pudeat sapientī adsentīrī – Quī sē ūnus (quod sciam) sapiēntem profitērī sit ausus."**

> "indeed, I have no doubt" I said "that you can easily do so ¬ and you have no reason to be ashamed of agreeing with a wise man – who (so far as I know) is the only person who dared to publicly declare himself wise."

"nam Metrōdorum nōn Putō ipsum professum ¬ sed, cum appellārētur ab Epicūrō: repudiāre tantum beneficium nōluisse."

"for I do not think Metrodorus declared himself so ¬ rather, when he so was called by Epicurus: [*he is said*] to have not wanted to reject so great an honor."

"septem autem Illī nōn suō, sed populōrum suffrāgiō omnium, nōminātī sunt!"

"but those seven [*ancient sages*] were named not by their own vote, but by the vote of all the peoples!"

In the Protagoras, Plato gives the seven ancient sages as:
Thales of Miletus (fl. c. 585 BCE) *Pittacus of Mytilene (fl. c. 604 BCE)* *Bias of Priene (fl. f. 550 BCE)* *Solon of Athens (fl. c. 598 BCE)* *Cleobulus of Lindos (fl. c. 600 BCE)* *Myson of Chenae (fl. f. 550 BCE)* *Chilon of Sparta (fl. c. 555 BCE)*

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100A

...σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν

[*Epicurus used*] to say that no one had become wise except himself and his students

[U147]

Biological Primacy

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 279F

ταύτης γὰρ [τῆς γαστρὸς] ἕνεκεν, ὁ Ἀνήρ, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἐκολάκευεν καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Μητρόδωρον

indeed, for the sake of this belly, and the other pleasure that exists according to the flesh, the Man flattered both Idomeneus and Metrodorus

καὶ αὐτὸς δέ που ὁ Μητρόδωρος, οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόμενος τὰς καλὰς ταύτας θέσεις φησίν "περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὦ, φυσιολόγε, Τιμόκρατες – περὶ γαστέρα ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βαδίζων Λόγος τὴν ἅπασαν ἔχει σπουδήν"

and Metrodorus himself too, not hiding these fine positions, says somewhere "about the belly indeed, O, you natural scientist, Timocrates – the Reasoning that proceeds according to nature has all its eagerness about the belly"

Ἐπίκουρος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τούτων διδάσκαλος!

Epicurus was the tutor of these men!

ἡ σάρξ **αἱ σάρκες**	flesh	**ΣΑΡΞ** *flesh*
ἡ θέσις **αἱ θέσεις**	position	**ΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing*
ἡ γαστήρ **αἱ γαστέρες**	belly	**ΓΑΣΤΗΡ** *instrument of eating*
ὁ φυσιολόγος **οἱ φυσιολόγοι**	natural scientist	**ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΟΣ** *reasoning of producing*
ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
βαδίζειν	proceed	**ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ** *walking*

ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ἅπας *(ασα, αν)*	all together	**ἍΠΑΣ** *all together*
ἡ σπουδή **αἱ σπουδαί**	eagerness	**ΣΠΟΥΔΗ** *being eager*
ὁ διδάσκαλος **οἱ διδάσκαλοι**	teacher	**ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΟΣ** *person related to teaching*

23. To Mithres

Πρὸς Μίθρην

Mithres is sometimes transliterated "Mithras" and means "the one who holds the covenant." Mithres is the Greek rendering of the Persian name Mithra.

In (Persian) Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda is the single supreme god and creator of everything – but many other divine beings exist: one is Mithra – who was associated with covenants, loyalty, and oaths.

(Roman) Mithraism was inspired by the cult of Mithra in Zoroastrianism – but in Mithraism, "Mithras" is the central deity.

In the Achaemenid Empire, the Persians were the dominate tribe ruling the Iranians.

After the fall of Darius III (who was Persian and Zoroastrian) and the beginning of Macedonian rule, many elite Persians maintained high-ranking political positions. This resulted in a hierarchy where (1) Greek and Macedonian rulers held the highest authority, (2) the Persian aristocracy remained but with reduced influence, and (3) the wider Iranian peoples formed the broader base beneath them.

Thus, by the time the name Mithres appears in Hellenistic Greek contexts, it is usually a Persian-origin name for high-status Iranians.

1. Helping Idomeneus

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), *Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 32*

...γρά[φων Ἐ]πίκουρος... ...ἀγοραία[ς μηθὲ]ν [ἐνόμισ]ας τὰς π[ρὸς ε]ὐδ[αίμον]α βίον [σ]υντεινούσας ἰδ[έ]ας τοῦ [βιοῦ].' καὶ πάλιν· 'ἄξιος γὰρ νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν τῶ[ι] ὅλωι ἤθει [ε]ἶναι οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς.' τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ τούτου προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἔφαμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους· λέγωμεν δ' ἡμεῖς ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς μνημονεύει τ[ο]ῦ συγγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ...ἐ[πὶ] δ' {Ὁρίου / Εὐ[θ]ίου} Λεοντεῖ προγρά[ψας, ἐ]πέσταλκ[ε] δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρ[ος πρὸς] Μιθρῆν ἐ[πι]στ... ...ολὴν [ὑ]πὲρ [τῶν] μερῶν τούτων.... ...γράμμ[ατα δ]ὲ τῶ... ...βοηθεια... ...[τὸ]ν... ...Ἰδομεν[έα]... ὥς φησιν... ...[Μιθ]ρῆν πρός...

...γράφων Ἐπίκουρος... "...ἀγοραίας μηθὲν Ἐνόμισας τὰς πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον συντεινούσας ἰδέας τοῦ βιοῦ" καὶ πάλιν "ἄξιος γὰρ – νὴ τοὺς Θεοὺς! – Ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν, τῷ ὅλῳ ἤθει, εἶναι ¬ οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς"

> ...Epicurus writes... "...You consider the ideas of lifestyle that contribute to a thriving lifestyle in no way vulgar" and again "by the Gods! – through your disposition You revealed to us that you were deserving ¬ not according to the laws of a free livelihood"

τὰ, μὲν δὴ, περὶ τούτου Προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δι' ἃς αἰτίας Ἔφαμεν – καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους

> therefore, Let these matters concerning this be additionally assigned for now through the reasons we mentioned – along with those concerning Mithres

λέγωμεν δ' Ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς Μνημονεύει τοῦ συγγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ...ἐπὶ δ' Εὐθίου Λεοντεῖ προγράψας. ἐπέσταλκε δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Μιθρῆν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μερῶν τούτων... ...γράμματα... ...βοήθεια... ...Ἰδομενέα... ὥς Φησιν... ...Μιθρῆν, πρὸς...

let us say, then, that He mentions this composition also in many other places. He also wrote during [*the archonship in 284*BCE] of Isaeus… …and during [*the archonship in 283*BCE] of Euthius, having made a proclamation to Leonteus. and Epicurus also had sent a letter to Mithres concerning these matters… …writings… …help… …Idomeneus… as He says… …Mithres, to…

284 BCE was a significant year for King Lysimachus and Mithres. The preceding years had seen Lysimachus' son Agathocles successfully keeping Demetrius Poliorcetes out of southern Anatolia. Agathocles had been set as Lysimachus' successor, and he was popular with the court and the public.

However (possibly due to false information from Ptolemy Ceraunus) Lysimachus ordered his own son Agathocles to be put to death (in 284 BCE).

[U148]

2. Praising the Minister of Lysimachus – *Harms of Ignoring Gods & Kings*

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.4

Μιθρῆν τε αἰσχρῶς κολακεύειν – τὸν Λυσιμάχου διοικητήν, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς "Παιᾶνα" καὶ "Ἄνακτα" καλοῦντα

and [*Epicurus is said*] to shamefully flatter Mithres – calling that minister of Lysimachus "Paean" and "Lord" in his letters

Παιάν (*τοῦ Παιᾶνος*)	Paean	**ΠΑΙΑΝ** *physician* *(title of Apollo)*
ὁ ἄναξ **οἱ ἄνακτες**	Lord	**ΑΝΑΞ** *king*

*We know that Epicurus wrote a book called "Judgments about Diseases (***Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι***)" that was dedicated "to Mithres (***πρὸς Μίθρην***).*

For a contrast Epicurus' close and polite interactions with Mithres, consider the brash behaviour of Epicurus' contemporary Theodorus the Atheist (who wrote a series of book entitled "Against Epicurus"). This exchange shows Mithres speaking for King Lysimachus, while standing next to him.

Laertius 2.102:

For a while [Theodorus the Cyrenaic and atheist] stayed at the court of Ptolemy [I Soter] the son of Lagus, and was once sent by him as ambassador to Lysimachus.

And on this occasion his language was so bold that Lysimachus said, "Tell me, are you not the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?"

To which he replied, "Your information is correct, for, when Athens could not bear me any more than Semele could Dionysus, she cast me out."

And upon Lysimachus adding, "Take care you do not come here again!"

"I never will" Theodorus said, "unless Ptolemy sends me!"

Then, Mithres, the king's minister, standing by said, "It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well!"

Theodorus replied, "How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?"

[U149]

3. Practical Diplomacy

"καὶ δεηθέντος μου {*φιλανθ[ρω] πεύ[εσ]* / φιλανθ[ρ]ώ[πο]υ}... ...δ[ιὰ παντὸ]ς πρὸς Μ[ι]θρῆ[ν]. ἡνίκα ἔζη [Λ]υσίμαχο[ς] χρήσιμον οἰόμενο[ι] τοῦ... ...ὑμῖν εἶν[αι] ἢ π[ροπ]... ...δὲ καὶ τὰ [κα]τὰ τὴν ἔξωθε[ν] φα[ν]τασίαν ἐφ' ὃ ἂν ἀνέ[κ]... ...τι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς ἡμᾶς." καὶ Ἰδομενεῖ δὲ παραπλήσια [κα]... ...Κωλώτει· τούτωι δὲ ὅτι· 'ḳαὶ [ὑ]πέρτερ[ο]ν ἐγένετ[ο]... ...[χρ]ήσιμ[ο][ν]... ...μ[ιθ]ρῆ[ς] *φίλαι τε, τῆι μετρὶ τῆι Κρατέρ[ο]υ, καὶ [α]ὐτῶι Κρατέρωι, ὡς αὐ[τὸ]ς ἀπολογίζεται ΜΙΘΡΗΣ.' Μιθρε<ῖ> δέ· "ἀνήγγελλέ μοι... ...τοῦ [ἄ]ρχειν κα[ὶ] μὲ[ν τ]ὰ ἴδια...

"...καὶ δεηθέντος μου, φιλανθρώπου... ...διὰ παντὸς πρὸς Μιθρῆν. ἡνίκα ἔζη Λυσίμαχος – χρήσιμον Οἰόμενοι τοῦ... ...δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἔξωθεν φαντασίαν ἐφ' ὃ ἂν ἀνέχειν... ...τι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς ἡμᾶς." καὶ Ἰδομενεῖ δὲ παραπλήσια...

> [*Epicurus wrote*] "...and [*although*] I was in need, [*was*] philanthropic... ...always toward Mithres. when Lysimachus was alive – They were believing it useful to... ...even the [*issues*] in accordance with the appearance from an external source, insofar as one might endure them... ...also a little bit of such things that relate to us." and to Idomeneus likewise [*Epicurus wrote*] similar things...

Seleucus used the outrage of Agathocles' death as a pretext to invade Lysimachus' territory and rally defectors from Lysimachus' court.

Seleucus killed Lysimachus during battle in 281 BC. So Epicurus would have written this in the last decade of his life.

Epicurus' network of friends extended through many hostile borders.

[U150]

...Κωλώτει· τούτῳ δὲ ὅτι "καὶ ὑπέρτερον Ἐγένετο... ...χρήσιμον...

> ...to Colotes, in regard to this, [*Epicurus wrote*] that "It turned out even better... ...useful..."

***...Μιθρῆς Φίλαι τε, τῇ μετρὶ τῇ Κρατέρου – καὶ αὐτῷ Κρατέρῳ – ὡς αὐτὸς ἀπολογίζεται Μίθρης.* Μιθρεῖ δέ· "Ἀνήγγελλέ μοι... ...τοῦ ἄρχειν, καὶ μὲν τὰ ἴδια..."**

> *...of Mithres to Phila, the mother of Craterus – and to Craterus himself – as Mithres himself explains.* and to Mithres [*Epicurus wrote*] "He reported to me... ...regarding the governing, and indeed the particular [*private*] matters..."

δέεσθαι	to be in need	**ΔΕΕΣΘΑΙ** *needing*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ὁ φιλάνθρωπος **οἱ φιλάνθρωποι**	philanthropic	**ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *loving man face*
τὸ πᾶν *(τοῦ παντός)*	*(individually)* everything, *(collectively)* the universe	**ΠΑΝ** *all*
Μίθρης	Mithres	**ΜΙΘΡΗΣ** *Mithra*
ἡνίκα	when	
Λυσίμαχος	Lysimachus	**ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ** *battle destroyer*
χρήσιμος *(ον)*	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
οἰόμενος *(η, ον)*	suspecting [here, "believing"]	**ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *perceiving*
ἔξωθεν	from an external source	**ΕΞΩΘΕΝ** *from outside*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*

ἀνέχειν	to hold oneself up [here, "to endure"]	**ANEXEIN** *hold up*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
	Part 2	
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ἄρχειν	to begin [here, "to govern"]	**ΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning*

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 30 full

...περὶ ἡμ[ῶν] γρά[φων·] "[ἣν προ]ςέταξα τιμὴ[ν] ἐμαυτῶι κἂν ἐν Ὑπερβορείοις ὦσιν ἀποστέλλ[ε]ιν, ταύτην καὶ ὑμῖν συντάττω· ἑκατὸν γὰρ καὶ *εἴκοσι [δ]ρ[αχ]μὰ[ς μόν]ας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν βούλομαι παρ' ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν." καὶ δι' ἑτέρας "ἤνεγκέ μοι Κτήσιππος τὴν κα[τ]' ἐνιαυτὸν σύνταξιν ἣν ἀπέστειλας ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ [π]ατρὸς καὶ σεαυτοῦ." Μιθρεῖ δὲ· "ὁ γὰρ ὅρος ὁ κατατεταγμένος τῆς συντάξεως ὃν κατεῖχον ὥστε ἀποφορὰς οἰκετῶν ε[ἶναι]... ...ὅτι [δ]ιὰ τὰ πρά[γμ]ατα οὐ μ[όν]ον τ[ὸ] ἐπιδεχόμεν[ον ἐ]ξῆν μερίζειν ἀλλ' εἰ κα[ὶ δ]ῆθε νεῖν... ...[ἄλ]λους... ...[πρ]άγ[μα]τα... ...[ο]ὐδέ[ν]." ἐπὶ... ...Μ[ι]θρῆς... ... νῦν βιβλίο[ν]...

...περὶ ἡμῶν γράφων "ἣν Προσέταξα τιμὴν ἐμαυτῷ (κἂν ἐν Ὑπερβορείοις ὦσιν!) ἀποστέλλειν – ταύτην καὶ ὑμῖν Συντάττω: ἑκατὸν γὰρ καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμὰς μόνας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Βούλομαι παρ' ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν."

> *...writing about us "the honor which I ordered to be sent to myself (even if they are among the Hyperboreans!) – and this I also order from you all: I want to acquire only one hundred and twenty drachmas per year from each of you."*

A drachma was about 4.3 grams of silver and was an average daily wage for average labor and had the purchasing power of around $50–$150 during Epicurus lifetime.

[U151]

4. Collection Agent & Fixed Rate for the Yearly Contribution

καὶ δι ἑτέρας "ἤνεγκέ μοι Κτήσιππος τὴν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν σύνταξιν ἣν Ἀπέστειλας ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ σεαυτοῦ."

> and in another [*letter, Epicurus writes*] "Ctesippus brought to me the contribution for the year which you sent on behalf of both your father and yourself."

*Ctesippus (**Κτήσιππος**) meaning "possessor of a horse" appears to be a trusted friend involved in the financial administration of the school's extended network.* *We also learn that Epicurus, Pythocles, Hermarchus and Ctesippus all sailed together on a trip to Lampsacus to visit Themista and the rest of their friends there. (U176)*

*Philodemus has also included a letter to Mithres in the section about the school's finances, and Epicurus is discussing the "annual contribution (**ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτόν σύνταξις**)" with Mithres.*

Μιθρεῖ δὲ "ὁ γὰρ Ὅρος ὁ κατατεταγμένος τῆς συντάξεως, ὃν Κατεῖχον ὥστε ἀποφορὰς οἰκετῶν εἶναι... ...ὅτι, διὰ τὰ πράγματα, οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον Ἐξῆν μερίζειν ¬ ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ δῆθε... ...ἄλλους... ...πράγματα... ...οὐδέν." ἐπὶ... ...Μιθρῆς... ...νῦν βιβλίον...

> and to Mithres: "for the limit [*i.e., fixed rate*] that was assigned for the contribution, which I firmly held so that it amounted to the payments [*i.e., bills*] of the household...* ...since, because of the circumstances, it was possible not only to divide what was accepted ¬ but even if truly, in fact... ..others... ...circumstances... ...in no way." concerning... ...Mithres... ...now a book...

* alternatively: *"which I firmly held so that it amounted to the level of payments from house-slaves" i.e., as low as the payments extracted from one employed slave*

120 drachmas per year (the amount of the annual contribution) equals about two obols per day – which was an ancient standard for the daily income expected from one working slave.

διατάττειν	to arrange	**ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering across*
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	**ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering under*
προστάττειν	to order for	**ΠΡΟΣΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering toward*
συντάττειν	to also order	**ΣΥΝΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering together*
ἡ τιμή **αἱ τιμαί**	honor	**ΤΙΜΗ** *value*
ὁ Ὑπερβόρειος **οἱ Ὑπερβόρειοι**	Hyperborean	**ὙΠΕΡΒΟΡΕΙΟΣ** *beyond north*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send [away]	**ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready away*
εἰκοστός *(ή, όν)*	twentieth	**ΕΙΚΟΣΤΟΣ** *twenty*
ἡ εἰκάς **αἱ εἰκάδες**	20th day of the month	**ΕΙΚΑΣ** *twenty*
τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον **τὰ εἰκοσάεδρα**	icosahedron *(20 faced polyhedron)*	**ΕΙΚΟΣΑΕΔΡΟΝ** *twenty-face*
εἴκοσι	20	**ΕΙΚΟΣΙ** *twenty*
ἡ δραχμή **αἱ δραχμαί**	drachma	**ΔΡΑΧΜΗ** *[as much as one can] grasp*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	**ΜΟΝΟΣ** *single*
ὁ ἐνιαυτός **οἱ ἐνιαυτοί**	year	**ΕΝΙΑΥΤΟΣ** *year passing [over to next]*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *wishing*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
	Part 2	
φέρειν	to carry	**ΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing*
ἐνεγκεῖν	to carry [already]	**ΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ** *brought*
συντάττειν	to also order	**ΣΥΝΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering together*
ἡ σύνταξις **αἱ συντάξεις**	contribution	**ΣΥΝΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordering together*
ὁ πατήρ **οἱ πατέρες**	father	**ΠΑΤΗΡ** *father*
	Part 3	
ὁ ὅρος **οἱ ὅροι**	limit	**ὉΡΟΣ** *outline, definition*
προστάττειν	to order for	**ΠΡΟΣΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering toward*
τὰ συντεταγμένα	things organized	**ΣΥΝΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ** *having arranged together*
κατατάττειν	to assign	**ΚΑΤΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *thoroughly ordering*

κατατεταγμένος *(η, ον)*	assigned	**ΚΑΤΑΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ** *having thoroughly arranged*
ἡ σύνταξις **αἱ συντάξεις**	contribution	**ΣΥΝΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordering together*
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	**ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ** *thoroughly holding*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἡ ἀποφορά **αἱ ἀποφοραί**	payment	**ΑΠΟΦΟΡΑ** *carrying away*
I think this refers to payments due [i.e., bills for the operation of the household] but it could be a reference to payments received [i.e., the 120 drachma income]		
ἡ οἰκονομία **αἱ οἰκονομίαι**	household management	**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ** *managing the home*
ὁ οἰκέτης	house slave	**ΟΙΚΕΤΗΣ** *the home*
οἱ οἰκέται	the household	**ΟΙΚΕΤΑΙ**
although **οἱ οἰκέται** *is often used to refer to "the household," its traditional and fundamental meaning is "house slaves." I think Epicurus is using this word in its more general sense of "household" to simply refer to those living and working with him.*		
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation [here, "circumstance"]	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἀποδέχεσθαι	to accept	**ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting from away*
ἐπιδέχεσθαι	to receive	**ΕΠΙΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting upon*
τὸ ἐπιδεχόμενον **τὰ ἐπιδεχόμενα**	what is received	
ἀπιέναι	to go way	**ΑΠΙΕΝΑΙ** *going away*
ἐξιέναι	to be possible	**ΕΞΙΕΝΑΙ** *going out*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
μερίζειν	to divide	**ΜΕΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *part*
δῆθε = **δῆθεν**	truly, in fact	**ΔΗΘΕΝ** *strengthend* **δή**
τὸ βιβλίον **τὰ βιβλία**	book	**ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ** *strip of papyrus*

5. Enduring Changes

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 5 (36) fin.

...[μὴ ἐνοχλή]σεσθαι... ...μικρᾶς ἕνεκεν ἐλα[ττ]ώσ[ε]ως πρὸς Πυθ[οκ]λέα [λ]έγειν· "ἂν [ἀνε]χώμεθα... ...τὴν μ[ετάπ]τωσ[ι]ν, οὐκ [ἐ]νο[χ]λήσει·" καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆ[ν] ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· κ[αί]τοι [ἀ]ν[εκτέο]ν τὸν τρόπ[ο]ν· οὐ [γὰ]ρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν ἐνόχλημα, κἂν [δια]ίτης οὐ πάντα... ...*κατ' ἔνδειαν*... ...*[ἐξ]αι[ρ]ούμενον*... ...*[θ]υμ[ὸ]ν*... ...*τὴν πενίαν*... ...*[α]ἱρε‹ῖ›σ[θαι]*... ...*αὐτῶι*...

καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆν, ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους "καίτοι, ἀνεκτέον τὸν τρόπον: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν Ἐνόχλημα – κἂν διαιτης οὐ πάντα..."

and to Mithres, during [*the archonship in 280BCE*] of Telocles [*Epicurus says*] "nevertheless, the way must be endured: for disturbance from transition is not deserving of fear – even if not everything in [*one's*] manner of living [*stays the same*]..."

ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

ἄξιος *(α, ον)*	deserving	ΑΞΙΟΣ *counterbalancing*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἡ μετάπτωσις αἱ μεταπτώσεις	transition	ΜΕΤΑΠΤΩΣΙΣ *to fall change*
τό ὄχλημα τά ὀχλήματα	[cause of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΜΑ *result of* *a crowd of people*
ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ *in a crowd of people*
τό ἐνόχλημα τά ἐνοχλήματα	[feeling of] disturbance	ΕΝΟΧΛΗΜΑ *result of [being] in* *a crowd of people*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἡ βιοτή αἱ βιοταί	livelihood	ΒΙΟΤΗ *life*
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ *responsibility*
ἡ δίαιτα αἱ δίαιται	way of living	ΔΙΑΙΤΑ *through the* *responsibility*
ἡ ἔνδεια αἱ ἔνδειαι	lack	ΕΝΔΕΙΑ *deficiency*
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking out*
ἐξαιρούμενος *(η, ον)*	removing	ΕΞΑΙΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ὁ θυμός οἱ θυμοί	anger	ΘΥΜΟΣ *spirit*
ἡ πενία αἱ πενίαι	poverty	ΠΕΝΙΑ *need*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
αἱρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	ἉΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ

[24. To Mys]

Πρὸς Μῦν

"Mouse"

Μῦς *means "mouse" or "hampster." Some editors incorrectly translate his name as "fly" (probably from its simularity to* **Μύια**, *which does mean fly).* **Μῦς** *is mentioned by Laertius as "joining in Epicurus studies" and was given his full freedom in Epicurus will.*

[These four fragments are no longer accepted as referring to Mys]

[U152]

To Leonteus

Πρὸς Λεοντέα

"The Radiant Letter" against Atheism

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 6 (col. 100)

...[τῶι] μὲν ἁμαρτή[σαντι παρρη]σιάσ[ε]ται, τῶι δὲ καὶ [πικρ]ότητας ἀποδιδόντι. διὸ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, Λε[οντ]έως διὰ Πυθοκλέα πίσ[τιν] θεῶ[ν] οὐ παρέντο[ς,] Πυθοκλεῖ μὲν [ἐ]πιτιμᾶι μετρίως, πρὸς δὲ τὸν γράφει [τ]ὴν λαμπρὰν καλουμένην ἐπισ[τολ]ήν, λαβὼ[ν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ] Πυθ[οκλ]...

...τῷ μὲν ἁμαρτήσαντι Παρρησιάσεται – τῷ δὲ καὶ πικρότητας ἀποδιδόντι.

...He will speak frankly to the one who has done wrong – and even to the one who responds with bitterness.

διὸ, καὶ Ἐπίκουρος (Λεοντέως, διὰ Πυθοκλέα, πίστιν θεῶν οὐ παρέντος) Πυθοκλεῖ μὲν Ἐπιτιμᾶι μετρίως. πρὸς δὲ τὸν Γράφει τὴν "Λαμπρὰν" καλουμένην Ἐπιστολήν – λαβὼν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθοκλέους...

therefore, even Epicurus (according to Leonteus, on account of Pythocles, because he was not maintaining faith in the gods) reproaches Pythocles moderately. but [*Epicurus*] writes to him [*i.e., Leonteus*] the so-called "Radiant" Letter – taking his starting point from [*this issue with*] Pythocles...

As we see here, Epicurus wrote the so-called "Radiant Letter" to Leonteus (radiant in the sense of light-giving) – and the topic started with the issue of Pythocles' questioning the existence of the gods.

λαμπρός *(ά, όν)*	radiant	**ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ** *shining*
ἡ Λαμπρά Ἐπιστολή	the radiant letter	

[U153]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 10

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαρ[ιδή]μωι [γ]ράφ[ων]· 'ἤκουσα Λύκ[ου] φησίν (ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' ὅτι ν[εα]νίσκον...
...Θεμίστ<ι> δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππου· 'Λύκον φὴ[ς] πιστ[ὸν] εὔτακτόν... ...κατ' αὐτὰ παρακ[αλοῦ]ντα...'

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαριδήμωι γράφων· "Ἤκουσα Λύκου" Φησίν "Ἥκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶσ' – ὅτι νεανίσκον..."

...writing to Charidemus about his presence in Athens, [Epicurus] says "I heard of Lycus, for He has come to us – that the young man..."

[U154]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 5 (36) fin.

...[μὴ ἐνοχλή]σεσθαι... ...μικρᾶς ἕνεκεν ἐλα[ττ]ώσ[ε]ως πρὸς Πυθ[οκ]λέα [λ]έγειν· "ἂν [ἀνε]χώμεθα... ...τὴν μ[ετάπ]τωσ[ι]ν, οὐκ [ἐ]νο[χ]λήσει·" καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆ[ν] ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· κ[αί]τοι [ἀ]ν[εκτέο]ν τὸν τρόπ[ο]ν· οὐ {γὰ]ρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν ἐνόχλημα, κἂν [δια]ίτης οὐ πάντα... ...κατ' ἔνδειαν... ...[ἐξ]αι[ρ]ούμενον... ...[θ]υμ[ὸ]ν... ...τὴν πενίαν... ...[α]ἱρε‹◌›σ[θαι]... ...αὐτῶι...

καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῆν, ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους

and to Mithres, during [the archonship in 280BCE] of Telocles [Epicurus says]

[U155]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.3.60

εἴ γ´ εὐ[σκοποῦσίν] φησιν φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων δοξ[άζειν ἀξεῖναι] καὶ πολ[λοῖς ἀι]δίοις [θεοῖς κάθα]νάτο[ις εἶναι]

εἴ γ' Εὐσκοποῦσίν, Φησιν, φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων Δοξάζειν ἀξεῖναι καὶ πολλοῖς αἰδίοις θεοῖς κἀθανάτοις εἶναι

If, indeed, They examine carefully, [Epicurus] says, the nature of these situations and the many things [that relate to] this [nature], They will judge [this nature] to rise up and to exist for many eternal and immortal gods

25. To Polyaenus
Πρὸς Πολύαινον
"Much Praised"

[U156]

1. Polyaenus' Graciousness Towards All

Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 24

...ἐπειδὰν μεθ' Ἕρμαρχον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄ[λλων] Ἐπι[κού]ρου φίλων ποιῶμαι τὴν γραφὴν. ὅλως δὲ τοιούτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς π[ρ]ὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίοις ὁμιλίαις ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οὐ μόνο[ν τ]οὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπί τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸ[ν] καὶ [Λ]εον[τέα, ἀλ]λὰ [καὶ τοὺς]... ...καὶ π[ρο]βάς· ...[Πο]λυαιν[ος]...

...ἐπειδὰν, μεθ' Ἕρμαρχον, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἐπικούρου φίλων Ποιοῦμαι τὴν γραφὴν.

...when, after Hermarchus, I undertake the writing about the other friends of Epicurus also.

ὅλως δὲ, τοιούτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι, καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίοις ὁμιλίαις, ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος – ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς Κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν:

and in general, Polyaenus conducted himself with such dispositions and feelings and with gracious conversations toward each person – that He made those from other philosophers well-disposed toward him:

οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς – ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπί τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ Λεοντέα – ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς... ...καὶ προβάς... ...Πολυαινος...

not only those from the Stoa Poikile – concerning [*all of*] whom even Epicurus wrote during [*the archonship in 292*[BCE]] Philippus, both to [*Polyaenus*] and to Leonteus – but also those... ...and [*he who*] advanced... ...Polyaenus...

Polyaenus' affability is noted – as well as his friendliness toward the Stoics and other schools (unnamed because the text cuts off).

We also see here that Epicurus wrote directly about the Stoics.

[U157]

2. Group Celebration of Anthesteria – Remembering the Gods

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.30.865

...ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ πρὸς Πο]λύαινον [συνεορτασ]τέα κἀν[θεστήρι]α· καὶ γὰρ τῶ[ν θεῶν] ἐπιμνησκέ[ον]... ...τον πολλῶν...

...ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς Πολύαινον, συνεορταστέα κ' Ἀνθεστήρια – καὶ γὰρ τῶν θεῶν Ἐπιμνησκέον...

...but also [*Epicurus says in his letter*] to Polyaenus, that the Anthesteria should be celebrated together – for indeed one must also remember the gods...

[U158]

3. Full Assarius

[=U95] Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 18.9

certōs habēbat diēs ille Magister voluptātis, Epicūrus, quibus malīgne famem exstinguēret: vīsūrus an aliquid dēesset ex plēnā et cōnsummātā voluptāte – vel quantum dēesset – et an dignum quod Quis magnō labōre pēnsāret.

that Master of pleasure, Epicurus, had certain days on which he would parsimoniously extinguish his hunger: to see whether anything was missing from full and complete pleasure – or how much was missing – and whether [*it was*] something worth Someone paying with great effort.

hoc certē in iīs epistulīs Ait – quās scrīpsit Charīnō magistrātū ad Polyēnum. et quidem, Glōriātur nōn tōtō assē sē pāscī ¬ Metrodorum, quī nondum tantum prōfēcerit – tōtō!

He certainly says this in those letters – which he wrote during Charinus' magistracy [*in 308 BCE*] to Polyaenus. and indeed, He boasts of feeding himself on less than a full assarius ¬ Metrodorus, who had not yet advanced so far – on a full [*assarius*]!

By the 1st century BCE (when Cicero was writing) the weight of the assarius was around 10 grams of bronze (which was equivalent to about 0.4 grams of silver). *For comparison, the Attic drachma was about 4.3 grams of silver, and the Attic mina was 436 grams of silver.* *Therefore a mina is about 1,000 assarii.*

[U159]

4. Differentiating Types of Poverty

[= U98] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 3 (34)

...ὅ[τ]αν δ[ιανοῶν]ται περι[γ]ίνοντ[αι] τῶ[ν] κατὰ [τὴ]ν [ἔ]νδειαν κα[ὶ] πε[νί]αν καὶ δέ[ησι]ν· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...[π]άντ[α]... ...πενίαν μηδὲ... ...τὸ δὴ λέγομε[ν]... ...εἰς με[τ]άθεσιν ὅλ[η]ν τῆς ὅλ[ης] ὑπ[άρξεως ἄ]ξει· [κ]αὶ πρὸς [Πολ]ύαι[νον]... ...τὴν πενίαν ἀδι[άφορον] Ἐπίκ[ουρος]... ...[ἔνδει]αν ἢ προσδέ[ησιν]... ...κατ[ακ]ολουθεν... ...ὑπα[ρξ]...

...ὅταν Διανοῶνται: Περιγίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν καὶ πενίαν καὶ δέησιν· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...πάντα... ...πενίαν μηδὲ... ...τὸ δὴ Λέγομεν... ...εἰς μετάθεσιν ὅλην τῆς ὅλης ὑπάρξεως ἄξει·

...whenever They intend to: They prevail over what relates to want and poverty and need. during [*the archonship in 308 BCE*] of Charinus... ...all things... ...poverty in no way... ...what We say... ...[*such a view*] will lead into a complete transformation of one's whole existence.

καὶ πρὸς Πολύαινον... ...τὴν πενίαν ἀδιάφορον Ἐπίκουρος... ...ἔνδειαν ἢ προσδέησιν... ...κατακολουθεῖν... ...ὕπαρξιν...

and also to Polyaenus... ...Epicurus [*says*] poverty is undifferentiated [*i.e., refers to different types of circumstances*]... ...want or additional need... ...to fully follow... ...existence...

ἀδιάφορος *(ος, ον)*	undifferentiated	**ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ** *not carrying apart*

[U160]

5. Confession of Faults

[=U170] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 49

...[ἐπαι]νεῖσθαι τὸν {Ἡρακλείδην / Χαρμίδην}, ὅτι τὰς ἐκ τῶ[ν] ἐνφαν[η]σομένων μέμψεις ἧττο[υ]ς τιθέμενος τῆ[ς] ὠφελία[ς] αὐτῶν, ἐμήνυεν Ἐπικούρωι τὰς ἁμαρτίας· καὶ Πολύαινος δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὅς γε καὶ Ἀ[πολλωνί]δου ῥαθυμοῦν[τ]ο[ς, ἐφοίτ]α πρὸς Ἐπ[ί]κουρον...

…ἐπαινεῖσθαι τὸν Χαρμίδην ὅτι – τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐνφανησομένων μέμψεις ἥττους τιθέμενος τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτῶν – Ἐμήνυεν Ἐπικούρῳ τὰς ἁμαρτίας·

…Charmides was praised because – setting the criticisms from what [*discomfort*] was going to appear to be lesser than their usefulness – he disclosed his faults to Epicurus.

καὶ Πολύαινος δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὅς (γε καὶ Ἀπολλωνίδου ῥαθυμοῦντος) ἐφοίτα πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον…

and Polyaenus too was such a man, who (even when Apollonides was being negligent) went frequently to Epicurus…

Sincere self-disclosure and consistent engagement with the teacher were praised as signs of philosophical maturity and trust.

26. To Pythocles

Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα

"Pythian Fame" "Glory of Apollo"

[U161]

1. Praiseworthy Example

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1124C

νέοις ὁ περὶ Πυθοκλέους (οὔπω γεγονότος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη) γράφων, οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω – καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν

he [*i.e., Epicurus*] who writes to young men about Pythocles (when he was not yet eighteen years), asserts that there is no nature better in all of Greece – and that [*Pythocles*] expresses himself portentously well

καὶ πάσχειν Αὐτὸς τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν: εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα πάντα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανίσκου

and [*Epicurus*] himself experiences that [*impulse*] of women: by praying that everything may be without divine resentment and without envy for the excess [*talent*] of the young man

In his "Radiant Letter" against atheism, Epicurus "moderately reproached" Pythocles, taking the young man's lack of "not maintaining faith in the gods" as his starting point for the letter. *However, in general, Epicurus appears to have praised Pythocles not just for his understanding in philosophy, but for his ability to articulate it with clarity and fidelity.*

[De Lacy] Early brilliance presages an early death. We doubtless are told that Pythocles was not yet eighteen because he never reached that age.

[U162]

2. Not Another Alcibiades

Alciphron (fl. fortasse 160 CE), Letters, Book 4, Letter 17 (2.2) – section 3 fin.

καὶ Σωκρατίζειν καὶ στωμυλεύεσθαι Θέλει καὶ εἰρωνεύεσθαι – καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην τινὰ τὸν Πυθοκλέα νομίζει ¬ καὶ Ξανθίππην ἐμὲ οἴεται ποιήσειν!

He wants to be a Socrates and to talk on and on and to be ironic – and he regards Pythocles as an Alcibiades ¬ and counts on making me Xanthippe!

The charge of turning young admirers into Alcibiades figures – and casting oneself as Socrates – was a familiar and often mocking accusation in philosophical circles.

For example, Lucian records that he once traveled on the same boat with the self-immolating Cynic Peregrinus Proteus, and mentions "his self-indulgence on the voyage, and the handsome boy whom he had persuaded to turn Cynic, that he too might have an Alcibiades." *(The Passing of Peregrinus, part 43)*

However, Alcibiades was a volatile youth who hurled himself into politics ¬ Pythocles, by contrast, was a praised student of Epicurus, with no such trajectory.

[U163]

3. *Sail Clear* of Public Education

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.6

ἔν τε τῇ πρὸς Πυθοκλέα ἐπιστολῇ γράφειν "παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, Μακάριε, Φεῦγε – τἀκάτιον ἀράμενος!"

[*Epicurus is said*] to write in a letter to Pythocles "Avoid all education, blessed one – after taking up a little boat!"

ἡ παιδεία **αἱ παιδεῖαι**	education	**ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ** *child*
ἡ μακαριότης **αἱ μακαριότητες**	blessedness	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from greatness*
μακάριος *(α, ον)*	blessed	**ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ** *greatness*
φεύγειν	to avoid	**ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
τό ἀκάτιον **τὰ ἀκάτια**	little boat	**ΑΚΑΤΙΟΝ** *little vessel*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	**ἉΙΡΕΙΝ** *taking*
αἴρειν	to raise	**ΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *lifting*
ἀράμενος *(η, ον)*	having raised [here, "after taking up"]	**ΑΡΑΜΕΝΟΣ** *lifted*

[=U117] Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, Μνησθήσομαι τοῦ φιλαληθεστάτου Ἐπικούρου: Ὅστις ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὢν – Ἐμακάριζε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν παρερχομένους ¬ τοιαύτας φωνὰς προϊέμενος:

and first, I shall recall the most truth-loving Epicurus: Who, though he was uninitiated in general education – He considered those people blessed who were proceeding toward philosophy similarly to himself ¬ uttering such words:

"Μακαρίζω σε, Ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι – καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας – ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν Ὥρμησαι!"

"I bless you, O dear one, because – clear of all education – You have rushed toward philosophy!"

4. The Little Epicurean Boat – **τὸ Ἐπικούρειον Ἀκάτιον**

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On Listening to Lectures, 1.1 (15D)

πότερον οὖν (τῶν νέων ὥσπερ τῶν Ἰθακησίων κληρῷ τινι τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ κηρῷ καταπλάσσοντες) Ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς – τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτιον ἀραμένους – ποιητικὴν φεύγειν καὶ παρεξελαύνειν;

so then, shall we (after sealing the ears of the young with some hard and unyielding bees-wax like the Ithacans) force them – after taking up that little Epicurean boat – to flee from poetry and sail right past?

A reference to Circe's advice to Odysseus regarding the Sirens "But do thou row past them, and anoint the ears of thy comrades with sweet wax, which thou hast kneaded, lest any of the rest may hear." *(Homer, Odyssey 12.45)*

Plutarch portrays education in poetry from the Epicurean perspective as alluring – but (due to it taking the place of more important studies) harmful and requiring active measures of avoidance – thus comparing it to the Sirens.

5. Flee the Folly of Limitless Inquiry

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1094D, 12 sup.

ταύτας μέντοι τὰς, τηλικαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας, ἡδονὰς, ὥσπερ ἀενάους – ἐκτρέποντες Οὗτοι καὶ ἀποστρέφοντες – οὐκ Ἐῶ σι γεύεσθαι τοὺς πλησιάσαντας αὐτοῖς: ἀλλὰ, τοὺς μὲν ἐπαραμένους τὰ ἀκάτια φεύγειν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν Κελεύουσι:

however, these pleasures [*of learning the disciplines of mathematics, geometry, astronomy, music, painting, poetry, et alia*], so great and so numerous, as if unending – those men divert [*them*] and turn away – and do not allow those who approach them to taste them: instead, they command those who have taken up their little boats to flee away from those [*numerous and unending disciplines*]

6. Dismiss Yourself from the Classroom

Quintilian (fl. c. 75 CE), Institutio Oratoria, 12.2.24

vērum ex hōc alia mihi Quaestiō exorītur: quae Secta cōnferre plūrimūm ēloquentiae possit?

but from this another question arises for me: which sect can contribute the most to eloquence?

quamquam Ea nōn inter multās potest esse contentiō – nam, in prīmīs, nōs Epicūrus ā sē ipse dimittit – Quī fugere omnem disciplīnam nāvigātiōne quam vēlōcissimā iubet!

although that is not able to be in dispute among many people – for, first of all, Epicurus dismisses us from his company – since he commands that all instruction be fled by the fastest possible voyage!

[U164]

7. The Appeal to Pythocles

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1094D, 12 sup.

Πυθοκλέους δὲ Πάντες καὶ Πᾶσαι δέονται (δι᾽ Ἐπικούρου) καὶ ἀντιβολοῦσιν – ὅπως οὐ Ζηλώσῃ τὴν "ἐλευθέριον" καλουμένην παιδείαν

all men and all women beg and plead with Pythocles (through [*the writings of*] Epicurus) – so that he does not desire the so-called "liberal" education

Pythocles is urgently implored by all, men and women alike, in the person of Epicurus, not to set his heart on the so-called "education of free men"

ἐλεύθερος *(α, ον)*	free	**ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ** *from a tribe* *(with the rights and responsibilities of a free man)*
ἐλεύθεριος *(α, ον)*	liberal *("befitting a free person")*	

[U165]

8. Pleasant Expectations

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.5

πρὸς δὲ Πυθοκλέα, ὡραῖον ὄντα: "Καθεδοῦμαι" Φησὶ "προσδοκῶν τὴν ἱμερτὴν καὶ ἰσόθεόν σου εἴσοδον"

but as for Pythocles, who was in his prime: "I will sit" [*Epicurus*] says "expecting your lovely and godlike arrival"

καθέζεσθαι	to sit [down]	**ΚΑΘΕΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *sitting down*
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	**ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ** *seeming*
ἱμερτός *(ή, όν)*	lovely	**ἹΜΕΡΤΟΣ** *longing for*
ἰσοταχής *(ής, ές)*	equally fast	**ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ** *equally swift*
ἰσόθεος	godlike	**ΙΣΟΘΕΟΣ** *equal to a god*
ἡ ὁδός **αἱ ὁδοί**	course	**ΟΔΟΣ** *road*
ἡ εἴσοδος **αἱ εἴσοδοι**	arrival	**ΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ** *road into*

[U166]

27. To Timocrates

Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη

"Power of Honor"

Spreading the Word

[= U124] Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.5

...ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα, καὶ Ἡρόδοτον, καὶ Τιμοκράτην (τοὺς ἔκπυστα αὐτοῦ τὰ κρύφια ποιήσαντας) ἐγκωμιάζειν – καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο

but [*it is said that* Epicurus] praised Idomeneus, and Herodotus, and Timocrates (the very ones who made his hidden teachings public) – and that he flattered this very thing

Timocrates, brother of Metrodorus, was once close to Epicurus and took part in spreading his teachings – but he later abandoned the school and became a hostile critic.

[U167]

Πρὸς Φυρσῶνα

1. Consolation for Hegesianax

[= U120] Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1101A,B

τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, Μάχονται καὶ Λέγουσι

to those who remove distress and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, They oppose and say that

"τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν – ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, Πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι: καὶ Λυπεῖσθαι καὶ – νὴ Δία! – Λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ Τήκεσθαι"

"impassivity established in apathy exists from another greater evil – of cruelty or of unrestrained vanity and of rage – therefore, to Experience something is better: and to be Distressed and – by Zeus! – to Anoint the eyes and to Melt"

...ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε – καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν, τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολὰς Διῆλθον αὐτοῦ...

...for Epicurus has said these things in many other contexts – and also while writing about the death of Hegesianax to Dositheus, the father, and to Phyrson [*of Colophon*], the brother of the deceased: for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

τὸ ἀπαθὲς **τὰ ἀπαθῆ**	apathy *"the apathetic state"*	**ΑΠΑΘΕΣ** *not experiencing*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
ἡ λύπη **αἱ λῦπαι**	distress	**ΛΥΠΗ** *vexation*
ἡ ἀλυπία **αἱ ἀλυπίαι**	impassivity	**ΑΛΥΠΙΑ** *no vexation*
λυπεῖσθαι	to be distressed	**ΛΥΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *vexation*
ἡ ὠμότης **αἱ ὠμότητες**	cruelty	**ΩΜΟΤΗΣ** *condition from being savage / raw*
ἡ δοξοκοπία **αἱ δοξοκοπίαι**	vanity	**ΔΟΞΟΚΟΠΙΑ** *striving toward seeming*
ἄκρατος *(ον)*	unrestrained	**ΑΚΡΑΤΟΣ** *no power*
ἡ λύσσα **αἱ λύσσαι**	rage	**ΛΥΣΣΑ** *fury / frenzy*
πάσχειν	to experience	**ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ** *enduring*
βελτίων *(ων, ον)*	better	**ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ** *greater*
λιπαίνειν	to anoint	**ΛΙΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *fat / oil*
ὁ ὀφθαλμός **οἱ ὀφθαλμοί**	eye	**ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΣ** *eye chamber*
τήκεσθαι	to melt	**ΤΗΚΕΣΘΑΙ** *melt down / pine away*

[U168]

2. "Regarding Those Who Are Occupied"

[part of U101] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 24

...[τὸ]ν ἀγαθ[ὸν]... ...τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀσχ[όλο][υς]... ...αὐτῶι καὶ μνημονεύ[ει] κατὰ Δι[ό]τιμο[ν] Ἐπίκουρος ἄρ[χο]ντα τοῦ βυβλ[ιου] Φύρσωνι γο[ῦν] γράφων· Ἀπέστει[λε]ν δ[ὲ] ἡ[μῖν] καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺ[ς ἀσ]χ[όλους' κ]αὶ 'κἂ[ν ἠ]ναγκασμέν[ος]... ...[ές μεγ]ιστ' ἂν ἥκοις κ[α]κὰ... ...τὸν τρό[πον] τ[οῦτο]ν καὶ τοσ[οῦτ]όν τε... ...εἰ καὶ Νικάν[ο]ρ...

...τὸν ἀγαθὸν... ...τὸ 'Πρὸς Τοὺς Ἀσχόλους'... ...αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύει, κατὰ Διότιμον Ἐπίκουρος ἄρχοντα τοῦ βυβλίου – Φύρσωνι γοῦν γράφων "Ἀπέστειλεν δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ 'Πρὸς Τοὺς Ἀσχόλους' καὶ κἂν ἠναγκασμένος... ...ἐς μέγιστ' ἂν Ἥκοις κακὰ... ...τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτόν τε... ...εἰ καὶ Νικάνορ..."

...a good man... ...that [*work*] 'Regarding Those who are Occupied'... ...Epicurus also reminds him, during [*the archonship in 285*BCE] of Diotimus the archon of the book's [*composition*] – in any case [*Epicurus*] writes to Phyrson [*of Colophon*] "He sent to us that [*work*] 'Regarding Those who are Occupied' and even if being forced... ...You would fall into the gravest evils... ...this way and so great... ...even if Nīkánor..."

ἡ σχολή **αἱ σχολαί**	school	**ΣΧΟΛΗ** *leisure*
ἡ ἀσχολία **αἱ ἀσχολίαι**	occupation	**ΑΣΧΟΛΙΑ** *not leisure*

[U169]

3. Festival Participation

[part of U103] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.28.785

ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μὲγ γὰ[ρ] Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεọδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν [φησι] πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ]ναι...

ἐπ' Ἀριστωνύμου μέγ γαρ Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου, Θεοδότου, γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν Φησι πασῶν μετεσχηκέναι...

during [*the archonship in 287*BCE] of Aristonymus, while writing to Phyrson [*of Colophon*] about a certain fellow countryman of his, Theodotus [*of Colophon*, *Epicurus*] says that he had participated in all the festivals...

[U170]

29. To Charmides

Πρὸς Χαρμίδην

"Grace"

Catharsis

[part of U160] Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 49

...[ἐπαι]νεῖσθαι τὸν {Ἡρακλείδην / Χαρμίδην}, ὅτι τὰς ἐκ τῶ[ν] ἐνφαν[η]σομένων μέμψεις ἥττο[υ]ς τιθέμενος τῆ[ς] ὠφελία[ς] αὐτῶν, ἐμήνυεν Ἐπικούρωι τὰς ἁμαρτίας· καὶ Πολύαινος δὲ τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὅς γε καὶ Ἀ[πολλωνί]δου ῥαθυμοῦν[τ]ọ[ς, ἐφοίτ]α πρὸς Ἐπ[ί]κουρον...

Some editors restore this name as "Heracleides"

ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΔΗΝ *vs.* **ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΝ**

In fragment 20 of this same work (On Frank Criticism) Heracleides of Pontus (the pupil of Plato, playwright, and astronomer) is mentioned: "as Epicurus maintains consistently both in his writings Against Democritus and Against Heracleides" (U16)

The individual mentioned here was a contemporary and friend of Epicurus – thus he is certainly not Heracleides of Pontus – but his exact name is uncertain.

...ἐπαινεῖσθαι τὸν Χαρμίδην ὅτι – τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐνφανησομένων μέμψεις ἥττους τιθέμενος τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτῶν – Ἐμήνυεν Ἐπικούρῳ τὰς ἁμαρτίας·

...Charmides was praised because – setting the criticisms from what [*discomfort*] was going to appear to be lesser than their usefulness – he disclosed his faults to Epicurus.

To Uncertain Persons

30. On Occupations

Περὶ Ἐπιτηδευμάτων

[U171]

1. Aristotle: *Squanderer, Soldier, Drug-Seller, & Drifter*

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 8, 354B

πολλὰ δὲ ἔχων ἔτι λέγειν περὶ ὧν ἐλήρησεν ὁ Φαρμακοπώλης, Παύομαι – καίτοι εἰδὼς καὶ Ἐπίκουρον, τὸν φιλαληθέστατον, ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ *Περὶ Ἐπιτηδευμάτων* ἐπιστολῇ:

though still having many things to say about what that Drug-seller [*i.e., Aristotle*] raved about, I'll stop – even though I know that Epicurus, the most truth-loving man, in his letter *On Occupations* also said these things about him:

ὅτι καταφαγὼν τὰ πατρῷα – ἐπὶ στρατείαν Ὥρμησε, καὶ ὅτι, ἐν ταύτῃ κακῶς πράττων – ἐπὶ τὸ φαρμακοπωλεῖν Ἦλθεν.

that, having fully devoured his paternal estate – he rushed into military service, and that, doing poorly in it – he turned to drug-selling.

εἶτα, ἀναπεπταμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος περιπάτου, Φησί – παραβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν – προσεκάθισε τοῖς λόγοις, οὐκ ὢν ἀφυής, καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὴν θεωρουμένην ἐξῆλθεν.

then, when Plato's walkaround [*i.e., school*] was premiered, [*Epicurus*] says, [*Aristotle*] – throwing himself in as well – settled alongside those reasonings, given that he was not stupid, and he gradually entered into observation.

οἶδα δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα μόνος Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκεν κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ – οὔτε δ᾽ Εὐβουλίδης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Κηφισόδωρος τοιοῦτόν τι ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦ Σταγειρίτου (καίτοι καὶ συγγράμματα ἐκδόντες κατὰ τἀνδρός)

but I know that only Epicurus said these things about him – neither Eubulides, nor even Cephisodorus dared to say such a thing against the Stagirite (even though they published treatises against the man)

*Aristotle is called "the Stagirite" because he was born in Stagira (**Στάγειρα**), a city in northern Greece (northeast Chalkidice).*

τὸ φάρμακον **τὰ φάρμακα**	remedy	**ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΝ** *drug*
ὁ Φαρμακοπώλης	drug-seller	**ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΠΩΛΗΣ** *drug selling*
τὸ φαρμακοπωλεῖν	selling drugs	
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
ὁ φιλάνθρωπος **οἱ φιλάνθρωποι**	philanthropic	**ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *loving man face*
φιλαληθέστατος *(η, ον)*	most truth-loving	**ΦΙΛΑΛΗΘΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *most loving* *what is not hidden*
ὁ Φιλαληθέστατος	most truth-loving man	

ἐπιτηδεύειν	to be trained	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΕΙΝ *pursuing towards*
τό ἐπιτήδευμα τά ἐπιτηδεύματα	occupation	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΜΑ *pursuing towards*
ὁ περίπατος οἱ περίπατοι	walkaround	ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΟΣ *walking around*
θεωρεῖν	to observe	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ *envisioning*
ἡ θεωρουμένη	*observation	

2. Degeneracy of Aristotle

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8

καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη, "ἄσωτον (ὃν, καταφαγόντα τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν – στρατεύεσθαι καὶ φαρμακοπωλεῖν)

and [*Epicurus called*] Aristotle "degenerate" (who, having devoured his paternal estate – engaged in military service and selling drugs)

Presumably in connection with his drug-selling, we also learn of Aristotle "bathing in a bath of warm oil and then selling the oil." (Laertius 5.16)

Regarding Aristotle' pharmacological abilities, consider "at Chalcis [Aristotle] died, according to Eumelus in the fifth book of his Histories – by drinking **ἀκόνιτον** *(aconite, i.e., wolfsbane or monkshood)…" However, Laertius notes that other sources say Aristotle died a natural death. (Laertius 5.6 & 10)*

ὁ ἄσωτος οἱ ἄσωτοι	degenerate	ΑΣΩΤΟΣ *not saving*

3. Aristotle Joined Plato

Aristocles of Messene

from Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Praeparatio Evangelica, book 15, chapter 2 (791A)

Eusebius (a 4th-century AD Christian historian) preserves a summary from Aristocles of Messene (a 1st-century AD Peripatetic philosopher and defender of Aristotle), who in turn reports what Epicurus wrote in his letter On Occupations.

πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιστολῇ: νέον μὲν ὄντα, καταφαγεῖν Αὐτὸν τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν – ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ στρατεύεσθαι συνῶσαι, κακῶς δὲ πράττοντα ἐν τούτοις ¬ ἐπὶ τὸ φαρμακοπωλεῖν ἐλθεῖν, ἔπειτα, ἀναπεπταμένου τοῦ Πλάτωνος περιπάτου πᾶσι παραβαλεῖν αὐτόν;

for how is it possible, as Epicurus says in his Letter On Occupations: that, while still young, [*Aristotle*] squandered his paternal estate – then resorted to military service, and, doing poorly in these things ¬ turned to selling drugs, then, when Plato's walk [*i.e., school*] was premiered to all, he threw himself into it?

The passage goes on to list other detractors of Aristotle (Timaeus, Aristoxenus, Alexinus, Eubulides, Demochares, Cephisodorus, Lycon, etc.)

[U172]

4. Protagoras: *Basket-Carrier, Scribe, School Teacher & Sophist*

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 8.50, 354C

ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ ἐπιστολῇ, ὁ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Πρωταγόραν φησὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν – ἐκ φορμοφόρου καὶ ξυλοφόρου πρῶτον, μὲν γενέσθαι γραφέα Δημοκρίτου

(θαυμασθέντα δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐπὶ ξύλων τινὶ ἰδίᾳ συνθέσει) ‑ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀναληφθῆναι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ διδάσκειν ἐν κώμῃ τινὶ γράμματα, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ σοφιστεύειν Ὁρμῆσαι.

> in the same letter, Epicurus also says that Protagoras the sophist – from first being a basket-carrier and firewood-carrier, then became Democritus' scribe (with [*Protagoras*] having been admired by [*Democritus*] for some particular invention for [*carrying*] firewood) ‑ from that starting point, [*Protagoras*] was taken up by [*Democritus*], and [*Protagoras*] taught letters in some village, from which he began his path to playing a sophist

Epicurus was probably not disparaging Protagoras working as basket-carrier – but instead disparaged leaving that work and entering into the "profession" of sophist.

διάφορος (ον)	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ *carrying apart*
ὁ φορμοφόρος οἱ φορμοφόροι	basket-carrier	ΦΟΡΜΟΦΟΡΟΣ *wicker basket carrying*

5. Protagoras Joined Democritus

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8

"φορμοφόρον" τε Πρωταγόραν – καὶ γραφέα Δημοκρίτου ‑ καὶ ἐν κώμαις γράμματα διδάσκειν:

> [*Epicurus stated that*] Protagoras was "a basketbearer" – and a scribe of Democritus ‑ and taught letters in villages

Consider also the fact that Democritus (fl. 420 BCE) was 30 years younger than Protagoras (fl. 450 BCE). However Democritus was a prodigy and his family was very extremely wealthy (to the point that his father hosted King Xerxes).

6. Protagoras: Inventor of the Shoulder Pad

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 9.53 (Protagoras)

καὶ πρῶτος [Πρωταγόρας] τὴν καλουμένην "Τύλην" (ἐφ᾽ ἧς τὰ φορτία βαστάζουσιν) εὗρεν – ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Περὶ Παιδείας: φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρός πού φησι.

> Protagoras was the first to invent the so-called "Tyle" (on which people carry burdens) – as Aristotle says in *On Education*: for [*Protagoras*] was a basketbearer, as Epicurus also says somewhere.

καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον Ἤρθη πρὸς Δημοκρίτου ξύλα δεδεκὼς Ὀφθείς.

> and he was taken up by Democritus after being seen loaded up with firewood in this way

[U173]

7. Protagoras: A Late Learner

Uncertain Author On Hippomachus, in John Anthony Cramer's
Anecdota Graeca e codicibus manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis,
Volume 1, bottom of page 171, lines 31 onward

This work, published in 1839, is a compilation of previously unpublished Greek texts sourced from manuscripts housed in the Royal Library of Paris (now the Bibliothèque nationale de France).

ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ "Μεγάλῳ Λόγῳ," ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπε "φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως Διδασκαλία δεῖται – καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους Δεῖ μανθάνειν."

> that in the work titled "Great Reasoning," Protagoras said "Instruction requires nature and training – and it is necessary to have begun learning from youth."

οὐκ ἂν δὲ Ἔλεγε τοῦτο, εἰ αὐτὸς ὀψιμαθὴς ἦν (ὡς ἐνόμιζε καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἐπίκουρος περὶ Πρωταγόρου)

> but he would not have said this, if he himself had been a late learner (as Epicurus supposed and said about Protagoras)

*Despite this objection, Protagoras is clearly described as a late learner (**ὀψιμαθής**), not just by Laertius, but also by the broader tradition that emphasizes his turn to philosophy only after working as a manual laborer.*

31. On Stilpo

*Stilpo (**Στίλπων**, fl. c. 320 BCE) was twenty years older than Epicurus, and was a very famous and wealthy member of the Megarians. He is one of the philosophers criticized by Colotes in his "On the Point that Conformity to the Doctrines of other Philosophers actually makes it impossible to Live."*

1. Invincible Goods

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 9.18

omne intrā sē bonum Terminābit et Dīcet quod Stilpōn ille dīxit – Stilpōn quem Epicūrī Epistula insequitur

> [*the wise man*] will confine all good within himself and say what that Stilpo said – Stilpo whom a letter of Epicurus attacks

Hic enim, captā patriā, amissīs līberīs, amissā uxōre, cum ex incendiō pūblicō, sōlus, et tamen beātus, exīret: interrogantī Dēmētriō – cui cognōmen ab exitiō urbium Poliorcētēs fuit – num quid perdidisset "omnia" Inquit "Bona mea mēcum sunt!"

> for this man, with his country captured, his children lost, and his wife gone, yet he came out from the general destruction, alone, and yet happy: to Demetrius who was asking – who had the surname Poliorcetes from the destruction of cities – whether he had lost anything, [*Stilpo*] said "all my goods are with me!"

(19) **Ecce vir fortis ac strēnuus! ipsam hostis suī victōriam vīcit. "Nihil" inquit "perdidī." dubitāre illum coēgit an vīcisset, "omnia mea mēcum sunt: Iūstitia, Virtūs, Prūdentia, hoc ipsum: nihil bonum putāre quod ēripī possit"**

> Behold a brave and vigorous man! He conquered the very victory of his enemy. "I have lost nothing" [*Stilpo*] said. he made that man [*i.e., Demetrius*] doubt whether he had truly won, "everything that is mine is with me – Justice, Virtue, Wisdom, and this very thing: to consider nothing good that can be taken away"

Mīrāmur animālia quaedam quae per mediōs ignēs sine nōxā corporum trānseunt: quantō hic mīrābilior vir – quī per ferrum et ruīnās et ignēs inlaesus et indemnis ēvāsit! Vidēs quantō facilius sit tōtam gentem quam ūnum virum vincere?

We marvel at certain animals that pass through the midst of flames without harm to their bodies: how much more marvelous is this man – who came uninjured and untouched through sword, ruins, and fire! do you see how much easier it is to conquer an entire nation rather than one man?

Many Romans thought that Salamanders could live in fire – this is false.

haec vōx illī commūnis est cum Stōicō: aequē et hic intacta bona per concrēmātās urbēs fert – sē enim ipse contentus est – hōc fēlīcitātem suam fīnē dēsignat

This saying is shared with him and with the Stoic: he too carries his untouched goods through burned-out cities – for he is content with himself – he defines his happiness by this boundary

(20) **Nē existimēs nōs sōlōs generōsa verba iactāre: et ipse Stilpōnis obiūrgātor Epicūrus, similem illī vōcem ēmīsit – quam Tū bonī consule (etiam sī hunc diem iam expūnxī)**

Do not think that we alone utter noble words: Epicurus himself, the critic of Stilpo, expressed a similar sentiment – which you should regard favorably, (even if I have already crossed off this day)

"sī cui" inquit "Sua nōn videntur amplissima, licet tōtius mundī dominus sit, tamen miser est"

[Epicurus] said "if to anyone his own things do not seem most ample – even if he is master of the whole world – he is still miserable"

(vēl sī hoc modō tibī melius enuntiārī vidētur – id enim agendum est, ut nōn verbīs Serviāmus, sed sēnsibus) "miser est quī sē nōn beatissimum iūdicat, licet imperet mundō"

(or if this seems to you to be better expressed – for this is what must be done, so that we do not serve words, but meanings) "he is wretched who does not judge himself most blessed, even if he rules the world"

2. Demetrius Protects Stilpo

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 2.115 fin. (Stilpo)

ἀλλὰ καὶ Δημήτριος, ὁ Ἀντιγόνου, καταλαβὼν τὰ Μέγαρα, τήν τε οἰκίαν αὐτῷ φυλαχθῆναι – καὶ πάντα τὰ ἁρπασθέντα προὐνόησεν ἀποδοθῆναι

but even Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, after taking Megara, ordered that [*Stilpo's*] house be protected for him – and [*Demetrius*] took care that all that had been plundered be returned

ὅτε καὶ βουλομένῳ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀναγραφὴν λαβεῖν – Ἔφη μηδὲν τῶν οἰκείων ἀπολωλεκέναι: παιδείαν γὰρ μηδένα ἐξενηνοχέναι – τόν τε λόγον ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην

and to [*Demetrius*] who wished to receive from [*Stilpo*] a list of what had been lost – [*Stilpo*] said that he had lost none of his belongings: for he had lost no education – and still possessed both reasoning and knowledge

καὶ αὐτῷ διαλεχθεὶς περὶ ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίας: οὕτως Εἷλεν, ὥστε προσέχειν αὐτῷ

and having conversed with [*Demetrius*] about kindness for people: [*Stilpo*] so captivated [*Demetrius*], so that he paid attention to [*Stilpo*]

[U174]

3. Some External Goods are Necessary for Wellbeing

an meritō reprehendat, in quādam epistulā, Epicūrus eōs quī dīcunt sapientem sē ipsō esse contentum et, propter hoc, amīcō nōn indigēre, Dēsīderās scīre

> whether Epicurus rightly criticizes, in a certain letter, those who say that the wise man is content with himself and, because of this, has no need of a friend, you wish to know

Hoc obiicitur Stilbōnī ab Epicūrō et iīs quibus summum Bonum vīsum est animus inpatiēns

> This [*objection*] is raised against Stilpo by Epicurus and by those to whom the highest good seemed to be a non-suffering mind

[U175]

4. Reciprocal Responsibilities of Friendship

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 9.8

nunc ad prōpositum Reuertāmur, Sapiēns, etiam sī contentus est sē, tamen habēre amīcum vult – sī nihil aliud, ut exerceat amīcitiam, nē tam magna Virtūs iaceat ¬ nōn ad hoc quod dīcēbat Epicūrus in hāc ipsā epistulā:

> Let us now return to the point, the wise man, even if he is content with himself, still wishes to have a friend – if for nothing else, so that he may practice friendship, lest so great a virtue lie idle ¬ not for the reason Epicurus stated in this very letter:

"ut habeat quī sibi aegrō assideat – succurrat in uincula coniectō vel inopī"

> "so that he may have someone to sit by him when he is ill – to help when he is thrown into chains or in need"

sed ut habeat aliquem cui Ipse aegrō assideat – quem Ipse circumuentum hostīlī custōdiā līberet

> but so that he may have someone whom he himself may sit beside when that person is ill – whom he himself may free when that person is surrounded by hostile guards

Quī sē spectat et propter hoc ad amīcitiam venit, male cōgitat. quemadmodum coepit, sīc dēsinēt: parāuit amīcum aduersum uincla lātūrum opem – cum prīmum crepuerit Catēna, Discedet!

> He who looks to himself and for this reason comes to friendship, thinks poorly. however he began, so will he end: he has prepared a friend to bring help against chains – as soon as the chain rattles, he will depart!

Seneca is being rhetorical and unfair to Epicurus – who certainly recognized the reciprocal responsibilities involved with friendship.

5. Defense of Imperfect Predication

As a further indication of what was in Epicurus letter against Stilpo, we see that Colotes wrote against Stilpo's rejection of predication.

Predication is the act of stating something about a subject – for example, saying "the man is wise" joins the subject "man" with the predicate "wise."

Stilpo argued that predication is fundamentally mistaken because it attributes to a subject something distinct from it – treating, for example, "man" and "good" as if they could form a single truth.

Although most predicates are imperfect, in the sense that they do not fully capture the distinct identity of their subject, if no predication is considered valid, then the basic operations of language – defining, describing, judging – are all undermined, leaving us unable to communicate meaningfully or distinguish one thought from another.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 22, 1119C

μετὰ δὲ Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα, προσμάχεται Στίλπωνι… …ἑνὸς μνησθεὶς, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο μηδὲν εἰπὼν, μηδὲ λύσας τὴν πιθανότητα: τραγῳδίαν ἐπάγει τῷ Στίλπωνι, καί "τὸν βίον ἀναιρεῖσθαὶ" φησιν "ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι"

> after Socrates and Plato, [*Colotes*] engages against Stilpo… …recalling one [*saying*], and saying nothing about its [*context*], nor resolving its subtlety: he brings a tragedy against Stilpo, and he says that "[*our way of*] life is destroyed by him who says that one thing must not be predicated of another"

"πῶς γὰρ βιωσόμεθα, μὴ λέγοντες 'ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν' μηδ᾽ 'ἄνθρωπον στρατηγόν' ¬ ἀλλ᾽ 'ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον' χωρὶς, καὶ 'ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν' καὶ 'στρατηγὸν στρατηγόν';"

> "how could we live, if we do not say 'a man is good' or 'a man is a commander' ¬ but instead 'a man is a man' separately, and 'a good is good' and 'a commander is a commander'?"

μηδ᾽ 'ἱππεῖς μυρίους' μηδὲ 'πόλιν ἐχυράν' ¬ ἀλλ᾽ 'ἱππεῖς ἱππεῖς' καὶ 'μυρίους μυρίους', καὶ τἄλλα ὁμοίως;"

> "and [*how can live*] without [*saying*] 'ten thousand horsemen' or 'a fortified city' ¬ but only 'horsemen are horsemen' and 'ten thousand is ten thousand,' and similarly for the rest?"

[U176]

32. To Apia

Good Health and Conditions

Most scholars accept this as a quote of Epicurus.

(Batis, the sister of Metrodorus and wife of Idomeneus, has been alternatively proposed, but she is never mentioned in P.Herc. 176)

Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 23

…[ἀ]φείγμεθα εἰς Λάμψακον ὑγιαίνοντες ἐγὼ καὶ Πυθοκλῆς κα[ὶ Ἕρ]μαρχος καὶ Κτήσιππος καὶ ἐκεῖ κατειλήφαμεν ὑγ[ι]αίνοντας Θεμίσταν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς φίλο[υ]ς· εὖ δὲ ποιεῖς καὶ εἰ σὺ ὑγιαίνεις καὶ ἡ μ[ά]μμη [σ]ου καὶ πάπαι καὶ Μάτρω[ν]ι πάντα πείθ[η] ὥ[σπ]ερ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν· εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, [ὦ Ἀ]πία, ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ο[ἱ] λοιπ[ο]ὶ πάντες σε μέγα φιλοῦμεν ὅτι τούτοις πείθῃ πάντα…

…"Ἀφείγμεθα εἰς Λάμψακον ὑγιαίνοντες – Ἐγὼ καὶ Πυθοκλῆς καὶ Ἕρμαρχος καὶ Κτήσιππος – καὶ ἐκεῖ Κατειλήφαμεν ὑγιαίνοντας Θεμίσταν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς φίλους·"

"We have arrived in Lampsacus healthy – I and Pythocles and Hermarchus and Ctesippus – and there we found Themista and the rest of the friends healthy [*as well*]."

"εὖ δὲ ποιεῖς, καὶ εἰ Σὺ ὑγιαίνεις καὶ ἡ Μάμμη σου – καὶ Πάπᾳ καὶ Μάτρωνι πάντα πείθῃ (ὥσπερ καὶ ἔμπροσθεν)."

"but you are doing well, especially if you are healthy and your mama too – and while you are obeying your father and Matron in everything (just as before)."

"εὖ γὰρ Ἴσθι, ὦ Ἀπία, ὅτι καὶ Ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ Λοιποὶ πάντες σε μέγα φιλοῦμεν, ὅτι τούτοις πείθῃ πάντα...

"Know well, Oh Apia, that I and all the others love you greatly, given that you obey them in all things..."

*Ctesippus (**Κτήσιππος**) meaning "possessor of a horse" appears to be a close friend of Epicurus and was responsible (in the case of at least a few members) for transferring the yearly contribution, Philodemus says: "in another letter, Epicurus writes 'Ctesippus brought to me the contribution for the year which you sent on behalf of both your father and yourself.'" (U151)*

[U177]

33. Letter From His Last Days

Composure and Acceptance

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 31

...[πο]ιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτ[ὸν ἐ]πέπεισ[το] καί τινα τρόπον α[ὐ]τὸς ἀπεδέχετ' αὑτόν· ὡς γὰρ ἐφώνησεν ἐκπνέων· 'ἑβδόμη<ι> γὰρ ἡμέραι, φησίν, ὅτε ταῦτ' ἔγραφον οὐχὶ [ἀποκεχ]ώρ[ηκ]εν κα[τὰ τὴν] οὔρησιν [ἐμ]οὶ οὐθὲν καὶ ἀλγηδόνες ἐνῆ[σα]ν τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν ἀγουσῶν. σὺ οὖν, ἄν τι γένεται, τὰ παιδία τὰ Μετροδώρου διοίκησον τέτταρα ἢ πέντ' ἔτη μηθὲν πλεῖον δαπανῶν ἤπερ νῦν εἰ[ς ἐ]μὲ δαπανᾶ<ι>ς κατ' ἐνιαυτόν.' καὶ προβάς· 'ὑπὲρ τῶν υἱῶν οἶδα καὶ Αἰγέα καὶ Διόδωρον καὶ τῆς σῆς φρενὸς ὄντας [καὶ οὐ]κ ἀρέσκευμα μ[ό]νον {ποι[ουμέν]ο[υς ἐ]π' αὐ[τῶν, ὡ]ς [ἐ]π[ὶ τούτων γε] πρέ[π]‹ει, ἀ›[λλὰ] καὶ [ἐπ]ιλύ‹πω›[ς ἐσχη]κό[τας] πρὸς τ[ὴν ἐκείνου τελευτή]ν}... ...καὶ [ἐπ]ιλυον[τ][ας]... ...ὅμως [ὑμ]ῖν εἶπ[ον]... ...[γρ]άφω[ν]... ...τὰς παρὰ σοῦ... ...μαλ' ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσας... ...πρός τε Ἐπ[ί]κουρον καὶ... ...τὸν Ἐπίκ[ο]υ[ρ]ον πρὸς... ...εὐνοίας... ...φυσ[ι]ολογια... ...τῶι συστήσασθαι δι[ὰ]... ...μόνον δὴ...

...ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν Ἐπέπειστο ¬ καί τινα τρόπον αὐτὸς ἀπεδέχετ' αὑτόν – ὡς, γὰρ ἐφώνησεν, ἐκπνέων:

[*Epicurus*] he had persuaded himself to compose himself ¬ and in a certain way he himself accepted himself – for he uttered, while breathing out [*his last breaths*]:

"ἑβδόμῃ γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ" Φησίν "ὅτε ταῦτ' Ἔγραφον, οὐχὶ Ἀποκεχώρηκεν κατὰ τὴν οὔρησιν ἐμοὶ Οὐθέν, καὶ Ἀλγηδόνες ἐνῆσαν – τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ἡμέραν ἀγουσῶν.

"for on the seventh day" he says "when I wrote these things, nothing has in any way ceased for me in regards to urination, and the pains were present – the ones leading to the final day"

Σὺ οὖν, ἄν τι γένεται, τὰ παιδία τὰ Μετροδώρου διοίκησον – τέτταρα ἢ πέντ' ἔτη – μηθὲν πλεῖον δαπανῶν ἤπερ νῦν εἰς ἐμὲ δαπανᾷς κατ' ἐνιαυτόν."

so you, if anything happens, take care of Metrodorus' children – for four or five years – while spending no more than you now spend on me each year."

καὶ προβὰς "ὑπὲρ τῶν υἱῶν, Οἶδα καὶ Αἰγέα καὶ Διόδωρον καὶ τῆς σῆς φρενὸς ὄντας ¬ καὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκευμα μόνον ποιουμένους ἐπ' αὐτῶν (ὡς ἐπὶ τούτων γε Πρέπει) – ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιλύπως ἐσχηκότας πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου τελευτήν...

and he continued "concerning the sons, I know that both Aigeas and Diodoros both are of your mind ¬ and not merely doing what pleases regarding them (as is fitting in such cases) – but given that they also have been deeply affected by his [*i.e., Metrodorus'*] death..."

"...καὶ ἐπιλυοντ... ...ὅμως, ὑμῖν Εἶπον... ...γράφων... ...τὰς παρὰ σοῦ... ...μαλ' ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσας..."

"...and [*although they are*] distressed... ...nevertheless, I told you all... ...while writing... ...the [*letters*] from you... ...[*letters that*] were very emotional..."

...πρός τε Ἐπίκουρον καὶ... ...τὸν Ἐπίκουρον πρὸς... ...εὐνοίας... ...φυσιολογία... ...τῷ συστήσασθαι διὰ... ...μόνον δὴ...

[quoted section has ended]...both to Epicurus and... ...Epicurus toward... ...[*a spirit*] of goodwill... ...the study of nature... ...in the act of composing through... ...only indeed...

Metrodorus died in 277 BCE, and predeceased Epicurus (who died in 270 BCE), by seven years.

1. Wisdom Recognized & Appreciated

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100A

καὶ μὴν, ἀπὸ δόξης γίγνεσθαι τινας ἡδονὰς Ἐπίκουρος ὡμολόγει: τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἔμελλεν Αὐτὸς – οὕτω σπαργῶν περιμανῶς, καὶ σφαδάζων πρὸς δόξαν;

and indeed, Epicurus admitted that certain pleasures arise from reputation: and what would he himself not have been likely to do – being so frenziedly puffed up, and twitching for the sake of fame?

ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς, μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ (τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ) ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν ¬ σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν?

so that he not only rejected the founders [*of philosophy*], nor only contended with Democritus (the one from whom was taken the doctrines word-for-word) over syllables and diacritical marks ¬ but also [*Epicurus used*] to say that no one had become wise except himself and his students?

ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης, μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα, Προσκυνήσειε, γονάτων ἀψάμενος – Νεοκλῆς δ᾽ ὁ ἀδελφὸς, εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀποφαίνοιτο "Μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι μηδ᾽ εἶναι" ἡ δὲ Μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοσαύτας ¬ Οἷαι, συνελθοῦσαι, σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν;

but even [*to the point of*] writing that Colotes, upon seeing him engaged in natural philosophy, fell, having grasped his knees – and that his brother Neocles used, directly from a childhood, to say "no one has been or is wiser than Epicurus" and that his Mother had just so many atoms within her ¬ such that, when they came together, must have produced a wise man?

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1100C

οὐ γὰρ ἄν τινα Πείσειεν ἀνθρώπων (Ὁ τὴν Νεοκλέους μαρτυρίαν καὶ τὴν Κωλώτου προσκύνησιν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ τιθέμενος καὶ ἀγαπῶν) ὡς οὐκ ἂν – ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κροτηθεὶς Ὀλυμπίασιν – Ἐξεμάνη καὶ Ἀνωλόλυξε, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅλως ὑπὸ χαρᾶς Ἤρθη…

for he would not persuade anyone who is alive (he who places and delights in the testimony of Neocles and the prostration of Colotes in such a lengthy speech) that he would not – if he had been applauded by the Greeks at Olympia – have gone mad and cried aloud, or rather have been entirely carried away by joy…

2. Brotherly Love

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On Brotherly Love, 16, 487D

φαίνεται δὲ πολλὴ καὶ πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον ἡ Αἰδὼς τῶν ἀδελφῶν δι᾽ εὔνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κηδεμονίαν – εἴς τε τἆλλα καὶ φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἐκείνου συνενθουσιώντων: καὶ γὰρ εἰ Διημάρτανον δόξης (εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων πεπεισμένοι, καὶ λέγοντες ὡς Οὐδεὶς γέγονεν Ἐπικούρου σοφώτερος), ἄξιόν ἐστι θαυμάζειν καὶ τοῦ διαθέντος οὕτως καὶ τῶν διατεθέντων

great Reverence also appears toward Epicurus from his brothers through his affection and guardianship – who were jointly inspired by both his other [*dealings*] and especially his philosophy: for even if they were mistaken in judgment (having been immediately persuaded from childhood, and all saying that no one had ever been wiser than Epicurus), it is appropriate to admire both the one who inclined [*them*] in such a way and those so were so inclined

3. Atomic Origins *(Neocles & Chairestrate)*

Dionysius Episcopus (Bishop) = Dionysius of Alexandria (fl. 230 CE)

from Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE),

Praeparatio Evangelica, book 14, chapter 26, paragraph 2 (779A)

πόσας γὰρ ἀτόμους ὁ Ἐπικούρου Πατὴρ, καὶ ποταπὰς, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ προέχεεν – ὅτ᾽ ἀπεσπέρμαινεν Ἐπίκουρον;

how many atoms, and of what kind, did Epicurus' Father emit from himself – when he was sowing Epicurus?

καὶ πῶς – εἰς τὴν μητρῴαν αὐτοῦ καταβληθεῖσαι γαστέρα – Συνεπάγησαν, Ἐσχηματίσθησαν, Ἐμορφώθησαν, Ἐκινήθησαν, Ηὐξύνθησαν;

and how – having been cast into his mother's womb – were they fused together, shaped, formed, set in motion, and developed?

[U179]

4. Philosophy at 14

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.2

ἐφάψασθαι δὲ φιλοσοφίας Αὐτός φησιν – ἔτη γεγονὼς τετταρεσκαίδεκα

He himself says that he began to apply himself to philosophy – when he was fourteen years [*old*]

[U180]

5. [Going to Athens]

Some letters are missing at a critical point in this sentence – leading to two contrary possible meanings. Although the version from the DCLP has been more fully reviewed and is probably a more nearly correct reconstruction.

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 16

(DCLP) …[ἀ]χρήστ[ους] διαφοράς. διὰ τίνας αἰτίας δημό[την] ὄντ᾽ αὐτὸν πατ[ρόθε]ν ἀνη[γόρευ]εν Ἐπίκουρος… …περὶ τοῦ μάλιστα μὲν [εἰ]ς Ἀθήνας ἐλθ[εῖν ἔ]νθα διατρίψουσιν, ἂν ὁ κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων… …εἰς Μυτι[λή]νην…

…ἀχρήστους διαφοράς. διὰ τίνας αἰτίας δημότην ὄντ᾽ αὐτὸν πατρόθεν ἀνηγόρευεν Ἐπίκουρος… …περὶ τοῦ μάλιστα μὲν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐλθεῖν, ἔνθα διατρίψουσιν – ἂν ὁ κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων… …εἰς Μυτιλήνην…

…useless disputes. because of these things, Epicurus declared himself to be a commoner by birth on his father's side… …and especially about going to Athens, where they would spend time – if he in opposition to the philosophers… …to Mytilene…

(Usener) …[τῆς πρὸς τὸν] χρηστ[ὸν] διαφορᾶς, διὰ τίνας αἰτίας δὴ μό[ν]α[ρχ]ον ἑαυτὸν π[άν]τ[ω]ν ἀνη[τόρευ]εν Ἐπίκουρος, [ἢ καὶ] περὶ τοῦ μάλιστα μὲν [τὰ]ς Ἀθήνας ἐνοι[κεῖν, ἔ]νθα διατρίβουσ[ιν] ἂν ὁ κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων [φθόνος]…

…τῆς πρὸς τὸν χρηστὸν διαφορᾶς. διὰ τίνας αἰτίας δὴ μόναρχον ἑαυτὸν πάντων ἀνητόρευεν Ἐπίκουρος, ἢ καὶ περὶ τοῦ μάλιστα μὲν τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐνοικεῖν, ἔνθα διατρίβουσιν – ἂν ὁ κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων φθόνος…

…of the dispute with the upright man. because of these things indeed Epicurus proclaimed himself monarch over all, and especially about settling in Athens, where they would spend time – if the [envy] in opposition to the philosophers…

[U181]

6. Spitting on Pleasure from Extravagance

Johannes Stobaeus (fl. f. 450 CE), Anthology: volume 3, chapter 17, section 24

[Ἐπικούρου] "Βρυάζω τῷ κατὰ τὸ σωμάτιον ἡδεῖ – ὕδατι καὶ ἄρτῳ χρώμενος – καὶ Προσπτύω ταῖς ἐκ πολυτελείας ἡδοναῖς: οὐ δὶ αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξακολουθοῦντα αὐταῖς δυσχερῆ"

From Epicurus "I teem with what is pleasant for this little body – using only water and bread – and I spit on the pleasures from extravagances: not because of them, but because of what follows from them [*that is*] is difficult"

βρυάζειν	to bubble [here, "to teem"]	**ΒΡΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *swelling, fermenting*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ὁ σωμάτιον **τὰ σωμάτια**	little body	**ΣΩΜΑΤΙΟΝ** *little body*
ἡδύς *(ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)*	pleasant	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
τὸ ἧδον **τὰ ἧδοντα**	what causes pleasure [active in producing pleasure]	**ἩΔΟΝ** *sweet*
τὸ ἡδύ **τὰ ἡδέα**	what is pleasant [pleasant in quality]	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
τὸ ὕδωρ **τὰ ὕδατα**	water	**ὙΔΩΡ** *rain / water*
ὁ ἄρτος **οἱ ἄρτοι**	bread	**ΑΡΤΟΣ** *loaf of wheat bread*
χρώμενος *(η, ον)*	using	**ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ** *necessary*
προσπτύειν	spit on	**ΠΡΟΣΠΤΥΕΙΝ** *[onomatopoeic] upon*
ἡ συντέλεια **αἱ συντέλειαι**	mutual fulfillment	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *completing together*
ἡ πολυτέλεια **αἱ πολυτέλειαι**	extravagance	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *much completing*
ἡ ἡδονή **αἱ ἡδοναί**	pleasure	**ἩΔΟΝΗ** *sweet*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἐξακολουθεῖν	to follow after	**ΕΞΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following out of*
ἐξακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following after	
δυσμνημόνευτος *(ον)*	hard to remember	**ΔΥΣΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΤΟΣ** *hard thinking*
τὸ δυσχερές **τὰ δυσχερῆ**	what is difficult	**ΔΥΣΧΕΡΕΣ** *hard hand*

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE) 10.11

Αὐτός τέ φησιν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὕδατι μόνον ἀρκεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρτῳ λιτῷ

He himself also says in his letters, that he is content with only water and plain bread

7. Welcoming Sign to the Gardens

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 21.10

cum Adiēris eius hortulōs et inscriptum Notāueris:
"Hospes, hīc bene manēbis – hīc summum bonum Voluptās est"

when you come to his little gardens and you notice the inscription:
"Stranger, here you will dwell well – here the highest good is pleasure"

parātus erit istīus domicilīī Custos hospitālis, hūmānus – et tē polentā excipiet et aquam quoque largē ministrābit, et dicet:

[*then*] the hospitable, kind, guardian of that dwelling will be ready – and he will receive you with barley meal and also generously serve water, and he will say:

"ecquid bene acceptus es? nōn irritant" inquit "hī Hortulī famem, sed exstinguunt ¬ nec maiōrem ipsīs pōtiōnibus sitim faciunt, sed nātūrālī et grātuitō remediō sēdant: in hāc voluptāte Consēnuī"

"were you well received?" he says "these little gardens do not provoke hunger, but they quench it ¬ nor do they make thirst greater by the drinks themselves, but they calm it with a natural and free remedy: in this pleasure I have grown old"

[U182]

8. Little Pot of Cheese

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.11

…ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς… …καί "Πέμψον μοι τυροῦ" Φησί "κυθριδίου – ἵν' ὅταν Βούλωμαι, πολυτελεύσασθαι Δύνωμαι"

…in his letters… …he also says "Send me a little pot of cheese – so that, when I like, I am able to live extravagantly"

πέμπειν	to send	**ΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ** *conveying*
ὁ τυρός **οἱ τυροί**	cheese	**ΤΥΡΟΣ** *swelling*
τό κυθρίδιον **τὰ κυθρίδια**	little pot	**ΚΥΘΡΙΔΙΟΝ** *little jar*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *council*
ἡ πολυτέλεια **αἱ πολυτέλειαι**	extravagance	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *much completing*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *much completing*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*

[U183]

9. Gratitude for the Essentials

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1097C

ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν οὐδὲ, βουλόμενόν, ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρελθεῖν – τὰς μὲν Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Μιλτιάδου πράξεις ὑπὸ πόδας τιθεμένου καὶ κατευτελίζοντος – ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταυτὶ τοῖς φίλοις γράφοντος:

but it is not possible, even for someone willing, to pass by the absurdity of the man – who belittles and places the deeds of Themistocles and Miltiades under foot – while writing things like this to his friends on his own behalf:

"δαιμονίως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς Ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν – καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα Ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας"

"You marvelously and magnificently took care of our issues regarding the delivery of food – and you have demonstrated sky-high signs of good will toward me"

ὥστε, εἴ Τις ἐξεῖλε τὸ σιτάριον ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου, δόξαν ἂν παραστῆσαι τὰ Ῥήματα τῆς χάριτος ὡς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅλης ἢ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερωθέντος ἢ σωθέντος γραφομένης.

thus, if someone were to remove a little food from the philosopher's letter, the words of gratitude would give the impression as though it had been written on behalf of all Greece or on behalf of the Athenian people having been liberated or saved

ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ *good spirit*
δαιμόνιος *(α, ον)*	marvellous	ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ *spirit*
δαιμονίως	marvelously	
μεγαλοπρεπής *(ές)*	magnificent	ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΡΕΠΗΣ *appearing proper* *[for one who is] great*
μεγαλοπρεπῶς	magnificently	
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι	to take care of	ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *caring upon*
τὸ σιτίον τὰ σιτία	food	ΣΙΤΙΟΝ *grain / provisions*
ἡ κομιδή αἱ κομιδαί	delivery	ΚΟΜΙΔΗ *exerting*
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ *extent*
οὐρανομήκης *(ες)*	sky-high	ΟΥΡΑΝΟΜΗΚΗΣ *extent of heaven*
τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ *state of indication*
ἐνδεικνύναι	to indicate in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ *showing in*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
ἡ εὔνοια αἱ εὐνοίαι	good will	ΕΥΝΟΙΑ *seeing well* *[looking upon positively]*

[U184]

10. Annual Contribution

A drachma was about 4.3 grams of silver and represented the average daily wage for common labor. With a modern melt value of around $4, it had a historical purchasing power equivalent to approximately $50–$150 during Epikouros' lifetime.

*Therefore, 120 drachmae contribution (**σύνταξις**) would correspond to a purchasing power of roughly $6,000–$18,000.*

This sum is equivalent to about two obols per day (often described as "the yield of one slave").

Philodemus (fl.c.. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 30 sup.

...περὶ ἡμ[ῶν] γρά[φων·] "[ἣν προ]σέταξα τιμὴ[ν] ἐμαυτῶι κἂν ἐν Ὑπερβορείοις ὦσιν ἀποστέλλ[ε]ιν, ταύτην καὶ ὑμῖν συντάττω· ἑκατὸν γὰρ κα[ὶ ε]ἴκοσι [δ]ρ[αχ]μὰ[ς μόν]ας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν βούλομαι παρ' ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν."

...περὶ ἡμῶν γράφων "ἣν Προσέταξα τιμὴν ἐμαυτῷ (κἂν ἐν Ὑπερβορείοις ὦσιν!) ἀποστέλλειν – ταύτην καὶ ὑμῖν Συντάττω: ἑκατὸν γὰρ καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμὰς μόνας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Βούλομαι παρ' ἑκατέρου λαμβάνειν."

> ...writing about us "the value which I ordered to be sent to myself (even if they are among the Hyperboreans!) – and this I also order from you all: I want to acquire only one hundred and twenty drachmas per year from each of you."

While instruction itself remained free, Epicurus clearly established a voluntary but standardized financial support system during his lifetime.

Given that we have also seen Epicurus dispersing money – it is clear that these finances were pooled for collective use. Epicurus rejected mandatory collectivism, but he embraced voluntary support between friends.

In this way, wealthier friends helped fund communal meals, housing, and the other necessities – ensuring all members had their basic necessities secure.

ἡ σύνταξις **αἱ συντάξεις**	contribution	**ΣΥΝΤΑΞΙΣ** *ordering together*
διατάττειν	to arrange	**ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering across*
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	**ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering under*
προστάττειν	to order for	**ΠΡΟΣΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering toward*
συντάττειν	to also order	**ΣΥΝΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering together*
ἡ τιμή **αἱ τιμαί**	honor [here, "value"]	**ΤΙΜΗ** *value*
ὁ Ὑπερβόρειος **οἱ Ὑπερβόρειοι**	Hyperborean	**ὙΠΕΡΒΟΡΕΙΟΣ** *beyond north*
ἀποστέλλειν	to send [away]	**ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ** *making ready away*
εἰκοστός *(ή, όν)*	twentieth	**ΕΙΚΟΣΤΟΣ** *twenty*
ἡ εἰκάς **αἱ εἰκάδες**	20th day of the month	**ΕΙΚΑΣ** *twenty*
τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον **τὰ εἰκοσάεδρα**	icosahedron *(20 faced polyhedron)*	**ΕΙΚΟΣΑΕΔΡΟΝ** *twenty-face*
εἴκοσι	20	**ΕΙΚΟΣΙ**
ἡ δραχμή **αἱ δραχμαί**	drachma	**ΔΡΑΧΜΗ** *[as much as one can]* *grasp*
μόνος *(η, ον)*	only	**ΜΟΝΟΣ** *single*
ὁ ἐνιαυτός **οἱ ἐνιαυτοί**	year	**ΕΝΙΑΥΤΟΣ** *year passing* *[over to next]*
βούλεσθαι	to want	**ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ** *wishing*

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*

[U185]

11. Kronios & Arkephon *(sharing meat)*

Philodemus (fl.c.. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 19 full.

(DCLP) ...παρειληφότι τάκείν[ου διδ]όν[αι] ḳαρνεΐσκω<ι> δεῖν τι, ὄ[ντος] τοιούτου Κρονίου καὶ δόντος προθ[ύμως· καὶ μά]λ' ἀσπασίως τῷ Ἀρκε[φ]ῶντι μίαν μὲν ἐξ ἐπαίνου <οὖ>σαν τὴν [ὑπ'] ἐμοῦ δοθεῖσαν αὐτῶι πᾶ[σ]αν δὲ[δ]ωκε παρ' [ἑκα]τέρ[ου]ς οὐδὲ... ...δ' ἐλεῖν ἀλ[λὰ] ḳαὶ προ<στέ>ταχέ τιν[ι] Καλ[λισ]ṭρ[ά]τωι ṗ[έν]ṭε μνᾶς ἡμῖν δοῦναι.' καὶ προβάς· 'ὁ μὲν [δὴ] Καλ[λίσ]τρατος... ...μέχρι [γ]ε τοῦ πα[ρ]ọ́ντος... ...[Π]ατρόκḷ[ο]υ [ἤθε]λον εἶναι...

"...παρειληφότι τἀκείνου, διδόναι καρνεΐσκῳ δεῖν τι, ὄντος τοιούτου Κρονίου καὶ δόντος προθύμως: καὶ, μάλ' ἀσπασίως, τῷ Ἀρκεφῶντι μίαν (μὲν ἐξ ἐπαίνου οὖσαν τὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ πᾶσαν) Δὲδωκε – παρ' ἑκατέρους, οὐδὲ..."

> "...for [*the recipient*] who had received what was his, [*he considered it*] to be necessary to give something for the meat-offering, given that Kronios was such a man and had given [*his part*] willingly: and [*that recipient*], very gladly, gave to Arkephon the one [*share*] (which, being [*a token*] of praise, had all been given to him by me) – for both parties, neither..."

It seems that Epicurus gave a portion of meat to a man, and that man, in turn, gave it to Arkephon.

Kronios is also parenthetically mentioned as part of the giving.

...δ' ἐλεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Προστέταχέ τινι Καλλιστράτῳ πέντε μνᾶς ἡμῖν δοῦναι καὶ προβάς "ὁ μὲν δὴ Καλλίστρατος ... ...μέχρι γε τοῦ παρόντος... ...Πατρόκλου ἤθελον εἶναι..."

> ...to take, but he had also instructed a certain Kallistratos to give us five minas and he continues "indeed, Kallistratos... ...up to the present... ...I wanted to be with Patroklos..."

An Attic mina was 436 grams of silver. With a modern melt value of around $500, it had a historical purchasing power of at least $5,000 during Epikouros' lifetime.

Thus five minas would have the purchasing power of at least $25,000.

[U186]

12. Remembering Neocles

[see U190] *Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 16, 1097E*

"ὅτι νοσῶν νόσον ἀσκίτην, τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων Συνῆγε – καὶ οὐκ Ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι καὶ (τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος) Ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἰδιοτρόπῳ ἡδονῇ"

> [Metrodorus] "that, while sick with a dropsical disease, he gathered certain feasts of friends – and did not begrudge the offering of liquid to [*himself*] with dropsy, and (while remembering the final words of Neocles) he was melting in that idiosyncratic pleasure that is mixed with tears"

[U187]

13. Pleasing the Public

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115R (Maxims of Epicurus)

"οὐδέποτε Ὠρέχθην τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν:῞Α μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἤρεσκεν – οὐκ Ἔμαθον ¬῞Α δ᾽ ἤδειν ἐγώ μακρὰν ἦν τῆς ἐκείνων αἰσθήσεως"

"I never aimed to please the many: for the things which were pleasing to them – I did not learn ¬ but the things I knew were at a distance from their sensation"

οὐδέποτε	never	**ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ** *not even at some point*
ὀρέγειν	to aim at	**ΟΡΕΓΕΙΝ** *reaching*
ἀρέσκειν	to please	**ΑΡΕΣΚΕΙΝ** *satisfying*
ἤρεσκεν	it was pleasing	
ἔμαθον	I learned	
εἰδέναι	*to have mentally seen ∴* "to know"	**ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ** *seen*
μακρός *(ά, όν)*	distant	**ΜΑΚΡΟΣ** *long-reaching*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*

Maximus the Confessor (fl. c. 630 CE)

entry 6 of Maximus' Gnomologion (Collection of Sayings)

page 172 in Tigani's edition. volume 2, page 549, of Combefis' edition.

sine scrīptōris nōmine ("Ἐπικούρου" codd. Laurentianus et Borbōnicus)

without the writer's name ("from Epicurus" in the Laurentianus and Bourbonicus codices)

"numquam Voluī populō placēre: nam quae ego Sciō, nōn probat Populus – quae probat Populus, Ego nesciō."

"I never wanted to be pleasing to the public: for the things I know, the public does not approve – and the things the public approves, I do not know."

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 29.10

...tibī quod dēbeō impīngam:

...I will deliver to you what I owe:

"numquam Voluī populō placēre: nam quae ego Sciō, nōn probat Populus – quae probat Populus, Ego nesciō."

"I never wanted to be pleasing to the public: for the things I know, the public does not approve – and the things the public approves, I do not know."

"Quis hoc?" Inquis, tamquam Nesciās, cui Imperem: Epicūrus ¬ sed idem hoc Omnēs tibī ex omni domō conclāmābunt – Peripatēticī, Acadēmicī, Stoicī, Cynicī. Quis enim placēre populō potest, cui placet Virtūs? mālīs artibus populāris Favor quaeritur.

"Who [*said*] this?" You ask, as if you did not know whom I am supplying: Epicurus ¬ but this same thing all [*philosophers*] from every school will shout to you – the Peripatetics, the Academics, the Stoics, the Cynics. indeed, Who, to whom Virtue is pleasing, could please the people? Popular favor is sought by wicked arts.

14. Fundamentalist Christian Rejection of Greco-Roman Culture

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Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 38

Tertullian was the first major Christian writer to compose in Latin, using a bold and confrontational style that helped define early Western Christian theology.

aeque spectāculīs vestrīs in tantum Renūntiāmus in quantam originibus eōrum, quās Scīmus dē superstitīone conceptās – cum et ipsīs rēbus dē quibus trānsiguntur Praetersūmus.

we reject your spectacles equally to the extent that [*we reject*] their origins, which we know to be derived from superstition – and because we stay away from the very things for which they are conducted.

Nihil est nōbīs dictū, vīsū, audītū cum īnsāniā circī, cum impudicitiā theātrī, cum atrocitāte arēnae, cum xystī vānitāte. Quō Vōs offendīmus, sī aliās praesūmimus voluptātēs? Sī obiectārī novisse nōlumus – nostra iniūria est, sī forte, nōn vestra!

there is Nothing for us to say, see, or hear with the insanity of the circus, with the imprudence of the theater, with the atrocity of the arena, with the vanity of the exercise ground. how do we offend, if we prefer other pleasures? If we do not wish to be accused of knowing [*them*] – the fault is ours, perhaps, but not yours!

sed Reprobāmus quae placent vōbīs, nec vōs Nostra dēlectant: sed, licuit Epicūreīs aliquam dēcernere voluptātis vēritātem – id est, animī aequitātem – et ampla negōtia Chrīstiānae.

but we reject the things which are pleasing to you all, nor do our things delight you all: although, it was permitted for the Epicureans to determine a certain truth of pleasure – that is, calmness of soul – so too [*it should be permitted*] for the grand concerns of the Christian life.

Due to his acceptance of the cultural practices of traditional religion, Epicurus' rejection of culture was not as fundamental as Tertullian outlines here in regard to the Christians.

[U188]

15. Ignored by the Powerful

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 79.15

Vīdēs Epicūrum quantopere nōn tantum Erūditiōrēs, sed haec quoque imperitōrum Turba mīrētur: Hic ignōtus ipsīs Athēnīs fuit, circa quās dēlituērat.

You see how greatly not only the more educated, but even this crowd of the uneducated admire Epicurus: He *was* unknown even in Athens itself, around which he hid

multīs itaque iam annīs Metrōdorō suō superstes, in quādam epistulā, cum amīcitiam suam et Metrōdorī grātā commemorātiōne cecinisset – hoc novissimē adiēcit: nihil sibi et Metrōdorō inter bona tanta nocuisse, quod ipsōs illa nōbilis Graecia nōn ignōtōs sōlum habuisset, sed paene inaudītōs

therefore, many years after already surviving past his Metrodorus, in a certain letter, when he sang of his and Metrodorus' friendship with pleasing recollection – he added this at the end: that among so many great [*political*] affairs, nothing had harmed himself and Metrodorus, because that famous Greece had held them not only as unknown, but nearly as unheard of

[U189]

16. Sailing to Lampsacus *(Dangers during Storm)*

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 6, 1090E

…καὶ θαλάσσης σήραγγας ὑφ᾽ αἷς Ἐπίκουρος ὀλίγον ἐδέησε καταποθῆναι πλέων εἰς Λάμψακον, ὡς Γράφει…

...and the tunnels of the sea [*i.e., barrels of waves*] under which Epicurus was nearly swallowed while sailing to Lampsacus, as he says...

[U190]

17. Fellowship Amidst Pain

[U186] Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 16, 1097E

τὸ δὲ περὶ τοῦ πρὸς εὐπαθείας ἐπαίρεσθαι – ναυτῶν δίκην Ἀφροδίσια ἀγόντων – καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν:

but the matter of being uplifted toward comforts – like sailors carrying on in the custom of Aphrodite – and thinking highly:

"ὅτι νοσῶν νόσον ἀσκίτην, τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων Συνῆγε – καὶ οὐκ Ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι..."

[Metrodorus] "that, while sick with a dropsical disease, he gathered certain feasts of friends – and did not begrudge the offering of liquid to [*himself*] with dropsy..."

ταῦτ᾽ Οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑγιαινόντων εὐφροσύνας ἀληθεῖς ἢ χαρὰς ὀνομάσειεν!

No one of sound mind would call these things true joys or pleasures!

[U191]

18. Preserving Mental Pleasure *(while in Bodily Pain)*

Marcus Aurelius (fl. 161 CE), Meditations, 9.41

Ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει ὅτι "ἐν τῇ νόσῳ, οὐκ ἦσάν μοι αἱ Ὁμιλίαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ σωματίου παθῶν ¬ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰσιόντας τοιαῦτά τινα" φησίν "Ἐλάλουν"

Epicurus says that "in my illness, my conversations were not about the feelings of my little body ¬ nor was I chatting about such things [*i.e., the illness*] to those who visited"

"ἀλλὰ τὰ προηγούμενα, φυσιολογῶν, Διετέλουν, καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὤν, πῶς ἡ Διάνοια, συμμεταλαμβάνουσα τῶν ἐν τῷ σαρκιδίῳ τοιούτων κινήσεων, ἀταρακτεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τηροῦσα."

"but, while studying nature, I continued with these [*prior*] topics, even while in that very state, [*studying*] how the mind – although partaking in such movements [*occurring*] within my little bit of flesh – remains undisturbed, while preserving its own good."

"οὐδὲ τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἐμπαρεῖχον" Φησί "καταφρυάττεσθαι ὥς τι ποιοῦσιν ¬ ἀλλ' ὁ Βίος ἤγετο εὖ καὶ καλῶς."

"nor" He says "did I surrender power to the doctors to act important as if they were accomplishing something ¬ instead, my lifestyle was being led well and correctly."

ἡ νόσος **αἱ νόσοι**	illness	**ΝΟΣΟΣ** *disease*
ἡ ὁμιλία **αἱ ὁμιλίαι**	association [here, "conversation"]	**ὉΜΙΛΙΑ** *company*
ὁ σωμάτιον **τὰ σωμάτια**	little body	**ΣΩΜΑΤΙΟΝ** *little body*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
ἐπεισιέναι	to enter in	**ΕΠΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ** *going upon into*

εισιέναι	to enter [here, "to visit"]	ΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ *going into*
ἀδολεσχεῖν	to prattle	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΕΙΝ *chattering*
λαλεῖν	to chat	ΛΑΛΕΙΝ *talking*
προηγεῖσθαι	to proceed	ΠΡΟΗΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ *leading before*
	Part 2	
τὸ προηγούμενον τὰ προηγούμενα	the past thing [here, "the prior topic"]	ΠΡΟΗΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *leading before*
ἡ φυσιολογία	natural science	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ *reasoning* *of producing*
φυσιολογεῖν	to study nature	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ
φυσιολογῶν	studying nature	
διατελεῖν	to continue	ΔΙΑΤΕΛΕΙΝ *thoroughly completing*
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ *seeing through*
συμμεταλαμβάνειν	to partake [lit. "to take a share together"]	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ *grasping change together*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*
ἀταρακτεῖν	to be undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΕΙΝ *without agitating*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἀγαθός *(ή, όν)*	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ *great*
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ *protecting / watching*
	Part 3	
ἡ ἰατρεία αἱ ἰατρεῖαι	healing	ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ *curing*
ὁ ἰατρός οἱ ἰατροί	doctor	ΙΑΤΡΟΣ *curing*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
ἐμπαρέχειν	to surrender power	ΕΜΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold in beside*
καταφρυάττεσθαι	to act important	ΚΑΤΑΦΡΥΑΤΤΕΣΘΑΙ *thoroughly being proud*
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to accomplish"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle / life	ΒΙΟΣ *life*
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going*
καλῶς	correctly	ΚΑΛΩΣ *beautiful*

[U192]

Regarding Epicurus' Disciples

1. Three Ways to Reach the Truth

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 52.3,4

quōsdam ait Epicūrus ad vēritātem sine ūllīus adiūtōriō exīsse – fēcisse sibi ipsōs viam – hōs maximē laudat quibus ex sē Impetus fuit, quī sē ipsī prōtulērunt.

Epicurus says that certain people reached the truth without anyone's help – having made their own way for themselves. He especially praises those whose impulse came from themselves, who brought themselves forward.

quōsdam indigēre ope aliēnā ¬ nōn itūrōs sī Nēmō praecēsserit, sed bene secūtūrōs – ex hīs Metrōdorum Ait esse: ēgregium Hoc quoque, sed secundae sortis ingēnium.

others need the help of another ¬ those who will go not forward if no one has gone ahead, but those who will follow well – of these, he says, is Metrodorus: this is also excellent, but is a genius of the second rank.

Nōs ex illā prīmā notā nōn sumus – bene nōbīscum agitur sī in secundam recipimur. nē hunc, quidem, Contempsēris hominem quī aliēnō beneficiō esse salvus potest: et hoc multum est – velle servārī.

We are not from that first rank – things go well for us if we are admitted into the second. You should not, indeed, despise the man who can be saved by another's help: even this is much – to wish to be saved.

[4] **praeter haec, adhūc Inveniēs genus aliud hominum (nē ipsum quidem fastidiendum) eōrum Quī cōgī ad rēctum compellīque possunt – quibus nōn duce tantum opus sit, sed adiūtōre et, ut ita dīcam, coāctōre.**

beyond these, you will still find another type of people (not even this itself is to be scorned) those who can be driven and compelled toward the right – for whom there is not only need for a guide, but also for a helper and, so to speak, for a compeller.

Hic tertius color est. sī Quaeris huius quoque exemplār, Hērmarchum ait Epicūrus talem fuisse – itaque alterī magis grātulātur, alterum magis suspicit – quamvīs enim ad eundem fīnem Uterque pervēnerit, tamen, maior est Laus idem effēcisse in difficiliōre māteriā.

This is the third category. if you are looking for an example of this one too, Epicurus says Hermarchus was such a man – therefore, he congratulates one more, but more admires the other – for although both arrived at the same end, still, the praise is greater for having accomplished the same thing with more difficult material.

[U193]

2. Sources of Security & Gaiety

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 22.1103A

Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Μητρόδωρος καὶ Πολύαινος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος "ἐκθάρσημα" καὶ "γῆθος" ἦσαν – ὧν τοὺς πλείστους θεραπεύων νοσοῦντας, ἢ καταθρηνῶν ἀποθνήσκοντας, Διετέλεσε

to Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Aristobuolos were "sources of security" and "gaiety" – He persisted tending for most of them as they were sick, and he mourned as they were dying

These are both uncommon words and are both closely associated with Epicurus.		
τὸ ἐκθάρσημα **τὰ ἐκθάρσηματα**	source of confidence	**ΕΚΘΑΡΣΗΜΑ** *result of* *holding firmly out*
τὸ γῆθος **τὰ γήθη**	source of gaiety	**ΓΗΘΟΣ** *joy*
It seems to be a shortened version of the more common:		
ἡ γηθοσύνη **αἱ γηθοσύναι**	gladness	**ΓΗΘΟΣΥΝΗ** *condition of joy*

[U194]

3. The Piraeus Affair

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 33, 1126E

καί τοι, ὅτι Μητρόδωρος εἰς Πειραιᾶ κατέβη σταδίους τεσσαράκοντα – Μιθρῇ τινι, Σύρῳ τῶν βασιλικῶν συνειλημμένῳ βοηθήσων – πρὸς πάντας ἐγράφετο καὶ πάσας ἐπιστολαῖς μεγαληγοροῦντος Ἐπικούρου καὶ σεμνύνοντος ἐκείνην τὴν ὁδόν.

> and indeed, when Metrodorus went down forty stadia to Piraeus – while going to help a certain Mithres, a Syrian from the king's forces who had been arrested – as Epicurus was boasting and glorifying that journey, he was writing to all men and women in his letters.

One stadion is about 600 feet. Forty stadia measures approximately 4.5 miles (the distance from Athens to Piraeus).

4. Metrodorus Helps Mithres

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 15, 1097B

οἵας φωνὰς ἀφῆκεν Ἐπίκουρος! οἷα δὲ γράμματα τοῖς φίλοις ἔπεμψεν, ὑμνῶν καὶ μεγαλύνων Μητρόδωρον – ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἅλαδε κατέβη, Μιθρῇ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων – καὶ ταῦτα πράξαντος οὐθὲν τότε τοῦ Μητροδώρου.

> [Theon Speaking] what statements Epicurus let out! and what letters he sent to his friends, praising and magnifying Metrodorus – for how well and boldly he went down from the city to the sea, while helping Mithres the Syrian – and this when Metrodorus had at that time accomplished nothing.

*"at that time (**τότε**)" seems to open up the possibility that the story continues and Metrodorus has more success later on.*

[U195]

5. Kronios

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 20

…'[καὶ] π̣ρ̣ο̣ελθών· Κρόν[ι]ος… …ἠσ[κ]ημένο̣… …ἂν τύ[χ]ηι, καίπερ οὐκ [ἄτ]οπος ὤν, ἄπειρος δὲ λεπτολογίας διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὸν Εὔδ[ο]ξον ἱκανῶς ἐνδελεχίζειν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ἔλεγεν κ̣αὶ Ἀρ̣[κ]εφῶ[ν] κα[ὶ] τὸ συμβε[β]ηκ[ὸς] ἐμή[ν]υεν.' Κρονίωι [δ'] αὐτῶι γ[ρά]φων· 'οὐκ ὀλιάκις γὰρ καὶ Λεόντ̣[ιο]ν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρο[ν] εὐφήμως π[ε]ρ̣[ὶ] σοῦ καὶ πρεπόντως διελήλυθ[ε] καὶ ὁ Πυθοκλῆς ὁ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ διατρ[ίβ]ων καὶ τῶν υἱῶν ἐπιστατῶν τ̣ῶν σῶν καὶ κομίζων παρ' Εὐδ[ό]ξου καὶ δ̣[ιο]τ̣ίμου… …[τ]ὰς ἐπιστο̣[λὰ]ς…

"…καὶ προελθών, Κρόνιος… …ἠσκημένο… …ἂν τύχῃ, καίπερ οὐκ ἄτοπος ὤν, ἄπειρος δὲ λεπτολογίας – διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὸν Εὔδοξον ἱκανῶς ἐνδελεχίζειν ἐν φιλοσοφίαι: καθάπερ ἡμῖν ἔλεγεν καὶ Ἀρκεφῶν, καὶ τὸ Συμβεβηκὸς ἐμήνυεν."

> "…and having gone forward, Kronios… …was trained… …perhaps, although not inept, yet inexperienced in precision – because of not pursing Eudoxus persistently enough in philosophy: just as Arkephon was telling us, and as the actual outcome revealed."

*In the preceding column, Kronios is mentioned by Epicurus as gifting some meat (**ὁ καρνεῖσκος**) "Kronios was such a man and had given his part willingly." Arkephon is then mentioned as the general recipient of the meat. It appears that both Kronios and Arkephon were very close to Epicurus.*

It seems below that Epicurus was receiving letters from this Eudoxus, which removes the possibility of this referring to Eudoxus of Cnidus (who died right around when Epicurus was born).

Κρονίωι δ' αὐτῷ γράφων "οὐκ ὀλιάκις γὰρ καὶ Λεόντιον πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον εὐφήμως περὶ σοῦ καὶ πρεπόντως διελήλυθε – καὶ ὁ Πυθοκλῆς, ὁ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ

διατρίβων, καὶ τῶν υἱῶν ἐπιστατῶν τῶν σῶν καὶ κομίζων παρ' Εὐδόξου καὶ Διοτίμου… …τὰς ἐπιστολὰς…"

and writing to Kronios himself "not infrequently Leontion has also spoken favorably and fittingly to Epicurus about you – as has Pythocles, who is from your [*household*] and who stays on, and oversees those sons of yours, and who brings from Eudoxus and Diotimus… …the letters…"

*We have seen in the dated letters that "**ἐπὶ Διοτίμου**" indicates "during the archonship in 285^BCE of Diotimus" but here we have "**παρ' … Διοτίμου**" meaning "from Diotimus" which does not seem to be referring to an archon date, but another friend of Epicurus.*

Here we learn that Pythocles, along with delivering letters, was associated with Kronios – and seems to have has some responsibility for watching Kronios' sons.

[U196]

6. Practically Vulgar

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 32

(Usener) …γρά[φων Ἐ]πίκουρος· [ἀ]γοραία[ς φαμὲ]ν [ἐργασ]ίας τὰς [μὴ πρὸς εὐ]δ[αίμον]α βίον [συ]ντεινούσας ἰδ[έ]ας τοῦ βίου."

…γράφων Ἐπίκουρος… "…ἀγοραίας Φαμὲν ἐργασίας τὰς μὴ πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον συντεινούσας ἰδέας τοῦ βίου."

…Epicurus writes… "…We call those ideas of lifestyle not also contributing toward a good-spirited lifestyle 'vulgar efforts.'"

(DCLP) …γρά[φων Ἐ]πίκουρος· ἀγοραία[ς μηθὲ]ν [ἐνόμισ]ας τὰς π[ρὸς ε]ὐδ[αίμον]α βίον [σ]υντεινούσας ἰδ[έ]ας τοῦ [βιοῦ]."

…γράφων Ἐπίκουρος… "…ἀγοραίας μηθὲν Ἐνόμισας τὰς πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον συντεινούσας ἰδέας τοῦ βιοῦ."

…Epicurus writes… "…You consider the ideas of lifestyle that contribute to a good-spirited lifestyle in no way vulgar."

In Usener's rendering, what does not contribute to a thriving life is considered common/vulgar.

In the DCLP's rendering, what does contribute to a thriving lifestyle is not considered common/vulgar.

φάναι	to assert	**ΦΑΝΑΙ** *speaking*
ἡ κατεργασία **αἱ κατεργασίαι**	outflow	**ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work thoroughly*
ἡ ἐργασία **αἱ ἐργασίαι**	effort	**ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ** *work*
ἀγοραῖος *(α, ον)*	vulgar *["of the marketplace"]*	**ΑΓΟΡΑΙΟΣ** *market*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
εὐδαίμων *(ων, ον)*	good-spirited	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ** *good spirit*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
ἡ βιοτή **αἱ βιοταί**	livelihood	**ΒΙΟΤΗ** *life*
συντείνειν	to contribute	**ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ** *stretching together*
συντείνων	contributing	
ἡ ἰδέα **αἱ ἰδέαι**	idea	**ΙΔΕΑ** *appearing*

7. Hopes for Timocrates

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 12

...[κα]ὶ Τιμ[ο]κράτει [δ'· ἰδὼν ὡς] ἡμεῖς [πά]ντα ταῦτα κ[ατὰ τ]ρόπον [ὄνθ'] {ὡς οἶσ}θα, συλλάμβανε καὶ αὐτοῖς, ο̣ὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν οἰκειότετά [σου, ἀλλὰ] καὶ διὰ τὸ ἦθος αὐτῶν ὅπ[ως τῆς] πάσης χορηγίας τυγχάνωσ̣[ιν τῆς ε]ἰς τὸ [φιλοσοφεῖν] ἁρμοττούσης· καὶ σὺ δὴ τοῖς ἂν [ἐμ]πείρως σαυτὸν χρήσιμ[όν τε] καὶ εὔνουν παρ[έχοις]... ...τίς σοὶ [ὑπ]οστολὴν... ...ἡμᾶς ἄλ̣λ̣[ο] τ̣[ι]...

...καὶ Τιμοκράτει δ' "ἰδὼν ὡς Ἡμεῖς πάντα ταῦτα κατὰ τρόπον ὄνθ' ὡς Οἶσθα: Συλλάμβανε καὶ αὐτοῖς ¬ οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν οἰκειότετά σου, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἦθος αὐτῶν – ὅπως τῆς πάσης χορηγίας Τυγχάνωσιν τῆς εἰς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἁρμοττούσης καὶ Σὺ δὴ τοῖς ἂν ἐμπείρως σαυτὸν χρήσιμόν τε καὶ εὔνουν παρέχοις... ...Τίς σοὶ ὑποστολὴν... ...ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι..."

...and to Timocrates too "having seen how we handle all these [*topics*] according to a method, which are as you understand [*them to be*]: assist those people also ¬ not only because of your greater compatibility [*with them*], but also on account of their disposition – so that they may obtain the full provision that is fitting for philosophizing, and indeed you may knowledgeably present yourself as useful and well-disposed to those... ...Anybody [] to you [] a holding back... ...us with anything else..."

ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
πᾶς (*πᾶσα, πᾶν*)	whole	**ΠΑΣ** *all*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ὄνθ' = ὄντα	from **εἶναι**	
οἶδα	I know	
συλλαμβάνειν	to comprehend together	**ΣΥΛΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping together*
οἰκείως	compatibly	**ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ** *appropriate*
οἰκεῖος (*α, ον*)	compatible	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ** *appropriate*
ἡ οἰκειότετα **αἱ οἰκειότεται**	greater compatibility	**ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΕΡΑΤΑ** *more appropriate*
τὸ ἦθος **τὰ ἤθη**	disposition	**ΗΘΟΣ** *custom*
ἡ χορηγία **αἱ χορηγίαι**	provision	**ΧΟΡΗΓΙΑ** *office defraying the cost of the public choruses*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
ὁ φιλόσοφος **οἱ φιλόσοφοι**	philosopher	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ** *loving knowledge*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ** *loving knowledge*
ἐναρμόττων (*ουσα, ον*)	fitting into	**ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ** *adapting into*
ἁρμόττων (*ουσα, ον*)	fitting	**ἉΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ**
ἡ ἐμπειρία **αἱ ἐμπειρίαι**	experience	**ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΑ** *attempting in*
ἐμπείρως	knowledgeably	
χρήσιμος (*ον*)	useful	**ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ** *necessary*
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν **οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες**	he who considers well	**ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ** *good mind*
ὁ νοῦς **οἱ νοῖ**	intellect	**ΝΟΥΣ** *sense*

εὔνους (ουν)	well-disposed	ΕΥΝΟΥΣ *good sense*
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ *equipping*
ἡ ὑποστολή αἱ ὑποστολαί	*holding back	ὙΠΟΣΤΟΛΗ *equipping under*

[U198]

Regarding the Stoics

Zenonians in the Stoa of Peisianax

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 7.5 (Zeno of Citium)

Ἀνακάμπτων δὴ ἐν τῇ Ποικίλῃ Στοᾷ (τῇ καὶ "Πεισιανακτίῳ" καλουμένῃ, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς Πολυγνώτου "ποικίλῃ") διετίθετο τοὺς λόγους – βουλόμενος καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἀπερίστατον ποιῆσαι.

while pacing up and down, then, in the Painted Stoa (also called "of Peisianax," and named "Poikile" from the painting by Polygnotus) [*Zeno*] arranged his discourses – wishing also to make the place [*of his lectures*] unrestricted

*Polygnotus of Thasos collaborated with an Athenian painter, Micos, to cover this stoa with murals depicting mythic and historical battles; the stoa thereafter was known as Poikile (***ποικίλη*** – "dappled" or "multicolored," usually rendered "painted" in this context).*

Peisianax was supposedly responsible for the construction of the stoa, which ran along the north side of the agora.

(ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν τριάκοντα, τῶν πολιτῶν, πρὸς τοῖς χιλίοις τετρακόσιοι ἀνῄρηντ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ) Προσῄεσαν, δὴ λοιπὸν ἀκούοντες αὐτοῦ – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Στωικοὶ ἐκλήθησαν, καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὁμοίως ¬ πρότερον Ζηνώνειοι καλούμενοι, καθά φησι καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς

(for under the Thirty, among the citizens, more than 1,400 were killed in it) so [*students*] would approach, and then indeed listen to [*Zeno*] – and because of this they were called Stoics, and likewise those who followed him ¬ formerly they were called Zenonians, as Epicurus also says in his letters

In 404 BC, after Athens lost the Peloponnesian War to Sparta, a pro-Spartan oligarchy known as the Thirty Tyrants seized power and were responsible for the execution of about 1,400 citizens – either within the Stoa Poikilē itself or by pronouncing their death sentences there.

[U199]

Sayings

1. Serving Philosophy, Gaining Freedom

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 8.7

adhūc Epicūrum complicāmus, cuius hanc vocem hodiernō diē lēgī "philosophiae Serviās Oportet ut tibi contingat vēra Lībertās."

even now we include Epicurus, whose saying I read today "It is necessary for you to serve philosophy in order for true freedom to reach you."

nōn differtur in diem ¬ Quī sē illī subiēcit et trādidit, statim circumagitur: Hoc enim ipsum – philosophiae servīre – lībertās est.

It is not postponed to another day ¬ he who has submitted and handed himself over to her, is immediately transformed: indeed this very thing – to serve philosophy – is freedom.

Potest fierī ut mē Interrogēs quārē ab Epicūrō tam multa bene dicta Referam potiūs quam nostrōrum. Quid est, tamen? quārē Tū istās Epicūrī vōcēs putēs esse, nōn pūblicās?

It is possible that you will ask me why I report so many well said things from Epicurus rather than of our own [*philosophers*] – what is it, then? why do you think these are the sayings of Epicurus, and not public [*sayings*]?

[U200]

2. Dangerous to Disregard the Body

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 30.465-470

It is unclear to what extent Porphyry is directly quoting Epicurus in this letter.

I follow the interpretation represented by Elias Tempelis (Professor of Philosophy at the Hellenic Naval Academy):

"In the Letter to Marcella 27.425-31.483 Porphyry did not make a collation of a number of scattered views deriving from different Epicurean texts, but inserted an integral text, which was either a single chapter or even a whole treatise of Epicurean philosophy, aiming at the elaboration of a specific view of Epicurus, i.e. a variant of Principal doctrine 15 and Vatican saying 8."

"ἀφυσιολόγητον μηδὲν Ἡγοῦ, βοώσης τῆς σαρκὸς, βοᾶν τὴν ψυχήν: σαρκὸς δὲ Φωνὴ μὴ πεινῆν, μὴ διψῆν, μὴ ῥιγοῦ. καὶ ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ χαλεπὸν μὲν Κωλῦσαι, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ Παρακοῦσαι τῆς παραγγειλάσης φύσεως αὐτῇ – διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς αὐτῇ αὐταρκείας καθ᾽ ἡμέραν"

"Suppose nothing unphysiological, that when the flesh cries out, the soul [also] cries out: for the voice of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. and to hinder these things is difficult for the soul [too], and to ignore the nature [*of the flesh*] communicating [*those needs*] to the [*soul*] is risky – through the self-sufficiency that clings to [*the soul*] every day"

[Wicker] "Consider it in no way contrary to Nature for the soul to cry out when the flesh cries out. The flesh cries not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. And so it is difficult for the soul to repress these cries, but it is dangerous for it to disregard nature's exhortations to it because of the self-sufficiency which grows in it from day to day"

Do not dismiss bodily needs (hunger, thirst, cold) as unnatural – the soul naturally cries out along with the flesh. Although one's soul grows stronger and self-sufficient with practice, it is still dangerous for us to ignore real physical needs.

ἀφυσιολόγητος (ον)	unphysiological (*i.e., not to be explained by science*)	**ΑΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΗΤΟΣ** *not capable of reasoning about producing*
ἡγεῖσθαι	to suppose	**ΗΓΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *leading*
βοᾶν	to shout	**ΒΟΑΝ**
ἡ σάρξ **αἱ σάρκες**	flesh	**ΣΑΡΞ** *flesh*

ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ *blowing*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
ἡ πεῖνα αἱ πεῖναι	hunger	ΠΕΙΝΑ *hunger*
πεινῆν	to be hungry	
ἡ δίψα αἱ δίψαι	thirst	ΔΙΨΑ *dry / parched*
διψῆν	to be thirsty	
τὸ ῥῖγος τὰ ῥίγη	[the state of] being cold	ῬΙΓΟΣ *shivering*
ῥιγοῦ	to be cold	ῬΙΓΟΥ
χαλεπός *(ή, όν)*	difficult	ΧΑΛΕΠΟΣ *hard to bear*
κωλύειν	to prevent	ΚΩΛΥΕΙΝ *preventing*
ἀσφαλής *(ής, ές)*	stable	ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ *not stumbling*
ἐπισφαλής *(ής, ές)*	risky	ΕΠΙΣΦΑΛΗΣ *upon* *[what is]* *prone to fall*
ἀκούειν	to hear	ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ *listening*
παρακούειν	to ignore	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going*
τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὰ ἀγγεῖα	vessel	ΑΓΓΕΙΟΝ *instrument of* *going / carrying*
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΛΛΕΙΝ *sending a message* *across*
παραγγείλας *(άσα, άσαν)*	having recommended [here, "having communicated"]	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΙΛΑΣ *sending a message* *across*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτά	plant	ΦΥΤΟΝ *growing*
σύμφυτος *(ος, ον)*	innate	ΣΥΜΦΥΤΟΣ *growing together*
προσφυής *(ής, ές)*	clinging	ΠΡΟΣΦΥΗΣ *producing toward*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια αἱ αὐτάρκειαι	self-sufficiency	ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ *state of* *self-beginning*
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ *day*

3. Natural Riches Possible in Poverty

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 4.10

sed ut fīnēm epistulae Impōnam, Accipe quod mihi hodiērnō diē placuit – et hoc quoque ex aliēnīs hortulīs sumptum est:

but so that I may put an end to the letter, receive what has pleased me on this very day – and this too has been taken from little foreign gardens:

"magnae Dīvitiae sunt lēge nātūrae composita Paupertās – Lēx autem illa nātūrae, Scīs, quōs nōbīs terminōs statuāt: nōn ēsūrīre, nōn sitīre, nōn algēre."

"Poverty arranged according to the law of nature is great wealth – and indeed you know what limits that law of nature sets for us: to not hunger, to not thirst, to not be cold."

4. "Hunger, Thirst, & Cold"

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 2.21

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐν "τῷ μὴ πεινῆν, μηδὲ διψῆν, μηδὲ ῥιγοῦν" τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμενος…

Epicurus who placed wellbeing in "not being hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold"…

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), The Parasite, 38

The Parasite is a mock-platonic dialogic where Lucian argues that practicing the art of parasitism is the most virtuous and pleasant of all lifestyles. Throughout the work he contrasts Epicurus with the parasite – in each case finding that the parasite has better success achieving pleasure than Epicurus.

["Simon" speaking] **καὶ μέντοι, εἰ ἔστιν εὔδαιμον "τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, μηδὲ διψῆν, μηδὲ ῥιγοῦν" ταῦτα οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχει ἢ παρασίτῳ.**

and indeed, if being well is "not being hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold" these things belong to no one else but to a parasite.

ὥστε φιλοσόφους μὲν ἄν Τις πολλοὺς καὶ ῥιγοῦντας καὶ πεινῶντας εὕροι, παράσιτον δὲ οὔ – ἢ οὐκ ἂν εἴη παράσιτος, ἀλλὰ δυστυχής τις καὶ πτωχὸς ἄνθρωπος: καὶ φιλοσόφῳ ὅμοιος.

therefore, one might find many philosophers who are cold and hungry, but not a parasite – for then he would not be a parasite, but some unfortunate and poor man: and similar to a philosopher!

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.35.102

Diēs dēficiat sī Velim paupertātis causam dēfendere. aperta enim rēs est, et cōtīdiē nōs ipsa Nātūra admonet, quam paucīs, quam parvīs rēbus egeat, quam vīlibus.

The day would run out if I wished to defend the cause of poverty. for the matter is clear, and every day nature herself reminds us how few, how small, the things are that she needs, and how cheap.

[U201]

5. Cover the Earth in Marble

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 16.7

nōn est quod Mīreris animum meum, adhūc dē aliēnō līberālis sum ¬ quārē autem aliēnum dixī? Quicquid bene dictum est ab ullō meum est – istuc quoque ab Epicūrō dictum est:

there is no reason why you should wonder at my intellect, up to this point I am [*just*] generous with what is from another ¬ [*but*] why do I call it another's? whatever has been well said by anyone is mine – that too was said by Epicurus!

"sī ad nātūram Vīvēs, numquam eris pauper – sī ad opiniōnēs, numquam Eris dīves: exiguum Nātūra dēsīderat, Opiniō immēnsum"

"if you live according to nature, you will never be poor – if [*you live*] according to opinions, you will never be rich: Nature desires a little, opinion [*desires*] the boundless"

"Congerātur in tē quicquid multī locuplētēs possēderant – ultrā prīvātum pecūniae modum Fortūna tē prōvehat, aurō tegat, purpurā vestiat, eō dēliciārum opumque perdūcat: ut terr am marmōribus Abscondās, nōn tantum habēre tibī liceat, sed calcāre dīvitias"

"Let whatever many wealthy men have possessed be heaped upon you – Let fortune carry you beyond a private measure of wealth, cover you with gold, clothe you in purple, lead you to such [*a height*] of luxuries and riches: that you conceal the earth with marble, and it is permitted not only for you to possess, but to tread on wealth"

"accēdant Statuae et Pictūrae, et quicquid Ars ulla luxuriae ēlābōrāvit – maiōra cupere ab hīs Discēs! nātūrālia Dēsīderia fīnīta sunt; ex falsā opiniōne nāscentia ubi dēsinant, nōn habent. nūllus enim terminus falsō est."

"let Statues and Paintings be added, and anything that any Art has elaborated out for luxury – from these you will learn to desire greater things! Natural desires are limited: those arising from false opinion do not have [*a point*] where they end. no limit exists for the false"

[U202]

6. Undefined Impulses

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 27.427-431

"Ὁ οὖν τῇ φύσει κατακολουθῶν καὶ μὴ ταῖς κεναῖς δόξαις ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης: πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀρκοῦν, πᾶσα Κτῆσίς, ἐστι πλοῦτος ¬ πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀορίστους ὀρέξεις, καὶ ὁ μέγιστος Πλοῦτός ἐστιν πενία"

"He who follows along according to nature and not according to empty judgments is self-sufficient in all things: indeed, every possession for what is sufficient according to nature is wealth ¬ but for undefined impulses, even the greatest wealth is poverty"

[Wicker] "So then, the person who follows Nature and not empty false opinions is self-sufficient in everything. For satisfying Nature any possession is wealth, but for satisfying unlimited yearnings even the greatest wealth is nothing"
(οὐδέν instead of πενία)

ἡ φύσις **αἱ φύσεις**	nature	**ΦΥΣΙΣ** *producing*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ** *following*
ἀκολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following	**ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following*
κατακολουθῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	following along	**ΚΑΤΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ** *following down*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	**ΚΕΝΟΣ** *emptiness*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἡ αὐτάρκεια **αἱ αὐτάρκειαι**	self-sufficiency	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ** *state of* *self-sufficing*
αὐτάρκης *(ες)*	self-sufficient	**ΑΥΤΑΡΚΗΣ** *self-sufficing*
ἀρκεῖν	to be sufficient	**ΑΡΚΕΙΝ** *sufficing*
τὸ ἀρκοῦν **τὰ ἀρκοῦντα**	what is sufficient	
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*

κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ *acquired*
ἡ κτῆσις αἱ κτήσεις	possession	ΚΤΗΣΙΣ *acquiring*
ὁ πλοῦτος οἱ πλοῦτοι	wealth	ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ *flowing*
ἀόριστος (ος, ον)	undefined	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ *no border*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
ἡ ὄρεξις αἱ ὀρέξεις	impulse	ΟΡΕΞΙΣ *impulse*
μέγιστος (η, ον)	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ *biggest*
ἡ πενία αἱ πενίαι	poverty	ΠΕΝΙΑ *need*

[U203]

7. Undefined Fears

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 29.459-461

"ἐφ' ὅσον δ' ἂν Ἀμηχανῇς: Λήθῃ τῆς φύσεως Ἀμηχανεῖς· σαυτῷ γὰρ ἀορίστους φόβους καὶ ἐπιθυμίας Προσβάλλεις"

"to the extent that you have no means: you have no means because you fail to notice nature – for you apply undefined fears and desires upon yourself"

[Wicker] "To the extent that you are troubled, it is because you forget Nature, for you inflict upon yourself unlimited fears and desires"

μηχανᾶσθαι	to construct	ΜΗΧΑΝΑΣΘΑΙ *device*
ἀμηχανεῖν	to have no means	ΑΜΗΧΑΝΕΙΝ *no device*
λανθάνειν	to evade notice [here, "to fail to notice"]	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ *to be hidden*
ἀόριστος (ος, ον)	undefined	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ *no border*
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ *fleeing*
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ *toward spirit*
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing in across*
ὑποβάλλειν	to suggest	ὙΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing under*
προσβάλλειν	*to apply	ΠΡΟΣΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ *throwing toward*

[U204]

8. Procrastinating Cheer

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 16.28

Γεγόναμεν ἅπαξ ¬ δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: Δεῖ δὲ, τὸν αἰῶνα, μηκέτι εἶναι

We have been produced once ¬ but twice it is not possible to be produced: it is necessary, for eternity, to no longer exist

Σὺ, δὲ, οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὔριον Κύριος ¬ ἀναβάλλῃ τὸ χαῖρον?

You, however, not being Master of tomorrow ¬ postpone cheer?

ὁ δὲ Βίος μελλησμῷ παραπόλλυται – καὶ εἷς Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνῄσκει

> Life is frittered away by procrastination – and each one of us, while being occupied, passes away

This matches Vatican Saying 14

9. "Slaughtered in Advance"

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 27, 1104E

ᾗ καὶ προεπισφάττουσιν, Οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες" "ἅπαξ ἄνθρωποι Γεγόναμεν ¬ δὶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: Δεῖ δὲ, τὸν αἰῶνα, μηκέτι εἶναι"

> by which they slaughter [*us*] in advance, those who say these things: "We have been produced as human once ¬ but twice it is not possible to be produced: it is necessary, for eternity, to no longer exist"

καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ὡς μικρὸν (μᾶλλον δὲ μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν) πρὸς τὰ σύμπαν ἀτιμάσαντες: ἀναπόλαυστον Προΐενται, καὶ Ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ πράξεως – οἷον ἐξαθυμοῦντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐφημέρων καὶ ἀβεβαίων καὶ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἀξιόλογον γεγονότων

> for they too, having dishonored the present as small (or rather, as nothing at all) in comparison to the whole: they let it go unenjoyed, and they make light of virtue and action – as if disheartened and scorning themselves, as ephemeral and unstable and born for nothing worthy

10. Never Born Twice

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 30, 1106F

ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ ὁ Κέρβερος οὔθ᾽ ὁ Κωκυτὸς ἀόριστον Ἐποίησε τοῦ θανάτου τὸ δέος, ἀλλ᾽ ¬ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος Ἀπειλή – μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάλιν οὐκ ἔχουσα τοῖς φθαρεῖσι "δὶς γὰρ οὐκ Ἔστι γενέσθαι, Δεῖ δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μὴ εἶναι" κατ᾽ Ἐπίκουρον

> from which not even [*the dog*] Cerberus, nor [*the river*] Cocytus made the fear of death indefinite ¬ but the threat of not-being – not having a change into being again for the perished "for it is not possible to be born twice, and it is necessary to not exist for eternity" according to Epicurus

[U205]

11. Meditate on Death

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 26.8

interim, commodābit Epicūrus, quī ait "Meditāre *mortem*" (vel, sī commodius sit, *trānsīre ad deōs*) – hīc patet Sēnsus: egregia Rēs est mortem condiscere...

> meanwhile, Epicurus will oblige, who says "Meditate on *death*" (or, if it be more suitable, *passing over to the gods*) – the meaning here is plain: it is an excellent thing to thoroughly learn death...

"Meditāre mortem" – quī hoc dīcit, meditārī lībertātem Iubet. Quī morī didicit, servīre *de*didicit.

> "Meditate on death" – he who says this, commands one to meditate on freedom. He who has learned to die, has *un*learned to be a slave.

12. Easy to Get
(and easy to leave behind)

οἱ γοῦν Πολλοὶ, διὰ τοῦτο, καίπερ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι, ὡς ὑπολειψόντων ἀνήνυτα Μοχθοῦσιν.

Most [*people*], because of this – even though they have acquired most [*things*] – they toil as though [*things*] are going to be left behind unfinished

ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορίστοις καὶ λιτοτάτοις ποιεῖ τὸ Μνημονεύειν, ὅτι "πρὸς μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀξιόλογον ταραχῆς λύσιν Οὐθὲν ἰσχύειν πέφυκεν, οὐδ' ὁ πᾶς Πλοῦτος συναχθείς ¬ τὸ δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς Ὀχληρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ τὰ πάνυ μέτρια καὶ τυχόντα, πᾶσάν τε εὐποριστίαν κεκτημένα"

Remembering [*this*] produces being content with what is easily obtainable and most simple, that "Nothing exists strong [*enough*] for the release from a significant disturbance of the soul, not even all gathered wealth ¬ but the annoyance of the flesh is alleviated by even the most moderate and ordinary [*resources*], which also have every [*means of*] easy acquisition"

ὑπολείποντα, δὲ καὶ, τὰ Τοιαῦτα οὐ ταράττει τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶντα

and also, when they are left behind, [*ordinary*] things of this sort do not disturb the one who rehearses dying.

[U206]

13. Magnificent in Rags

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 20.9

Invideās licet, etiam nunc libenter prō mē dēpendet Epicūrus "magnificentiōr, mihī Crēde, Sermō tuus in grabattō vidēbitur et in pannō: nōn enim dīcentur tantum Illa ¬ sed probābuntur"

It is possible that you may look askance [*at it, but*] even now Epicurus gladly pays on my behalf "more magnificent, believe me, your speech will appear on a cot and in a rag: for those things will not only be said ¬ but they will be represented"

Ego certē aliter audiō quae dicit Demetrius noster cum illum Vīdī nūdum – quantō minus quam in strāmentīs incubantem: nōn praeceptor vēri sed testis est.

I certainly hear the things our Demetrius says differently since I saw him naked – much less lying on straw: he is not [*just*] a teacher of truth but an [*actual*] witness [*to it*].

Demetrius the Cynic was a contemporary of Seneca and the emperors Caligula, Claudius, Nero, and Vespasian. He was famous for his "fearless poverty" and for "embodying the ideals he taught."

[U207]

14. Disturbed on a Gold Couch

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 29.461-463

"κρεῖσσον δέ σοι θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ στιβάδος κατακειμένῃ ἢ ταράττεσθαι χρυσῆν ἐχούσῃ κλίνην καὶ πολυτελῆ τράπεζαν"

"but it is more powerful for you to be confident while reclining on a straw mattress than to be disturbed while you have a golden couch and an extravagant table"

[Wicker] "But it is better for you to have confidence as you lie on a bed of straw than to be in turmoil while you possess a gold couch and a costly table."

κρατύς	powerful	**ΚΡΑΤΥΣ** *strong*
κρεῖσσων *(ον)*	more powerful	**ΚΡΕΙΣΣΩΝ** *stronger*
θαρρεῖν	to be confident	**ΘΑΡΡΕΙΝ** *taking courage*
ἡ στιβάς **αἱ στιβάδες**	straw mattress	**ΣΤΙΒΑΣ** *compressed*
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	**ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting together*
κατακεῖσθαι	to recline	**ΚΑΤΑΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting down*
κατακείμενος *(η, ον)*	reclining	
ἡ ἀταραξία **αἱ ἀταραξίαι**	undisturbedness	**ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ** *without agitating*
ταραχώδης *(ης, ες)*	disturbing	**ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ** *agitating*
ταράττεσθαι	to be disturbed	**ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΣΘΑΙ** *agitating*
χρυσοῦς *(ῆ, οῦν)*	gold	**ΧΡΥΣΟΥΣ** *shining*
ἡ κλίνη **αἱ κλῖναι**	couch	**ΚΛΙΝΗ** *leaning*
εὐτελής *(ές)*	low-cost	**ΕΥΤΕΛΗΣ** *good completing*
ἡ πολυτέλεια **αἱ πολυτέλειαι**	extravagance	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΑ** *much completing*
πολυτελεῖν	to live extravagantly	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *much completing*
πολυτελής *(ές)*	extravagant	**ΠΟΛΥΤΕΛΗΣ** *much completing*
ἡ τράπεζα **αἱ τράπεζαι**	table	**ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ** *three feet* *"tri-pod"*

[U208]

15. Private Audience

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 7.11

ēgregiē hoc tertium Epicūrus, cum ūnī ex cōnsortibus studiōrum suōrum scrīberet: "haec" inquit "Ego nōn multīs, sed tibi – satis enim magnum, alter alterī, theātrum Sumus."

Epicurus said this third* *[quote]* especially well, when he was writing to one of the companions of his studies: "I *[write]* these things not to many people, but to you – indeed we, the one to the other, are quite a great audience."

[Long] Here is a nice expression by Epicurus, written to one of the partners of his studies: "I write this not for the many, but for you; you and I are audience enough for one another."

θεᾶσθαι	to watch	**ΘΕΑΣΘΑΙ** *viewing*
τὸ θέατρον **τὰ θέατρα**	*lit. "a place for watching," also Used in the singular to refer to* audience	**ΘΕΑΤΡΟΝ**

*Third, i.e. of the quotes included at the end of this letter – the other two being of Democritus "To me, one person counts as a nation, and a nation as one person" and of an unknown artist "A few are enough – one is enough – not even one is also enough!"

Ista, mī Lūcilī, condenda in animum sunt, ut Contemnās voluptātem ex plūrium adsēnsiōne venientem.

Those things, my Lucilius, must be stored in the mind, so that you may despise the pleasure that comes from the approval of many.

Multī tē laudant. ecquid Habēs, cūr placeās tibi? sī is Es, quem intellegant Multī? intrōrsus Bona tua spectent.

Many praise you. Do you have anything [*of substance that justifies*] why you should be pleasing to yourself? if you are the person who many people understand [*you to be*], let your good qualities look inward.

[U209]

16. Withdraw into Yourself

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 25.6

cum hoc Effēceris, et aliqua coeperit apud tē tuī esse Dignātiō: Incipiam tibi permittere quod idem suādet Epicūrus: "tunc praecipuē in tē ipse sēcēde – cum esse Cōgeris in turbā."

when you will have accomplished this, and some self-esteem has begun to exist in you: I will start to allow you what Epicurus also advises: "then especially withdraw into yourself – when you are forced to be in a crowd."

[U210]

17. Live as if a Good Man were Watching

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 11.8

iam clausulam Epistula poscit. Accipe (et quidem ūtilem ac salūtārem) quam tē affīgere animō Volō

now the letter is calling for a close. Receive what I want you to fix in your mind (and indeed is useful and beneficial)

"aliquis Vir bonus nōbīs dīligendus est ac semper ante oculōs habendus – ut sīc tamquam illō spectante Vīvāmus, et omnia tamquam illō videntē faciāmus."

"Some good man must be esteemed by us and always kept before our eyes – so that we may live as if he were watching, and we may do everything as if he were seeing."

hoc, mī Lūcilī, Epicūrus praecepit: custōdem nōbīs et paedagōgum dedit, nec immeritō – magna Pars peccātōrum tollitur, sī peccātūrīs Testis adsistit.

this, my Lucilius, Epicurus prescribed: he gave us a guard and a tutor, nor without reason – a great part of one's wrongdoings is removed, if a witness stands by those about to do wrong.

[U211]

18. Happiness of Zeus – SFOTSE

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 25.5

ad lēgem nātūrae Revertāmur ¬ Dīvitiae parātae sunt: aut gratuitum est quō ēgemus aut vīle – pānem et aquam Nātūra dēsīderat.

Let us return to the law of nature ¬ wealth has been prepared: what we need is either free or cheap – nature desires bread and water.

Nēmō ad haec pauper est – "intra quae Quisquis dēsīderium suum clūsit cum ipsō love dē fēlīcitāte contendat" – ut ait Epicūrus, cuius aliquam vocem huic epistulae Involvam:

No one is poor regarding these things – "whoever has enclosed his desire within these may contend with Jupiter himself in happiness" – as Epicurus says, whose saying I will weave into this letter:

"sīc Fac" inquit "omnia tamquam spectet Epicūrus."

"Do everything in this way" he says "as if Epicurus were watching."

Prōdest, sine dubiō, custōdem sibi inposuisse et habēre quem respiciās, quem interesse cōgitātiōnibus tuīs Iūdicēs.

It is beneficial, without a doubt, to have assigned oneself and to have a guardian whom you look to, whom you judge to be involved in your thoughts.

[U212]

19. Those Who Misunderstand Inferences from Sensation

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, col. 29

...Μιθρῆν πονοῦ[ντα] ἢ τῆ[ς μνή]μης... ...ἐκ Πειρ[α]ιέως καὶ... ...ἀναγγελλοντ... ...φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ὃν ἐπεπόησο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι μήτε τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα [ἐν] τοῖς ἀοράτοις ο[ὖσα]ν ἠδύναντο συνιδεῖν μήτε τὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ πάλιṿ ἀντιμ[α]ρτυρ[οῦ]σιν" [ἐπὶ] δὲ Δημοκλέ\ο/υ[ς αὐ]τῶι γρά[φων· ὁ δ]ια[κε]χαρισμέν[ος ἑ]κάσ[τωι]... ... ...ποτε μ[ί] αν ἢ τε... δί ἑτέρας... ...κα[ὶ] ἔτη... ...ἡμῖν ὅτι τὰ κατὰ νῦ[ν]... ...καὶ τ[ῶ]<ι> μέρει πράγματα... ...καὶ διὰ τοῦ... ...[π]αρ' [ἡ]μῶν τι...

...Μιθρῆν, πονοῦντα ἢ τῆς μνήμης... ...ἐκ Πειραιέως καὶ... ...ἀναγγελλοντα...

...Mithres, suffering either from the memory of... ...from Peiraeus and... ...reporting...

"...φέρων τὴν ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ σοῦ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν ὃν Ἐπεπόησο περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων – Ὅσοι μήτε (1) τὴν ἀναλογίαν τὴν κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις οὖσαν ἠδύναντο συνιδεῖν, μήτε (2) τὴν συμφωνίαν τὴν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ὑπάρχουσαν πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα καὶ (3) πάλιν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσιν."

...bringing the letter from you and the thorough reasoning which you had made concerning those people – as many [*of them*] as were not able to have fully seen (1) the analogy that exists in accordance with what is apparent with what is unseen, nor (2) the agreement existing among the sensations toward the unseen, and (3) when [*the sensations*] again contest [*in a particular case to a full agreement or even just an analogy between the seen and the unseen*].

[Anderson] ...bringing your letter and the reasoning which you had carried out concerning men who could see neither (1) the analogy which obtains between the phenomena and the unseen [*realities*] nor (2) the consistency which exists between the senses and the senses [*realities*] and again (3) the counterfactuals...

ἐπὶ δὲ Δημοκλέους αὐτῷ γράφων· "ὁ Διακεχαρισμένος ἑκάστῳ... ... ...ποτε μίαν ἢ τε... ...δι ἑτέρας... ...καὶ ἔτη... ...ἡμῖν ὅτι τὰ κατὰ νῦν... ...καὶ τῷ μέρει πράγματα... ...καὶ διὰ τοῦ... ...παρ' ἡμῶν τι..."

and writing to him during [*the archonship in 278*[BCE]] of Democles: "he who has thoroughly cheered each... ... ...one at some time or... ...through different... ...and years... ...to us that the things at present... ...and the situation in part ... ...and through the... ...something from us..."

φέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	carrying	**ΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing*
ἡ ἐπιστολή **αἱ ἐπιστολαί**	letter *[i.e., a sent message]*	**ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ** *equipping upon*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning through action*
ποιεῖν	to make	**ΠΟΙΕΙΝ** *gathering*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος **οἱ ἄνθρωποι**	person (human)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ** *man face*
ὅσος *(η, ον)*	as many as	**῾ΟΣΟΣ** *however great*
ἡ ἀναλογία **αἱ ἀναλογίαι**	analogy	**ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ** *reasoning back/again*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἀόρατος *(ος, ον)*	unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ** *not looking*
δύνασθαι	to have the force [here, "to be able"]	**ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ** *power*
συνιδεῖν	to have fully seen [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΙΔΕΙΝ** *seen together*
ἡ συμφωνία **αἱ συμφωνίαι**	agreement	**ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ** *speaking together*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	**῾ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under (before)*
τὸ ἀόρατον **τὰ ἀόρατα**	[0] the unseen	**ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ** *not looking*
πάλιν	again	**ΠΑΛΙΝ** *back*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	{W} to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
	Part 2	
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	favor [here, "grace"]	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *charming / gracious*
χαίρειν	to rejoice [used for "hello/goodbye"]	**ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *being cheerful*
ὁ διακεχαρισμένος [+ dat] **οἱ διακεχαρισμένοι**	he who has thoroughly cheered	**ΔΙΑΚΕΧΑΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ** *through having charmed / graced*
ἕκαστος *(η, ον)*	each *(with plural verb)*	**῾ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ** *each*
εἷς μία ἕν *(ἑνός, μιᾶς, ἑνός)*	one	**῾ΕΙΣ ΜΙΑ ῾ΕΝ** *one*
ἕτερος *(ἑτέρα, ἕτερον)*	different [other / another]	**῾ΕΤΕΡΟΣ** *other*
τό ἔτος **τά ἔτη**	year	**ΕΤΟΣ** *year*
τὸ μέρος **τὰ μέρη**	part	**ΜΕΡΟΣ** *part*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *doing / affair*

[U213]

20. Focusing on the Good Past

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 28, 1105D

εἰ τοίνυν "ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν ἡ φίλου Μνήμη τεθνηκότος" ὥσπερ Ἐπίκουρος εἶπε: καὶ ἤδη νοεῖν Πάρεστιν ἡλίκης ἑαυτοὺς χαρᾶς Ἀποστεροῦσι:

> if then "the memory of a friend that has died is pleasant from every standpoint" as Epicurus said, indeed already it is possible to understand how much they deprive themselves of joy:

φάσματα μὲν καὶ εἴδωλα τεθνηκότων ἑταίρων οἰόμενοι δέχεσθαι καὶ θηρεύειν – οἷς οὔτε Νοῦς ἐστιν, οὔτ᾽ Αἴσθησις – αὐτοῖς δὲ συνέσεσθαι πάλιν ἀληθῶς (καὶ τὸν φίλον πατέρα καὶ τὴν φίλην μητέρα καί που γυναῖκα χρηστὴν ὄψεσθαι) μὴ προσδοκῶντες

> believing they [*passively*] receive and [*actively*] pursue appearances and films of dead companions – in which neither mind exists, nor sensation – while they are not expecting to be truly united again with them (and to see their beloved father, and beloved mother, and even their helpful wife)

ἡδύς (*ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ*)	pleasant	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides [here, "from every standpoint"]	**ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ** *from all places*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ** *loving knowledge*
ὁ φίλος **οἱ φίλοι**	friend	**ΦΙΛΟΣ** *loving*
ἡ μνήμη **αἱ μνῆμαι**	memory	**ΜΝΗΜΗ** *thinking*
θνήσκειν	to die	**ΘΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ** **ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ** *died*
τεθνηκώς (*υῖα, ός*)	having died	**ΤΕΘΝΗΚΩΣ** *having died*
τὸ φάσμα **τὰ φάσματα**	appearance	**ΦΑΣΜΑ** *shining*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*

@ 21. Foresee the Inevitable

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 63.7

"mihi, amīcōrum dēfunctōrum Cōgitātiō dulcis ac blanda est: Habuī enim illōs tamquam amissūrus – amīsī tamquam habeam.

> "for me, the thought of departed friends is sweet and pleasant: for I had them as though I would lose them – I have lost them as though I still have [them]"

> *Seneca presents this as a quotation but does not cite his source. Epicurus is frequently quoted in the Letters to Lucilius, and this particular passage appears to continue the Epicurean quotation Plutarch gives just above.*
>
> *Cherish people with the awareness they may be lost, and let their memory live on as if they are still present.*

[U214]

22. Giving Favors, Small and Large

Maximus the Confessor (fl. 620 CE), Sayings, chapter 8

Maximus the Confessor had a classical education, but he turned to a Dyothelite interpretation of Christianity (believing Christ has two wills: one divine, one human).

He was convicted of heresy by the preeminent Monothelite Christians – who cut off his tongue and right hand. Maximus died later that year.

This saying appears in Maximus' gnomology (a collection of sayings) in the Ribittianae codex (page 196)

It is also found attributed to Epicurus in the Laurentian and Borbonicus codices, and in the Melk Monastery manuscript by Antonius the Monk (book I, entry 29, page 37)

"Μὴ φεῦγε μικρὰ χαρίζεσθαι' – Δόξεις γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα τοιοῦτος εἶναι"

"Do not avoid giving favors regarding small things – for you will also seem to be such a sort regarding what is great"

φεύγειν	to avoid	**ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ** *fleeing*
μεικρός = **μικρός** (ά, όν)	small	**ΜΕΙΚΡΟΣ** **ΜΙΚΡΟΣ** *little*
ἡ χάρις **αἱ χάριτες**	favor [here, "grace"]	**ΧΑΡΙΣ** *charming / gracious*
χαρίζειν	to give favor	**ΧΑΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *action of being cheerful*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
τὸ μέγα **τὰ μεγάλα**	what is great	**ΜΕΓΑ** *large*
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*

[U215]

23. Caution Toward Pleading Enemies

Maximus the Confessor (fl. 620 CE), Sayings, 66

This is maxim 66 in Maximus' gnomology, on page 259 of the Ribittiana manuscript, and was printed by Combefis on page 682. It also appears in a Melk Monastery manuscript (item 54, page 123, cited by Antonius) and in Paris manuscript 1166, published by Boissonade in Anecdota Graeca I, page 123, line 5. In each location it is attributed to Epicurus.

"Ἐχθροῦ δεηθέντος, μὴ Ἀποστραφῆς τὴν ἀξίωσιν: πλὴν, Ἀσφαλίζου σεαυτόν – οὐδὲν γὰρ κυνὸς Διαφέρει."

"when an enemy has requested, you should not reject the request: but stabilize yourself – for he differs in no way from a dog!"

It is as absurd to formally respond to an enemy's request as it would be to formally respond to the desires of wild animals – simply protect yourself from them!

ὁ ἐχθρός **οἱ ἐχθροί**	enemy	**ΕΧΘΡΟΣ** *hating*
δέεσθαι	to be in need	**ΔΕΕΣΘΑΙ** *needing*
ἡ δέησις **αἱ δεήσεις**	request	**ΔΕΗΣΙΣ** *needing*
δεηθείς (εῖσα, θέν)	having requested	**ΔΕΗΘΕΙΣ** *needing*
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	**ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *thoroughly turning*

διαστρέφειν	to distort	**ΔΙΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *turning through*
ἀποστρέφειν	to reject	**ΑΠΟΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ** *turning away*
ἡ ἀξίωσις **αἱ ἀξιώσεις**	request	**ΑΞΙΩΣΙΣ** *action of* *counterbalancing*
πλὴν	besides	
ἡ ἀσφάλεια **αἱ ἀσφάλειαι**	stability [lit. "not tripping"]	**ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ** *not stumbling*
ἀσφαλίζειν	to stabilize	**ΑΣΦΑΛΙΖΕΙΝ** *not stumbling*
ὁ κύων **οἱ κύνες**	dog	**ΚΥΩΝ** *dog*
διαφέρειν	to differ	**ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing through*

[U216]

24. Details of Property Management

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Property Management, P.Herc. 1424, col. 27, lines 20-29

εἰ δὴ καταμέμφεταί τις ἡμῶν περὶ οἰκονομίας ἀναγρ[α]φ[όν]των, ἡμῖν μὲν ἱκανὸς μετ’ Ἐπικούρου Μητρόδωρος ἐπιστέλλων καὶ παραινῶν καὶ διοικῶν ἐπ[ι]μελέστερον καὶ μέχρι μικροτέρων καὶ ποιῶν αὐτός, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμ[α κ]ατήπειγεν ὡς [φαί]νεται.

εἰ δὴ καταμέμφεταί Τις ἡμῶν περὶ οἰκονομίας ἀναγραφόντων: ἡμῖν μὲν ἱκανὸς μετ’ Ἐπικούρου Μητρόδωρος – ἐπιστέλλων καὶ παραινῶν καὶ διοικῶν ἐπιμελέστερον καὶ μέχρι μικροτέρων, καὶ ποιῶν αὐτός ¬ εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸ Πρᾶγμα κατήπειγεν, ὡς Φαίνεται.

if indeed someone among us will find fault for writing about property management: along with Epicurus, Metrodorus is sufficient for us – since he also gives instructions, advises, and manages more carefully, even down to the smaller things, and he does it himself ¬ even if the situation was not pressing, it seems.

[Tsouna] *On the one hand, Philodemus appeals to the authority of Metrodorus to defend the philosophical value of his own treatise and his detailed engagement with its subject. On the other hand, he openly acknowledges that the matter of* **οἰκονομία** *(property management) is more pressing for him than it was for Metrodorus.*

Will

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.16 fin. – 21

1. Legal Heirs: Amunomachus & Timocrates

κατὰ τάδε, Δίδωμι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάντα [1] Ἀμυνομάχῳ Φιλοκράτους Βατῆθεν καὶ [2] Τιμοκράτει, Δημητρίου, Ποταμίῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ Μητρῴῳ ἀναγεγραμμένην ἑκατέρῳ δόσιν

regarding these things, I give all my possessions to [1] Amunomachus son of Philocrates from Bátē and to [2] Timocrates, son of Demetrius, the Potamian, according to the inheritance recorded for each in the Metroon

Epicurus names Amunomachus and Timocrates as his legal heirs – but on the condition that they provide the Garden and its assets for Hermarchus and his philosophical successors to use for study.

It is clear from their demotic identifiers both Amunomachus and Timocrates were members of the Athenian polis, registered in those respective demes.

ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	**ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving away*
διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*
ἡ δόσις **αἱ δόσεις**	gift / inheritance	**ΔΟΣΙΣ** *given*
Ἀμυνόμαχος	Amunomachus	**ΑΜΥΝΟΜΑΧΟΣ** *battle defender*
Φιλοκράτης	Philocrates	**ΦΙΛΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ** *lover of power*
Βατῆθεν	from Bátē	**ΒΑΤΗΘΕΝ** *passable / accessible*
Bátē (Βατή) was a deme of ancient Attica roughly located in modern Ampelokipoi, Athens (northeast of the Acropolis)		
Τιμοκράτης	Timocrates	**ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ** *power from honor*
Δημήτριος	Demetrius	**ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ** *from Demeter*
Ποτάμιος *(α, ον)*	Potamian	**ΠΟΤΑΜΙΟΣ** *river*
The three Potamos demes were on the southeast coast of Attica (north of Thoricus)		
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
ἀναγράφειν	to place on record	**ΑΝΑΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ**
ὁ κῆπος **οἱ κῆποι**	garden	**ΚΗΠΟΣ** *plantation*
τό προσόν **τά προσόντα**	asset	**ΠΡΟΣΟΝ** *existing for*
παρέχειν	to yield [here, "to give over"]	**ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold beside*
Μητρῷον	the Metroon	**Μητρῷον** *"sanctuary of mother"*
the Metroon (Mother Goddess temple) in Athens was the Old Bouleuterion (council house of the Athenian boule). It was converted into a temple for Cybele and also served as the office for holding official archives of the city.		



2. Beneficiary: Hermarchus

ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε τὸν μὲν κῆπον καὶ τὰ προσόντα αὐτῷ Παρέξουσιν: Ἑρμάρχῳ Ἀγεμόρτου Μυτιληναίῳ καὶ τοῖς συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν αὐτῷ – καὶ οἷς ἂν Ἕρμαρχος καταλίπῃ διαδόχοις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐνδιατρίβειν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν

provided that they give over the garden and its assets to him: to Hermarchus son of Agemortus, the Mytilenean, and to those who philosophize together with him – and to whomever Hermarchus may leave remaining as successors of the philosophy, to occupy themselves in accordance with philosophy

Hermarchus would have been considered a metic – a foreigner with only partial citizenship privileges. Therefore, he could not legally inherit land in Attica.

Giving the use of the land to Hermarchus (a Mytilenean) was legal, but he could not technically own it.

Ἕρμαρχος	Hermarchus	**ἝΡΜΑΡΧΟΣ** *rule of Hermes*
Ἀγεμόρτος	Agemortus	**ἈΓΕΜΟΡΤΟΣ** *leader of mortals*
Μυτιληναῖος *(η, ον)*	Mytilenean	**ΜΥΤΙΛΗΝΑΙΟΣ** *daughter of Makareus (early king of Lesbos)*
a resident of the city of Mytilene on Lesbos		
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ** *loving knowledge*
συμφιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize together	**ΣΥΜΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ** *loving knowledge together*
οἱ συμφιλοσοφοῦντες	those who philosophize together	
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	**ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ** *thoroughly leave*
δεχόμενος *(η, ον)*	receiving	**ΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting*
ὁ διάδοχος **οἱ διάδοχοι**	successor	**ΔΙΑΔΟΧΟΣ** *receiving in turn*
ἐνδιατρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	**ΕΝΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ** *rubbing through in*

καὶ ἀεὶ δὲ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀπὸ ἡμῶν, ὅπως ἂν Συνδιασώσωσιν Ἀμυνομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτει, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, τὴν ἐν τῷ κήπῳ διατριβὴν Παρακατατίθεμαι τοῖς τ' αὐτῶν κληρονόμοις – ἐν ᾧ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατον ᾖ: ὅπως ἂν κἀΚεῖνοι διατηρῶσιν τὸν Κῆπον ¬ καθάπερ καὶ Αὐτοὶ οἷς ἂν οἱ ἀπὸ ἡμῶν φιλοσοφοῦντες παραδῶσιν

and also for those philosophizing from among us, so that they may preserve [*it*] together with Amunomachus and Timocrates, as far as what is possible, I entrust the continuance in the Garden to their heirs in perpetuity – in whatever way is most stable: so that they too may fully preserve the Garden ¬ just as they themselves also [*should do*] to whomever the ones philosophizing from among us may hand it down

φιλοσοφῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	philosophizing	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ** *loving knowledge*
διασῴζειν	to preserve	**ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ** *fully saving*
συνδιασῴζειν	to preserve together	**ΣΥΝΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ** *fully saving together*
Ἀμυνόμαχος	Amunomachus	**ΑΜΥΝΟΜΑΧΟΣ** *battle defender*
Τιμοκράτης	Timocrates	**ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ** *power from honor*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ** *power*
τό δυνατόν **τὰ δυνατά**	what is possible	**ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ** *power*
ὁ κῆπος **οἱ κῆποι**	garden	**ΚΗΠΟΣ** *plantation*
ἐνδιατρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	**ΕΝΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ** *rubbing through in*
ἡ διατριβή **αἱ διατριβαί**	occupation [here, "continuance"]	**ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗ**
τιθέναι	to put	**ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing*
παρατιθέναι	to juxtapose	**ΠΑΡΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing alongside*
παρακατατιθέναι	to entrust	**ΠΑΡΑΚΑΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing down alongside*
ὁ νόμος **οἱ νόμοι**	law	**ΝΟΜΟΣ** *allotting*
ὁ κληρονόμος **οἱ κληρονόμοι**	heir	**ΚΛΗΡΟΝΟΜΟΣ** *allotting inheritance*
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*
ἀσφαλής *(ής, ές)*	stable	**ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ** *not stumbling*
ἀσφαλέστατος *(η, ον)*	most stable	**ΑΣΦΑΛΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ** *most not stumbling*
κἀκεῖνος = **καί** + **ἐκεῖνος** *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	**ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ** *that there*
διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	**διατηρειν** *completely protecting / watching*
καθάπερ	just as	**ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ** *just as thoroughly*
παραδιδόναι	to hand over [here, "to hand down"]	**ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving alongside*

τὴν δ᾽ οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Μελίτῃ παρεχέτωσαν Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης ἐνοικεῖν Ἑρμάρχῳ καὶ τοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφοῦσιν – ἕως ἂν Ἕρμαρχος ζῇ.

and let Amunomachus and Timocrates give over the house in Melite for Hermarchus and those philosophizing with him to inhabit – for as long as Hermarchus lives.





Μελίτη	Melite	**ΜΕΛΙΤΗ** *Melite* *[a lover of Heracles]*
*Melite (**Μελίτη**) was a central deme of ancient Attica, located within the Themistoclean walls of Athens, west of the Acropolis, and associated with areas near the Agora and the Pnyx*		
ἡ οἰκονομία **αἱ οἰκονομίαι**	household management	**ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ** *managing the home*
ἡ συνοικεώσις **αἱ συνοικεώσεις**	association	**ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΩΣΙΣ** *home together*
ἡ οἰκία **αἱ οἰκίαι**	house	**ΟΙΚΙΑ** *the home*
ἐνοικεῖν	to inhabit	**ΕΝΟΙΚΕΙΝ** *in the home*
παρέχειν	to yield [here, "to give over"]	**ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ** *hold beside*
Ἀμυνόμαχος	Amunomachus	**ΑΜΥΝΟΜΑΧΟΣ** *battle defender*
Τιμοκράτης	Timocrates	**ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ** *power from honor*

Ἕρμαρχος	Hermarchus	ἝΡΜΑΡΧΟΣ *rule of Hermes*
φιλοσοφῶν *(οὖσα, οὖν)*	philosophizing	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ** *loving knowledge*
βιοῦν	to live [to live one's life]	**BIOYN** *living*
ζῆν	to live [to be alive]	**ZHN** *breathing / hot*



The Garden was located up the center road out of the Dipylon Gate and before the location of the Academy.

5. Revenues for Memorials and Gatherings

ἐκ δὲ τῶν γινομένων προσόδων, τῶν δεδομένων ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν Ἀμυνομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτει: κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, Μεριζέσθωσαν, μεθ᾽ Ἑρμάρχου ¬ σκοπούμενοι [1] **εἵς τε τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῷ τε πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς,** [2] **καὶ ἡμῖν, εἰς τὴν εἰθισμένην ἄγεσθαι γενέθλιον ἡμέραν ἑκάστου ἔτους τῇ προτέρᾳ Δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος – ὥσπερ καὶ** [3] **εἰς τὴν γινομένην σύνοδον ἑκάστου μηνὸς ταῖς Εἰκάσι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν τε καὶ Μητροδώρου μνήμην κατατεταγμένην.**

and from the revenues being produced, already given by myself to Amunomachus and Timocrates: as far as possible, they should let [*the revenues*] be divided, together with Hermarchus ¬ while making considerations [1] for the memorial rites for my father and mother and brothers, [2] and for myself, for the customary birth day each year to be lead on the earlier Tenth [*day from the end*] of Gamelion – just as also [3] for the gathering being produced on the Twentieth of each month by those philosophizing together with us, assigned to the memory of myself and of Metrodorus

The "earlier Tenth" refers specifically to the 20th day in a month with 30 days.

After the full moon, the Athenians switched to counting down from the end of the month. They referred to days as so-many days waning (i.e., remaining) in the month.

Also, in order to accommodate the variability between a 30-day and 29-day month, they duplicated the 10th waning day on months with 30 days.

On these months, the 20th and 21st were both referred to as "tenth" days – the 20th being the earlier tenth and the 21st as the later tenth.

Thus, the 20th day of the month was referred to as **Εἰκάς** *(the Twentieth), and* **εἰκοστή** *(20th), and* **δεκάτη προτέρα** *(the earlier tenth) – and even just* **προτέρα** *(the earlier)*

γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*

ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition [here, "revenue"]	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ *path toward*
παραδεδομένος *(η, ον)*	[already] handed down	ΠΑΡΑΔΕΔΟΜΕΝΟΣ *gave alongside*
δεδομένος *(η, ον)*	[already] given	ΔΕΔΟΜΕΝΟΣ *gave*
τό δυνατόν τὰ δυνατά	what is possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ *power*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
μερίζειν	to divide	ΜΕΡΙΖΕΙΝ *part*
μεριζέσθωσαν	let them divide	*3rd person plural present imperative*
σκοπεῖν	to consider	ΣΚΟΠΕΙΝ *looking*
σκοπούμενος *(η, ον)*	while making considerations	ΣΚΟΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *looking*
τό ἐνάγισμα τὰ ἐναγίσματα	memorial rites	ΕΝΑΓΙΣΜΑ *result of* *action of consecrating in*
ὁ πατήρ οἱ πατέρες	father	ΠΑΤΗΡ *father*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ *gift [to]* *mother*
ἡ μήτηρ αἱ μητέρες	mother	ΜΗΤΗΡ *mother*
ὁ ἀδελφός οἱ ἀδελφοί	brother	ΑΔΕΛΦΟΣ *womb together*
εἰθισμένος *(η, ον)*	accustomed	ΕΙΘΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ *accustomed action*
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ *carrying / going*
ἄγεσθαι	to be lead [i.e., to be celebrated]	
τό γενέθλιον τὰ γενέθλια	birthday	γενέθλιον *race / family*
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ *day*
τό ἔτος τά ἔτη	year	ΕΤΟΣ *year*
πρότερος *(α, ον)*	former [here, "earlier"]	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ *before [contrast]*
δέκατος *(η, ον)*	tenth	ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ *ten*
Γαμηλιών	Gamelion	ΓΑΜΗΛΙΩΝ *marriage*
The Athenian month beginning the first new moon in January. It was the 7th month of the Attic calendar and associated with marriage rituals, especially festivals for Hera and Zeus.		
γινόμενος *(η, ον)*	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *become*
ἡ σύνοδος αἱ σύνοδοι	gathering	ΣΥΝΟΔΟΣ *path together*
ὁ μήν οἱ μῆνες	month	ΜΗΝ *moon*
εἴκοσι	20	ΕΙΚΟΣΙ *twenty*
οἱ συμφιλοσοφοῦντες	those who philosophize together	ΣΥΜΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥΝΤΕΣ *loving knowledge* *together*
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνῆμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ *thinking*
κατατάττειν	to assign	ΚΑΤΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ *thoroughly ordering*

6. Memorials for Brothers and Polyaenus

Συντελείτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμέραν τοῦ Ποσειδεῶνος ¬ Συντελείτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν Πολυαίνου τοῦ Μεταγειτνιῶνος – καθάπερ καὶ Ἡμεῖς

and let them altogether fulfill the day for my brothers during Poseideon ¬ and let them also altogether fulfill the one for Polyaenus during Metageitnion – just like us

Epicurus seems to have already been celebrating yearly memorials for his brothers Neocles, Chairedemus, and Aristobuolus.

συντελεῖν	to altogether fulfill	**ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ** *completing together*
ὁ ἀδελφός **οἱ ἀδελφοί**	brother	**ΑΔΕΛΦΟΣ** *womb together*
ἡ ἡμέρα **αἱ ἡμέραι**	day	**ἩΜΕΡΑ** *day*
Ποσειδεών	Poseideon	**ΠΟΣΕΙΔΕΩΝ** *named in honor of Poseidon*
The Athenian month beginning the first new moon in December. It was the 6th month of the Attic calendar and was dedicated to Poseidon, featuring rural and seafaring festivals, especially the Poseideia, a celebration of fertility and the sea.		
Πολύαινος	Polyaenus	**ΠΟΛΥΑΙΝΟΣ** *much praise*
Μεταγειτνιών	Metageitnion	**ΜΕΤΑΓΕΙΤΝΙΩΝ** *"next to neighbor" cult title of the god Apollo*
The Athenian month beginning the first new moon in August. It was the 2nd month of the Attic calendar and associated with community and neighborly relations, especially honoring Apollo Metageitnios, patron of migration and social integration.		

7. Metrodorus' Son (Epicurus) & Polyaenus' Son

Ἐπιμελείσθωσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Μητροδώρου Ἐπικούρου – καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Πολυαίνου, φιλοσοφούντων αὐτῶν καὶ συζώντων μεθ᾽ Ἑρμάρχου

Let Amunomachus and Timocrates also take care of the son of Metrodorus, Epicurus – and of the son of Polyaenus, since they are philosophizing and living with Hermarchus

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι	to take care of	**ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *caring upon*
ὁ υἱός **οἱ υἱοί**	son	**ΥΙΟΣ** *offspring*
Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	**ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ** *running toward [to assist]*
φιλοσοφῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	philosophizing	**ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ** *loving knowledge*
συζῆν	to live with	**ΣΥΖΗΝ** *breathing together*
συζῶν *(ῶσα, ῶν)*	living with	
Ἕρμαρχος	Hermarchus	**ἙΡΜΑΡΧΟΣ** *rule of Hermes*

ὡσαύτως δὲ, τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς Μητροδώρου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν Ποιείσθωσαν: καὶ εἰς ἡλικίαν Ἐλθοῦσαν – Ἐκδότωσαν ᾧ ἂν Ἕρμαρχος ἕληται τῶν φιλοσοφούντων μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ¬ οὔσης αὐτῆς εὐτάκτου καὶ πειθαρχούσης Ἑρμάρχῳ

likewise, let them take care of the daughter of Metrodorus: and when she has come to age – let them give her in marriage to whomever Hermarchus may choose of those philosophizing with him ¬ with her being well-behaved and obedient to Hermarchus

Presumably either Amunomachus or Timocrates would have to give the legal consent for the marriage of Metrodorus' daughter, but Epicurus wanted Hermarchus to actually make the choice.

ὡσαύτως	likewise	**ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ** *as self*
ἡ θυγάτηρ **αἱ θυγατέρες**	daughter	**ΘΥΓΑΤΗΡ** *maid*
μελετᾶν	to study	**ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ** *caring*
ἡ ἐπιμέλεια **αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι**	care	**ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΑ** *caring upon*
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made [here, "to take"]	**ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *gathering*
ἡ ἡλικία **αἱ ἡλικίαι**	age *(stage of life)*	**ἩΛΙΚΙΑ** *comrade*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	**ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *moving*
τὸ ἀπελθόν **τὰ ἀπελθόντα**	what went away	**ΑΠΕΛΘΟΝ** *went away*
ἐπελθών *(οῦσα, όν)*	having occurred	**ΕΠΕΛΘΩΝ** *went upon*
ἐλθών *(ἐλθοῦσα, ἐλθόν)*	having come	**ΕΛΘΩΝ** *went*
διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*
ἐκδιδόναι	to give in marriage	**ΕΚΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving out*
αἱρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	**ἉΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *taking*
ἕληται	he may choose	**ἙΛΗΤΑΙ** *took* *aorist middle subjunctive 3rd person singular*
εὔτακτος *(η, ον)*	well-behaved	**ΕΥΤΑΚΤΟΣ** *well behaved*
Ἕρμαρχος	Hermarchus	**ἝΡΜΑΡΧΟΣ** *rule of Hermes*
πειθαρχῶν *(οῦσα, οῦν)*	being obedient	**ΠΕΙΘΑΡΧΩΝ** *persuaded by rule*

9. Support for the Children

διδότωσαν δ᾽ Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἡμῖν προσόδων, εἰς τροφὴν τούτοις, ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι δοκῇ ¬ σκοπουμένοις μεθ᾽ Ἑρμάρχου

let Amunomachus and Timocrates give, from the revenues already existing for myself, for the nourishment of these [*children*], whatever may seem right to be received by them each year ¬ while making considerations with Hermarchus

διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*

ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)*	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition [here, "revenue"]	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ *path toward*
ἡ τροφή αἱ τροφαί	nourishment	ΤΡΟΦΗ *food*
ὁ ἐνιαυτός οἱ ἐνιαυτοί	year	ΕΝΙΑΥΤΟΣ *year passing* *[over to next]*
ἐπιδέχεσθαι	to receive	ΕΠΙΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting upon*
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ *seeming*
σκοπούμενος *(η, ον)*	while making considerations	ΣΚΟΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *looking*

10. Hermarchus selected as Hegemon

Ποιείσθωσαν δὲ, μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν, καὶ Ἕρμαρχον κύριον τῶν προσόδων – ἵνα μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγηρακότος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ καταλελειμμένου ἡγεμόνος τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν Ἕκαστα γίνηται

Let them make, along with themselves, Hermarchus the principle of the revenues as well – so that each thing may come about with the one who has fully grown old together with myself in philosophy and who has been left undisputed as the guide of those who philosophize together with myself

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
κύριος *(α, ον)*	principle	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ *critical / valid*
ὁ κύριος οἱ κύριοι	principle	
ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition [here, "revenue"]	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ *path toward*
ὁ συγκαταγεγηρακώς οἱ συγκαταγεγηρακότες	he who has fully grown old together	ΣΥΓΚΑΤΑΓΕΓΗΡΑΚΩΣ *fully having grown old together*
ἡ φιλοσοφία	philosophy	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ *loving knowledge*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
ὁ ἡγεμών οἱ ἡγεμόνες	guide / hēgemṓn	ἩΓΕΜΩΝ *one who is leading*
οἱ συμφιλοσοφοῦντες	those who philosophize together	ΣΥΜΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥΝΤΕΣ *loving knowledge together*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*

11. Dowry for Metrodorus' Daughter

τὴν δὲ προῖκα τῷ θήλει παιδίῳ, ἐπειδὰν εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθῃ, μερισάτωσαν Ἀμυνόμαχος καὶ Τιμοκράτης – ὅσον ἂν ἐπιδέχηται ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀφαιροῦντες ¬ μετὰ τῆς Ἑρμάρχου γνώμης

let Amunomachus and Timocrates divide the dowry for the female child, whenever she comes of age – with them removing as much as may be received from the [*revenues*] that exist ¬ in accordance with the discernment of Hermarchus

ἡ προίξ αἱ προῖκες	dowry	ΠΡΟΙΞ *[giving] before*

θῆλυς *(εία, υ)*	female	ΘΗΛΥΣ *breast*
ἡ παιδεία αἱ παιδεῖαι	education	ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ *child*
τὸ παιδίον τὰ παιδία	child	ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ *child*
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age *(stage of life)*	῾ΗΛΙΚΙΑ *comrade*
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go [in general]	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ *moving*
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
μερίζειν	to divide	ΜΕΡΙΖΕΙΝ *part*
ἐπιδέχεσθαι	to receive	ΕΠΙΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting upon*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	῾ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning* *under (before)*
ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping away*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ *distinguishing*
ἡ γνώμη αἱ γνῶμαι	discernment	ΓΝΩΜΗ *distinguishing*
ἡ ἐπικράτεια αἱ ἐπικρατεῖαι	prevailing opinion	ΕΠΙΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ *power upon*
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ *seeming*

12. Nicanor and the rest
(Reciprocal Support)

Ἐπιμελείσθωσαν δὲ καὶ Νικάνορος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡμεῖς, ἵν᾿ Ὅσοι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν ¬ χρείαν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις παρεσχημένοι καὶ τὴν πᾶσαν οἰκειότητα ἐνδεδειγμένοι, συγκαταγηράσκειν μεθ᾿ ἡμῶν προείλοντο ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ – μηδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς καθεστήκωσιν, παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν δύναμιν

Let them also take care of Nicanor, just as I [*do*], in order that all those of the ones philosophizing along with myself ¬ who have offered [*their*] use in private matters and have shown full compatibility, and have chosen to fully grow old together with myself in philosophy – may be established as lacking in nothing of the necessities, to the extent of our power

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι	to take care of	ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *caring upon*
Νικάνορ	Nicanor	ΝΙΚΑΝΟΡ *man of victory*
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ *necessary*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
παρέχειν	to yield [here, "to offer"]	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ *hold beside*
παρεσχημένος	having offered	ΠΑΡΕΣΧΗΜΕΝΟΣ *hold beside*
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομίαι	household management	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ *managing* *the home*
οἰκεῖος *(α, ον)*	compatible	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ *appropriate*
ἡ οἰκειότης αἱ οἰκειότητες	compatibility	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΣ *appropriate*
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ *showing in*

συγκαταγηράσκειν	to fully grow old together	**ΣΥΓΚΑΤΑΓΗΡΑΣΚΕΙΝ** *fully growing old together*
ἐξαιρεῖσθαι	to be removed from	**ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *grasping out*
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping before*
προαιρεῖσθαι	to choose [for oneself]	**ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *grasping before*
οὐθείς = **οὐδείς** (*οὐδεμία, οὐδέν*)	no one [factual]	**ΟΥΔΕΙΣ** *not even one*
μηδείς (*μηδεμία, μηδέν*)	no one [modal]	**ΜΗΔΕΙΣ** *not one*
ἀναγκαῖος (*α, ον*)	necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ** *necessity*
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον **τὰ ἀναγκαῖα**	what is necessary	**ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ** *necessity*
δεῖν	to be necessary	**ΔΕΙΝ** *needing*
ἡ ἔνδεια **αἱ ἔνδειαι**	lack	**ΕΝΔΕΙΑ** *deficiency*
ἐνδεής (*ής, ές*)	lacking	**ΕΝΔΕΗΣ** *deficiency*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force [here, "power"]	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*

13. Library given to Hermarchus

Δοῦναι δὲ τὰ βιβλία τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν, πάντα, Ἑρμάρχῳ

[*and Amunomachus and Timocrates are*] to give the books that already exist with us, all of them, to Hermarchus

διδόναι	to give	**ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving*
τὸ βιβλίον **τὰ βιβλία**	book	**ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ** *strip of papyrus*
ὑπάρχων (*ουσα, ον*)	existing [already]	**ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under*
Ἕρμαρχος	Hermarchus	**ἝΡΜΑΡΧΟΣ** *rule of Hermes*

14. Human Contingency Clause

ἐὰν δέ τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων περὶ Ἕρμαρχον γένηται πρὸ τοῦ τὰ Μητροδώρου παιδία εἰς ἡλικίαν ἐλθεῖν, δοῦναι Ἀμυνόμαχον καὶ Τιμοκράτην ὅπως ἂν (εὐτακτούντων αὐτῶν) ἕκαστα γίνηται τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἀπὸ τῶν καταλελειμμένων ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν προσόδων

and if something among what is human happens concerning Hermarchus before the children of Metrodorus come of age, let Amunomachus and Timocrates provide so that (while they behave well) each of the necessary things may be produced, as far as possible, from the revenues left remaining by myself

ἀνθρώπινος (*η, ον*)	human (adj.)	**ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΟΣ** *man face*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	**ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ** *gift [to] mother*

τὸ παιδίον τὰ παιδία	child	ΠΑΙΔΙΟΝ *child*
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age *(stage of life)*	ἩΛΙΚΙΑ *comrade*
ἐλθεῖν	to come / go [once, completed]	ΕΛΘΕΙΝ *moved*
διδόναι	to give	ΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ *giving*
δοῦναι	to give [already]	ΔΟΥΝΑΙ *gave*
εὐτακτεῖν	to behave well	ΕΥΤΑΚΤΕΙΝ *arranging well*
ἀναγκαῖος *(α, ον)*	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ *necessity*
δυνατός *(ή, όν)*	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ *power*
καταλείπειν	to leave remaining/undisputed	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ *thoroughly leave*
ἡ πρόσοδος αἱ προσόδοι	addition [here, "revenue"]	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ *path toward*

15. Freeing Slaves

καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων ὡς Συντετάχαμεν Ἐπιμελείσθωσαν – ὅπως, ἄν, κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, Ἕκαστα γίγνηται: Ἀφίημι δὲ τῶν παίδων ἐλεύθερον Μῦν, Νικίαν, Λύκωνα – Ἀφίημι δὲ καὶ Φαίδριον ἐλευθερίᾳ

Let them also take care of all the remaining things just as we have also ordered – so that, as far as is possible, each thing may come to be: of the slaves, I release Mys, Nicias, and Lycon as free – I also release Phaidrion into freedom

λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + *gen*]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ *what is left over*
συντάττειν	to also order	ΣΥΝΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ *ordering together*
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι	to take care of	ΕΠΙΜΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ *caring upon*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἀφιέναι	to emit [here, "to release"]	ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ *send away*
ὁ παῖς οἱ παῖδες	child / slave	ΠΑΙΣ *son*
ἐλεύθερος *(α, ον)*	free	ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ *from a tribe* *(with the rights and responsibilities of a free man)*
ἡ ἐλευθερία αἱ ἐλευθερίαι	freedom	ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ
Νικάνορ	Nicanor	ΝΙΚΑΝΟΡ *man of victory*
Νικίας	Nicias	ΝΙΚΙΑΣ *victorious one*
Λύκων	Lýkōn	ΛΥΚΩΝ *wolf*
Φαίδρα	Phaídra	ΦΑΙΔΡΑ *shining*
Φαίδριον	Phaídrion *"little Phaídra"*	ΦΑΙΔΡΙΟΣ
ὁ μῦς οἱ μῦες	mouse	ΜΥΣ *mouse*

Μυσοί	Mysians	**ΜΥΣΟΙ** Mysian
The inhabitants of Mysia, a region in northwestern Asia Minor		
Μῦς / **Μῦς**	Mys	**ΜΥΣ** / **ΜΥΣ** *mouse* / Mysian

[U218]

Stone Dedications prepared for Tomb

Aelian (Claudius Aelianus, fl. 215 CE), fragment 39

The Suda, Epicurus (epsilon-2405)

Aelian was a Roman Classicist and Naturalist. The Suda preserves some of his work.

οὕτω, δὲ ἄρα, ἧν ἡδονῆς ἥττων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὥστε διὰ τῶν ἐσχάτῶν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις αὐτοῦ ἔγραψε τῷ μὲν πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἐναγίζειν ἅπαξ τοῦ ἔτους – καὶ Μητροδώρῳ δὲ καὶ Πολυαίνῳ, τοῖς προειρημένοις ¬ ἑαυτῷ δὲ δισσῶς (ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσωτίας, τὸ πλέον προτιμῶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Σοφός) καὶ τραπέζας λίθου πεποιῆσθαι ὡς ἀναθήματά τε ἐν τῷ τάφῳ Προσέταξε τεθῆναι – ὁ προτένθης τε καὶ ὀψοφάτος οὗτος

in this way, then, Epicurus was inferior to pleasure that, during his final [days], in his will he wrote to perform rites once a year to his father and mother and brothers – and also to Metrodorus and Polyaenus, [both] aforementioned ¬ and for himself twice (due to degeneracy, the wise man even in this respect prefers the greater amount) and he ordered that tables of stone be made as dedications to be placed in his tomb – this man who was both pre-buried and a delicacy-eater

Aelian presumably calls Epicurus "pre-buried" because he prepared his own tomb.

τό ἐνάγισμα **τὰ ἐναγίσματα**	memorial rites	**ΕΝΑΓΙΣΜΑ** *result of action of consecrating in*
ἐναγίζειν	to perform rites	**ΕΝΑΓΙΖΕΙΝ** *action of consecrating in*
ὁ ἄσωτος **οἱ ἄσωτοι**	degenerate	**ΑΣΩΤΟΣ** *not saving*

ἡ ἀσωτία **αἱ ἀσωτίαι**	degeneracy	**ΑΣΩΤΙΑ** *not saving*
τὸ ὄψον **τὰ ὄψα**	delicacy	**ΟΨΟΝ** *sauce*
anything cooked and eaten with bread (particularly fish)		
ὁ ὀψοφάτος	delicacy eater	**ΟΨΟΦΑΤΟΣ** *eating sauce*

Gatherings of the Good and Useful

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129A

"μηδὲ Διάπεμπε βίβλους πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν – "μηδὲ Διατάσσου περὶ ταφῆς!"

"Do not to send out books to every man and to every woman while you advertise your wisdom!" – "Do not to leave instructions about [*your*] burial!"

τί γὰρ αἱ κοιναὶ Τράπεζαι; τί δ᾽ αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ καλῶν Σύνοδοι;

what are the public Tables for? what are those Gatherings of the useful and of the good [*people*] for?

Fragments from Unknown Works

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PROLOGUES

1. Wisdom & the Sage

[U219]

1. Philosophy is Active Reasoning *(based on Established Reasoning)*

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Ethicists, 169

ἐπαγγέλλονται γὰρ "τέχνην" τινὰ περὶ τὸν βίον παραδώσειν – καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Ἐπίκουρος μὲν ἔλεγε "τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιοῦσαν"

[*the Dogmatists*] claim to hand down a certain "art" concerning life – and for this reason Epicurus used to say that "philosophy is activity that fully produces the good-spirited lifestyle by [*established*] reasonings and by thorough [*active*] reasonings"

τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of* *working within*
ἡ ἐνέργεια **αἱ ἐνέργειαι**	activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ** *working within*
ἡ εὐδαιμονία **αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι**	wellbeing	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ** *good spirit*
εὐδαίμων *(ων, ον)*	good-spirited	**ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ** *good spirit*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
ὁ διαλογισμός **οἱ διαλογισμοί**	[active] thorough reasoning	**ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ** *reasoning* *through action*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*

[U220]

2. Authentic Pursuit of Wisdom

Vatican Saying 54, attributed in Epicurus in:
PARALLELA sacra et profana, codex Florentinus A 14, folio 156,
(page 761 in the edition of Thomas Gaisford), &
GNOMOLOGION Parisinum, Bibliothèque nationale de France
(codex Parisinus graecus 1168, 12th century, folio 115 recto.), &
MAXIMUS Gnomologium, section 17, page 183 in the Zurich edition (Turici),
(volume 2, page 587 in the edition of François Combefis)

"οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι Δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν ¬ ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν: οὐ γὰρ Προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν – ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν"

"It is necessary to not pretend to philosophize ¬ but to really philosophize: for we are not also in need of seeming to be healthy – but of being healthy in truth"

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering*
προσποιεῖν	to attach to	ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΕΙΝ *gathering* *in addition*
προσποιεῖσθαι	to pretend	ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ *gathering* *in addition*
φιλοσοφεῖν	to philosophize	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ *loving knowledge*
ὄντως	really	ΟΝΤΩΣ *existing*
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ *needing*
δεῖσθαι	to need	ΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ *needing*
προσδεῖσθαι	to also be in need [of]	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ *needing in addition to*
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ *seeming*
ὑγιαίνειν	to be healthy	῾ΥΓΙΑΙΝΕΙΝ *making good life*
ὁ Φιλαληθέστατος	most truth-loving man	ΦΙΛΑΛΗΘΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ *most loving* *what is not hidden*
τἀληθές = τὸ ἀληθές τὰ ἀληθῆ	what is true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not hidden*
ἡ ἀλήθεια αἱ ἀλήθειαι	truth	ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ *not hidden*

[U221]

3. Removing the Pain of the Soul

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 31.479-483, interpreted as quoting Epicurus

"κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου Λόγος ὑφ’ οὗ μηδὲν Πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν Ὄφελος εἰ μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων θεραπεύει – οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος"

"empty is the reasoning of that philosopher by whom no [*painful*] feeling of man is cured: for just as there is no benefit from medicine if it does not cure the illnesses of bodies – neither is there from philosophy if it does not throw out the [*painful*] feeling of the soul"

κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ἐκεῖνος *(ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)*	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ *that there*
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
μηδείς *(μηδεμία, μηδέν)*	no one [modal]	ΜΗΔΕΙΣ *not one*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[Π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ *man face*
θεραπεύειν	to cure	ΘΕΡΑΠΕΥΕΙΝ *assisting*
ἡ ἰατρεία αἱ ἰατρεῖαι	healing	ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ *curing*
ὁ ἰατρός οἱ ἰατροί	doctor	ΙΑΤΡΟΣ *curing*

ἡ ἰατρική αἱ ἰατρικαί	medicine	**ΙΑΤΡΙΚΗ** *characteristic of curing*
τὸ ὄφελος τὰ ὀφέλη	benefit	**ΟΦΕΛΟΣ** *helping*
ἡ νόσος αἱ νόσοι	illness	**ΝΟΣΟΣ** *disease*
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	**ΨΥΧΗ** *blowing*
ἐκβάλλειν	to extend	**ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ** *throwing out*

[U222]

4. Total Certainty

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 19, 1117F

Ἓν γάρ ἐστι τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων τὸ "μηδὲν ἀμεταπείστως πεπεῖσθαι Μηδένα – πλὴν τὸν σοφόν"

One of the doctrines of Epikouros is that "No one is unchangeably convinced of anything – except the wise man"

[U222a]

5. Total Stability

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.117

τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν – μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν, ἑκόντα

[*Epicurus says that*] the one who has once become wise – no longer acquires the opposing arrangement nor pretends to, while willing

ἅπαξ	once	**ἍΠΑΞ** *one all one*
σοφός *(ή, όν)*	wise	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	**ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ** *process of placing through*
πλάττειν	to mold [here, "to pretend"]	**ΠΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *forming*
ἑκών *(ἑκοῦσα, ἑκόν)*	while willing	**ἙΚΩΝ** *holding*

[U223]

6. Effort of Sticking to Sensation

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica, Part 2 (Lucullus), 14.45

sēd Prōgrediāmur longius et ita Agāmus ut nihil nōbīs adsentātī esse Videāmur – quaeque ab iīs dīcuntur sīc Persequāmur ut nihil in praeteritīs Relinquāmus

but let us advance farther and proceed in such a way that we seem to have flattered nothing ourselves – and let us pursue the things that are said by them in such a way that we leave nothing behind in the earlier [arguments]

prīmum, igitur, Perspicuitās illa, quam dīximus, satis magnam habet vim – ut Ipsa, per sēse, ea quae sint nōbīs ita ut sint indicet

first, then, that Perspicuity [*i.e., clarity of the senses*], which we spoke of, has sufficiently great force – so that it itself, by itself, reveals to us things that are as they are

sēd tamen, ut Maneāmus in perspicuīs fīrmius et cōnstantius ¬ maiōre quādam opus est, vel arte vel dīligentiā: nē (ab iīs quae clāra sint ipsa, per sēse) quasi praestīgiīs quibusdam et captiōnibus Dēpellāmur

nevertheless, so that we can remain more firmly and more steadily in what is perspicuous [*i.e., clear to the senses*] ¬ there is need for something greater, either in skill or diligence: so that we are not driven away (from the things which are clear in themselves, by themselves) as if by certain illusions and traps

nam quī voluit subvenīre errōribus Epicūrus (iīs Quī videntur conturbāre vērī cognitiōnem) dīxitque sapientis esse opiniōnem ā perspicuitāte seiungere, nihil prōfēcit – ipsīus enim opiniōnis errōrem nullō modō sustulit

for Epicurus, who wanted to come to the aid of errors (those which seem to disturb the understanding of truth) and who said that it is [*the quality*] of a wise person to separate opinion from perspicuity [*i.e., clarity of the senses*], accomplished nothing further – for he in no way removed the error of opinion itself

Clarity of the senses [including mental perception] is powerful enough to reveal things as they truly are ¬ but we must continue using skill and diligence to stay rooted in sensory truth, so that we are not misled by illusions or opinions.

[U224]

7. Belief *(The Sacred Illness)*

Fragment 195 from the Florilegium Monacense

(which is contained in manuscript Codex graecus 8 of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich)

ὁ αὐτὸς [Ἐπίκουρος] τὴν οἴησιν "ἱερὰν νόσον" ἔλεγεν

[*Epicurus*] himself called belief "the sacred illness"

οἰόμενος *(η, ον)*	suspecting [or, "believing"]	**ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *perceiving*
ἡ οἴησις **αἱ οἰήσεις**	belief	**ΟΙΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving*
ἱερός *(ά, όν)*	sacred	**ἹΕΡΟΣ** *holy*
ἡ νόσος **αἱ νόσοι**	illness	**ΝΟΣΟΣ** *disease*

[U225]

8. Only the Wise Know the Wise

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.9:20

Ἐπίκουρος σοφῷ μόνῳ τὸν σοφὸν [*καταληπτὸν εἶναι*]

Epicurus says that a wise man [*is recognized*] only by another wise man

ὁ σοφός	wise man	**ΣΟΦΟΣ** *knowledge*

[U226]

9. No Philosophy for Non-Greeks

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellenies, I.15 [p. 130.37 Sylb]:

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος, ἔμπαλιν, ὑπολαμβάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθα

Epicurus, on the contrary, supposes that only Greeks are able to philosophize

2. The Arts

1. Opposition to the Professions

[U227]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1-3

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντίρρησιν κοινότερον μὲν διατεθεῖσθαι δοκοῦσιν Οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρωνος ¬ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δέ διαθέσεως

both those around Epicurus and those around Pyrrho seem more commonly inclined to the opposition toward those from the professions ¬ but not from the same standpoint

ἀλλ' Οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδέν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν – ἤ (ὥς Τινες εἰκάζουσι) τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπαιδευσίας εἶναι Νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθὴς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται ¬ οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων)

Those around Epicurus [*oppose the professions, on the grounds*] that the professions contribute nothing to the perfection of wisdom – or (as some conjecture) thinking this is a cover for their own lack of education (for in many areas Epicurus is refuted as ignorant ¬ not even speaking correctly in common conversations)

τάχα δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν – πολυμιαθεῖς γεγονότας

perhaps [*Epicurus made a case against professors*] also because of his hostility towards those around Plato and Aristotle and their like – who were polymaths

ὁ μαθηματικός **οἱ μαθηματικοί**	professor	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of the result of learning*
τὸ μάθημα **τὰ μαθήματα**	profession	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑ** *the result of learning*
ἡ ὁμιλία **αἱ ὁμιλίαι**	association [here, "conversation"]	**ὉΜΙΛΙΑ** *company*

2. Opposition to Studying Literature

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.4.12

quod vestrī, quidem, vēl optimē disputant nihil opus esse eum philosophum quī futūrus sit scīre litterās

because [*the members*] of your [*Epicurean school*], indeed, argue quite well that there is no need for him who is going to be a philosopher to know literature

3. Stuck in Cultural Fictions from Childhood

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.21, 71-72 (Torquatus to Cicero about Epicurus)

Quī quod tibī parum vidētur ērudītus, eā causā est: quod nullam ērudītiōnem esse dūxit nisi quae beātae vītae disciplīnam iūvāret – an Ille tempus aut in poētīs evolvendīs, cōnsumeret… …in quibus nulla solidā Ūtilitās, omnisque puerīlis est Dēlectātiō?

because he who seems to you insufficiently educated, is so for this reason: because he considered no education to exist except that which aided the discipline of the blessed life – should he waste time in the poets being rolled through... ...in which there is no solid usefulness, and all the amusement is childish?

aut sē, ut Platō, in mūsicīs, geōmetriā, numerīs, astrīs contereret – quae, et ā falsīs initiīs profecta, vērā esse nōn possunt: et sī essent vēra ¬ nihil afferrent quō iūcundius, id est, quō melius vīverēmus?

Or would he, like Plato, wear himself out in music, geometry, numbers, and astrology – which, having proceeded from false principles, cannot be true: and even if they were true ¬ they would bring nothing by which [*we might live*] more pleasantly, that is, by which we might live better?

eās, ergō, artēs persequerētur, vīvendi artem – tantam, tamque operōsam, et perinde frūctuōsam relinqueret?

Was he, then, to pursue those arts and abandon the art of living – so great, and so laborious, and correspondingly so fruitful?

nōn, ergō, Epicūrus inerudītus ¬ sed lī indoctī quī quae puerōs nōn didicisse turpe est ea putant – usque ad senectūtem esse discenda!

therefore, it is not Epicurus who is uneducated ¬ but those people are unlearned who think that the things which it is shameful for boys not to have learned – must be studied all the way into old age!

[U227a]

4. Being Cultured is not needed for Philosophy

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.25.4 & 7

Lucius Lactantius was from North Africa and was appointed as a professor of Latin rhetoric in Nicomedia by Emperor Diocletian – but lost his position during Diocletian's anti-Christian policies.

Later, Lactantius entered the circle of Constantine "the Great," serving as tutor to Constantine's son Crispus and supporting Constantine's pro-Christian policies in his writings.

Constantine presided over the Council of Nicaea (which defined core Christian beliefs), and a year later executed his own son Crispus (an act that further solidifies him as part of the Christian tradition of fathers sacrificing their sons).

Quid est aliud hominibus negāre sapientiam – quam mentibus eōrum vērum ac dīvīnum lūmen auferre?

What else is it to deny wisdom to human beings – than to take away from their minds the true and divine light?

quod sī Nātūra hominis sapientiae capāx est: oportuit Opificēs et Rūsticōs et Mulierēs et Omnēs, dēnique, quī hūmānam formam gerunt docērī ut sapiant – populumque sapientem ex omnī linguā et condiciōne et sexu et aetāte conflārī…

but if the human nature is capable of wisdom: then artisans and peasants and women and, finally, all who bear the human form ought to be taught so that they may become wise – and so that a wise public may be formed from every language, condition, sex and age…

…sēnsērunt hoc adeō Stōicī, quī et servīs et mulieribus philosophandum esse dīxērunt – Epicūrus quoque, quī rūdēs omnium litterārum ad philosophiam invītat…

…the Stoics sensed this to such a degree that they said philosophizing is necessary even for slaves and women – and Epicurus as well, who invites those untrained in all letters to philosophy…

5. Lactantius' Critique: A Full Education *is* Required

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 25.8 & 12

cōnātī quidem Illī sunt facere, quod vēritās exigēbat ¬ sed nōn potuit ultrā verba prōcēdī. prīmum, quia multīs artibus opus est ut ad philosophiam Possit accēdī…

They did, indeed, attempt to do what truth demanded ¬ but it was not possible to go beyond words: first, because there is need for many disciplines in order that one may be able to come to philosophy…

…ob eam causam Tullius ait abhorrēre ā multitūdine philosophiam. at, enim, rūdēs Epicūrus accipiet: quō modō, ergō, illa quae dē principiīs rērum dīcuntur intellegent – quae perplexa et involūta vix etiam polītī Hominēs assequuntur?

…Tullius* for that reason says that philosophy abhors the masses. but, indeed, Epicurus will accept the untrained: how, then, will they understand those things that are said about the principles of things – which are so perplexing and entangled that even refined men scarcely grasp [*them*]?

**Cicero express this view in Tusculanae Disputationes at 2.2.4.*

in rēbus, igitur, obscūritāte implicātīs et ingeniōrum varietāte cōnfūsīs et ēloquentium virōrum exquīsītō sermōne fūcātīs – quis imperitō ac rūdī Locus est?

therefore, in matters entangled by obscurity, confused by the variety of intellects, and adorned with the elaborate speech of eloquent men – what place is there for the unskilled and untrained?

dēnique, nullās umquam mulierēs philosophārī docuērunt – praeter ūnam ex omnī memoriā: Themistēn

and finally, they never taught any women to philosophize – except one from all memory: Themista

[U227b]

6. Art is Defined by its Function

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scholiast on Dionysius Thrax (fl. 130 BCE), The Art of Grammar

section 649, line 26 (Alfred Hilgard edition, page 108)

οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὴν τέχνην: "Τέχνη ἐστὶ μέθοδος ἐνεργοῦσα τῷ βίῳ τὸ συμφέρον" – "ἐνεργοῦσα" δὲ οἷον "ἐργαζομένη"

the Epicureans define art in this way: "an art is an active pursuit in what mutually benefits life" – and "active in" [*here means*] something like "working on"

Art is a working process that actively produces benefit in life.

Consider also Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr. 12 col. 2, 8–11)

"for needs and circumstances over the course of time produced all [the arts]"

"πάσας [τὰς τέχνας] γὰρ ἐγέννησαν αἱ Χρεῖαι καὶ Περιπτώσεις μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου"

Ἐπικούρειος *(α, ον)*	Epicurean	**ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΣ** *running toward [to assist]*
ὁρίζειν	to set a limit	**ὉΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *separating*
ἡ τέχνη **αἱ τέχναι**	art	**ΤΕΧΝΗ** *technique*
ἡ πρόσοδος **αἱ προσόδοι**	addition	**ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟΣ** *path toward*
ἡ μέθοδος **αἱ μέθοδοι**	pursuit	**ΜΕΘΟΔΟΣ** *along path*
τὸ ἔργον **τὰ ἔργα**	task	**ΕΡΓΟΝ** *work*
τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of working within*
ἡ ἐνέργεια **αἱ ἐνέργειαι**	activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ** *working within*
ἐνεργεῖν	to be active in	**ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ** *working within*
ὁ βίος **οἱ βίοι**	lifestyle / life	**ΒΙΟΣ** *life*
συμφέρειν	to be mutually beneficial	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing together*
τὸ συμφέρον **τὰ συμφέροντα**	mutual benefit	**ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ** *bringing together*
ἐργάζεσθαι	to be working	**ΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *work*

[U228]

7. The Rabble around Fairytales

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 2, 1086F

(Aristódēmos speaking about Heracleides, both characters in this dialogue)

This Heracleides is otherwise unknown but (given the context in this dialogue) may have been an Epicurean leader.

(There also was a Heracleides Pontikós (fl. c. 350 BCE), a pupil of Plato, playwright, and astronomer. He is mentioned in On Frank Criticism: "as Epicurus maintains consistently both in his writings Against Democritus and Against Heracleides.")

ὑπολαβὼν, οὖν Ἀριστόδημος "Ἡρακλείδης, μὲν οὖν" ἔφη "γραμματικὸς ὤν, ἀντὶ 'τῆς ποιητικῆς τύρβης,' ὡς ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι, καὶ 'τῶν Ὁμήρου μωρολογημάτων' ἀποτίνει ταύτας Ἐπικούρῳ χάριτας – ἢ ὅτι Μητρόδωρος, ἐν γράμμασι τοσούτοις, τῷ ποιητῇ λελοιδόρηκεν"

while responding, then Aristódēmos said "Heracleides, then, being a grammarian, in exchange for 'the poetic rabble,' as they say, and 'the foolish sayings of Homer' repays these favors to Epicurus – or because Metrodorus, in so many writings, rebuked the poet"

Aristodemus then subjoined: Heraclides, you know, is a great philologist; and that may be the reason why he made Epicurus those amends for 'the poetic din' (so that party style poetry) and for 'the fooleries of Homer,' or else, it may be, it was because Metrodorus had libelled that poet in so many books.

*Metrodorus wrote criticisms of Homer – in doing so, he may have used the phrases "the poetic rabble (**ἡ ποιητικὴ τύρβη**)" and "the foolish sayings of Homer (**τὰ Ὁμήρου μωρολογήματα**)."*

ποιητικός (ή, όν)	productive, [or] poetic	**ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of gathering*
ἡ τύρβη **αἱ τύρβαι**	rabble	**ΤΥΡΒΗ** *uproar*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
τὸ μωρολόγημα **τὰ μωρολογήματα**	foolish saying	**ΜΩΡΟΛΟΓΗΜΑ** *foolish reasoning*

8. Gods are not Anthropopathic

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellenies, 5.14

καὶ τὸ παραδοξότατον: Ὅμηρος γιγνώσκειν φαίνεται τὸ θεῖον ὁ ἀνθρωποπαθεῖς εἰσάγων τοὺς θεούς – ὃν οὐδ' οὕτως αἰδεῖται Ἐπίκουρος

what is also most paradoxical: Homer seems to recognize the divine when he introduces the gods as anthropopathic [*i.e., subject to human passions*] – whom [*i.e., the divine*] not even in this way does Epicurus revere

This passage continues: "for [Homer] says: 'Why do you chase me with swift feet, O son of Peleus, you who are yourself mortal, (pursuing) an immortal god? Have you not yet realized that I am a god?' For he has shown that the Divine cannot be caught or comprehended by a mortal – neither by feet, nor hands, nor eyes, nor, in sum, by the body. To whom then will you liken the Lord? Or to what likeness will you compare Him?"

[U229]

9. Harmful Bait: The Myths of the Poets

Heraclitus (fl. f. 50 CE), Allegories of Homer, 4

Heraclitus "glory of Hērāklês" was a grammarian and rhetor (not to be confused with the more famous Heraclitus of Ephesus or with the two men named Heracleides "descendant of Hērāklês" above)

In "Allegories of Homer" Heraclitus defends Homer against accusations of immoral portrayals of the gods – by arguing that Homer is better understood as providing allegories (for example, that relationship between Aphrodite and Ares does not represent those gods – but only represents Love and Strife).

οὐδ᾽ Ἐπικούρου Φροντὶς ἡμῖν – ὃς τῆς ἀσέμνου περὶ τοὺς ἰδίους κήπους ἡδονῆς γεωργός ἐστιν: ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥσπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀφοσιούμενος

nor is there any concern for us of Epicurus – who is a cultivator of unchaste pleasure in his own gardens: devoting himself to [*opposing*] all that is poetic in the same way as if it were a ruinous bait of myths

10. Filling Poems with Asterisks

Heraclitus (fl. f. 50 CE), Allegories of Homer, 75

ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ φιλόσοφος Ἐπίκουρος "ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις κήποις γεωργὸς" – Ὃ, πᾶσαν ποιητικὴν ἄστροις σημηνάμενος ¬ οὐκ ἐξαιρέτως μόνον Ὅμηρον

Phaiāx calls the philosopher Epicurus "the cultivator of pleasure in his own gardens" – the one who, marking all that is poetic with stars [*i.e. asterisks, indicating criticism*] ¬ with no exception even for Hómēr

11. Rejecting the Poets and their Myths

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Republic" [p. 382 Bas.]

Próklos was a prodigy and influential Neoplatonist philosopher (becoming leader of the Academy in 437 CE until his death in 485 CE – his 48 years in charge of the Academy giving rise to his title Diádokhos "successor")

…καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα περὶ τῶν ἐνἍιδου διαμυθολογῶν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀνεφθέγξατο – ἢ Αὐτὸς λέγων ἢ ἄλλῳ λέγοντι χρώμενος: Διασκοπήσωμεν, ὅπῃ, ἄρα, ἀληθείας ἔχεταί τινος καὶ ταῖς Πλάτωνος ὑφηγήσεσι προσήκοντα φαίνεται…

…and before the rest, whatever things the poet uttered while thoroughly mythologizing about the things in Hades – whether speaking himself or using another who is speaking: let us examine in what way, then, those things hold any truth and seem to accord with Plato's expositions…

…ἀλλὰ Τὰ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ γεγραμμένα πρὸς τῷ τέλει – πῶς οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι διανοίας τῇ Ὁμηρικῇ ποιήσει…;

…but the things written in this treatise toward the end – how are they not of the same mind as Homeric poetry…?

Τί γὰρ, ἐν τούτοις, ἀπολείπεται τῆς μεγίστης τραγῳδίας; ὥστε ὁ αὐτὸς Λόγος καὶ ταῦτα ἐκβάλλειν ἢ μηδὲ τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν αἰτιᾶσθαι διδασκαλίαν. Λέγωμεν, τοίνυν, ἐπ' ἀμφότερον: εἴ τε τῶν Ἐπικουρείων Τις ἐγκαλεῖν ἐπιχειροίη τοῖς τοιούτοις μύθοις εἴ τε καὶ ἄλλος Τις…

What, in these things, is lacking from the greatest tragedy? So that the same reasoning [*compels us*] either to cast these out or not to blame Homeric teaching. Let us speak, then, on both counts: whether one of the Epicureans should attempt to blame such myths, or even someone else…

[U229a]

12. Rejecting the Study of the Professions

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 11, 1093C

Ἐξωθοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων [ἡδονάς]!

They even reject those [*pleasures that come*] from the professions!

ἐξωθεῖν	to eject [here, "to reject"]	**ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ** *pushing out*
τὸ μάθημα **τὰ μαθήματα**	profession	**ΜΑΘΗΜΑ** *the result of learning*

13. Rejecting the Study of Geometry

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), On the Utility of Faith, 6.13

Quis dēnique geōmetrīcās litterās Archimēdis legere magistrō Epicūrō aut discere voluit? contrā quās, Ille multum pertināciter, nihil eārum (quantum Arbitror) intellegēns, Disserēbat

> Who, finally, wanted to read or to learn the geometrical writings of Archimedes with Epicurus as the teacher? against which [*writings*, Epicurus] argued very stubbornly, understanding (as far as I can see) none of them

Archimedes of Syracuse was born in 287 BCE, and Epicurus died in 270 BCE – when Archimedes was 17. Augustine either confused the timeline, is only referring to later Epicureans, or deliberately used Archimedes symbolically to criticize Epicurus' rejection of geometry, despite the anachronism.

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.33.106 (Lucullus)

Polyaenus, quī magnus mathematicus fuisse dīcitur: is, posteā quam Epicūrō adsentiēns, tōtam geōmetriam falsam esse crēdidit – num illa etiam quae sciēbat oblītus?

> Polyaenus, who is said to have been a great mathematician: did he, after agreeing with Epicurus, and believing all geometry to be false – did he even forget those things which he knew?

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), Commentary on Euclid [p. 55 Bas.; 199.9 Friedl.]

τῶν δὲ τὰς γεωμετρικὰς μόνας ἀρχὰς ἀνατρέπειν προθεμένων – ὥσπερ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων

> but with those people having set it before themselves to overthrow the geometric unitary principles – just like the Epicureans

[U229b]

14. Rejecting the Study of Music

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Musicians, 27

καὶ μὴν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ Οἱ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα μουσικὴν ἀπεδέξαντο, Ῥητέον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτὴν συντείνειν ¬ ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἄλλοι, μὴ λειπόμενοι τῆς τούτων ἀξιοπιστίας – καθά περ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον – ἠρνήσαντο ταύτην τὴν ἀντιποίησιν, λέγοντες τοὐναντίον: αὐτὴν "ἀσύμφορον" εἶναι καὶ "ἀργὸν, φίλοινον, χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ"

> and indeed, NOT EVEN if those around Plato accepted music, must it be said that it contributes to well-being ¬ since others also, not lacking in their credibility – just like those around Epicurus – have rejected this claim, saying the opposite: that [*music*] is "useless" and "lazy, a lover of wine, careless with money"

The words in quote are not Epicurus – but Sextus Empiricus quotes Euripides (fr. 184 Nauck) to represent the Epicurean position.

In the original quote from Euripides, Zethus (a herdsman, representing practical skills that allow one to thrive in a life of action) critiques his brother Amphion (a lyre player, representing a quiet life of music-making and intellectual cultivation): "You begin troubles by introducing this Muse – who's lazy, wine-loving, and unconcerned with money"

[U230]

15. Chorus of Epicureans

Standing on Fixed Criteria

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. 20 BCE), On the Composition of Words, 24, p. 188

*Dionysius of Halicarnassus was a historian, classicist, and teacher of rhetoric – as well as one of the rumor-spreading madmen (**Οἱ Μεμηνότες**) mentioned by Diogenes Laertius*

Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορόν, οἷς Οὐδὲν μέλει τούτων, Παραιτούμεθα. τὸ γὰρ "οὐκ ἐπιπόνου τοῦ γράφειν ὄντως" ὡς αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος λέγει "τοῖς μὴ στοχαζομένοις τοῦ πυκνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου!" πολλῆς ἀργίας ἦν καὶ σκαιότητος ἀλεξιφάρμακον

We reject the chorus of Epicureans, for whom none of these things matter. The [*idea*] that "the tediousness of composing does not exist" as Epicurus himself says "for those not aiming at frequently shifting criterion!" was a counter-remedy for much idleness and awkwardness

*"The chorus of Epicureans (**ὁ χορὸς τῶν Ἐπικουρείων**)" is used here to mock the agreement among Epicureans compared to the other schools ¬ but the phrase can beneficially be appropriated!*

*Evoking the Tetrapharmakos, Dionysius uses the term "counter-remedy (**ἀλεξιφάρμακον**)"*

ἐπίπονος (ος, ον)	tedious	**ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ** *upon toil*
γράφειν	to compose	**ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ** *writing*
στοχαζόμενος (η, ον)	aiming at	**ΣΤΟΧΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *target*
πυκνός (ή, όν)	dense	**ΠΥΚΝΟΣ** *compacting*
πυκνὰ	frequently	
μεταπίπτειν	to shift	**ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling differently*
τὸ κριτήριον **τὰ κριτήρια**	criterion	**ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ** *instrument of dividing*

3. Philosophers

[U231]

1. Rejecting Irony

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Brutus, 85.292 (Atticus speaking)

Egō "īroniam" illam quam in Sōcrate dīcunt fuisse… …facētam et ēlegantem Putō… …ut, apud Platōnem, Sōcratēs in caelum effert laudibus Prōtagoram, Hippiām, Prōdicum, Gorgiam, cēterōs ¬ sē autem omnium rērum inscium fingit et rudem – decet Hoc nēscio quō modō illum: nec Epicūrō, quī id reprehendit, assentior

I consider that "irony," which is what they say was in Socrates… …to be witty and elegant… …as, in Plato, Socrates lifts up to the heavens with praise Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the rest ¬ but portrays himself as ignorant and unskilled in all things – this somehow suits him: and I do not agree with Epicurus, who criticizes that [*irony*]

[U232]

2. Aristotle is the first source for "Leucippus the Philosopher"

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.13

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Λεύκιππόν τινα γεγενῆσθαί φησι φιλόσοφον οὔτε Αὐτὸς οὔτε Ἕρμαρχος ¬ ὃν Ἔνιοί φασι, καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος, διδάσκαλον Δημοκρίτου γεγενῆσθαι

he himself [*i.e., Epicurus*] and Hermarchus say that a certain Leucippus never existed as a philosopher ¬ though some, including Apollodorus the Epicurean, say that he [*i.e., Leucippus*] was the teacher of Democritus

The ideas attributed to – and the existence of – a deterministic philosopher named "Leucippus" (a name means that "white horse") originate from Aristotle and Theophrastus and cannot in any way be distinguished from Democritus. No textual or inscriptional evidence from before Aristotle's time explicitly mentions Leucippus by name – no writings from the 5th or early 4th centuries BCE refer to Leucippus.

*Apollodorus the Epicurean (**Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος**), who was called by some "garden-tyrant (**ὁ Κηποτύραννος**)," wrote over four hundred books – including the multiple book "Life of Epicurus" and the "Chronology."*

[U233]

3. Independent of any School
(rejecting Pamphilus the Platonist)

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.26.72 (Cotta Speaking)

...Ista ā vōbīs quasi dictāta redduntur – quae Epicūrus oscitāns hallūcinātus est – cum, quidem, glōriārētur (ut Vidēmus in scrīptīs) sē magistrum habuisse nūllum

...these things are repeated back by you almost like dictations – which Epicurus hallucinated while yawning – while, indeed, he was boasting (as we see in his writings) that he had had no teacher

Xēnocrātēn audīre Potuit... et sunt quī putent audīisse: Ipse nōn vult, Crēdō, plūs nēminī.

He could have listened to [*i.e., been a student of*] Xenocrates... and there are those who think he did listen: he himself does not want, I believe, [*to grant the status of teacher*] any further to anyone else

Pamphilum quendam, Platōnis audītōrem, ait ā sē Samī audītum: ibī enim, adulēscēns, habitābat cum patre et frātribus, quod in eam pater eius Neoclēs agripēta vēnerat ¬ sed cum Agellus eum nōn satis aleret – ut opīnor – ludī magister fuit

He says that a certain Pamphilus, a hearer of Plato, was heard by him at Samos: there indeed, as a youth, he was living with his father and brothers, because his father Neocles had come into that place as a land-claimer ¬ but since the little farm did not support him sufficiently – I suspect – he became a schoolteacher

sed hunc Platonicum mīrificē contemnit Epicūrus: ita metuīt nē quid umquam didicisse vidēātur

but Epicurus marvelously despises this Platonist [*i.e., Pamphilus*]: he is so afraid that he might seem to have ever learned anything

in Nausiphanē Dēmocriteō tenētur: quem (cum ā sē nōn neget audītum) vexat tamen omnibus contumēlīīs. atquī sī haec Dēmocritea nōn audīisset ¬ quid audīerat?

He was influenced by Nausiphanes the Democritean: whom (though he does not deny having heard from him) he nonetheless attacks with every insult. and yet, if he did not hear these Democritean [*teachings*] ¬ what did he hear?

quid est in physicīs Epicūrī nōn ā Dēmocritō? nam etsī quaedam commūtāvit (ut quod paulllō ante dē inclīnātiōne atomōrum Dixī) tamen, plēraque dīcit eadem: atomōs, ināne, imāginēs, īnfīnītātem locōrum, innumerābilitātemque mundōrum, eōrum ortūs interitūs – omnia ferē quibus nātūrae Ratiō continētur

What is there in Epicurus' physics that is not from Democritus? For even if he changed certain things (such as what I said just before about the swerve of the atoms) still, he says most of the same things: atoms, the void, images, the infinity of places, the innumerability of worlds, their origins and destructions – nearly all the things by which the account of nature is contained

For his first introduction into a philosophical school, it seems that Epicurus first listened to Pamphilus (a student of Plato).

Epicurus rejected Pamphilus teachings of Platonism. Epicurus had no teacher in the sense that he was not the follower of an established school.

Cicero admits the idea that Neocles struggled with the family farm was only speculation.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A

τί δ᾽ οὐκ ἔμελλεν Αὐτὸς – οὕτω σπαργῶν περιμανῶς, καὶ σφαδάζων πρὸς δόξαν; ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς, μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ (τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ) ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν ¬ σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν?

and what would he himself not have been likely to do – being so frenziedly puffed up, and twitching for the sake of fame? so that he not only rejected the founders [*of philosophy*], nor only contended with Democritus (the one from whom was taken the doctrines word-for-word) over syllables and diacritical marks

[U234]

4. Rejecting Determinism, Reviving Atomism

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.6.17, 21

in physīcīs, quibus maximē gloriātur, prīmum tōtus est aliēnus: Dēmocritea dīcit – perpauca mūtāns ¬ sed ita ut ea quae corrigere volt, mihi quidem dēprāuāre vidētur…

in physics, in which [*Epicurus*] especially boasts, he is first of all completely a stranger: he says Democritean things – changing very few ¬ but in such a way that those things which he wants to correct, he seems to me indeed to distort…

…ita, quae mūtat, ea corrumpit – quae sequitur sunt tōta Dēmocritī… …quae, etsī mihi nūllō modō probantur: tamen Dēmocritum, laudātum ā cēterīs ab hōc (quī eum ūnum secūtus esset) Nōllem vituperātum

…thus, what he changes, those things he corrupts – what he follows is wholly from Democritus… …those things which, even if in no way approved by me: yet I would not want Democritus, praised by others, to be blamed by this man (who followed him as a sole [*guide*]!)

5. Accepting Aspects of Democritus' Philosophy

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1108E

In the opening of this section, Plutarch compares Colotes to Lydia's King Candaules (the last of the Heraclid dynasty) – who was killed by Gyges (the founder of the Mermnad dynasty).

The door behind which Kind Candaules hid Gyges to see the Queen nude, was the same door behind which the Queen hid Gyges to murder King Candaules. Gyges then reigned for 38 years (from 680 – 644 BCE) – Croesus, the famous wealthy king, was the great-great-grandson of Gyges.

ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ, καθάπερ ὁ Λυδὸς ἐφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ἀνοίγειν οὐ θύραν μίαν ¬ ἀλλὰ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν ἀποριῶν καὶ μεγίσταις περιβάλλειν τὸν Ἐπίκουρον: Ἄρχεται γὰρ ἀπὸ Δημοκρίτου, καλὰ καὶ πρέποντα διδασκάλια κομιζομένου παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ

but it seems to me that, just like the Lydian [*King Candaules did*] upon himself, [*Colotes just*] does not open one door ¬ but surrounds Epicurus with the greatest amount and largest of difficulties: for he begins from Democritus, while taking from him noble and fitting teachings

καίτοι, πολὺν χρόνον, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀνηγόρευε Δημοκρίτειον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ὡς Ἄλλοι τε λέγουσι – καὶ Λεοντεύς, εἷς τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἄκρον Ἐπικούρου μαθητῶν, πρὸς Λυκόφρονα γράφων, τιμᾶσθαί τέ φησι τὸν Δημόκριτον ὑπ᾽ Ἐπικούρου διὰ τὸ πρότερον ἅψασθαι τῆς ὀρθῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τὸ σύνολον τὴν πραγματείαν "Δημοκρίτειον" προσαγορεύεσθαι ¬ διὰ τὸ περιπεσεῖν αὐτὸν πρότερον ταῖς ἀρχαῖς περὶ φύσεως

and yet, for a long time, Epicurus himself called himself a Democritean, as others say – and Leonteus as well, one of Epicurus' top students, writing to Lycophron says also that Democritus was honored by Epicurus because he had first touched upon correct knowledge, and that the entire [*philosophical*] effort was called "Democritean" ¬ because he had stumbled upon the principles concerning nature earlier

ὁ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἄντικρυς, περὶ φιλοσοφίας, εἴρηκεν ὡς, εἰ μὴ προκαθηγήσατο Δημόκριτος ¬ οὐκ ἂν προῆλθεν Ἐπίκουρος ἐπὶ τὴν σοφίαν

Metrodorus said outright, in regards to philosophy, that if Democritus had not led the way ¬ Epicurus would not have advanced toward wisdom

[U235]

6. Rejecting Aristotle and Phaedo

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.33.93 (Cotta speaking)

...quandō quidem haec esse in deō propter pulchritūdinem Vultis. Istīsne fidentēs somniīs – nōn modo Epicūrus et Mētrōdōrus et Hermarchus contrā Pythagoram, Plātōnem, Empedoclēmque dīxērunt – sed meretrīcula etiam Leontion contrā Theophrastum scrībere ausa est?...

...since indeed you want these [*parts of the body*] to exist in god because of beauty. Believing in these dreams [*of anthropomorphic gods*] – not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus spoke against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles – but even that little harlot Leontion dared to write against Theophrastus?...

...cum Epicūrus Aristotelem uexārit contumēliōsissimē – Phaedōnī Socraticō turpissimē male dīxerit

...although Epicurus treated Aristotle with the most contempt – Phaedo [*of Elis*], the disciple of Socrates, he foully slandered

Phaedo was born to a wealthy family in Elis, but was taken as a slave in 401 BCE. He was freed by Socrates and become a close student. (Phaedo is the main speaker in Plato's "Phaedo," which recounts Socrates' final conversation).

Phaedo later returned to his hometown and founded the Elean School of philosophy (teaching that virtue is knowledge, the mind is the sole source of the good, and the soul is immortal).

Mētrōdorī sōdālis suī frātrem, Timocratem, quia nescīo quid in philosophiā dissentīret, tōtīs volūminibus concīderit: in Dēmocritum ipsum, quem secūtus est, fuerit ingrātus – Nausiphānem, magistrum suum (ā quō nōn nihil didicerat) tam male accēperit

> [*Epicurus*] also pelted Timocrates, the brother of his companion Metrodorus, with whole volumes because he disagreed for some reason in philosophy: he was ungrateful even to Democritus himself, whom he followed – Nausiphanes, his teacher (from whom he had learned something) he treated very badly

[Sedley] "My confident guess is that both these parts of Cotta's speech derive from a single Academic source, presumably Philo, Cicero's former teacher, whose information will have come ultimately from Timocrates' anti-Epicurean writings."

[U236]

7. Mocking Nausiphanes

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8 sup.

πλεύμονά τε αὐτὸν Ἐκάλει – καὶ ἀγράμματον, καὶ ἀπατεῶνα, καὶ πόρνην

> [*Epicurus*] used to call [*Nausiphanes*] a jellyfish – and illiterate, and a swindler, and a prostitute

Jellyfish literally, "(sea) lungs"	Ναυσιφάνης *Nausiphanes* (fl.c. 310 BCE)	Pleúmones	**οἱ Πλεύμονες** *sides / lungs*
illiterate		Agrámmatos	**Ἀγράμματος** *not the result of writing*
swindler		Apateṓn	**ὁ Ἀπατεών** *deceiving agent*
prostitute		Pórnē	**ἡ Πόρνη** *selling*

[Sedley] "It is obvious to anyone browsing the surviving writings of Epicurus that he suffered from a deep-seated aversion to mentioning his rivals by name. Usually they appear simply as «someone» or «some people», or else generically as «the physicists», «the sophists», or «the astronomers». (Only once in his surviving philosophical works does he name a philosopher outside his own school, and this is Empedocles Περί φύσεως XIV, fr. 29.28.17-18 Arr). No doubt the nicknames listed by Timocrates served a similar function."

[U237]

8. Mocking Epithets (from Plutarch)

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1086 D fin. – F sup.

(Zeuxippus speaking about Heracleides – both peers of Plutarch and characters in this dialogue, given the context, Heracleides may be an Epicurean leader)

προελθόντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον, ὥσπερ Εἰώθειμεν ἐκ τῆς διατριβῆς, Ζεύξιππος "ἐμοὶ μέν" ἔφη "Δοκεῖ πολὺ τῆς προσηκούσης ὁ Λόγος εἰρῆσθαι παρρησίας μαλακώτερον ¬ ἀπίασι δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐγκαλοῦντες Οἱ περὶ Ἡρακλείδην, τοῦ

Ἐπικούρου καὶ τοῦ Μητροδώρου – ἡμῖν μηδὲν αἰτίων ὄντων θρασύτερον καθαψαμένοις!"

> with us advancing into the gymnasium, just as we were accustomed to do after the lecture, Zeuxippus said "to me it seems that the argument was spoken much more mildly than the frankness that was fitting ¬ and yet those around Heracleides go off, accusing us regarding Epicurus and Metrodorus – while in no way is there fault for us who have been attacked rather more boldly!"

καὶ ὁ Θέων "εἶτ᾽ οὐκ Ἔλεγες"εἶπεν "ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνων ὁ Κωλώτης παραβαλλόμενος, εὐφημότατος ἀνδρῶν φαίνεται;"

> and Theon said, "so didn't you say that, Kōlōtēs, when compared to those of their [*school*], seems the most moderate of men?"

"τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα – 'βωμολοχίας,' 'ληκυθισμούς,' 'ἀλαζονείας,' 'ἑταιρήσεις,' 'ἀνδροφονίας,' 'βαρυστόνους,' 'πολυφθόρους,' 'βαρυεγκεφάλους' συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἱππάρχου: καὶ, τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν;"

> "indeed, the most shameful utterances among men – 'Altar-Beggars,' 'Clatterers,' Pretenders,' 'Courtesanry,' 'Manslayers,' 'Groaners,' 'Grand Wreckers,' and 'Thickskulls' – they brought together [*these epithets for the followers of*] Aristotle, Socrates, Pythagoras, Protagoras, Theophrastus, Heracleides, Hipparchia: indeed, whom among the distinguished have they not attacked?"

the Clatterers	**οἱ περὶ** **Πυθαγόραν** *followers of* *Pythagoras* (530 BCE onward)	Lēkythismoí	**οἱ Ληκυθισμοί** *action of* *a lekythos*
the Thickskulls	**οἱ περὶ** **Πρωταγόραν** *followers of* *Protagoras*	Baryengképhaloi	**οἱ Βαρυεγκέφαλοι** *heavy head*
the Pretenders	**οἱ περὶ** **Σωκράτη** *followers of* *Socrates* (430 BCE onward)	Alazoneîai	**αἱ Ἀλαζονεῖαι** *vagrant / boaster*
the Manslayers	**οἱ περὶ** **Ἡρακλείδην** *followers of* *Heracleides* *of Aenus*	Androphoníai	**αἱ Ἀνδροφονίαι** *man slaying*
the Grand Wreckers	**οἱ Διαλεκτικοί** *Dialecticians*	Polýphthoroi	**οἱ Πολύφθοροι** *having damaged* *much*
the Groaners	**οἱ περὶ** **Θεόφραστον** *followers of* *Theophrastus* (fl. 330 BCE)	Barýstonoi	**οἱ Βαρύστονοι** *heavy tone*
the Altar-Beggars	**οἱ περὶ** **Ἱππαρχίαν** *followers of* *Hipparchia* *of Maroneia* (fl.c. 325 BCE)	Bōmolochíai	**αἱ Βωμολοχίαι** *ambushing* *the altar* *[i.e., to beg]*
the Courtesanry		Hetairéseis	**αἱ Ἑταιρήσεις** *process of being* *a courtesan*

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 29, 1124C

Σοφισταὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ Ἀλαζόνες οἱ πρὸς ἄνδρας ἐλλογίμους οὕτως ἀσελγῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως γράφοντες

> the [*true*] sophists and the pretenders are those who write so shamelessly and arrogantly against reputable men!

[U238]

9. Mocking Epithets (from Laertius)

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.8

τούς τε περὶ Πλάτωνα "Διονυσοκόλακας" καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα "Χρυσοῦν," καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη "Ἄσωτον" (ὃν, καταφαγόντα τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν – στρατεύεσθαι καὶ φαρμακοπωλεῖν)

> [*Epicurus called*] those around Plato "the Dionysus-flatterers," and Plato himself "Golden" and Aristotle "degenerate," (who, having devoured his paternal estate – engaged in military service and selling drugs)

"φορμοφόρον" τε Πρωταγόραν (καὶ γραφέα Δημοκρίτου, καὶ ἐν κώμαις γράμματα διδάσκειν)

> and [*said that*] Protagoras was "a basketbearer" (and a scribe of Democritus, and taught letters in villages)

Ἡράκλειτόν τε "κυκητὴν" καὶ Δημόκριτον "Ληρόκριτον" καὶ Ἀντίδωρον "Σαννίδωρον," – τούς τε *Κυζικηνούς "ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος," καὶ τοὺς Διαλεκτικοὺς "πολυφθόρους" ¬ Πύρρωνα δ᾽ "ἀμαθῆ" καὶ "ἀπαίδευτον"

> [*Epicurus called*] Heraclitus "Agitator," and Democritus "Arbiter of Absurdities," and Antidorus "Wood-giver," – and the Cyzicenes "Enemies of Greece," and the Dialecticians "the Grand Wreckers," ¬ and Pyrrho "stupid" and "uneducated"

* [Sedley] *"Long's Oxford Classical Text of Diogenes Laertius still carries the old emendation* **Κυνικούς** *for* **Κυζικηνούς** *– surprisingly, since as long ago as 1936 Bignone pointed out an unmistakable parallel with a fragment of Philodemus On Epicurus 2.92 which cites a letter of Epicurus «concerning a certain Cyzicene astronomer-geometrician». This offered the vital clue as to the identity of the Cyzicenes:*

*Eudoxus of Cnidos (***Κνίδος***), the great mathematical astronomer and associate of Plato, taught for a period at Cyzicus (***Κύζικος***), and produced there several distinguished pupils. One of these, Polemarchus, in turn became the teacher of Callippus of Cyzicus, who was later to move to Athens and exert a profound influence on the meteorological thinking of Aristotle. All this points to an established Eudoxan school at Cyzicus, which our fragment suggests was still going strong in Epicurus' day."*

the Agitator	**Ἡράκλειτος** *Heraclitus* *of Ephesus* (fl. 500 BCE)	Kykētḗs	**ὁ Κυκητής** *wheel*
the Basketbearer	**Πρωταγόρας** *Protagoras* (fl. 450 BCE)	Phormophóros	**ὁ Φορμοφόρος** *wicker basket carrying*
the Arbiter of Absurdities	**Δημόκριτος** *Democritus* (fl.420 BCE)	Lērókritos	**ὁ Ληρόκριτος** *judge of nonsense*

the Golden	Πλάτων *Plato* (fl. 387 BCE)	Chrysoûs	ὁ Χρυσοῦς *shining*
the Dionysus-Flatterers	οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα *followers of* *Plato*	Dionysokólakes	οἱ Διονυσοκόλακες *Dionysus flatterer*
the Enemies of Greece	οἱ Κυζικηνοί *the Cyzicenes* (350 BCE onward)	Echthroì tês Helládos	οἱ Ἐχθροὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος *hating*
the Degenerate	Ἀριστοτέλης *Aristotle* (fl. 344 BCE)	Ásōtos	ὁ Ἄσωτος *not saving*
the Grand Wreckers	οἱ Διαλεκτικοί *Dialecticians*	Polýphthoroi	οἱ Πολύφθοροι *having damaged much*
the Wood-Giver	Ἀντίδωρος *Antidorus* *(fl.c 330 BCE)*	Sannídōros	ὁ Σαννίδωρος *gift of* *penis / plank*
stupid	Πύρρων *Pyrrho* (fl. 320 BCE)	Amathḗs	ὁ Ἀμαθής *not learning*
uneducated		Apaídeutos	ὁ Ἀπαίδευτος *not educated*

10. Arcesilaus – Criticized

[U239]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 26, 1121 E fin.

*Arcesilaus (*Ἀρκεσίλᾱος*, "assisting the people") was 25 years younger than Epicurus and was a student of both Theophrastus and Pyrrho.*

Arcesilaus was popular and influential during Epicurus' lifetime. He was elected the sixth scholarch of the academy in 264 BCE – upon the death of Crates of Athens, the last scholarch of the Old Academy (6 years after Epicurus' death).

Arcesilaus bridged Peripatetic, Skeptical, and Academic traditions – and turned the Academy toward Academic Skepticism:

Inspired by Pyrrhonist skepticism, Arcesilaus emphasized the skepticism present in Plato's writings, moved the Academy from Pythagoras toward Pyrrho, and initiated Academic Skepticism (and in doing so, also initiated the "Middle Academy").

τοῦ δὲ Ἀρκεσιλάου τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐ μετρίως ἔοικεν ἡ Δόξα παραλυπεῖν – ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαπηθέντος

> the reputation of Arcesilaus seems to immoderately distress Epicurus – given that [*Arcesilaus*] was especially admired among the philosophers in those times

μηθὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἴδιον λέγοντα, Φησὶν, ὑπόληψιν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώποις ἀγραμμάτοις – ἅτε δὴ πολυγράμματος Αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ μεμουσωμένος

> although [*Arcesilaus*] said nothing of his own, as [*Colotes*] says, he produced supposition and opinion in unlettered people – since [*Colotes*] himself is indeed very learned and initiated into the Muses [*i.e., cultured*]

ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ *taking hold under*

"Arcesilaus said nothing of his own" probably refers to the fact that Arcesilaus did not write any words (another way in which he was very unlike Epicurus). Diogenes reports that he "never wrote a book because he suspended judgment on all matters" (although "he was caught revising certain works") – instead he was "devoted to dialectic."

"Arcesilaus produced supposition and opinion in unlettered people" refers to Arcesilaus' affirmation of Skepticism.

Arcesilaus' reputation rightfully disappointed Epicurus – but Epicurus' popularity bothered Arcesilaus, as Laertius says "to someone who asked why pupils from all the other schools leave [the Academy] to join the Epicureans, but no one ever leaves the Epicureans he said 'because men may become eunuchs, but no eunuch ever become a man'"

Arcesilaus was a fan of Homer, and an extravagant wealthy aristocrat – who is also reported to have been "lecherous and fond of boys" (Laertius 4.40)

[U240]

*Arcesilaus (**Ἀρκεσίλᾱος**, "assisting the people," fl. 275 BCE), whose skepticism Epicurus greatly criticized (a pupil of Theophrastus and Pyrrho)*

——— must be clearly distinguished from ———

*Archelaus (**Ἀρχέλᾱος**, "leader of the people" fl. fort. c. 450 BCE), whom Epicurus praised for his physics-based philosophy (a pupil of Anaxagoras)*

11. Archelaus and Anaxagoras – Praised

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.12 fin.

μάλιστα δ᾽ ἀπεδέχετο, φησὶ Διοκλῆς, τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξαγόραν ¬ καίτοι ἔν τισιν ἀντειρηκὼς αὐτῷ – καὶ Ἀρχέλαον, τὸν Σωκράτους διδάσκαλον

> [*Epicurus*] especially approved of Anaxagoras among the ancients, Diocles says ¬ even though in some respects [*Epicurus*] had opposed [Anaxagoras] – and also [*Epicurus approved of*] Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates

Epicurus praised Anaxagoras and his student Archelaus for their contributions to physics.

The teachings of Epicurus and Anaxagoras include some similarities in meteorology, geology, hostility to Democritus, and composing in prose.

Anaxagoras is credited as the first philosopher to write in prose (not in poetic meter like earlier thinkers) (Laertius 2.11)

Metrodorus stated that Anaxagoras was "the first to pay serious attention to Homer's treatment of nature" (also 2.11)

Anaxagoras was fined, imprisoned, and sentenced to death for impiety due to declaring that the sun is a red-hot mass of iron (however, Pericles, who was his friend, successfully got his charges dropped). He then traveled to Lampsacus where he lived to the end of his life – where he was given a distinguished burial and honored with a local holiday "the Anaxagoreia" even 600 years after his death. (2.14)

According to Laertius, "it was [Archelaus] who first brought natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens."

The teachings of Epicurus and Archelaus include some similarities in the infinity of space, planetary formation, abiogenesis, moral relativism, and division of philosophy.

[U241]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.23 sup.

γέγονε δὲ [Μητρόδωρος] ἀγαθὸς πάντα – καθὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ Τιμοκράτους

[*Metrodorus*] became good in all things – just as Epicurus also bears witness in the prefaces [*of some of his books*] and in the third [*book against*] Timocrates

*[Usener] Regarding, **προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς**, if I am not mistaken, Diogenes means the prefaces of the books in which Epicurus had addressed Metrodorus at some length.*

THE STANDARD

1. On Judgment

[U242]

1. Epicurus' Twofold Division
(Physical & Ethical)

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 89.11

Epicūrēī duās partēs philosophiae putāvērunt esse:
[1a] nātūrālem atque [2] mōrālem

The Epicureans thought two parts of philosophy existed:
[1a] natural and [2] moral

[x] ratiōnālem remōvērunt, deinde cum ipsīs rēbus cōgerentur ambigua sēcernere – falsa sub speciē vērī latentia coarguere: Ipsī quoque locum, quem [1b] "dē iūdiciō et rēgulā" appellant, aliō nōmine ratiōnālem indūxērunt ¬ sed eum accessionem esse nātūrālis partis existimant

They removed the [x] rational [*part of philosophy*], but then, when they were forced by their very circumstances to separate ambiguities – [*and*] to expose false things hiding under the appearance of truth: they too introduced a section, which they call [1b] "concerning judgment and the rule [*i.e., the canon*]" – they introduced the rational [*part*] under another name ¬ but they considered it to be an appendix to the natural part

The most basic division in our philosophy is between [1] the natural/physical (which includes our sensations, i.e., our "measuring rod of truth") and [2] the ethical.

2. The Sensations are Physical

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.30

Εἰώθασι, μέντοι, τὸ Κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ Φυσικῷ τάττειν – Καλοῦσι δ' αὐτὸ "περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς" καὶ "στοιχειωτικόν"

they are accustomed, however, to place what relates to Standards together with the Physical – and they call it "[*the part*] concerning the criterion and the foundation" and "a component [*part of the Physical*]"

ὁ κανών **οἱ κανόνες**	standard	**ΚΑΝΩΝ** *measuring stick* *(ruler)*

τό κανονικόν τά κανονικά	what relates to standards	ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΟΝ *characteristic of measuring rod*
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ *producing*
φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of producing*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [in time]	ΑΡΧΗ *first order*
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ *result of a row (in a series)*
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ *instance of a row (in a series)*

3. Learning Methods of Disputation
(Not Full Dialectic Training)

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Against Cresconius, 1.13.16

Named after the Berber Christian bishop Donatus Magnus, the "Donatist schism" in Africa began in 311 and flourished for one hundred years, until the conference at Carthage in 411. Donatists were moral purity extremists who argued that Christian clergy must be faultless for their ministry to be effective and their prayers and sacraments to be valid.

The Donatists position was defended by a grammarian named Cresconius, against whom St. Augustine published a reply in four books.

Nōstī, enim, quam maximē apud Stōicōs vīguisse Dialecticam

You know, in fact, how greatly Dialectic flourished among the Stoics

quamvīs et ipsī Epicūrēī – quōs Imperītia līberālium disciplīnārūm nōn sōlum nōn pudēbat, vērum etiam dēlectābat ¬ quāsdam disputandī rēgulās quibus Quisque, ūsus, minimē fallerētur, sē potiūs et tenēre et docēre iactābant

and yet even the Epicureans themselves – whom ignorance of the liberal arts did not shame, but in fact delighted ¬ they boasted that instead they both understood and taught certain rules of disputation by which, having used [*them*], each person might be least deceived

quid est, enim, aliud Dialectica quam perītia disputandī?

What else, in fact, is Dialectic other than skill in disputation?

4. Archelaus' Twofold Division
(Physical & Ethical)

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.14

As seen above, "Epicurus also approved of Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates" [U240]

τῶν δὲ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησαμένων... ...Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος [μετήρχετο] τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν

of those who set up philosophy as twofold… …Archelaus the Athenian pursued the physical and the ethical

μεθ᾽ οὗ, Τινες καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τάττουσιν ὡς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα

along with him, some also classify Epicurus as one who also casts out the logical theory

Ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἵ φασι μὴ κοινῶς αὐτὸν τὴν λογικὴν παρῃτῆσθαι ¬ μόνην δὲ τὴν τῶν Στωικῶν – ὥστε δυνάμει τριμερῆ πάλιν ἀπολείπειν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν…

but there were others who say that he did not entirely reject logic ¬ but only that of the Stoics – so that he again leaves philosophy tripartite in principle…

…οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσβάλλουσιν: τὰ γὰρ κανονικὰ πρῶτον ἐπιθεωροῦσιν περί τε ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολούθων (ποιούμενοι τὴν ὑφήγησιν)

…but the Epicureans attack from the logical [*side*]: for first they examine the Canonical concerning both the clear and the unclear things, and those that follow from these (while composing an explanation)

As seen above, "[Epicurus] especially approved of… Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates." [U240]

[U243]

5. Certainty in Physics

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.19.63 (Torquatus to Cicero)

In dialecticā autem vestrā, nullam existimāvit esse nec ad melius vīvendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam

but in your [*Platonic*] dialectic, [*Epicurus*] thought there was no path either to better living or to more effective arguing

in physicīs plūrimum posuit – eā scientiā et verbōrum Vīs et Nātūra ōrātiōnis et consequentium repugnantiumve Ratiō potest perspicī

he placed the most [*importance*] in physics – through this knowledge the Force of words and the Nature of speech and the Reasoning of what follows or contradicts can be understood

omnium autem rērum Nātūra cognita: Levāmur superstitiōne, Liberāmur mortis metū, nōn Conturbāmur ignōrātiōne rērum – ex quā ipsā, horribilēs existunt saepe Formīdinēs

but when the nature of all things is known: we are relieved of superstition, we are freed from fear of death, and we are not disturbed by ignorance of things – from that [*ignorance*] itself, horrible fears often arise

dēnique, etiam morātī melius Erimus, cum Didicerimus quid Nātūra dēsīderet

finally, we will also be better morally, when we have learned what nature desires

tum vērō, sī stabilēm scientiam rērum Tenēbimus – servātā illā (quae, quasi, delāpsa dē caelō est ad cognitiōnem omnium) rēgulā, ad quam omnia Iūdicia rērum dirigentur: numquam, ullius ōrātiōne victī, sententiā Dēsistemus.

then indeed, if we hold a firm science of things – with that rule [*i.e., the canon*] preserved (which, as it were, has fallen from heaven for the understanding of all things), to which all judgments about things will be directed: we will never, overcome by anyone's speech, abandon that conviction

6. Certainty in the Sensations
(Physics as the Source of Virtues)

[continued from above] Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.19.64 (Torquatus to Cicero)

nisī, autem, rērum Nātūra perspecta erit: nullō modō Poterimus sensuum iūdicia dēfendere

unless, however, the nature of things is understood: we will in no way be able to defend the judgments of the senses

quidquid porrō animō Cernimus – Id omne orītur ā sensibus! Quī, sī omnēs vērī erunt (ut Epicūrī Ratiō docet) tum dēnique Poterit aliquid cognōscī et percipī

whatever we discern further with the mind – it all arises from the sensations! Which, unless [*the senses*] are all true (as Epicurus' theory teaches) only then will it be possible for anything to be known and grasped

quōs Quī tollunt et Nihil posse percipī dicunt: Iī – remōtīs sensibus – nē id ipsum quidem expedīre possunt quod disserunt!

Those who reject them [*i.e., the senses*] and say that nothing can be perceived: they – with the senses removed – they are not even able to explain the very thing which they are arguing!

praētereā, sublātā cognitiōne et scientiā, tollitur omnis Ratiō – et vītae dēgendae et rērum gerendārum

moreover, with knowledge and understanding taken away, all reasoning is destroyed – both of life to be lived and of things to be done

sīc, ē physicīs, et [1] Fortitūdō sūmitur contrā mortis timōrem, et [2] Cōnstantia contrā metum religiōnis, et [3] Sēdātiō animī omnium rērum occultārum ignōrātiōne sublātā et [4] Moderātiō nātūrā cupiditātum generibusque eārum explicātīs – et, ut modo Docuī, cognitiōnis rēgulā et iūdiciō ab eādem illā cōnstitūtō: vērī ā falsō [5] Distinctiō trāditur.

thus, from physics, [1] Courage against the fear of death is obtained, and [2] Constancy against fear of religion, and [3] Calmness of mind with the ignorance of all hidden things removed, and [4] Moderation, with nature of desires and their types having been explained – and, as I just described, through the rule [*i.e., canon*] and judgment of knowledge established by that same [*principle*], the [5] Distinction of truth from falsehood is handed down

7. Rejecting Technical Logic and Abstract Analysis

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 1.7.22

iam, in alterā philosophiāe parte, quae est quaerendī ac disserendī – quae "λογικὴ" dicitur – Iste vester plānē (ut mihī quidem vidētur) inermis ac nūdus est!

now, in the other part of philosophy, which is of inquiry and of discussion – and which is called "logical" – your man clearly (as it seems to me) is unarmed and naked!

Tollit Dēfīnītiōnēs, nihil dē dīvidendō ac Partiendō docet, nōn quō modō efficiātur concludāturque Ratiō trādit, nōn quā viā Captiōsa solvantur, Ambigua distinguantur ostendit

He removes Definitions, teaches nothing about Division and Partition, does not hand down in what manner Reasoning is formed and concluded, he does not show in what way Fallacies are solved or Ambiguities distinguished

iūdicia rērum in sēnsibus ponit – quibus sī semel aliquid falsī prō vērō probātum sit: sublātum esse omne iūdicium vērī et falsī putat… [lacuna]

He places judgments for things in the sensations – if something of the false has been once approved as true by [*the sensations*]: he thinks all judgment of true and false has been abolished… [lacuna]

…Cōnfirmat autem illud vel maximē: quod ipsa Nātūra (ut ait Ille) sciscat et probet (id est) volūptātem et dolōrem

…He especially affirms this: what nature itself (as that man says) demands and approves (that is) pleasure and pain

ad haec – et quae sequāmur et quae fugiāmus – Refert omnia

He refers everything to these – both what we should pursue and what we should avoid

8. "Epicurean" – *an early Christian Insult*

Saint Jerome (f. c. 385 CE), Contra Rufinum 1.30, 487 B

Jerome was a Roman Christian scholar and ascetic. He best known for producing the Vulgate, a translation of the Bible from the original Hebrew into Latin (as opposed to translating from the Greek of Ptolemy II Philadelphus' Septuagint)

Contra Rufinum ("Against Rufinus") is Saint Jerome's fiery three-book apology written around 401 CE, defending himself against Rufinus of Aquileia, his former friend turned theological enemy. Rufinus implied Jerome still secretly followed Origen's heresies (e.g., pre-existence of souls, universal salvation).

eī! quoniam Stōicī logicam sibi vindicant – et Tū huius scientiae dēlīrāmenta contemnis: in hāc parte "Epicūrēus" es

Oh! since the Stoics claim logic for themselves – and you despise the ravings of this discipline: in this respect you are "an Epicurean"

nec quaeris quō modō, sed quid loquāris: quid enim ad tē pertinet, sī Alius nōn intellegat quid velīs dīcere – quia nōn ad omnēs, sed ad tuōs loqueris?

nor do you inquire HOW you speak, but WHAT you speak: for what does it matter to you, if someone else does not understand what you want to say – since you are not speaking to everyone, but to your own?

In this quote, Jerome, who lived in Bethlehem, insults Rufinus by comparing him to an Epicurean – based on perceived similarities in the rejection of formal studies in Logic and Rhetoric.

Epicurus' name ("Apiqoros") still has negative associations in the area.

Epicureans are regarded by Jewish law as deserving death – killing an Epicurean is a mitzvah (a religious commandment), even if the killing is not sanctioned by any other laws. (Mishneh Torah, Rotzeah uShmirat Nefesh, 4.10)

The term is now used, not for Epicureans specially, but for all those who reject Judaism on intellectual grounds. (Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism pg. 549)

[U244]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.9

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα – οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον

> Epicurus said that all perceptible things are true and real [*i.e., existing*] – for he made no distinction between saying that something is true or that it exists

ἔνθεν καὶ, ὑπογράφων τἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος, "ἔστι" φησὶν "ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν" – καὶ "ψεῦδός ἐστι" φησί "τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν"

> and from there, while outlining what is true and false, [*Epicurus*] says "what is true is that which is in such a way as it is said to be" – he says "what is false is that which is not in such a way as it is said to be"

Epicurus defines truth as the agreement between what is and what is said to be, and falsehood as the lack of that agreement.

ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον)	existing [already]	**ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ** *beginning under*
ἀληθής (ές)	(α) true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*
τἀληθές = **τὸ ἀληθές** **τὰ ἀληθῆ**	[α] what is true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not hidden*
τὸ ψεῦδος **τὰ ψεύδη**	[-α] what is false	**ΨΕΥΔΟΣ** *falsehood / lie*

[U245]

10. All Judgment is based in Experience

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2 (Lucullus) 46.142

aliud Epicūrī [iūdicium est] – Quī omne iūdicium in sēnsibus et in rērum notītiīs et in volūptāte cōnstituī

> another judgment exists for Epicurus – who [*thinks*] all judgment is established in the senses, in the acquaintance with things, and in pleasure

We can look at Zeno of Citium's "Analogy of the Closing Hand" for contrast:

An open hand represents **φαντασία** *(an appearance),*
partially closed fingers represent **συγκατάθεσις** *(assent that the appearance is true),*
a closed fist represents **κατάληψις** *(thorough comprehension),*
and the other hand enclosing the fist represents **ἐπιστήμη** *(understanding),*
– true knowledge, possessed only by the wise.

According to Cicero "from this illustration he gave to that process the actual name of **κατάληψις***, which it had not had before"(Academica 2.145)*

<u>2. Sensation</u>

[U246]

1. The Criterion *is* What Is Apparent

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), Lives of Philosophers, 9.106 (Pyrrho)

ἔστιν οὖν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς Σκεπτικοὺς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς καὶ Αἰνησίδημός φησιν – οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος

according to the Skeptics, the criterion is what is apparent, as Aenesidemus also says – and so too Epicurus

*Aenesidemus (**Αἰνησίδημός**, "praised by the people") was a 1st-century BCE Skeptic who broke from the Academy – and revived Pyrrhonian Skepticism in reaction to Antiochus of Ascalon's Middle Platonist introduction of Stoic and Peripatetic dogma into the Academy.*

τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*

[U247]

2. Appearance and Judgment are Linked
(Appearance is Always True)

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216

[203] **Ἐπίκουρος, δὲ, δυεῖν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων – φαντασίας καὶ τῆς δόξης – τούτων, τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ "ἐνάργειαν," καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησιν ὑπάρχειν**

Epicurus, however, says that of the two things which are linked with one another – appearance and judgment – of these, the appearance, which he also calls "detectible reality," always exists as true

*What is apparent (**τὸ φαινόμενον**) to the senses is always real in some way – it is a true part of experience ¬ but judgment (**δόξα**) might go wrong when interpreting that appearance.*

τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
δυεῖν	*– genitive dual of –*	**ΔΥΟ** *two*
συζυγῶν *(οῦσα, ῶν)*	linked together	**ΣΥΖΥΓΩΝ** *yoked together*
[no nominative] **ἀλλήλων**	of one another	**ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ** *each other*
τὸ πρᾶγμα **τὰ πράγματα**	situation	**ΠΡΑΓΜΑ** *result of doing / affair*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] evidence	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ** *within clear*
τὸ ἐνάργημα **τὰ ἐναργήματα**	[E] detectible fact	**ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of being within clear*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργείαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*

ἀληθής *(ές)*	[α] true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not concealed*
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ *crying out*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*

3. Sensory Realism
(Opposing Relativism)

ὡς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα Πάθη (τουτέστιν, Ἡδονὴ καὶ Πόνος) ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τινων, καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ποιητικὰ συνίσταται (οἷον ἡ μὲν Ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων – ἡ δὲ Ἀλγηδὼν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν) ¬ καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς Ποιητικὸν Ἐνδέχεταί ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδύ, οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος Παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγεινόν

for just as the primary Experiences (that is, Pleasure and Suffering) are composed from certain productive things and in accordance with the very productive things themselves (such as Pleasure from what IS pleasant – and Pain from what IS painful) ¬ and is it not possible that what produces pleasure is not pleasant, nor what results in pain does not exist as painful

Pleasure and pain arise from things that are themselves truly pleasant or painful: when you feel pleasure, that is because something really and inherently pleasant caused it.

This view rejects radical relativism, asserting that (even if individuals may react differently) the causes themselves have a fixed nature.

πρῶτος *(η, ον)*	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ *first*
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience *(feeling)*	ΠΑΘΟΣ *enduring*
τουτέστιν = τοῦτο ἐστιν	"that is [to say]"	
ἡ ἡδονή αἱ ἡδοναί	pleasure	ἩΔΟΝΗ *sweet*
ἐπίπονος *(ος, ον)*	tedious	ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ *upon toil*
ὁ πόνος οἱ πόνοι	suffering	ΠΟΝΟΣ *toil*
ποιητικός *(ή, όν)*	productive, [or] poetic	ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of gathering*
τὸ ποιητικόν τὰ ποιητικά	what produces	ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΝ *characteristic of gathering*
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
ἡδύς *(ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)*	pleasant	ἩΔΥΣ *sweet*
τὸ ἡδύ τὰ ἡδέα	what is pleasant	ἩΔΥ *sweet*
ἡ ἀλγηδών αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ *the state pain*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν τὰ ἀλγοῦντα	what causes pain	ΑΛΓΟΥΝ *being in pain*
ἀλγεινός *(ή, όν)*	painful	ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΣ *pain*
τὸ ἀλγεινόν τὰ ἀλγεινά	what is painful	ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΝ *pain*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ *accepting in*

παρεκτικός (ή, όν)	resulting in	**ΠΑΡΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being from out of*
τὸ παρεκτικόν **τὰ παρεκτικά**	what results in	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*

4. Correspondence of Appearance and Reality

ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἧδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγῦνον ἀλγεινὸν τὴν φύσιν ὑποκεῖσθαι: οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν – παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐσῶν

but [*it is*] necessary that both what causes pleasure is pleasant and what causes pain is underlyingly painful by nature: so also in the case of the appearances – given that they exist around us as experiences

τὸ Ποιητικὸν ἑκάστης αὐτῶν πάντη τε καὶ πάντως φανταστόν ἐστιν – Ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὂν φανταστόν, μὴ ὑπάρχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται [*lacuna*] **ποιητικὸν φαντασίας καθεστάναι**

what produces each of the [*appearances*] is in every way and altogether capable of appearing – which cannot, being capable of appearing, not exist in truth such as it appears… …to establish what produces an appearance

What consistently appears hard is actually hard, what consistently appears cold is actually cold.

ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
τὸ ἧδον **τὰ ἧδοντα**	what causes pleasure [active in producing pleasure]	**ἩΔΟΝ** *sweet*
τὸ ἡδύ **τὰ ἡδέα**	what is pleasant [pleasant in quality]	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
ἡδύς (ἡδεῖα, ἡδύ)	pleasant	**ἩΔΥΣ** *sweet*
τὸ ἀλγοῦν **τὰ ἀλγοῦντα**	what causes pain	**ΑΛΓΟΥΝ** being in *pain*
ἀλγεινός (ή, όν)	painful	**ΑΛΓΕΙΝΟΣ** *pain*
κεῖσθαι	to be set [up]	**ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting*
ὑπόκεισθαι	to underlie	**ὙΠΟΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting under*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
φανταστικός (ή, όν)	appearance-based	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of appearing*
φανταστός (ή, όν)	capable of appearing	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΟΣ** *appearing*
τὸ πάθος **τὰ πάθη**	[π] experience *(feeling)*	**ΠΑΘΟΣ** *enduring*
τὸ ποιητικόν **τὰ ποιητικά**	what produces	**ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΝ** *characteristic of gathering*
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible [here, "can"]	**ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting in*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*

τἀληθές = τὸ ἀληθές τὰ ἀληθῆ	[α] what is true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not hidden*
ἡ ἀλήθεια αἱ ἀλήθειαι	truth	ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ *not hidden*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
καθιστάναι	to establish	ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *thoroughly standing*

5. Reasoning Analogically
with the Data from Each Sense

[204] **καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον Χρὴ λογίζεσθαι – τὸ γὰρ Ὁρατὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὁρατόν ¬ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτον ὁποῖον φαίνεται**

It is also necessary to reason nearly equivalently in regards to the [*sensations*] according to [*the details of*] each – for what is visible not only appears visible ¬ but is also such a thing as the kind of thing it appears [*to be*]

καὶ τὸ Ἀκουστὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως: γίνονται, οὖν, πᾶσαι αἱ Φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς

and what is audible does not only appear audible ¬ but actually in truth exists as such: and likewise for the other [*senses*]: all appearances, therefore, turn out to be true

Because our senses provide us with an actual presentation of our environment we can use the data they provide as a basis for analogical reasoning.

τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ *part*
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each [part]	
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near*
παραπλήσιος (*α, ον*)	nearly equivalent	ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ *near alongside*
παραπλήσιον	nearly equivalently	ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ *necessary*
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ *action of collecting*
ὁρατός (*ή, όν*)	visible	ὉΡΑΤΟΣ *seeing*
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*) [*here, "such a thing as"*]	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ποῖος (*α, ον*)	what kind of [thing]	ΠΟΙΟΣ *gathering*
ὁποῖος	the kind of [thing]	ὉΠΟΙΟΣ *that gathering*
	Part 2	
ἀκουστικός (*ή, όν*)	auditory	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ *characteristic of hearing*
ἀκουστός	audible	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΟΣ *hearing*

φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ *shining*
ἡ ἀλήθεια αἱ ἀλήθειαι	truth	ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ *not hidden*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this *(such as this)*	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΎΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ *beginning under (before)*
ὡσαύτως	likewise	ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ *as self*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced [here, "turn out to be"]	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	appearance	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ *state of appearing*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not concealed*

6. What Appears Must Exist

[205] **καὶ κατὰ λόγον: εἰ, γὰρ, ἀληθὴς λέγεται Φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται – πᾶσα δὲ Φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστὸν συνίσταται – πᾶσα, κατ' ἀνάγκην, Φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής**

> and according to reason: for, if an appearance is called true, say the Epicureans, whenever it is produced from something existing and in accordance with the very thing that exists – and [*given that*] every appearance is composed from something existing that is capable of appearing and in accordance with what is capable of appearing itself – [*then*] by natural necessity, every appearance is true

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ *collecting (words)* *[i.e., reasoning]*
Ἐπικούρειος *(α, ον)*	Epicurean	ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΕΙΟΣ *running toward [to assist]*
ὑπάρχων *(ουσα, ον)* ὑπάρχοντες *(ουσαι, οντα)*	existing [already]	ΎΠΑΡΧΩΝ *beginning under (before)*
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ *come into being*
πᾶς *(πᾶσα, πᾶν)*	whole	ΠΑΣ *all*
φανταστός *(ή, όν)*	capable of appearing	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΟΣ *appearing*
τὸ φανταστόν τὰ φανταστά	what is capable of appearing	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΟΝ *appearing*
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing together*
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ *up against* *constraint*

7. Changing Appearances

[206] **ἐξαπατᾷ δὲ ἐνίους ἡ Διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ (οἷον ὁρατοῦ) δοκουσῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασιῶν – καθ' ἣν ἢ ἀλλοιόχρουν ἢ ἀλλοιόσχημον ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ Ὑποκείμενον**

but the difference regarding the appearances that seem to fall upon [*us*] from the same sensible thing (such as from a visible one) deceives some people – according to which the original source is apparent as either differently colored, or differently shaped, or otherwise completely changed

Appearances are real and trustworthy *As the sun's apparent size and color change throughout the day, each appearance is truly a real physical impression from the sun – error can only arise if we assert the size of the sun (i.e., the original source of the appearances) without more direct information.*

ἐξαπατᾶν	to deceive	**ΕΞΑΠΑΤΑΝ** *thoroughly* *seducing*
ἔνιοι *(αι, α)*	some	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*
οἱ ἔνιοι	some people	**ΕΝΙΟΙ** *one*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*
αἰσθητός *(ή, όν)*	(A) sensible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ** *perceiving*
ὁρατός *(ή, όν)*	visible	**ὉΡΑΤΟΣ** *seeing*
δοκεῖν	to seem	**ΔΟΚΕΙΝ** *seeming*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	**ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling toward*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἀλλοιοσχήμων *(ον)*	differently shaped	**ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ** *holding other* *[form]*
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *[skin] color*
ἀλλοιόχρους *(ουν)*	differently colored	**ΑΛΛΟΙΟΧΡΟΥΣ** *different color*
ἀλλοιοσχήμων *(ον)*	differently shaped	**ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ** *holding different* *[form]*
ἀπηλλαγμένος *(η, ον)*	having been removed	**ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ** *removing* *away from*
ἐξηλλαγμένος *(η, ον)*	completely changed	**ΕΞΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ** *removing out*
φαίνειν	to appear	**ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ** *shining*
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*
τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *situated under*

8. False Dichotomy of the Skeptics

Ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι, τῶν οὕτω διαφερουσῶν καὶ μαχομένων φαντασιῶν Δεῖ τὴν μέν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ¬ τὴν δ', ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν (Ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὔηθες [207] **καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνορώντων τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι φύσιν)**

[*Epicureans*] conjectured that, of appearances differing and conflicting in this way, it is necessary that a certain [*appearance*] is true ¬ but the other [*appearance*], from opposing things, happens to be false (which is naïve and [*a sign*] of men not fully perceiving the nature in the things that exist)

In fact, the Skeptics are being naïve. To call one appearance false and the other true is to misunderstand their nature. They are both true and real presentations. Error arises only if you form a mistaken opinion about what the appearances suggest.

It is only through repeated and uncontradicted exposure to appearances that confidence is established about the nature of original source of any particular appearances.

ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	**ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping under*
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	**ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ** *reasoning action together*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*
ὑπονοεῖν	to conjecture	**ὙΠΟΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
διαφέρων *(ουσα, ον)*	differing	**ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ** *bringing through*
μάχεσθαι	to contend [here, "to conflict"]	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*
ἐναντίος *(α, ον)*	opposing	**ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ** *in against*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	**ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ** *happening*
ὅσπερ *(ἥπερ, ὅπερ)*	the very thing which	**ὍΣΠΕΡ** *relative pronoun* *emphatic particle*
τὸ ἦθος **τὰ ἤθη**	disposition	**ΗΘΟΣ** *custom*
εὐήθης	naïve	**ΕΥΗΘΗΣ** *good custom*
συνορῶν *(ῶσα)*	fully seeing [mentally]	**ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ** *seen together*

9. Correct Example from Sight

οὐ γὰρ ὅλον ὁρᾶται τὸ Στερέμνιον (ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν Ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον) ¬ ἀλλὰ τὸ Χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου

(let us make the reasoning based on visible things in this way) the hard object is not seen as a whole ¬ but [*only*] the color of the hard object

τοῦ δὲ χρώματος, τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου (καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου διαστήματος βλεπομένων) – τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου κἀν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τόποις ὑποκείμενον (καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρουμένων)

of the color, one [*part*] is on the hard object itself (just as in things seen from nearby and from a moderate separation) – the other [*part is*] outside the hard object and underlying in the adjacent locations (just as with things observed from a distant separation)

Τοῦτο δὲ, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἐξαλλαττόμενον καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον σχῆμα,
[208] **τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν ὁποῖον καὶ Αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται**

but this, being completely changed in the intervening [*space*] and taking on a particular shape, delivers such an appearance as the kind of thing which it also itself underlies in truth

ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	**ὉΡΑΝ** *looking*
τὸ στερέμνιον **τὰ στερέμνια**	hard object	**ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ** *object from making hard*
ὁρατός (ή, όν)	visible	**ὉΡΑΤΟΣ** *seeing*
ὁ λόγος **οἱ λόγοι**	reasoning	**ΛΟΓΟΣ** *collecting (words)* [i.e., reasoning]
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *skin color*
	Part 2	
σύνεγγυς	nearby	**ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ** *near together*
μετρεῖν	to measure	**ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ** *measuring*
μέτριος (η, ον)	moderate	**ΜΕΤΡΙΟΣ** *measuring*
τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
βλεπόμενος (η, ον)	seen	**ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *having been looking*
ἐκτὸς	outside	**ΕΚΤΟΣ** *out*
ἑξῆς	in succession	**ἙΞΗΣ** *possessing*
ἐφεξῆς	successively [here, "adjacent"]	**ΕΦΕΞΗΣ** *possessing upon*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
παρέκεισθαι	to displace	**ΠΑΡΕΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting alongside*
ὑπόκεισθαι	to underlie	**ὙΠΟΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting under*
ὑποκείμενος (η, ον)	underlying	
μακρός (ά, όν)	distant	**ΜΑΚΡΟΣ** *long-reaching*
τὸ διάστημα **τὰ διαστήματα**	separation	**ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ** *standing between*
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	observed	**ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *envisioning*
	Part 3	
μεταξύ	intervening	**ΜΕΤΑΞΥ** *among with*
ἀλλάττειν	to change	**ΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *changing*
ἐξαλλάττειν	to completely change	**ΕΞΑΛΛΑΤΤΕΙΝ**
ἐξαλλαττόμενος (η, ον)	[being] completely changed	**ΕΞΑΛΛΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ**

ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ *particular*
ἀποδέχεσθαι	to accept	**ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting from away*
ἐπιδέχεσθαι	to receive	**ΕΠΙΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *accepting upon*
ἀναδεχόμενος (η, ον)	taking upon [*itself*]	**ΑΝΑΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *accepting back/again*
τὸ σχῆμα **τὰ σχήματα**	shape	**ΣΧΗΜΑ** *holding [a form]*
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ἀναδιδόναι	to deliver	**ΑΝΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ** *giving up*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὁποῖος	the kind of [thing]	**ὉΠΟΙΟΣ** *that gathering*
ἡ ἀλήθεια **αἱ ἀλήθειαι**	truth	**ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ** *not hidden*
ὑπόκεισθαι	to underlie	**ὙΠΟΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *setting under*

10. Perceptual Realism

ὅνπερ, οὖν, τρόπον, οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ κρουομένῳ χαλκώματι Φωνὴ ἐξακούεται οὔτε ἡ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγότος ¬ ἀλλ' ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αἰσθήσει

in just the same way, therefore, neither is the sound thoroughly heard in a bronze instrument that is being struck, nor the [*sound*] in the mouth of the man who shouted ¬ but rather the [*sound*] that is falling upon our sensation

καὶ ὡς Οὐθείς φησι τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν – ἐπείπερ σύνεγγυς ἐλθὼν ὡς μείζονος ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται: οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν ὅτι ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος μικρὸν ὁρᾷ τὸν πύργον καὶ στρογγύλον ¬ ἐκ δὲ τοῦ σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον

and just as no one says that a person hearing a sound from a small distance hears falsely – just because after he has come nearby he instead receives it as louder: in this way I would not say that vision gives a false report because from a far separation it sees the tower as small and round ¬ but from nearby as larger and tetragonal

[209] **ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύειν – ὅτι καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ Αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιουτόσχημον: ὄντως ἐστὶ μικρὸν καὶ τοιουτόσχημον – τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾷ, ἀποθραυομένων τῶν κατὰ τὰ εἴδωλα περάτων**

but rather [vision] truly reports – because even when the sensible object is apparent to [*vision*] as small and of a certain shape: it really is small and of a certain shape – due to the transmission through the air, as the edges of the films are being broken off

Perception is real and valid even if the source is distant or altered. It is absurd to argue that "you do not hear the sound of musical instruments, or the words people are saying, just because you are not hearing the exact quality of those sounds right at their original location" – or that "you do not really smell a perfume in a room unless you smell it right at the source of the perfume."

But this appearance-rejection is exactly what people engage in when they say the sun is not really the size it appears to be – part of the sun's very existence is how it sheds its films, and thus how it appears across space.

ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

κρούειν	to strike	ΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ *bumping*
κρουόμενος *(η, ον)*	being struck	ΚΡΟΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ *bumping*
τό χαλκῶμα τά χαλκώματα	bronze instrument	ΧΑΛΚΩΜΑ *result of bronze*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement [here, "sound"]	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
ἀκούειν	to hear	ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ *listening*
ἐξακούειν	to thoroughly hear	ΕΞΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ
τὸ στόμα τὰ στόματα	mouth	ΣΤΟΜΑ *opening*
κράζειν	to shout	ΚΡΑΖΕΙΝ *crying out*
ὁ κεκραγώς οἱ κεκραγότες	he who shouted	ΚΕΚΡΑΓΩΣ *cried out*
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ *falling toward*
προσπίπτων *(ουσα, ον)*	falling upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΩΝ *falling toward*
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ *perceiving process*
	Part 2	
οὐθείς = οὐδείς *(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)*	no one [factual]	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ *not even one*
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ *standing away*
μικρός *(ά, όν)*	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ *little*
ἀκούων	hearing	ΑΚΟΥΩΝ *listening*
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement [here, "sound"]	ΦΩΝΗ *speaking*
ψευδῶς	falsely	ΨΕΥΔΩΣ *deceiving*
σύνεγγυς	nearby	ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ *near together*
ἐλθών *(ἐλθοῦσα, ἐλθόν)*	having come	ΕΛΘΩΝ *went*
παραλαμβάνεσθαι	to be received	ΠΑΡΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ *grasping alongside*
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι	to receive instead	ΑΝΤΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ *grasping against*
εἴποιμι	I might say	
ψεύδεσθαι	to give a false report	ΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ *deceiving*
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision [here, "appearance"]	ΟΨΙΣ *eye*
μακρός *(ά, όν)*	distant	ΜΑΚΡΟΣ *long-reaching*
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὉΡΑΝ *looking*
ὁ πύργος οἱ πύργοι	tower	ΠΥΡΓΟΣ *pre-Greek*
στρογγύλος *(η, ον)*	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ *droplet*
μείζων *(ον)*	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ *greater*
τετράγωνος *(η, ον)*	tetragonal	ΤΕΤΡΑΓΩΝΟΣ *four-angled*

Part 3		
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
ἀληθεύειν	to truly report	**ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ**
φαίνεσθαι	to be apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *shining*
αἰσθητός *(ή, όν)*	(A) sensible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ** *perceiving*
τοιουτόσχημος *(η, ον)*	of a certain shape	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣΧΗΜΟΣ** *such a kind of holding [a form]*
ὄντως	really	**ΟΝΤΩΣ** *existing*
ὁ ἀήρ *(τοῦ ἀέρος)*	air	**ΑΗΡ** *morning mist*
ἡ φορά **αἱ φόραι**	transmission	**ΦΟΡΑ** *carrying*
ἀποθραύειν	to break off	**ΑΠΟΘΡΑΥΕΙΝ** *shattering away from*
τὸ εἴδωλον **τὰ εἴδωλα**	film	**ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ** *object from appearing*
τὸ πέρας **τὰ πέρατα**	limit [here, "edge"]	**ΠΕΡΑΣ** *finished*

11. Physical Realty of Appearances

καὶ ὅτε μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, πάλιν ὁμοίως μέγα καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον ¬ ἤδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφότερα καθεστώς

and when [*it appears*] again large and differently shaped, [*it is*] again similarly large and differently shaped ¬ since by now both [*appearances*] are not established as the same thing

Τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστρόφου λοιπόν ἐστι δόξης: οἴεσθαι ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν

for this is what remains of distorted judgment: to believe that the appearance observed from nearby and from far off was the same

ἀλλοιοσχήμων *(ον)*	differently shaped	**ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ** *holding differently [form]*
ὁμοίως	similarly	**ΟΜΟΙΩΣ** *similar*
ἀμφότερος *(ος, ον)*	both	**ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ** *what is on both sides*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
καθεστώς *(ῶσα, ώς)*	[*having been*] established	**ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΣ**
part 2		
ἡ συστροφή **αἱ συστροφαί**	assemblage	**ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ** *twisting together*
διαστρόφος *(ος, ον)*	distorted	**ΔΙΑΣΤΡΟΦΟΣ** *twisting*
λοιπός *(ή, όν)*	remaining [rest of + gen]	**ΛΟΙΠΟΣ** *what is left over*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
οἴεσθαι	to believe	**ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ** *perceive*

σύνεγγυς	near by	**ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ** *near together*
πόρρωθεν	from far off	**πόρρωθεν** *from afar*
θεωρούμενος *(η, ον)*	observed	**ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *envisioning*
φανταστός *(ή, όν)*	capable of appearing	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΟΣ** *appearing*

12. Senses Perceive Appearances

[210] **αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε ‹τὸ› τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν Ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι – οἷον χρώματος – οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ Διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τὸ Ἐνθάδε ¬ ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε Ὑποκείμενον**

but it exists as the particularly of sensation instead to receive only what is present and moving it – such as color – and not to thoroughly separate that what is here is one thing ¬ but what is underlying there is another thing

διόπερ, αἱ μὲν Φαντασίαι, διὰ ταῦτα, πᾶσαί εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς ¬ αἱ, δὲ, Δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ‹ἦσαν› ἀληθεῖς – ἀλλ', εἶχόν τινα διαφοράν

therefore, the appearances, for these reasons, are all true ¬ the judgments, however, are not all true – but, they have some difference

ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἴδιος *(α, ον)*	particular	**ΙΔΙΟΣ** *particular*
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	**ῩΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ** *beginning under (before)*
τὸ παρόν **τὰ παρόντα**	what is present	**ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ** *existing alongside*
κινεῖν	to move	**ΚΙΝΕΙΝ** *moving*
κινοῦν *(οῦσα)*	moving	**ΚΙΝΟΥΝ**
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι	to receive instead	**ΑΝΤΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *grasping against*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	**῾ΟΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
τὸ χρῶμα **τὰ χρώματα**	color	**ΧΡΩΜΑ** *skin color*
ἐπικρίνειν	to discriminate	**ΕΠΙΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *dividing upon*
διακρίνειν	to thoroughly separate	**ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *dividing through*
ἐνθάδε	here / there	
ὑποκείμενος *(η, ον)*	underlying	**῾ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ** *setting under*
	part 2	
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἡ διαφορά **αἱ διαφοραί**	difference	**ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ** *carrying apart*

τούτων, γὰρ, αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς: ἐπείπερ Κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις – Κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς, τὰ δὲ μοχθηρῶς (ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναι τι καὶ προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ¬ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν τι τούτων – καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως)

for, of these [*judgments*], some were true, but others false: since our distinctions [*between true and false*] are established upon appearances – and we distinguish some things rightly, others wretchedly (either by adding and allotting something to the appearances ¬ or by removing something from them – and generally give a false report against unreasoning sensation)

[211] **οὐκοῦν, τῶν δοξῶν, κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς: ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἵ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας ¬ ψευδεῖς δὲ αἵ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας**

so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by detectible reality ¬ false are those contested and not attested by detectible reality

ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*
ἡ κρίσις **αἱ κρίσεις**	distinction [i.e., an act of discrimination]	**ΚΡΙΣΙΣ** *dividing*
κρίνειν	to distinguish	**ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ** *separating / judging*
καθιστάναι	to establish	**ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *thoroughly standing*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*
ὀρθῶς	{α} rightly	**ΟΡΘΩΣ** *straight upright*
μοχθηρός *(ή, όν)*	wretched	**ΜΟΧΘΗΡΟΣ** *hardship*
μοχθηρῶς	wretchedly	**ΜΟΧΘΗΡΩΣ** *hardship*
προστιθέναι	to add	**ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing toward*
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	**ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ** *ordering under*
προσνέμειν	to allot	**ΠΡΟΣΝΕΜΕΙΝ** *assigning upon*
ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping away*
κοινῶς	generally	**ΚΟΙΝΩΣ** *common*
ψεύδεσθαι	to give a false report	**ΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ** *deceiving*
καταψεύδεσθαι	to give a false report against	**ΚΑΤΑΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ** *deceiving against*
ἄλογος *(ον)*	unreasoning	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
	part 2	
ἡ δόξα **αἱ δόξαι**	judgment	**ΔΟΞΑΙ** *seeming*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	**ΑΛΗΘΕΣ** *not concealed*
ψευδής *(ής, ές)*	false	**ΨΕΥΔΗΣ** *deceiving*

τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	[M] what is attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *result of testifying upon*
ἐπιμαρτυρούμενος *(η, ον)*	attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *testifying upon*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	[W] to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα	[W] what is contested	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ *result of testifying against*
ἀντιμαρτυρούμενος *(η, ον)*	contested	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ *result of testifying against*
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργείαι	[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ *within clear*

14. Attestation *(definition)*

[212] **ἔστι δὲ Ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν κατάληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε ἐδοξάζετο: οἷον, Πλάτωνος μακρόθεν προσιόντος, Εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ Δοξάζω, παρὰ τὸ διάστημα, ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί ¬ προσπελάσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ, προσεμαρτυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος – καὶ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας**

Attestation is the comprehension through detectible reality of what is judged [*actually*] being the kind of thing it was once judged [*to be*]: such as, when Plato is approaching from afar, I imagine and judge, due to the separation, that it is Plato ¬ but when he has approached, it was confirmed that it is Plato, with the separation between having been removed – and it was attested through detectible reality itself

ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	[M] attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ *action of testifying upon*
ἡ κατάληψις *αἱ καταλήψεις*	*[Stoic Term]* *thorough comprehension*	*ΚΑΤΑΛΗΨΙΣ* *thoroughly taking hold*
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργείαι	[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ *within clear*
δοξαζόμενος *(η, ον)*	being judged	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ *seeming*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
τοιοῦτος *(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)*	like this [here, "actually"]	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ *this of this sort*
ὁποῖος	the kind of [thing]	ὉΠΟΙΟΣ *that gathering*
οἷος *(οἷα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
Πλάτων	Plato	ΠΛΑΤΩΝ *broad*
μακρὰν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ *long-reaching*
μακρόθεν	from afar	ΜΑΚΡΟΘΕΝ *long-reaching*
προσιών *(ῶσα, όν)*	approaching	ΠΡΟΣΙΩΝ *going toward*
ἡ εἰκών αἱ εἰκόνες	image	ΕΙΚΩΝ *portraying*
εἰκάζειν	to imagine	ΕΙΚΑΖΕΙΝ *portraying*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*

πέλας	near	ΠΕΛΑΣ *approaching*
προσπελάζειν	to approach	ΠΡΟΣΠΕΛΑΖΕΙΝ *approaching toward*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	[w] to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying against*
προσεμαρτυρεῖν	to confirm	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying further*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἉΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
συναίρειν	to remove… between…	ΣΥΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking together*
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying upon*

15. Non-Contestation *(definition)*

[213] **Οὐκ-ἀντιμαρτύρησις δέ ἐστιν ἀκολουθία τοῦ – ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος – ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ: οἷον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων εἶναι κενόν, Ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄδηλον ¬ πιστοῦται δι' ἐναργοῦς πράγματος Τοῦτο – τῆς κινήσεως**

Non-contestation is conformity of what is unclear – but has been postulated and judged – with what appears: such as Epicurus saying that void exists, which is the very thing that is unclear ¬ this is confirmed through a detectible situation – movement

ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις	[W] contestation	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ *action of testifying against*
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ *following*
ἡ ἀκολουθία αἱ ἀκολουθίαι	conformity	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΙΑ *following*
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ *experience together*
ὑφιστάναι	to be established	ὙΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ *standing under*
ὑποσταθείς	[having been] postulated	ὙΠΟΣΤΑΘΕΙΣ *stood under*
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ *seeming*
δοξασθείς	[having been] judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΘΕΙΣ *seemed*
ἄδηλος *(ον)*	(0) unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΣ *not clear*
φαινόμενος *(η, ον)*	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ *shining*
οἷος *(οἵα, οἷον)*	such as	ὉΙΟΣ *of this sort*
κενός *(ή, όν)*	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ *emptiness*
ὅσπερ *(ἥπερ, ὅπερ)*	the very thing which	ὉΣΠΕΡ *relative pronoun* *emphatic particle*
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief [based on experience]	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ *trust*
πιστοῦν	to confirm	ΠΙΣΤΟΥΝ *trust*
ἐναργής *(ές)*	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ *within clear*
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ *result of doing / affair*
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	[general] movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ *moving process*

[214] **μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ, οὐδὲ Κίνησις ὤφειλεν εἶναι – τόπον μὴ ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν περιστήσεται, διὰ τὸ πάντα εἶναι πλήρη καὶ ναστά: ὥστε τῷ δοξασθέντι ἀδήλῳ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ Φαινόμενον (κινήσεως οὔσης)**

for if the void does not exist, movement should not exist – with the moving body not having a location into which it will be transferred, because of everything being full and solid: so that what is apparent (that movement does exist) does not contest the unclear thing that has been judged

For **ναστά**, *consider Aëtius 1.12:6*

"**Δημόκριτος τὰ πρῶτά φησι σώματα (ταῦτα δ' ἦν τὰ ναστά) βάρος μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν**"

"Democritus says that the first bodies (these are the solid bodies) do not have heaviness"

τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
τὸ ὄφελος **τὰ ὀφέλη**	benefit	**ΟΦΕΛΟΣ** *helping*
ὀφείλειν	to be obliged [here, "should"]	**ΟΦΕΙΛΕΙΝ** *helping*
ὁ τόπος **οἱ τόποι**	location	**ΤΟΠΟΣ** *a place*
κινεῖσθαι	to be moved	**ΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *moving*
τὸ σῶμα **τὰ σώματα**	body	**ΣΩΜΑ** *body*
ἱστάναι	to stand	**ἹΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing*
περιϊστάναι	to transfer	**ΠΕΡΙΪΣΤΑΝΑΙ** *standing around*
περιστήσεσθαι	to be transferred [in the future]	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ** *will stand around*
πλήρης *(ες)*	full	**ΠΛΗΡΗΣ** *quality from filling*
ναστός *(ή, όν)*	solid	**ΝΑΣΤΟΣ** *squeezed, close-pressed*
δοξασθείς	[having been] judged	**ΔΟΞΑΣΘΕΙΣ** *seemed*
ἄδηλος *(ον)*	(0) unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΣ** *not clear*
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ** *testifying against*
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*

17. Contestation *(definition)*

ἡ μέντοι Ἀντιμαρτύρησις μαχόμενόν τί ἐστι τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει – ἦν γὰρ Συνανασκευὴ τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀδήλῳ

but contestation is something opposed to non-contestation – for there was a joint-refutation of the visible thing with the unclear thing that was postulated

οἷον ὁ Στωϊκὸς λέγει μὴ εἶναι κενόν – ἄδηλόν τι ἀξιῶν – τούτῳ δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι, ὀφείλει τὸ Φαινόμενον συνανασκευάζεσθαι (Φημὶ, δ' ἡ Κίνησις)

as for example the Stoic says that the void does not exist – asserting something unclear – and with this having been so postulated, what is apparent (movement, I mean) should be jointly refuted

[215] **μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ, κατ' ἀνάγκην, οὐδὲ Κίνησις γίγνεται – κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προδεδηλωμένον ἡμῖν τρόπον**

for if the void does not exist, then, by natural necessity, movement is not produced – according to the way [*of thinking*] already previously made clear by us

ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις**	[W] contestation	**ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying against*
μάχεσθαι	to contend [here, "to be opposed to"]	**ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ** *combating*
	Part 2	
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	**ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ** *preparing alongside*
ἡ συνανασκευή **αἱ συνανασκευαί**	joint-refutation	**ΣΥΝΑΝΑΣΚΕΥΗ** *preparing back together*
συνανασκευάζεσθαι	to be jointly refuted	
τὸ φαινόμενον **τὰ φαινόμενα**	what is apparent	**ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of shining*
ὑποσταθείς	[having been] postulated	**ΥΠΟΣΤΑΘΕΙΣ** *stood under*
ἄδηλος *(ον)*	(0) unclear	**ΑΔΗΛΟΣ**
ὁ Στωικός **οἱ Στωικοί**	the Stoic	**ΣΤΩΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of the Stoa [Poikile]*
τὸ κενόν	void	**ΚΕΝΟΝ** *emptiness*
ἡ ἀξίωσις **αἱ ἀξιώσεις**	request	**ΑΞΙΩΣΙΣ** *action of counterbalancing*
ἀξιῶν *(ἀξιοῦσα, ἀξιοῦν)*	asserting	**ΑΞΙΩΝ** *counterbalancing*
ὀφείλειν	to be obliged [here, "should"]	**ΟΦΕΙΛΕΙΝ** *helping*
ἡ κίνησις **αἱ κινήσεις**	[general] movement	**ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ** *moving process*
	Part 3	
ἡ ἀνάγκη **αἱ ἀνάγκαι**	[natural] necessity	**ΑΝΑΓΚΗ** *up against constraint*
γίνεσθαι = **γίγνεσθαι**	to be produced	**ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ** *come into being*
δηλοῦν	to make clear	**ΔΗΛΟΥΝ** *clear*
προδηλοῦν	to previously make clear	**ΠΡΟΔΗΛΟΥΝ** *clear before*
προδεδηλωμένος	having previously made clear	
ὁ τρόπος **οἱ τρόποι**	way	**ΤΡΟΠΟΣ** *manner / direction*

18. Non-Attestation *(definition)*

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ, ἡ οὐκ-Ἐπιμαρτύρησις ἀντίξους ἐστὶ τῇ ἐπιμαρτυρήσει: ἦν γὰρ Ὑπόπτωσις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὁποῖόν περ ἐδοξάζετο

and so likewise, non-attestation is opposed to attestation: for it is as an underlying occurrence through the detectible reality of what is being judged not existing as such a thing as the exact kind of thing it was judged [*to be*]

οἷον, πόρρωθέν τινος προσιόντος, Εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι ¬ ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος: Ἔγνωμεν δι' ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτων

Just as, when someone is approaching from far off, because of the separation we imagine it to be Plato ¬ but when the separation has been reduced: we come to know by detectible reality that it is not Plato

[216] **καὶ γέγονε τὸ Τοιοῦτον οὐκ-ἐπιμαρτύρησις: οὐ γὰρ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ Δοξαζόμενον**

thus something like this comes to be non-attestation: for what is judged was not attested by what is apparent

ὡσαύτως	likewise	**ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ** *as self*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
ἀντίξους (*υν*)	opposed to	**ΑΝΤΙΞΟΥΣ** *approaching against*
ὡσαύτως	likewise	**ὩΣΑΥΤΩΣ** *as self*
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις **αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις**	[M] attestation	**ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ** *action of testifying upon*
ἡ περίστασις **αἱ περιστάσεις**	circumstance	**ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ** *standing around*
ἡ περίπτωσις **αἱ περιπτώσεις**	incident	**ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling around*
ἡ ἔμπτωσις **αἱ ἐμπτώσεις**	collision	**ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling into*
ἡ ἀντίπτωσις **αἱ ἀντιπτώσεις**	contrary occurrence	**ΑΝΤΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling against*
ἡ ὑπόπτωσις **αἱ ὑποπτώσεις**	underlying occurrence	**ὙΠΟΠΤΩΣΙΣ** *falling under*
ἡ ὑποψία **αἱ ὑποψίαι**	suspicion	**ὙΠΟΨΙΑ** *looking under*
ἡ ἐνάργεια **αἱ ἐναργεῖαι**	[E] detectible reality	**ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ** *within clear*
δοξάζειν	to judge	**ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ** *seeming*
δοξαζόμενος	being judged	**ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeming*
τοιοῦτος (*τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον*)	like this (*such as this*)	**ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ** *this of this sort*
ὁποῖος	the kind of [thing]	**ὉΠΟΙΟΣ** *that gathering*
	part 2	
οἷος (*οἷα, οἷον*)	such as	**ὉΙΟΣ** *of this sort*
πόρρωθεν	from far off	**πόρρωθεν** *from afar*
προσιών (*ῶσα, όν*)	approaching	**ΠΡΟΣΙΩΝ** *going toward*
ἡ εἰκών **αἱ εἰκόνες**	image	**ΕΙΚΩΝ** *portraying*
εἰκάζειν	to imagine	**ΕΙΚΑΖΕΙΝ** *portraying*

τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation [here, "distance"]	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ *standing between*
αἱρεῖν	to choose	ἈΙΡΕΙΝ *taking*
συναιρεῖν	to reduce	ΣΥΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *taking together*
συναιρεθείς	[having been] reduced	ΣΥΝΑΙΡΕΘΕΙΣ *took together*
γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ *having distinguished*
	Part 3	
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ *testifying upon*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
τὸ δοξαζόμενον τὰ δοξαζόμενα	[Δ] what is judged	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of seeming*

19. Criterion *(general summary)*

ὅθεν, ἡ μὲν Ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ Οὐκ-ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι ἐστὶ κριτήριον ¬ ἡ δὲ Οὐκ-ἐπιμαρτύρησις καὶ Ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψεῦδος εἶναι: πάντων δὲ Κρηπὶς καὶ Θεμέλιος ἡ Ἐνάργεια

therefore, attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something being true ¬ but non-attestation and contestation of being false: while the basis and foundation of all things is detectible reality

ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ *action of testifying upon*
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις	contestation	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ *action of testifying against*
ἀληθής *(ές)*	(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ *not concealed*
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	criterion	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ *instrument of dividing*
τὸ ψεῦδος τὰ ψεύδη	[-α] what is false	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ *falsehood / lie*
ἡ κρηπίς αἱ κρηπῖδες	basis	ΚΡΗΠΙΣ *boot / groundwork*
ὁ θεμέλιος οἱ θεμέλιοι	foundation	ΘΕΜΕΛΙΟΣ *foundation*

Chart 2. Attestation & Contestation

<table>
<tr><th>ATTESTED</th><th></th><th>CONTESTED</th><th></th><th></th></tr>
<tr><td>(M)
ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον
attested

being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</td><td>∨
or</td><td rowspan="2">(¬W)
μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον
not contested

not being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</td><td>⇒</td><td>(α)
TRUE</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(¬M)
μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον
not attested

not being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment as long as there continues to be no attestation</td><td>∧
and</td><td>⇒</td><td>(O)
προσμένον
pending
(no evidence → unknown)</td></tr>
<tr><td>∨
or</td><td rowspan="2">(W)
ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον
contested

being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment long as there continues to be no attestation</td><td>⇒</td><td>(-α)
FALSE</td></tr>
<tr><td>(M)
ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον
attested</td><td>∧
and</td><td>⇒</td><td>(O)
προσμένον
pending
(conflicting evidence → more observation needed)</td></tr>
</table>

20. The True and Real *is* What Physically Exists

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.9

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα – οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναί τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον

Epicurus said that all perceptible things are true and real [*i.e., existing*] – for he made no distinction between saying that something is true or that it exists

ἔνθεν καὶ, ὑπογράφων τἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος, "ἔστι" φησὶν "ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν" – καὶ "ψεῦδός ἐστι" φησί "τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν"

and from there, while outlining what is true and false, [*Epicurus*] says "what is true is that which is in such a way as it is said to be" – he says "what is false is that which is not in such a way as it is said to be"

"τήν τε αἴσθησιν (ἀντιληπτικὴν οὖσαν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῇ, καὶ μήτε ἀφαιροῦσάν τι μήτε προστιθεῖσαν μήτε μετατιθεῖσαν τῷ) ἄλογον εἶναι ¬ διὰ παντός τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὂν λαμβάνειν – ὡς εἶχε φύσεως Αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο"

"and sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning ¬ yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing is by nature"

"πάντων δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων: τὰ Δοξαστὰ διαφέρειν – καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ¬ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ"

"but with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true ¬ but others false

διαληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	[mentally] distinguishing	**ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of taking hold between*
περιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	relating to what is completely comprehensible	**ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold around*
ἀντιληπτικός *(ή, όν)*	capable of taking hold [in response]	**ΑΝΤΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of being taken hold in return*
ὑποπίπτειν	to fall under	**ὙΠΟΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ** *falling under*
ἀφαιρεῖν	to remove	**ΑΦΑΙΡΕΙΝ** *grasping away*
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	**ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ** *placing change*
ἄλογος *(ον)*	unreasoning	**ΑΛΟΓΟΣ** *not reasoning*
ἀληθής *(ής, ές)*	true	**ΑΛΗΘΗΣ** *not hidden*
ἀληθεύειν	to truly report	**ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ**
τὸ ὄν **τὰ ὄντα**	what exists	
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	**ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ** *grasping*
αἰσθητός *(ή, όν)*	(A) sensible	**ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ** *perceiving*
τὸ δοξαστόν **τὰ δοξαστά**	what is able to be judged	**ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΝ** *seeming*
διαφέρειν	to differ	**ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ** *bringing through*

21. Accepting the Apparent

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.369

τῶν φυσικῶν, Οἳ μὲν πάντα ἀνῃρήκασι τὰ φαινόμενα ¬ ὡς Οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον

of the naturalists, some have rejected all that is apparent ¬ like those around Democritus

Οἳ δὲ πάντα ἔθεσαν – ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Πρωταγόραν

Others have established all *[that is apparent]* – like those around Epicurus and Protagoras

οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν ἀνεῖλον, τινὰ δὲ ἔθεσαν – ὡς Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ Περιπάτου

other [*naturalists*] rejected certain ones, but established certain ones – like those from the Stoa and the Peripatos

φυσικός *(ή, όν)*	natural	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*
ὁ φυσικός **οἱ φυσικοί**	naturalist	**ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of producing*

ἀναιρεῖν	to confute [here, "to reject"]	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ *grasping back*
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	what is apparent	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ *result of shining*
ἡ Στοά αἱ Στοαί	Stoa	ΣΤΟΑ *a Stoa*
ὁ Περίπατος οἱ Περίπατοι	Peripatetic	ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΟΣ *walking around*
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ *placing*
ἔθεσαν	*3rd person plural aorist active indicative* *"they established"*	
Ἐπίκουρος	Epicurus	ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ *running toward* *[to assist]*
Πρωταγόρας	Protagoras	ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ *first of the assembly*

22. All Sensible Things Are Real

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.185

ὁ, δὲ, Ἐπίκουρος πάντα ἔλεγε τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποκεῖσθαι ὁποῖα φαίνεται καὶ κατ' αἴσθησιν προσπίπτει – μηδέποτε ψευδομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως

Epicurus, however, was saying that all such sensible things subsist as the kinds [*of things*] they appear and [*all sensible things*] fall upon [*us*] in accordance with sensation – with perception never being false

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.355

Ἐπίκουρος, δὲ, πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι

Epicurus, however, said that every sensible [*thing*] is affirmed

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics" [p. 428.20 Bon.]

Τινὲς δὲ – τὰ αἰσθητὰ μᾶλλον οὐσίας λέγοντες – οὐδὲν οἴονται εἶναι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὥσπερ... ...ὕστερον Οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον

but certain people – saying that the sensible things [*are*] of more existence – believe that in no way is there [*anything*] besides the sensible things, just as... ...afterwards those around Epicurus [*said*]

Olympiodorus the Younger (fl. 540 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo"
[page 80, section, 1, Finckh edition]

Οἳ μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἶναί φασι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν... ...Πρωταγόρας, Ἐπίκουρος...

Those who assert the sensations to be precise toward truth... ...Protagoras, Epicurus...

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.26.82 (Lucullus)

sed ab hōc crēdulō (quī numquam sēnsūs mentīrī putat) Discēdāmus

but from this credulous man (who thinks that the senses never lie) let us depart

23. The *Shared Truth* of Sensation

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 17

Epicūreī cōnstantius parem omnibus atque perpetuam dēfendunt vēritātem ¬ sed aliā viā

The Epicureans defend more steadfastly a truth equal for all and everlasting ¬ but by another path

nōn enim Sēnsum mentīrī ¬ sed Opiniōnem

for they say that sense indeed does not lie ¬ but opinion [*does lie*]

sēnsum enim patī: nōn opīnārī ¬ animam, enim, opīnāri

sense indeed undergoes [*experience*]: it does not opine ¬ the soul, indeed, does opine

absciderunt et opiniōnem ā sēnsū et sēnsum ab animā: et unde opiniō, sī nōn ā sēnsū?

They have both cut off opinion from sense and [*cut off*] sense from the soul: and whence [*comes*] opinion, if not from sense?

dēnique, nisī Vīsus rotundam sēnserit turrim, nulla Opiniō rotunditātis: et unde Sēnsus, sī nōn ab animā?

indeed, unless sight has sensed a round tower, [*there is*] no opinion of roundness: and whence comes sense, if not from the soul?

24. Incompatible with Platonism

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), City of God, 8.7

absit ut hīs [*Platonicīs*] comparandī videantur – quī posuērunt iūdicium vēritātis in sēnsibus corporis, eōrumque īnfīdīs et fallācibus rēgulīs omnia quae discuntur metienda esse cēnsuērunt: ut Epicūrēī et quīcumque aliī tālēs

far be it that they seem to be comparable with these [*Platonists*] – those who placed the judgment of truth in the senses of the body, and judged that all things which are learned must be measured by untrustworthy and deceitful rules of those [*senses*]: as the Epicureans and whoever other such [*stated*]

25. Partial Agreement with the Stoics

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter to Dioscorus, 118.29

cum ergō Epicūrēī numquam Sēnsūs corporis fallī dīcerent ¬ Stōicī autem fallī aliquandō concederent:

therefore while the Epicureans were saying that the senses of the body are never deceived ¬ the Stoics were however conceding that they are deceived at some time:

utrīque tamen rēgulam comprehendendae vēritātis in sēnsibus ponerent – quis, istīs contrā dīcentibus, audīret Platonicōs?

yet both [*schools*] were placing the rule of truth-to-be-apprehended in the senses – who, with those [*schools*] speaking against, would listen to the Platonists?

26. The Unwavering Criterion toward Understanding

Ioannes Siculus "John the Sicilian" (fl. fort. 950 CE), Commentary on Hermogenes' "Rhetoric"
[volume 6, page 88, section 24, Walz edition]

...οἱ Λόγοι τῶν τὴν αἴσθησιν οἰομένων κριτήριον ἀπλανὲς εἰς ἐπιστήμην (ἢ τινὸς ἐπιστήμης) – οἱ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κακοῖς βοηθοῦσιν ὁποῖα καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος...

...the reasonings of those who believe sensation [*to be*] an unwavering criterion toward understanding (or of a certain understanding) – who provide support for their own bad [*ideas*] of the kind as Epicurus also [*has*]...

[U248]

27. *One* Falsification for Sensation vs. *Two* Falsifications for Appearance

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Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.9.5

Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ ¬ τῶν δὲ δοξῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς

Epicurus [*says*] every sensation and every appearance [*is*] true ¬ but of judgments, some [*are*] true and some [*are*] false

καὶ ἡ μὲν Αἴσθησις μοναχῶς ψευδοποιεῖται, κατὰ νοητά ¬ ἡ δὲ Φαντασία διχῶς: καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητῶν ἐστι Φαντασία καὶ νοητῶν

and Sensation is falsified in only one way, according to what is conceived ¬ while Appearance [*is falsified*] in two ways: for there is both an Appearance of sensible things and also of conceived things

τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original-source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *situated under*
ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure together*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ φαντασία **αἱ φαντασίαι**	appearance	**ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ** *state of appearing*

Symmetry refers to the level of accurate correspondence between:
(1) the actual qualities of a particular object and
(2) the qualities of that object its films preserve after reaching the viewer

Sensations have full symmetry – they come from direct contact (and thus have full accurate correspondence) – because of this, only our thoughts about them can be false (i.e., not fully corresponding to is original-source).

Appearances, however, do not have full symmetry – they come from objects indirectly contacting us (through the medium of air) – and thus can lose their correspondence through these changes in their medium as well as through our thoughts.

[U249]

28. *the Force* of Sensation vs. *the Activity* of Awareness

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.8.2

Ἐπίκουρος: "τὸ μόριόν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἥ τις ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις – καὶ τὸ ἐπαίσθημα, ὅ περ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνέργημα"

Epicurus: "a portion [*of the functional component of the soul*] is sensation, which is a certain force – and [*a portion is*] awareness, which indeed is an activity"

[Mansfeld] Epicurus: "sense/sensation is the [*bodily*] part that is the faculty – and the sensory recognition that is the activity"

ὥστε, διχῶς, παρ᾽ αὐτῷ λέγεσθαι "αἴσθησιν" – μὲν τὴν δύναμιν, "αἴσθησιν" δὲ τὸ ἐνέργημα

so that, with him "sensation" is said in two ways – while [*it means*] the force, "sensation" also [*means*] the activity

ἡ μοῖρα **αἱ μοῖραι**	a portion [as assigned share]	**ΜΟΙΡΑ** *receiving one's portion*
ἡ αἴσθησις **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**	[A] sensation	**ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ** *perceiving process*
ἡ δύναμις **αἱ δυνάμεις**	force	**ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ** *power*
τὸ ἐπαίσθημα **τὰ ἐπαίσθηματα**	awareness	**ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΜΑ** *result of perceiving upon*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἡ ὀξυδερκία **αἱ ὀξυδερκίαι**	sharp perception	**ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ** *sharp seeing*
τὸ ἐνέργημα **τὰ ἐνεργήματα**	an activity	**ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ** *result of working within*

[U250]

29. Symmetries, Harmonies, & Multiple-Mixtures

Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1109A fin. – 1109E

ὁ δ᾽ οὖν [Κωλώτης] – δόξας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον – Ἐπικουρείῳ δόγματι κέχρηται: τῷ πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς

Colotes also then – having supposed that nothing is more such than such [*i.e., no more this than that*] – uses an Epicurean doctrine: that all the appearances through sensation are true

But whatever we think of that {how Colotes interprets Democritus}, whoever held that nothing is any more of one description than of another {no more this than that} is following an Epicurean doctrine, that all the impressions reaching us through the senses are true.

εἰ γὰρ, δυοῖν λεγόντων, τοῦ μὲν αὐστηρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον ¬ τοῦ δὲ γλυκὺν: οὐδέτερος ψεύδεται τῇ αἰσθήσει – τί μᾶλλον ὁ Οἶνος αὐστηρὸς ἢ γλυκύς ἐστιν;

for if, when two are speaking, one [*says*] the wine is harsh ¬ but the other [*says it is*] sweet: neither [*is*] false in sensation – how is the wine more harsh than sweet?

For if one of two persons says that the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet?

καὶ μὴν, λουτρῷ γε τῷ αὐτῷ: τοὺς μὲν ὡς θερμῷ ¬ τοὺς δὲ ὡς ψυχρῷ χρωμένους ἰδεῖν ἔστιν – Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχρόν, Οἱ δὲ θερμὸν ἐπεμβάλλειν κελεύουσιν...

and indeed, in the same bath: it is possible to see people [*proclaiming it*] as hot ¬ while other people proclaiming it as cold – for some [*ask to add*] cold [*water*], while others ask to add hot [*water*]...

Again, you may observe that in one and the same bath some consider the water as too hot, others as too cold, the first asking for the addition of cold water, the others of hot.

...εἴπερ οὖν μὴ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας ἀληθὴς Αἴσθησις: εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τὸ Ὕδωρ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν – καὶ τὸ Μύρον καὶ τὸ Βούτυρον μὴ μᾶλλον εὐῶδες ἢ δυσῶδες

...if then indeed one sensation is not more true than another: it is likely that the water also is not more cold than hot – and that perfume and butter are not more sweet-smelling than ill-smelling

So if one sense-perception is no more true than another, we must suppose that the water is no more cold than hot, and that perfume or butter is no more sweet-smelling than ill-smelling;

εἰ γὰρ ταὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ φάσκει Τις – ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγων λέληθεν

for if someone asserts that the same [*thing*] appears different to a different person – he is in error while he says both exist [*as they are sensed*]

for he who asserts that the object itself is what appears one thing to one person and another to another has unwittingly said that it is both things at once

αἱ δὲ πολυθρύλητοι "Συμμετρίαι" καὶ "Ἁρμονίαι" τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων, αἵ τε "Πολυμιξίαι" τῶν σπερμάτων:

and the much-talked-about "Symmetries" and "Harmonies" of the passages around the sense-organs, and the "Multiple-Mixtures" of the seeds:

As for the old story of the "right size" and "perfect fit" of the passages in the sense organs, and on the other hand the multiple mixture of the "seeds"

ἡ συμμετρία **αἱ συμμετρίαι**	symmetry [of physical proportion]	**ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ** *measure together*
ἡ ἁρμονία **αἱ ἁρμονίαι**	harmony	**ἉΡΜΟΝΙΑ** *quality of* *a joint / fitting*
ἡ πολυμιξία **αἱ πολυμιξίαι**	multiple-mixture	**ΠΟΛΥΜΙΞΙΑ** *much mixing*

ἃ δὴ πᾶσι χυμοῖς καὶ ὀσμαῖς καὶ χροιαῖς ἐνδιεσπαρμένα Λέγουσιν ἑτέραν ἑτέρῳ ποιότητος κινεῖν αἴσθησιν: οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς "τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον" τὰ πράγματα συνελαύνουσιν αὐτοῖς;

which indeed they say are scattered in all flavours and smells and colors, setting in motion a different sensation in a different [*person*] by their quality: do they not straightaway compel these situations in their own [*view*] into "the [*conclusion that things are*] not more [*one way than another*]"?

that they say are found dispersed in all tastes, odors, and colors, so as to give rise in different persons to different perceptions of quality, do not these theories actually compel objects in their view to be "no more this than that?"

ἡ ποιότης **αἱ ποιότητες**	quality	**ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ** *condition from* *[asking] what kind*

τοὺς γὰρ οἰομένους ψεύδεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν (ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία πάθη γινόμενα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρῶσι) παραμυθούμενοι, διδάσκουσιν:

for, while offering reassurance, [*these Epicureans*] teach those people who (because they see the opposite experiences arising in those using the same things) think that sensation gives a false report:

For when people take sensation to be deceptive because they see that the same objects have opposite effects on those resorting to it, these thinkers offer the reassuring explanation:

ὡς ἀναπεφυρμένων καὶ συμμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ τι πάντων – ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλῳ πεφυκότος ἐναρμόττειν: οὐκ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς ποιότητος Ἐπαφὴ καὶ Ἀντίληψις ¬

[*teaching*] that, since something of everything has been mixed and mingled together – and while another [*quality*] has naturally come to fit into other [*person*]: contact and post-comprehension [*antilēpsis*] are not of the same quality

that since just about everything is mixed and compounded with everything else, and since different substances are naturally adapted to fit different passages , the consequence is that everyone does not come into contact with and apprehend the same quality,

οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι κινεῖ πάντας ὡσαύτως τὸ Ὑποκείμενον ¬ ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις Ἕκαστοι μόνοις ἐντυγχάνοντες πρὸς ἃ σύμμετρον ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν

[*and also teaching that*] the original source does not move all people in the same way with all the parts ¬ but each [*person*] encounters only those [*qualities*] toward which they have a symmetric sensation

and again the object perceived does not affect everyone in the same way with every part. What happens instead is that different sets of persons encounter only those components to which their sense organs are perfectly adjusted

τὸ ὑποκείμενον **τὰ ὑποκείμενα**	original-source	**ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ** *result of* *situated under*

οὐκ ὀρθῶς διαμάχονται περὶ τοῦ χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα – τὰς αὐτῶν οἰόμενοι βεβαιοῦν αἰσθήσεις τῷ τὰς ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖν

[*thus the Epicureans say that those people*] do not rightly contend about whether the situation is useful or troublesome or white or not white – thinking to affirm their own sensations by confuting those of others

and they are therefore wrong when they fall to disputing whether the object is good or bad or white or not white, imagining that they are confirming their own perceptions by denying one another's.

δεῖν δὲ αἰσθήσει μὲν μηδὲ μιᾷ μάχεσθαι: Πᾶσαι γὰρ ἅπτονταί τινός – οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς τῆς πολυμιξίας Ἑκάστη λαμβάνουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον

[*Epicureans say that*] that one must not contend even with a single sensation: for all [*senses*] touch something – such as each [*sense*] acquiring what is suitable and compatible from the fount of the multiple-mixture

The truth of the matter is that no sense-perception should be challenged, as all involve a contact with something real, each of them taking from the multiple mixture as from a fountain what agrees with and suits itself; and

ὅλου δὲ μὴ κατηγορεῖν – ἁπτομένους μερῶν ¬ μηδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οἴεσθαι δεῖν πάσχειν ἅπαντας: ἄλλους κατ᾽ ἄλλην ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ πάσχοντας

and [*Epicureans say that people should*] not fully indicate the entire [*original source*] – when [*people are only*] touching parts [*of the original source through their sensation*] ¬ nor [*should people*] think that it is necessary that they all together experience the same thing: since other [*people*] are experiencing according to a different quality and force of that same [*original source*]

we should make no assertions about the whole when our contact is with parts, nor fancy that all persons should be affected in the same way, when different persons are affected by different qualities and properties in the object.

ἄρα Δεῖ σκοπεῖν: τίνες μᾶλλον Ἄνθρωποι "τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον" ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν – ἢ οἱ πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰσθητὸν κρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιοτήτων Ἀποφαίνουσι "σύμμικτον ὥστε γλεῦκος ὑλιστήριον"

therefore it is necessary to contemplate: which people more greatly lead to "the [*conclusion that things are*] not more [*one way than another*]" upon these situations – than those who declare every sensible [*thing*] to be a mixture of varied qualities "commingled just like [*sweet new*] wine in a [*filtering*] vat" {*quote is probably a fragment of a lost tragedy*}

It is time to consider the question: who are more chargeable with imposing on objects the doctrine that "nothing is more this than that" than those who assert that every perceivable object is a blend of qualities of every description, "mixed like the must entangled in the filter" {fragment of a lost tragedy},

ἔρρειν δὲ Ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς κανόνας αὐτοῖς (καὶ παντάπασιν οἴχεσθαι τὸ κριτήριον) – ἄν περ εἰλικρινὲς αἰσθητὸν ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ πολλὰ ἕκαστον ἀπολίπωσιν;

while they agree that the standards of theirs are flowing away (and that in all respects the criterion has gone off) – if indeed they leave behind some pure sensible [thing] whatsoever and they do not [*leave*] many [*qualities*] in each thing

and who confess that their standards would go glimmering and the criterion of truth quite disappear if they permitted any sense-object whatsoever to be purely one thing and did not leave every one of them a plurality?

[Castagnoli] According to Plutarch, the Epicurean canons and criteria would be eliminated if the Epicureans allowed any sense-object to be purely something and did not leave each sense-object a plurality.

This is correct if we take this to mean that we need this kind of atomic plurality (at least in the case of smells and flavours) to account for conflicting appearances and for their truthfulness to their direct (and partial) objects.

But plurality need not be a plurality of the qualities which we can truly attribute to the sense-object.

[U251]

30. Every Sense is Truthful

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.25.79 (Lucullus)

vērācēs suōs esse sēnsūs dīcit – igitur semper auctōrem habet eum, quī magnō suō perīculō casam agat.

[Epicurus] says that his senses are truthful – therefore he always has as guarantor one who pleads the case at his own great risk.

eō enim rem dīmittit Epicūrus – sī ūnus sēnsus semel in vītā mentītus sit: nūllī umquam esse crēdendum

for Epicurus sends the matter to this point – if one sense should have lied once in life: no one [sense] is ever to be believed.

31. Messengers of Truth

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.25.70 (Cotta)

timuit Epicūrus, nē sī ūnum Vīsum esset falsum, nūllum esset vērum: omnēs sēnsūs "vērī nūntiōs" dīxit esse

Epicurus feared that, if one Impression were false, none would be true: he said that all the senses are "messengers of truth"

32. False Appearances Do Not Exist

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.32.101 (Lucullus)

ex ūnō Epicūrī capitē, alterō vestrō, Perceptiō et Comprehēnsiō tollitur.

from one principle of Epicurus, [along with] your other [principle], Perception and Comprehension are taken away.

quod est Caput Epicūrī? "sī ullum sēnsūs Vīsum falsum est: Nihil potest percipī."

what is the Principle of Epicurus? "If any Impression of sense is false: nothing is able to be perceived."

quod vestrum? "sunt falsa sēnsūs Vīsa."

what [is] yours? "false Appearances of sense exist."

quid sequitur? ut taceam, Conclusiō ipsa loquitur: nihil posse percipī

What follows? though I am silent, the Conclusion itself speaks: that nothing can be perceived

33. @X

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.26.83 (Lucullus)

Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nōscī, percipī, comprehendī possit… ex quibus prīmum est: esse aliquod vīsum falsum… prīmum Epicūrus nōn dat

There are four main points which conclude that there is nothing which can be known, perceived, or comprehended… of which the first is: that there exists some false appearance… the first Epicurus does not grant.

There are four points of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended. … The first of these arguments is that there is such a thing as a false presentation; … the first is not granted by Epicurus.

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1124B

εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων δυνατόν ἐστιν ἐπέχειν, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδύνατον κατά γε ὑμᾶς αἴσθησιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ φαντασίαν φαντασίας οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν διαφέρειν ἡγουμένους

If it is possible to withhold judgment about these sensations, it is not impossible to withhold it about others as well, as least on the principles of your school, who set one act or image of sensation on exactly the same footing as another

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123D

ἡ γὰρ ἰσότης, ἣν ὑποτίθενται πᾶσι, τῶν νενομισμένων ἀφίστησι μᾶλλον ἢ προστίθησι τοῖς παραλόγοις τὴν πίστιν

By putting all in the the same boat, their theory does more to estrange us from established beliefs than to convince us that the grotesques {fanciful or fantastic human and animal forms} are real.

[U252]

x. X

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), Academica 2.7.19 (Lucullus)

Nec vērō hōc locō exspectandum est, dum dē rēmō īnflexō aut dē collō columbae respondeam.

Nor indeed in this place must it be expected until I reply about the bent oar or about the neck of the dove.

Nōn enim is sum, quī quidquid vidētur, tāle dicam esse, quale vidētur: Epicūrus hoc vīderit et alia multa

For I am not the man who would say that whatever is seen is such as it appears to be: Epicurus may look to this matter and to many others

Nor is it necessary to delay at this point while I answer about the case of the bent oar {c.f. Lucretius, IV.436-}or the pigeon's neck {c.f. Lucretius, 2.801-}, for I am not one to assert that every object seen is really such as it appears to be. Let Epicurus see to that, and a number of other matters.

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 25, p. 1121A

(ὁ Κωλώτης) οὓς ἐν τοῖς Ἐπικούρου γράμμασιν ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ λόγους οὐ συνίησιν οὐδὲ γινώσκει λεγομένους ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων. οἱ γὰρ eibuAou προσπίπτοντος ἡμῖν περιφεροῦς, ἑτέρου δὲ κεκλασμένου τὴν μὲν αἴσθησιν ἀληθῶς τυποῦσθαι λέγοντες, προσαποφαίνεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐῶντες ὅτι στρογγύλος ὁ πύργος ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ κώπη κέκλασται, τὰ πάθη χὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα βεβαιοῦσι, τὰ δ᾽

ἐκτὸς οὕτως ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν... τὸ γὰρ εἴδωλον ὑφ᾽ οὗ πέπονθεν ἡ ὄψις, κεκλασμένον ἐστίν᾽ ἡ κώπη δέ, ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὸ εἴδωλον, οὐκ ἔστι κεκλασμένη᾽ διαφορὰν οὖν τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐκτὸς ἔχοντος, ἢ μένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ πάθους δεῖ τὴν πίστιν ἢ τὸ εἶναι τῷ φαίνεσθαι προσαποφαινομένην ἐλέγχεσθαι. τὸ δὲ δὴ βοᾶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ‹ὡς› οὐ λέγουσι τὸ ἐκτὸς εἶναι θερμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθος γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον, ἆρ᾽ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ λεγομένῳ περὶ τῆς γεύσεως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς οὔ φησιν εἶναι γλυκύ, πάθος δέ τι καὶ κίνημα περὶ αὐτὴν γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον; ὁ δὲ λέγων ἀνθρωποειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι πόθεν εἴληφε τὰς ἀφορμάς; οὐ παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων καμπυλοειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ καμπύλον ἐστὶ μὴ προσαποφαίνεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν μηδ᾽ ὅτι στρογγύλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι φάντασμα περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τύπωμα στρογγυλοειδὲς γέγονε; Νὴ Δία, φήσει τις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ τῷ πύργῳ προσελθὼν καὶ τῆς κώπης ἁψάμενος ἀποφανοῦμαι τὴν μὲν εὐθεῖαν εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πολύγωνον᾽ ἐκεῖνος δὲ κἂν ἐγγὺς γένηται. τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι, πλέον δὲ οὐδὲν ὁμολογήσει. Ναὶ μὰ Δία σοῦ γε μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὁρῶν καὶ φυλάττων, τὸ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν ὁμοίως ἀξιόπιστον ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου δὲ μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἴσης ἔχειν. σοὶ δὲ οἴχεται τὸ πάσας ὑπάρχειν ἀληθεῖς, ἄπιστον δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ μηδεμίαν, εἰ ταύταις μὲν οἴει δεῖν προσαποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκείναις δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν πλέον οὐδὲν ἐπίστευες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἴσης ἔχουσιν ἐγγὺς γενόμεναι ἢ μακρὰν οὖσαι πρὸς πίστιν, ἢ πάσαις δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ μηδὲ ταύταις ἕπεσθαι τὴν προσαποφαινομένην τὸ εἶναι κρίσιν᾽ εἰ δὲ γίνεται διαφορὰ τοῦ πάθους ἀποστᾶσι καὶ ἐλθοῦσι, ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ μήτε φαντασίαν μήτε αἴσθησιν ἑτέραν ‹ἑτέρας› ἐναργεστέραν ὑπάρχειν. καθά περ ἃς λέγουσιν ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις καὶ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις οὐθέν εἶσι πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἡν δόξαν᾽ ὥστε εἰ ταύταις ἑπομένους ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς κελεύουσι, τῆς δόξης κρίμα τὸ εἶναι, τῆς δὲ αἰσθήσεως πάθος τὸ φαινόμενον ποιοῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντως ἀληθοῦς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διαπῖπτον πολλάκις μεταφέρουσιν.

So it is with Colotes: the reasoning that he accepts with satisfaction when he finds it in the writings of Epicurus he neither understands nor recognizes when it is used by others. For the school that asserts that when a round image impinges on us, or in another case a bent one, the important is truly received by the sense, but refuses to allow us to go further and affirm that the tower is round or that the oar is bent, maintains the truth of its experiences and sense impressions, but will not admit that external objects correspond; and as surely as that other school must speak of "being horsed" and "walled" but not of a horse or wall, so this school of theirs is under the necessity of saying that the eye is rounded or be-angled, and not that the oar is bent or the tower round, for it is the image producing the effect in the eye that is bent, whereas the oar is not bent from which the image proceeded. Thus, since the effect produced on the senses differs from the external object, belief must stick to the effect or be exposed as false if it proceeds to add "it is" to "it appears." That vociferous and indignant protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produced in sensation has been of this kind – is it not the same as the statement about taste? Why does it not assert, if the external object is sweet, that there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind? A man says "I receive an impression of humanity, but I do not perceive whether a man is there." Who put him in the way of such a notion? Was it not the school who asserts that they receive an impression of curvature, but that their sight does not go beyond to pronounce that the thing is curved or yet that it is round' there has merely occurred in it an appearance and impression of rotundity?

"Exactly" someone will say, "but for my part I shall go up to the tower and I shall feel the oar, and thereupon I shall pronounce the oar straight and the tower angular; but this other fellow even at close quarters will only grant he has this 'view' and that there is this 'appearance,' but will grant nothing more." Exactly, my good friend, since he is a better hand than you at noticing and holding to the consequences of his doctrine – that every sensation is equally trustworthy when it testifies on its own behalf, but none when it testifies on behalf of anything else, but all are on the same footing. And here is an end to your tenet that all sensations are true and none untrustworthy or false – if you think it proper for one set of them to proceed to make assertions about external objects, whereas you refused to truth the others in anything beyond the experience itself. For if they are on the same footing of trustworthiness whether they come close or are at a distance, it is only fair to confer on all the power of adding the judgment "it is" or else to deny it to the former as well. Whereas if there is a difference in the effect produced on the observer when he stands at a distance and when he is close at hand, it is false to say that no impression and no sensation has in its stamp of reality a better warrant of truth than another. So too the "testimony in confirmation" and "testimony in rebuttal" of which they speak has no bearing on the sensation but only on our opinion of it; so if they tell us to be guided by this testimony when we make statements about external objects, they appoint opinion to pass the verdict "it is" and sense to undergo the experience "it seems" and thus transfer the decision from what is unfailingly true to what is often wrong.

[U253]

x. X

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.63

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. ἐπὶ γοῦν τοῦ Ὀρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἐρινύας, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ᾽ εἰδώλων κινουμένη ἀληθὴς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἴδωλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι στερέμνιοί εἰσιν Ἐρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησίν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰν εἰσάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς οὔτε γὰρ φαινομένῳ διδάξουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον (ζητεῖται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα) οὔτε ἀδήλῳ (διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει τὸ ἄδηλον ἀποδείκνυσθαι)

Epicurus said that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existing and like the thing which moves the sense. He also said that those who contend that some impressions are true but others false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence. At least in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being moved by the images, was true, in that the images objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held a false opinion. "And besides" he says, "the persons mentioned above when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by something non-evident, since something non-evident must be proven by means of something apparent."

[U254]

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 28, 1123B

ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἕτερα τραγικώτερα τοῖς Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐοικότα 'τεράσμασιν' ὧν καταγελῶσιν.... καὶ τίνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄψιν ἢ φύσιν ἔκφυλον εἰς ταὐτὸ συνενεγκόντες ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τῶν παρακοπῶν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασι παρόραμα τούτων οὐδὲ ψεῦδος οὐδ’ ἀσύστατον ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς ἁπάσας καὶ σώματα καὶ μορφὰς ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀφικνουμένας.... ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀπὸ σπουδῆς τιθέμενοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ὑπάρχοι, πίστιν οἴχεσθαι καὶ βεβαιότητα καὶ κρίσιν ἀληθείας φάσκοντες αὐτοὶ καταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἀφασίαν πάντα πράγματα.

These {images from the furies} and many of another artificial variety, resembling the Empedoclean monsters that they deride, "with lurching ox-feet, random arms" and "Ox-creatures, fronted like a man" – what phantom or prodigy do they omit? All of these they assemble from dreams and delirium and say that none is an optical illusion or false or unsubstantial, but all are true impressions, bodies and shapes that reach us from the surrounding air. That being the case, is there anything in the world about which it is impossible to suspend judgment, when such things as these can be accepted as real? Things that no artful joiner, puppet-maker, or painter ever ventured to combine of our entertainment into a likeness to deceive the eye, these they seriously suppose to exist, or rather they assert that, if these did not exist, there would be an end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth.

3. On Representations & Words

[U255]

x. X

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellenies, 2.4

ναὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὁ μάλιστα τῆς ἀληθείας προτιμήσας τὴν ἡδονὴν πρόληψιν εἶναι διανοίας τὴν πίστιν ὑπολαμβάνει. πρόληψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπί τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπίνοιαν᾽ μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ μηδένα μήτε ζητῆσαι μήτε ἀπορῆσαι μηδὲ μὴν δοξάσαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι χωρὶς προλήψεως τῆσαι μήτε ἀπορῆσαι μηδὲ μὴν δοξάσαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι χωρὶς προλήψεως

Indeed, Epicurus, who more than anyone prefers pleasure to truth, supposes that a preconception {prolepsis} is the basis of the intellect's conviction; he defines a preconception as an application of the intellect to something clear and to the clear conception of the thing, and holds that no one can either investigate or puzzle over, nor even hold an opinion or even refute someone, without a preconception.

x. X

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.33

τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον τὸ Τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι Ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρώτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό, οἷον Τὸ πόρρω ἑστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς; δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς μορφήν. οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὠνομάσαμέν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις.

By preconception they mean a sort of "apprehension" or a "right opinion" or "notion" or universal idea stored in the mind – that is, a recollection of an external object often presented. For example: "this thing is human" – and no sooner than the word "human" is uttered that we imagine a human shape by an act of preconception, in which the senses take the lead. Thus the object primarily denoted by the very term is then plain and clear. And we should never have started an investigation, unless we had known what it was that we were in search of. For example: "The object standing way over there is a horse or a cow." Before making this judgment we must at some time or another have known by preconception the shape of a horse or a cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first learnt its form by way of preconception.

x. X

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Natura Deorum, I.16.43 (Velleius speaking)

U34?? Quae est enim gēns aut quod genus hominum, quod nōn habeat sine doctrīnā anticipātiōnem quandam deōrum? Quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicūrus, id est anteceptam animō rēī quandam informationem, sine quā nec intellegī quicquam nec quaerī nec disputārī potest. Cuius ratiōnis vīm atque ūtilitātem ex illō caelestī Epicūrī dē rēgulā et iūdiciō volūmine accēpimus

For what nation or what kind of human beings is there that does not have without instruction a certain anticipation of the gods? This Epicurus calls prolêpsis, that is, a certain information of a thing pre-taken in the mind, without which nothing can be understood nor inquired into nor discussed. The force and usefulness of this method we have received from that heavenly volume of Epicurus On the Rule and the Criterion.

What race of men or nation is there which does not have some untaught apprehension of the gods? Such an innate idea Epicurus calls prolepsis, that is to say, a certain form of knowledge which is inborn in the mind and without which there can be no other knowledge, not rational thought or argument. The force and value of this doctrine we can see from his own inspired work on The Canon. {= Cicero U34}

x. X

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, I.17.44 (Velleius speaking)

fatēāmur cōnstāre illud etiam, hanc nōs habēre sīve anticipātiōnem, ut ante dīxī, sīve praenōtiōnem deōrum: sunt enim rēbus novīs nōva ponenda nōmina, ut Epicūrus ipse πρόληψιν appellāvit, quam anteā nēmō eō verbō nōminārat.

Let us admit that this also stands: that we have either an anticipation, as I said before, or a preconception of the gods. For for new things new names must be set down, as Epicurus himself called it prólēpsis, which previously no one had named by that word

We must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a "preconception" as I called it, or "prior notion" of the gods. For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense which no one had ever used before.

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), by way of Olympiodorus the Younger (fl. 540 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo" (p. 125.10 Finckh.)

οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι τὰς προλήψεις (αἰτιῶνται τοῦ ζητεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ εὑρίσκειν). ἃς εἰ μὲν διηρθρωμένας φασί, περιττὴ ἡ ζήτησις εἰ δὲ ἀδιαρθρώτους, πῶς ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς προλήψεις ἐπιζητοῦμεν ὅ γε οὐδὲ προειλήφαμεν;

The Epicureans, then, accuse us of seeking and rediscovering the prolepses. If these, as they say, correspond to real objects, then to seek them is useless; if, on the other hand, they don't correspond, how can we seek an explanation regarding preconceptions that we haven't we been able to think of already?

x. X

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.57

...οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως...

According to the wise Epicurus, it is not possible to investigate or even to be puzzled without preconceptions.

[U256]

x. X

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.9.30 (Torquatus to Cicero)

Itaque negat (Epicūrus) opus esse ratiōne neque disputātiōne, quam ob rem voluptās expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentīrī haec putat, ut calēre ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce.

Therefore Epicurus says that there is no need of reasoning nor of disputation as to why pleasure is to be sought and pain to be avoided. He thinks these things are perceived, as that fire is hot, that snow is white, [that] honey [is] sweet.

Quōrum nihil oportēre exquīsītīs ratiōnibus cōnfirmāre, tantum satis esse admonēre.

Of which none ought to be confirmed by highly wrought reasonings; it is enough only to remind.

Interesse enim inter argumentum conclūsiōnemque ratiōnis et inter mediocrem animadversiōnem atque admonitiōnem: altera occulta quaedam et quasi involūta aperīrī, altera prompta et aperta iūdicārī.

For there is a difference between the argument and the conclusion of reasoning, and between moderate noticing and reminding: the former has certain hidden and as it were wrapped things to be opened, the latter has things ready and open to be judged.

etenim, quoniam dētractīs dē homine sēnsibus relictum nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad nātūram aut contrā sit ā nātūrā ipsā iūdicārī

And indeed, since with the senses taken away from the human being nothing is left, it is necessary that what is either according to nature or against is judged by nature itself.

Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

[U257]

x. X

Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.2.6

Epicūrum… quī crebrō dicat dīligenter oportēre exprīmī, quae vīs subiecta sit vocibus

Epicurus… who often says that it is necessary to express carefully what meaning is attached to words.

[Epicurus] is always harping on the necessity of carefully sifting out the meaning underlying the terms we employ…

x. X

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.31

τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν. ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.

They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries, physicists should be content to employ ordinary terms for things.

[U258]

x. X

Erotianus, Glossary of Hippocrates, Preface, [p. 34, 10 Klein]

εἰ γὰρ μέλλοιμεν τὰς πᾶσι γινωσκομένας ἐξαπλοῦν φωνάς, ἤ τοι πάσας ὀφειλήσομεν ἐξηγήσασθαι ἢ τινάς. ἀλλὰ πάσας μὲν ἀδύνατον, τινὰς δὲ καὶ κενόν. ἢ γὰρ διὰ συνήθων ἐξαπλώσομεν αὐτὰς ῥημάτων ἢ διὰ τῶν μὴ συνήθων᾿ ἀλλ᾿ αἱ μὲν ἀσυνήθεις εἰς τοῦτο ἀφυεῖς φαίνονται --- δεκτὸν γὰρ τὰ ἧττον γινωσκόμενα διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον γινωσκομένων ἐξαπλοῦν —, αἱ δὲ συνήθεις τῷ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης εἶναι φανεραὶ πρὸς τὸ δηλωτικὸν τῆς ἑρμηνείας οὐκ ἔσονται (χρήσιμοι, ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος ἀπόλλυται γὰρ ἰδίως τῆς ἑρμηνείας τὸ φανερόν, ὅταν ὑπὸ λόγου καθά περ τινὸς οἰκείου μαγγανεύηται φαρμάκου

For if we are going to explain the words known to everybody, we would have to expound either all or some. But to expound all is impossible, whereas to expound some is pointless. For we will explain them either through familiar locutions or through unfamiliar. But unfamiliar words seem unsuited to the task, the accepted principle being to explain less known things by means of better known things; and familiar words, by being on a par with them, will be unfamiliar for illuminating language, as Epicurus says. For the informativeness of language is characteristically ruined when it is bewitched by an account, as if by a homeopathic drug.

[U259]

x. X

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.258

ὁρῶμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀνῃρηκότες τὴν ὕπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι

> We see that there are some who have denied the real existence of "expressions" and these not only men of other schools, such as the Epicureans, {but even Stoics like Basileides...}

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 22, p. 1119F

τίνες μᾶλλον ὑμῶν (Ἐπικούρειοι) πλημμελοῦσι περὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, οἳ τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχον ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖτε, τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ τυγχάνοντα μόνον ἀπολιπόντες, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ σημαινόμενα πράγματα, δι᾽ ὧν γίνονται μαθήσεις διδασκαλίαι προλήψεις νοήσεις ὁρμαὶ συγκαταθέσεις, τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ εἶναι λέγοντες;

> What school is more at fault in its views about language than yours {Epicureanism}, which makes a clean sweep of the whole category of meanings, which impart to discourse its substantial reality, and leave us with nothing but vocables and facts, when you say that the intermediate objects of discourse, the things signified, which are the means of learning, teaching, preconceptions, conceptions, desires, and assent, do not exist all?

x. X

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians 2.13

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Στράτωνα τὸν φυσικὸν δύο μόνον ἀπολείποντες, σημαῖνόν τε καὶ τυγχάνον, φαίνονται... περὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπειν

> The disciples of Epicurus and Strato the physicist, who admit only two things – the thing signifying and the thing existing – appear ... to ascribe truth or falsity to the mere word.

4. The Feelings

[U260]

x. X

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.34

Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἱστάμενα περὶ πᾶν ζῷον, καὶ τὴν μὲν οἰκεῖον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον: δι᾽ ὧν κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγάς.

> They assert that there are two kinds of feelings, pleasure and pain, which arise in every living thing. The one is appealing and the other vexing to one's nature; in consideration of these, choices and avoidances are made.

x. X

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.21, 768D

τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ κριτήριον ἔχειν ἡμᾶς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν πόνον .... λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον .... τοσούτου τοίνυν ἔγωγε δέω λέγειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ κανόνα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ πάθος, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κριτηρίου δεῖσθαι

Some say that as the principle and criterion of choosing and avoiding we have pleasure and pain: at least the Epicureans now still say something of this kind … For my part then I am so far from saying that feeling is the principle and canon of things good and evil, that I think a criterion is needed for feeling itself.

[U261]

x. X

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.9.11

Ἐπίκουρος τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἡδονὰς ἤδη καὶ τὰς λύπας.

For Epicurus, pleasure and pain are a part of sensations.

5. Signs

[U262]

x. X

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.177

Ἐπίκουρος μὲν γὰρ kai οἱ προεστῶτες αὐτοῦ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔλεξαν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς νοητόν.

Epicurus and the leaders of his school have stated that the sign is sensible, while the Stoics state that it is intelligible.

[U263]

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 29, p. 1124B

τούτοις οἳ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων πίστιν ἔχειν φάσκουσιν ἀπιστίαν τοσαύτην καὶ ἀσάφειαν ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις ὁρῶντες

…these people are deluded who regard what is seen as evidence of things unseen although they observe that appearances are so untrustworthy and ambiguous.

6. On Disputation

[U264]

x. X

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.1.3

Omnis in quaerendō, quae viā quādam et ratiōne habētur, ōrātiō praescrībere prīmum dēbet…, ut inter quōs disseritur cōnveniāt, quid sit id dē quō disserātur.

Every discourse in inquiry which is conducted by a certain path and method ought first to prescribe, so that among those between whom it is argued there is agreement what the thing is about which it is argued.

Hoc positum in Phaedrō ā Platōne probāvit Epicūrus sēnsitque in omnī disputātiōne id fierī oportēre. Sed quod proximum fuit, nōn vīdit; negat enim dēfīnīrī rem placēre, sine quō fierī interdum nōn potest ut inter eōs quī ambigunt cōnveniāt, quid sit id dē quō agātur

Epicurus approved this, set down in the Phaedrus by Plato, and perceived that in every discussion this ought to be done. But what was next he did not see; for he says that it does not please that a thing be defined, without which it cannot sometimes happen that among those who dispute there is agreement what the thing is about which it is being dealt.

In philosophical investigation, a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble … so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating. This rule is laid down by Plato in Phaedrus, and it was approved by Epicurus, who realized that it ought to be followed in every discussion.

[U265]

x. X

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.34

τῶν τε ζητήσεων εἶναι τὰς μὲν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰς δὲ περὶ ψιλὴν τὴν φωνήν

They assert that there are two kinds of inquiry: one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words.

[U266]

1. Fundamentally Unchanging

Pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies, Fragment 8

from Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, 1.8.24B, Greek Doxography, [p. 581, 19 Diels]

Ἐπίκουρος... φησὶν... ὅτι "οὐδὲν ξένον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀποτελεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον"

> Epicurus asserts that nothing new happens in the universe when compared to the infinite time already passed.

2. The Atoms

[U267]

x. X

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.3.18

Ἐπίκουρος Νεοκλέους Ἀθηναῖος κατὰ Δημόκριτον φιλοσοφήσας ἔφη τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, ἀμέτοχα κενοῦ, ἀγένητα ἀδιάφθαρτα, οὔτε θραυσθῆναι δυνάμενα οὔτε διάπλασιν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λαβεῖν οὔτε ἀλλοιωθῆναι. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ... ταῦτα μέντοι κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ καὶ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ. εἶναι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄπειρα. εἴρηται δὲ ἄτομος οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλαχίστη, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐ δύναται τμηθῆναι, ἀπαθὴς οὖσα καὶ ἀμέτοχος κενοῦ.

> Epicurus, the son of Neocles and an Athenian, philosophized in the manner of Democritus and said that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of existing things are bodies inferable by reason, which do not participate in the void and are uncreated and indestructible – since they can neither be broken nor be compounded out of parts, nor be altered in their qualities. They can be inferred by reason … {lacuna here} … They move in the void and through the void. And the void itself is infinite, and so are the bodies. Bodies have these three properties: shape, size, weight. Democritus said that there were two – size and shape – but Epicurus added weight to these as a third. For, he says, it is necessary that the bodies move by the blow of [an object with] weight, otherwise they will not move. The shapes of the atoms are innumerable, but not infinite. For there are none which are hooked or trident-shaped or ring-shaped; for these shapes are easily broken and the atoms are impervious. They have their own shapes which can be contemplated by reason. The atom {a-tomos} is so-called not because it is smallest, but because it cannot be divided, since it is impervious and does not participate in void.

x. X

Achilles Tatius (The Astronomer, fl.c. 250 CE), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aratus' Phaenomena, 3

Achilles' origins and biography are unknown. In the Suda, he is mistakenly identified with the writer Achilleus Tatius. He is almost fully ignored in English scholarship.

He is placed in the 3rd century because, he quotes 2nd-century astronomers ¬ but he is himself quoted by Julius Firmicus Maternus in the 4th century.

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐκ σωμάτων νοητῶν σμικροτάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων εἶναί φησι. καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὰς ἀτόμους ἢ διὰ σμικρότητα ἀκαριαίας τινὰς οὔσας ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀφθάρτους αὐτὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ τέμνεσθαι

Epicurus of Athens maintained that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of all things are comprised in extremely tiny bodies, knowable by the intellect, and he named them "atoms" or other words, minimums, because of their smallness, or because they are indestructible and cannot be divided.

x. X

Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies), 1.19

τὰς δὲ ἀτόμους τὰ λεπτομερέστατα σώμαθ', ὧν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κέντρον οὐδὲ σημεῖον οὐδὲ διαίρεσις οὐδεμία, ἔφη (Ἐπίκουρος) εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἀτόμους αὐτὰς ὠνόμασε

Epicurus says that the atoms are the most minute bodies; it is not possible to ascribe them a center nor a point nor any subdivision: and because of this he called them atoms.

[U268]

x. X

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 7.1

οἳ δὲ τῆς ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον τομῆς ἀπεγνωκότες ὡς οὐ δυναμένων ἡμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον τέμνειν καὶ ἐκ τούτου πιστώσασθαι τὸ ἀκατάληκτον τῆς τομῆς ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων ἔλεγον ὑφίστασθαι τὰ σώματα καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα διαιρεῖσθαι. πλὴν ὅτι Λεύκιππος μὲν καὶ Δημόκριτος οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀπάθειαν αἰτίαν τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι τοῦ μὴ διαιρεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ ἀμερές Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ὕστερον ἀμερῆ μὲν οὐχ ἡγεῖται, ἄτομα δὲ αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπάθειαν εἶναί φησι. καὶ πολλαχοῦ μὲν τὴν Δημοκρίτου δόξαν καὶ Λευκίππου ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διήλεγξεν. καὶ δι' ἐκείνους ἴσως τοὺς ἐλέγχους πρὸς τὸ ἀμερὲς ἐνισταμένους ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὕστερον γενόμενος, συμπαθῶν δὲ τῇ Δημοκρίτου καὶ Λευκίππου δόξῃ περὶ τῶν πρώτων σωμάτων, ἀπαθῆ μὲν ἐφύλαξεν αὐτά, τὸ δὲ ἀμερὲς αὐτῶν παρείλετο, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ ᾽Αριστοτέλους ἐλεγχομένων.

Others, who had given up on [the idea of] cutting to infinity on the grounds that we cannot [in fact] cut to infinity and thereby confirm the endlessness of cutting, used to say that bodies consist of indivisibles and are divided into indivisibles. Leucippus and Democritus, however, believed not only in imperviousness as the reason why primary bodies are not divided, but also in smallness and partlessness, while Epicurus later did not hold that they were partless, but said that they were atomic {i.e., uncuttable} by virtue of imperviousness alone. Aristotle refuted the view of Leucippus and Democritus in many places, and it is because of these refutations in objection to partlessness, no doubt, that Epicurus, coming afterwards but sympathetic to the view of Leucippus and Democritus concerning primary bodies, kept them impervious but took away their partlessness, since it was on this account that they were challenged by Aristotle.

[U269]

x. X

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1114A

ἀλλ᾽ ἄπειρα νὴ Δία πλήθει τὰ σώματα κατ᾽ Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστι καὶ γίνεται τῶν φαινομένων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἐκείνων. ὁρῶμεν οἵας ὑποτίθεσθε πρὸς γένεσιν ἀρχάς, ἀπειρίαν καὶ κενόν. ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄπρακτον ἀπαθὲς ἀσώματον. ἡ δ᾽ ἄτακτος ἄλογος ἀπερίληπτος, αὐτὴν ἀναλύουσα καὶ ταράττουσα τῷ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι μηδὲ ὁρίζεσθαι διὰ πλῆθος.

For Epicurus, the number of bodies is infinite and every single object is the world of sense is generated from them. Observe right here the sort of first principles you people {Epicureans} adopt to account for generation: infinity and the void – the void incapable of action, incapable of acted upon, bodiless; the infinite disordered, irrational, incapable of formulations, disrupting and confounding itself because of a multiplicity that defies control or limitation.

[U270]

x. X

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.3.16

εἶναι δὲ τὰ σχήματα τῶν ἀτόμων ἀπερίληπτα, οὐκ ἄπειρα. μὴ γὰρ εἶναι: μήτ᾽ ἀγκιστροειδεῖς μήτε τριαινοειδεῖς μήτε κρικοειδεῖσ᾽ ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ σχήματα εὔθραυστά ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ ἄτομοι ἀπαθεῖς. ἴδια δὲ ἔχειν σχήματα λόγῳ θεωρητά.

The forms of the atoms are certainly incalculable, but not infinite. Indeed, none are hook-shaped, trident-shaped, or ring-shaped: these shapes break easily, but the atoms are in fact impenetrable and have, instead, their own shapes, intuitable by reason.

3. The Void

[U271]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.20.2

Ἐπίκουρος ὀνόμασιν παραλλάττειν κενὸν τόπον χώραν.

Epicurus says that void, place, and space differ only in name.

Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 200 CE), Against the Physicisists, 2.2

Therefore we must understand that, according to Epicurus, one part of that nature which is termed intangible is called the void, one part place, and another part space – the names varying according to the different ways of looking at it since the same substance when empty of all body is called void, when occupied by a body is named place, and when bodies roam through it becomes space. But generically it is called "intangible substance" in Epicurus' school, since it lacks resistance.

not in usener

[U272]

Sextus Empiricus (fl. c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.329

Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ ἰσχυροτάτην τεθεικέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτὴν. εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν᾽ ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησισ᾽ ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν. ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὰ λήμματα εἰ μὲν συνεχωρεῖτο πρὸς πάντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν εἶχεν ἀκολουθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων παραχωρουμένην. νῦν δ᾽ ἐνέστησάν τινες τούτῳ, φημὶ δὲ τῷ μὴ συνάγεσθαι τοῖς λήμμασι τὴν ἐπιφοράν, οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνομόλογα.

Epicurus, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void, namely this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the premises of this proof had been agreed to by all, it would necessarily have had a conclusion also following from them and admitted by all. Instead, some have objected to it (i.e., the deduction of the conclusions from the premises) not because it does not follow form them, but because they are false and not admitted.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 2.314

ἔνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν᾽ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι λόγος δι᾽ ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ἄδηλόν τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ δι᾽ ἀληθῶν δοκεῖ τοῦ τε "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν" καὶ τοῦ "ἔστι δὲ κίνησις " κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.

Hence also they {the Dogmatists} describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premises reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion." For example: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premises: "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

[U273]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 4.5 [folio 140 verso, Aldine]

ἰστέον οὖν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τόπου τι γραψάντων οἱ μὲν σῶμα τὸν τόπον οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον ὑπέθεντο .... τῶν δὲ ἀσώματον λεγόντων οἱ μὲν πάντη ἀδιάστατον οἱ δὲ διαστατὸν λέγουσι... τῶν δὲ διαστατὸν λεγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ δύο διεστῶτα..., οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τρία΄ καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν πάντη ἀδιάφορον καί ποτε καὶ ἄνευ σώματος μένον, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον, οἱ δὲ διάστημα καὶ ἀεὶ σῶμα ἔχον καὶ ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὡς οἱ κλεινοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν καὶ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 4.5 [folio 144 verso, Aldine]

πάλιν δὲ αὖ τῶν τὸ κενὸν αὐτὸ τιθεμένων οἱ μὲν ἄπειρον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὑπερβάλλον ἀπειρίᾳ τὰ σώματα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλοις αὐτοῦ μέρεσι καταδεχόμενον, ὡς ἂν ἔτυχον, εἴ περ μέρη λέγειν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου κενοῦ δυνατόν. τοιαύτην δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐσχηκέναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον ἀρχαῖοι φυσιολόγοι

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 4.4

καὶ φησὶν ὅτι "τέσσαρά ἐστιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν τόπον ἕν τι εἶναι" ἢ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ ἢ τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ ἢ τὸ διάστημα τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ περιέχοντος τὸν τόπον ἀνάγκη εἶναι (ὃ τινὲς καὶ τῶν πρότερον ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ οἱ Στωικοί, τινὲς δὲ καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τοῦτο τὸν τόπον εἶναι ἐνόμισαν) ἢ τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ περιέχοντος. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν τριῶν ἐστιν, ὡς δείξει, ἀνάγκη τὸ λειπόμενον εἶναι τὸν τόπον. τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο οἱ μὲν περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν οὕτως ὥστε ποτὲ μὲν πληροῦσθαι σώματος, ποτὲ δὲ κενὸν ἀπολείπεσθαι᾽ οἱ δὲ Πλατωνικοὶ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ εἶναι μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ σώματα φασίν, ἀεὶ δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν, ὡς μηδέποτε κενὸν ἀπολείπεσθαι.

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's Physics, 4.4 [folio 38 verso, Aldine]

λείπεται τοίνυν ἡμῖν, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ διάστημα ὁ τόπος ἐστίν, ἀποδεῖξαι. διάστημα δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ νοούμενον τῶν περάτων τοῦ περιέχοντος, οἷον τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς κοίλης ἐπιφανείας τοῦ κάδου. παλαιὰ μὲν οὖν ἡ δόξα καὶ τοῖς τὸ κενὸν τιθεμένοις προσήκουσα, ἠκολούθησεν δὲ ὅμως αὐτῇ καὶ ὁ περὶ Χρύσιππον χορὸς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὕστερον, εἰσποιοῦσι δέ τινες καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα τῷ δόγματι. ἤρτηται δὲ ἐκ πιθανῆς μὲν αἰτίας, ψευδοῦς δὲ ἱκανῶς. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἰς ἐπίνοιαν ἤλθομεν ὅλως τοῦ τόπου ἐκ τῆς ἀντιμεταστάσεως τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι συνεχῶς ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ, διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ὁ τόπος ἔδοξεν εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τὸ μεταξύ, ὃ ταὐτὸ μένον ὑπελάμβανον ὑποδέχεσθαι

τὰ ἀντιμεθιστάμενα σώματα κεχωρισμένον ἑκάστου τούτων τῶν εἰσιόντων σωμάτων. ἐνῆγε δὲ αὐτοὺς εἰς ταύτην μάλιστα τὴν ὑπόνοιαν τὰ ἀγγεῖα. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐν τῷ κεραμίῳ τῆς κοίλης μενούσης τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ περιγεγραμμένης ἰδίοις πέρασιν ποτὲ μὲν ὕδωρ ἐγγίνεται, ποτὲ δὲ ἀὴρ ἐν τῷ σκεύει, διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς κοίλης ἐπιφανείας διάστημα ὑπενόησαν, ὃ ταὐτὸ μένον καὶ τῶν σωμάτων κεχωρισμένον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια τοῦ ἀγγείου, δέχεσθαι ἀνὰ μέρος τὰ σώματα. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο ὑγιές. εἰ μὲν οἷόν τε ἦν κενὸν σώματος γενέσθαι ποτὲ τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ἴσως ἂν ἐφωράθη καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο διάστημα νῦν δὲ ἅμα ἐκχεῖται τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ ἀντεισέρχεται. κἀντεῦθεν ἡ πλάνη ἐπεὶ γὰρ σῶμα πᾶν μετὰ διαστήματος, μεταφέρουσιν τὸ τῶν σωμάτων διάστημα ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, οὐκ ἐννοοῦντες ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ διάστημά ἐστιν ἐν τόπῳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σῶμα ἀεί" δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ χαλκᾶ καὶ στεγανὰ πανταχόθεν ἀγγεῖα᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκρύσειεν τὸ ὕδωρ, εἰ μὴ χώραν (εἰς) εἴσρυσιν ὁ ἀὴρ λάβοι. φενακίζει δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ μένειν ἀεὶ ἀσύγχυτον καὶ τὴν κοίλην ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ἀγγείων, ὡς εἴ γε συνέπιπτεν ἐξαιρουμένου τοῦ ὕδατος ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσκίων, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐξηπατῶντο

> It remains for us to demonstrate also that place is not extension. An extension is what is conceived of as between the limits of the container, e.g., what is within the hollow surface of the pot. Now this belief is traditional, and associated with those who posit the void, yet later both Chrysippus' crowd and Epicurus were nonetheless adherents. Some imposed the doctrine on Plato too. It relies on a plausible explanation, yet one that is quite false: namely, since we reach a conception of place in general from the mutual replacement of bodies (i.e., from different bodies continually coming to be in the same place at different times), they took place to be the intervening extension, which they believed remained the same when it received the bodies that were replacing one another, while being separated from each of these incoming bodies. Vessels above all egged them on to this inference. For since water and air enter the vessel at different times while the hollow surface within the clay remains the same (i.e. circumscribed by unique limits), they inferred the existence of the extension within the hollow surface, which resembled the surface of the vessel in remaining the same (i.e., separated from the bodies) as it received the bodies in succession. But this is invalid. If the vessel could at any time be devoid of body, then perhaps this so-called "extension" would be detected per se. But, as it is, fluid flows out and air simultaneously enters to replace it, and that leads them astray. For since every body is accompanied by an extension, they transfer the extension belonging to bodies to place, without reasoning that an extension is always in place just because a body always is too, as completely covered bronze vessels reveal: for [in their case] there would be no efflux of fluid unless the air acquired a space for its influx. What dupes them is that the vessels' hollow surface also always remains rigid; but if there were an implosion when the fluid was extracted, as there is in the case of wine-skins, they would not be similarly deluded.

[U274]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's Physics, 4.6 [folio 40 verso, Aldine]

δύο γὰρ οὗτοι τῆς θέσεως τοῦ κενοῦ τρόποι, ἢ παρεσπάρθαι τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτό, καθά περ λέγουσιν Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Λεύκιππος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὕστερον (οὗτοι γὰρ πάντες τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ παρεμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶνται τῆς διαιρέσεως. τῶν σωμάτων, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθῶς συνεχὲς ἀδιαίρετον κατ᾽ αὐτούς). ἢ κεχωρισμένον καὶ ἀθρόον εἶναι καθ' αὑτὸ περιέχον τὸν οὐρανόν, ὡς πρότερον μὲν ᾤοντο τῶν ἀρχαίων τινές, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ περὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Κιτιέα.

> The void can be posited in two ways: either as disseminated in bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus claim, and many others, including Epicurus later (they all make the 'interlacing' of the void the cause of bodily division, since according to them what is truly continuous is undivided); or else as separate (i.e., gross), per se, surrounding the cosmos, as some early thinkers were the first to believe, and later Zeno of Citium and his followers. We, then, must examine what those involved with the void claim.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 4.6 [folio 151 verso, Aldine]

ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἔλεγον ἐνεργείᾳ τι τοιοῦτον εἶναι διάστημα, ὃ μεταξὺ τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχον οὐκ ἐᾷ συνεχῆ εἶναι τὰ σώματα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Λεύκιππον ἔλεγον, οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κενὸν εἶναί τι λέγοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου, ὅ περ δηλονότι τόπος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὑφέστηκε᾽ ταύτης δὲ

τῆς δόξης γέγονε καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χῖος καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων τινές, ὡς μετ᾽ ὀλίγον αὐτὸς ἐρεῖ, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος

4. Bodies & their Attributes

[U275]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.12.5

Ἐπίκουρος ἀπερίληπτα εἶναι τὰ σώματα. καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δὲ ἁπλᾶ τά τε ἐξ ἐκείνων συγκρίματα πάντα βάρος ἔχειν.

> Epicurus maintains that the primary and simple bodies are imperceptible, and also that compounds formed by them all have weight.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.3.16

συμβεβηκέναι δὲ τοῖς σώμασι τρία ταῦτα, σχῆμα μέγεθος βάρος. Δημόκριτος μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγε δύο, μέγεθός τε καὶ σχῆμα. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τούτοις καὶ τρίτον βάρος προσέθηκεν. ἀνάγκη γάρ, φησί, κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα τῇ τοῦ βάρους ὁλκῇ. ἐπεὶ οὐ κινηθήσεται.

> Bodies have these three attributes: shape, size, and weight. Democritus guessed two of them, size and shape. Epicurus, for his part, added weight to these; it is necessary, he argues, that bodies be moved by the blow of their weights, for otherwise they would not move

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Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 2.240

ἐπειδὰν λέγῃ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὸ σῶμα νοεῖν κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων σωμάτων βιάζεται τὸ σῶμα νοεῖν

> When Epicurus asserts that we conceive body by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 2.257

Ἐπίκουρος φήσας κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν σχήματός τε καὶ μεγέθους καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους τὸ σῶμα νενοῆσθαι.

> … this too Epicurus acknowledged, when he said that "body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight."

Sextus Empiricus (*fl.c. 200 CE*), Against the Ethicists, 226

ἐάν τε γὰρ ἀθροισμός τις ᾖ τὸ σῶμα, ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας

> For whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combination of size and form and solidity…

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1110F

ταῦτα τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων οὕτως ἀχώριστά ἐστιν ὡς τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ βάρος αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀτόμου λέγουσι

> I can affirm that this view {that denying the reality of emergent properties contradict the senses} is as inseparable from Epicurus' as shape and weight are by their own assertion inseparable from the atom.

5. Motion

[U276]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's De Caelo, 3.1

οἱ γὰρ περὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀτόμους πάσας ὁμοφυεῖς οὔσας βάρος ἔχειν φασί, τῷ δὲ εἶναί τινα βαρύτερα, ἐξωθούμενα τὰ κουφότερα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑφιζανόντων ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, καὶ οὕτω λέγουσιν οὗτοι δοκεῖν τὰ μὲν κοῦφα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ βαρέα.

> The followers of Democritus, and, later, Epicurus, say that all atoms of the same nature have weight. However, because some are heavier, they sink down and in doing so they push the lighter ones up. Hence, they say, some are light and others are heavy.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's De Caelo, 1.8 [31, Karst]

τὰ γὰρ στοιχειώδη σώματα ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν κινεῖται ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς φερόμενα ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐκθλιβόμενα .... ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐκθλίψει βιαζόμενα κινεῖται, δείκνυσιν ἐφεξῆς. ταύτης δὲ γεγόνασι τῆς δόξης μετ᾽ αὐτὸν Στράτων ὁ Λαμψακηνός τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτητα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑφιζάνειν τὰ ἧττον βαρέα ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ὥστε εἴ τις ὑφεῖλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἰ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.

> Elementary bodies move either as a result of their own nature, or are moved by something else, or are squeezed out by one another. And he [Aristotle] shows that they do not move under the force of mutual extrusion either as follows. This opinion was held after him by both Strato of Lampsacus, and Epicurus, who thought that every object possessed weight and moved towards the middle, and that lighter ones settled out above the heavier ones by being forcibly squeezed out upwards by them, so that if the earth were removed, water would move to the center, and if the water [were removed] the air, and if the air [were removed] the fire.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's De Caelo, 1.8 [25, Karst]

οἱ δὲ τοῦ πάντα πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν τεκμήριον κομίζοντες τὸ τῆς γῆς ὑποσπωμένης τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν ἀέρα ἀγνοοῦσι τούτου αἰτίαν τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν οὖσαν... ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι οὐ Στράτων μόνος οὐδὲ Ἐπίκουρος πάντα ἔλεγον εἶναι τὰ σώματα βαρέα καὶ φύσει μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω φερόμενα, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων οἶδε φερομένην ταύτην τὴν δόξαν καὶ διελέγχει, τό τε κάτω καὶ τὸ ἄνω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου μὴ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι νομίζων καὶ τὸ βαρέα λέγεσθαι οὕτως ὡς πρὸς τὸ κάτω φερόμενα μὴ ἀποδεχόμενος.

> Those who treat as an indication that everything moves naturally towards the middle the fact that when earth is removed water moves downwards, and when water [is removed] the air [does so too], do not know that the reciprocal motion is the cause of this. For when the denser things are transferred into the place of the rare, the rarer take the place of the denser, propelled downwards because there can be no void, and because body cannot pass through body. But one must realize that it was not just Strato and Epicurus who held that all bodies were heavy and moved naturally downwards, unnaturally upwards, but Plato too knows that this opinion is held, and disputes it, thinking that 'downwards' and 'upwards' are not properly applied to the world, and refusing to accept that things are called heavy in virtue of their downward motion.

[U277]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 6.2

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν πᾶν μέγεθος διαιρετόν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν τὸ βραδύτερον ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἔλαττον κινεῖσθαι τοῦ θάττονος. τὸ γὰρ ἄτομον καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τὸ θᾶττον διέρχεται καὶ τὸ βραδύτερον. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πλείονι, ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἔλαττόν τι τοῦ ἀμεροῦς διελεύσεται. διὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἀρέσκει ἰσοταχῶς πάντα διὰ τῶν ἀμερῶν κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ τὰ ἄτομα αὐτῶν διαιρούμενα μηκέτι ἄτομα ᾖ.

Unless every magnitude were divisible, it would not always be possible for a slower object to move a lesser distance in equal time than a quicker one. For slower and quicker objects cover the atomic and indivisible distance in the same time, since if one took more time, it would cover in the equal time a distance less than the indivisible distance. And that is why the Epicureans too think all bodies move at equal speed through indivisible distances, so that they can avoid having their atomic quantities be divided – and thus no longer atomic.

[U278]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's Physics, 6.1 [folio 52 verso, Aldine]

ἀλλ᾽ ὁ σοφώτατος ἡμῖν Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ αἰσχύνεται χρῆσθαι φαρμάκῳ τῆς νόσου χαλεπωτέρῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ᾿Αριστοτέλους τὴν μοχθηρίαν τοῦ λόγου προεπιδείξαντος. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὅλης τῆς ΑΒΓ κινεῖται, φησίν, τὸ κινούμενον, ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου δὲ τῶν ἀμερῶν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κεκίνηται. εἶτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται περιπίπτων ἀναριθμήτοις τισὶν ἀτοπίαις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὴν κίνησιν τὴν ἐφ᾽ ὅλης τῆς ΑΒΓ συντίθησιν οὐκ ἐκ κινήσεων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ περάτων κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κεκινῆσθαι εἰ γὰρ ὅλη κίνησις ΔΕΖ, οὐχ ἕξει κίνησιν τὰ μόρια τὸ Δ καὶ τὸ Ε καὶ τὸ Ζ. κεῖται γὰρ οὐ κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστην τούτων ἀλλὰ κεκινῆσθαι. ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι τὸ κεκινῆσθαί φησιν ἀληθὲς ἐφ᾽' οὗ μηδέποτε τὸ κινεῖσθαι γέγονεν ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ διεληλυθέναι ὑπάρχειν ᾧ μὴ πρότερον τὸ διιέναι, καὶ τὸ βεβαδικέναι ᾧ μὴ πρότερον τὸ βαδίζειν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ παρῳχημένον ἀληθὲς οὗ τὸ ἐνεστὼς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν ἀληθές. ἔτι δὲ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινεῖσθαι πεφυκός, ὅτε πέφυκεν, ἤτοι κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἠρεμεῖ, (εἰ) μὴ κινεῖται τὸ Ω κατὰ τὸ Α, δῆλον ὅτι ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τῷ Α, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ Β, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ. ἀλλὰ καὶ κεῖται κινεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς συγκειμένης ἐκ τῶν ΑΒΓ, ὥστε κατὰ πᾶν μέρος ἠρεμοῦν τῆς ΑΒΓ πᾶσαν οὐδὲν ἧττον διήξει. ὅλως δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἀμερῶν κίνησις ὑπάρξει τῷ Ω, πῶς ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται; εἰ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρξει κίνησις ἀλλ' ἠρεμία, ἐξ ἠρεμίας ἡ κίνησις συντεθήσεται.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 6.1 [folio 218 verso, Aldine]

ἐπάγει δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἄτοπον ἀκολουθοῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει, τὸ κεκινῆσθαί τι μὴ πρότερον κινούμενον, οἷον βεβαδικέναι τι μὴ πρότερον βαδίσαν. κεῖται μὲν γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ῶ τὴν ΔΕΖ κίνησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ΑΒΓ μεγέθους οὔτε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α κινεῖται, κεκίνηται γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Β, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Γ᾽ τὴν ὅλην ἄρα κίνησιν κεκινημένον ἔσται μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὴν πρότερον. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντῃ ἀπίθανον ταύτην τέθεικε τὴν ἔνστασιν, δηλοῖ τὸ καὶ θέντος αὐτὴν καὶ διαλύσαντος τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ὅμως ὕστερον γενομένους οὕτω λέγειν τὴν κίνησιν γίνεσθαι. ἐξ ἀμερῶν γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι λέγοντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ὅλου μεγέθους τοῦ ἐξ ἀμερῶν συνεστῶτος κινεῖσθαι λέγουσι τὸ κινούμενον, καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀμερῶν οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ κεκινῆσθαι, διὰ τὸ εἰ τεθείη καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅλου κινούμενον, διαιρετὰ αὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι.

He {Aristotle} adds yet another absurdity that follows upon this hypothesis, [namely] that something has moved that was not previously moving, for example, that something has walked that did not previously walk. For it is posited that O moves [with] the motion DEF over the magnitude ABC, but it moves neither over A (for it has moved over it), nor over B, nor likewise, over C. It will consequently, have moved [with] the whole motion without previously moving [with] it.



That this obstacle which he {Aristotle} has formulated is itself not entirely beyond belief is shown by the fact that despite his having formulated it and produced his solution, the Epicureans, who came along later, said that this is precisely how motion does occur. For they say that motion, magnitude and time have part-less constituents, and that over the whole magnitude composed of part-less constituents the moving object moves, but at each of the part-less magnitudes contained in it, it does not move but has moved; for if it were laid down that the object moving over the whole magnitude moves over these too, they would turn out to be divisible.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 4.8 [folio 159 verso, Aldine]

ἐκ δὴ τούτων, φησὶν ὁ ᾿Αλέξανδρος, ἔνεστι λέγειν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον ἴσως καὶ πρὸς Δημόκριτον καὶ Λεύκιππον καὶ ἁπλῶς τοὺς ἀρχὰς τὰ ἄτομα λέγοντας καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἀνισοταχῶς φέρονται αἱ ἄτομοι ἐν τῶ κενῷ, τὰς αἰτίας τῆς ἀνισοταχοῦς φορᾶς ὥρα λέγειν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς τὸ μέγεθος ἢ τὸ βάρος ἢ τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ τάχος συμβάλλεται᾽ εἰ δὲ ἰσοταχῶς, οὐδέποτε καταλήψεται ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν οὐδὲ ἀλληλοτυπήσουσιν ἢ περιπλακήσονται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σχημάτων διαφορὰ οἵα τέ ἐστιν ἄνισον αὐτῶν ποιεῖν τὴν φοράν᾽ καὶ γὰρ τὰ σχήματα τῷ διαιρεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ διαιρεῖν ἄνισον τὴν φορὰν ποιεῖ᾽ ἐν δὲ τῷ κενῷ οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ διαιρούμενον. (ὥστε οὐδὲ γένεσις ἔσται τινὸς κατ' αὐτούς. μήποτε δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἄτοπον αὐτοῖς ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ λέγοιεν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰς ἀτόμους. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἠρεμοῦσι καὶ ἰσοταχῶς κινοῦνται, ἐπικαταλαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλας. εἰ δέ τις ζητεῖ διὰ τί ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ ἰσοταχῶς κινεῖσθαι τὸ βαρύτερον τῷ ἧττον βαρεῖ, ῥάδιον λέγειν, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἡ προσθήκη τοῦ βάρους θάττω ποιεῖ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν ἡ βαρύτης αἰτία ἔσται τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω κινήσεως ἐν τῷ κενῶ ὃ γὰρ προστιθέμενον οὐκ ἐπιτείνει. οὐδὲ αὔξει τὴν κίνησιν, τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἂν αἴτιον εἴη κινήσεως. εἰ δὲ μὴ αἱ ῥοπαὶ τοῖς σώμασίν εἶσιν αἴτιαι τῆς κινήσεως τῆς ἐν τῷ κενῷ, οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τῷ κενῷ τὰ ουματα᾽ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη τις αἰτία τῆς κατὰ φύσιν φορᾶς τοῖς σώμασι πλὴν τῆς οἰκείας ῥοπῆς. ἔτι δέ, φησὶν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν τοῖς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον δοκεῖ καὶ διὰ τὸ βάρος κινεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ, ἕπεται δὲ οἶς ἡ βαρύτης αἰτία τῆς κινήσεως, τούτοις τὴν μείζω ῥοπὴν ταχυτέρας αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι κινήσεως, οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ κενῷ γίνεσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἂν διὰ τὸ βάρος κινοῖτο ἐν αὐτῷ᾽ εἰ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὅλως κινοῖτο.

[U280]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.12.5

κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄτομα τοτὲ μὲν κατὰ στάθμην, τοτὲ δὲ κατὰ παρἔγκλισιν, τὰ δὲ ἄνω κινούμενα κατὰ πληγὴν καὶ ἀποπαλμόν

> Atoms sometimes move straight down, sometimes swerve, and those which move upwards do so by collision and rebound.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.23.4

Ἐπίκουρος δύο εἴδη τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ κατὰ στάθμην καὶ τὸ κατὰ παρέγκλισιν.

> Epicurus said there are two types of the motion: the straight and the swerve.

6. Atomic Swerve

[U281]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.6.18

Epicūrus autem, in quibus sequitur Dēmocritum, nōn ferē lābitur… illae Epicūrī prōpriae ruīnae: cēnset enim eadem illa individua et solida corpora ferrī deorsum suō pondere ad līneam; hunc nātūrālem esse omnium corporum mōtum.

> But Epicurus, in the points in which he follows Democritus, scarcely slips… those are Epicurus' own disasters: for he thinks that those same indivisible and solid bodies are carried downward by their own weight in a straight line; that this is the natural motion of all bodies.

Deinde ibidem homō acūtus, cum illud occurreret, sī omnia deorsum ē regiōne ferrentur et, ut dīxī, ad līneam, numquam fore ut atomus altera alteram posset attingere itaque…, attulit rem commenticiam:

Then, in that same place, the clever man, when this came up—that if all things were carried downward straight opposite, and, as I said, in a line—it would never happen that one atom could touch another; and so he brought in a contrived notion:

dēclināre dīxit atomum perpaullum, quō nihil posset fierī minus; ita efficī complexiōnēs et copulātiōnēs et adhaesiōnēs atomōrum inter sē, ex quō efficerētur mundus omnēsque partēs mundī quaeque in eō essent…

he said that an atom swerves a very little, than which nothing could be made smaller; thus combinations and unions and adhesions of atoms with one another come about, from which the world and all the parts of the world and whatever things are in it are produced…

Ipsa dēclīnātiō ad libidinem fingitur—ait enim dēclināre atomum sine causā—, et illum mōtum nātūrālem omnium ponderum, ut ipse cōnstituit, ē regiōne inferiōrem locum petentium, sine causā ēripuit atomīs; nec tamen id, cuius causā haec fīnxerat, assecutus est.

The swerve itself is fashioned at pleasure—for he says that the atom swerves without a cause—and he snatched away from the atoms, without a cause, that natural motion of all weights, as he himself establishes it, of seeking the lower place straight opposite; and yet he did not achieve that on account of which he had invented these things.

Nam sī omnēs atomī dēclinābunt, nullae umquam cohaerēbunt; sīve aliae dēclinābunt, aliae suō nūtu rēctē ferentur, prīmum erit hoc quasi prōvinciās atomīs dare, quae rēctē quae oblique ferantur; deinde eadem illa atomōrum— in quō etiam Dēmocritus haeret—turbulenta concursiō hunc mundī ōrnātum efficere nōn poterit.

For if all atoms will swerve, none will ever cohere; or if some will swerve, others will be carried straight by their own tendency, first this will be as if to assign provinces to the atoms, which are carried straight and which obliquely; then that same turbulent collision of the atoms—in which even Democritus sticks—will not be able to produce this adornment of the world.

Epicurus for his part, where he follows Democritus, does not generally blunder. … I now come to the lapses peculiar to Epicurus. He believes that these same indivisible solid bodies are borne by their own weight perpendicularly downward, which he holds is the natural motion of all bodies; but thereupon this clever fellow, being met with the difficulty that if they all traveled downwards in a straight line, and, as I said, perpendicularly, no one atom would ever be able to overtake any other atom, accordingly introduced an idea of his own invention: he said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve–the smallest divergence possible; and thus produces entanglements and combinations and cohesion of atoms with atoms, which result in the creation of the world, and all its parts, and of all that in them is. Now not only is this whole affair a piece of childish fancy, but it does not even achieve the result that its author desires. The swerving is itself an arbitrary fiction; for Epicurus says the atoms swerve without cause–yet this is the capital offense in a natural philosopher, to speak of something taking place uncaused. Then also he gratuitously deprives the atoms of what he himself declared to be the natural motion of all heavy bodies, namely, movement in a straight line downwards, and yet he does not attain the object for the sake of which this fiction was devised. For, if all the atoms swerve, none will ever come to cohere together; or if some swerve while others travel in a straight line, but their own natural tendency, in the first place this will be tantamount to assigning to the atoms their different spheres of action, some to travel straight and some sideways; while secondly (and this is a weak point with Democritus also) this riotous hurly-burly of atoms could not possibly result in the ordered beauty of the world we know.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Fate, 10.22

Epicūrus dēclīnātiōne atomī vītārī necessitātem fātī putat. Itaque tertius quidam mōtus oritur extrā pondus et plagam, cum dēclīnat atomus intervallō minimō – id appellat ἐλάνιστον:

Epicurus thinks that by the swerve of the atom the necessity of fate is avoided. And so a certain third motion arises, beyond weight and impulse, when an atom swerves by a very small interval, he calls that elániston:

quam dēclīnātiōnem sine causā fierī, sī minus verbīs, rē cōgitur cōnfitērī. Nōn enim atomus ab atomō pulsa dēclīnat.

which swerve he is compelled to confess happens without a cause, if not in words, yet in fact.

Nam quī potest pellī alia ab aliā, sī gravitāte feruntur ad perpendiculum corpora individuā rēctīs līneīs, ut Epicūrō placet?

For an atom does not swerve when struck by another atom. For how can one be struck by another if the indivisible bodies are carried downward by gravity in perpendicular straight lines, as it pleases Epicurus?

Sequitur enim ut, sī alia ab aliā numquam dēpellātur, nec contingat quidem alia aliam.

For it follows that, if one is never struck aside by another, one does not even touch another.

Ex quō efficitur, etiam sī sit atomus eaque dēclīnet, dēclīnāre sine causā.

From which it results that even if there is an atom and it swerves, it swerves without a cause.

Hanc Epicūrus ratiōnem indūxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est nē, sī semper atomus gravitāte ferretur nātūrālī ac necessāriā, nihil līberum nōbīs esset, cum ita movērētur animus, ut atomōrum mōtū cōgerētur.

Epicurus introduced this explanation for this reason, because he feared that, if always the atom were carried by gravity naturally and necessarily, there would be nothing free for us, since the mind would move in such a way as to be compelled by the motion of atoms.

Id Dēmocritus, auctor atomōrum, accipere maluit necessitāte omnia fierī quam ā corporibus individuīs nātūrālis mōtus avellere

Democritus, the founder of the atomic theory, preferred to accept that all things happen by necessity rather than to tear away natural motion from indivisible bodies.

Epicurus, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom; and so a certain third movement arises, part from weight and collision, when the atom swerves by a very small distance – this he calls a "minimum." That this swerve comes about without a cause he is compelled to admit, if not by his words, by the facts themselves. For it is not the case that an atom swerves when struck by another; for how can one be struck by another if individual bodies are carried downwards by their weight in straight lines, as Epicurus supposes? For if one is never struck from its course by another, it follows that none even touches another; and from this it results that, even if there is an atom and it swerves, it does so without cause. Epicurus introduce this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. Democritus, the inventor of the atoms, preferred to accept this, that all things come about through fate, rather than to remove the natural movements of individual bodies from them.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Fate, 20.46

Hōc modō hanc causam dīscēptārī oportet, nōn ab atomīs errantibus et dē viā dēclīnantibus petere praesidium.

It is necessary that this case be argued in this way, not to seek help from atoms wandering and swerving off the road.

"Dēclīnat," inquit, "atomus." Prīmum, cūr? Aliam enim quandam vīm mōtūs habuērant ā Dēmocritō impulsiōnis, quam plāgam ille appellat, ā tē, Epicūre, gravitātis et ponderis.

"It swerves," he says, "the atom." First, why? For they had from Democritus a certain other force of motion, of impulse, which he calls "stroke," from you, Epicurus, [a force] of gravity and of weight.

Quae ergō nova causa in nātūrā est quā dēclīnet atomus? Aut num sortīuntur inter sē, quae dēclīnat, quae nōn? Aut cūr minimō dēclīnent intervallō, maiōre nōn? Aut cūr dēclīnent ūnō minimō, nōn dēclīnent duobus aut tribus?

What therefore is the new cause in nature by which an atom should swerve? Or do they draw lots among themselves, which one swerves, which one does not? Or why do they swerve by the smallest interval, not by a greater? Or why do they swerve by one smallest [interval], do they not swerve by two or three?

Optāre hoc quidem est, nōn disputāre. Nam neque extrīnsecus impulsam atomum locō movērī et dēclīnāre dīcis, neque in illō inānī per quod ferātur atomus quicquam fuisse causae cūr ea nōn ē regiōne ferretur, nec in ipsā atomō mūtātiōnis aliquid factum est, quam ob rem nātūrālem mōtum suī ponderis nōn teneret.

This indeed is to wish, not to argue. For you say neither that an atom struck from outside is moved from its place and swerves, nor that in that void through which an atom is carried there was anything of cause why it should not be carried straight opposite, nor has anything of change been made in the atom itself, on account of which it would not hold the natural motion of its own weight.

ita, cum attulisset nullam causam quae istam dēclīnātiōnem efficeret, tamen aliquid sibi dīcere vidētur, cum id dīcat quod omnium mentēs aspernantur ac respuant

Thus, although he had brought forward no cause which would produce that swerve, nevertheless he seems to himself to say something, when he says that which all minds reject and spurn.

This is how the case ought to be argued; one ought not to seek help from atoms that swerve and deviate from their path. "The atom swerves" he says. First why? For the atoms will have one force to move them from Democritus, the force of an impulse which he calls a blow, and from you, Epicurus, the force of weight and heaviness. So what new cause is there in nature to make the atom serve? Or do they draw lots among themselves which will swerve and which not? Or why do they swerve by a minimum interval and not by a larger one, or why do they swerve by one minimum and not by two or three? This is wishful thinking, not argument. For you do not say that the atom is moved from its position and swerves through an impulse from outside, nor that in that void through which the atom travels there was any cause for its not traveling in a straight line; nor has there been any change in the atom itself as a result of which it might no preserve the motion natural to its weight. So, although [Epicurus] has not brought forward any cause which might cause that serve of his, nevertheless he thinks he has a point to make when he says the sort of thing which the minds of all reject and repudiate.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Fate, 9.18

Nec… est caussa cūr Epicūrus fātum extimēscat et ab atomīs petat praesidium eāsque dē viā dēdūcat et ūnō tempore suscipiat rēs duās inenodābilēs: ūnam, ut sine causā fiat aliquid—ex quō existet ut dē nihilō quippiam fiat…, alteram, ut cum duo individuā per inānitātem ferantur, alterum ē regiōne moveātur, alterum dēclīnet

There is no reason for Epicurus to tremble before fate, seek help from the atoms and turn them aside from their path, and for him to commit himself at one and the same time to two things that cannot be proved: first that something should happen without a cause, from which it will follow that something comes from nothing, which neither he himself nor any natural philosopher accepts; and second that, when two indivisible bodies travel through the void, one moves in a straight line and the other swerves aside.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.25.69 (Cotta)

Epicūrus cum vidēret, sī atomī ferrentur in locum inferiōrem suōpte pondere, nihil fore in nostrā potestāte, quod esset eārum mōtus certus et necessārius, invēnit quō modō necessitātem effugeret, quod vidēlicet Dēmocritum fugerat:

When Epicurus saw that, if the atoms were being carried to the lower place by their own weight, there would be nothing in our power, because their motion would be fixed and necessary, he found how he might escape necessity, which plainly had escaped Democritus:

ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitāte dīrectō deorsus ferātur, dēclīnāre paullulum

he says that an atom, when with weight and gravity it is carried straight downward, swerves a little

Epicurus saw that if those atoms of his were always falling downwards by their own weight, their motion would be fixed and predetermined, and there would be no room for free will in the world. So casting about for a way to avoid this determinism, which Democritus had apparently overlooked, he said that the atoms, as they fell, just swerved a little!

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On The Birth of the Soul in Plato's Timaeus, 1015C

Ἐπκούρῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἀκαρὲς ἐγκλῖναι τὴν ἄτομον συγχωροῦσιν (οἱ Στωικοὶ) ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.

The fact is that they [the Stoics] do not concede to Epicurus that the atom can swerve the tiniest bit, on the grounds that he introduces a causeless motion coming from nonexistence…

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Against the Academicians, 3.10.23

Quō modō enim inter Dēmocritum et superiōrēs physicos dē ūnō mundō et innumerābilibus lītem dīiūdicābimus, cum inter ipsum hērēdemque eius Epicūrum concordia manēre nequīverit?

In what way indeed shall we decide the dispute between Democritus and the earlier natural philosophers about one world and countless worlds, since agreement could not remain between him himself and his heir Epicurus?

Nam iste luxuriōsus, cum atomōs quasi ancillulās suās, id est corpuscula quae in tenebrīs laetus amplectitur, nōn tenēre viam suam, sed in aliēnōs līmitēs passim sponte dēclīnāre permittit, tōtum patrimōnium etiam per iurgia dissipāvit. Hoc vērō nihil ad mē attinet

For that self-indulgent man, while he gladly embraces the atoms as his little maidservants, that is the little bodies in the dark, allows them not to keep their own path but to swerve at random of their own accord into others' boundaries, and he has even scattered the whole inheritance through quarrels. This truly pertains nothing to me.

How shall we decide the controversy between Democritus and earlier physicists about whether there is one world or innumerable worlds, when Democritus and his heir Epicurus were unable to remain in agreement? Once that voluptuary Epicurus allows atoms, as though they were his little handmaids – that is, the little bodies he gladly embraces in the dark – not to stay on their courses but to swerve freely here and there into the paths of others, he has also dissipated his entire patrimony through such quarrels.

7. Aggregation and Dissolution

Marcus Terentius Varro (fl. 46 BCE), On Latin Language, 6.39

Dēmocritus, Epicūrus, item aliī quī īnfīnīta prīncipia dīxērunt, quae unde sint nōn dīcunt, sed quālis modī sint, tamen faciunt magnum, quod quae ex iīs cōnstant in mundō, ostendunt.

Democritus, Epicurus, likewise others who said that the first elements are infinite, do not say whence they are, but of what sort they are; nevertheless, they accomplish something great, because they show the things which are composed from them in the world.

Democritus, Epicurus, and still others who have deemed the original elements to be unlimited in number, though they do not tell us where the elements came from but only of what sort they are, still perform a great service: they show us the things of the world which consist of these elements.

[U282]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1116C

ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν ἡδέως ἂν ἐροίμην τὸν κατήγορον (Πλάτωνος Κωλώτην), εἰ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἐνορῶσι ταύτην, καθ᾽ ἣν τὰ μὲν μόνιμα καὶ ἄτρεπτα ‹τὰ δὲ μεταβλητὰ καὶ τρεπτὰ› ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν; ὡς λέγουσι καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπαθείᾳ καὶ στερρότητι πάντα χρόνον ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ συγκρίματα πάντα ῥευστὰ καὶ μεταβλητὰ καὶ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα εἶναι, μυρίων μὲν εἰδώλων ἀπερχομένων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων, μυρίων δὲ ὡς εἰκὸς ἑτέρων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιρρεόντων καὶ ἀναπληρούντων τὸ ἄθροισμα, ποικιλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ταύτης καὶ μετακεραννύμενον, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τῶν ἐν βάθει τοῦ συγκρίματος ἀτόμων οὐδέποτε λῆξαι κινήσεως οὐδὲ παλμῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας δυναμένων, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν

But I should like to ask the very man {Colotes} who brings this indictment {against Plato} if his school does not see this distinction in their own system, whereby some objects are enduring and unchanging in their being, just as atoms too in their doctrine are forever the same because they are too hard to be affected, while all aggregates of atoms are subject to flux and change and come into being and pass of of it, as innumerable images leave them in a constant stream, and innumerable others, it is inferred, flow in from the surroundings and replenish the mass, which is varied by this interaction and altered in its composition, since in fact even the atoms in the interior of the aggregate can never cease moving or vibrating against one another, as the Epicureans say themselves.

[U283]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1112A

τοῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσι μήτε γένεσιν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι μήτε φθορὰν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ ὄντων τινῶν συνόδῳ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν γένεσιν, διαλύσει δ᾽ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸν θάνατον ἐπονομάζεσθαι

{The Epicureans} assume that there is neither generation of the non-existent nor destruction of the existent, but that generation is a name given to the conjunction of certain existents with one another and death a name given to their separation.

[U284]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's De Caelo, 1.7

δείκνυσιν (Ἀριστοτέλης) ἐφεξῆς ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ὡς διωρισμένα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει οἷόν τε εἶναι τὰ στοιχειώδη σώματα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Λεύκιππον καὶ Δημόκριτον ὑπετίθεντο πρὸ αὐτοῦ γεγονότες καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρος. οὗτοι γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀπείρους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει τὰς ἀρχάς, ἃς καὶ ἀτόμους καὶ ἀδιαιρέτους ἐνόμιζον καὶ ἀπαθεῖς διὰ τὸ ναστὰς εἶναι καὶ ἀμοίρους τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν γὰρ διαίρεσιν κατὰ τὸ κενὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἔλεγον γίνεσθαι, ταύτας δὲ τὰς ἀτόμους ἐν ἀπείρῳ τῷ κενῷ κεχωρισμένας ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφερούσας σχήμασί τε καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ θέσει καὶ τάξει φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ κενῷ, καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβανούσας ἀλλήλας συγκρούεσθα!' καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀποπάλλεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, τὰς δὲ περιπλέκεσθαι ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν τῶν σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ θέσεων καὶ τάξεων συμμετρίαν, καὶ συμβαίνειν καὶ οὕτω τὴν τῶν συνθέτων γένεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι.

Aristotle then demonstrated that the number of types of elementary bodies were not infinite, as Leucippus and Democritus and their followers (who lived before him) supposed and Epicurus (who lived after him). These men indeed maintained that the principles {i.e., elements} were unlimited in number, and they also thought that they were atomic and indivisible and impervious, because they were dense and did not enclose any empty space; for they said that division takes place where there is some void within bodies, and also that these atoms, being separated from each other in the unlimited void and differing in shape and size and position and ordering, move in the void and that they catch up with each other and collide and that some rebound to any chance place while others get entangled with each other, in accordance with the symmetry of their shapes and sizes and positions and orderings; and in this way it comes about that the origin of compounds is produced.

[U285]

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Preparation of Simple Medicines, 1.14

μεμνημένων ἀεί, πῶς λέγεται χώρα κενὴ πρὸς τῶν ἡνῶσθαι φασκόντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅτι μὴ καθὰ περ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Ασκληπιάδη δοκεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἀέρος πλήρης ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἀραιοῖς σώμασιν ἡ κενὴ χώρα.

...always remembering how space is said to be empty by those who maintain that its essence is unique. But space is not empty in the sense in which it seems to Epicurus and to Asclepiades, but rather it is full of air, sparsely populated with bodies everywhere.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), Comment on the 6th book of "Epidemics" by Hippocrates, 4.10

τὸ δὲ κενὰς εἶναί τινας χώρας ἢ κατὰ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα τῇ μὲν Ἐπικούρου τε καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδου δόξῃ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι.

The statement that there might empty spaces, in water or in the air, corresponds to the opinion of Epicurus and of Asclepiades in regards to the elements.

[U286]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1112B

οἱ δὲ (Ἐπικούρειοι) τὰς ἀτρέπτους καὶ ἀσυμπαθεῖς ἀτόμους εἰς ταὐτὸ συνελαύνοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτῶν δὲ πολλὰς ποιοῦσι καὶ συνεχεῖς πληγάς. ἡ γὰρ περιπλοκὴ κωλύουσα τὴν διάλυσιν μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνει τὴν σύγκρουσιν, ὥστε μηδὲ μῖξιν εἶναι μηδὲ κόλλησιν ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν καὶ μάχην κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὴν λεγομένην γένεσιν. εἰ δὲ ἀκαρὲς νῦν μὲν ἄπιασι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν, νῦν δὲ προσίασι τῆς πληγῆς ἐκλυθείσης, πλεῖον᾽ ἢ διπλάσιον χωρὶς εἰσιν ἀλλήλων χρόνον οὐ ψαύουσαι καὶ πλησιάζουσαι, ὥστε μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖσθαι μηδὲ ἄψυχον. αἴσθησις δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἐπίνοιαν δίδωσι πῶς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν κενῷ καὶ ἀτόμοις. ὧν οὔτε καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ποιότης ἐστὶν οὔτε πάθος ἢ μεταβολὴ συνελθόντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ

συνέλευσις ἢ σύγκρασιν ποιοῦσα καὶ μῖξιν καὶ συμφυΐαν ἀλλὰ πληγὰς καὶ ἀποπηδήσεις.

> [The Epicureans], who herd together unyielding and unresponsive atoms, produce nothing out of them – only an uninterrupted series of collisions among the atoms themselves. For the entanglement that prevents dissolution produces rather an intensification of the collisions, so that generation is by their account neither mixture nor cohesion, but confusion and conflict. On the other hand, if the atoms after an instant of collision rebound for while from the impact, and for a while draw near when the blow is spent, the time that they are separated from one another, without contact or proximity, is more than twice as long, so that nothing, not even an inanimate body, is produced out of them; while perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best of will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality and which on meeting are not thereby affected or changed.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1111E

ἡ δὲ ἄτομος αὐτή τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἔρημός ἐστι καὶ γυμνὴ πάσης γονίμου δυνάμεως, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην προσπεσοῦσα βρασμὸν ὑπὸ σκληρότητος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν ἔσχεν οὐδ᾽ ἐποίησε πάθος, ἀλλὰ παίονται καὶ παίουσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, οὐχ ὅπως ζῷον ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ φύσιν ἀλλ᾽᾽ οὐδὲ πλῆθος ἐξ ἑαντῶν κοινὸν οὐδὲ σωρὸν ἕνα παλλομένων ἀεὶ καὶ διισταμένων δυνάμεναι παρασχεῖν.

> Whereas an atom, taken alone, is destitute and bare of any generative power, and when it collides with another it is so hard and resistant that a shock ensues, but it neither suffers nor causes any further effect. Rather the atoms receive and inflict blows for all time, and so far are they from being that they cannot even produce out of themselves a collective plurality or the unity of a heap in their constant shaking and scattering.

[U287]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.22

Cūr igitur illa (sēmina) nōn sentīmus aut cernimus? Quia nec colōrem habent, inquit, nec calōrem ūllum nec odōrem; sapōris quoque et ūmōris experta sunt, et tam minuta ut secārī ac dīvidī nequeant.

> Why therefore do we not feel or discern those “seeds”? Because, he says, they have neither color nor any heat nor odor; they are devoid also of taste and moisture, and so small that they cannot be cut and divided.

Sic eum, quia in prīncipiō falsum suscēperat, consequentium rērum necessitās ad dēlīrāmenta perdūxit. Ubi enim sunt aut unde ista corpuscula?

> Thus, since at the beginning he had taken up a falsehood, the necessity of consequent things has led him to ravings.

Cūr illa nēmō praeter ūnum Leucippum somniāvit? A quō Dēmocritus ērudītus hērēditātem stultitiae relīquit Epicūrō. Quae sī sunt corpuscula, et quidem solida, ut dīcunt, sub oculōs certē venīre possunt.

> For where are those tiny bodies, or whence are they? Why did no one dream of them except Leucippus alone? From whom, having been taught, Democritus left to Epicurus an inheritance of foolishness. If these are tiny bodies, and indeed solid, as they say, surely they can come under the eyes.

Sī eadem est nātūra omnium, quō modō rēs variās efficiunt? Variō, inquit, ōrdine ac positiōne conveniunt, sīcut litterae: quae, cum sint paucae, variē tamen collocātae innumerābilia verba cōnficiunt.

If the nature of all is the same, in what way do they produce various things? “By varied order and position,” he says, “they agree together, just as letters: which, although they are few, yet when placed in various ways make up innumerable words.”

At litterae variās fōrmās habent. Ita, inquit, et haec ipsa prīmordia: nam sunt aspera, sunt hāmāta, sunt levia. Secārī ergō et dīvidī possunt, sī aliquid inest illīs quod ēmineat.

But letters have various shapes. “So,” he says, “also these very first-beginnings: for some are rough, some hooked, some smooth.” Therefore they can be cut and divided, if there is in them something that projects.

Sī autem levia sunt et hāmīs indigent, cohaerēre nōn possunt. Hāmāta igitur esse oportet, ut possint invicem concatenārī.

But if they are smooth and lack hooks, they cannot cohere. Therefore they must be hooked, so that they can chain together mutually.

Cum vērō tam minuta esse dīcantur ut nūllā ferrī aciē dīssicī valeant, quō modō hāmōs aut angulōs habent? Quōs, quia exstant, necesse est posse dīvellī.

But since they are said to be so small that they cannot be cut apart by any edge of steel, how do they have hooks or angles? Which, because they stick out, must be able to be pulled apart.

Deinde quō foedere inter sē, quā mente conveniunt, ut ex iīs aliquid cōnserātur, sī sēnsū carent nec coīre tam dispositē possunt? Quia nōn potest quisquam ratiōnāle perficere nisi ratiō. Quam multīs coarguī haec vānitās potest!

Then by what compact among themselves, by what intention do they agree, so that from them something is put together, if they lack sense and cannot come together in such an ordered way? Because nothing rational can complete anything except reason. By how many arguments can this vanity be refuted!

{Regarding atoms:} Why then, do we not feel nor perceive them? Because, he says, they have neither color, nor heat, nor odor. They are free of taste also, and moisture, and they are so minute that they cannot be cut and divided. Thus, the necessity of consequent things led him to wild ravings because he had undertaken falsehood in the beginning. For where or whence are those little bodies? Why did nobody save that one Leucippus dream them up, by whom Democritus was instructed, he who left the inheritance of foolishness to Epicurus? If these little bodies are indeed solid, as they say, certainly they can come under the eyes. If the nature of all of them is the same, how do they effect various things? They come together, he tells us, in varied order and position just as letters do: although they are few, yet variously arranged, they bring about innumerable words. But letters have various forms. So do these have commencements themselves, he says, for there are rough ones, there are hooked ones, there are smooth ones. Therefore, they can be cut and divided if there is in them something which projects. But if they are smooth and in need of hooks or projections, they cannot cohere. They must be hooked bodies, then, for a concatenation of them to take place. But since they are said to be so minute, that they are able to be severed by no sharp blade, how do they have hooks or corners? It is necessary for them, since they exist, to be torn apart. Then, by what pact, by what agreement do they come together among themselves, that something may be formed of them? If they lack sense, they are not able to come together with such order, for it is not possible for anything but reason to bring about anything rational. With how many proofs is this vanity able to be refuted!

8. Qualities

[U288]

ἐγκλητέος οὖν ὁ Δημόκριτος οὐχὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὁμολογῶν, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνων ἀρχὰς αἷς ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν. ἔδει γὰρ ἀμετάβλητα μὴ θέσθαι τὰ πρῶτα, θέμενον δὲ δὴ συνορᾶν ὅτι ποιότητος οἴχεται πάσης γένεσις. ἀρνεῖσθαι δὲ συνορῶντα τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἀναισχυντότατον.

οἷα Ἐπίκουρον φησὶν (Κωλώτης), ἀρχὰς μὲν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὰς αὐὗτάς, οὐ λέγειν δὲ "νόμῳ χροιὴν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ "οὐ λέγειν" τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν "οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν," τῶν εἰθισμένων τι ποιεῖ…

…οὐκ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑποθέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑφελέσθαι Δημοκρίτου ἀτόμους εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀρχάς. θεμένῳ δὲ τὸ δόγμα καὶ καλλωπισαμένῳ ταῖς πρώταῖς πιθανότησιν αὐτοῦ προσεκποτέον ἐστὶ τὸ δυσχερές, ἢ δεικτέον ὅπως ἄποια σώματα παντοδαπὰς ποιότητας αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ συνελθεῖν παρέσχεν.

οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ καλούμενον θερμὸν ὑμῖν πόθεν ἀφῖκται καὶ πῶς ἐπιγέγονε ταῖς ἀτόμοις, αἳ μήτε ἦλθον ἔχουσαι θερμότητα μῆτε ἐγένοντο θερμαὶ συνελθοῦσαι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντος ποιότητα, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν πεφυκότος οὐδέτερον δὲ ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν φατὲ προσῆκον εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν

> Democritus is not to be censured not for admitting the consequences that flow from his principles, but for setting up principles that lead to these consequences. For he should not have posited immutable first elements; having posited them, he should have looked further and see that the generation of any quality becomes impossible. But to see the absurdity and deny it is the purest effrontery. Epicurus {as reported by Colotes} acts with the purest effrontery when he claims to lay down the same first principles, but nevertheless does not say that "color is by convention" and thus the qualities sweet, bitter, etc. If "does not say" means "does not admit" it is so, he is following his familiar practice… 1111C: There was no necessity to assume, or rather filch from Democritus, the premise that the primary elements of all things are atoms. But once you have laid down the doctrine and made a fine showing with its initial plausibility, you must drain the disagreeable conclusions along with it, or else show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. Take for the example the quality called hot. How do you account for it? From where has it come and how has it been imposed on the atoms, which neither brought heat with them nor became hot by their conjunction? For the former implies the possession of quality, the latter the natural capacity to be affected, neither of which, say you, can rightly belong to atoms by reason of their indestructibility.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Art of Medicine, 7

ἀδύνατον ἓν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει τὸ στοιχεῖον, οἷον Ἐπίκουρος ὑπέθετο τὴν ἄτομον. ὅτι γὰρ οὐχ ἓν τῷ εἴδει τὸ στοιχεῖόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον, ἐνθένδε δῆλον.

οὐδεμία τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν οὔτε ψυχρά, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ λευκή τίς ἐστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ μέλαινα. καὶ τί διατρίβω....;

ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμία ποιότης ἐστὶν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀτόμῳ, ὡς οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν βούλονται.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Elements According to Hippocrates, 1.2

αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄτομοι σύμπασαι σώματα οὖσαι σμικρὰ χωρὶς ποιοτήτων εἰσί, τὸ δὲ κενὸν χιύρα τις ἐν ᾗ φερόμενα ταυτὶ τὰ σώματα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω σύμπαντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος ἢ περιπλέκεταί πως ἀλλήλοις ἢ προσκρούει καὶ ἀποπάλλεται, καὶ διακρίνει δὲ καὶ συγκρίνει πάλιν εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας κἀκ τούτου τά τε ἄλλα συγκρίματα πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

ἀπαθῆ δ᾽ ὑποτίθενται τὰ σώματα εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα (τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ σκληρότητος ἄθραυστα, καθά περ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἔνιοι δὲ ὑπὸ

σμικρότητος ἀδιαίρετα, καθά περ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιππον), ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι κατά τι δυνάμενα ταύτας δὴ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις, ἃς ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι πεπιστεύκασιν εἶναι διδαχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, οἷον οὔτε θερμαίνεσθαί τί φασιν ἐκείνων οὔτε ψύχεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὔθ᾽ ὑγραίνεσθαι οὔτε ξηραίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι μήτε μελαίνεσθαι μήτε λευκαίνεσθαι μήτ᾽ ἄλλην τινὰ ὅλως ἐπιδέχεσθαι ποιότητα κατὰ μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν.

> All the atoms, then, being small bodies, are without qualities, and the void is a kind of place in which these bodies, being carried downward, all of them for all time, somehow become entwined with each other or strike each other and rebound; and in such assemblages they cause separations and recombinations with each other; and from this (interaction) they produce, besides all other compounds, our bodies, their affections, and their sensations. But (these philosophers) postulate that the first bodies are unaffected, some of them, like Epicurus, holding that they are unbreakable because of hardness, some, like Diódōros and Leucippus, that they are indivisible because of their small size; and [they hold that] these bodies cannot undergo any of those alterations in whose existence all men, taught by their senses confidently believe; for example, they say that none of the primary bodies grows warm or cold, and similarly none becomes dry or wet, and much less would they become black or white or admit to any other change whatsoever in any quality.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's Categories, 8

καὶ πρὸς Δημόκριτον δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρον δικαιολογεῖται, τί δή ποτε τινὰς μὲν διαφορὰς περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπολείπουσιν, οἷον σχημάτων βάρους ναστότητος σωματότητος περάτων μεγέθους κινήσεως, οὔτε δὲ χρόαν οὔτε γλυκύτητα οὔτε ζωὴν ἔχειν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων λόγους προὐφεστηκέναι ἀποφαίνονται κοινοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἑκτῶν λόγου ἄτοπον μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διατάττεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον τὰς ἀρχηγικωτάτας δυνάμεις ὑστερογενεῖς ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ ζωὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. παραπλησίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀπό του συνόδου ταῦτα ἀποτελεῖσθαι νόμῳ γὰρ ἔστι χροιὴ κατὰ τὸν Δημόκριτον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

[ἔστι] δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. ὁ δὲ ἅπαξ τὰ ὄντα ἀνελὼν οὐδὲν ἕξει τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὁ παραδεξάμενος τὸ ἀναίτιον οὐδαμοῦ στήσεται. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία προτιμήσει ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ὡρισμένης αἰτίας ὁρμώμενος;

βέλτιον οὖν εἰς ἐκείνην ἐλθεῖν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ἥ τις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχεσθαι παράγει τὰ ἑκτά, ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὶ ὡρίσαντο ἑκτὸν τὸ οἷόν τε ἔχεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀποδόντες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτυμολογίας αὐτοῦ παραλαβόντες τὸν λόγον

> In objection to Democritus and Epicurus, the question can be put: why on earth do they grant certain differentiae to atoms such as shape, weight, solidity, corporeality, edges, size, and motion, while asserting that they possess neither color nor sweetness nor life, and that the logoi of other such things do not pre-exist? For it is absurd, since there is a common account {logos} of the havables, not to classy like with like; it is even more absurd to make the most primary powers secondary, such as life, intellect, nature, reason {logos} and the like. It is equally impossible for these to be produced out of the conjunction [of atoms]; for according to Democritus, color and suchlike are by convention, and only atoms and void exist in truth. But once a person has done away with realities, he will have nothing to put in their place, and he who admits the causeless will have no ground to stand on. For why should the person starting from no definite cause prefer these to the contraries? So it is better to have recourse to the hypothesis which produces the havables from being had, in the way that the Academics defined 'havable' by representing it as 'that which can be had' {hektón}, not accepting the definition on the basis of its etymology.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary of Aristotle's Categories, 14

καὶ οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον δὲ καὶ ὕστερον οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον: τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀποίους ὑποτιθέμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων παρὰ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὴν ποιὰν αὐτῶν σύνθεσιν ἐπιγίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας τάς τε ἁπλᾶς, οἷον θερμότητας καὶ λειότητας, καὶ τὰς κατὰ ‹τὰ› χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμούς.

εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ποιᾷ συνθέσει τῶν ἀτόμων ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις αὐτὴ κατ'' αὐτοὺς ἂν εἴη μεταβολή, ἡ δὲ ποιὰ σύνθεσις αὐτῶν καὶ μετάθεσις καὶ τάξις οὐκ

ἀλλαχόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως ἐστίν᾽ ὥστε ἡ ἀλλοίωσις τῇ φορᾷ ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ παρακολουθοῦσα ταύτῃ καὶ ταύτης τι.

The followers of Democritus, and subsequently those of Epicurus, in hypothesizing atoms to be unaffected and unqualified by other qualities apart from the shapes [of the atoms] and the way they are composed {tên poian autôn sunthesin}, say that other qualities – whether simple, such as temperatures {thermotêtes} and textures {leioêtes}, or those in respect of colors and tastes – supervene. And if these latter things [consist] in the way atoms are composed, alteration too will consist in change in respect of them {i.e., the atoms}. But the way they {i.e., the atoms} are composed, and their transposition and order, derive from nowhere else than from their motion and spatial movement, so that alteration is the same thing as their motion, or at least is a concomitant of this and is something belonging to this.

[U289]

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Questions, 1.13

ὅτι μὴ ὁμοίως κατ᾽ Ἐπίκουρον εἰσάγεται τὰ χρώματα, ὡς ἔλεγέν τις παριστάμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ δόξῃ, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας αἱρέσεις.

ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις στοιχείοις, ἅ περ ἀρχὰς ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἁπάντων, οὐδὲν τούτων φησὶν εἶναι᾽ καθ᾽ οὓς δὲ στοιχεῖα τὰ τέσσαρα, κατὰ τούτους ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐστὶν καὶ ταῦτα.

διὸ κατὰ μὲν τούτους ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων χρωμάτων γίνεταί τινα χρώματα᾽ καθ᾽ ὃν δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων ἡ Ὑένεσις αὐτῶν.

ὡς οὖν εἰ ὑπέθετό τις ἄτομα εἶναι σώματα ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων μὴ μόνον ἔχοντα σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀντιτυπίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῶμα, οὐχ ὁμοίως κατά τε τοῦτον ἡ τῶν χρωμάτῶν γένεσις (ἐκ προϋπάρχοντος γὰρ χρώματος καὶ ὄντος ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοισ) καὶ καθ' ὃν τὰ ἄτομα ταῦτα στοιχεῖα οὐκ ἔχει χρῶμα οὕτως οὐδ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἄτομά τις τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγοι, λέγοι δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα τῷ ἐν τούτοις εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰ χρώματα, οὐδ’ οὗτος ἂν ὁμοίως Ἐπικούρῳ τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων εἰσάγοι φύσιν

9. Mixture

[U290]

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), On Mixture, 214.28-215.8

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ φεύγεῖν βουλόμενος τὸ ὑπὸ Δημοκρίτου ῥηθὲν ἕπεσθαι βούλεται τοῖς παραθέσει τῶν κιρναμένων τὴν κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι λέγουσι, παραθέσει μέν τινων σωμάτων καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς κράσεις γίνεσθαι λέγων, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τῶν μιγνυμένων σωμάτων σῳζομένων ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει, ἀλλ' ἀναλυομένων εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν συγκείμενόν πως τὸ μὲν οἶνος ἦν τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ μέλι τὸ δ’ ἄλλό τι, ἔπειτα ποιᾷ τούτων τῶν σωμάτων ἐξ ὧν ἦν τὰ κιρνάμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνθέσει γεννώντων τὸ κεκραμένον σῶμα, συμμιγνυμένων (οὐχ) ὕδατός τε καὶ οἴνου ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑδροποιῶν ἀτόμων, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ταῖς οἰνοποιοῖς, φθορᾷ τε καὶ γενέσει τινῶν τὴν κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι λέγων. (ἡ) γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀνάλυσις ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σύνθεσις αὐτῶν ‹τὸ μὲν γένεσις› τὸ δὲ φθορά

Epicurus wanted to avoid what Democritus supposed happened for those who say that blending occurs by means of a juxtaposition of the components of the blend. He himself said that blending occurs by means of the juxtaposition of certain bodies – not of bodies which were themselves preserved as compounds, but rather of bodies that were broken down into elementary atoms which formed particular compounds, e.g., wine, water, honey, etc. He then says that the mixture is created by a certain kind of reciprocal compounding by component elements. It is these which produce the new mixture – not water and the wine, but the atoms which made up the water, as one might designate them, are combined together with those which made up the wine by a destruction and generation of the compound bodies. For the breakdown of each into its elements is a form of destruction, and the compounding produced from the elements themselves is ‹a sort of genesis›.

10. Change

[U291]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 2.42

τινὲς τῶν φυσικῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, τὴν μεταβλητικὴν κίνησιν εἶδος ἔλεξαν εἶναι τῆς μεταβατικῆς· τὸ γὰρ μεταβάλλον κατὰ ποιότητα σύγκριμα πάντως κατὰ τὴν τῶν συγκεκρικότων αὐτὸ λόγῳ θεωρητῶν σωμάτων τοπικήν τε καὶ μεταβατικὴν κίνησιν μεταβάλλει. οἷον ἵνα τι ἐκ γλυκέος γένηται πικρὸν ἢ ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν, δεῖ τοὺς συνεστακότας αὐτὸ ὄγκους μετακοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἄλλην ἀντὶ ἄλλης τάξιν ἀναδέξασθαι.

τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως συμβαίη, ἐὰν μὴ μεταβατικῶς κινηθῶσιν οἱ ὄγκοι καὶ πάλιν ἵνα τι ἐκ σκληροῦ μαλακὸν γένηται ἢ ἐκ μαλακοῦ σκληρόν, δεῖ τὰ ἐξ ὧν ἔστι μόρια κατὰ τὸν τόπον κινηθῆναι. διατάσει μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν μαλακύνεται, συνελεύσει δὲ καὶ πυκνώσει σκληρύνεται. παρ' ὃ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ κίνησις οὐχ ἑτέρα κατὰ γένος ἐστὶ τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως.

Some of the natural philosophers, amongst them Epicurus, have declared that the motion of change is a particular form of transitional motion; for the composite object which changes in quality changes owing to the local and transitional motion of the rationally perceived bodies which compose it. Thus, in order that a thing may become bitter from sweet, or black from white, the particles which must be arranged in a new order and take up different positions; that this could not be brought about in any other way than by the transitional motion of the molecules. And again, in order that a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft, the parts whereof it is composed must move in place; for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard by their coalescence and condensation. And owing to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing else than transitional motion.

[U292]

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Elements According to Hippocrates, 1.9

ὡς οὐκ ἔστι διάκρισίς τις καὶ σύγκρισις ἡ φαινομένη τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Δημόκριτον ἐνόμιζον.

… the {qualitative} change of bodies, as it happens, isn't aggregation and dispersal, as the disciples of Epicurus and Democritus think.

11. Magnetism

[U293]

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On Natural Faculties, 1.14

Ἐπίκουρος μὲν οὖν .... ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς μὲν τῆς Ἡρακλείας λίθου τὸν σίδηρον ἕλκεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῶν ἠλέκτρων τὰ κυρήβια, καὶ πειρᾶταί γε καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ φαινομένου.

τὰς γὰρ ἀπορρεούσας ἀτόμους ἀπὸ τῶν λίθων ταῖς ἀπορρεούσαις ἀπὸ τοῦ σιδήρου τοῖς σχήμασιν οἰκείας εἶναί φησιν, ὥστε περιπλέκεσθαι ῥᾳδίως:

προσκρουούσας οὖν αὐτὰς τοῖς συγκρίμασιν ἑκατέροις, τοῖς τε τῆς λίθου καὶ ‹τοῖς› τοῦ σιδήρου, κἄπειτ' εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποπαλλομένας οὕτως ἀλλήλαις τε περιπλέκεσθαι καὶ συνuverισπᾶσθαι τὸν σίδηρον...

...καὶ οὕτω γε καὶ κατὰ τὰ σώματα τῶν ζῴων φησὶ γτίνεσθαι τάς τ᾽' ἀναδόσεις καὶ τὰς διακρίσεις τῶν περιττωμάτων καὶ τὰς τῶν καθαιρόντων φαρμάκων ἐνεργείας...

...ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀκόλουθον φυλάττειν βούλεται (Ἀσκληπιάδης), τὸ δ' ἐναργῶς φαινόμενον ἀνατρέπειν ἔμπαλιν Ἐπικούρῳ. τιθεὶς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἀεὶ τὸ φαινόμενον αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ ψυχρὰν ἀποδίδωσι.

τὰ γὰρ ἀποπαλλόμενα σμικρὰ σώματα τῆς Ἡρακλείας λίθου τοιούτοις ἑτέροις περιπλέκεσθαι μορίοις τοῦ σιδήρου κἄπειτα διὰ τῆς περιπλοκῆς ταύτῆς καὶ μηδαμοῦ φαινομένης ἐπισπᾶσθαι βαρεῖαν οὕτως οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως ἄν τις πεισθείη.

καὶ γὰρ εἰ τοῦτο συγχωρήσαιμεν, τό γε τῷ σιδήρῳ πάλιν ἕτερον προστεθέντα συνάπτεσθαι τὴν αὐὖτὴν αἰτίαν οὐκέτι προσίεται. τί γὰρ ἐροῦμεν;

ἢ δηλαδὴ τῶν ἀπορρεόντων τῆς λίθου μορίων ἔνια μὲν προσκρούσαντα τῷ σιδήρῳ πάλιν ἀποπάλλεσθαι καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἶναι δι᾽ ὧν κρέμασθαι συμβαίνει τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ δ᾽ εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσδυόμενα διὰ τῶν κενῶν πόρων διέρχεσθαι τάχιστα κἄπειτα τῷ παρακειμένῳ σιδήρῳ προσκρούοντα μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνον διαδῦναι δύνασθαι καὶ τόν γε πρῶτον διαδύντα, παλινδρομοῦντα δ᾽ αὖθις ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον ἑτέρας αὖθις ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς προτέραις ὁμοίας περιπλοκάς;

ἐναργῶς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ληρῶδες τῆς αἰτίας ἐλέγχεται. γραφεῖα γοῦν οἶδά ποτε σιδηρᾶ πέντε κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀλλήλοις συναφθέντα, τοῦ πρώτου μὲν μόνου τῆς λίθου ψαύσαντος, ἐξ ἐκείνου δ᾽ εἰς τἆλλα τῆς δυνγάμεως διαδοθείσης...

...πάντῃ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἡ τῆς λίθου διαδίδοται δύναμις, εἰ μόνον ἅψαιτο κατά τι τοῦ πρώτου γραφείου, καὶ μέντοι κἀκ τούτου πάλιν εἰς τὸ δεύτερον ὅλον ἡ δύναμις ἅμα νοήματι διαρρεῖ κἀξ ἐκείνου πάλιν εἰς τὸ τρίτον ὅλον.

εἰ δὴ νοῆσαις μικράν τινα λίθον Ἡρακλείαν ἐν οἴκῳ τινὶ κρεμαμένην, εἶτ᾽ ἐν κύκλῳ πάμπολλα ψαύοντα σιδήρια κἀκείνων πάλιν ἕτερα κἀκείνυν ἄλλα καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἄχρι πλείονος, ἅπαντα δή που πίμπλασθαι χρὴ τὰ σιδήρια τῶν ἀπορρεόντων τῆς λίθου σωμάτων καὶ κινδυνεύει διαφορηθῆναι τὸ σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνο λιθίδιον εἰς τὰς ἀπορροὰς διαλυθέν.

καί τοι κἂν εἰ μηδὲν παρακέοιτο αὐτῷ σιδήριον, εἰς τὸν ἀέρα σκεδαννῦτο, μάλιστ᾽ εἰ καὶ θερμὸς ὑπάρχοι. ναί, φησί. σμικρὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ χρὴ πάνυ νοεῖν, ὥστε τῶν ἐμφερομένων τῷ ἀέρι ψηγμάτων τούτων δὴ τῶν σμικροτάτων ἐκείνων ἕκαστον μυριοστὸν εἶναι μέρος. εἶτ' ἐξ οὕτω σμικρῶν τολμᾶτε λέγειν κρεμάννυσθαι

βάρη τηλικαῦτα σιδήρου; εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μυριοστόν ἐστι μέρος τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φερομένων ψηγμάτων, πηλίκον χρὴ νοῆσαι τὸ πέρας αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγκιστρῶδες, ᾧ περιπλέκεται πρὸς ἄλληλα; πάντως γὰρ δή που τοῦτο σμικρότατόν ἐστιν ὅλου τοῦ ψήγματος.

εἶτα μικρὸν μικρῷ, κινούμενον κινουμένῳ περιπλακὲν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀποπάλλεται;

καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα πάντως αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν κάτωθεν τὰ δ᾽ ἄνωθεν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθεν τὰ δ' ὄπισθεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἐκρηγνύμενα σείει τε καὶ ταράττει καὶ μένειν οὐκ ἐᾷ. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πολλὰ χρὴ

νοεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕκαστον ἐκείνων τῶν μικρῶν σωμάτων ἔχειν ἀγκιστρώδη πέρατα.

δι᾽ ἑνὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις οὐ συνάπτεται, δι᾽ ἑτέρου δ᾽ ἑνός, τοῦ μὲν ὑπερκειμένου τῇ λίθῳ, τοῦ δ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τῷ σιδήρῳ᾽ εἰ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν ἐξαφθείη τῆς λίθου, κάτω δὲ τῷ σιδήρῳ μὴ συμπλακείη, πλέον οὐδέν᾽ (ὥστε τοῦ μὲν ὑπερκειμένου τὸ ἄνω μέρος ἐκκρέμασθαι χρὴ τῆς λίθου, τοῦ δ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τῷ κάτω πέρατι συνῆφθαι τὸν σίδηρον.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κἀκ τῶν πλαγίων ἀλλήλοις περιπλέκεται, πάντως που κἀνταῦθα ἔχει τὰ ἀἄγκιστρα. καὶ μέμνησό μοι πρὸ πάντων, ὅπως ὄντα σμικρὰ τὰς τοσαύτας τε καὶ τοιαύτας ἀποφύσεις ἔχει᾽ καὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἔτι δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι, ὅπως ἵνα τὸ δεύτερον σιδήριον συναφθῇ τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ τὸ τρίτον κἀκείνῳ τὸ τέταρτον, ἅμα μὲν διέρχεσθαι χρὴ τοὺς πόρους ταυτὶ τὰ σμικρὰ καὶ ληρώδη ψήγματα, ἅμα δ᾽ ἀποπάλλεσθαι τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ τεταγμένου, καί τοι κατὰ πᾶν ὁμοίου τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη πάλιν ὑπόθεσις ἄτολμος ἀλλ᾽ εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, μακρῷ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναισχυντοτέρα, πέντε σιδηρίων ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις ἐφεξῆς τεταγμένων διὰ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου διαδῦναι ῥᾳδίως τῆς λίθου τὰ μόρια, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἀποπάλλεσθαι καὶ μὴ διὰ τούτου κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἑτοίμως διεξέρχεσθαι.

καὶ μὴν ἑκατέρως ἄτοπον᾽ εἰ μὲν ἀποπάλλεται, πῶς εἰς τὸ τρίτον ὠκέως διεξέρχεται;

εἰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀποπάλλεται, πῶς κρεμάννυται τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου; τὴν Ὑὰρ ἀπόπαλσιν αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο δημιουργὸν τῆς ὁλκῆς…

…ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἐπίκουρος τὰ φαινόμενα φυλάττειν βουλόμενος ἀσχημονεῖ φιλοτιμούμενος ἐπιδεικνύειν αὐτὰ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὁμολογοῦντα…

…πῶς οὖν ἕλκουσιν (οἱ νεφροί); εἰ μὲν ὡς Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται τὰς ὁλκὰς ἁπάσας γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀτόμων ἀποπάλσεις τε καὶ περιπλοκάς, ἄμεινον ὄντως ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν μηδ' ἕλκειν ὅλως αὐτούς πολὺ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἡρακλείας λίθου μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένων ὁ λόγος ἐξεταζόμενος εὑρεθείη γελοιότερος.

Now Epicurus, despite the fact that he employs in his Physics elements similar to those of Ascelpiades, still allows that iron is attracted by the lodestone, and chaff by amber. He even tries to give the cause of the phenomenon. His view is that the atoms which flow from the stone are related in shape to those flowing from the iron, and so they become easily interlocked with one another; thus it is that, after colliding with each of the two compact masses (the stone and the iron) they then rebound into the middle and so become entangled with each other, and draw the iron after them. So far, then, as his hypotheses regarding causation go, he is perfectly unconvincing; nevertheless, he does grant that there is an attraction. Further, he says that it is on similar principles that there occur in the bodies of animals the dispersal of nutrient and the discharge of waste matter, as also the actions of cathartic drugs.

Asclepiades, however, who viewed with suspicion the incredible character of the cause mentioned, and who saw no other credible cause on the basis of his supposed elements, shamelessly found his way out by stating that nothing is in any way attracted by anything else. Now, if he was dissatisfied with what Epicurus said, and had nothing better to say himself, he ought to have refrained from making hypotheses, and should have said that Nature is a constructive artist and that the substance of things is always tending towards unity and also towards alteration because its own parts act upon and are acted upon by one another. For, if he had assumed this, it would not have been difficult to allow that this constructive nature has powers which attract appropriate and expel alien matter. For in no other way could she be constructive, preservative of the animal, and eliminative of its diseases, unless it be allowed that she conserves what his appropriate and discharges what is foreign.

But in this matter, too, Ascelpiades realized the logical sequence of the principles he had assumed; he showed no scruples, however, in opposing plain fact; he joins issue in this matter also, not merely with all physicians, by with everyone else, and maintains that there is no such thing as a crisis, or a critical day, and that nature does absolutely nothing for the preservation of the animal. For his constant aim is to follow out logical consequences and to upset obvious fact, in this respect being opposed to Epicurus; for the latter always affirmed the observed fact, although he gives an ineffective explanation of it, saying that these small corpuscles belonging to the lodestone rebound, and become entangled with other similar particles of the iron, and that then, by means of this entanglement (which cannot be seen anywhere) such a heavy substance as iron is attracted. I fail to understand how anybody could believe this. Even if we admit this, the same principle will not explain the fact that, when the iron has another piece brought in contact with it, this becomes attached to it.

For what are we to say? That, indeed, some of the particles that flow from the lodestone collide with the iron and then rebound back, and that it is by these that the iron becomes suspended? That others penetrate into it, and rapidly pass through it by way of its empty channels? That these then collide with the second piece of iron and are not able to penetrate it although they penetrated the first piece? And that they then course back to the first piece and produce entanglements like the former ones?

The hypothesis here becomes clearly refuted by its absurdity. As a matter of fact, I have seen five writing-stylets of iron attached to one another in a line, only the first one being in contact with the lodestone, and the power being transmitted through it to the others. Moreover, it cannot be said that if you bring a second stylet into contact with the lower end of the first, it becomes held, attached, and suspended, whereas, if you apply it to any other part of the side it does not become attached. For the power of the lodestone is distributed in all directions; it merely needs to be in contact with the first stylet at any point; from this stylet again the power flows, as quick as thought, all through the second, and from that again to the third. Now, if you imagine a small lodestone hanging in a house, and in contact with it all round a large number of pieces of iron, form them again others, from these others, and so on, all these pieces of iron must surely become filled with the corpuscles which emanate from the stone; therefore, this first little stone is likely to become dissipated by disintegrating into these emanations. Further, even if there be no iron in contact with it, it still disperses into the air, particularly if this be also warm.

"Yes" says Epicurus, "but these corpuscles must be looked on as exceedingly small, so that some of them are a ten-thousandth part of the size of the very small particles carried in the air." Then do you venture to say that so great a weight of iron can be suspended by such small bodies? If each of them is a ten-thousandth part as large as the dust particles which are borne in the atmosphere, how big must we suppose the hook-like extremities by which they interlock with each other to be? For of course this is quite the smallest portion of the whole particle.

Then, again, when a small body becomes entangled with another small body, or when a body in motion becomes entangled with another also in motion, they do not rebound at once. For, further, there will of course be others which break in upon them from above, from below, from front and rear, from right to left, and which shake and agitate them and never let them rest. Moreover, we would be forced to suppose that each of these small bodies has a large number of these hook-like extremities. For by one it attaches itself to its neighbors, by another – the topmost one – to the lodestone, and by the bottom one to the iron. For if it were attached to the stone above and not interlocked with the iron below, this would be of no use. Thus, the upper part of the superior extremity must hang from the lodestone and the iron must be attached to the lower end of the inferior extremity; and, since they interlock with each other by their sides as well, they must, of course, have hooks there too. Keep in mind also, above everything, what small bodies these are which possess all these different kids of outgrowths. Moreover, remember how, in order that the second piece of iron may become attached to the first, the third to the second, and to that the fourth, these absurd little particle must both penetrate the passages in the first piece of iron and at the same time rebound from the piece coming next in the series, although this second peeve is naturally in every way similar to the first.

Such a hypothesis, once again, is certainly not lacking in audacity; in fact, to tell the truth, it is far more shameless than the previous ones; according to it, when five similar pieces of iron are arranged in a line, the particles of the lodestone which easily traverse the first piece of iron rebound from the second, and do not pass readily through it in the same way. Indeed, it is nonsense, whichever alternative is adopted. For, if they do rebound, how then do they pass through into the third piece? And if they do not rebound, how does the second piece become suspended to the first? For Epicurus himself regarded the rebound as the active agent in the attraction.

But, as I have said, one is driven to talk nonsense whenever one gests into discussion with such men. Having, therefore, given a concise and summary statement of the matter, I wish to be done with it. For if one diligently familiarizes oneself with the writings of Ascelpiades, one will see clearly their logical dependence on his first principles, but also their disagreement with observed facts. Thus, Epicurus, in his desire to adhere to the facts, cuts an awkward figure by aspiring to show that these agree with his principles.

... 15.59: How, then, do they {kidneys} exert this attraction {pulling waste from the blood}. If, as Epicurus thinks, all attraction takes place by virtue of the rebounds and entanglements of the atoms, it would be certainly better to maintain that the kidneys have no attractive action at all; for his theory, when examined, would be found as it stands to be much more ridiculous even than the theory of the lodestone, mentioned a little while ago.

[U294]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 2.219

Ἐπίκουρος δέ, ὡς αὐτὸν Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων ἐξηγεῖται, τὸν χρόνον σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων εἶναι λέγει, παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ γυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμπτώματά ἐστι τισὶ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ ὁ χρόνος πᾶσι τούτοις συμπαρεπόμενος εἰκότως ἂν λεχθείη 10 σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων.

According to the account of Demetrius of Laconia, Epicurus says that time is a concurrence of concurrences, one which accompanies days, nights, hours, the presence and absence of feelings, motions and rests. For all of these are incidental properties of certain things, and since time accompanies them all it would be reasonable to call it a concurrence of concurrences.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Outlines of Pyrrhonism , 3.137

Cf. U79]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.22.5

Περὶ οὐσίας χρόνου... ...Ἐπίκουρος σύμπτωμα ‹συμπτωμάτων› τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ παρακολούθημα κινήσεων

In regards to the essence of time, Epicurus defines it a concurrence ‹of concurrences›, that being what accompanies motion.

12. The Universe & its World-Systems

[U295]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.18.3

Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Δημήτριος Μητρόδωρος Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἄτομα ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει.

Lucretius, Democritus, Demetrius, Metrodorus, Epicurus – they consider the atoms to be infinite in number, while the void is infinite in size.

[U296]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1114A

καὶ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν λέγῃ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ μῆτ' αὐξόμενον μῆτε μειούμενον, ὡς περὶ ἑνός τινος διαλέγεται τοῦ παντός.

Epicurus, who says that "the universe" is infinite, uncreated and imperishable, and subject neither to increase nor diminution, speaks of the universe as if it were a unity.

[U297]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 2.50.103

Vīdēsne Epicūrum, quem hebetem et rudem dīcere solent Stōicī, quem ad modum quod in nātūrā rērum omne esse dīcimus id īnfīnītum esse conclūserit? "Quod fīnītum est," inquit, "habet extrēmum." Quis hoc nōn dederit?— "Quod autem habet extrēmum, id cernitur ex aliō extrīnsecus." Hoc quoque est cōncedendum.

Do you see how Epicurus, whom the Stoics are accustomed to call dull and unrefined, has concluded that what we say is the All in the nature of things is infinite? "What is finite," he says, "has a boundary." Who would not grant this? "But what has a boundary is discerned from something else outside." This too must be conceded.

"At, quod omne est, id nōn cernitur ex aliō extrīnsecus." Ne hoc quidem negārī potest. "Quod igitur nihil habet extrēmum, īnfīnītum sit necesse est."

"But what is the All is not discerned from something else outside." Not even this can be denied. "Therefore what has no boundary must be infinite."

> You see how Epicurus proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: "If there are gods, they are kindly disposed towards men." Now, who will grant you that? Not Epicurus! He says that the gods are concerned at all – for themselves or for anybody else.

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics 3.4

τέταρτον δὲ καὶ δυσαντίβλεπτον τὸ φαίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀεὶ πρός τι περαῖνον. εἰ γὰρ. πᾶν τὸ πεπερασμένον πρὸς ἄλλό τι ἔξωθεν αὐῦτοῦ ὂν περαίνει, τὸ ἔξωθεν ἐκεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ περαίνει, ἢ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν ἢ πεπερασμένον καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄπειρον, ἔχομεν αὐτόθεν ὅτι ἔστι τὸ ἄπειρον: εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένον οἷον ἡ γῆ, καὶ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἄλλο περαίνει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ ἐπ' ἄπειρον, ἔστι τὸ ἄπειρον᾽ οὐδὲν γὰρ τελευταῖον ληφθήσεται πέρας, εἴ περ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἄλλό τι περαίνει. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ὡς μάλιστα, ὡῶς φησιν ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον πιστεύοντες ἄπειρον ἔλεγον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, διότι πᾶν τὸ πεπερασμένον παρά τι περαινόμενον ἔξωθέν τι ἔχει. ὁ δὲ ᾿Αριστοτέλης ὡς ἀρχαιοτέρου μέμνηται τοῦ λόγου.

> There is fourth point which is hard to deal with: the fact that everything which is limited seems to be limited by something. For if everything which is limited is limited by something which is external to itself, then that external thing by which it is limited is itself either unlimited or limited. And if it is unlimited, then we immediately have the result that the unlimited exists. And if it is limited, like the earth for example, then this too is limited by something else, and so on without limit. And if it goes on without limit, the unlimited exists. For one will never get one's hands on the final limit, if indeed this too is limited by something else. The Epicureans, according to Alexander, relied on this argument above all else when they said that the universe was infinite, because everything which is limited by something has outside it something which is limited {and so on and so on}. Aristotle mentions that this argument is quite old.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Questions, 3.12

εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ τὸ εἶναι πεπερασμένῳ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι παρ᾽᾽ ἄλλο, καλῶς ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι ἀξιοῦντες παντὸς πεπερασμένου ἐκτὸς ὀφείλειν εἶναί τι παρ' ὃ περαίνειν φαίνεται, εἴ γε ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πεπερασμένῳ τὸ εἶναι.

> If the being limited of what is limited consisted in being considered [as] up against something else, then our opponents would have a point when they claim that outside every limited thing there has to be something up against which it is seen to be limited – if it is in this that being {einai}, for what is limited, consists.

[U298]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's Physics, 3.8

καὶ ταῖς Ἐπικούρου δὲ ἀτόμοις ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομέναις πεπεράνθαι μὲν ὑπάρχει, πρὸς τὶ δὲ περαίνειν οὐκέτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἢ τινὸς ἅπτεσθαι. καί τοι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἠγάπησεν οὕτως Ἐπίκουρος, ὥστε παλαιότερον ὄντα εἰσποιήσασθαι καὶ ὑποβάλλεσθαι μικραῖς τισι καὶ φαύλαις προσθήκαις, καθά περ οἱ τὰ φώρια μετασχηματίζοντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ λανθάνειν.

[U299]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On the Obsolescence of Oracles, 28

ἐπεὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον ἀλλ᾽ ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ κάτω kai ἄνω λαμβάνοντες ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀπορίαις Ἐπικούρῳ γενησόμεθα κινοῦντι τὰς ἀτόμους ἁπάσας εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ πόδας τόπους, ὥσπερ ἢ τοῦ κενοῦ πόδας ἔχοντος ἢ τῆς ἀπειρίας ἐν αὐτῇ κάτω τι καὶ ἄνω διανοῆσαι διδούσης.

For, if we take the expressions below and above as referring, not to the world, but outside of it, we shall become involved in the same difficulties as Epicurus, who would have all his atoms move to places under our feet, as if either the void had feet, or infinity granted us to conceive of below and above within itself.

Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1111B

καὶ τὸ μὲν πᾶν (Ἐπίκουρος λέγει) ἄπειρον ὑποτίθεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μὴ ἀναιρεῖν.

{Epicurus} says that while he posits an infinite universe, he does not eliminate "up" and "down."

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1054B

ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου κενὸν ἐκτὸς ἄπειρόν ἐστι, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὔτ' ἀρχὴν οὔτε μέσον οὔτε τελευταῖον ἔχει, πολλάκις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (Χρυσίππου) λέγεται. καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' Ἐπικούρου τῆς ἀτόμου κάτω φορὰν ἐλέγξαντες ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἀπείρῳ διαφορᾶς, καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω νοεῖται γινόμενον.

It is frequently asserted by Chrysippus that outside the world there is infinite void and that what is infinite has no beginning, middle, or end; and this the Stoics use especially to annihilate the downward motion which Epicurus says the atom has of itself, their contention being that in an infinite void, there is no difference by which to distinguish one part as being up and the other as down.

[U300]

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.88

Κόσμος ἐστὶ περιοχή τις οὐρανοῦ, ἄστρα τε καὶ γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα – οὗ λυομένου Πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σύγχυσιν λήψεται

a Cosmos is a certain surrounding of sky, that surrounds celestial bodies and earth and all apparent things – and when [*a cosmos*] is dissolved all the things in it will come to have disorder

[U301]

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Diagnosis and Cure of Soul's Errors, 7

ὁ δὲ Στωικὸς οὐκ ἔνδον τι κενὸν εἶναι, ἔξωθεν τοῦ κόσμου ὑπάρχειν αὐτό ταῦτα δ'' ἄμφω συγχωρῶν ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ διαφέρεται πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ ἕνα ὁμολογεῖ κόσμον εἶναι τόνδε, καθά περ ὁ Στωικὸς οἴεται κατά γε τοῦτο τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς ὁμόδοξος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον τῷ μεγέθει φησὶν ὑπάρχειν, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ κόσμους ἀπείρους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει.

The Stoic says that there is no void in the world, but that there is empty space outside it. The Epicurean grants both these types of void, but differs from the [Stoics] in another respect. He does not admit that there is only one world, as does the Stoic, who in this respect agrees perfectly with the Peripatetics. But just as he maintains that the void is infinite in size, so also does he way that there are in it an infinite number of world-systems.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.1.3

Ἀναξίμανδρος, Ἀναξιμένης, Ἀρχέλαος, Ξενοφάνης, Διογένης, Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὁ τούτου καθηγητὴς Μητρόδωρος, ἀπείρους κόσμους ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατὰ πᾶσαν [περιαγωγῆν or περίστασιν]..

Democritus and Epicurus maintain that there are infinite worlds in the infinite ‹universe›, in every direction.

Achilles Tatius (The Astronomer, fl.c. 250 CE), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aratus' Phaenomena, 8

οἱ μὲν εἶναί τι ἐκτός φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὃς καὶ ἀπείρους κόσμους ὑποτίθεται ἐν ἀπείρῳ τῷ κενῷ.

Some assert that there exists something externally, as indeed Epicurus, who supposes that there are infinite world-systems in the infinite void.

Achilles Tatius (The Astronomer, fl.c. 250 CE), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aratus' Phaenomena, 5

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ πολλοὺς κόσμους ὑποτίθεται καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος αὐτοῦ Μητρόδωρος.

Epicurus and his master [sic] Metrodorus believe in the existence of many world-systems.

Servius the Grammarian (fl.c. 390 CE), Commentary on Virgil's Aeneid, 1.330

[Quo sub caelō]… secundum Epicūrēōs, quī plūrēs volunt esse caelōs, ut Cicerō in Hortensiō

[Under which heaven] … according to the Epicureans, who wish there to be more heavens, as Cicero says in Hortensius.

… according to the Epicureans, who would have it that there exist more skies, as Cicero does in his Hortensius.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.24.67 (Cotta to Velleius)

Sed ubi (disciplīnae Epicūreae) est vēritās? In mundīs, crēdō, innumerābilibus, omnibus minimīs temporum punctīs aliīs nāscientibus, aliīs cadentibus?

But where is the truth of the Epicurean doctrine? In worlds, I suppose, innumerable, all in the smallest moments of time, some being born, others perishing?

Where is this "truth" of yours to be found? Among the innumerable world-systems, born and dying through every instant of time?

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.6.21

Infīnitīō ipsa (Epicūrī), quam ἀπειρίαν vocant, tōta ab illō (Dēmocritō) est, tum innumerābilēs mundī, quī et oriantur et intereant cotīdiē.

The very infinity (of Epicurus), which they call apeiria, is entirely from him (Democritus), and also the countless worlds, which both arise and perish every day.

The very conception of infinite space, apeiria as they term it, is entirely derived from Democritus; and again the countless numbers of world-systems that come into existence and pass out of existence every day.

Dionysius the Episcopalian,
by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.23

τὰς ἀτόμους .... κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν.

The atoms comprise an infinity of world-systems.

Hermias (ob. 450 CE), Derision of the Pagan Philosophers, 18

προκύψας δέ μοι φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος σὺ μὲν δὴ κόσμον ἕνα μεμέτρηκας, ὦ φιλότης εἰσὶ δὲ κόσμοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἄπειροι.

Epicurus jumps up and tells me "You actually have counted only one world-system, my friend. But there are many world-systems – in fact, they are infinite."

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Questions, 3.12

ὅτι δὲ πλείω τὰ ἄπειρα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπείρους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγοντας, καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώριμον: λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ τοὺς κόσμους ἀπείρους. τούτων δὲ εἰ μὲν καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀπείρων ἀρχῶν ἐστι συγκείμενος, ἀπειράκις ἄπειρα τὰ ἄπειρα ἀνάγκη εἶναι κτλ.

That there is a plurality of unlimited things according to those who say that the principles {i.e., elements} are unlimited is clear also from what follows. They say that the world-systems, too, are unlimited [in number]. If each of these too is composed out of unlimited principles, it is necessary for the unlimited things to be unlimited an unlimited number of times over.

[U301a]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.1.5

Ἐπίκουρος ἄνισον εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τῶν κόσμων διάστημα.

Epicurus asserts that the spaces between world-systems are unequal.

[U302]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Doxography, 2.2.5

Ἐπίκουρος δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι μὲν εἶναι σφαιροειδεῖς τοὺς κόσμους, ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις σχήμασι κεχρῆσθαι.

Epicurus affirms that, on the one hand, it is possible that world-systems might be spherically shaped, and on the other hand, that it is also possible they may be characterized by other configurations.

[U303]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.7.3

Ἐπίκουρος ἐνίων μὲν κόσμων ἀραιὸν τὸ πέρας, ἐνίων δὲ πυκνόν, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέν τινα κινούμενα τὰ δ᾽ ἀκίνητα.

Epicurus maintains that the edges of some world-systems may be thin, others thick, and that of these, some move and others remain stationary.

[U304]

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (fl.c. 20 CE), On the Indestructibility of the Cosmos, 3

Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ὁ πολὺς ὅμιλος τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλοσόφων γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν ἀπολείπουσι τοῦ κόσμου, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὺς κόσμους ὑπογράφουσιν, ὧν τὴν μὲν γένεσιν ἀλληλοτυπίαις καὶ ἐπιπλοκαῖς ἀτόμων ἀνατιθέασι, τὴν δὲ φθορὰν ἀντικοπαῖς καὶ προσράξεσι τῶν γεγονότων.

Democritus, Epicurus, and a numerous company of Stoic philosophers believe in a birth and destruction of the world, though not in the same way. The ones who believe in the existence of an infinity of world-systems attribute their births in terms of reciprocal impacts and entanglement of atoms, and their deaths to crashing atoms and to collisions from that which it was formed out of.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 8.1

Dīversē Stōicī et Epicūrēī, quī et nātum esse (mundum) et peritūrum affirmant

They don't agree with the Stoics and Epicureans, who assert that the world was born and will perish

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Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.1.10

Ūnus igitur Epicūrus, auctōre Dēmocritō, vēridicus in hāc rē fuit, quī ait et ortum aliquandō fuisse (mundum) et aliquandō esse peritūrum. Nec tamen ratiōnem ullam reddere potuit, scilicet aut quibus dē causīs tantum hoc opus aut quō tempore solvātur.

Therefore Epicurus alone, with Democritus as his authority, was truthful in this matter, who says that the world both once had an origin and at some time will perish. Yet he was able to render no argument at all, namely either by what causes this so great work is dissolved or at what time it is dissolved.

Epicurus then, on the authority of Democritus, was truly versed on this point. He said that [the world] had begun at one time and would come to extinction at some time. However, he was not able to render any account either for what causes or at what time this such great work would be dissolved.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 2.10.24

Quod sī (mundus) potest occidere in tōtum, quia per partēs occidit, appāret aliquandō esse ortum, et ut fragilitās initium, sīc dēclārat et terminum. Quae sī vēra sunt, nōn potuit dēfendere Aristotelēs quō minus habuerit et mundus ipse prīncipium. Quod sī Aristotelī Platō et Epicūrus extorquent, et Platōnī et Aristotelī, quī semper fore mundum putāvērunt, licet sint ēloquentēs, ingrātīs tamen idem Epicūrus ēripiet, quia sequitur ut habeat et fīnem

But if the world can perish entirely, because it perishes by parts, it becomes apparent that it once arose, and just as fragility shows a beginning, so it also shows an end. If these things are true, Aristotle could not defend against the conclusion that the world itself has had a beginning. And if Plato and Epicurus force this from Aristotle, then from Plato and Aristotle, who thought that the world would exist forever—although they are eloquent—the same Epicurus will nevertheless take it away against their will, because it follows that it also has an end

But if the world can perish entirely, since it perishes in parts, it is clear that at some time it began. Fragility thus exposes the end of the world just as it shows its beginning. And if these things are true, Aristotle will not be able to defend the point he held, namely, that the world itself had no beginning. If Plato and Aristotle, who thought that the world will always be, although they are eloquent, the same Epicurus will force the same point from them, however unwilling, since it follows that it also has an end.

[U305]

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, physics, 20.1

Ἐπίκουρος πλείστοις τρόποις τὸν κόσμον φθείρεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς φυτὸν καὶ πολλαχῶς.

=AETIVS II 4, 10?

Epicurus says that the world {continuously} destroys itself in very many ways: for it can be destroyed in the manner of an animal, in the manner of plant, and in lots of other ways.

[U306]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's, Physics, 8.1

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει τοὺς κόσμους ὑποθέμενοι, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀναξίμανδρον καὶ Λεύκιππον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ ὕστερον οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον, γινομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ φθειρομένους ὑπέθεντο ἐπ’ ἄπειρον, ἄλλων μὲν ἀεὶ γινομένων, ἄλλων δὲ φθειρομένων, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀίδιον ἔλεγον ἄνευ γὰρ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις ἢ φθορά.

[U307]

St. Jerome (fl.c. 385 CE), Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 1

Nec putēmus sīgna atque prōdigia et multa, quae arbitrīō deī nova in mundō fiunt, in priōribus saeculīs esse iam facta, et locum invenīre Epicūrum, quī asserit per innumerābilēs periodōs eadem et eīsdem in locīs et per eōsdem fierī.

Let us not think that the signs and portents and many things which by the will of God happen as new in the world were already done in earlier ages, and that Epicurus find a place, who asserts that through innumerable cycles the same things occur in the same places and by the same [agents].

We do not believe that signs and portents and many unusual facts, which happen in the world by divine will, have already happened in past generations, such as Epicurus would have it, asserting that through innumerable temporal cycles, the same things happen, in the same places, by means of the same agents.

[U308]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.4

ὁ τοίνυν κόσμος συνέστη περικεκλασμένῳ σχήματι ἐσχηματισμένος τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῶς τε καὶ τάχιστα κινουμένων, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πολλὰ σώματα συνηθροίσθη διὰ τοῦτο ποικιλίαν ἔχοντα καὶ σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν ‹καὶ βαρῶν›. ἀθροιζομένων δ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ τούτῶν τὰ μὲν ὅσα μείζονα ἦν καὶ βαρύτερα πάντως ὑπεκάθιζεν ὅσα δὲ μικρὰ καὶ περιφερῆ καὶ λεῖα καὶ εὐόλισθα, ταῦτα καὶ ἐξεθλίβετο κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον τῶν ἀτόμων εἴς τε τὸ μετέωρον ἀνεφέρετο. ὡς δ᾽ οὖν ἐξέλειπε μὲν ἡ πληκτικὴ δύναμις μετεωρίζουσα οὐκέτι τε ἦγεν ἡ πληγὴ πρὸς τὸ μετέωρον, ἐκωλύετο δὲ ταῦτα κάτω φέρεσθαι, ἐπιέζετο πρὸς τοὺς τόπους τοὺς δυναμένους δέξασθαι. οὗτοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ πέριξ, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σωμάτων περιεκλᾶτο. περιπλεκόμενα δὲ ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν περίκλασιν τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐγέννησε. τῆς δ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐχόμεναι φύσεως αἱ ἄτομοι ποικίλαι οὖσαι, καθὼς εἴρηται, πρὸς τὸ μετέωρον ἐξωθούμεναι τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων φύσιν ἀπετέλουν. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν ἀναθυμιωμένων σωμάτων ἔπληττε τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τοῦτον ἐξέθλιβε. πνευματούμενος δὲ οὗτος κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ συμπεριλαμβάνων τὰ ἄστρα συμπεριῆγεν αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν νῦν περιφορὰν αὐτῶν μετέωρον ἐφείλιττε. κἄπειτα ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὑποκαθιζόντων ἐγεννήθη ἡ γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μετεωριζομένων οὐρανός, πῦρ, ἀήρ. πολλῆς δὲ ὕλης ἔτι περιειλημμένης ἐν τῇ γῇ πυκνουμένης τε ταύτης κατὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτῶν πληγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων αὐγὰς προσεθλίβετο πᾶς ὁ μικρομερὴς σχηματισμὸς ταύτης καὶ τὴν ὑγρὰν φύσιν ἐγέννα᾽ ῥευστικῶς δὲ αὕτη διακειμένη κατεφέρετο πρὸς τοὺς κοίλους τόπους καὶ δυναμένους χωρῆσαί τε καὶ στέξαι, ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ὑποστὰν ἐκοίλαινε τοὺς ὑποκειμένους τόπους. τὰ μὲν οὖν κυριώτατὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐγεννήθη.

So the world was compounded and endowed with its bent {i.e., rounded} shape in the following manner: Because atomic bodies, which move without guidance and in a haphazard manner, were constantly moving at the greatest of speeds, many bodies happened to be assembled together in the same place, and thereby had variety of shapes and seizes ‹and weights›. As they assembled in the same place, the larger and heavier bodies tended to move toward the bottom and settled; but the small, round, smooth, and slippery ones were pushed out in the concourse of atoms and so moved into the celestial regions. So when the force of the blows [of atomic collisions] stopped raising them up, and the blows no longer carried them into the celestial regions, they were still prevented from falling down because they were squeezed into places that could accommodate them. Now these were situated all around, and most of the bodies were bent around to these places. By becoming entangled with each other during the bending, they generated the sky. Retaining the same nature and being varied, as was said, the atoms which were pushed out to the celestial regions produced the nature of the heavenly bodies. The majority of the bodies which were evaporated upwards struck the air and compressed it. And the air, being made wind-like during its movement and gathering together the heavenly bodies, drove them around with itself and by this twisting produced their present circular movement in the celestial regions. And then the earth was produced from the bodies which settled at the bottom, while those which were raised upwards produced the sky, fire, and air. Since a great deal of matter was still contained in the earth and this was packed densely by the blows of the atomic bodies and by those from the rays of the heavenly bodies, the earth's entire configuration, which was made up of small particles, was squeezed together and so produced the nature of fluids. And since this nature was disposed to flow, it moved down into the hollow places and those able to receive it and contain it; either that, or the water all by itself hollowed out the existing places by settling there. So the most important parts of the world were produced in this way.

[U309]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 5.26.3

οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρειοι οὐκ ἔμψυχα (τὰ φυτά). τινὰ γὰρ ψυχῆς ὁρμητικῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῆς, τινὰ δὲ καὶ λογικῆς. τὰ δὲ φυτὰ αὐτομάτως πως κινεῖσθαι, οὐ διὰ ψυχῆς.

The Stoics and the Epicureans do not consider the planets to be living beings (some are actually characterized as being irascible and lustful – others as rational), but instead the planets move, in a certain sense, automatically, without mental guidance.

14. Man

[U310]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.267

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ δεικτικῶς dn0noav δύνασθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρίστασθαι, λέγοντες ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τοιουτονὶ μόρφῶώμα μετ᾽ ἐμψυχίας, οὐκ ἔγνωσαν δ᾽ ὅτι εἰ τὸ δεικνύμενόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὴ δεικνύμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος κτλ.

Epicurus and his followers supposed that the conception of Man could be conveyed by indication, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape combined with vitality." But they did not notice that if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indicated is not Man.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.25

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρός φησιν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸ τοιουτονὶ μόρφωμα μετὰ ἐμψυχίας. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος δείξει ἐμφανίζεται, ὁ μὴ δεικνύμενος οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος

Epicurus says that Man is "This sort of shape combined with vitality." According to him, then, since a man is revealed by direct perception, he that is not perceived as such is not a man.

15. The Soul

[U311]

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.66

Λέγει, ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων Αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων – πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός: καὶ τὸ μέν τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι ¬ τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς

He says, in other [*locations*], that the [*Soul*] is compounded from the smoothest and roundest atoms – by a large measure in a certain respect differing from those of fire: and that a certain [*part*] of it is unreasoning, which is spread out through the remaining body ¬ but the rational [*part is*] in the chest, as is clear both from fears and from joy

Ὕπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (τῶν παρ᾽ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένων, ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων) – εἶτα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς ἐπερεισμοῖς: τό τε Σπέρμα ἀφ᾽ ὅλων τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι

[*Epicurus also says that*] Sleep is produced when the parts of the soul (which are spread out throughout the whole compound, [*either*] compacted or disseminated) – accordingly fall into each other from their mutual pressing: for Seeds [*of the soul*] emanate from the entirety of [*our*] bodies

[U312]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.4.7

[Δημόκριτος] Ἐπίκουρος διμερῆ τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἔχουσαν ἐν τῷ θώρακι καθιδρυμένον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ σώματος διεσπαρμένον.

> Democritus and Epicurus say that the soul has two parts, one which is rational and situated in the chest, and the other which is non-rational and spread throughout the entire body.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.5.6

Παρμενίδης [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι] ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ θώρακι, καὶ Ἐπίκουρος

> Parmenides and Epicurus maintain that the seat of consciousness – the rational part of the soul – occupies the entire chest.

Tertulllian (fl.c. 195 CE), On the Soul, 15

nec in tōtā lōricā pectoris, ut Epicūrus, putēs τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν concludī

> nor in the whole breastplate of the chest, as Epicurus [thinks], you would suppose the ruling part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) to be enclosed.
>
> You must not suppose that the sovereign faculty … is found enclosed in the breast, as Epicurus thinks.

[U313]

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), P.Herc. 1012 col. 22 & 29 (46 & 47)

…[κα] τελέξαθ' ὁ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ π̣[ε]ρὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ λογιζομένου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς καὶ τούτου πραγματικὴν τὴν ζήτησιν ἔχοντος κα[ὶ] κατὰ λόγον· η μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] ζ̣ητο[ύ]μενον τῶν ἐναρ̣[γ]ῶν, φό[βων] [ὄντ]ων ἀδεήτων λόγων, τοῦ[το δὲ] βουλόμενος διδ̣άσ̣[κειν]… …[εἴτ' ἐν τῶι] ἀ̣λ̣ογίστω[ι] <εἴτ'> <ἐπὶ> <λογιστικ[ο]ῦ>… …φαμένων ὡς ἐπιβάλ[λε]ι̣ν δεῖ ἐ̣ν τῶι λογίζεσθα[ί] τ̣ι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι· ποῦ μάλισθ' ἡ κείνησις καὶ τὸ πάθος ἕλκει; φανερῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θώρακα ἡ ὁλκὴ γε̣ίνετα̣ι. μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ἀντιπ̣ρ̣ο̣φέρεται τὴν σημήωσιν, ἧι χρῶνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶ[ν ὑ]πὲρ το[ῦ τὸ]ν λογισμὸν ἐ̣ν κεφα[λῆι ἐστηρ]ίχθαι, καὶ ἐπιτίθησιν τῆ[ι δυνά]μει λέγων ὡς κατά τινας ἐκ τῶν παθῶν κ[αὶ π]α̣ρακοπῶν ἔστιν σημ̣[ηώσασθ]α̣ί τ[ι]νων μερῶν, ἔ[στιν δ' ἐν κεφαλῆι ὁ λο]γισμὸς… …καθὸ κα[τ' αὐτ]ήν, ὥ[ς φησι]ν, ἀπολο[γίζοιτ'] ἂν τ̣ο̣[ὐναντίον ἢ Ἐπίκουρος]…

…κατελέξαθ' ὁ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ περὶ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ λογιζομένου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς καὶ τούτου πραγματικὴν τὴν ζήτησιν ἔχοντος καὶ κατὰ λόγον· η μὲν γὰρ τὸ ζητούμενον τῶν ἐναργῶν, φόβων ὄντων ἀδεήτων λόγων, τοῦτο δὲ βουλόμενος διδάσκειν… …εἴτ' ἐν τῶι ἀλογίστωι ‹εἴτ'› ‹ἐπὶ› ‹λογιστικοῦ›… …φαμένων ὡς ἐπιβάλλειν δεῖ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαί τι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι· ποῦ μάλισθ' ἡ κείνησις καὶ τὸ πάθος ἕλκει; φανερῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θώρακα ἡ ὁλκὴ γείνεται. μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ἀντιπροφέρεται τὴν σημήωσιν, ᾗ χρῶνται πολλοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐν κεφαλῆι ἐστηρ]ίχθαι, καὶ ἐπιτίθησιν τῇ δυνάμει λέγων ὡς κατά τινας ἐκ τῶν παθῶν καὶ παρακοπῶν ἔστιν σημηώσασθαί τινων μερῶν, ἔστιν δ' ἐν κεφαλῇ ὁ λογισμὸς… …καθὸ κατ' αὐτήν, ὥς φησιν, ἀπολογίζοιτ' ἂν τοὐναντίον ἢ Ἐπίκουρος…

[U314]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1118D

Κωλώτῃ δὲ γελοῖον δοκεῖ (τὸ ζητεῖν Σωκράτη τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος). τί οὖν οὐ καταγελᾷ καὶ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ πράττοντος, ὁσάκις γράφοι καὶ διαλέγοιτο περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀθρόου τῆς καταρχῆς; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ὡς ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοί, σώματος τοιοῦδε καὶ ψυχῆς ὃ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὁ ζητῶν ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖ φύσιν ἐκ τῆς κυριωτέρας ἀρχῆς. ὅτι δὲ αὕτη λόγῳ δυσθεώρητος, αἰσθήσει δὲ ἄληπτός ἐστι, μὴ παρὰ Σωκράτους σοφιστοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος ἀνδρός, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων λάβωμεν. οἱ μέχρι τῶν περὶ σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, αἷς θερμότητα καὶ μαλακότητα καὶ τόνον παρέχει τῷ σώματι, τὴν οὐσίαν συμπηγνύντες αὐτῆς ἔκ τινος θερμοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ ἀερώδους οὐκ ἐξικνοῦνται πρὸς τὸ κυριώτατον ἀλλ᾽ ἀπαγορεύουσι᾽ τὸ γὰρ ᾧ κρίνει καὶ μνημονεύει καὶ φιλεῖ καὶ μισεῖ καὶ ὅλως τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ λογιστικὸν ἔκ τινός φησιν ἀκατονομάστου ποιότητος ἐπιγίνεσθαι. καὶ ὅτι μὲν αἰσχυνομένης ἐστὶν ἀγνοίας τουτὶ τὸ ἀκατονόμαστον ἐξομολόγησις, οὐκ ἔχειν ὀνομάσαι φασκόντων ὃ μὴ δύνανται καταλαβεῖν, ἴσμεν. ἐχέτω δὲ συγγνώμην καὶ τοῦτο᾽, ὡς λέγουσι.

Colotes, however finds the question absurd {Socrates' inquiries into "what is a man?"}. Why then does he not deride has master too, who did this very thing as often as he wrote or spoke about the constitution of the soul and the "initiation of the aggregate." For if (as they themselves hold) the combination of the two parts, a body of a certain description and a soul, is man, then one who seeks to discover the nature of the soul is seeking to discover the nature of man, starting from the more important source. And that the soul is hard to apprehend by reason and cannot be discerned by sense let us not learn from Socrates, "the sophist and charlatan" but from these sages, who get as far as those powers of the soul that affect the flesh, by which it imparts warmth and softness and firmness to the body, when they manufacture its substance by the combining their own varieties of heat, gas and air, but quite before they reach the seat of power. For its ability to judge, remember, love, and hate – in short, its thinking and reasoning faculty – is added to these, they say from a quality "that has no name." This talk of the thing "that has no name" is, we know, a confession of an embarrassed ignorance – what they cannot make out they assert that they cannot name. But let this too "be excused"* as they say.

"just move past it"?

[U315]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.3.11

Ἐπίκουρος (τὴν ψυχὴν) κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου᾽ τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ὧν τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἠρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκατονόμαστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἴσθησιν.

Epicurus said that the soul is a blend of four things: one of which is fire-like, one air-like, one wind-like, while the fourth is something which lacks a name. (This last he made the one which accounts for sensation.) The wind, he said, produces movement in us, the air produces rest, the hot one produces the evident heat of the body, and the unnamed one produces sensation in us. For sensation is found in none of the named elements

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Macrobius, Commentary on the "Dream of Sciopio," 1.14.20

Epicūrus (animam dīxit) speciēm ex ignē et aere et spīritū mixtam

Epicurus called the soul a being commixed with fire, air, and breath.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 1.8

καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον᾽ καὶ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους σύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ πλειόνων τινῶν καὶ διαφερόντων σωμάτων.

... and the Epicureans: indeed, according to them, the soul is a compound of more varied bodies.

16. Temperaments

[U316]

Lucretius transitions from discussing temporary moods to the enduring traits of individuals. He shows some of the effects that result depending on which of the three named elements of the soul exists in the greatest proportion:

[1] Thermal Element	● **τό Θερμόν, τό Πυρώδες**	Calor, Vapor
[2] Pneumatic Element	● **τό Πνευματικόν**	Ventus, Aura
[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	● **τό Ἀερώδες**	Aer
[3] Unnamed Element	**τό Ἀκατονόμαστον**	Nominis Expers

3.294 **sed cálidī Plūs est íllīs quíbus ā́cria Corda**
More heat exists in those whose violent Heart

īrācúndaque Mēns fácil^{e} effervḗscit in īrā:
and irascible Mind easily boil over in anger:

quō géner^{e} in prī́mīs Vī́s est violénta leṓnum,
of which kind in first place is the violent Force of lions,

péctora Quī frémitū rumpunt – plērúmque geméntēs
nec cáper^{e} īrā́rum flúctūs in péctore possunt.

Who puff out their chest with roaring – generally they
cannot contain the growling waves of anger in their chest.

3.299 **ăt ventōsa magis cervōrum frīgida Mēns est**
but the cold Mind of deer is more full of breath

et gelidās citius per viscera concitat aurās –
and quickly stirs cold currents through its organs –

quae tremulum faciunt membrīs existere mōtum
which causes a trembling movement to arise in the limbs.

3.302 **ăt Nātūrā boum plácidō mágis āëre vīvit**
But the Nature of cattle lives more in calm air,

(nec nimis īrāī Fāx umquam subdita percit
(nor is the smoky Torch of anger, arousing too much, ever applied –

fūmida – suffúndēns caecae cālīginis umbram)
pouring forth the shadow of blind darkness)

nec gélidīs torpet tēlīs perfixa pavōris:
nor does it become numb, pierced by the cold darts of fear:

interutrāsque sita ^{e}st cervōs saevōsque leōnēs.
as she is situated between the deer and the fierce lions.

3.307 **sīc hominum Genus est: quamvīs Doctrīna polītōs**
cōnstituat pariter quōsdam – tamen illa relinquit

the Species of humans is like this: however much Education
can dispose each to be similarly polite – yet it leaves

nātūrae cuiusqu^{e} animī vestīgia prīma.
the first traces of each man's nature in the mind.

3.310 **nec rādīcitus ēvellī mala posse putandumst:**
nor must it be thought that faults can be pulled out from the roots:

quīn, prōclīvius, ^{H}īc īrās dēcurrat ad ācrīs –
but that this Man, more inclined, may run down into fierce angers –

ille metū citius paulō temptētur – at ille
that man may be tempted by fear a little more quickly – but a

tertius accipiat quaedam clēmentius aequō.
third man may receive certain things more gently than is fair.

3.314 **inqu^{e} aliīs rēbus multīs differre necessest**
and so in many other ways, it is necessary to differentiate

nātūrās hominum variās mōrēsque sequācīs –
various natures of man and the behaviors that follow –

quōrum ēgō nunc nequeō caecās expōnere causās,
which I cannot now set out the obscure causes,

nec reperīre figūrārum tōt nōmina quōt sunt
nor can I find so many names of the forms as there are

principiīs – undē haec orītur Variāntia rērum.
in the principle parts – from which these Differences in things emerge.

3.319 **illud in hīs rēbus videō firmāre potesse:**
I see it possible to confirm this in these matters:

usqu^{e} adeō nātūrārum vestīgia linquī
to such an extent that the traces of natures are left

parvola quae nequeat Ratiō depellere nōbīs –
very small which Reason cannot drive away for us –

ut: Nihil impediat dignam dīs dēgere vītam.
so that: Nothing may impede leading a life worthy for the gods.

17. Sensation

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.8.10

Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδώλου.

Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say that sense-perception and thought occur when images approach from the outside. For we apply neither [sense-perception nor thought] to anything in the absence of an image striking form the outside.

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.6.21

Quae sequitur [Epicūrus], sunt tōta Dēmocritī: atomī, ināne, imāginēs, quae εἴδωλα nominant, quōrum incursiōne nōn sōlum videāmus sed etiam cogitēmus

The things which Epicurus follows are entirely Democritus': the atoms, the void, the images which they call eidōla, by the impact of which we both see and also think.

Those ideas which he {Epicurus} adopts, the credit belongs entirely to Democritus – {e.g.,} the atoms, the void, the images, or as they call them, eidola, whose impact is the cause not only of vision but also of thought.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.38.108 (Cotta to Velleius)

Vōs autem nōn modo oculīs imāginēs, sed etiam animīs inculcātis

But you impress images not only upon the eyes, but also upon the minds.

You are trying to foist these images of yours not only on our eyes but on our minds as well.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.38.107

Fac imāginēs esse, quibus pulsentur animī

Assume that there are images by which minds are struck.

Suppose that there are such images constantly impinging on our minds.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter to Dioscorus, 118.27

Dicant ergō, in quō genere pōnant imāginēs, quās dē corporibus solidioribus affluere putant ipsās minimē solidās, ita ut tactū nisi oculōrum, cum vidēmus, et animī, cum cogitāmus, sentīrī nōn possint, sī et ipsa corpora sunt.

Let them therefore say in what kind they place the images which they think flow off from more solid bodies, though they themselves are in the least degree solid, in such a way that they can be perceived by touch only of the eyes, when we see, and of the mind, when we think—if indeed they too are bodies.

Let them say, then, in which class they would include the images which, as they think, stream from solid substances, without themselves being at all solid, and by their impact on the eyes cause us to see; on the mind, to think. They could not possibly be perceived if they are themselves substances.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.23.2

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πεπονθόσι τόποις, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν ἀπαθές.

Epicurus maintained that both emotions and sensation take place in the parts of the body susceptible to being affected, while the sovereign faculty is unaffected.

[U318]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.13.1

Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος κατὰ εἰδώλων εἴσκρισιν οἴονται τὸ ὁρατικὸν συμβαίνειν πάθος.

> Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus maintain that visual perception takes place by the entrance of images [into the eyes].

Meletius, in Cramer, Oxoniensian Anecdote, 3

πολλὰ δὲ οἱ φιλόσοφοι περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταύτης διηνέχθησαν· οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι εἴδωλα τῶν φαινομένων προσπίπτειν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς λέγουσι καὶ τὴν ὅρασιν ποιεῖν.

> There is much disagreement among philosophers regarding [the act of seeing]: the Epicureans profess that images from apparent objects come to impact the eyes and produce vision.

[U319]

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's "On the Sensations," 2

ἡγεῖται δὲ αὐτός τε (Δημόκριτος) καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ Λεύκιππος καὶ ὕστερον δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον εἴδωλά τινα ἀπορρέοντα ὁμοιόμορφα τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν ἀπορρεῖ --- ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ὁρατά — ἐμπίπτειν τοῖς τῶν ὁρώντων ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι. οὗ τεκμήριον παρατίθεται τὸ ἀεὶ τῶν ὁρώντων ἐν τῇ κόρῃ εἶναι τὴν τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἔμφασιν καὶ εἴδωλον, ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι.

> Democritus himself, and before him Leucippus, and after him the Epicureans, think that certain images, which are of the same shape as the objects from which they flow, flow from them and strike the eyes of those who are seeing and that this is how seeing occurs. As a proof of this he offers the fact that there is always in the pupil of those who are seeing a reflection and image of what is seen, and this is exactly what the act of seeing is.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 2.13

πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεως τὸ ὁρᾶν λέγοντας

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 8.7

πολὺ τοίνυν ἄμεινον ὡς ἐν ἐσφαλμένοις Ἐπίκουρος ἀπεφήνατο τῶν Στωικῶν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἄγουσιν ἄχρι τῆς ὀπτικῆς δυνάμεως: ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἄγει· καὶ πολύ γε τούτου κρεῖττον Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐκ εἴδωλον σωματικόν, ἀλλὰ ποιότητα δι'' ἀλλοιώσεως τοῦ πέριξ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἄγων ἄχρι τῆς ὄψεως.

> Therefore Epicurus' view – although both views are mistaken – is much better than that of the Stoics. For the latter do not bring anything of the visual object up to the visual power, but Epicurus declared that he did so. Aristotle is much superior to ‹Epicurus›; he does not posit a corporeal image but a quality from the visual object to the eyes through an alteration of the surround air.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 5.16.3

Epicūrus affluere semper ex omnibus corporibus simulācra quaedam corporum ipsōrum eaque sēsē in oculōs inferre atque ita fierī sēnsum videndī putat

> Epicurus believes that there is a constant flow from all bodies of images from those bodies themselves, and that these impinge upon the eyes, and hence the sensation of seeing arises.

Macrobius, Saturnalia, 7.14.3

Ipsam vērō videndī nātūram nōn inīnsuāviter intrōspexit Epicūrus, cuius in hōc nōn est, ut aestimō, improbanda sententia, adstipulante praecipuē Dēmocritō:

quī sīcut in cēterīs, ita et in hōc paria sēnsērunt. Ergō cēnset Epicūrus ab omnibus corporibus iugī fluōre quaedam simulācra mānāre nec umquam tantullam moram intervenīre, quīn ultrā ferantur inānī figūrā cohaerentēs corporum exuviæ: quārum receptācula in nostrīs oculīs sunt, et ideō ad deputātam sibi ā nātūrā sedem proprī sēnsūs recurrunt. Haec sunt quae vir ille commemorat.

> He looked not unpleasantly into the very nature of seeing, Epicurus, whose view in this matter, as I judge, is not to be disapproved, with Democritus especially agreeing: who, just as in other things, so also in this felt the same. Therefore Epicurus thinks that from all bodies, by a continual flow, certain images flow out, and that never does even the least delay come in, but that the cast-offs of bodies, adhering in empty shape, are carried beyond; the receptacles of which are in our eyes, and therefore they return to the seat assigned to them by nature for their proper sense. These are the things which that man recounts.

> The nature of vision has been brilliantly investigated by Epicurus, and his views on the subject should not, in my opinion, be rejected, especially since the theories of Democritus agree with them–for in this as in everything else those two philosophers are of the same mind. Epicurus, then, holds that from all bodies images flow in a continuous stream and that the sloughed-off particles, cohering to form an empty shape, are forever carried abroad, without the slightest intermission, to find lodgment in our eyes, thus reaching the seat which nature has appointed form them as the seat of the appropriate sense. Such is the explanation given by that famous man.

19. Mirrors

[U320]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.14.2

Λεύκιππος Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὰς κατοπτρικὰς ἐμφάσεις γίνεσθαι κατ᾽ εἰδώλων ἀποστάσεις, ἅ τινα φέρεσθαι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν, συνίστασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατόπτρου κατ᾽ ἀντεπιστροφήν.

> Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus assert that what we see in mirrors is formed by opposition of images moving away from us and upon the mirror will be reflected backwards.

Lucius Appuleius (fl.c. 164 CE), Apology, 15

Quid quod nec ob haec dēbet tantummodō philosophus speculum invīsere? Nam saepē oportet… etiam ipsīus similitūdinis ratiōnem cōnsiderāre, num, ut ait Epicūrus, profectae ā nōbīs imāginēs, velut quaedam exuviāe, iugī fluōre ā corporibus manantēs, cum leve aliquid et solidum offendērunt, illīsae reflectantur et retrō expressae contrōversum respondeant.

> What of the fact that, not on account of these things only, ought the philosopher to visit a mirror? For often it is proper… to consider also the account of the likeness itself, whether, as Epicurus says, the images gone forth from us, as certain cast-offs, flowing from bodies in a continual stream, when they strike something smooth and solid, being dashed against are reflected and, driven back, answer in reverse.

> What is the reason why, not even for these motives, that the philosopher, and only him, should not look into the mirror? Indeed sometimes it is proper … to consider also the criterion of the resemblance itself, it, as Epicurus affirms, certain images moving away from us, like husks that emanate from bodies in a continuous flux, once they have bumped against something smooth and solid, are reflected backwards upon impact, and reproduced in reverse, corresponding in the opposite way.

20. Hearing

[U321]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.19.4

Ἐπίκουρος τὴν γωνὴν εἶναι ῥεῦμα ἐκπεμπόμενον ἀπὸ τῶν φωνούντων ἢ ἠχούντων ἢ ψοφούντων. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ῥεῦμα εἰς ὁμοιοσχήμονα θρύπτεσθαι θραύσματα. ὁμοιοσχήμονα δὲ λέγεται τὰ στρογγύλα τοῖς στρογγύλοις καὶ σκαληνὰ καὶ τρίγωνα τοῖς ὁμοιογενέσι. τούτων δ᾿ ἐμπιπτόντῶν ταῖς ἀκοαῖς ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς φωνῆς. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσκῶν ἐκρεόντων καὶ τῶν ἐμφυσώντῶν κναφέων τοῖς ἱματίοις.

> Epicurus maintains that the voice is a flow sent out from those who make utterances or produce sounds or noises. This flow is broken up into particles of the same shape. ("Of the same shape" means that the round are like the round and the angular and the triangular are like those of those types.) And when these strike the organs of hearing, the perception of voice is produced.

[U322]

Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax (fl. 130 BCE), British Museum codex,
in Cramer, Anecdota Oxoniensia, vol. 4, p. 317. 8

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ σῶμά φασι τὴν φωνήν.

Epicurus, Democritus, and the Stoics say that voice is a body. For everything which can act or be acted upon is a body. For example, iron: it is acted upon by fire and it acts on men or wood. So if voice can act and be acted upon, it is a body. But it acts, since we enjoy hearing a voice or a lyre; and it is acted upon, as when we are speaking and the wind blows, which makes it harder to hear our voice.

Grammaticus the Byzantine, Paris codex, 2555 BAG, p. 1168:

ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ σῶμα λέγουσι τὴν φωνήν, ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἔχει ἐνέργειαν καὶ πάθος ἤγουν δύναται δρᾶσαι καὶ παθεῖν, σῶμά ἐστι.

> Democritus, Epicurus, and the Stoics said that the voice must be a body, since everything that has activity and reactivity – that is: anything able to act and be acted upon – is a body.

[U323]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Table Talk, 720E, 720F

ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον (Ἀμμώνιος ἔφη) λόγου δεῖσθαι τὸ νυκτὸς ἠχωδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς φωνὰς καὶ πρὸς τῷ μεγέθει τὴν τρανότητα καθαρῶς συνδιαφυλάττειν... ...ἡσυχίας δὲ γενομένης Βόηθος ἔφη... ...χρήσεσθαί τισι τῶν προαποδεδειγμένων ὑπ᾿ Ἐπικούρου.

Φέρεται τὰ ὄντα ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι πολὺ γὰρ κενὸν ἐνδιέσπαρται καὶ μέμικται ταῖς τοῦ ἀέρος ἀτόμοις. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ᾖ διακεχυμένος καὶ πλάτος ἔχων καὶ περιδρομὴν ὑπὸ μανότητος, μικρὰ καὶ λεπτὰ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν μορίων κενὰ λείπεται καὶ πολλὴν αἱ ἄτομοι κατεσπαρμέναι χώραν ἐπέχουσιν᾿ ὅταν δὲ συσταλῇ καὶ πίλησις εἰς ὀλίγον αὐτῶν γένηται καὶ συμπέσωσιν ἀποβιασθεῖσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας, πολλὴν εὐρυχωρίαν ἔξω καὶ διαστάσεις μεγάλας ποιοῦσι. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται νυκτὸς ὑπὸ ψυχρότητοσ᾿ ἡ γὰρ θερμότης χαλᾷ καὶ διίστησι καὶ λύει τὰς πυκνώσεις. διὸ πλείονα τόπον τὰ ζέοντα αἱ μαλασσόμενα χαὶ τηκόμενα τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιλαμβάνει, καὶ τοὐναντίον αὖ πάλιν τὰ πηγνύμενα καὶ ψυχόμενα συγχωρεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ συνάγεται καὶ ἀπολείπει κενότητας ἐν τοῖς περιέχουσιν ἀγγείοις καὶ τόποις ἐξ ὧν ὑποκεχώρηκεν.

ἡ δὴ φωνὴ προσφερομένη καὶ προστυγχάνουσα σώμασι πολλοῖς καὶ ἀθρόοις ἢ τυφλοῦται παντάπασιν ἢ διασπάσματα λαμβάνει καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ἀντικρούσεις καὶ διατριβάς. ἐν δὲ κενῷ καὶ σωμάτων ἐρήμῳ διαστήματι λεῖον δρόμον ἔχουσα καὶ συνεχῆ καὶ ἄπταιστον ἐξικνεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἀκοήν, ὑπὸ τάχους ἅμα τῷ λόγῳ διασῴζουσα τὴν σαφήνειαν. ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀγγείων τὰ κενὰ πληττόμενα μᾶλλον ὑπακούει πληγαῖς καὶ τὸν ἦχον ἀποτείνει μακράν, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κύκλῳ περιφερόμενον διαδίδωσι πολύν᾿ τὸ δ᾿ ἐμπλησθὲν ἢ στερεοῦ σώματος ἤ τινος ὑγροῦ παντάπασι γίνεται κωφὸν καὶ ἄναυδον, ὁδὸν οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐδὲ χώραν ᾗ δίεισι τῆς φωνῆς. αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν σωμάτων χρυσὸς μὲν καὶ λίθος ὑπὸ πληρότητος ἰσχνόφωνα καὶ δυσηχῆ καὶ ταχὺ κατασβέννυσι τοὺς φθόγγους ἐν αὑτοῖς, εὔφωνος δὲ καὶ λάλος ὁ χαλκός, fj πολύκενος καὶ ὄγκον ἐλαφρὸς καὶ λεπτός, οὐ πολλοῖς συντεθλιμμένος ἐπαλλήλοις σώμασιν ἀλλ᾿ ἄφθονον ἔχων τὸ τῆς ἐπιεικοῦς καὶ ἀναφοῦς μεμιγμένον οὐσίας, ἣ ταῖς τ᾿ ἄλλαις κινήσεσιν εὐπορίαν δίδωσι τήν τε φωνὴν εὐμενῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσα

παραπέμπει, μέχρις ἂν ἀψάμενός τις ὥσπερ ἐν ὁδῷ καταλάβῃ καὶ τυφλώσῃ [τὸ κενόν]· ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ ἔστη καὶ ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ πρόσω χωρεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀντίφραξιν. ταῦτα, ἔφη, δοκεῖ μοι τὴν νύκτα ποιεῖν ἠχώδη, τὴν δ᾽ ἡμέραν ἧττον, θερμότητι καὶ διαλύσει τοῦ ἀέρος μακρὰ τὰ διαστήματα τῶν ἀτόμων ποιοῦσαν. μόνον, ἔφη, μηδεὶς ἐνιστάσθω πρὸς τὰς πρώτας ὑποθέσεις.

> The fact which needed explanation, continued Ammonius, was rather that voices are more sonorous at night and preserve not only their volume but the precise articulation… …Boëthus then said that when he was still young and occupied with academic pursuits, he had been accustomed to using postulates and adopting unproved assumptions, after the manner of geometry, but that he would now employ some of the demonstrated doctrines of Epicurus. "Existing things move about in the non-existent. There is a great deal of void interspersed and mingled with the atoms of air. Now when air is dispersed and has scope and motility because of its loose structure, the empty spaces left between the particles are small and narrow and the atoms, being scattered, fill a good deal of space, but when it is compressed and the atoms are crowded into a small space, and are forced close together, they leave plenty of space outside and make the intervals large. This is what happens at night, under the influence of cold. For warmth loosens and separates and dissolves concentrations, which is why bodies when boiling or softening or melting take up more room, while on the other hand the particles in freezing and cooling bodies join together more compactly and leave vacuums – spaces from which they have withdrawn – in the vessels which hold them. A sound which approaches and strikes a large number of particles collected in a mass is either silenced completely or undergoes serious convulsions and many collisions and delays. But in an empty stretch, devoid of atoms, it travels a smooth, continuous, and unimpeded path to the organ of hearing, preserving, by its velocity, not only the sense of the message but its fine detail. Surely you have noticed that empty vessels when struck are more responsive and send the sound a long way, and often the sound goes round and round and there is much communication of it; but a vessel filled either with solid matter or with some liquid becomes completely mute and soundless, since the sound has no way or passage by which to go through. Of physical bodies themselves, gold and stone, because of their compactness, are weak-voiced and dull-sounding, and quickly extinguish sounds within them, but bronze is melodious and vocal, because it has much empty space within its structure and is light and fine in its spatial mass, not constricted by crowding particles, but containing an abundance of flimsy, yielding substance. This gives easy passage to other motions and especially to sound, receiving it hospitably and speeding it on its journey, until someone, like a highway-robber, seizes and detains and blindfolds it. There it comes to a halt, ceasing to move on because of the obstruction. This is in my opinion what makes the night sonorous and the day less so. Daytime, by its warmth, and the expansion of the air, makes the intervals between the atoms small, so long as no one objects to my basic assumptions.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Table Talk, 721F

οὐδὲν οὖν ἔδει τῇ νυκτὶ παρέχειν πράγματα συσπῶντας αὐτῆς τὸν ἀέρα καὶ συντείνοντας, ἑτέρωθι δ᾽ αὖ χιύρας καὶ κενότητας ἀπολείποντας, ὥσπερ ἐμποδὼν ὄντα τῇ φωνῇ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ φθείροντα τὴν οὐσίαν, ἧς αὐτὸς οὐσία καὶ σῶμα καὶ δύναμίς ἐστιν. ἄνευ δὲ τούτων ἔδει δῆ που τὰς ἀνωμάλους νύκτας, οἷον ὁμιχλώδεις καὶ δυσχειμέρους ἠχωδεστέρας εἶναι τῶν αἰθρίων καὶ κεκραμένων ὁμαλῶς διὰ τὸ δεῦρο μὲν συνωθεῖν τὰς ἀτόμους, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὅθεν μεθίστανται χώραν ἔρημον ἀπολιπεῖν σωμάτων, καὶ τὸ δὴ προχειρότατον, ἡμέραν ψυχρὰν ἠχωδεστέραν εἶναι νυκτὸς ἀλεεινῆς καὶ θερινῆς· ὧν οὐδέτερον ἀληθές ἐστιν.

> There was no need to trouble the night with contraction and increased tension of its air, so as to leave passages and vacuums elsewhere, as through the air were a hindrance to sound or destroyed its substance. Air is itself the substance and body and power of sound. Apart from these points, turbulent nights, for example cloudy or stormy ones, ought to be in your theory more sonorous than nights that are clear and uniform in composition, because then the atoms are forced together in one place, and leave the place they are driven from empty of matter. It is also very obvious that a cold day would be more sonorous than a hot summer night. But neither are true.

21. Taste

[U324]

τῷ λεγομένῳ περὶ τῆς γεύσεως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς οὔ φησιν εἶναι γλυκύ, πάθος δέ τι καὶ κίνημα περὶ αὐτὴν γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον.

{That ... protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produce in sensation has been of this kind – } is it not the same as the statement about taste? It does not assert that the external object is sweet – there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind.

22. Sleep & Dreams

[U325]

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 43

Epicūreī (somnum affirmant) dēminūtiōnem spīritūs animālis

The Epicureans affirm that sleep is a diminution of the vital breath of the soul.

The Epicureans maintain that sound is a diminution of vital spirit.

[U326]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Table Talk, 734D

ὁ δὲ λεγόμενον περὶ τῶν ἐνυπνίων, ὡς ἔστιν ἀβέβαια καὶ ψευδῆ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς φυλλοχόους μῆνας, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως... ἀνέκυψε... ...ὁ δὲ Φαβωρῖνος... ...λόγον τινὰ τοῦ Δημοκρίτου παλαιὸν ὥσπερ ἐκ καπνοῦ καθελὼν ἠμαυρωμένον οἷος ἦν ἐκκαθαίρειν καὶ διαλαμπρύνειν, ὑποθέμενος τοῦτο δὴ τοὐπιδήμιον, ὅ φησι Δημόκριτος, ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι τὰ εἴδωλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ὄψεις ἐπαναφερόμενα. φοιτᾶν δὲ ταῦτα πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ζῴων ὑπὸ σάλου πολλοῦ καὶ θερμότητος, οὐ μόνον ἔχοντα μορφοειδεῖς τοῦ σώματος ἐκμεμαγμένας ὁμοιότητας -- ὡς Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται μέχρι τούτου Δημοκρίτῳ συνεπόμενος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ προλιπὼν τὸν λόγον —, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βουλευμάτων ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις ἀναλαμβάνοντα συνεφέλκεσθαι κτλ.

[regarding] the common notion about dreams – that they are especially likely to be unreliable or false in the autumn months ... I don't know ... how it came to be ... §2 p. 734F:...Favorinus ... on this occasion advanced an old argument of Democritus. Taking it down all blackened with smoke, as it were, he set about cleaning and polishing it. He used for a foundation the familiar argument found in Democritus that ghostly films penetrate the body through the pores and that when they emerge they make us see things in our sleep. These films that come to us emanate from everything – from utensils, clothing, plants, and especially from animals, because of their restlessness and their warmth. The films have not only the impressed physical likeness in contour of an animal – so far Epicurus agrees with Democritus, though he drops the subject at this stage – but they gather and convey by attraction ghostly copies of each man's mental impulses, designs, moral qualities, and emotions.

[U327]

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 7.8

Epicūrus dīcit atomōs influere animīs nostrīs in imāginibus corporum et ea quae gessimus aut quae gestūrī sumus per quiētem vidērī

Epicurus says that atoms flow into our minds in the images of bodies, and that the things which we have done or are about to do appear during sleep.

Epicurus asserts that flowing atoms penetrate our minds from the images of objects, and that during the sleep there appears either actions that we have done or those we are about to do.

[U328]

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 46

Vāna in tōtum somnia Epicūrus iūdicāvit, līberāns ā negōtiīs dīvīnitātem et dissolvens ōrdinem rērum et in passīvitāte omnia spargens, ut ēventuī exposita et fortuita.

Epicurus judged dreams to be wholly empty, freeing divinity from affairs, and dissolving the order of things, and scattering all things in passivity, as exposed to chance and accident.

Epicurus, who used to liberate the divinity from every occupation, and eliminate the order of things, and dispersed them into passivity … [more]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 1.30.62

Epicūrum igitur audiēmus potiūs (dē somniīs quam Platōnem)?

Shall we listen to Epicurus rather than Plato {regarding dreams}?

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 1.44, 99

Sisenna… insolenter, crēdō ab Epicūrēō aliquō inductus, disputat somniīs crēdī nōn oportēre

Sisenna—presumptuously, I think led on by some Epicurean—argues that dreams ought not to be believed

Sisenna … later, influenced to doubt by some petty Epicurean, goes on inconsistently to maintain that dreams are not worthy of belief.

Petronius (fl.c. 67 CE), Satyricon, 104 [Eumolpus speaking]

Hinc sciēs, inquit Eumolpus, Epicūrum esse, hominem dīvīnum, quī eius modī lūdibria facētissimā ratiōne condemnat

From this you will know, said Eumolpus, that he is an Epicurus, a divine man, who with the most elegant reasoning condemns mockeries of this kind.

Exactly. And this {coincidence of similar dreams by two different people} shows you why we consider Epicurus almost superhuman. As you many remember, he very wittily disposes of such coincidences as mere silly superstitions.

Cassius, by way of Plutarch, Life of Cassius, 37

aliena refert ut Epicurea: δηλοῦσι δ᾽ αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους τροπαὶ τῶν ὀνείρων, ἃς τρέπεται τὸ φανταστικὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς βραχείας παντοδαπὰ καὶ πάθη καὶ εἴδωλα γινόμενον. κινεῖσθαι δ᾽ ἀεὶ πέφυκε, κίνησις δ᾽ αὐτῷ φαντασία τις ἢ νόησις.

{Referring to other doctrines as if they might be Epicurean…} And they explain the transpiration of dreams during periods of sleep – transpirations that are due to the imaginative faculty, which from minor beginnings, gives rise to varied emotions and images. This faculty, on the other hand, is always set in motion by nature and its motion is a representation or a concept.]

23. Reproduction

[U329]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 5.3.5

Ἐπίκουρος (τὸ σπέρμα φησὶ) ψυχῆς kai σώματος ἀπόσπασμα.

Epicurus asserts that seminal fluid is a small detachment from the body and soul.

[U330]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 5.5.1

Πυθαγόρας Ἐπίκουρος Δημόκριτος καὶ τὸ θῆλυ προΐεσθαι σπέρμα. ἔχειν γὰρ παραστάτας ἀπεστραμμένους. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν περὶ τὰς χρήσεις

Pythagoras, Epicurus, and Democritus all say that the female also secretes seminal fluid. It comes from testicles, flipped around in the opposite sense; it must thereby also have an impetus for union.

Censorinus (fl.c. 238 CE), On the Natal Day, 5.4

Illud quoque ambiguam facit inter auctōrēs opīniōnem, utrumne ex patris tantummodō semine partus nāscātur … an etiam ex mātris, quod Epicūrō vīsum est.

That, too, makes the opinion doubtful among the authorities, whether the offspring is born from the father's seed only … or also from the mother's, which seemed [right] to Epicurus.

Even on this question there is uncertainty among the various scholars: if the child is born only by the semen of the father…, or also by that of the mother as well, which … is the opinion of Epicurus.

[U331]

Censorinus (fl.c. 238 CE), On the Natal Day, 6.2

Stōicī ūnā tōtum infantem figurārī dīxērunt… sunt quī id opīnentur ipsā fierī nātūrā, ut Aristotelēs atque Epicūrus.

The Stoics said that the whole infant is formed at once… there are those who think that this happens by nature itself, as Aristotle and Epicurus.

The Stoics assert that the fetus forms itself in its entirety in a single moment. … There are also those who think that it arrives by the work of Nature itself, like Aristotle and Epicurus.

[U332]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, V.16.1, [p. 426 Diels]

Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὸ ἔμβρυον ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ διὰ τοῦ στόματος τρέφεσθαι, ὅθεν εὐθέως γεννηθὲν ἐπὶ τὸν μαστὸν φέρεσθαι τῷ στόματι. εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ θηλάς τινας καὶ στόματα, δι᾽ ὧν τρέφεσθαι.

Democritus and Epicurus say that the embryo in the womb partially nourishes itself through the mouth, …etc…

[U333]

24. The Origin of Human Beings

Censorinus (fl.c. 238 CE), On the Natal Day, 4.9

Dēmocritō Abderitae ex aquā limōque prīmum vīsum esse hominēs prōcrēātōs. Nec longē secus Epicūrus: is enim crēdidit limō calefactō uterōs nescio quōs rādīcibus terrae cohaerentēs prīmum incrēvisse et infantibus ex sē ēditīs, nātūrā ministrante, ingenitum lactis ūmōrem praebuīsse, quōs ita ēducātōs et adultōs genus hūmānum prōpagāsse.

To Democritus of Abdera it seemed first that men were produced from water and mud. Not far otherwise Epicurus: for he believed that, when the mud was warmed, certain wombs, clinging to the roots of the earth, first grew, and that, with nature supplying, they offered to the infants born from themselves an inborn moisture of milk, and that these, thus reared and grown, propagated the human race.

Democritus of Abdera first held that men were created from water and mud. And Epicurus' view is not much different, for he believed that when the mud became warm, first there grew wombs of some kind or another which clung to the earth by roots, and these begat infants and provided a natural supply of milky fluid for them, under the guidance of nature. When these [infants] had been brought up in this manner and reached maturity, they then propagated the human race.

25. Linguistics

[U334]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 1.24

ἐμπίπτει... λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὡς οἴεται ᾽Αριστοτέλης, θέσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα .. ... ἢ ὡς διδάσκει Ἐπίκουρος --- ἑτέρως ἢ ὡς οἴονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ---, φύσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀπορρηξάντων τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων τινὰς φωνὰς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων.

As to this, one should also say that a deep and arcane debate about the nature of names emerged. Are names conventional, as Aristotle thinks? ... Or are names natural, as Epicurus teaches – in a manner different from that of the Stoics – such that the first men burst forth with particular sounds which were then applied to things?

[U335]

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Cratylus" 16 [p. 6 Boiss.]

ὅτι τῆς Κρατύλου δόξης γέγονε Πυθαγόρας τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος... ...ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἐπίκουρος κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον ᾤετο φύσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ὡς ἔργα φύσεως προηγούμενα, ὡς τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν ὄρασιν καὶ ὡς τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν᾽ ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα φύσει εἶναι ὡς ἔργον φύσεως... ....ὁ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγεν, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐπιστημόνως οὗτοι (οἱ πρῶτοι θέμενοι) ἔθεντο τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ φυσικῶς κινούμενοι, ὡς οἱ βήσσοντες καὶ πταίροντες καὶ μυκώμενοι καὶ ὑλακτοῦντες καὶ στενάζοντες.

Pythagoras and Epicurus shared the view of Cratylus... 17 [p. 8]: Epicurus thought that names were natural in [one] sense, as being a primary function of nature, such as voice and vision and seeing and hearing, in the same way naming is natural. So that names too are natural in the sense of functions of nature. But Cratylus says that names are natural in [another] sense; that is why he says that each thing has its own proper name, since it was given specifically by the first name-givers in a craftsman-like fashion based on an understanding of the thing. Epicurus, however, said that these men did not give names based on an understanding of things, but because they were moved in a natural fashion, like those who cough and sneeze and below and bark and lament.

26. Death

[U336]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 4.7.4

Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος (τὴν ψυχὴν) φθαρτὴν τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην.

Democritus and Epicurus said that the soul is mortal and perishes with the body.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.33

Quid quod tōtum illud argumentum falsum est, quia nōn intereunt animae. “Vērō,” inquit Epicūrus, “nam quod cum corpore nāscitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est.”

What of the fact that that argument is completely false, since souls do no perish? "Reflect again on the truth" [Epicurus] says, "for it is necessary that that which is born with the body, perish with the body."

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.12.1

Nunc argumenta eōrum, quī contrā disserunt, refellāmus, quae Lūcrētius tertiō librō execūtus est. “Quoniam cum corpore,” inquit, “anima nāscitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est

Now let us refute the arguments of those who argue to the contrary, which Lucretius has set forth in the third book. “Since the soul is born with the body,” he says, “it must perish with the body

Now let us refute the arguments of those who set forth contrary opinions. Lucretius worked them into his third book. "Since the soul is born with the body" he said, "It must perish with the body."

{Cf. Lucretius, 3.417, 3.634, & 3.746}

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.13.7

Falsa est ergō Dēmocritī et Epicūrī et Dīcaearchī dē animae dissolūtiōne sententia.

Thus, the opinion of Democritus and Epicurus and Dicaearchus about the dissolution of the soul is false then.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.8.8

{...those who opposed [Plato, Pythagoras, & Pherecydes] held no less influence: Dicaearchus, at first; then Democritus; finally, Epicurus}}

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Exegesis of the Psalm, 73.25

Et fortē quī dīcit "cum mortuus fuero, posteā nihil erō," et litterās dīdicit et ab Epicūrō dīdicit hoc, nescio quō dēlīrō philosopho vel potiūs amātōre vānitātis, nōn sapientiae: quem ipsī etiam philosophī porcum nōminā vērunt; quī voluptātem corporis summum bonum dīxit, hunc philosophum porcum nōminā vērunt volūtantem sē in caenō carnālī. Ab illō fortē dīdicit iste litterātus dīcere: "Nōn erō posteā quam mortuus fuero"

And perhaps the one who says "when I will have died, afterward I will be nothing" both learned letters and learned this from Epicurus, some deranged philosopher or rather a lover of vanity, not of wisdom—whom the philosophers themselves also named a pig; who said that the pleasure of the body is the highest good; they named this philosopher a pig, wallowing himself in carnal filth. From that man perhaps this learned fellow learned to say: "I will not exist after I will have died"

And, once this life is spent, they do not believe that there might be another one in the hereafter.

idem sermon. 348 t. V p. 1344* “ei consumpta ista uita nullam postea credunt futuram '.

[U337]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 1.72

[αἱ ψυχαὶ] καθ᾽ αὑτὰς διαμένουσι καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκίδνανται.

[Souls] persist as they are in themselves, and are not, as Epicurus said, "dispersed like smoke when released from their bodies."

Iamblichus of Chalcis (fl. c. 300 CE), by way of Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, Physics, 41.43

εἰ δὲ παρέσπαρται μὲν καὶ ἔνεστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι καθά περ ἐν ἀσκῷ πνεῦμα περιεχομένη, ἢ συμμιγνυμένη πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγκινουμένη ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα διὰ τῶν θυρίδων φαινόμενα, δῆλόν που τοῦτο ὅτι ἔξεισι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκβαίνειν διαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάννυται, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνονται.

[U338]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.31.100

Scripsit enim et multīs saepe verbīs, et breviter apertēque in eō librō, quem modo nominābī, mortem nihīl ad nōs pertinēre

He {Epicurus} repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the work I have just mentioned {The Principal Doctrines}, that death does not affect us at all...

[U339]

Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epicurus)

Πρὸς μὲν τἄλλα δυνατὸν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οἰκοῦμεν.

It is possible to provide security against other afflictions, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls. {= Vatican Saying 31}

[Cf. Maximus the Confessor (fl. c. 630 CE), Gnomologion, 36, [p.194 Turic.; t. 2 p. 827 Combef.]

[U340]

Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies) 22.5

τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λύεσθαι ἅμα τοῖς σώμασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ συγγεννᾶσθαι αὐτοῖς τίθεται (Ἐπίκουρος). αἷμα γὰρ αὐτὰς εἶναι, οὗ ἐξελθόντος ἢ τραπέντος ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅλον τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ μήτε κρίσεις εἶναι ἐν "Αιδου μήτε δικαστήρια, ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δράσῃ τις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ καὶ διαλάθῃ, ἀνεύθυνον εἶναι παντελῶς.

He {Epicurus} concluded that the souls of men are dissolved along with their bodies, just as also they were produced along with them; these, in fact, are blood, and when this has gone forth or been altered, the entire man perishes. In keeping with this tenet, it follows that there are neither trials in Hades, nor tribunals of justice; so that whatsoever any one may commit in this life, that, provided he may escape detection, he is altogether beyond any liability of trial.

[U341]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 24.18

Nōn sum tam ineptus ut Epicūreām cantilēnam hōc locō persequar et dīcam vānōs esse inferōrum metūs, nec Ixīonem rotā volvi nec saxum umerīs Sīsyphī trudī in adversum nec ūllīus viscera et renāscī posse cotīdiē et carpī. Nēmō tam puer est ut Cerberum timeat et tenebrās et lāruālem habitum nūdīs ossibus cohaerentium

I am not so foolish as to pursue the Epicurean refrain in this place and to say that the fears of the underworld are empty, nor that Ixion is turned on a wheel, nor that the stone is pushed uphill on the shoulders of Sisyphus, nor that anyone's entrails can both be born again every day and be eaten away. No one is so much a child as to fear Cerberus and the darkness and the ghostly appearance of those whose bare bones stick together.

I am not so foolish as to go through at this juncture the arguments which Epicurus harps upon, and say that the errors of the world below are idle – that Ixion does not whirl round on his wheel, that Sisyphus does not shoulder his stone uphill, that a man's entrails cannot be restored and devoured everyday; no one is so childish as to fear Cerberus, or the shadows, or the ghostly garb of those who are held together by nothing but their bare bones.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.42

Dīcit Epicūrus… inferōrum poēnas nōn esse metuendās, quod animāe posteā mortem intereant nec ūllī omnīnō sint inferī

Epicurus says… that the punishments of the underworld are not to be feared, because the souls after death perish and there are no underworld beings at all

Epicurus says … the punishments of hell do not have to be feared, because souls die after death; nor is there any hell at all.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.7.13

Esse īnferōs Zēnō Stōicus docuit et sēdēs piōrum ab impiīs esse discrētās; et illōs quidem quietās ac dēlectābilēs incolere regiōnēs, hōs vērō luere poenās in tenebrōsīs locīs atque in caenī vorāginibus horrendīs. Idem nōbīs prōphētae palam faciunt. Ergō Epicūrus errāvit, quī poētārum id esse figmentum putāvit et illās īnferōrum poenās, quae ferantur, in hāc esse vītā interpretātus est.

Zeno the Stoic taught that the underworld exists and that the abodes of the pious are separated from the impious; and that those indeed inhabit regions calm and delightful, but these pay penalties in dark places and in dreadful whirlpools of filth. The prophets likewise make this clear to us. Therefore Epicurus erred, who thought that that is a fiction of the poets and interpreted those punishments of the underworld which are reported to be in this life.

Zeno, the Stoic, taught that there was a hell, and that the abodes of the virtuous were separated from the wicked, and that the former inhabited quiet and delightful regions, while the latter paid their penalty in dark places and horrible caverns of mud. The prophets made the same thing clear to us. Therefore, Epicurus was in error who thought that this was a figment of the poet's imagination, and took those punishments of hell to be those which are borne in this life.

27. Celestial Phenomena

Tertulllian (fl.c. 195 CE), On the Pagan Nations, 2.4

Sed Epicūrus, quī dīxerat "quae super nōs, nihil ad nōs," cum et ipse caelum īnspicere dēsīderat, sōlis orbem pēdalem dēprehendit

But Epicurus, who had said "the things above us are nothing to us," when he himself too desired to look at the sky, discovered that the disk of the sun is a foot wide.

Epicurus, however, who had said, "What is above us is nothing to us" wished notwithstanding to have a peep at the sky, and found the sun to be a foot in diameter.]

[U342]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 5.20.2

Δημόκριτος Ἐπίκουρος τὰ οὐράνια (οὐκ ἀποδέχονται ζῶα εἶναι).

Democritus and Epicurus do not believe that celestial bodies are living beings.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123A

τίς οὖν κινεῖ τὰ πεπιστευμένα καὶ μάχεται τοῖς ἐναργέσιν; οἱ... φάσκοντες μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον εἶναι μηδὲ τὴν σελήνην, οἷς πάντες ἄνθρωποι θύουσι καὶ προσεύχονται καὶ σέβονται;

> Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject… {divination, providence, and} that the sun and moon are living beings, to whom sacrifice and prayer and reverence is offered up by all mankind.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Use of Parts, XII 6, t. IV [p. 21 K.]

καὶ μέντοι καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς ἡμῶν εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν τὴν ἀχαριστίαν ὅμως δημιουργεῖ, καὶ τὰς ὥρας τοῦ ἔτους ὁ ἥλιος ἀπεργάζεται καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς τελειοῖ μηδὲν φροντίζων, οἶμαι, μῆτε Διαγόρου μήτ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου μήτ᾽ Ἐπικούρου μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν βλασφημησάντων. ἀγαθῷ γὰρ οὐδενὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὠφελεῖν πάντα καὶ κοσμεῖν πέφυκεν.

> Even our Creator, though knowing perfectly the ingratitude of such men as these, has yet created them. The sun makes the seasons of the year and perfects the fruits without paying any heed, I suppose, to Diagoras, Anaxagoras, Epicurus, or the others blaspheming against it. No beneficent being bears malice over anything, but naturally aides and adorns all.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), City of God, 18.41

nonnē apud Athēnās et Epicūreī clārēbant adserentēs rēs hūmānās ad deōrum cūram nōn pertinēre, et Stoicī quī contrāria sentientēs eās regī atque munīrī diīs adiūtōribus et tūtoribus disputābant? unde mīror, cūr Anaxagorās reus factus sit, quia sōlem dīxit esse lapidem ardentem, negāns utique deum, cum in eādem cīvitāte glōriā flōruerit Epicūrus vīxeritque sēcūrus nōn sōlum sōlem vel ullum sīderum deum esse nōn crēdēns, sed nec Iovem nec ullum deōrum omnīnō in mundō habitāre contendēns, ad quem precēs hominum supplicationēsque perveniānt.

> Surely at Athens the Epicureans were famous, asserting that human affairs do not pertain to the care of the gods, and the Stoics, who thinking the opposite, argued that they are ruled and protected by the gods as helpers and guardians; whence I marvel why Anaxagoras was made a defendant, because he said the sun is a burning stone, denying of course that it is a god, since in the same city Epicurus flourished in glory and lived in security, believing not only that neither the sun nor any of the stars is a god, but asserting also that neither Jupiter nor any of the gods at all dwell in the world, to whom the prayers and supplications of men might reach

> At Athens did there not flourish both the Epicureans, who asserted that human affairs are of no concern to the gods, and the Stoics, who, coming to the opposite conclusion, argued that these are guided and supported by the gods, who are our helpers and protectors? I wonder therefore why Anaxagoras was tried for saying that the sun is a blazing stone and denying that it is a god at all, while in the same city Epicurus lived in glory and in safety, though he not only believed neither in the divinity of the sun nor in that of any other luminary, but also maintained that neither Jupiter nor any other god dwells in the universe at all for men's prayers and supplications to reach him.

[U343]

Aëtius (fl.f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.20, 14

Ἐπίκουρος γήινον πύκνωμα τὸν ἥλιόν φησιν εἶναι κισηροειδὲς καὶ σπογγοειδὲς ταῖς κατατρήσεσιν ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἀνημμένον.

Epicurus maintains that the sun is a compact amassment of earth, similar in aspect to pumice-stone, spongy because of its pores, and ignited by fire.

Achilles Tatius (The Astronomer, fl.c. 250 CE), Isagoge (Introduction) to Aratus' Phaenomena, 19

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κισηροειδῆ αὐτὸν ἔφη ἐκ πυρὸς διὰ τρημάτων τινῶν τὸ φῶς ἐκπέμποντα.

Epicurus asserts that it [the sun] is similar in a way to pumice-stone, and that from fire and through certain pores, it emanates its light.

[U344]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.22.6

Ἀναξιμένης πλατὺν ὡς πέταλον τὸν ἥλιον. Ἡράκλειτος σκαφοειδῆ, ὑπόκυρτον. οἱ Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ ὡς τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα. Ἐπίκουρος ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ προειρημένα πάντα.

Anaximénēs believes that the sun might be large and flat as a petal, Heraclitus that it might be similar to a bowl-shaped container, and very bent; the Stoics that it might be spherical, like the world and celestial bodies; Epicurus, that it might be able to assume any given shape.

[U345]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.21.5

Ἐπίκουρος (τὸν ἥλιον) τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος φαίνεται, ἢ μικρῷ τινι μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω

Epicurus maintains that the sun is more or less as large as it appears.

[U346]

Servius the Grammarian (fl.c. 390 CE), Commentary on Virgil's Georgics, 1.247

aut "intempestā silet," quia Epicūrēī dicunt nōn īre sōlem per alterum hemisphaerium, sed semper hīs ab ortū colligī scintillās et fierī orbem sōlis.

At the expression "intempesta silet" ... The Epicureans maintain that the sun does not proceed around the other hemisphere, but according to them sparkles always gather together in the east, and the disc of the sun is formed.

Servius the Grammarian (fl.c. 390 CE), Commentary on Virgil's Aeneid, 4.584

novō lūmine ... secundum Epicūreōs quī stultē sōlem dīcunt dē atomīs cōnstāre, et cum diē nāscī, cum diē perīre.

"With new light" ... according to the Epicureans, who foolishly believe that the sun is composed of atoms, and that it is born together with the day, and together with the day perishes.

[U347]

Junius Philargirius, Commentary on Virgil's "Georgics" 2.478 [p.248 Orsini] ("Various eclipses"):

Vrsinī: "Vāriōs dēfectūs secundum Epicūrum, quī ait nōn ūnam causam prōnuntiandam, quā sōl dēficere vidētur, sed vāriās: potest enim fierī ut exstinguātur, ut longius recēdat, ut aliquod eum corpus abscondat."

Ursinus: 'Various eclipses according to Epicurus, who says that not one cause should be declared by which the sun seems to fail, but various ones: for it can happen that it is extinguished, that it withdraws farther away, or that some body hides it.'

Epicurus maintains that, regarding the phenomenon in which the sun seems to diminish, one should not attribute a single cause, but rather various hypotheses: it may be proposed, in fact, that it extinguishes itself, or that it ventures further out, or that some other body hides it.

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics, 1.33

διό περ οὐδ' οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμβάνοι καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό' ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν εἶναι περὶ τούτου δόξαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἐπιστήμην συμβαίνει ἐν Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν γὰρ δόξα ἦν, ὅτι τῆς σελήνης ὑποτρεχούσης ὁ ἥλιος ἐκλιμπάνει, ᾤετο γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἐν 1ππάρχῳ δὲ ἐπιστήμη.

Therefore it is not possible, for the same belief, that it can be opinion and knowledge for the same person simultaneously, for he would then assume that the same thing can and cannot also be something else at the same time. But it happens that a man can have a certain belief as his opinion, while for another man, it is knowledge. For Epicurus, in particular, it was indeed an opinion that the sun is eclipsed when the moon, in its course, passes under it; but in fact he believed it possible for things to be otherwise; for Hipparchus, by contrast, it was knowledge.

[U348]

Scholion on Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.74

καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις (φησὶν Ἐπίκουρος) τὴν γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι.

Elsewhere he says that the earth is supported on air.

[U349]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 3.4.5

Ἐπίκουρος (νέφη καὶ ὑετὸν κτλ. γίνεσθαι) ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων. στρογγυλαίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν χάλαζαν καὶ τὸν ὑετὸν ἀπὸ τῆς μακρᾶς καταφορᾶς ὑποπεπλασμένον.

Epicurus says that all these things {i.e., clouds, rain, etc.} can be explained with the atomic theory. Hail and rain, in particular, are rounded off because they are so-shaped from their long fall.

[U350]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 3.15.11

περὶ σεισμῶν γῆς. Ἐπίκουρος ἐνδέχεσθαι μὲν ὑπὸ πάχους ἀέρος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ὑδατώδους ὄντος ἀνακρουομένην αὐτὴν καὶ οἷον ὑποτυπτομένην κινεῖσθαι' ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ σηραγγώδη τοῖς κατωτέρω μέρεσι καθεστῶσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διασπειρομένου πνεύματος εἰς τὰς ἀντροειδεῖς κοιλότητας ἐμπίπτοντος σαλεύεσθαι.

As for earthquakes, Epicurus says that it is possible that the earth is moved by being violently thrust upwards when struck by the air from below, which is humid and dense; it's also possible that it happens because the earth is cavernous underground, and thus jolted by the wind, which bursts into its cavities, which are like caverns, and diffused into their interiors.

[U351]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Natural Questions, 6.20.1

veniāmus nunc ad eōs, quī omnia ista quae rettulī in causā esse dīxerunt aut ex iīs plūra. Dēmocritus plūra: ait enim mōtum aliquandō spīritū fierī, aliquandō aquā, aliquandō utrōque … omnēs istās esse posse causās Epicūrus ait plūrēsque aliās temptat et illōs quī aliquid ūnum ex istīs esse adfirmāvērunt corripit, cum sit

arduum dē hīs quae coniectūrā sequenda sunt aliquid certī prōmittere. ergō, ut ait,

> Let us now come to those who said that all those things which I have mentioned, or several of them, are causes. Democritus [said] several; for he says that motion is sometimes produced by breath, sometimes by water, sometimes by both … Epicurus says that all these can be causes and tries out several others besides, and reproves those who have asserted that any one of these alone is the cause, since it is difficult to promise anything certain about things that must be inferred by conjecture. Therefore, as he says…

potest terram movēre aqua, sī partēs aliquās ēluit et adrōsit, quibus desiit posse extenuātīs sustinērī quod integrīs ferēbātur. potest terram movēre impressiō spīritūs: fortasse enim aere extrīnsecus aliō intrante agitātur, fortasse aliquā parte subitō cadente percutitur et inde mōtum capit. fortasse aliquā pars terrae velut columnīs quibusdam ac pilīs sustinētur, quibus vitiātīs ac recedentibus tremit pondus inpositum. fortasse calida vīs spīritūs in ignem versa fulminī similis cum magnā strāge obstantium fertur. fortasse palustrēs et iacentes aquās aliquis flātus impellit et inde aut ictus terram quatit aut spīritūs agitātiō ipsō mōtū crēscēns et sē incitāns ab īmō in summa usque perfertur. nullam tamen illī placet causam mōtūs esse maiōrem quam spīritum.

> The earth can be moved by water, if it washes away and gnaws certain parts, by the weakening of which that which was supported by the intact parts ceases to be able to be sustained. The earth can be moved by the pressure of air: for perhaps it is stirred when some other air enters from outside, or perhaps it is struck when some part suddenly falls, and from there it gains motion. Perhaps some part of the earth is supported, as it were, on certain columns or piles, and when these are weakened and give way, the weight placed above trembles. Perhaps a hot force of air, turned into fire, rushes like lightning with great destruction of things resisting. Perhaps some blast drives marshy and stagnant waters, and from this either the blow shakes the earth or the movement of the air, growing and rousing itself by its own motion, is borne from the depth up to the surface. Yet no cause of motion pleases him more than air
>
> Now we come to those writers who have stated as a cause of earthquakes either all the elements I mentioned or several of them. Democritus thinks several. For he says that an earthquake is produced sometimes by moving air, sometimes by water, sometimes by both. (5) Epicurus says that all these things can be causes and he tries several other causes. Also he criticizes those who insist that some single on e of them is the cause, since it is difficult to promise anything certain about theories which are based on conjecture. Therefore, as he says, water can cause an earthquake if it washes away and erodes some parts of the earth. When these parts are weakened they cease to be able to sustain what they supported when they were intact. The pressure of moving air can cause earthquakes; for perhaps the air inside the earth is agitated by other air entering, perhaps the earth receives a shock when some part of it suddenly falls and from this the earth takes on movement. Perhaps a warm quantity of moving air is changed to fire and like lightning is carried along with great destruction to things that stand in its way. Perhaps some blast pushes the swampy and stagnant waters and consequently either the blow shakes the earth or the agitation of the air increases by its very motion and, stirring itself up, travels all the way from the depths to the surface of the earth. At any rate, Epicurus is satisfied that air is the main cause of earthquakes.

28. Gods

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 5.52

cum *bene* praesertim multa ᵃc dīvī*nitus* ipsīs
since especially he has well and divinely [spoken] many things to the very

immortā*libus* dē dīvīs *dare* dic*ta sue*rit (*Epi*cūrus)
immortals about the gods, he has uttered words (Epicurus)

> The man who gets the better of all this
> by words and without weapons, will not such a one {Epicurus}
> deserve to be reckoned among deities?

[U352]

Sōlus enim (Epicūrus) vīdit prīmum esse deōs, quod in omnium animīs eōrum nōtiōnem impressisset ipsa nātūra. quae est enim gēns aut quod genus hominum, quod nōn habeat sine doctrīnā anticipātiōnem quandam deōrum? quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicūrus

> Epicurus alone saw first that the gods exist, because nature itself had impressed the notion of them upon the minds of all. For what nation or what race of men is there that does not have, without instruction, some preconception of the gods? This Epicurus calls prólēpsis (‘preconception’)

Quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestiōnis est, id praeclārē iactum vidētis. cum enim nōn institūtō aliquō aut more aut lege sit opiniō cōnstitūta maneatque ad ūnum omnium firma cōnsēnsiō, intellegī necesse est esse deōs, quoniam īnsitās eōrum cognitiónēs habēmus. dē quō autem omnium nātūra cōnsentit, id vērum esse necesse est. esse igitur deōs cōnfitendum est. Quod quoniam ferē cōnstat inter omnīs nōn philosophōs solum sed etiam indoctōs, fateāmur cōnstāre illud etiam, hanc nōs habēre sīve anticipātiōnem, ut ante dīxī, sīve praenōtiōnem deōrum, ut deōs beātōs et immortālēs putēmus. quae enim nōbīs nātūra informātiōnem ipsōrum deōrum dedit, eādem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eōs aeternōs et beātōs habērēmus.

> Therefore, you see that the foundation of this inquiry has been excellently laid. For since the belief has been established by no institution, custom, or law, and yet a firm agreement among all remains as one, it must be understood that the gods exist, since we have innate perceptions of them. And whatever all nature agrees upon must be true. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that gods exist. Since this is generally agreed upon by all, not only philosophers but even the unlearned, let us also admit this much: that we possess, as I said before, either a preconception or foreknowledge of the gods, so that we regard them as blessed and immortal. For the same nature that gave us the conception of the gods themselves has engraved in our minds the idea that they are eternal and blessed.

Si nihil aliud quaererēmus nisi ut deōs piē colerēmus et ut superstitiōne līberārēmur, satis erat dictum. nam et praestāns deōrum nātūra hominum pietāte colerētur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vī atque īrā deōrum pulsus esset: intellegitur enim a beātā immortālique nātūrā et īram et grātiam segregārī, quibus remōtīs nullōs a superīs impendere metus. sed ad hanc cōnfirmandam opiniōnem anquīrit animus et fōrmam et vītae āctiōnem mentisque agitātiōnem in deō.

> If we sought nothing else except to worship the gods piously and to be freed from superstition, enough would have been said. For the excellent nature of the gods would be honored by the piety of men, since it is both eternal and most blessed (for whatever is preeminent rightfully receives reverence), and all fear would have been banished of the power and wrath of the gods; for it is understood that both anger and favor are excluded from a blessed and immortal nature, and with these removed, no fears from the gods hang over us. But to confirm this belief, the mind seeks also in the god form, activity of life, and movement of thought.

Ac de formā quidem partim nātūra nōs admonet, partim ratiō docet. nam ā nātūrā habēmus omnēs omnium gentium speciēn nullam aliam nisi hūmānam deōrum. quae enim forma alia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormientī? sed nē omnia revocentur ad prīmās notiōnēs, ratiō hoc idem ipsa dēclārat. nam cum praestantissimam nātūram, vel quia beāta est vel quia sempiterna, convenīre videātur eandem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositiō membrōrum, quae cōnformātiō līniamentōrum, quae figūra, quae speciēs hūmāna potest esse pulchrior? quod sī omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figūra, deus autem animāns est, eā figūrā profectō est, quae pulcherrima sit omnium.

And concerning form, nature in part warns us, and reason in part teaches us. For by nature we all, among all nations, have no image of the gods other than human. For what other form has ever appeared to anyone, either awake or asleep? But so that all things may not be referred back to first notions, reason itself also declares the same. For since it seems fitting that the most excellent nature, whether because it is blessed or because it is everlasting, should also be the most beautiful, what composition of limbs, what shaping of features, what figure, what form can be more beautiful than the human? And if the figure of man surpasses the form of all living creatures, and the god is a living being, then by that figure surely he possesses the most beautiful form of all.

quoniamque deōs beatissimōs esse cōnstat, beātus autem esse sine virtūte nēmō potest nec virtūs sine ratiōne cōnstāre nec ratiō usquam inesse nisi in hominis figūrā, hominis esse speciē deōs cōnfitendum est, nec tamen ea speciēs corpus est sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem. Epicūrus autem, quī rēs occultās et penitus abditās nōn modo vīderit animō sed etiam sīc tractet ut manū, docet eam esse vīm et nātūram deōrum, ut prīmum nōn sensū, sed mente cernantur nec soliditāte quādam nec ad numerum ut ea quae ille propter firmitātem στερέμνια appellat, sed īmaginibus similitudine et trānsitiōne perceptīs, cum īnfinīta simillimārum īmāginum seriēs ex īnnumerābilibus individuīs existat et ad nōs adfluāt, cum maximīs voluptātibus in eās īmaginēs mentem intentam īnfixamque nostram intellegentiam capere, quae sit et beāta nātūra et aeterna.

And since it is agreed that the gods are most blessed, and that no one can be blessed without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, nor can reason reside anywhere except in human form, it must be admitted that the gods are of human appearance—yet that form is not a body but as it were a body, and it does not have blood but as it were blood. Epicurus, however, who has not only seen with the mind but also handled, as it were with the hand, things hidden and deeply concealed, teaches that the power and nature of the gods are such that they are perceived not by sense but by mind, and not with any solidity nor as countable things, like those which he, because of their firmness, calls steremnia; but rather through images apprehended by likeness and succession, since an infinite series of similar images arises from innumerable indivisibles and flows toward us, while with the greatest delight the mind, fixed and intent upon those images, grasps by understanding what the nature is that is both blessed and eternal.

summa vērō vīs īnfīnītātis, et magna ac dīligentī contemplātiōne dignissima est, in quā intellegī necesse est eam esse nātūram, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicūrus, id est aequābilem tribūtiōnem. ex hāc igitur illud efficitur, sī mortālium tanta multitūdō sit, esse immortālium nōn minōrem, et sī quae interimant innumerābilia sint, etiam ea quae conservant īnfīnīta esse dēbēre.

But the highest power of infinity, most worthy of great and careful contemplation, is this—that it must be understood as a nature such that all things correspond equally to all other equal things. Epicurus calls this isonomía, that is, an even distribution. From this, therefore, it follows that if there is so great a multitude of mortal beings, the number of immortal beings must be no less; and if those things which destroy are innumerable, those which preserve must also be infinite.

Et quaerere a nōbīs soletis, quae vīta deōrum sit quaeque ab iīs degātur aetās. ea videlicet, quā nihil beātius, nihil omnibus bonīs affluentius cōgitārī potest. nihil enim agit, nullīs occupātiōnibus est implicātus, nulla opera molītur, suā sapientiā et virtūte gaudet, habet explorātum fore sē semper cum in maximīs, tum in aeternīs voluptātibus. hunc deum rītē beātum dīxerimus, vestrum vērō labōriōsissimum. sīve enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum quam nullō punctō temporis intermissō versārī circā axem caeli admirābilī celeritāte? nisi quietum autem nihil beātum est. sīve in ipsō mundō deus inest aliquis quī regat, quī gubernet, quī cursūs astrōrum, mūtātiōnēs temporum, rērum vicissitūdines ōrdinēsque conservet, terrās et maria contemplāns hominum commoda vītāsque tueātur, ne ille est implicātus molestīs negotiīs et operōsīs. nōs autem beātam vītam in animī sēcūritāte et in omnium vacātiōne mūnerum pōnimus.

And you are accustomed to ask us what the life of the gods is and what manner of existence they lead. It is, of course, that life than which nothing more blessed, nothing more abounding in every good, can be conceived. For they do nothing, are entangled in no occupations, engage in no labors; they rejoice in their own wisdom and virtue and are assured that they will always remain in the highest and eternal pleasures. This god we rightly call blessed; yours, indeed, is most toilsome. For if the world itself is a god, what could be less at rest than to be turning without interruption at every instant around the axis of heaven with marvelous speed? Yet nothing that is not at rest is blessed. Or if there is within the world some god who governs, who directs, who maintains the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, the alternations and order of things, who, watching the lands and seas, guards the welfare and lives of men—surely that god is entangled in troublesome and toilsome business. But we place the blessed life in the tranquility of the mind and in complete freedom from all duties.

docuit enim nōs idem quī cetera, nātūrā effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabricā, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vōs effici negātis sine dīvīnā posse sollertiā, ut innumerābilis nātūra mundōs effectūra sit, efficiat, effecerit. quod quia quem ad modum nātūra efficere sine aliquā mente possit nōn vidētis, ut trāgicī poētae, cum explicāre argumentī exitum nōn potestis, cōnfugitis ad deum. cuius operam profectō nōn dēsīderārētis, sī immēnsam et interminātam in omnīs partīs magnitūdinem regiōnum vidērētis, in quam sē iniciēns animus et intendēns ita lātē longēque peregrinātur, ut nullam tamen ōram ultimī videat, in quā possit īnsistere. in hāc igitur immēnsitāte latitūdinum longitūdinum altitūdinum īnfīnita vīs innumerālium volitat atomōrum, quae interiectō inānī cohaerēscunt tamen inter sē et aliae aliās adprehendentes continuantur: ex quō efficiuntur eae rērum formae et figūrae, quās vōs effici posse sine follibus et incūdibus nōn putātis.

For the same teacher who has shown us everything else—Nature—has taught that the world came into being by natural process, that no craftsman was needed, and that the matter was so easy—though you deny that it could be accomplished without divine skill—that Nature, capable of producing innumerable worlds, does produce and has produced them. Because you cannot see how Nature could bring this about without some mind, you, like tragic poets, when you cannot resolve the plot, take refuge in a god. Yet you would surely not call for his help if you could behold the boundless and unending vastness of the regions extending in all directions, into which the mind, casting and straining itself, wanders so far and wide that it sees no shore or limit where it might stand still. In this immensity of breadth, length, and height, the infinite force of countless atoms moves and drifts, which, though empty space lies between them, still cohere with one another and, grasping and linking together, form the shapes and configurations of things that you suppose cannot be produced without bellows and anvils.

itaque imposuistis in cervicibus nostris sempiternum dominum, quem diēs et noctēs timerēmus. quis enim nōn timeat omnia prōvidentem et cogitantem et animadvertentem et omnia ad sē pertinēre putantem, curiosum et plēnum negōti deum? hinc vōbīs extitit prīmum illa fātālis necessitās, quam εἱμαρμένην dīcitis, ut quicquid accidat, id ex aeterna vēritāte causarumque continuātiōne flūxisse dīcātis. quantī autem haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tamquam aniculīs et iīs quidem indoctīs fātō fierī videantur omnia? sequitur μαντικὴ vestra, quae Latīnē dīvīnātiō dīcitur, quā tantā imbuerēmur superstitiōne, sī vōs audīre vellemus, ut haruspicēs, augurēs, hariolī, vātēs, coniectōrēs nōbīs essent colendī.

And so you have set upon our necks an eternal master, whom we must fear day and night. For who would not fear a god who foresees everything, thinks of everything, observes everything, and imagines that all things concern himself—an inquisitive and busy deity? From this there arose for you that fatal necessity which you call heimarmenē, so that whatever happens you say has flowed from eternal truth and the unbroken chain of causes. But how highly is that philosophy to be valued, to which everything seems to happen by fate—as it does to old women, and those uneducated ones at that? Next follows your mantikē, which in Latin is called divination, by which we would be so steeped in superstition, if we were willing to listen to you, that we should have to worship soothsayers, augurs, prophets, seers, and interpreters.

hīs terrōribus ab Epicūrō solūtī et in lībertātem vindicātī nec metuimus eōs, quōs intellegimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alterī quaerere, et piē sanctēque colimus nātūram excellentem atque praestantem.

Freed by Epicurus from these terrors and reclaimed into liberty, we do not fear those whom we understand to invent no trouble for themselves nor to seek any for another, and we revere with piety and holiness the nature that is noble and preeminent.

{Translated elsewhere}

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 34.95 (Cotta)

et maris deōs et fēminās esse dīcitis

You say that there are gods of the male sex and female

You say that there are both male and female gods – well, you can see as well as I can what is going to follow from that!

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 7.3.5

quī neget deum esse spīritum omnibus partibus inmīxtum, nōn hoc dīcat, falsam esse dīvīnae illīus nātūrae appellātiōnem, sīcut Epicūrus, quī hūmānam eī fōrmam locumque inter mundōs dedit

whoever denies that God is a spirit pervading all parts should not therefore say that the name of that divine nature is false—as does Epicurus, who assigned to it a human form and a dwelling-place between the worlds

A man who denies that god is a "spirit diffused through all the parts of the world" {a Stoic definition} would not be saying that it is mistaken to call the world divine, as Epicurus would, for he gave God human form and a place in the spaces between worlds.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter to Dioscorus, 118.27

quantō enim melius nē audīssēm quidem nōmen Dēmocritī quam cum dolōre cōgitārem nescio quem suīs temporibus magnum putātum, quī deōs esse arbitrārētur īmaginēs, quae dē solidīs corporibus fluerent solīdaeque ipsae nōn essent, eāsque hāc atque hāc mōtū propriō circum eundō atque illabendō in animās hominum facere ut vīs dīvīna cōgitētur, cum profectō illud corpus unde imāgō fluit quantō solidius est, tantō praestantius quoque esse iūdicētur? ideōque fluctuāvit, sīcut istī dicunt, nutāvitque sententia, ut aliquandō nātūram quandam, dē quā fluerent īmaginēs, deum esse dīceret, quī tamen cōgitārī nōn posset nisi per eās īmaginēs, quās fundit ac ēmittit, id est quae dē illā nātūrā, quam nescio quam corpoream et sempiternam ac etiam per hōc dīvīnam putat, quasi vapōris similitudine continuā velut ēmanātiōne ferrentur et venīrent atque intrārent in animōs nostrōs, ut deum vel deōs cōgitāre possēmus. nullam enim aliam causam cuiuslibet cōgitātiōnis nostrae opīnantur istī, nisi cum ab hīs corporibus quae cōgitāmus veniunt atque intrant īmaginēs in animōs nostrōs

For how much better it would have been not even to have heard the name of Democritus, than to think with distress of some man, esteemed great in his time, who supposed that the gods were images flowing from solid bodies yet not themselves solid, and that these, by their own motion, circling and gliding hither and thither into the souls of men, cause the idea of divine power to be conceived—when surely that body from which the image flows must be judged the more excellent, the more solid it is! And therefore his opinion, as these people say, wavered and shifted, so that at one time he declared that a certain nature, from which these images flowed, was god; yet one which could not be conceived except through those very images that it pours forth and emits—that is, which, from that nature (he somehow thought it corporeal, eternal, and even by that token divine), are carried and borne like a continuous exhalation or vapor and enter into our minds, so that we may conceive a god or gods. For these thinkers suppose no other cause of any thought of ours than that images come from those bodies which we think of and enter into our minds.

quamquam Dēmocritus etiam hoc distāre in nātūrālibus quaestiōnibus ab Epicūrō dīcitur, quod iste sentit inesse concursiōnī atomōrum vīm quandam animālem et spīritālem; quā vī eum crēdō et īmaginēs ipsās dīvīnitāte praeditās dīcere, nōn omnēs omnium rērum, sed deōrum; et prīncipia mentis esse in ūniversīs, quibus dīvīnitātem tribuit, et animantēs īmaginēs, quae vel prōdesse nōbīs soleant vel nocēre: Epicūrus vērō neque aliquid in prīncipiīs rērum pōnit praeter atomōs, id est corpuscula quaedam tam minuta, ut etiam dīvidī nequeant neque sentīrī aut vīsū aut tactū possint; quōrum corpusculōrum concursū fortuitō et mundōs

innumerābilēs et animantia et ipsās animās fierī dīcit et deōs, quōs hūmānā formā nōn in aliquō mundō sed extra mundōs atque inter mundōs cōnstituit; et nōn vult omnīnō aliquid praeter corpora cōgitāre, quae tamen ut cōgitet, īmaginēs dīcit ab ipsīs rēbus, quās atomīs formārī putat, dēfluere atque in animum intrāre subtiliōrēs quam sunt illae īmaginēs quae ad oculōs veniunt. nam et vidēndī causam hanc esse dīcit, ingentēs quāsdam īmaginēs ita ut ūniversum mundum complectantur extrinsecus.

How much better for me not even to have heard the name of Democritus than to reflect with sorrow that someone was considered great in his own times who thought that the gods were images which were emitted from solid substances, although they themselves were not solid, and that they, by circling around this way and that, of their own motion, and by sliding into the minds of men, make them think the image is a divine force, while the substance from which the image was given off was deemed excellent in proportion to its solidity! Therefore, his theory wavered, as they say, and varied, so that sometimes, he said that a certain substance from which the images streamed was god, yet, that substance cannot be conceived except through the images which it emits and gives off, that is, those which come from that substance, which he somehow thinks is corporeal and eternal and therefore divine, while the images are carried long by a constant emanation like mist, and they come and enter into ours so that we can think they are a god or gods. Those philosophers hold that there is no other cause for any thought of ours except these images which, when we think, come form those substances and enter into our minds. ... 28: However, Democritus is said to differ from Epicurus in his natural philosophy, in that he thinks there is a certain living and breathing force present at the coming together of atoms, by which force, I believe, he says "the images are endowed with divinity" – not the images of all things, but those of gods – and "that the elements from which the mind is compounded" exist in the universe, and to these he attributes divinity, and that these are "animate images which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us." But Epicurus postulated nothing as the beginning of the world but atoms, that is, certain particles of matter so minute that they cannot be divided or perceived by either sight or touch, and by the chance meeting of these particles he says that innumerable worlds, and living beings, and the principle of life itself were produced, as well as the gods whom endows with human form, and locates, not in any world, but beyond and between the worlds. He refuses absolutely to consider anything but material substances, but, in order to be able to think even about these, he says that images are given off by the very things which he supposes to be formed by the atoms, that they enter the mind, and that they are finer than the other images which appear to the eyes – for he says that this is the cause of our sight – but that they are "vast images of such a size as to envelop and enfold the entire world."

[U353]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 1.25

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φαντασιῶν οἴεται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔννοιαν ἐσπακέναι θεοῦ· μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους προσπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινὰς τοιούτους θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομόρφους.

Epicurus thinks that men have derived the conception of god from presentations [received] while asleep. For he says, since large manlike images strike them while they sleep, they supposed that some such manlike gods also existed in reality

29. Gods *(Nature & Form)*

[U354]

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 47

(deum) alii incorporālem asseverant, alii corporālem, ut tam Platōnicī quam Stōicī; alii ex atomīs, alii ex numerīs, quā Epicūrus et Pythagorā

Some are sure that he [God] is incorporeal, others that he has a body – i.e., the Platonists and the Stoics respectively. Others say he consists of atoms, others of numbers – as do the Epicurus and the Pythagoreans respectively.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 10.28

concedāmus tamen hīs, ut ex atomīs fiant quae terrēna sunt: num etiam caelestia? deōs aiunt incorruptōs aeternōs beātōs esse solīsque dant immunitātem, nē concursū atomōrum concrētī esse videantur. sī enim diī quoque ex illīs cōnstitissent, dissipābiles fierent sēminibus aliquandō resolūtīs atque in nātūram suam revertentibus. ergō sī est aliquid, quod atomī nōn effēcerint, cūr nōn cetera eōdem modō intellegāmus? sed quaerō, antequam mundum prīmordia ista generārent, cūr sibi di habitāculum nōn aedificāvērint? videlicet, nisi atomī coīssent caelumque fēcissent, adhūc diī per medium ināne penderent.

Let us grant them, however, that things earthly are formed from atoms; but are heavenly things as well? They say that the gods are incorruptible, eternal, and blessed, and grant only to them immunity, lest they appear to be composed through the concourse of atoms. For if the gods too had been made from these, they would be capable of dissolution when their elements were at some time dispersed and returned to their natural state. Therefore, if there exists anything that atoms did not produce, why should we not understand other things in the same way? But I ask: before those first elements produced the world, why did the gods not build a dwelling place for themselves? Evidently, unless the atoms had come together and made the heavens, the gods would still be hanging in the middle of the void.

Let us concede to them, however, that the things which are earthly are made from atoms. Are the things which are heavenly also? They say that the gods are incorrupt, eternal, happy, and to them alone they give immunity, such that they may not be seen to be formed by the assembly of atoms. For if the gods also had come from these, they would also be able to be dissipated, any time the seeds break apart and return to their natural state. Therefore, if there is something which atoms have not brought about, why do we not understand that this is the case with other things, too? My question is, before those beginning-bodies had generated the world, why did not the gods build a dwelling for themselves? Surely, unless the atoms had come together and made heaven, the gods would still be hanging in the empty void.]

[U355]

Scholion on Epicurus, Principal Doctrines 1, Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.139

ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς

Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible as mental impressions, some being unique, while others look similar, owing to the continuous flow of similar images to the same place, culminating in human form.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.7.34

Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν τοὺς θεούς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας θεωρητοὺς διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως.

Epicurus thinks the gods resemble humans, and can be contemplated by reason as a result of the fineness of the nature of their images.

[U356]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On the Life of the Gods,

P.Herc. 152 col. 13 inf, | P.Herc. 157 col. 14, | P.Herc. 152 col. 14 sup

...μήτε δ' εἶναι πεζ[ὰ μ]ήτε φθ[όν]γον ἔμ[με]τ[ρ]ον οὐ πρ(οσ)δεόμενον ἀναπνοῆς οὐ ῥητέον, ὡς οὐδὲ [χ]ιόνα χ[ωρὶ]ς λε[υκό]τητος ἢ πῦρ ἂν ἄνευ θερμότητος. κ(αὶ) φωνῆι δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ὁμειλίαι τῆι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ῥητέον· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον εὐδαίμονας κ(αὶ) ἀδιαλύτους νοήσομεν, φησί, μὴ φωνοῦντας μηδ' ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐνεοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁμοίους· τῶι γὰρ ὄντι φωνῇ χρωμέ|νων ἡμῶν, ὅ[σοι] μή τι πεπηρώμεθα, τοὺς θεοὺς ἢ πεπηρῶσθαι ἢ μὴ κατὰ τ[ο]ῦθ' ἡμῖν ὡμοιῶσθαι, μηδ' [ἑτέρ]ως μηδετέρων ἐκκοπτόντων ἀναφθέγματα, [κ(αὶ)] ὑπερεύηθες, ἄ[λλως τε] καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίου[ς] τοῖς σπουδαίο[ις] κοινολογίας ἄφατον ἡδονὴν καταχεούσης· καὶ νὴ Δία γε τὴν Ἑλληνίδα νομιστέον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς διάλεκτον, ἢ μὴ πόρρω, τὰς φω[νὰ]ς δὲ σὺν [λό]γῳ κ(αὶ) τ[ρα]νες | [τάτας κ(αὶ) ὀρθοτάτας, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οἱ] σοφο[ὶ] πάντε[ς, καθόσον σ]οφο[ί, λ]έγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς· καὶ μόνους οἴδαμεν γεγονότας σ[οφ]οὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους, ἐπεὶ κ(αὶ) πρ(οσ)αλλήλων εἰ[ς κοιν]ολογίας [διαλ]έκ[των]...

...μήτε δ' εἶναι πεζὰ μήτε φθόνγον ἔμμετρον οὐ προσδεόμενον ἀναπνοῆς οὐ ῥητέον, ὡς οὐδὲ χιόνα χωρὶς λευκότητος ἢ πῦρ ἂν ἄνευ θερμότητος.

καὶ φωνῇ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ὁμειλίαι τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ῥητέον·

οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰδαίμονας καὶ ἀδιαλύτους νοήσομεν, φησί, μὴ φωνοῦντας μηδ' ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐνεοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁμοίους·

τῷ γὰρ ὄντι φωνῇ χρωμένων ἡμῶν, ὅσοι μή τι πεπηρώμεθα, τοὺς θεοὺς ἢ πεπηρῶσθαι ἢ μὴ κατὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὡμοιῶσθαι, μηδ' ἑτέρως μηδετέρων ἐκκοπτόντων ἀναφθέγματα, καὶ ὑπερεύηθες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους τοῖς σπουδαίοις κοινολογίας ἄφατον ἡδονὴν καταχεούσης·

καὶ νὴ Δία γε τὴν Ἑλληνίδα νομιστέον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς διάλεκτον, ἢ μὴ πόρρω, τὰς φωνὰς δὲ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ τρανες τάτας καὶ ὀρθοτάτας, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οἱ σοφοὶ πάντες, καθόσον σοφοί, λέγονται μὴ πολὺ διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ἀρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς·

καὶ μόνους οἴδαμεν γεγονότας σοφοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσαλλήλων εἰς κοινολογίας διαλέκτων...

> It must also be said that the gods speak, and that they entertain themselves with one another. Indeed, we would no longer believe that the gods are happy and incorruptible, if the did not speak and did not communicate with one another. On the contrary, they would be similar to mute men. In effect, just as we use our voice...
>
> ...and since for virtuous men, conversation with their equals is a source of inexpressible pleasure. And, by Zeus, it is necessary to uphold that they have a language like Greek, or not far from it, and we know that those who have become gods only used the Greek language.

[U357]

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Physicists, 1.178

τὸ μὲν οὖν λέγειν ἄφωνον τὸν θεὸν τελέως ἄτοπον καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις μαχόμενον. εἰ δὲ φωνᾶέν ἐστι, φωνῇ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὄργανα, καθά περ πνεύμονα καὶ τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν γλῶσσάν τε. καὶ στόμα. τοῦτο δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς Ἐπικούρου μυθολογίας.

> Thus, to define God as speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the mythology of Epicurus.

[U358]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.10.23 (Velleius speaking)

quī vērō mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque esse dīxērunt, nullō modō vīdērunt animī nātūram intellegentis in quam figūram cadere posset. admirābor eōrum tarditātem, quī animantem immortālem et eundem beātum rotundum esse velint, quod eā formā neget ullam esse pulchriōrem Platō. at mihi vel cylindrī vel quadrātī vel conī vel pyramidis vidētur esse formōsior. quae vērō vīta

tribuitur istī rotundō deō? nempe ut eā celeritāte contorqueātur, cui pār nulla nec cōgitārī quidem possit. in quā nōn videō ubinam mēns cōnstāns et vīta beāta possit īnsistere. quodque in nostrō corpore, sī minimā ex parte carnificētur, molestum sit, cūr hoc idem nōn habeātur molestum in deō? terra enim profectō, quoniam mundī pars est, pars est etiam deī. atquī terrae maximās regiōnēs inhabitābilīs atque incultās vidēmus, quod pars eārum adpulsū sōlis exārserit, pars obbliguerit nive pruīnāque longinquō sōlis abscessū: quae, sī mundus est deus, quoniam mundī partēs sunt, deī membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerāta dicenda sunt.

> But those who have said that the world itself is a living and wise being have by no means seen into what form the nature of an intelligent mind could fall. I am amazed at the slowness of those who wish a living, immortal, and blessed being to be round—because Plato declares no form more beautiful than that. Yet to me the shape of a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid seems more beautiful. And what life, indeed, is assigned to this round god? Surely that he should be whirled about with such speed as none like it could even be conceived. In such a state I do not see where a steady mind or a blessed life could stand firm. And if in our own body it is painful when the smallest part is wounded, why should the same not be thought painful in a god? For the earth, since it is part of the world, is also part of the god. Yet we see the greater regions of the earth uninhabitable and uncultivated, because one portion is scorched by the sun's heat, and another frozen stiff by snow and frost through the sun's long withdrawal. Therefore, if the world is god, since these are parts of the world, we must say that parts of god's body are burning while others are frozen.
>
> As for those who say that the world itself is a conscious intelligence, they have not grasped the nature of consciousness, or understood in what shape it can be manifest. … I am astonished by the stupidity of those who say that the world itself is a conscious and immortal being, divinely blest, and then say that it is a sphere, because Plato thought this to be the most beautiful of all shapes – I for one find more beauty in the shape of a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid. What mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning around with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room can there be in such an existence for stability of mind and for happiness – I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of the god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of the god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 2.17.46 (Balbus speaking)

hic quam volet Epicūrus iocētur, homō nōn aptissimus ad iocandum minimēque resipiēns patriam, et dicat sē nōn posse intellegere, qualis sit volubilis et rotundus deus: tamen ex hōc, quod etiam ipse probat, numquam mē movebit. placet enim illī esse deōs, quia necesse sit praestantem esse aliquam nātūram, quā nihil sit melius

> Here let Epicurus jest as much as he likes—a man not very fit for jesting and least mindful of his native country—and say that he cannot conceive what sort of god could be rolling and round: still, from this very thing which even he himself admits, he will never move me. For he agrees that there must be gods, because it is necessary that there exist some nature than which nothing is better.
>
> Epicurus may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!" He may say that he can make no sense of a "spherical and revolving god." But he will never move me from the one view which even he himself accepts: he agrees that gods exist, because there must be some supreme being which is superior to all else.

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), De forma dei, P.Herc. 1055 col. 21 (column 25)

…[ἡμεῖς] δὲ λέγομεν τὴν θεοῦ [μορφὴν οὐκ εἶναι τοι] αὐτην οἵαν οἱ λοιποὶ φιλόσοφοι συνάπτουσιν. πάντως γὰρ ἂν εἶλ' ἂν τὸ μὴ σφαιρῶν ἔχειν μορφὰς μηδὲ κρίσεις καὶ διαθέσει[ς] ὀργ[ί]λας καὶ μεικραιτίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ μορφὰς διανεστηκυίας εἰς ὕψος κα[ὶ] διαθέσεις παντὸς τοῦ ταπεινοῦ περιφρονούσας, ὅλας δὲ στρεφομέ[νας περὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ] μακαριότητα καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν…

…ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν τὴν θεοῦ μορφὴν οὐκ εἶναι τοι αὐτην οἷαν οἱ λοιποὶ φιλόσοφοι συνάπτουσιν. πάντως γὰρ ἂν εἶλ' ἂν τὸ μὴ σφαιρῶν ἔχειν μορφὰς μηδὲ κρίσεις καὶ διαθέσεις ὀργίλας καὶ μεικραιτίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ μορφὰς διανεστηκυίας εἰς ὕψος καὶ διαθέσεις παντὸς τοῦ ταπεινοῦ περιφρονούσας, ὅλας δὲ στρεφομένας περὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μακαριότητα καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν…

> … that which the other philosophers ascribe to [a god]. They must surely know that [a god] does not have a spherical bodily form, nor a tendency towards arguments, anger, or pettiness, but rather has a bodily form that approaches the sublime, and a disposition that disregards all that is impure, being entirely devoted to true blessedness and incorruptibility.

[U359]

Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies) 22.3

τὸν δὲ θεὸν ὁμολογῶν (Ἐπίκουρος) εἰναι ἀίδιον καὶ ἄφθαρτον φησὶ μηδενὸς προνοεῖν, καὶ ὅλως πρόνοιαν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲ εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ πάντα αὐτοματισμῷ γίνεσθαι. καθῆσθαι γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τοῖς μετακοσμίοις οὕτω καλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. ἔξω γάρ τι τοῦ κόσμου οἰκητήριον τοῦ θεοῦ ἔθετο εἶναι λεγόμενον τὰ μετακόσμια. ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἡσυχάζειν ἐν τῇ ἀκροτάτῃ εὐφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸν πράγματα ἔχειν οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχειν.

> Acknowledging the Deity to be eternal and incorruptible, he says that God has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things arc made by chance. For that the Deity reposed in the intermundane spaces, (as they) are thus styled by him; for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of God, denominated "the intermundane spaces" and that the Deity surrendered himself to pleasure, and took his ease in the midst of supreme happiness; and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them.

30. Gods *(The Blessed Life)*

[U360]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 17.1

Deus, inquit Epicūrus, nihil cūrat. nullam igitur habet potestātem. cūrāre enim necesse est eum, quī habet potestātem; vel sī habet et nōn ūtur, quae tantae neglegentiae causa est, ut eī nōn dīcam nostrum genus, sed etiam mundus ipse sit vīlis? ideō, inquit, incorruptus est ac beātus, quia semper quiētus. cui ergō administrātiō tantārum rērum cessit, sī haec a deō neglegantur, quae vidēmus ratiōne summā gubernārī? aut quiētus esse quō modō potest quī vīvit et sentit? nam quiēs aut somnī rēs est aut mortis

> “God,” says Epicurus, “cares for nothing.” Then he has no power at all. For it is necessary that whoever has power must take care; or if he has it and does not use it, what can be the cause of such great neglect that not only our race, but even the world itself, should be worthless to him? “Therefore,” he says, “he is incorruptible and blessed, because he is always at rest.” To whom, then, has the administration of so great a universe been handed over, if these things which we see governed with supreme reason are neglected by God? Or how can one be at rest who lives and feels? For rest belongs either to sleep or to death.

> "God" says Epicurus, "cares for nothing." Therefore, He has no power – for it is necessary that he who has power exercise care – or if He has power and does not use it, what is the reason of negligence so great that, I will not say our race, but even the world itself, is vile and worthless to Him? "On this account" he says, "He is incorrupt and blessed, because He is always quiet." To whom, then, has the administration of such great affairs yielded, if these things which we see controlled by the highest plan are neglected by God? Or how is he who lives and feels able in any way to be quiet? For quiet is a quality of either sleep or death.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.12.15

Epicūrus deum beātum et incorruptum vocat, quia sempiternus est. beātitūdō enim perfecta esse dēbet, ut nihil sit quod eam vexāre aut imminuere aut

immutāre possit. nec aliter quicquam existimārī beātum potest, nisi fuerit incorruptum. incorruptum autem nihil est nisi quod est immortāle

> Epicurus calls a god happy and incorrupt because he is everlasting. Beatitude ought to be perfect so that there be nothing which can vex or lessen or change it, nor can anything be considered blessed unless through its being incorrupt. And nothing is incorrupt save what is immortal.

[U361]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.9

κατ᾽Ἐπίκουρον τὸ τῆς προνοίας οἴχεται, καί τοι τῶν θεῶν κατ’ αὐτὸν πᾶσαν κηδεμονίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν εἰσφερομένων.

> In Epicurus' view, providence disappears; the gods according to him pay most attention to the preservation of their own good.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.7, line 35

κοινῶς οὖν ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἀμφότεροι (Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων), ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησαν ἐπιστρεφόμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τούτου χάριν τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζοντα. τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ζῷον, πεπληρωμένον τε πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῦ παντὸς ἄδεκτον, ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμονίας τε καὶ ἀφθαρσίας ἀνεπιστρεφές ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· κακοδαίμων δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἐργάτου δίκην καὶ τέκτονος ἀχθοφορῶν καὶ μεριμνῶν εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευήν

> "Both [Anaxagoras and Plato] share this error, because they portrayed a god as being concerned for human affairs and as making the cosmos for the sake of man. For a blessed and indestructible being, overflowing with good things and free of any share of what is bad, is completely preoccupied with the continuance of his won happiness and indestructibility and so is not concerned with human affairs. For he would be wretched, like a workman or builder, if he undertook burdens and felt concern for the creation of the cosmos."

[U362]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.11

ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἐμοὶ κριτῇ καὶ αἰσχυντηλότερον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ πεποιηκέναι (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπογνοὺς δύνασθαι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποσχέσθαι τῆς ἀνθρώπων κηδεμονίας εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐλθόντας αὐτοῖς, καθά περ εἰς ἀλλοδαπὴν ἀπῴκισε καὶ ἔξω που τοῦ κόσμου καθίδρυσε, τὸ ἀπάνθρωπον αὐτῶν τῇ ἀποστάσει καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἅπαντ᾽ ἀκοινωνίᾳ παραιτούμενος.

> But therein Epicurus, in my judgment, seems to have acted more modestly {than Aristotle}
>
> for as if he had not hope of the gods being able to abstain from the care of mankind if they came in contact with them, he transferred them, as it were, to a foreign country, and settled them somewhere outside the world, excusing them from the charge of inhumanity by the removal, and by their separation from all things.

[U363]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Life of Pyrrhus, 20.3

ὁ δὲ θεῖον ἀπωτάτω χάριτος καὶ ὀργῆς καὶ τοῦ μέλειν ἡμῶν εἰς ἀπράγμονα βίον καὶ μεστὸν εὐπαθειῶν ἀποικίζοντες.

> they [the Epicureans] removed the Deity as far as possible from feelings of kindness or anger or concern for us, into a life that knew no care and was filled with ease and comfort.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 2.7

aiunt enim quidam nec gratificārī (deum) cuiquam nec īrāscī, sed sēcūrum et quiētum immortalitātis suae bonīs perfruī.

For some say that God neither shows favor to anyone nor grows angry, but secure and at peace enjoys the blessings of his own immortality

Certain individuals say that [God] neither is pleased nor angered by anything, but that, free from care and in repose, He enjoys the good of His own immortality.

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 2.1093

sancta deum tranquilla pectora pace, quae placidum degunt aeuom uitamque serenam

I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods,
which in tranquil peace pass untroubled days and a life serene.

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 5.82

bene qui didicere deos securum agere aeuom

Those who have been correctly taught
that the gods lead a life without care...

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Satire, 1.5.101

deōs didicī sēcūrum agere aevom, nec sī quid mīrī faciāt nātūra, deōs id trīstis ex altō caelī dēmittere tectō

I have learned that the gods live their life in calm security, nor, if nature brings about anything strange, do the gods in sadness send it down from their lofty heaven

I've learned that the gods exist carefree,
And, if a miracle does happen in Nature,
That petulant gods have nothing to do
With dispatching it down from the heavenly rooftop

Dionysius the Episcopalian,
by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27

ἐργάζεσθαι δέ γε καὶ διοικεῖν καὶ εὐεργετεῖν τε καὶ προκήδεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀργοῖς... καὶ κακούργοις ἴσως ἐπαχθῆ, οἷς ἐγκατέλεξεν ἑαυτὸν Ἐπίκουρος, τοιαῦτα φρονῆσας περὶ τῶν θεῶν.

To work, to administer, to do good and to show forethought, and all such actions are burdensome perhaps to the idle and foolish, and to the feeble and wicked, among whom Epicurus enrolled himself by entertaining such thoughts of the gods.

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 47

Epicūreī (deum asseverant) ōtiōsum et inexercitum et, ut ita dīxerim, nēminem hūmānīs rēbus.

The Epicureans affirm that God is inactive and unoccupied, and, so to speak, unconcerned with human affairs.

The Epicureans picture him [God] as idle and unemployed, a nobody (so to say) in regards to human affairs.

Salvianus, On the Governence of God, 1.5

Epicureōrum ... quī sīcut voluptātem cum virtūte, sīc deum cum incuriā ac torpōre iūnxērunt.

Of the Epicureans … who, just as they joined pleasure with virtue, so also joined God with indifference and sluggishness.

Among the Epicureans… who, just as they connect pleasure with virtue, so too they connect God with disinterest and laziness.

[U364]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Benefits, 4.4.1

itaque nōn dat deus beneficia, sed sēcūrus et neglegēns nostrī, āversus ā mundō, aliud agit aut, quae maxima Epicūrō fēlīcitās vidētur, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia quam iniuriae tangunt. hoc quī dīcit, nōn exaudit precantium vōcēs.

And so God grants no blessings, but, unconcerned and heedless of us, turned away from the world, either busies himself with other things or—what seems to Epicurus the greatest happiness—does nothing; nor do kindnesses touch him any more than injuries. Whoever says this admits that he does not hear the voices of those who pray.

"True; therefore God does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us, He turns away from our world and either does something else, or else does nothing, which Epicurus thought the greatest possible happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by injuries." The man who says this surely cannot hear the voices of those who pray…

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Benefits, 4.19

tū dēnique, Epicūre, deum inermem facis; omnia illī tēla, omnem detraxistī potentiam et, nē cuiquam metuendus esset, prōiēcistī illum extrā mundum. hunc igitur intersaeptum ingentī quidem et inexplicābilī mūrō, dīvīsumque ā contactū et ā cōnspectū mortālium, nōn habēs quārē vereāris. nulla illī nec tribuendī nec nocendī māteria est; in mediō intervallō huius et alterius caelī dēsertus, sine animālī, sine homine, sine rē, ruīnās mundōrum suprā sē circāque sē cadentium ēvitāt, nōn exaudiēns vōta nec nostrī cūriōsus. atquī hunc vīs vidērī colere nōn aliter quam parentem, grātō, ut opīnor, animō; aut, sī nōn vīs grātus vidērī, quia nullum habēs illīus beneficium, sed tē atomī et istae mīcae tuae forte ac temerē conglobāvērunt, cūr colis? propter maiestātem, inquis, eius eximiam singulāremque nātūram.

You, Epicurus, in the end make God powerless: you have stripped him of all weapons, of all power, and, lest he be feared by anyone, you have flung him outside the world. This god, then, shut off by a vast and impenetrable wall and cut off from the touch and sight of mortals, you have no reason to fear. He has no means either to bestow or to harm; alone, between this heaven and the next, desolate, without living creature, without man, without thing, he avoids the ruins of collapsing worlds falling above and around him, hearing no prayers, caring nothing for us. And yet you wish to seem to worship him, as a father, I suppose, with grateful mind; or, if you do not wish to appear grateful—since you have received no benefit from him, but atoms and those tiny motes of yours by chance and accident have rolled you together—why do you worship him? “Because of his supreme majesty,” you say, “and unique nature.”

You, Epicurus, ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him from the world. There is no reason why you should fear this being, cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and that of another world, without the society either of animals, of men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this being just as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, if you do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since you have received no benefit from him, but have been put together entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours? "I worship him" you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and his unique nature."

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Benefits, 7.31.3

alius illīs (dīs) obicit neglegentiam nostrī, alius inīquitātem; alius illōs extrā mundum suum prōicit et ignāvōs hebetēsque sine lūce, sine ullō opere dēstituit.

One charges those gods with neglect of us, another with injustice; another casts them outside their own world and leaves them dull, inert, without light, without any activity.

Some blame [the gods] for neglecting us, some with their injustice towards us; others place them outside of their own world, in sloth and indifference, without light, and without any functions;

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature,
by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27, 8

...τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς περὶ ὧν οἱ μὲν ποιηταὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ᾄδουσι 'δωτῆρες ἐάων,' οὗτοι δὲ οἱ φιλόσοφοι μετὰ τωθείας εὐφημοῦσι· 'θεοὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἀδώρητοί τε καὶ ἀμέτοχοι,' τίνι καὶ τρόπῳ τεκμηριοῦνται [θεοὺς] εἶναι, μήτε παρόντας καὶ πράττοντάς τι ὁρῶντες... ...μήτε τινὰ δημιουργίαν αὐτοῖς ἢ κατασκευὴν προσνέμοντες, ἵν’ ἐκ τοῦ θεῖναι τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι ποιῆσαι θεοποιήσωσιν αὐτούς... ...μήτε διοίκησιν ἢ κρίσιν ἢ χάριν αὐτῶν τινα πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐκτιθέμενοι, ἵνα φόβον ἢ τιμὴν ὀφλήσαντες προσκυνήσωμεν αὐτοῖς; ἢ τοῦ κόσμου προκύψας Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὸν οὐράνιον ὑπερβὰς περίβολον ἢ διά τινων κρυφίων ἃς μόνος οἶδεν ἐξελθὼν πυλῶν τοὺς ἐν τῷ κενῷ κατεῖδε θεοὺς καὶ τὴν πολλὴν αὐτῶν ἐμακάρισε τρυφὴν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπιθυμητὴς γενόμενος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ κενῷ ζηλωτὴς διαίτης οὕτω πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ μακαρισμοῦ τούτου μετουσίαν ἐξομοιωθησομένους ἐκείνοις τοῖς θεοῖς παρακαλεῖ κτλ.

As for the gods of whom their poets sing as "Givers of good things" {Homer, Od. viii. 325} these philosophers with mocking reverence say, The gods are neither givers nor partakers of any good things. In what way then do they show evidence of the existence of gods, if they neither see them present and doing something, as those who in admiration of the sun and moon and stars said that they were called gods (θεούς) because of their running (θεειν), nor assign to them any work of creation or arrangement, that they might call them gods from setting (θεῖναι), that is making (for in this respect in truth the Creator and Artificer of the universe alone is God), nor exhibit any administration, or judgment, or favor of theirs towards mankind, that we should owe them fear or honor, and therefore worship them? Or did Epicurus peep out from the world, and pass beyond the compass of the heavens, or go out through some secret gates known only to himself, and behold the gods dwelling in the void, and deem them and their abundant luxury blessed? And did he thence become a devotee of pleasure, and an admirer of their life in the void, and so exhort all who are to be made like unto those gods to participate in this blessing, [etc.]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.59 (Attributing these words to Piso)

haec verba Pīsōnī Epicūreō tribuit: "quid est, Caesar, quod tē supplicationēs totiēns iam dēcrētae tot diērum tantō opere dēlectent? in quibus hominēs errōre dūcuntur, quās di neglegunt, quī, ut noster dīvīnus ille dīxit Epicūrus, neque propitiī cuiquam esse solent neque īrātī."

These words are attributed to Piso the Epicurean: "What is it, Caesar, that so greatly delights you in those thanksgivings already decreed so many times for so many days? In them men are led by error—rites which the gods neglect, who, as our divine Epicurus said, are accustomed to be neither gracious to anyone nor angry."

"What, Caesar, is the strong attraction that these thanksgivings of such frequency and such long duration as have been decreed to you possess? The world is under a deep delusion concerning them, the gods care naught for them; for they, as our godlike Epicurus has said, feel neither kindness nor wrath towards any."

[U365]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 4.1

quod sequitur dē scholā Epicūrī est: sīcut īram in deō nōn esse, ita nē grātiam quidem. nam cum putāret Epicūrus aliēnum esse ā deō male facere atque nocēre, quod ex affectū īrācundiae plērumque nascitur, adēmit eī etiam beneficentiam, quoniam vidēbat consequēns esse ut, sī habeat īram deus, habeat et grātiam. itaque nē illī vitium concēderet, etiam virtūtis fēcit expertem. ex hōc, inquit, beātus et incorruptus est, quia nihil cūrat neque habet ipse negōtium neque alterī exhibet.

What follows is from the school of Epicurus: just as anger does not exist in God, so neither does favor. For since Epicurus thought it unfitting for God to do harm or evil—which usually arises from the emotion of anger—he took from him also beneficence, because he saw it followed that if God had anger, he must also have favor. And so, lest he attribute any vice to him, he made him devoid even of virtue. "From this," he says, "God is blessed and incorruptible, because he cares for nothing, has no business of his own, and attends to none of another."

What follows is of the school of Epicurus. He teaches that just as there is no anger in God, so there is not even kindness. For since Epicurus thought that to do evil or do harm was foreign to God (an action which is generally spring from the emotion of anger), he also took from Him beneficence because he saw it to be a consequence that, if God possessed anger, He would have kindness also. "From this" he says, "he is blessed and incorrupt, because he cares for nothing, and he neither has any concern himself, nor does he show it for another."

[U366]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 4.11

iam sī nōn īra in (deō) nec grātia est, utique nec metus nec laetitia nec maeror nec misericordia; ūna est enim ratiō cunctīs affectibus, ūna commotiō, quae in

deum cadere nōn potest. quod sī nullus affectus in deō est, quia quicquid afficitur inbecillum est, ergō nec cūra ullīus reī nec prōvidentia est in eō. huc usque pervēnit sapientis hominis disputātiō, cētera quae sēcuntur obticuit. scilicet, quia nec cūra sit in eō nec prōvidentia, ergō nec cōgitātiōnem aliquam nec sēnsum in eō esse ullum: quō efficitur, ut nōn sit omnīnō. ita cum gradātim dēscendisset, in extrēmō gradū restitit, quia iam praecipitium vidēbat. sed quid prōdest reticuisse ac perīculum dissimulāsse? necessitās illum vel invītum cadere coēgit.

> Now if neither anger nor favor is in god, then certainly neither fear nor joy nor grief nor pity; for one reason belongs to all emotions, one movement, which cannot fall upon god. But if there is no emotion in god, because whatever is affected is weak, therefore there is in him neither care for anything nor providence. Thus far went the reasoning of the wise man; what follows after was silent. Clearly, since there is in him neither care nor providence, therefore neither any thought nor any sensation is in him at all—whence it results that he does not exist at all. And so, when he had descended step by step, he stopped at the last step, because he already saw the precipice. But what good did it do to keep silent and conceal the danger? Necessity forced him to fall, even unwilling.
>
> Accordingly, then, if there is neither anger nor kindness in [God], surely there is neither fear nor joy nor grief nor compassion. For there is one plan for all the affections, one connected movement, which cannot be in God. But if there is no affection in God, because whatever is affected is a weakness, therefore, neither is there any care of anything nor any providence in Him. The argument of [Epicurus] extends only this far. He was silent about the other things which follow, namely, that there is no care in Him nor providence, and, therefore, that there is not any reflection nor any sense in Him, by which it comes about that He does not exist at all. So when he had descended step by step, he stopped on the last step because he then saw the precipice. But what advantage is it to have kept silent and to have concealed the danger? Necessity forced him to fall even against his will.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 15.5

cum igitur sint in rēbus hūmānīs bona et mala, necesse est in utramque partem movērī deum, et ad grātiam cum iusta fierī videt, et ad īram cum cernit iniusta. sed occurrit nōbīs Epicūrus ac dīcit: sī est in deō laetitiae affectus ad grātiam et odiī ad īram, necesse est habeat et timōrem et libidinem et cupiditātem cēterōsque affectūs, quī sunt inbecillitātis hūmānae. nōn est necesse ut timeat quī īrāscitur aut maereat quī gaudet; timōris affectus habet in homine materiām, in deō nōn habet.

> Since, then, there are in human affairs both good things and bad, it is necessary that God be moved in both directions—toward favor when he sees what is just, and toward anger when he perceives what is unjust. But Epicurus meets us and says: if in God there is the emotion of joy leading to favor and of hatred leading to anger, it must follow that he also has fear, desire, longing, and the rest of the emotions which belong to human weakness. It is not necessary that he who grows angry should fear, or that he who rejoices should grieve; the emotion of fear has material in man, but in God it has none.
>
> Since, therefore, there are good and evil things in human affairs … it is of necessity that God is moved with reference to each. He is moved to kindness when He sees just things done, and to wrath when He beholds the unjust. But Epicurus is in opposition to us and he says: "If there is in God movement of joy unto kindness and of hatred unto wrath, then he must have both fear, and inclination, and desire, and the other affections which belong to human feebleness." But it is not necessary that he who is angry should also fear, or that he who rejoices should grieve. … The affection of fear is a matter in man – not in God.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 16.6

inānia ergō et falsa reperiuntur argumenta eōrum, quī nullum animī mōtum esse in deō putant, et quia sunt aliquī affectūs quī nōn cadunt in deum, ut libīdō, timor, avāritia, maeror, invidia, omnī prorsus affectū eum vacāre dīxērunt. hīs enim vacat, quia vitiorum affectūs sunt; eōs autem, quī sunt virtūtis, id est īra in malōs, caritās in bonōs, miserātiō in adflictōs, quoniam dīvīnā potestāte sunt digna, proprios et iustōs et vērōs habet.

Therefore the arguments of those who think there is no movement of mind in God are found empty and false; and because there are certain emotions that do not fall upon God—such as desire, fear, greed, grief, envy—they have said that he is entirely free from all emotion. From these indeed he is free, because they are emotions of vice; but those which belong to virtue—namely, anger toward the wicked, love toward the good, pity toward the afflicted—since they are worthy of divine power, he has them as his own, just, and true.

So the arguments are found to be empty ... of those who think that there is no movement of the mind in God. Because there are some affections which do not happen to be found in God, like desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy, they have said that He is utterly free from all affection. He is free of these because they are affections of vices; but, those which are of virtue (that is, anger toward the evil, love toward the good, compassion for the afflicted) since they are becoming to His divine power.

31. Care & Governance of the World

[U367]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.8.18 - 9.23 (Velleius' monologue)

tum Velleius: "Audīte," inquit, "nōn futtilēs commenticiāsque sententias: nōn opificem aedificatōremque mundī, Platōnis de Timaeō deum; nec anum fatidicam, Stōicōrum πρόνοιαν, quam Latīnē licet prōvidentiam dīcere; neque vērō mundum ipsum animō et sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, volubilem deum:

Then Velleius said: "Listen—not to futile and fictitious doctrines: not to the craftsman and builder of the world, the god of Plato's Timaeus; nor to the old prophetic crone, the pronoia of the Stoics, which one may call Providence in Latin; nor indeed to the world itself endowed with mind and senses, the round, fiery, whirling god—

portenta et mīrācula nōn disserentium philosophōrum sed somniantium. quibus enim oculīs intuērī potuit vester Platō fabricam illam tantī operis, quā cōnstruī a deō atque aedificārī mundum facit?

monstrosities and marvels not of philosophers reasoning but of dreamers. For with what eyes could your Plato have looked upon that workshop of so great a work, in which he makes the world to be constructed and built by a god?

quae molitiō, quae ferramentā, quī vectēs, quae māchinae, quī ministrī tantī mūneris fuērunt? quem ad modum autem oboedīre et parēre voluntātī architectī aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuērunt?

What toil, what tools, what levers, what machines, what assistants were there for so great a task? And how could air, fire, water, and earth obey and submit to the will of the architect?

unde vērō ortae illae quīnque formae, ē quibus reliqua formantur, aptē cadentēs ad animum afficiendum pariendōsque sēnsūs? longum est ad omnia, quae tālia sunt ut optāta magis quam inventa videantur."

Whence, moreover, came those five forms from which the rest are shaped, fittingly arranged for affecting the mind and producing the senses? It would be long to go through all, which are such that they seem rather wished for than discovered."

sed illa palmāria, quod quī nōn modo nātum mundum intūlisset sed etiam manū paene factum, is eum dīxerit fore sempiternum.

But that is most absurd—that he who not only introduced a world that had been born but even one almost made by hand, should say it would be everlasting.

hunc cēnsēs prīmīs, ut dīcitur, labrīs gustāsse physiologiam, quī quicquam quod ortum sit putet aeternum esse posse?

Do you think this man, who believes that anything which has arisen could possibly be eternal, has even, as they say, tasted the first drops of natural philosophy?

quae est enim coagmentātiō nōn dissolubilis? aut quid est, cuius prīncipium aliquod sit, nihil sit extrēmum?

For what combination is not dissoluble? Or what thing that has a beginning can lack an end?

Prónoia vērō vestra, Lūcilī, eadem est, eadem requīrō quae paulō ante—ministerōs, māchinās, omnem tōtius operis dissignātiōnem atque apparātum.

And your Providence, Lucilius, is the same; I ask again for the same things as before—the helpers, the engines, the whole plan and equipment of the work.

sin alia est, cūr mortālem fēcerit mundum, nōn, quem ad modum Platōnicus deus, sempiternum?

But if it is another, why did it make the world mortal, and not eternal, as the Platonic god did?

ab utrōque autem scīscitor, cūr mundī aedificātōrēs repente exstiterint, innumerābilia saecula dormierint.

From both sides I ask: why did the builders of the world suddenly arise, having slept through innumerable ages?

nōn enim, sī mundus nullus erat, saecula nōn erant.

For even if there was no world, the ages were not therefore nonexistent.

saecula nunc dīcō nōn ea quae diērum noctiumque numerō annuīs cursibus cōnficīuntur—nam fateor ea sine mundī conversiōne efficī nōn potuisse—sed fuit quaedam ab īnfīnītō tempore aeternitās, quam nulla circumscriptiō temporum metiēbātur.

By "ages" I mean not those completed by the count of days and nights and annual courses—for I admit those could not exist without the revolution of the world—but there was a certain eternity from infinite time, measured by no circumscription of seasons.

spatiō tamen, quālis ea fuerit, intellegī quae potest? quod nē in cōgitātiōnem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum cum tempus esset.

Yet how can we even conceive what sort that duration was? For it cannot even enter thought that there was a time when no time existed.

istō igitur tam immēnsō spatiō quaerō, Balbe, cūr Prónoia vestra cessāverit.

Therefore, in that vast interval, I ask you, Balbus, why your Providence was idle.

labōremne fugiebat? at iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, cum omnēs nātūrae numinī dīvīnō—caelum, ignēs, terrae, maria—parerent.

Was it avoiding toil? But that does not touch god, nor was there any toil, since all natures—heaven, fires, earths, seas—obey the divine will.

quid autem erat quod concupīsceret deus mundum signīs et lūminibus tamquam aedīlis ornāre?

And what was there for god to desire—to adorn the world with lights and signs, like some city official?

sī ut deus ipse melius habitāret, antea vidēlicet tempore īnfīnītō in tenebrīs tamquam in gurgustiō habitāverat.

If it was so that god himself might dwell more comfortably, then evidently before that, through infinite time, he had lived in darkness, as in a hovel.

post autem varietātene eum dēlectārī putāmus, quā caelum et terrās exōrnātās vidēmus? quae ista potest esse oblectātiō deō?

Do we then think he is now delighted by the variety with which we see the heavens and earth adorned? What kind of amusement could that be for a god?

quae sī esset, nōn ea tam diū carēre potuisset.

And if such pleasure existed, he could not have gone without it for so long.

an haec, ut ferē dīcitis, hominum causā ā deō cōnstitūta sunt?

Or, as you commonly say, were these things established by god for the sake of men?

sapientiumne? propter paucōs igitur tanta est rērum facta molitiō?

For the wise, then? Was such vast labor of creation undertaken for so few?

an stultōrum? at prīmum causa nōn fuit cūr dē improbīs bene mererētur; deinde quid est adsecūtus?

Or for the foolish? But, first, there was no reason why he should have deserved well of the wicked; next, what has he achieved?

cum omnēs stultī sint sine dubiō miserrimī, maximē quod stultī sunt: miserius enim stultitiā quid possumus dīcere?

Since all fools are without doubt most wretched—especially because they are fools; for what can we call more wretched than folly?

deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vītā, ut ea sapientēs commodōrum compēnsātiōne leniant, stultī nec vītāre venientia possint nec ferre praesentia.

And then, since so many hardships exist in life that the wise mitigate them by balancing them with goods, fools can neither avoid what approaches nor bear what is present.

[U368]

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), The Double Indictment, 2

ἀληθὴς εὐθὺς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἀπρονοήτους ἡμᾶς (τοὺς θεοὺς) ἀποφαίνων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς πραγμάτων.

Epicurus certainly spoke the truth when he said that we {gods} do not provide for things on earth.

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), Icaromenippus, 32

οἱ δὲ δὴ Ἐπικούρειοι… …μάλα δὴ καὶ ὑβρισταί εἶσι καὶ οὐ μετρίως ἡμῶν (τῶν θεῶν) καθάπτονται, μῆτε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λέγοντες τοὺς θεοὺς μήτε ὅλως τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐπισκοπεῖν.

> The Epicureans are really quite insolent, and they attack us without restraint, affirming that we {gods} don't concern ourselves with human affairs, nor do we control events whatsoever.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), On Fate, 31

τὴν λεγομένην ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἀπρονοησίαν.

> The so-called "absence of {divine} providence" by those in Epicurus' circle…

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 1.12.1

Περὶ θεῶν οἱ μέν τινές εἰσι λέγοντες μηδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον· οἱ δ᾽ εἶναι μέν, ἀργὸν δὲ καὶ ἀμελές, καὶ μὴ προνοεῖν μηδενός.

> Concerning gods, there are some who say that the divine does not even exist while others, that it does exist but is inactive and indifferent, and takes forethought for nothing

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Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.23

λάβε τὰ ἐναντία, ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτ᾽ εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τό τ᾽ εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά ἐστιν "ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν᾽ ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν ἀδικούντων.

> "Consider the contrary assertion: The gods not exist, and even if they do, they pay no attention to men, nor have we any fellowship with them, and hence this piety and sanctity which the multitude talk about is a lie told by 'impostors and sophists,' or, I swear, by lawmakers to frighten and restrain evildoers."

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.13

αὐτῶν (τῶν θεῶν Ἐπίκουρος) ἀφεῖλε τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνέργειαν, ἐξ ἧς μόνης τὸ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ἔμελλε τὴν δικαίαν πίστιν ἕξειν.

> He {Epicurus} deprived the gods of their activity towards us, from which alone a just confidence in their existence was likely to be derived.

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.3

ὁ δὲ τὴν δαιμονίαν ταύτην φύσιν ἐκποδιὼν ποιούμενος καὶ τήν τε εἰς αὖθις ἐλπίδα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτέμνων τὴν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τῶν κρειττόνων εὐλάβειαν ἀφαιρούμενος τίνα πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἔχει κοινωνίαν; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐφ'' ἃ βούλεται Πλάτων, παρακαλέσαι καὶ πιστώσαιτο τὰ εἰρημένα; πᾶν γὰρ τοὐναντίον συνεργὸς ἂν οὗτός γε καὶ συναγωνιστὴς τῶν ἐθελόντων ἀδικεῖν φανείη. πᾶς γάρ τις ἄνθρωπος ὢν καὶ ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ὀρέξεσι κατεσχημένος ἂν καταφρονήσῃ τῶν θεῶν καὶ μηδὲν νομίσῃ πρὸς αὐτόν, ἅτε πόρρω μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπῳκισμένος ἐν τῷ ζῆν, ἀποθανὼν δὲ οὐδὲ ἔτι ὤν, ἕτοιμος ἂν ἔλθοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.

He who puts aside this divine nature, and cuts off the soul's hope of hereafter, and destroys reverence before superior Beings in the present life, what communion has he with Plato? Or how could he exhort men to what Plato desires, and confirm his sayings? For on the contrary he surely would appear as the helper and ally of those who wish to do injustice. For every one who is human and constrained by human desires, if he despise the gods and think they are nothing to him, inasmuch as in life he dwells far away from them, and after death exists no more, will come prepared to gratify his lusts.

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.6

τὴν ἐκ θεῶν ἄδειαν παρασχόμενος.

…guaranteeing the impunity on the part of the gods.

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Exhortation to the Greeks, 5

Ἐπικούρου μὲν γὰρ μόνου καὶ ἑκὼν ἐκλήσομαι, ὃς οὐδὲν. μέλειν οἴεται τῷ θεῷ, διὰ πάντων ἀσεβῶν.

Epicurus alone I will banish from memory, and willingly at that. For he, preeminent in impiety, thinks that God has no care for the world.

Plotinus (fl.c. 245 CE), Dissertations, 30 (Aeneids, 2.9), 15

Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν…

Epicurus, who rejects providence…

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 1.2.1

nōn putāvī adeō necessārium ab illā quaestiōne prīncipium sūmere, quae vidētur prīma esse nātūrā, sitne prōvidentia quae rēbus omnibus cōnsulat, an fortuitū vel facta sint omnia vel gerantur: cuius sententiae auctor est Dēmocritus, cōnfirmātor Epicūrus.

I did not think it so necessary to take my beginning from that question which seems to be the first by nature—whether there is a providence that cares for all things, or whether all things have been made and are conducted by chance—of which opinion Democritus is the originator and Epicurus the confirmer.

I do not think it so necessary to maintain a principle from what question which seems to be primary by nature, whether it is providence which takes care of all things, or whether they have been made and are carried on fortuitously. The author of this opinion is Democritus; its establisher, Epicurus.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 2.8.48

nam dīvīnā prōvidentiā effectum esse mundum a prīmīs illīs septem sapientibus ad Socraten usque et Platōnem prō cōnfessō et indubitātō habitum est, donec ūnus multīs post saeculis exstitit dēlīrus Epicūrus, quī audēret negāre id quod est ēvidentissimum, studiō scīlicet inveniendī nova, ut nōmine suō cōnstitueret disciplīnam. et quia nihil novī potuit reperīre, ut tamen dissentīre a cēterīs vidērētur, vetera voluit ēvertere, in quō illum circumlatrantēs philosophi omnēs coarguērunt.

> For that the world was made by divine providence was held as a confessed and undoubted truth from those first seven sages down to Socrates and Plato, until, many ages afterward, there arose the madman Epicurus, who dared to deny what is most evident—out of a zeal, of course, for discovering novelties, so that he might establish a school under his own name. And because he could discover nothing new, yet wished to seem to differ from the rest, he sought to overthrow the old doctrines, in which all the philosophers, barking around him, refuted him.

> The world was made by Divine Providence. … this was held as an acknowledged and indubitable fact by those first seven wise men up to Socrates and Plato even, until the mad Epicurus arose many ages after, and dared to deny that which is most evident, with a zeal and desire of inventing new beliefs, so that he might set up a system under his own name.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 9.4

posteā vērō Epicūrus deum quidem esse dīxit, quia necesse sit esse aliquid in mundō praestāns et eximium et beātum, prōvidentiam tamen nullam; itaque mundum ipsum nec ratiōne ūllā nec arte nec fabricā instructum, sed nātūram rērum quibusdam minūtīs sēminibus et īnsecābilibus conglobātam.

> Afterward, indeed, Epicurus said that there is a god—since it is necessary that there be in the world something preeminent and excellent and blessed—but that there is no providence; and thus the world itself, he said, was arranged by no reason, art, or workmanship, but that the nature of things was compacted from certain minute and indivisible seeds.

> Later, however, Epicurus said that there was a god, indeed, because it was necessary that there be in the world something outstanding, and distinguished, and blessed, but still he held that there was no providence; and, as a result of this, the world itself he regarded as fashioned neither by any plan nor by design nor by art, but that the nature of things had conglobated by certain minute and inseparable seeds.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123A

τίς οὖν κινεῖ τὰ πεπιστευμένα καὶ μάχεται τοῖς ἐναργέσιν; οἱ μαντικὴν ἀναιροῦντες καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπάρχειν θεῶν μὴ φάσκοντες.

> Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject divination and deny that there exists divine providence.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1124E

πότε οὖν ἔσται θηριώδης καὶ ἄγριος καὶ ἄμικτος ἡμῶν ὁ βίος; ὅταν ἀναιρεθῶσι μὲν οἱ νόμοι, μένωσι δὲ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν παρακαλοῦντες λόγοι, πρόνοια δὲ θεῶν μὴ νομίζηται.

> When, therefore, will our life be that of a beast, savage and without fellowship? When the laws are swept away, but the arguments that summon us to a life of pleasure are left standing; when the providence of heaven is not believed in…

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1111B

καὶ γὰρ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν (Ἐπίκουρος) εὐσέβειαν ἀπολιπεῖν λέγει.

> Thus he does away with providence, but says he has left us with piety.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against the Stoics, 1075E

(οἱ Στωικοὶ) πρὸς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσι τῶν πραγμάτων, Ἰοὺ ἰοὺ φεῦ φεῦ βοῶντες, ὡς συγχέοντα τὴν τῶν θεῶν πρόληψιν, ἀναιρουμένης τῆς προνοίας.

The Stoics themselves make no end of fuss crying woe and shame upon Epicurus for violating the preconception of the gods because he does away with providence, for they say that god is preconceived and conceived to be not only immortal and blessed but also humane and protective and beneficent.

[U369]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 1.13

Ἐπικουρείους δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐγκαλοῦντας τοῖς εἰσάγουσι πρόνοιαν καὶ θεὸν ἐφιστᾶσι τοῖς ὅλοις.

...the Epicureans, who charge as superstitious those who advocate Providence and put God in lordship of everything.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1101C

(οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι) διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἔμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπικρεμαμένην.

{The Epicureans} malign Providence as if she were some foul witch to frighten children with or an unrelenting Fury of punishment hanging over our heads.

[U370]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Instituions, 3.17.8

vidēbat Epicūrus bonīs adversa semper accidere—paupertātem, labōrēs, exsilia, cārōrum amissiōnēs; malōs contrā beātōs esse, augērī potentia, honōribus adfici. vidēbat innocentiam minus tūtam, scelera inpune committī; vidēbat sine dīlectū mōrum, sine ōrdine ac discrimine annōrum saevīre mortem: sed aliōs ad senectūtem pervenīre, aliōs īnfantēs rapī, aliōs iam robustōs interīre, aliōs in prīmō adulēscentiae flōre immātūrīs fūneribus exstingui, in bellīs potiōs meliorēs et vincī et perīre. maximē autem commovebat, hominēs in prīmīs religiōsōs graviōribus malīs adficī, iīs autem quī aut deōs omnīnō neglegerent aut nōn piē colerent, vel minōra incommoda evenīre vel nulla; ipsa etiam saepe templa fulminibus conflagrāre...

Epicurus saw that misfortunes always befell the good—poverty, toil, exile, the loss of loved ones; while the wicked, on the contrary, were happy, growing in power, and honored with distinctions. He saw innocence less secure, crimes committed with impunity; he saw death raging without regard for morals, without order or distinction of age: some reaching old age, others snatched away as infants, others dying in full strength, others extinguished by untimely funerals in the first bloom of youth, and in wars the better men rather being conquered and slain. Most of all he was moved by this—that men most religious were afflicted with the heaviest misfortunes, while those who either altogether neglected the gods or worshiped them impiously suffered lesser troubles or none at all; and that even the temples themselves were often struck and set aflame by lightning.

Epicurus saw that adversities were always befalling the good: poverty, labors, exiles, and loss of dear ones; that the evil on the contrary were happy, were gaining in wealth, and were given honors. He saw that innocence was not safe, that crimes were committed with impunity; he saw that death raged without concern for morals, without any order or regard for years, but that some reached old age, while others were snatched away in childhood; some still robust reach the end, but others are cut off by untimely deaths in the first flower of adolescence; and in wars the better ones are conquered and die. It was especially disturbing, however, that religious men were among the first to be afflicted with the more serious evils, but upon those who either neglected the gods entirely or who did not piously revere them, either lesser disadvantages came or none at all. Often, also, the very temples were struck with lighting.

cum haec igitur cogitāret Epicūrus, eārum rērum velut inīquitāte inductus—sic enim causam ratiōnemque ignōrantī vidēbātur—existimāvit nullam esse prōvidentiam. quod cum sibi persuasisset, suscēpit etiam dēfendendum. sīc in errōrēs inextricābilēs sē ipse coniēcit. sī enim prōvidentia nulla est, quō modō tam ōrdinātē, tam dispositē mundus effectus est? “Nulla,” inquit, “dispositiō est;

multa enim facta sunt aliter quam fierī dēbuērunt." et invēnit homō dīvīnus quae reprehenderet; quae singula, sī vacāret refellere, facile ostenderem nec sapientem hunc fuisse nec sānum. item sī nulla prōvidentia est, quō modō animālium corpora tam prōvidenter ōrdināta sunt, ut singula quaeque membra mīrābilī ratiōne disposita sua officia cōnservant? "Nihil," inquit, "in prōcreandīs animālibus prōvidentiae ratiō mōlīta est; nam neque oculī factī sunt ad videndum neque aurēs ad audiendum neque lingua ad loquendum neque pedēs ad ambulandum, quoniam prius haec nāta sunt quam esset loquī, audīre, vidēre, ambulāre. itaque nōn haec ad ūsus nāta sunt, sed ūsus ex illīs nātus est." sī nulla prōvidentia est, cūr imbres cadunt, frūgēs oriuntur, arbusta frondēscunt?

When, therefore, Epicurus thought upon these things, led—as it seemed to one ignorant of the cause and reason—by the injustice of such matters, he came to believe there is no providence. When he had persuaded himself of this, he even undertook to defend it. Thus he threw himself into inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how is the world made so orderly, so well arranged? "There is no arrangement," he says, "for many things have been made otherwise than they ought to have been." And this "divine" man found faults to censure—each of which, if I had leisure to refute, I could easily show him to have been neither wise nor sane. Likewise, if there is no providence, how are the bodies of living creatures so providently arranged that each part, disposed with marvelous reason, preserves its proper function? "Nothing," he says, "in the generation of living creatures has been shaped by providence; for eyes were not made for seeing, nor ears for hearing, nor tongue for speaking, nor feet for walking, since these parts were produced before there was seeing, hearing, speaking, or walking. Therefore, these were not made for use, but use arose from them." If there is no providence, why do rains fall, crops grow, and trees put forth leaves?

"nōn," inquit, "semper animantium causā ista fiunt, quoniam prōvidentiae nihil prōsunt; sed omnia suā sponte fierī necesse est. unde ergō nāscuntur aut quō modō sunt omnia quae geruntur? nōn est," inquit, "prōvidentiae opus. sunt enim sēmina per ināne volitantia, quibus inter sē temerē conglobātīs ūniversa gignuntur atque concrēscunt."

He says, "These things do not always happen for the sake of living creatures, since they are of no benefit to providence; but all things must come to be of their own accord. Whence, then, are all things born, or how do those things exist which take place? It is not," he says, "the work of providence. For there are seeds flying through the void, and when these come together by chance, all things are generated and grow together.

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not in Usener (Cf. Lucretius, 2.1101) — 17.16

When, therefore, Epicurus thought on these matters, as if influenced by the iniquity of those things, for so it seemed to one not knowing the cause and reason, he believed that there was no providence. When he had persuaded himself of this theory, he even undertook that it should be defended. Thus he cast himself into inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how was the world made so orderly, by its arrangement? "There is no arrangement" he says, "for many things have been done differently from the way they should have been."

Lucretius (c. 59 BCE), 2.180 & 5.195

And a godlike man discovered what he should reprehend. If there were time to refute each single thing, I would show easily that this man was neither wise nor sane. Likewise, if there is no providence, how are bodies of animals so ordered that each of the members disposed in a marvelous arrangement preserves its own functions? He says, "The plan of providence has done nothing in the procreating of animals. Neither were the eyes made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor the feet for walking, since these were in existence before there was seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking. So these things were not produced for use, but the use came from them."

Lucretius (c. 59 BCE), 4.822

If there is no providence, why do the rains fall, grains rise, trees flower? He says that "those are not for the sake of living things, since they are of no profit to providence, but all things must happen of their own accord." Whence, therefore, are they born, or how do all things which happen come to be? He says that it is not the work of providence. "There are seeds flying about through the void, and when these have massed together at random among themselves, all things are born and grow."

[U371]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Instituions, 7.5.3 & 7

sicut ergō mundum nōn propter sē deus fēcit, quia commōdīs eius nōn indiget, sed propter hominem, quī eō ūtur, ita ipsum hominem propter sē. “quae utilitās deō in homine,” inquit Epicūrus, “ut eum propter sē faceret?” scīlicet ut esset quī opera eius intellegeret, quī prōvidentiam disponendī, ratiōnem faciendī, virtūtem consummandī et sensū admirārī et voce prōloquī posset: quōrum omnium summa haec est, ut deum colat.

> Just as, therefore, God did not make the world for himself—since he has no need of its advantages—but for man, who uses it, so also he made man for himself. “What profit has God in man,” says Epicurus, “that he should have made him for himself?” Evidently, so that there might be one who could understand his works, who could perceive his providence in arranging, his reason in making, his excellence in perfecting, and who could admire with feeling and proclaim with voice—all of which come to this: that he might worship God.

> Therefore, just as God did not make the world for Himself, because He does not need its advantages; but because of man who uses it, so He made man on account of Himself. "What usefulness for god is there, that he should make man for himself?" asks Epicurus.

“quid ergō,” inquit, “deō cultus hominis cōnfert beātō et nullā rē indigentī? vel sī tantum honōris hominī habuit, ut ipsīus causā mundum fabricāret, ut īnstrueret eum sapientiā, ut dominum vīventium faceret eumque dīligeret tamquam fīlium, cūr mortālem fragilémque cōnstituit? cūr omnibus malīs quem dīligēbat obiēcit? cum oportēret et beātum esse hominem tamquam coniūnctum et proximum deō, et perpetuum, sīcut est ipse, ad quem colendum et contemplandum figūrātus est.”

> “What then,” he says, “does the worship of man bring to God, who is blessed and in need of nothing? Or if he held man in such honor that for his sake he fashioned the world, instructed him with wisdom, made him lord of living things, and loved him as a son—why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he expose the one he loved to every evil, when he ought to have made man blessed as being joined and near to God, and everlasting, like him, for whose worship and contemplation he was formed?”

Lucretius (c. 59 BCE), 5.165

Surely, it was so that he might understand His works, that he might be able to admire with his senses and declare with his voice the providence of His arrangement, the plan of His accomplishment, and the virtue of His completion of the work. The summation of all these acts is that he worships God.

5.7

"What then" he says, "does the worship on the part of man confer upon a god who is blessed and in need of nothing? If he had so much regard for man that he made the world on account of him, that he equipped him with wisdom, that he made him master of living things, and that he loved him as a son, why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he put him whom he loved up against all evils, when man should have been both happy, as though joined and near to god, and everlasting, as he is himself, for the worshiping and contemplation of whom he was made?"

Stōicī "hominum," inquīunt, "causā mundus effectus est." audiō. sed Epicūrus ignōrat ipsōs hominēs quā rē aut quis effēcerit.

> "The Stoics say, 'The world was made for the sake of men.' I hear them. But Epicurus does not know by what cause or by whom men themselves were made."
>
> The Stoics say that the world was made for the sake of men. I hear this argument. But Epicurus does not know the men themselves, or why, or who made them.

[U372]

Lactantius, The Works of God, 2.10

unde ego philosophōrum quī Epicūrum sequuntur amentiam soleō mīrārī, quī nātūrae opera reprehendunt, ut ostendant nullā prōvidentiā īnstructum esse ac regī mundum, sed orīginen rērum īnsecābilibus ac solidīs corporibus adsīgnant, quōrum fortuitīs concursiōnibus ūniversa nāscantur et nāta sint. praetereō quae ad ipsum mundum pertinentia vitiō dant, in quō rīdiculē īnsāniunt. id sūmō, quod ad rem dē quā nunc agimus pertinet.

> Hence I am accustomed to marvel at the madness of those philosophers who follow Epicurus, who find fault with the works of nature in order to show that the world is arranged and governed by no providence, yet assign the origin of things to indivisible and solid bodies, from whose chance collisions all things come to be and have been born. I pass over the faults they ascribe to the world itself—in which they rave absurdly. I take up that point which pertains to the matter we are now discussing.
>
> Wherefore, I often marvel at the folly of those philosophers in the wake of Epicurus who condemn the works of nature that they may show that the world is formed and governed by no providence. They assign the origin of things to inseparable and solid bodies from the chance combinations of which all things come to be and have arisen. I pass by the things pertaining to the world itself with which they find fault; in this they are mad, even to the point of ridicule. I take up now that which pertains to the subject which we have at hand.

queruntur hominem nimis inbecillum et fragīlem nāscī quam cētera animālia nāscuntur, quae, ut sunt ēdita ex uterō, prōtinus in pedēs suōs erigī et gestīre discursibus statimque aērī tolerandō idōnea esse, quod in lūcem nātūrālibus indumentīs mūnīta processerint: hominem contrā nūdum et inermem tamquam ex naufragiō in hūius vītae miseriās prōicī et expellī, quī neque movēre sē locō, ubi effūsus est, possit nec alimentum lactis appetere nec iniūriam temporis ferre. itaque nātūram nōn mātrem esse hūmānī generis, sed nōvercam, quae cum mūtīs tam līberāliter sē gesserit, hominem vērō sīc effūderit, ut inops et infirmus et omnī auxilīō indigens nihil aliud possit quam fragilitātis suae condiciōnem plōrātū ac flētibus ominārī, scīlicet.

> They complain that man is born too weak and fragile compared with other animals, which, as soon as they are brought forth from the womb, are immediately raised upon their feet and frisk about, at once fit to endure the air, because they come forth into the light clothed with their natural coverings. Man, on the contrary, naked and unarmed, is cast out and thrust forth, as from a shipwreck, into the miseries of this life; he cannot even move himself from the place where he is laid, nor seek the nourishment of milk, nor endure the injury of the weather. Therefore, they say, nature is not the mother of the human race but its stepmother, who, while she has dealt so generously with dumb beasts, has poured forth man in such a condition that, poor, weak, and needing every help, he can do nothing but with cries and tears forebode the hardship of his own frailty—of course.

cui tantum in vītā restet trānsīre malōrum.

> for whom so many evils still remain to pass through in life.

…at hominis, inquiunt, ēducātiō maximīs labōribus cōnstat… iidem queruntur hominem morbīs et immātūrae mortī esse subiectum. indignāntur videlicet nōn deōs sē esse nātōs. minimē, inquiunt, sed ex hōc ostendimus hominem nullā

prōvidentiā esse factum, quod aliter fierī dēbuīt… nempe nullum hominem morī volunt, nisi cum centēnsimum aetātis complēverit annum...

> …"But," they say, "the rearing of man depends on the greatest labors…" The same people complain that man is subject to diseases and to untimely death. They are indignant, it seems, that they were not born gods. "Not at all," they say, "but from this we show that man was made without any providence, since he ought to have been made otherwise…" Indeed, they would have no man die unless he had completed the hundredth year of his age…

sed istī ratiōnem sequentium nōn vident, quia semel errāvērunt in ipsā summā. exclusā enim dē rēbus hūmānīs dīvīnā prōvidentiā necessāriō sequēbātur, ut omnia suā sponte sint nāta. hinc invēnērunt illās minūtōrum sēminum plagās et concursiōnēs fortuitās, quia rērum orīginen nōn vidēbant. in quās sē angustiās cum coniēcissent, iam cogēbat eōs necessitās existimāre animās cum corporibus nāscī et item cum corporibus exstinguī. adsumpserant enim nihil fierī mente dīvīnā, quod ipsum nōn aliter probāre poterant quam sī ostenderent esse aliqua, in quibus vidērētur prōvidentiae ratiō claudicāre. reprehendērunt ergō ea, in quibus vel maximē dīvīnitās suam prōvidentiam mīrābiliter expressit, ut illa quae rettulī dē morbīs et immātūrā morte, cum debuērint cogitāre hīs adsūmptīs quae necessāriō sequērentur.

But these men do not see the logic of what follows, because they once erred in the chief point. For when divine providence was excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things came to be of their own accord. Hence they devised those blows and chance collisions of tiny seeds, because they could not perceive the origin of things. And when they had thrown themselves into such straits, necessity now compelled them to suppose that souls are born together with bodies and perish together with them. For they had assumed that nothing is done by divine mind, which they could not prove in any other way except by trying to show that there are certain things in which the plan of providence seems to fail. They therefore censured precisely those things in which divinity has most wonderfully displayed its providence—such as those I have mentioned, diseases and untimely death—when they ought rather to have reflected, from these assumptions, upon what necessarily follows.

They complain that man is born more weak and frail than other animals. For as soon as the others come forth from the womb, they are able at once to stand erect and move about with delight, and they are at once able to endure the air because they have come forth into the light fortified by natural protections. Man, on the other hand, they claim, is cast forth naked and unarmed as from a shipwreck and is hurled upon the miseries of this life. he is able neither to move himself from the place where he has been put forth, nor to seek the nourishment of milk, nor to bear the brunt of weather. So they say that nature is not the mother of the human race, but a stepmother. She has been very liberal with the dumb beasts, but she has produced man in such a way – needy and weak – and in want of all aid he can do nothing else by indicate his condition by wailing and weeping, that is "as one for whom there remains in life only the passage of evils."

"But the training of man" they say, "consists of great struggle." 4.1: Then too, people complain that man is subjected to sickness and untimely death. They are incensed, in fact, that they have not been born gods. "Not at all" they will say, "but from this we demonstrate that man was not made with any providence, and it should have been otherwise." …

They, mind you, would have no man die except when he has completed a hundred years of life. … 4.12: Our opponents do not see the reason of the outcomes, because they erred once in the very keypoints of this discussion. For when divine providence was excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things came into being of their own accord. From this stage, they hit upon those impacts and chance comings together of minute seeds, because they saw no origin of things. And when they had cast themselves into these straits, then, sheer necessity forced them to think that souls were born with their bodies and were also extinguished with them. They had taken it for granted that nothing was done by a divine mind. And this very point they could not prove in any other way than by showing that there were some things in which the determination of Providence seemed to limp. They found fault, therefore, with those things in which Providence marvelously, even exceptionally, expressed in divinity, namely, those things I have referred to concerning sicknesses and untimely death, although they should have considered, when they were assuming these things, what would be a necessary consequence.

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Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), The Works of God, 6.7

vidēbat igitur Epicūrus in corporibus animālium dīvīnae ratiōnis sollertiam. sed ut efficeret quod ante imprūdenter adsumpserat, adiēcit aliud dēlīrāmentum superiōrī congruēns. dīxit enim neque oculōs ad videndum esse nātōs neque aurēs ad audiendum neque pedēs ad ambulandum, quoniam membra haec prius nāta essent quam esset ūsus videndī et audiendī et ambulandī, sed hōrum omnium officia ex nātīs exstitisse. quid ais, Epicūre? nōn sunt ad videndum oculī nātī? cūr igitur vident? "Posteā," inquit, "ūsus eōrum apparuit." videndī ergō causā nātī sunt, sī quidem nihil possunt aliud quam vidēre.

Epicurus, then, saw in the bodies of living creatures the skill of divine reason. But in order to support what he had earlier assumed without understanding, he added another absurdity agreeing with the former. For he said that eyes were not born for seeing, nor ears for hearing, nor feet for walking—since these limbs were born before there was any use for seeing, hearing, or walking—but that the functions of all these arose afterward from what had been born. What say you, Epicurus? Were eyes not born for seeing? Why, then, do they see? “Afterward,” he says, “their use appeared.” Therefore, they were born for the purpose of seeing—since indeed they can do nothing else but see.

Epicurus, therefore, saw in the bodies of animals the skill of a divine plan, but, in order to accomplish what he had rashly taken upon himself before, he added another piece of nonsense in accordance with the former. He said that eyes of the body were not created for seeing or the ears for hearing or the feet for walking, since these parts were formed before there was any use of seeing and hearing and walking, but that the functions of all of these came about from them after they were produced.

Lucretius (fl. 59 BCE), 4.822

... What did you say, Epicurus? That the eyes were not made to see? Why, then, do they see? "Afterwards" he says, "their use appeared." For the purpose of seeing, therefore, they were produced, inasmuch as they cannot do anything else by see.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Use of Parts, 1.21

νυνὶ δὲ ἅ περ ἤδη τινὲς τῶν ἀσπαζομένων τοὺς Ἐπικούρου τε τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδου τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγους ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγουσιν, ἄξιον μὴ παρελθεῖν... ...δοκεῖ δὴ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οὔθ᾽ ὅτι παχεῖς οἱ τένοντες ἐγένοντο, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἶναι αὐτῶν σφοδράς, οὔθ᾽ ὅτι λεπτοί, διὰ τοῦτο ἀσθεγεῖς, ἀλλὰ ταύτας μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρειῶν ἀναγκάζεσθαι τοίας ἢ τοίας γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ ὄγκους τῶν τενόντων τῷ ποσῷ τῆς κινήσεως ἕπεσθαι, τῶν μὲν γυμναζομένων ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς εὐεκτούντων τε καὶ παχυνομένων, τῶν δ᾽ ἀργούντων ἀτροφούντῶν τε καὶ κατισχνουμένων. οὔκουν ὅτι βέλτιον ἦν τῶν μὲν σφοδρῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἰσχυροὺς καὶ παχεῖς εἶναι τοὺς τένοντας, τῶν δ᾽ ἀσθενεστέρων ἰσχνοὺς καὶ ἀρρώστους, οὕτω διαπλασθῆναί φασι πρὸς τῆς φύσεως -- οὐ γὰρ ἂν καὶ πιθήκοις γενέσθαι τοιούτους δακτύλους —, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἴρηται πρόσθεν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς μὲν γυμναζομένοις τὴν παχύτητα, διότι τρέφονται καλῶς, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀργοῦσι τὴν ἰσχνότητα, χεῖρον καὶ τούτοις τρεφομένοις.

At this point it is proper for us not to pass over the statements of certain men who embrace the doctrines of Epicurus, the philosopher, and Asclepiades, the physician, and who disagree with me on these matters. ... These men do not believe that it is because the tendons are thick that they are powerful, or because they are slender that their actions are weak, but think that actions are what they are as the necessary result of their usefulness in life, and that the size of the tendons depends on how much they are moved; that is, tendons that are exercised in all likelihood thrive and grow thick, whereas those that lie idle get no nourishment and waste away. Hence they say that Nature did not form the tendons as they are because it was better for the tendons of powerful actions to be strong and thick, and those of more feeble actions to be thin and weak – for if so, apes would not have fingers like ours – but as I said, before, they claim that parts which are exercised necessarily become thick because they are will nourished, and pats that lie idle are poorly nourished and become thin.

[U374]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), On the Anger of God, 13.19

vidēs ergō, magis propter mala opus nōbīs esse sapientiā: quae nisi fuissent prōposita, ratiōnāle animal nōn essemus. quod sī haec ratiō vēra est quam Stōicī posuērunt, dissolvitur etiam argumentum illud Epicūrī: “deus,” inquit, “aut vult tollere mala et nōn potest, aut potest et nōn vult, aut neque vult neque potest, aut et vult et potest. sī vult et nōn potest, inbecillis est, quod in deum nōn cadit. sī potest et nōn vult, invidus, quod aequē aliēnum ā deō. sī neque vult neque potest, et invidus et inbecillis est, ideō nec deus. sī et vult et potest, quod sōlum deō convenit, unde ergō sunt mala? aut cūr illa nōn tollit?” scio plērōsque philosophōrum quī prōvidentiam dēfendunt, hōc argumentō perturbārī solēre et invītōs paene adigī, ut deum nihil cūrāre fateantur, quod maximē quaerit Epicūrus. sed nōs, ratiōne perspectā, formidulōsum hoc argumentum facile

dissolvimus. itaque nisi prius malum agnōverimus, nec bonum poterimus agnōscere. sed hoc nōn vīdit Epicūrus nec alius quisquam: sī tollantur mala, tollī pariter sapientiam, nec ulla in homine virtūtis remanēre vestīgia, cuius ratiō in sustinendā et superandā malōrum acerbitāte consistit.

> You see, therefore, that we need wisdom chiefly because of evils; for if these had not been set before us, we would not be rational beings. And if this reasoning of the Stoics is true, that argument of Epicurus is refuted as well: "God," he says, "either wills to remove evils and cannot, or can and does not will, or neither wills nor can, or both wills and can. If he wills and cannot, he is weak—which cannot apply to God. If he can and does not will, he is envious—which is likewise foreign to God. If he neither wills nor can, he is both envious and weak, and therefore not God. But if he both wills and can, which alone befits God, whence then are evils? Or why does he not remove them?" I know that many philosophers who defend providence are accustomed to be disturbed by this argument and almost driven unwillingly to admit that God cares for nothing—which is what Epicurus most desires. But we, once we understand the reasoning, easily dissolve this alarming argument. For unless we first recognize evil, we cannot recognize good. But this Epicurus did not see, nor any other: if evils were removed, wisdom would likewise be removed, and no trace of virtue would remain in man, whose essence lies in bearing and overcoming the bitterness of evils.

> You see, then, that we need wisdom much more on account of evils. Unless these had been set before us, we would not be rational animals. And if this reasoning is true, then that argument of Epicurus is refuted. "God" he says, "either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants to and cannot, then he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can but does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god's nature. If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful, and so not a god. If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fitting for a god, where then do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them?" I know that most of the philosophers who defend [divine] providence are commonly shaken by this argument and against their wills are almost driven to admit that god does not care, which is exactly what Epicurus is looking for. But when the reasoning has been examined, we easily bring this formidable argument to dissolution. … unless we first recognize evil, we shall not be able to recognize the good. But Epicurus did not see this, nor anyone else, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is equally removed; nor do any vestiges of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in sustaining and overcoming the bitterness of evils.

[U375]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.29.5

Ἐπίκουρος ‹πάντα› κατ’ ἀνάγκην, κατὰ προαίρεσιν, κατὰ τύχην (γίνεσθαι).

> Epicurus says that all things happen by necessity, by choice, and/or by chance.

[U376]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Academica 2.30.97 (Lucullus)

cum ab Epicūrō, quī tōtam dialecticam et contemnit et inrīdet, nōn impetrent ut vērum esse cōncedat quod ita effabimur "aut vīvet crās Hermarchus aut nōn vīvet," cum dialecticī sīc statuant, omne quod ita disiunctum sit quasi "aut etiam aut nōn" nōn modo vērum esse sed etiam necessārium, vidē quam sit catus is quem istī tardum putant. "enim," inquit, "alterutrum concesserō necessārium esse, necesse erit crās Hermarchum aut vīvere aut nōn vīvere: nulla autem est in nātūrā rērum tālis necessitās." cum hoc igitur dialecticī pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stōicī: tōtam enim ēvertit dialecticam.

Since they cannot obtain from Epicurus—who both despises and mocks all dialectic—that he grant the truth of this statement, "Hermarchus will live tomorrow or he will not live," while the dialecticians maintain that every such disjunction, "either so or not so," is not only true but also necessary—see how shrewd is the man whom these others call dull. "For," he says, "if I grant that one or the other is necessary, it will follow that it is necessary tomorrow either that Hermarchus live or that he not live; but no such necessity exists in the nature of things." Therefore, with this point the dialecticians—namely Antiochus and the Stoics—contend; for he thereby overturns the whole of dialectic.

They will not get Epicurus, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic, to admit the validity of a proposition of the form "Hermarchus will either be alive tomorrow or not alive" while dialecticians demand that every disjunctive proposition of the form "either x or not-x" is not only valid but even necessary, See how on his guard the man is whom your friends think slow; for "If" he says, "I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermarchus must either be alive tomorrow or not alive; but as a matter of fact in the nature of things no such necessity exists." Therefore let the dialecticians, that is, Antiochus and the Stoics, do battle with this philosopher, for he overthrows the whole of dialectic.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.25.70 (Cotta)

idem facit Epicūrus contrā dialecticōs: ā quibus, cum trāditum sit in omnibus dīiunctionibus in quibus "aut etiam aut nōn" ponerētur, alterum utrum esse vērum, pertimuit nē, sī concessum esset huius modī aliquid "aut vīvet crās aut nōn vīvet Epicūrus," alterutrum fieret necessārium; tōtum hoc "aut etiam aut nōn" negāvit esse necessārium — quō quid dīcī potuit obtūsius?

Epicurus does the same against the dialecticians: from whom, since it has been handed down that in every disjunction where "either...or not" is used, one or the other must be true, he became afraid that, if something of this sort were granted—"Epicurus will live tomorrow or he will not live"—one of the alternatives would become necessary. So he denied that any such "either...or not" is necessary. What could be said, asks the critic, more dull-witted than that?

Epicurus did the same sort of thing in his argument with the logicians. It is an axiom of the traditional logic that in every disjunctive proposition of the form "X either is … or is not …" one of the alternatives must be true. He was afraid that if he admitted anything of this sort, then in a proposition such as "Tomorrow Epicurus will either be alive or he will not be alive" one or the other of the statements would be a necessary truth: so to avoid this he denied that there was any logical necessity at all in a disjunction proposition, which is too stupid for words!

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Fate, 10.21

hic primum, sī mihi libeat adsentīrī Epicūrō et negāre omnem enuntiātiōnem aut vēram esse aut falsam, eam plagam potiūs accipiam quam fatō omnia fierī comprobem; illa enim sententia habet aliquid disputātiōnis, haec vērō nōn est tolerābilis. itaque contendit omnīs nervōs Chrysippus, ut persuādeat omne ἀξίωμα aut vērum esse aut falsum. Epicūrus verētur, nē, sī hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fatō fierī quae cumque fiant: sī enim alterum utrum ex aeternitāte vērum sit, esse id etiam certum, et sī certum, etiam necessārium; ita et necessitātem et fatum cōnfirmārī putat.

At this point, if I were inclined to agree with Epicurus and deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would rather accept that absurdity than admit that all things happen by fate; for the former view has at least some ground for debate, but the latter is utterly intolerable. Therefore Chrysippus strains every nerve to persuade that every axiōma (proposition) is either true or false. Epicurus fears that, if he grants this, he must also grant that whatever happens happens by fate; for if one of the alternatives is true from eternity, then it is also certain—and if certain, also necessary. Thus he thinks that both necessity and fate are thereby affirmed.

Now here, first of all, if it were my desire to agree with Epicurus and deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would rather accept that blow than agree that all things come about through fate; for the former opinion gives some scope for discussion, but the latter is intolerable. So Chrysippus strains every sinew in order to convince us that every proposition is either true or false. Epicurus is afraid that, if he concedes this, he will have to concede that whatever comes about does so through fate; for if either the assertion or the denial is true from eternity, it will also be certain – and if certain, also necessary. [cf. Ibid., 9.19]

[U377]

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 2.8

ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθά περ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ 'βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωρα'

In cases where everything happened as though it were for the sake of some goal, these creatures were preserved because, although they were formed by chance, they were formed as suitable compounds; but in other cases [the creature] perished and still do perish, as Empedocles refers to "ox-like creatures with human faces." ;

Simplicius of Cilicia (fl. 520 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's Physics [fr. 84u Ald.; p. 372.9 Diels]

ταύτης δοκοῦσι τῆς δόξης τῶν μὲν ἀρχαίων φυσικῶν ὅσοι τὴν ὑλικὴν ἀνάγκην αἰτίαν εἶναι τῶν γινομένων φασί, τῶν δὲ ὑστέρων οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι. ἡ δὲ πλάνη γέγονεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεῖσθαι πάντα τὰ ἕνεκά του γινόμενα κατὰ προαίρεσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ λογισμόν, τὰ δὲ φύσει μὴ οὕτως ὁρᾶν γινόμενα.

The ancient natural philosophers who said that material necessity determines the cause of things which come to be, seem to hold this opinion, and among later thinkers so do the Epicureans. Their error, as Alexander says, comes from thinking that everything which comes to be for the sake of a goal comes to be by intention and calculation, and observing that things which come about by nature do not come to be in this way.

[U378]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On the Contradictions of the Stoics, 32, 1050C

καί τοι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἁμῶς γέ πως στρέφεται καὶ φιλοτεχνεῖ τῆς ἀιδίου κινήσεως μηχανώμενος ἐλευθερῶσαι καὶ ἀπολῦσαι τὸ ἑκούσιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν κακίαν.

And Epicurus, for his part, twists about and exercises his ingenuity in conniving to free and liberate voluntary action from the necessity of eternal motion, in order not to leave vice immune to blame.

[U379]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Fate, 10.22, 23

Epicūrus dēclinatione atomī vītārī necessitātem fātī putat… hanc Epicūrus ratiōnem induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est nē, sī semper atomus gravitāte ferretur nātūrālī ac necessāriā, nihil liberum nōbīs esset, cum ita movērētur animus, ut atomōrum motū cōgerētur. acūtius Carneadēs, quī docēbat posse Epicureōs suam causam sine hāc commenticiā dēclinatione dēfendere. nam cum docērent esse posse quendam animī motum voluntārium, id fuit dēfendī melius quam introducere dēclinationem… cum enim concessissent motum nullum esse

sine causā, nōn concederent omnia quae fierent fierī causīs antecedentibus: voluntātis enim nostrae nōn esse causās externās et antecedentēs.

> Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom. He introduced this theory for this reason: fearing that if the atom were always carried downward by its natural and necessary weight, nothing would be left free to us, since the mind would then move as compelled by the motion of the atoms. Carneades reasoned more sharply, teaching that the Epicureans could defend their position without this fictitious swerve. For since they taught that there could exist a certain voluntary motion of the mind, that was a better point to defend than to invent the swerve. For although they had granted that there is no motion without a cause, they did not grant that all things which happen arise from preceding causes; for the motions of our will, they said, have neither external nor antecedent causes.

> Epicurus, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom; Epicurus introduced this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and necessary way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. … More acutely, Carneades taught that the Epicureans could have maintained their position without this fictitious swerve. For, seeing that [Epicurus] taught that there could be some voluntary movement of the mind, it would have been better to defend that than to introduce the swerve, especially as they cannot find a cause for it. … For in having admitted that there was no movement without a cause, they would not be admitting that all things that came about die so through antecedent causes. For (they could have said), there are no external and antecedent causes of our will.

[U380]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 1.29.6

Ἐπίκουρος (τὴν τύχην λέγει) ἄστατον αἰτίαν προσώποις χρόνοις τόποις.

> Epicurus says that chance is a cause which is uncertain with respect to persons, times, and places.

[U381]

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Use of Parts, 7.14

ὅπως οὖν ἐπηνωρθώσατο τοῦθ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐξευροῦσα σοφὴν μηχανήν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλόμην ἤδη μοι λέγεσθαι, πρὶν τοῖς ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην τε καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐπιτρέψαι ζητῆσαι, τίνα τρόπον ἂν εἴ περ αὐτοὶ κατέστησαν ἐν χώρᾳ τοῦ διαπλάττοντος τὰ ζῷα, τοῖς εἰρημένοις μυσὶν τῶν νεύρων μετέδοσαν. εἴωθα γὰρ οὕτω ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε καὶ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὴν σκέψιν οὐχ ἡμερῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μηνῶν ὁπόσον ἂν αὐτοὶ βουληθῶσιν ἀριθμόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ πράττειν οὕτως ἐν γράμμασιν οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν παραβάλλειν τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἀτεχνίᾳ καὶ δεικνύειν, ὅπως ἡ λοιδορουμένη πρὸς αὐτῶν ὡς ἄτεχνος φύσις εἰς τοσοῦτον εὐμηχανωτέρα φαίνεται τῆς σοφίας αὐτῶν, ὥστ' οὐδ᾽ ἐπινοῆσαι δύνανται τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς τὴν τέχνην, ἀναγκαῖον ἤδη μοι λέγειν τὰς μηχανὰς τῆς φύσεως.

> I would not wish to tell how Nature corrected this fault {the relative isolation of some muscles from the nervous system} by inventing a clever device unless I first permitted the disciples of Asclepiades and Epicurus to search out the way in which they would have conferred nerves on these muscles if they were placed in the role of the Creator of animals; for I am in the habit of doing this sometimes and of granting them as many days or even months as they wish for deliberation. One cannot do so, however, when writing a book and cannot compare the wisdom of these gentlemen with Nature's lack of skill or show how the Nature the rebuke as being unskillful is so much more ingenious than they are with all their cleverness that they are unable to conceive of the skill with which she works. Hence, I find it necessary to tell now about the devices Nature has employed in order to give the muscles in question their share of nerves and motion.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Construction of the Embryo, 6

οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς ὀνομαζομένης φύσεως τὴν οὐσίαν, εἴ τ᾽ ἀσώματός τίς ἐστιν εἴ τε σωματική, σοφίας εἰς ἄκρον ἥκειν ἐροῦσιν, ἥν γε μηδ᾽ ὅλως ἔχειν φασίν, (οὐδ') οὕτω τεχνικῶς ἐνεργῆσαι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἐμβρύων διά πλασιν οἷόν τε πεισθῆναι.

τοῦτο γὰρ Ἐπικούρου τε καὶ τῶν ἄνευ προνοίας ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαι νομιζόντων ἀκούοντες οὐ πειθόμεθα.

It will certainly not be admitted that the substance of this 'Nature' {of the cause and formation of the embryo} – whether that is something incorporeal or corporeal – reaches this peak of intelligence by people who declare that they cannot believe it in any way possible that this entity functions in such skilful manner in the construction of the embryo. But we, on hearing this assertion from Epicurus and from those who maintain that everything happens without design, do not stand convinced of it.

[U382]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 2.3.1 & 2

οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος οὐδέτερα τούτῶν, φύσει δὲ ἀλόγῳ, ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα

All the other philosophers considered that the world is alive and governed by providence. Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, by contrast, say that neither is so; rather, it is made up of atoms, by nature and without reason.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Use of Parts, 11.8

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δῆσαι συνδέσμοις ἰσχυροῖς (τοὺς ὀδόντας) πρὸς τὰ φατνία καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς ῥίζας, ἵνα περ καὶ τὰ νεῦρα καταφύεται, πῶς οὐ καὶ. τοῦτ᾿ ἄν τις θαυμάζοι; καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ τύχης ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τέχνης ἔργον; ὃ δὲ δὴ πάντων μάλιστ᾿ ἄν τις θαυμάσειε καὶ συγχωρήσας ἅπασαν ταῖς Ἐπικουρείοις ἀτόμοις καὶ τοῖς Ἀσκληπιαδείοις ὄγκοις τὴν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένην εὐτυχίαν, τοῦτ᾿ οὐκ ἂν ἔτὶ συγχωρήσειεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήσειέ τε καί τινος ἐπιστάτου δικαίου μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσεως εὐτυχοῦς ἔργον εἶναι φήσειε, τὴν τῶν ὀδόντων ἰσότητα.

Moreover, would not one also marvel that the teeth are bound to the phatnia with strong ligaments {the periosteum}, especially at the roots where the nerves are inserted, and marvel the more if this is the work of chance, not skill? But the thing a person would marvel at most of all is the ordered disposition of the teeth – something that, even granting all the aforesaid good fortune of the Epicurean atoms and the particles of Asclepiades, he would not allow, balking and saying that it was the work of a just Governor and not of fortunate motion.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Use of Parts, 874

δεδόσθω δ᾿ ὅμως καὶ ταῦτα ταῖς εὐτυχεστάταις ἀτόμοις, ἃς ἀλόγως μὲν ἐκεῖνοι κινεῖσθαί φασι, κινδυνεύουσι δὲ μᾶλλον Ἐπικούρου τε καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδου λελογισμένως πάντα διαπράττεσθαι.

Nevertheless, let us grant even this to the most fortunate atoms, which those men say move without reason, but which are in more danger of doing everything according to reason than are Epicurus and Asclepiades.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 7.3.23

reddant ergō istī ratiōnem, sī possunt, cūr (mundus) aut factus in prīncipiō sit aut posteā resolvātur. quod quia docēre nōn poterat Epicūrus sīve Dēmocritus, suā sponte nātum esse dīxit sēminibus inter sē passim coeuntibus, quibus iterum resolūtīs discidium atque interitum secūtūrum... corrupit ergō quod rectē vīderat, et tōtam ratiōnem penitus ignōrantiā ratiōnis ēvertit, redēgitque mundum et omnia quae in eō geruntur ad similitudinem cuiusdam vānisimī somniī, sī quidem rēbus hūmānīs ratiō nulla subsistat.

Let them, then, give an explanation, if they can, why the world either was made in the beginning or will later be dissolved. Since Epicurus or Democritus could not explain this, he said it had arisen of its own accord, from seeds meeting with one another at random... which, once again dissolved, would bring about division and destruction. Thus he corrupted what he had rightly perceived, and through ignorance of reason utterly overthrew all reason, reducing the world and all things that are done in it to the likeness of a most empty dream, if indeed no reason at all exists in human affairs.

Let them make the case, if they can, either why [the world] was made in the beginning or should afterwards be destroyed. Since Epicurus, or Democritus, was not able to show this, he said that it was begun of its own accord, seeds coming together here and there. And when these were again loosened, separation and dissolution would follow. Therefore, he corrupted what he had rightly seen, and completely overturned the whole plan by his ignorance of the plan; and he reduced the world and all things which go on in it to the likeness of a certain very empty dream since no plan subsists in human affairs.

[U383]

Emperor Julian the Apostate (obit. 363), Orations, 5, "Hymn to the Mother of the Gods"

εἶναί τι λέγομεν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνυλον εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τούτων εἰ μή τις αἰτία προτέτακται, λανθάνοιμεν ἂν ἑαυτοὺς εἰσάγοντες τὴν Ἐπικούρειον δόξαν· ἀρχαῖν γὰρ δυοῖν εἰ μηδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον, αὐτόματος πάντα φορὰ καὶ τύχη συνεκλήρωσεν.

We assert that matter exists and also form, embodied in matter. But if no cause be assigned prior to these two, we should be introducing, unconsciously, the Epicurean doctrine. For if there be nothing of higher order than these two principles, then spontaneous motion and chance brought them together.

Dionysius the Episcopalian,
by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.24

πῶς αὐτῶν (τῶν περὶ Ἐπίκουρον) ἀνασχώμεθα τυχηρὰ λεγόντων εἶναι συμπτώματα τὰ σοφὰ δὴ ταῦτα καὶ καλὰ δημιουργήματα;

How are we to bear with them {the atomists} when they assert that the wise and therefore beautiful works of creation are accidental coincidences?

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Timeas," p. 80 midway

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῖς μὲν Ἐπικουρείοις καὶ πάντῃ προπεπηλάκισται τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ποιοῦσι.

This axiom {of Aristotle, that each 'particular' is generated by a certain cause}, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures, to be the work of chance.

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), p. 81 below

ἀποροῦσι δέ τινες, ὅπως ὁ Πλάτων ἔλαβεν ὡς ὡμολογημένον τὸ δημιουργὸν εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς εἰς παράδειγμα βλέποντα, μὴ γὰρ εἶναι δημιουργὸν εἰς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον ὁρῶντα. πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτου προεστᾶσι τοῦ λόγου τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ πάντῃ τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον οὐκ εἶναι φάσκοντες.

Some doubt, however, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged that there is a Demiurge {i.e., a creator} of the world who pursues a plan: for they say there is not a Demiurge of it who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. Any many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; particularly the Epicureans, who entirely deny that there is Demiurge and, even generally, a cause of all things.

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), p. 82.5

πόθεν δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι (τὸν κόσμον) ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον ὄντα; πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα πεπερασμένην ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥς φησι πόθεν οὖν τὴν ἄπειρον ἔσχε ταύτην τοῦ εἶναι δύναμιν τὸ πᾶν, εἴ περ μὴ ἐκ ταὐτομάτου κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον;

Every body, as [Aristotle] says, has limited power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is?

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), p. 108.33

νοῦς γὰρ ὑπόκειται δημιουργὸς καὶ θεός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ αὐτόματον, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν

It is intelligence, in fact, which is creator and god – not chance, as certain others maintain.

Proclus (Proklos Diadokhos, fl. 452 CE), p. 19.14

θᾶττον γὰρ ἂν τὰς ἀτόμους Ἐπικούρου συνελθούσας ποιῆσαι κόσμον ἢ ὀνόματα ὡς ἔτυχε συγκείμενα καὶ ῥήματα λόγον κατωρθωμένον.

The atoms of Epicurus, when encountering each other, succeed in forming a tidy universe more easily than a bunch of names and words, all mixed together, would happen to form coherent speech!

{Cf., Cicero, De Natura Deorum 2.37.93; Plutarch, The Oracles at Delphi, 11 p. 399E}

32. Religion

[U384]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1092B

ἐπεὶ δὲ τέλος ἦν τοῦ περὶ θεῶν λόγου (Ἐπικούρῳ) τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θεὸν ἀλλὰ παύσασθαι ταραττομένους, βεβαιότερον οἶμαι τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ὅλως μὴ νοοῦσι θεὸν ἢ τοῖς νοεῖν μὴ βλάπτοντὰ μεμαθηκόσιν.

Since, however, the aim of their theology is to have no fear of God, but instead to be rid of our anxieties, I should think that this condition is more securely in the possession of creatures that have no faintest notion of God than of those who have been taught to think of him as injuring no one.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1091F

οὐδ᾽ εἰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ θεῖα καὶ ταράττεσθαι τοῖς ἐν Ἅιδου κακόν, ἡ τούτων ἀποφυγὴ μακάριον καὶ ζηλωτόν.

It does not follow that if pain, fear of the supernatural and terror about the hereafter are evil, escape from them is godlike and bliss beyond compare.

[U385]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5

ἤδη δὲ ταύτῃ γε καὶ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ὄνησις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ θεῶν γίνεται· τὰς γοῦν βελτίονας ἀπορροίας αὐτῶν φασι τοῖς μετασχοῦσι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν παραιτίας γίνεσθαι.

{And as to our deriving any benefit from them while they remain in heaven,}
... in this way, even according to Epicurus, men get help from the gods,
"They say, for instance, that the better emanations from them become the causes of great blessings to those who partake of them..."

[U386]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, P.Herc. 1077 col. 13 fin. | P.Herc. 1098 col. 13 | P.Herc. 1077 col. 12 (Obbink 1.27.754 –)

DCLP ...εἰ μὴ διοικεῖται καὶ παντελῶς· μάλιστα τοίνυν γ' ιν(*)ομαι δεῖν μεισεῖν τοὺς | [ἄλλην] θεωρίαν ὡ[ς] [τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα [ἱερ]ὰ παραβαίνον[τας] ἢ δια\γε/χ(*)ῶντας· [ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[σεται] καὶ τετηρηκὼς [ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖς φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγ[γυηκ]ώς, οὐ μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺς νόμους ἀλλὰ διὰ⟦ς⟧ φυσει\κὰ/ς [αἰτίας·] προσεύχε{ι}σθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ [βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι [ἡμεῖ]αι(*) φησιν, οὐχ ὡς [δυσ]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή[σομεν], ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν [ὑπερβ]αλλουσῶν [δυνά]μει καὶ σπου[δαιότ]ητι φύσεων [ἵνα τά]ς τε τελ{λ}ο(*)[ι] [ότητας] τοικ(*)ώσκω[μεν καὶ] τοῖς νόμοις [συνπερι]φοράς· πρὸς [τῶι γράφ]ειν δὲ καὶ [τοῦτ' ἐ]αι(*) τῶι Πε[ρὶ] | [θεῶ]η(*) καὶ τὸ μέγισ[τόν] φησι καὶ οἱονεὶ [τὸ] καθ' ἡγεμονίαν [ὑπερ]έχον ἔχειν [πᾶ]αι(*)· πάντα γὰρ σο[φὸν] καθαρὰς καὶ ἁ- [γίο]υς δόξας ἔχειν [περὶ] τοῦ θείου καὶ [μεγ]άλην τε καὶ σε[μν]ὴν ὑπειληφέ[ναι] ταύτην τὴν φύσιν· ἐν δ[ὲ] ταῖς ἑορταῖς μ[ά]λιστ' ε[ἰ]ς ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς βαδίζοντα διὰ τὸ τοὔνομα πάντα ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχειν πί[σ]τει σφοδ[ρο]τέρως κατα[σχεῖ]ν τὴ[ν]...

Obbink (not changed from DCLP yet) ...εἰ μὴ διοικεῖται καὶ παντελῶς· μάλιστα τοίνυν γ' ιν(*)ομαι δεῖν μεισεῖν τοὺς | [ἄλλην] θεωρίαν ὡ[ς] [τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα [ἱερ]ὰ παραβαίνον[τας] ἢ δια\γε/χ(*)ῶντας· [ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[σεται] καὶ τετηρηκὼς [ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖς φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγ[γυηκ]ώς, οὐ μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺς νόμους ἀλλὰ διὰ⟦ς⟧ φυσει\κὰ/ς [αἰτίας·] προσεύχε{ι}σθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ [βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι [ἡμεῖ]αι(*) φησιν, οὐχ ὡς [δυσ]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή[σομεν], ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν [ὑπερβ]αλλουσῶν [δυνά]μει καὶ σπου[δαιότ]ητι φύσεων [ἵνα τά]ς τε τελ{λ}ο(*)[ι] [ότητας] τοικ(*)ώσκω[μεν καὶ] τοῖς νόμοις [συνπερι]φοράς· πρὸς [τῶι γράφ]ειν δὲ καὶ [τοῦτ' ἐ]αι(*) τῶι Πε[ρὶ] | [θεῶ]η(*) καὶ τὸ μέγισ[τόν] φησι καὶ οἱονεὶ [τὸ] καθ' ἡγεμονίαν [ὑπερ]έχον ἔχειν [πᾶ]αι(*)· πάντα γὰρ σο[φὸν] καθαρὰς καὶ ἁ- [γίο]υς δόξας ἔχειν [περὶ] τοῦ θείου καὶ [μεγ]άλην τε καὶ σε[μν]ὴν ὑπειληφέ[ναι] ταύτην τὴν φύσιν· ἐν δ[ὲ] ταῖς ἑορταῖς μ[ά]λιστ' ε[ἰ]ς ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς βαδίζοντα διὰ τὸ τοὔνομα πάντα ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχειν πί[σ]τει σφοδ[ρο]τέρως κατα[σχεῖ]ν τὴ[ν]...

... he says that as being both the greatest thing, and that which as it were excels in sovereignty, it possesses everything: for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature is great and august. And it is particularly at festivals that he, progressing to an understand of it, through having its name the whole time on his lips, embraces with conviction more seriously ......

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Music, Vol. Herc., 1497, columns 117 & 118

...ψυχ[ῶ]ν [κοι]νὰς ἅτε ἀπαραλλάκτου[ς] καθεστώσας ※. Καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' [ὁ] ζητῶν μουσικὸς τὴν τοιαύτην σύνεσιν ἧι δυνήσεται διαγινώσκειν αἱ ποιαὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πῶς διατεθήσονται, τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων ἐπιστήμην ζητεῖ* (καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο κενῶς παραδ[ιδ]ωσιν', ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν μέλος, καθὸ μέλος ἄλογον ὑπάρχον, ψυχὴν οὔτ' ἐξ ἀκεινήτου, καὶ ἡσυχάζουσαν, ἐγείρει καὶ ἄγει πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἤθει διάθεσιν, οὔτ' ἐξ ἀ(*)[τ]τούσης καὶ φερομένης πρὸς ὁτιδήποτε πρανει καὶ εἰς ἠρεμίαν καθίστησιν, οὐδ' ἀπ' ἄλλης ὁρμῆς ἐπ' ἄλλην ἀποστρέφ[ειν] οἷόν [τ'] ἐ[σ]τὶν οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπάρχου[σα]ν διάθεσιν εἰς αὔξησιν [ἄ]γειν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἡ μουσική, καθάπερ τι[ν]ὲς ὀνειρώττουσιν, οὐ δ' , [ὡς] οὗτος, ὁμοιότη[τα]ς ἠθῶν, οὐ μιμητικὰς δέ, [ἔχ]ει, πάντως δὲ πάσα[ς τὰς ἠ]θῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφ[α]ίνε[ι] τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἐστ[ι] μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀνδρῶδες καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ κόσμιον καὶ θρασύ, μ[ᾶ]λλον ἤπερ ἡ μαγειρική※. [Δ]ιόπερ οὐδὲ καθ' ἑαυτ⟦ο⟧\ὰ/ κειν[εῖ] διαφόρως οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν [ἀ]λλήλοις μεῖξιν οὐδὲ τὰ[ς] ἐναντί⟦οι⟧\α/ς ἀλλή⟦λ⟧λ⟦ο⟧\α/ις διαθέ[σ]εις, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖ[ς] πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἐπα[ι]σθήμασιν ἐκ [μιμη]μάτων ἔστιν δημιουργ[εῖ]ν. * Ἃ δὲ λέγει πρὸς τ[ὸ] μαρ[τ]υ[ρήσ]ασθαι κίνησιν κινοῦ[σα]ν [σύ]νολον θέ[α]τρο[ν] π[ε]ρὶ ἀ[νο]μοίων εὖ [δια-] κείμενο[ν, ο]ἰκειότερ[ον ἐν] ἄλλωι τόπωι κατοψ[όμεθα]. Περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τ[ῶν μου]σικῶν τοῦ θείου τ⟦ε⟧ιμῆς εἴ[ρ]ηται μὲν αὐταρκῶς καὶ π[ρ]ότερον, καὶ πάλιν τινὰ ῥηθήσεται*· τὰ δὲ τοσαῦτα λεγέσθω καὶ νῦν, ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον μὲν οὐ προσδεῖταί τινος τιμῆς, * ἡμῖν δὲ φυσ⟦.⟧\ι/κόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τιμᾶν μάλιστα μὲν ὁσίαις ὑπολήψεσιν *, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστωι τῶν ⟦μουσικων⟧ κατὰ μέ[ρ]ος· μουσικὴ δ' οὐκ ἐντέτα[κ]ται*· διόπερ οὐδ[ὲ] συνάγετα[ι] τὸ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος αὐτὴν χρησιμεύειν, ἀλλ' , εἴπερ ἄρ⟦[.]⟧\α/, τῶι δημοσίωι [*]· καὶ τούτω(*) δ' οὔτε πᾶν εἶδος αὐτῆς οὔτε ὅσον ποτὲ παρ[α{.}λα]μ[β]άνεται διαπεποι[κ]ι[λ]μένον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαιότα[τον], καὶ οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντω[ν], ἀ λ[λ'] ὑπὸ τινῶν Ἑλλήνων κ[α]ὶ κατὰ ἐνίους καίρουσ*, καὶ [τοί]νυν διὰ μισθωτῶν ἀν[θρ]ώπ⟦ο⟧\ω/ν. Καὶ πολλά[ς] τ' ἐρο[ῦ]με[ν] ἐμπειρίας κατὰ τὸν λόγον [π]ρὸς τ⟦ε⟧ιμὴν τοῦ θείου συνεργεῖν, καὶ μᾶλλόν γε καὶ πολλῶ(*) πλείονος ὠνίας γινομένας, καὶ διαμονίμως, τῆς μουσικῆς ἤδη πρός γε τὰ [τοι]αῦτα παρη(*)τημένης ὅσον μὴ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνασ*· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πάλαι τῶν ποημά[τω]ν ἦν ἡ πλείστη δ[ό]σις, οὐχὶ τῶν ⟦πο⟧\με/λῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κρουσέων. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ τοῦ θεα[τοῦ] κα[ὶ] τοῦ θεάτρου καὶ...

...ψυχῶν κοινὰς ἅτε ἀπαραλλάκτους καθεστώσας.

Καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὁ ζητῶν μουσικὸς τὴν τοιαύτην σύνεσιν ἧι δυνήσεται διαγινώσκειν αἱ ποιαὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πῶς διατεθήσονται, τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων ἐπιστήμην ζητεῖ* (καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο κενῶς παραδίδωσιν', ἐπειδήπερ οὐδὲν μέλος, καθὸ μέλος ἄλογον ὑπάρχον, ψυχὴν οὔτ' ἐξ ἀκεινήτου, καὶ ἡσυχάζουσαν, ἐγείρει καὶ ἄγει πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν ἤθει διάθεσιν, οὔτ' ἐξ ἀ(*)ττούσης καὶ φερομένης πρὸς ὁτιδήποτε πρανει καὶ εἰς ἠρεμίαν καθίστησιν, οὐδ' ἀπ' ἄλλης ὁρμῆς ἐπ' ἄλλην ἀποστρέφειν οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν διάθεσιν εἰς αὔξησιν ἄγειν καὶ ἐλάττωσιν.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἡ μουσική, καθάπερ τινὲς ὀνειρώττουσιν, οὐ δ' , ὡς οὗτος, ὁμοιότητας ἠθῶν, οὐ μιμητικὰς δέ, ἔχει, πάντως δὲ πάσας τὰς ἠθῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφαίνει τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἐστι μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀνδρῶδες καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ κόσμιον καὶ θρασύ, μᾶλλον ἤπερ ἡ μαγειρική.

Διόπερ οὐδὲ καθ' ἑαυτοὰ κειṿεῖ διαφόρως οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀλλήλοις μεῖξιν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐναντίοιας ἀλλήλλοαις διαθέσεις, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἐπαισθήμασιν ἐκ̣ μιμημάṭων ἔστιν δημιουργεῖν.

***Ἃ δὲ λέγει πρὸς τὸ μαρτυρήσασθαι κίνησ̣ιν κινο̣ῦ̣σαν σύνολον θέατρον περὶ ἀνομοίων εὖ διακείμενον, οἰκειότερον ἐν ἄλλωι τόπωι κατοψόμεθα. Περὶ τοίνυν τῆς διὰ τῶν μουσικῶν τοῦ θείου τειμῆς εἴρηται μὲν αὐταρκῶς καὶ πρότερον, καὶ πάλιν τινὰ ῥηθήσεται·**

τὰ δὲ τοσαῦτα λεγέσθω καὶ νῦν, ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον μὲν οὐ προσδεῖταί τινος τιμῆς, * ἡμῖν δὲ φυσικόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τιμᾶν μάλιστα μὲν ὁσίαις ὑπολήψεσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις ἑκάστωι τῶν μουσικων κατὰ μέρος·

μουσικὴ δ' οὐκ ἐντέτακται· διόπερ οὐδὲ συνάγεται τὸ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος αὐτὴν χρησιμεύειν, ἀλλ' , εἴπερ ἄρ⟦.⟧\α/, τῶι δημοσίωι·

καὶ τούτω(*) δ' οὔτε πᾶν εἶδος ạὐτῆς οὔτε ὅσον ποτὲ π̣αρα{.}λαμβάνεται διαπεποικιλμένον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαιότατον, καὶ οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντων, ἀ λλ' ὑπὸ τινῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατὰ ἐνίους καίρουσ*, καὶ τοίνυν διὰ μισθωτῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Καὶ πολλάς τ' ἐροῦμεν ἐμπειρίας κατὰ τὸν λόγον πρὸς τειμὴν τοῦ θείου συνεργεῖν, καὶ μᾶλλόν γε καὶ πολλῶ(*) πλείονος ὠνίας γινομένα̣ς, καὶ διαμονίμως, τῆς μουσικῆς ἤδη πρός γε τὰ τοιαῦτα παρη(*)τημένης ὅσον μὴ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνασ*·

ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ πάλαι τῶν ποημάτων ἦν ἡ πλείστη δόσις, οὐχὶ τῶ̣ν πομελῶν καὶ τῶν κρουσέων. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ τοῦ θεατοῦ καὶ τοῦ θεάτρου καὶ…

> Now, these very important things may still be said at the present: that the divine does not need any honor; for us, nevertheless, it's natural to honor it, above all, with pious convictions, even through the rites of national tradition, each according to his proper part.

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On the Life of the Gods, P.Herc. 152 col. 1 fin. | P.Herc. 157 fr. 10 tab. 5 sup.

…ṭοῖς θεοῖς, κ(αὶ) θαυμάζει τὴν φύσιν [κα]ὶ τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ πειρᾶται συνεγγί[ζει]ν αὐτῆι κ(αὶ) καθάπερ εἰ γλίχεται θιγε[ῖ]ν [κ(αὶ) συ]νεῖναι, καλείτω καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν [θεῶ]ν φίλους κ(αὶ) τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν σοφῶν. [ἀλλ' ο]ὐκ ἐοίκαμέ[ν που] τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν φι[λίαν] ἐρεῖν, ὥστε βέλτε[ιο]ν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγμα|τα [σκ]οπ̣εῖν, τὰ δ‹ὲ›ῥ[ήματ' ἀχρ]ήστως μὴ παραβιάζεσθαι. κᾂν̣ χαρίζεσθαι τοιγαροῦν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς θεοὺς τ̣ι̣θ̣ῶ̣μεν, ὡς ἐνλείπουσι μετάδοσίν τινων οἰκείων ποιουμένους οὐ ῥητέον·…

…τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ θαυμάζει τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ πειρᾶται συνεγγίζειν αὐτῆι καὶ καθάπερ εἰ γλίχεται θιγεῖν καὶ συνεῖναι, καλείτω καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς τῶν θεῶν φίλους καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν σοφῶν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐοίκαμέν που τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν φιλίαν ἐρεῖν, ὥστε βέλτειον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα σκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲῤήματ' ἀχρήστως μὴ παραβιάζεσθαι. κᾂν χαρίζεσθαι τοιγαροῦν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς θεοὺς τιθῶμεν, ὡς ἐνλείπουσι μετάδοσίν τινων οἰκείων ποιουμένους οὐ ῥητέον·…

> … to the gods, and he admires their nature and their condition and tries to approach them and, so to speak, yearns to touch them and to be together with them; and he calls Sages "friends of the gods" and the gods "friends of Sages."

[U387]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, P.Herc. 1098 col. 11

(Obbink I.31.880 –)

DCLP δη φύσ[ιν τὴν κατὰ] τὸ κρ[ιτήριον ποι]ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶς ἐπί]νοιαν ὠ[φελείας νομί]ζεσθαι· [ἵνα δὲ μὴ] ἐκτείνῳ [τὸν λόγον], πάλιν· ἡμ[εῖς θεοῖς] θύωμέν φησιν [ὁσί]ως καὶ καλῶς οὗ [καθ]ήκει κα[ὶ κ]αλῶ<ς> πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους, μ[η]θὲ[ν] ταῖς δόξαις α[ὐ]τοὺς ἐν τοῖς περη(*)τῶν ἀρίστων γ(*)[αὶ]σεμνοτάτων διαταράττοντ\ε/[ς· ἔτι]δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θύω]μεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλε[γον δό]ξης· οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φύσ[ιν θνη]τὴν ὁμοίω[ς τῶι Διί] νὴ{ι} Δία <διά>ξ(*)ειν, [ὡς φαί]νεται· κάν [τοῖς Πε]ρὶ βίων δὲ τ(*)[ερὶ τῆς] προσκυνή[σεως...]

Obbink (need to change) δη φύσ[ιν την κατα] τὸ κρ[ιτήριον ποι]ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶς ἐπ΄]νοιαν ὠ[φελε.ας νο.΄]ζεσθαι· [.να δε μη] ἐκτείνῳ [τον λογον], πάλιν· ἡμ[ε̣ῖς θεοῖς] θύωμέν φησιν [οσ.]ως καὶ καλῶς οὗ [καθ]ήκει κα[. κ]αλῶ<ς> πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους, μ[η]θὲ[ν] ταῖς δόξαις α[υ]τοὺς ἐν τοῖς περη(*)τῶν ἀρίστων γ(*)[α.]σεμνοτάτων διαταράττοντ\ε/[ς ετ.]δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θυω]μεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλε[γον δο]ξης· οὕτω γὰρ [εν]δέχεται φύσ[ιν θνη]τὴν ὁμοίω[ς τω. Δ..] νὴ{ι} Δία <διά>ξ(*)ειν, [ὡς φαι]νεται· κάν [τοῖς Πε]ρὶ βίων δὲ τ(*)[ερ. τῆς] προσκυνή[σεως...]

Again, he says, "let us sacrifice to the gods piously and well, as is appropriate, and let us do everything well according to the laws. But let us do so not disturbing them at all with our opinions on the topic of those who are best and most majestic; again, we say that it is even right to do this on the basis of the opinion which I was discussing. For in this way, by Zeus, it is possible for a mortal nature to live like Zeus, as it appears."

[U388]

Maximus the Confessor (fl. c. 630 CE), Gnomologion, 14

Εἰ ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐχαῖς ὁ θεὸς κατηκολούθει, θᾶττον ἂν ἀπώλλυντο πάντες ἄνθρωποι, συνεχῶς πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων εὐχόμενοι.

From Epicurus: "If the gods listened to the prayers of men, all men would quickly have perished: for they are always praying for evil against one another."

[U389]

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature,

by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27.10, 779A

καὶ δὴ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνων τῶν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς (θεῶν) ὅρκους τε καὶ ὁρκισμοὺς μυρίους τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ βιβλίοις ἐγγράφει, ὀμνύς τε συνεχῶς μὰ Δία καὶ νὴ Δία ἐξορκῶν τε τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ πρὸς οὓς διαλέγοιτο πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, οὔ τί που δεδιὼς αὐτὸς ἢ δεδιττόμενος ἐκείνους τὴν ἐπιορκίαν, κενὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ψευδὲς καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ ἄσημον ἐπιφθεγγόμενος τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ παράρτημα κτλ.

And moreover he {Epicurus} inserts in his own books countless oaths and adjurations addressed to those who are nothing to us, swearing continually "No, by Zeus" and "Yes, by Zeus" and adjuring his readers and opponents in argument "in the name of the gods" having, I suppose, no fear himself of perjury nor trying to frighten them, but uttering this as an empty, and false, and idle, and unmeaning appendage to his speeches, just as he might hawk and spit, and turn his face, and wave his hand. Such an unintelligible and empty piece of acting on his part was his mentioning the name of the gods.

[U390]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 7.66

καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ εὔχεσθαι τοῖς ἀγάλμασιν ἠλίθιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συμπεριφερόμενον τοῖς πολλοῖς προσποιεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγάλμασιν εὔχεσθαι, ὁποῖον ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσοφοῦντες καὶ οἱ τὰ Ἐπικούρου ἢ Δημοκρίτου ἀσπαζόμενοι. οὐδὲν γὰρ νόθον χρὴ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ἀληθῶς εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβοῦς.

And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epicurus and Democritus. For there is no falsehood or pretense in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God

[U391]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), Lives of Philosophers, 2.97 (Aristippos)

ἦν δὲ ὁ Θεόδωρος παντάπασιν ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας· καὶ αὐτοῦ περιετύχομεν βιβλίῳ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ θεῶν οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτῳ, ἐξ οὗ φασιν Ἐπίκουρον τὰ πλεῖστα λαβόντα εἰπεῖν.

> Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, it is said, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 8.45

ἀναπλάσματα μυθικά, οἷς οὐδ' Ἑλλήνων φιλόσοφοι αἱρέσεις πεπιστεύκασιν, ὥσπερ ἡ Δημοκρίτου καὶ ἡ Ἐπικούρου καὶ ἡ Ἀριστοτέλους.

> For why may not our accounts be true, and those of Celsus fables and fictions? At least, these latter were not believed by the Greek philosophical schools, such as the followers of Democritus, Epicurus, and Aristotle...

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 1.43

εἰ μὲν ὁ ἀπιστῶν τῷ περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς περιστερᾶς φάσματι τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἀνεγέγραπτο Ἐπικούρειος εἶναι ἢ Δημοκρίτειος ἢ Περιπατητικός, χώραν ἂν εἶχεν ἀκόλουθον τῷ προσωποποιουμένῳ τὸ λεγόμενον

> We shall therefore say, in the first place, that if he who disbelieves the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove had been described as an Epicurean, or a follower of Democritus, or a Peripatetic, the statement would have been in keeping with the character of such an objector.

[U392]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1119D

οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ὦ Κωλῶτα, μὴ λέγειν "ἀγαθὸν" οὐδὲ ἱππεῖς "μυρίους" δεινόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ὸν θεὸν μὴ λέγειν θεὸν μηδὲ νομίζειν ὃ πράττετε ὑμεῖς μήτε Δία γενέθλιον μήτε Δήμητρα θεσμοφόρον εἶναι μῆτε Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλμιον ὁμολογεῖν ἐθέλοντες: οὗτος ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ὀνομάτων πονηρός ἐστι καὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπίπλησιν ὀλιγωρίας ἀθέου καὶ θρασύτητος, ὅταν τὰς συνεζευγμένας τοῖς θεοῖς προσηγορίας ἀποσπῶντες συναναιρῆτε θυσίας μυστήρια πομπὰς ἑορτάς.

> What is grave, Colotes, is not to refuse to call a man good or some horsemen innumerable – it is to refuse to call or believe a god a god. This is what you and your company do, who will not admit that Zeus is "Author of the Race" Demeter "Giver of Laws" or Poseidon "Guardian of Growth." It is this disjoining of one word from another that works harm and fills your lives with godless negligence and recklessness, when you tear away from the gods the appellations attached to them and by that single act annihilate all sacrifices, Mysteries, processions and festivals.

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.32

εὐχάριστοί γ᾽ ἄνθρωποι καὶ αἰδήμονες, (οἱ» εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, καθ' ἡμέραν ἄρτους ἐσθίοντες τολμῶσι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐκ οἴδαμεν εἰ ἔστι τις Δημήτηρ ἢ Κόρη ἢ Πλούτων· ἵνα μὴ λέγω, νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἀπολαύοντες καὶ μεταβολῶν τοῦ ἔτους καὶ ἄστρων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ γῆς καὶ τῆς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων συνεργίας ὑπ' οὐδενὸς τούτων οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξεμέσαι τὸ προβλημάτιον ζητοῦσι καὶ τὸν στόμαχον Ὑγυμνάσαντες ἀπελθεῖν ἐν βαλανείῳ.

> Grateful men indeed and reverential. Why, if nothing else, at least they eat bread every day, and yet have the audacity to say, "We do not know if there is a Demeter, or a Kore, or a Pluto;" not mention that, although they enjoy night and day, the changes of the year and the stars and the sea and the earth and the cooperation of men, they are not moved in the least by any one of these things, but look merely for a chance to belch out their trivial "problem" and after thus exercising their stomach to go off to the bath.

[U393]

Περὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων... ...Ἐπίκουρος δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐγκρίνει.

In regards to demons and to heroes… Epicurus doesn't admit anything about any of this.

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.10

πρόνοιαν γὰρ ζητοῦμεν ἡμῖν διαφέρουσαν, ἧς οὐ μέτεστι τῷ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε ἥρωας μήτε ὅλως ἐπιδιαμένειν δύνασθαι τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεχωρηκότι.

We seek a providence that has an interest for us, and in such that man has no share who has admitted that neither demons, nor heroes, nor any souls at all can live on hereafter.

[U394]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On the Obsolescence of Oracles, 420B

Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ γέλωτας οὔ τι φοβητέον, οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας, μῦθον αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν μῦθον εἶναί φαμεν, ἐν κόσμοις τοσούτοις μηδένα λόγῳ θείῳ κυβερνώμενον ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐκ ταὐτομάτου καὶ γεγονότας καὶ συνισταμένους. εἰ δὲ χρὴ γελᾶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ εἴδωλα γελαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα, [ἃ] ποιμαίνουσιν ἀπλέτους ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐπιφαινόμενα καὶ περινοστοῦντα πάντη τὰ μὲν ἔτι ζώντων, τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων ἢ καὶ κατασαπέντων ἀπορρυέντα, φλεδόνας καὶ σκιὰς ἕλκοντες εἰς φυσιολογίαν, ἂν δὲ φῇ τις εἶναι δαίμονας οὐ φύσει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγοῖς καὶ τὸ σῴζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν πολὺν χρόνον ἔχοντας, δυσκολαίνοντες

As for the scoffing and sneers of the Epicureans which they dare to employ against Providence also, calling it nothing but a myth {cf. U369}, we need have no fear. We, on the other hand, say that their "Infinity" is a myth, which among so many worlds has not one that is directed by divine reason, but will have them all produced by spontaneous generation and concretion. If there is need for laughter in philosophy, we should laugh at those spirits, dumb, blind, and soulless, which they shepherd for boundless cycles of years, and which make their returning appearance everywhere, some floating away from the bodies of persons still living, others from bodies long ago burned or decayed, whereby these philosophers drag witlessness and obscurity into the study of natural phenomena; but if anyone asserts that such demigods exists, not only for physical reasons, but also for logical reasons, and that they have the power of self-preservation and continued life for a long time, then these philosophers feel much aggrieved.

33. Divination

[U395]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.135

μαντικὴν δ᾽ ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀναιρεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ μικρᾷ ἐπιτομῇ [fr. 27]

Elsewhere he rejects divination entirely, such as in the Small Summary.

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 5.1.2

Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀναιροῦσι τὴν μαντικήν.

Xenophanes and Epicurus dismissed the art of divination.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 2.65.162

nihil tam inrīdet Epicūrus quam praedictiōnem rērum futūrārum...

Nothing does Epicurus mock so much as the prediction of future events...

Prediction of future events is a favorite target for the wit of Epicurus.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 1.3.5

reliquī omnēs praeter Epicūrum balbutientem dē nātūrā deōrum dīvīnātiōnem probāvērunt…

All the others, except Epicurus—stammering about the nature of the gods—approved of divination…

All the rest, except for Epicurus, who spoke nonsense about the nature of the gods, endorsed divination.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 2.17.40

(Epicūrus) circumitiōne quadam deōs tollēns rēctē nōn dubitat dīvīnātiōnem tollere... illīus enim deus, nihil habēns nec suī nec aliēnī negōtiī, nōn potest hominibus dīvīnātiōnem imperīre.

Epicurus, by a kind of roundabout way abolishing the gods, rightly does not hesitate to abolish divination... for his god, having no concern either with his own affairs or with those of others, cannot impart divination to men.

Hence, while [Epicurus] takes a roundabout way to destroy the gods, he does not hesitate to take a short road to destroy divination.

[cf. Ibid., I.39.87; 49.109; 2.17.39; 23.51]

Scholion on Aeschylus (fl.c. 485 BCE), Prometheus, 624

Ἐπικούρειόν ἐστι δόγμα ἀναιροῦν τὴν μαντικήν· εἱμαρμένης γάρ, φησί, πάντα κρατούσης πρὸ καιροῦ λελύπηκας [εἰπὼν τὴν συμφοράν], ἢ χρηστόν τι εἰπὼν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐξέλυσας. λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι καὶ "ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γενήσεται."

Epicureanism is the doctrine that abolishes divination; indeed, they say "Given that destiny rules all, you ‹predicting a disgrace› have procured pain ahead of time; predicting instead something positive, you have wiped out the pleasure of its realization. On the other hand, they also say "That which must happen, will still happen."

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 8.3

λέγομεν οὖν περὶ τῶν κατειλεγμένων χρηστηρίων, ὅτι δυνατὸν μὲν ἡμῖν συνάγουσιν ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν τὰ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσοφησάντῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα εἰπεῖν εἰς ἀνατροπὴν τοῦ περὶ τῆς Πυθίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν χρηστηρίων λόγου δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ λελεγμένα τῷ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀσπαζομένοις αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν αὐῦτῶν παραθέμενον δεῖξαι, ὅτι καὶ Ἑλλήνων τινὲς ἀνατρέπουσι τὰς νομιζομένας καὶ τεθαυμασμένας ἐν πάσῃ Ἑλλάδι θεοπροπίας.

In regard to the oracles here enumerated, we reply that it would be possible for us to gather from the writings of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school not a few things to overthrow the authority of the Pythian and the other oracles. From Epicurus also, and his followers, we could quote passages to show that even among the Greeks themselves there were some who utterly discredited the oracles which were recognized and admired throughout the whole of Greece.

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), Alexander the Oracle Monger, 17

ὥστε πάνυ τὸ μηχάνημα ἐδεῖτο Δημοκρίτου τινὸς ἢ καὶ αὐτοῦ Ἐπικούρου ἢ Μητροδώρου ἤ τινος ἄλλου ἀδαμαντίνην πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντος, ὡς ἀπιστῆσαι καὶ ὅ περ ἦν εἰκάσαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ εὑρεῖν τὸν τρόπον ἐδύνατο, ἐκεῖνο γοῦν προπεπεισμένου, ὅτι λέληθε μὲν αὐτὸν ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαγγανείας, τὸ δ᾿ οὖν πᾶν ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον

It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), Alexander the Oracle Monger, 25

ὅλως δὲ ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυκτος αὐτῷ ὁ πόλεμος πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον ἦν. καὶ μάλα εἰκότως· τίνι γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δικαιότερον προσεπολέμει γόης ἄνθρωπος καὶ τερατείᾳ φίλος, ἀληθείᾳ δὲ ἔχθιστος ἢ Ἐπικούρῳ ἀνδρὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθεωρακότι καὶ μόνῳ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν εἰδότι; .... ὁ δὲ ἄτεγκτος Ἐπίκουρος -- οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸν ὠνόμαζεν — ἔχθιστος δικαίως, πάντα ταῦτα ἐν γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ τιθέμενος.

Well, it was war to the knife between [Alexander] and Epicurus, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? ... The unmitigated Epicurus, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile.

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), Alexander the Oracle Monger, 61

ταῦτα, ὦ (Κέλσε)... ...γράψαι ἠξίωσα... ...Ἐπικούρῳ τιμωρῶν ἀνδρὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱερῷ καὶ θεσπεσίῳ τὴν φύσιν καὶ μόνῳ μετ' ἀληθείας τὰ καλὰ ἐγνωκότι καὶ παραδεδωκότι καὶ ἐλευθερωτῇ τῶν ὁμιλησάντων αὐτῷ γενομένῳ.

My object, dear [Celsus], ... has been ... to strike a blow for Epicurus, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him.

ETHICS

[U396]

nam cum uīdit hic (Epicūrus) ad victum quae flagitat ūsus
For when he saw that, for sustenance, all the things that need requires

omnia iam ferme mortālibus esse parāta
were now almost entirely prepared for mortals,

et prō quam posset vītam consistere tūtam,
and that life could, as far as possible, stand secure,

dīvitīs hominēs et honōre et laude potentīs
that men abounded in riches, in honor, and in praise,

affluere atque bonā gnātōrum excellere fāmā,
and were outstanding in the good repute of their children,

nec minus esse domī cuiquam tamen anxia corda
yet that at home no one's heart was any less anxious,

atque animī ingrātīs vītam vexāre timōre
and that their minds tormented life with thankless fear,

passimque infestīs cōgī saevīre querellīs:
and everywhere were driven to rage with hostile complaints,

intellēgit ibi vitiō vās efficere ipsum
he understood then that the fault lay in the vessel itself,

omniaque illīus vitiō corrumpier intus,
and that everything within was spoiled by its own defect,

quae collāta forīs et commoda cumque venīrent,
whatever blessings came from outside and advantages accrued,

partim quod fluxum pertūsumque esse vidēbat,
partly because he saw it was leaky and porous,

ut nullā posset ratiōne explērī umquam,
so that by no means could it ever be filled,

partim quod taetrō quasi conspūrcāre sapōre
partly because, with a foul taste as it were, it defiled

omnia cernēbat quae cumque recēperat intus.
all the things it had taken in within itself.

veridicīs igitur pūrgāvit pectora dictīs
Therefore, with truthful words he cleansed men's hearts,

et fīnem statuit cupīdinis atque timōris
and set a limit to desire and to fear,

exposuitque bonum summum, quō tendimus omnēs,
and he declared the highest good, toward which we all strive,

quid foret, atque viam mōnstrāvit, tramite parvō
what it was, and showed the path, a narrow track,

quā possemus ad id rēctō contendere cursū.
by which we might press straight toward it.

For when he saw that whatever men's needs demanded,
so far as may be, to keep their lives in safety,
was there at hand already for their use,
that men had all they could want in the way of wealth
and honor and praise, and pride in successful children;
Yet, at home each was perpetually disquieted
and the mind was enslaved by all its bitter complaints;
He understood that the trouble was in the container
and because of some flaw in it, everything would go bad
no matter how many excellent things were put into it:
Partly because there were holes and things flowed through them
and there was no possibility of filling it up,
And partly because what did get in was spoiled,
so to speak, by the nauseous taste there was inside.

The truth was what he used to purify hearts with
and he set a limit to fear as to desire;
He explained what it is that all of us really want
and showed us the way along a little path
which makes it possible for us to go straight there.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.2.54

sincērum est nisi vās, quodcumque īnfundis acēscit.
Unless the vessel is clean, whatever you pour in turns sour.

sperne voluptātēs: nocet emptā dolōre voluptās.
Spurn pleasures; pleasure bought with pain harms.

semper avārus eget: certum vōtō pete fīnem.
The greedy man is always in want; seek a sure limit for your desire.

Jars left contaminated will carry their taint to any contents whatsoever.
Spurn all delights; any joy that is purchased with pain will be harmful.
Greed is forever unsatisfied – vow to keep definite limits.

[U397]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.9.29 - 19.62, (Torquatus to Cicero)

Prīmum sīc agam, ut ipsī auctōrī huius disciplīnae placet: cōnstituam, quid et quale sit id dē quō quaerimus..., ut ratiōne et viā prōcedat ōrātiō. quaerimus igitur quid sit extrēmum et ultimum bonōrum. quod omnium philosophōrum sententiā tāle dēbet esse, ut ad id omnia referrī opporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. hoc Epicūrus in voluptāte pōnit, quod summum bonum esse vult, summumque malum dolōrem. idque instituit docēre sīc.

First I shall proceed as it pleases the author himself of this doctrine: I shall establish what and of what sort is that which we inquire about..., so that the discussion may advance by reason and method. We are inquiring, then, what is the extreme and ultimate of goods. Which, in the judgment of all philosophers, ought to be such that everything is referred to it, but it itself to nothing. This Epicurus places in pleasure, which he wishes to be the highest good, and in pain the highest evil. And he sets out to teach this thus.

Omne animal simul atque nātum sit, voluptātem appetere eāque gaudēre ut summō bonō, dolōrem aspernārī ut summum malum et quantum possit ā sē repellere: idque facere nondum dēprāvātum, ipsā nātūrā incorrupte atque integrē iūdicante. itaque negat opus esse ratiōne neque disputātiōne, quam ob rem voluptās expetenda, fugiendus dolōr sit: sentīrī haec putat, ut calēre ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce: quōrum nihil oportere exquisītīs ratiōnibus cōnfirmāre, tantum esse satis admonēre... etenim quoniam dētractīs dē homine sensibus reliquī nihil est, necesse est, quid aut ad nātūram aut contrā sit, ā nātūrā ipsā iūdicārī. ea quid percipit aut quid iūdicat quō aut petat aut fugiāt aliquid, praeter voluptātem et dolōrem?

Every living creature, as soon as it is born, seeks pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good, shuns pain as the greatest evil, and repels it from itself as far as it can; and it does this while not yet corrupted, with nature herself judging incorruptly and purely. Therefore he says there is no need of reasoning or argument to explain why pleasure is to be sought and pain to be avoided; he thinks these are felt, as that fire is hot, snow is white, honey is sweet—none of which ought to be proved by elaborate reasoning, it is enough only to remind. For since, when sensation is taken away from man, nothing remains, it must be that what is according to or contrary to nature is judged by nature herself. What does she perceive, or by what does she judge what she is to pursue or avoid, except by pleasure and pain?

Sed ut perspiciātis unde omnis iste nātus error sit voluptātem accūsantium dolōremque laudantium, tōtam rem aperiam eāque ipsa quae ab illō inventōre vēritātis et quasi architectō beātae vītae dicta sunt explicābō. nēmō enim ipsam voluptātem, quia voluptās sit, aspernātur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magnī dolōrēs eōs quī ratiōne voluptātem sequī nesciunt. neque porrō quisquam est quī dolōrem ipsum, quia dolōr sit, amet, cōnsectētur, adipīscī velit, sed quia nōn numquam eius modī tempora incidunt, ut labōre et dolōre magnam aliquam quaerat voluptātem. ut enim ad minima veniām, quis nostrum exercitātiōnem ullam corporīs suscipit labōriōsam nisi ut aliquid ex eā commodi consequatur?

But that you may perceive whence all this mistaken idea of blaming pleasure and praising pain has arisen, I will open up the whole matter and explain the very things said by that discoverer of truth and, as it were, architect of the happy life. For no one rejects, dislikes, or avoids pleasure itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains result to those who do not know how to pursue pleasure with reason. Nor again is there anyone who loves or seeks or desires pain itself because it is pain, but because at times such circumstances occur that toil and pain procure some great pleasure. For, to come to the smallest detail, who of us undertakes any laborious bodily exercise except that he may gain some advantage from it?

quis autem vel eum iūre reprehendit, quī in eā voluptāte velit esse quam nihil molestiae consequitur, vel illum, quī dolōrem eum fugiat quō voluptās nulla pariātur? at vērō eōs et accūsāmus et iustō odiō dignissimōs dūcimus, quī blandītiīs praesentium voluptātum dēlenītī atque corruptī, quōs dolōrēs et quās molestiās exceptūrī sint, obcaecātī cupiditāte nōn prōvident; similēs sunt in culpā quī officia dēserunt mollitiā animī, id est labōrum et dolōrum fugā. et hārum quidem rērum facilis est et expedīta dīstiṇctiō. nam līberō tempore, cum solūta nōbīs est eligendī optiō cumque nihil impedit quō minus id quod maximē placet facere possimus, omnis voluptās assumenda est, omnis dolōr repellendus. temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiīs dēbitīs aut rērum necessitātibus saepe ēvenit, ut et voluptātēs repudiandae sint et molestīae nōn recūsandae. itaque eārum rērum hic tenētur ā sapiente dīlēctus, ut aut reiciendīs voluptātibus maiōrēs aliās consequatur aut perferendīs dolōribus asperiōrēs repellat.

Who, however, has any right to blame a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that brings no discomfort, or one who avoids a pain that produces no pleasure? On the contrary, we both accuse and with just hatred deem worthy of condemnation those who, softened and corrupted by the charms of present pleasures, do not foresee the pains and troubles that are bound to follow, blinded by desire. They are equally at fault who, through weakness of will—that is, through shirking toil and pain—fail in their duties. And of these matters there is indeed an easy and clear distinction. For in our free time, when the choice is open to us and nothing hinders us from doing what most pleases us, every pleasure should be embraced and every pain repelled. But at certain times, owing either to obligations or to the necessities of things, it often happens that pleasures are to be rejected and pains not to be avoided. Thus, in these matters, the wise man steadfastly makes his choice—so that by rejecting certain pleasures he gains others greater, or by enduring certain pains he avoids worse.

Nunc autem explicābō, voluptās ipsa quae qualisque sit... nōn enim hanc sōlam sequimur, quae suāvitate aliquā nātūram ipsam movet et cum iucunditāte quādam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptātem illam habēmus, quae percipitur omnī dolōre dētractō. nam quoniam, cum prīvāmur dolōre, ipsā līberātiōne et vacuitāte omnis molestiae gaudēmus, omne autem id quō gaudēmus voluptās est, ut omne quō offendimur dolōr, dolōris omnis prīvātiō rēctē nōmināta est voluptās. ut enim, cum cibō et potiōne famēs sitisque dēpulsa est, ipsa dētractiō molestiae cōnsequītiōnem affert voluptātis, sīc in omnī rē

dolōris amōtiō successiōnem efficit voluptātis. itaque nōn placuit Epicūrō medium esse quiddam inter dolōrem et voluptātem. illud enim ipsum quod quibusdam medium vidērētur, cum omnī dolōre carēret, nōn modo voluptātem esse, vērum etiam summam voluptātem. quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptāte esse aut in dolōre. omnis autem prīvātiōne dolōris putat Epicūrus terminārī summam voluptātem, ut posteā variārī voluptās distinguique possit, augērī amplificārīque nōn possit.

> Now I shall explain what pleasure itself is, and of what kind... For we do not pursue only that pleasure which by some sweetness moves nature itself and is perceived with a certain delight by the senses, but we regard as the greatest pleasure that which is felt when all pain has been removed. For since, when we are freed from pain, we rejoice in that very freedom and absence of all distress, and everything in which we rejoice is pleasure, just as everything by which we are pained is pain, therefore the complete absence of pain is rightly called pleasure. For just as when hunger and thirst are driven away by food and drink, that very removal of distress brings with it the enjoyment of pleasure, so in every case the removal of pain produces the succession of pleasure. And so Epicurus did not approve that there is any middle state between pain and pleasure. For that very state which seemed to some a mean—since it is free from all pain—not only is pleasure, but even the highest pleasure. For whoever feels how he is affected must necessarily be either in pleasure or in pain. And Epicurus thinks that the highest pleasure is completed by the total removal of pain, so that afterward pleasure may be varied and distinguished, but cannot be increased or made greater.

Extrēmum autem esse bonōrum voluptātem ex hōc facillimē perspicī potest. cōnstituāmus aliquem magnīs multīs perpetuīs fruentem et animō et corpore voluptātibus, nullō dolōre nec impediēnte nec impendēnte, quem tandem hōc statu praestabiliōrem aut magis expetendum possimus dīcere? inesse enim necesse est in eō quī ita sit affectus et firmitātem animī nec mortem nec dolōrem timentis, quod mors sensū careat, dolōr in longinquitate levis, in gravitāte brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitūdinem celeritās, diuturnitātem alleviātiō cōnsoletur. ad ea cum accēdit ut neque dīvīnum numen horreat nec praeteritās voluptātēs effluere patiātur earumque assiduā recordātiōne laetētur, quid est quod hūc possit, quō melius sit, accedere?

> That pleasure is the ultimate of goods can be most easily understood from this. Let us imagine a man enjoying great, many, and continuous pleasures of both mind and body, with no pain either hindering him or threatening him—whom, in this condition, could we say to be in a better or more desirable state? For it must be that such a one has firmness of mind, fearing neither death nor pain, since death is without sensation, and pain, if long, is slight, if severe, is short—so that its greatness is comforted by its brevity, and its length by its lightness. And when to these things it is added that he neither dreads divine power nor allows past pleasures to slip away but rejoices in their continual remembrance—what could be added to this state to make it better?

Statue contrā aliquem cōnfectum tantīs animī corporisque dolōribus, quantī in hominem maximī cadere possunt, nullā spē prōpositā fore levius aliquandō, nullā praetereā neque praesenti nec exspectātā voluptāte, quid eō miserius dīcī aut fingī potest? quod sī vīta dolōribus referta maximē fugienda est, summum profectō malum est vīvere cum dolōre: cui sententiae consentāneum est ultimum esse bonōrum cum voluptāte vīvere. nec enim habet nostra mēns quicquam ubi cōnsistat tamquam in extrēmō. omnēsque et metūs et aegritūdinēs ad dolōrem referuntur, nec praetereā est rēs ulla quae suā nātūrā aut sollicitāre possit aut angere. praetereā et appetendī et refugiendī et omnīnō rērum gerendārum initia prōficīscuntur aut ā voluptāte aut ā dolōre. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnīs rectās rēs atque laudābilēs eō referrī, ut cum voluptāte vīvetur. quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extrēmum bonōrum (quod Graecī τέλος nōminant), quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem rēs referuntur omnēs, fatendum est summum esse bonum iūcundē vīvere.

> Now set against this someone overwhelmed by such pains of mind and body as the greatest that can fall upon a man, with no hope offered that they will ever grow lighter, and with no present or expected pleasure besides—what can be said or imagined more wretched than that? And if life filled with pains is the most to be avoided, then surely the greatest evil is to live in pain. Therefore it follows that the highest good is to live with pleasure. For our mind has nothing on which it can rest as upon a final point. All fears and sorrows are referred to pain, nor is there any other thing by nature that can trouble or distress us. Moreover, the beginnings of desire and avoidance and indeed of all actions arise either from pleasure or from pain. Since this is so, it is clear that all right and praiseworthy actions are referred to this end—that life may be lived with pleasure. And since that is the highest, final, or ultimate good (which the Greeks call telos), which itself refers to no further thing, but to which all things are referred, it must be admitted that the highest good is to live pleasantly.

Id quī in ūnā virtūte pōnunt et splendōre nōminis captī, quid nātūra postulēt, nōn intellegunt, errōre maximō, sī Epicūrum audīre voluerint, līberābuntur. istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtūtēs nisi voluptātem efficerent, quis eas aut laudābilēs aut expetendās arbitrārētur? ut enim medicōrum scientiam nōn ipsīus artis sed bonae valētūdinis causā probāmus, et gubernātōris ars quia bene nāvigandī ratiōnem habet, ūtilitāte, nōn arte laudātur, sīc sapientia, quae ars vīvendī putanda est, nōn expeterētur, sī nihil efficeret. nunc expetitur, quod est tamquam artifex conquīrendāe et comparandae voluptātis...

> Those who place the highest good in virtue alone, captivated by the splendor of its name, do not understand what nature demands; but if they are willing to listen to Epicurus, they will be freed from their greatest error. For these your excellent and noble virtues—unless they produced pleasure—who would think them either praiseworthy or desirable? For just as we approve the science of physicians not for the art itself but for the sake of good health, and the art of the pilot because it provides the method of good navigation, and it is praised for its usefulness, not for its art, so wisdom, which must be considered the art of living, would not be sought if it accomplished nothing. Now it is sought because it is, as it were, the craftsman for discovering and acquiring pleasure.

Nam cum ignōrātiōne rērum bonārum et malārum maximē hominum vīta vexētur ob eumque errōrem et voluptātibus maximīs saepe prīvantur et dūrissimīs animī dolōribus torqueantur, sapientia est adhibenda, quae et terroribus cupiditātibusque dētractīs et omnium falsārum opiniōnum temeritāte dēreptā certissimam sē nōbīs ducem praebeat ad voluptātem. sapientia enim est ūna quae maestitiam pellat ex animīs, quae nōs exhorrescere metū nōn sinat, quā praeceptrice in tranquillitāte vīvī potest omnium cupiditātum ardōre restīnctō. cupiditātēs enim sunt īnsātiābilēs, quae nōn modo singulōs hominēs sed ūniversās familiās ēvertunt, tōtam etiam labefactant saepe rem pūblicam. ex cupiditātibus odia dissidia discordiae servitiōnēs bella nascuntur, nec eae sē foris sōlum iactant nec tantum in aliōs caecō impetū incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animīs inclūsae inter sē dissident atque discordant, ex quō vītam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiēns sōlum amputātā circumcīsāque inānitāte omnī et errōre, nātūrae fīnibus contentus, sine aegritūdine possit et sine metū vīvere.

> For since human life is greatly troubled by ignorance of good and evil things, and through this error people are often deprived of the greatest pleasures and tormented by the most bitter pains of mind, wisdom must be applied—which, once terrors and desires are removed and the rashness of all false opinions stripped away, offers itself to us as the most certain guide to pleasure. For wisdom alone drives sadness from our souls, prevents us from shuddering with fear, and under her guidance we can live in tranquility, once the fire of all desires is extinguished. Desires, indeed, are insatiable; they overthrow not only individual men but entire families, and often shake even the whole state. From desires arise hatreds, quarrels, discords, seditions, wars; nor do they only rage outwardly and attack others with blind impulse, but even within, confined in the soul, they clash and conflict with one another, from which it necessarily follows that life becomes most bitter—so that the wise man alone, having cut away and pruned all vanity and error, content with the limits of nature, can live without distress and without fear.

Quae est enim aut ūtilior aut ad bene vīvendum aptior partitio quam illa quā est ūsus Epicūrus? quī ūnum genus posuit eārum cupiditātum, quae essent et nātūrālēs et necessāriae; alterum, quae nātūrālēs essent nec tamen necessāriae;

tertium, quae nec nātūrālēs nec necessāriae. quārum ea ratiō est, ut necessāriae nec operā multa nec impēnsā explēantur.

> For what division is either more useful or better suited to living well than that which Epicurus employed? He set one kind of desires as both natural and necessary; a second as natural but not necessary; and a third as neither natural nor necessary. The rule of these is this—that the necessary ones are satisfied without much labor or expense.

Ne nātūrālēs quidem multa dēsīderant, propathereā quod ipsa nātūra dīvitias quibus contenta sit et parābilēs et terminātās habet, inānium autem cupiditātum nec modus ullus nec fīnis inuenīrī potest. quod sī vītam omnem perturbārī uidēmus errōre et īnsciēntiā, sapientiamque esse sōlam quae nōs ā libidinum impetū et ā formidinum terrōre uindicet et ipsīus fortūnae modicē ferre doceat iniūriās et omnīs mōnstret uiās quae ad quiētem et tranquillitātem ferant, quid est cūr dubitēmus dīcere et sapientiam propter voluptātēs expetendam et īnscientiam propter molestiās esse fugiendam?

> Not even the natural desires seek many things, because nature herself has wealth that is both easy to obtain and bounded, with which she is content; but for empty desires no limit or end can be found. And if we see that all life is disturbed by error and ignorance, and that wisdom alone frees us from the onrush of passions and the terror of fears, teaches us to bear even Fortune’s injuries with moderation, and shows every path that leads to rest and tranquility, what reason is there to doubt that wisdom must be sought for the sake of pleasures, and folly shunned because of its troubles?

Eādemque ratiōne nē temperantiam quidem propter sē expetendam esse dīcēmus, sed quia pācem animīs afferat et eōs quasi concordiā quādam plācet ac lēniat. temperantia est enim quae in rēbus aut expetendīs aut fugiendīs ut ratiōnem sequāmur monet. nec enim satis est iūdicāre quid faciendum nōn faciendumue sit, sed stāre etiam oportet in eō quod sit iūdicātum. plērīque autem quod tenēre atque servāre id quod ipsī statuērunt nōn possunt, victī et dēbilitātī obiectā speciē voluptātis trādunt sē libīdinibus constringendōs nec quid eventūrum sit prōvident, ob eamque causam propter voluptātem et parvam et nōn necessāriam et quae vel aliter parārētur et quā etiam carēre possent sine dolōre, tum in morbōs gravīs, tum in damna, tum in dēdecora incurrunt, saepe etiam lēgum iūdiciōrumque poenīs obligantur.

> And by the same reasoning, we shall not say that temperance is to be sought for its own sake, but because it brings peace to the mind and soothes it, as it were, with a kind of harmony. For temperance is that which advises us, in things to be pursued or avoided, to follow reason. For it is not enough to judge what ought or ought not to be done, but one must also stand firm in that which has been judged. Yet most people, because they cannot hold and keep to what they themselves have decided, overcome and weakened by the appearance of pleasure, surrender themselves to be bound by passions; nor do they foresee what will result. And for that reason, for the sake of a pleasure both small and unnecessary, and one which could either be gained otherwise or even done without without pain, they fall into serious diseases, losses, and disgrace, and are often bound by the penalties of laws and judgments.

Quī autem ita fruī volunt voluptātibus, ut nullī propter eās consequantur dolōrēs, et quī suum iūdicium retinent, nē voluptāte victī faciant id quod sentiānt nōn esse faciendum, iī voluptātem maximam adipīscuntur praetermittendā voluptāte; idem etiam dolōrem saepe perpetiuntur, nē sī id nōn faciānt, incidant in maiōrem. ex quō intellegitur nec intemperantiam propter sē esse fugiendam temperantiamque expetendam, nōn quia voluptātēs fugiāt, sed quia maiōrēs consequatur.

But those who wish to enjoy pleasures in such a way that they suffer no pains because of them, and who keep their judgment so that, overcome by pleasure, they do not do what they know ought not to be done—these attain the greatest pleasure by foregoing a pleasure; and likewise, they often endure pain, lest by not doing so they fall into a greater one. From this it is understood that lack of self-control is not to be avoided for its own sake, nor temperance sought for its own sake, but not because it avoids pleasures—rather because it gains greater ones.

Eādem fortitūdinis ratiō reperiētur. nam neque labōrum perfunctiō neque perpessiō dolōrum per sē ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitās nec vigiliae nec ipsa quae laudātur industriā, nē fortitūdō quidem: sed ista sequimur, ut sine cūrā metūque vīvāmus animūmque et corpus, quantum efficere possumus, molestia liberēmus. ut enim mortis metū omnis quiētae vītae status perturbātur, et ut succumbere dolōribus eōsque humilī animō imbecillōque ferre miserum est, ob eamque dēbilitātem animī multī parentēs, multī amīcōs, nōn nullī patriam, plērique autem sē ipsōs penitus perdidērunt, sīc robustus animus et excelsus omnī est liber cūrā et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, quā quī adfectī sunt in eādem causā sunt quā ante quam nātī, et ad dolōrēs ita parātus est, ut meminerit maximōs morte fīnīrī, parvōs multa habēre intervalla requiētis, mediocrium nōs esse dominōs, ut sī tolerābilēs sint, ferāmus, sī minus, animō aequō ē vītā, cum ea nōn placeat, tamquam ē theātrō exeāmus. quibus rēbus intellegitur nec timiditātem ignāviamque vituperārī nec fortitūdinem patientiamque laudārī suō nōmine, sed illās reicī quia dolōrem pariant, hās optārī quia voluptātem.

The same reasoning is found in regard to courage. For neither the endurance of labors nor the suffering of pains is attractive in itself—nor patience, nor persistence, nor wakefulness, nor even that industry which is praised, nor courage itself—but we pursue these so that we may live without care and fear, and free our mind and body, as far as we can, from distress. For just as the fear of death disturbs every condition of peaceful life, and as it is wretched to yield to pains and bear them with a low and feeble spirit—and through this weakness of mind many have destroyed parents, many friends, some their country, but most have utterly destroyed themselves—so a strong and lofty spirit is free from all care and anxiety: since it both despises death (those who have died being in the same condition as before they were born), and is so prepared for pains that it remembers the greatest are ended by death, the small have many intervals of rest, and of the moderate ones we are masters—so that, if they are bearable, we endure them; if not, we depart from life with calm mind, as from a theater, when it no longer pleases us. From these things it is understood that neither cowardice and weakness are blamed, nor courage and endurance praised for their own sake, but the former are rejected because they bring pain, the latter are desired because they bring pleasure.

Iūstitia restat, ut dē omne virtūte sit dictum, sed similia ferē dīcī possunt. ut enim sapientiam temperantiam fortitūdinem cōpulātās esse docuī cum voluptāte, ut ab eā nullō modō nec dīuellī nec distrahī possint, sīc dē iūstitiā iūdicandum est, quae nōn modō numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contrā semper imperit aliquid cum suā vī atque nātūrā, quod tranquillet animōs, tum spē nihil eārum rērum dēfutūrum, quās nātūra nōn dēprāvāta dēsīderet. et quem ad modum temeritās et libīdō et ignāvia semper animūm excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sīc improbitās sī cuius in mente cōnsēdit, hōc ipsō quod adest turbulenta est. sī vērō molīta quippiam est, quamuis occulte fēcerit, numquam tamen id cōnfidet fore semper occultum. plērumque improbōrum facta prīmō suspiciō insequitur, dein sermō atque fāma, tum accūsātor, tum iūdex.

Justice remains to be discussed, so that something may be said of every virtue—but nearly the same things can be said. For as I have shown that wisdom, temperance, and courage are joined with pleasure, so that they can in no way be separated or torn from it, so also must we judge concerning justice. Justice not only never harms anyone, but on the contrary always imparts something—by its own power and nature—that calms the soul, and with the hope that none of the things which uncorrupted nature desires will be lacking. And just as rashness, lust, and cowardice always torment and agitate the mind and are full of turmoil, so wickedness, if it has settled in anyone's mind, is by its very presence turbulent. But if it has done anything, however secretly, it will never trust that it will remain hidden forever. Most often the deeds of the wicked are first followed by suspicion, then by talk and rumor, then by an accuser, and finally by a judge.

Quod sī quī satis sibi contrā hominum cōnscientiam saeptī esse et mūnītī videntur, deōrum tamen horrent, eāsque ipsās sollicitūdinēs, quibus eōrum animī "noctisque diēsque" exeduntur, ā dis immortālibus supplicī causā importārī putant. quae autem tanta ex improbīs factīs ad minuendās vītae molestās accessiō potest fierī, quanta ad augendās cum cōnscientia factōrum tum poenā legum odiōque cīvium? … invītat igitur vēra ratiō bene sānōs ad iūstitiam aequitātem fidem. [neque hominī infantī aut impotentī iniūstē facta conducunt, quī nec facile efficere possit quod conētur nec obtinēre, sī effēcerit, et opēs vel fortūnae vel ingeniī līberālitātī magis conveniunt] quā quī utuntur, benevolentiam sibi conciliant et, quod aptissimum est ad quietē vīvendum, caritātem, praesertim cum omnīnō nulla sit causa peccandī. quae enim cupiditātēs ā nātūrā proficīscuntur, facile explentur sine ullā iniūriā.

But if some think themselves well fenced and fortified against the awareness of men, yet they still dread the gods, and those very anxieties by which their minds are consumed "night and day" they believe are sent upon them by the immortal gods as punishment. And what gain from wicked deeds could ever arise to lessen life's troubles as great as that which increases them—by the pangs of conscience, the penalties of the laws, and the hatred of citizens? … Therefore true reason invites all who are sane to justice, fairness, and faith. [Nor do unjust deeds benefit a man who is weak or powerless, since he can neither easily accomplish what he attempts nor keep what he has accomplished; and the resources of fortune or talent are better suited to generosity.] Those who make use of these win goodwill for themselves and, which is most conducive to peaceful living, affection—especially since there is in truth no cause at all for wrongdoing. For the desires that arise from nature are easily satisfied without any injustice.

Quae autem inānēs sunt, iīs parendum nōn est. nihil enim dēsīderābile concupīscunt, plusque in ipsā iniūriā dētrīmentī est quam in iīs rēbus emolumentī, quae pariuntur iniūriā. itaque nē iūstitiam quidem rēctē quis dīxerit per sē ipsam optābilem, sed quia iūcunditātis vel plūrimum adferat. nam dīligī et cārum esse iūcundum est, proptereā quia tūtiōrem vītam et voluptātum pleniōrem efficit. itaque nōn ob ea sōlum incommoda, quae ēveniunt improbīs, fugiendam improbitem putāmus, sed multō etiam magis quod cuius in animō versātur, numquam sinit eum respīrāre, numquam acquiēscere.

But as for the empty desires, they are not to be obeyed. For they crave nothing truly desirable, and there is more loss in the wrongdoing itself than gain in the things that are obtained by wrongdoing. Therefore, justice too should not rightly be called desirable for its own sake, but because it brings the greatest pleasure. For to be loved and held dear is pleasant, because it makes life safer and fuller of pleasures. Therefore we think wickedness must be shunned not only because of the misfortunes that befall the wicked, but even more because, when it dwells in a man's mind, it never allows him to breathe freely or find rest.

Quod sī nē ipsārum quidem virtūtum laus, in quā maximē ceterōrum philosophōrum exsultat ōrātiō, reperīre exitum potest, nisi dērīgātur ad voluptātem, voluptās autem est sōla quae nōs vocet ad sē et alliciat suāpte nātūrā, nōn potest esse dubium quin id sit summum atque extrēmum bonōrum omnium beātēque vīvere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptāte vīvere.

But if even the praise of the virtues themselves—on which the speech of the other philosophers most prides itself—cannot find its proper end unless it is directed toward pleasure, and since pleasure alone calls and draws us to itself by its own nature, there can be no doubt that this is the highest and ultimate of all goods, and that to live happily is nothing else than to live with pleasure.

Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta, explicābō brevi. nullus in ipsīs error est fīnibus bonōrum et malōrum, id est in voluptāte aut in dolōre, sed in iīs rēbus peccant, cum ex quibus haec efficiantur ignorant. animī autem voluptātēs et dolōrēs nāscī fatēmur ē corporīs voluptātibus et dolōribus.

I will briefly explain what things are connected with this sure and settled doctrine. There is no error in the very limits of good and evil—that is, in pleasure or in pain—but men err in the things by which these are produced, being ignorant of their causes. Moreover, we admit that the pleasures and pains of the mind arise from the pleasures and pains of the body.

…quamquam autem et laetitiam nōbīs voluptās animī et molestiam dolor adferat, eōrum tamen utrumque et ortum esse ē corpore et ad corpus referrī, nec ob eam causam nōn multō maiōrēs esse et voluptātēs et dolōrēs animī quam corporīs. nam corpore nihil nisi praesēns et quod adest sentīre possumus, animō autem et praeterita et futūra. ut enim aequē doleāmus, cum corpore dolemus, fierī tamen permagna accessiō potest, sī aliquod aeternum et īnfīnītum impendēre malum nōbīs opīnēmur. quod idem licet transferre in voluptātem, ut ea maior sit, sī nihil tale metuāmus. iam illud quidem perspicuum est, animī maximam aut voluptātem aut molestiam plus aut ad beātam aut ad miseram vītam adferre momentī quam eōrum utrumuis, sī aequē diū sit in corpore.

…And although pleasure brings us joy of mind and pain brings us distress, yet both have their origin in the body and are referred back to it—though for that reason the pleasures and pains of the mind are by far greater than those of the body. For in the body we can feel nothing except what is present and immediate, whereas the mind can grasp both past and future. Thus, although we suffer equally when we feel pain in the body, yet a great addition may occur if we imagine some eternal and infinite evil hanging over us. The same reasoning may be applied to pleasure—that it becomes greater if we fear nothing of the sort. And it is indeed clear that the mind's greatest pleasure or distress contributes more to making life either happy or miserable than either of those felt in the body, even if they should last equally long.

Nōn placet autem dētractā voluptāte aegritūdinem statim consequī, nisi in voluptātis locum dolor forte successerit: at contrā gaudēre nōsmet omittendīs dolōribus etiam sī voluptās ea, quae sēnsum moveat, nulla successerit. eōque intellegī potest, quanta voluptās sit nōn dolēre.

It does not seem true that sorrow must immediately follow the removal of pleasure, unless by chance pain has taken its place; but, on the contrary, we ourselves rejoice in the ending of pains, even if no new pleasure that stirs the senses follows in their place. From this it can be understood how great a pleasure it is simply not to suffer pain.

Sed ut iīs bonīs erigimur quae exspectāmus, sīc laetāmur iīs quae recordāmur. stultī autem malōrum memoriā torquentur, sapientēs bona praeterita grātā recordātiōne renovāta dēlectant. est autem situm in nōbīs, ut et adversa quasi perpetuā oblīvione obruāmus et secunda iūcunde ac suāviter meminerimus. sed cum ea quae praeterierunt acrī animō et attentō intuemur, tum fit ut aegritūdō sequātur, sī illa mala sint, laetitia sī bona…

Just as we are uplifted by the good things we expect, so we rejoice in those we remember. Fools, however, are tormented by the memory of their misfortunes, while the wise are delighted by the pleasant renewal of recalling their past blessings. Moreover, it lies within our power both to bury adversities in lasting forgetfulness and to remember prosperous things pleasantly and sweetly. But when we gaze sharply and attentively upon the things that have passed, then sorrow follows if they were bad, and joy if they were good…

Clāmat Epicūrus… …nōn posse iūcunde vīvī, nisi sapienter honeste iūstēque vīvuātur, nec sapienter honeste iūstē, nisi iūcunde. neque enim cīvitās in seditiōne beāta esse potest nec in discordiā dominōrum domus: quō minus animus ā sē ipse dissidēns secumque discordāns gustāre partem ullam liquidae voluptātis et līberae potest. atquī pugnantibus et contrariīs studiīs cōnsiliīsque semper ūtēns nihil quiētī vidēre, nihil tranquilli potest. quod sī corporīs graviōribus morbīs vītae iūcunditās impedītur, quantō magis animī morbīs impedīrī necesse est. animī autem morbī sunt cupiditātēs immēnsae et inānes dīvitārum glōriae dominātiōnis, libīdīnōsārum etiam voluptātum; accedunt aegritūdinēs molestiārum maerōrēs, quī exedunt animōs cōnficiuntque cūrīs hominum nōn intellegentium nihil dolendum esse animō, quod sit ā dolōre corporīs praesentī futūrōve seiūnctum. nec vērō quisquam stultus nōn hōrum morbōrum aliquō labōrat, nēmō igitur stultus nōn miser.

Epicurus proclaims… that it is impossible to live pleasantly unless one lives wisely, honorably, and justly—and impossible to live wisely, honorably, and justly unless one lives pleasantly. For a state cannot be happy in civil strife, nor a household in discord among its masters; much less can a soul at odds with itself and in conflict taste any share of pure and free pleasure. Indeed, a mind that always uses opposing and contradictory desires and counsels can see nothing calm, nothing peaceful. And if the greater diseases of the body hinder life's pleasantness, how much more must those of the mind hinder it! The diseases of the mind are unbounded and empty desires for wealth, glory, power, and even lustful pleasures; added to these are the griefs, troubles, and sorrows that eat away at men's souls and wear them down with cares—men who do not understand that the mind should feel no pain that is separated from the pain of the body, whether present or future. And indeed, no fool is free from some one of these diseases; therefore, no fool is not miserable.

Accēdit etiam mors, quae quasi saxum Tantālō semper impendet, tum superstitio, quā quī est imbutus, quiētus esse numquam potest. praetereā bona praeterita nōn meminerunt, praesentibus nōn fruuntur: futūra modō exspectant: quae quia certa esse nōn possunt, cōnficientur et angore et metū maximēque cruciantur, cum sērō sentiunt frūstrā sē aut pecūniae studuisse aut imperiīs aut opibus aut glōriae. nullās enim cōnsequuntur voluptātēs, quārum potiendī spē inflammātī multōs labōrēs magnōsque susceperant. ecce autem aliī minūtī et angusti et omnia semper dēspērantēs aut malevolī invidī, difficilēs lucifugī, maledīcī mōnstruōsī, aliī autem etiam amātōriīs levitātibus dēditī, aliī petulantēs, aliī audācēs protervī, idem intemperantēs et ignāvī, numquam in sententiā permanēntēs: quās ob causās in eōrum vītā nulla est intercāpedō molestiæ. igitur neque stultōrum quisquam beātus neque sapientum nōn beātus...

Death too comes in addition, ever hanging over them like the stone above Tantalus, and superstition—by which whoever is infected can never be at rest. Moreover, they do not remember past blessings, they do not enjoy the present ones; they look only to the future, and since these cannot be certain, they are consumed with anguish and fear, and are tormented most of all when too late they perceive that they have pursued in vain wealth, power, resources, or fame. For they gain none of the pleasures for whose attainment, inflamed by hope, they had undertaken many great labors. Behold, again, others are small-minded and narrow, always despairing of everything, or spiteful, envious, difficult, hating the light, slanderous, monstrous; others are given over to amorous frivolities, others are wanton, others rash and insolent, the same men intemperate and cowardly, never remaining in one purpose. For these reasons, in their life there is no pause in their troubles. Therefore, none of the foolish is happy, and none of the wise is not happy...

Sic enim ab Epicūrō sapiēns semper beātus indūcitur: fīnītās habet cupiditātēs, neglegit mortem, dē dīs immortālibus sine ullō metū vēra sentit, nōn dubitat, sī ita melius sit, migrāre dē vītā. hīs rēbus instructus semper est in voluptāte. neque enim tempus est ullum, quō nōn plūs voluptātum habeat quam dolōrum. nam et

praeterita grātē meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat quanta sint ea quamque iūcunda, neque pendet ex futūrīs sed exspectat illa, fruitur praesentibus, ab īsque vitiīs, quae paulō ante conlēgī, abest plūrimum, et cum stultōrum vītam cum suā comparat, magnā adficitur voluptāte. dolōrēs autem sī quī incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent, ut nōn plūs habeat sapiēns quod gaudeat quam quod angātur.

For in Epicurus' view, the wise man is always happy: his desires are limited, he disregards death, he holds true opinions about the immortal gods without any fear, and he does not hesitate, if it be better so, to depart from life. Equipped with these things, he is always in pleasure. For there is no moment when he does not have more pleasures than pains. He gratefully remembers past joys, and so enjoys the present ones that he perceives how great and how delightful they are. He does not depend upon the future but awaits it calmly, enjoys the present, and is most free from those vices I mentioned just before; and when he compares the life of the foolish with his own, he is filled with great pleasure. And if any pains do arise, they never have such power that the wise man does not have more reason to rejoice than to be troubled.

1. Chief Good & Evil

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Against the Academicians, 3.16

Ergō Zēnō vel Chrysippus sī interrogētur quis sit sapiēns, respondebit eum esse quem ipse dēscripserit. contrā Epicūrus vel quis alius adversāriōrum negābit suumque potiūs peritissimum voluptātis aucupem sapientem esse contendēt. inde ad iurgium. clāmat Zēnō et tōta illa porticus tumultuātur, hominem nātum ad nihil esse aliud quam honestātem, ipsam suō splendōre in sē animōs dūcere, nullō prōrsus commodō extrinsecus positō et quasi lenocinante mercēde, voluptātemque illam Epicūrī sōlis inter sē pecoribus esse commūnem: in quōrum societātem et hominem et sapientem trudere nefās esse. contrā ille convocātā dē hortulīs in auxilium quasi līberā turbā temulentōrum, quaerentium tamen quem incomptīs unguibus bacchantēs asperōque ōre discerpant, voluptātis nōmen, suāvitatem, quiētem testē populō exaggerāns īnstat ācriter, ut nisi eā beātus nēmō esse posse videātur.

Therefore, if Zeno or Chrysippus were asked who the wise man is, he would reply that it is the one he himself has described. In contrast, Epicurus—or any of his followers—would deny this and maintain instead that his own expert hunter of pleasure is the truly wise man. Then comes the quarrel. Zeno shouts, and the whole Stoic portico erupts in commotion, declaring that man was born for nothing else but virtue, that virtue by its own splendor draws souls to itself without any external advantage or enticing reward, and that Epicurus' pleasure is shared only with cattle—it being impious to thrust both man and the wise into their company. But Epicurus, summoning from his little gardens to his aid a seemingly free mob of revelers—drunken yet eager to know whom, with unkempt nails and savage mouths, they might tear apart—presses on with vehemence, exalting the name of pleasure, its sweetness, its tranquility, before the witness of the crowd, insisting that without it no one can seem to be happy.

{Attributed to Cicero} "If Zeno or Chrysippus were asked who the wise man is, he'll reply that the wise man is the one whom he himself has described. In return, Epicurus or another adversary will deny this and maintain instead that the wise man is the one most skilled at catching pleasures. And so the fight is on! The whole Porch is in an uproar! Zeno is shouting that man is naturally apt for nothing but virtue, which attracts mind to itself by its own grandeur without offering any extrinsic advantage and rewarded as a kind of enticement; Epicurus' 'pleasure' is common only among brute animals, and to push man – and the wise man! – into an association with them is abominable. Epicurus, like Bacchus, has called together a drunken mob from his Gardens to aid him against this onslaught! The mob is searching for someone to tear to pieces with their long fingernails and savage fangs in their Bacchic fury. Elevating the name of pleasure as agreeableness and calm, with popular support, Epicurus passionately insists that without pleasure nobody could seem happy."

[Cf. Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Sermon, 150.5-, t. V p. 713-]

[U398]

Ā prīmō, ut opīnor, animantium ortū petitur orīgō summī bonī. simul atque nātum animal est, gaudet voluptāte et eam adpetit ut bonum, aspernātur dolōrem ut malum. dē malīs autem et bonīs ab iīs animālibus, quae nondum dēprāvāta sint, ait optimē iūdicārī… nec tamen argūmentum hoc Epicūrus ā parvīs petīvit aut etiam ā bestiīs, quās putat esse specula nātūrae, ut dīceret ab iīs duce nātūrā hanc voluptātem expetī nihil dolendī. neque enim haec movēre potest adpetitum animī nec ullum habet ictum quō pellat animum status hic nōn dolendī. at ille pellit, quī permulcet sēnsum voluptāte, itaque Epicūrus semper hoc ūtitur, ut probet voluptātem nātūrā expetī, quod ea voluptās, quae in mōtū sit, et parvōs ad sē adliciat et bestiās, nōn illa stābilis, in quā tantum inest nihil dolēre.

> From the very first origin of living creatures, as I think, is sought the beginning of the highest good. As soon as an animal is born, it rejoices in pleasure and seeks it as a good, while it shuns pain as an evil. And he says that from those creatures which have not yet been corrupted the best judgment is made concerning what is good and bad… Yet Epicurus did not draw this argument from children or even from beasts, which he considers mirrors of nature, to assert that from them, guided by nature, is sought this pleasure of "not suffering pain." For this state of not feeling pain cannot move the desire of the mind, nor has it any impulse by which it stirs the soul. But that one does move it—the one that soothes the senses with pleasure; and thus Epicurus always uses this argument to prove that pleasure is naturally sought, because the pleasure that exists in movement attracts both children and animals to itself, not that stable state in which there is only the absence of pain.
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> For the origin of the Chief Good, he {Epicurus} goes back, I understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as an animal is born, it delights in pleasure and seeks it as a good, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet uncorrupted are according to him the best judges of Good and Evil… 33: For proof of this, however, Epicurus cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him hold a mirror up to nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite sexual desire; the 'static' condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is wrong here); it is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epicurus' standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants and animals are attracted by the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure, not the 'static' kind which consists merely in freedom from pain.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 13 31.109

Voluptātem bestiīs concēdāmus, quibus vōs dē summō bonō testibus ūtī solētis.

> Let us grant pleasure to the beasts, whom you are accustomed to use as witnesses concerning the highest good.
>
> Let us leave pleasures to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this question of the Chief Good your school is fond of appealing.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Academica, 1.2.6

Dē vītā et mōribus et dē expetendīs fugiendīsque rēbus illī (Epicūreī) simpliciter: pecudis enim et hominis idem bonum esse cēnsent.

> Concerning life and conduct, and about things to be sought and avoided, they (the Epicureans) speak simply; for they hold that the good of a beast and of a man is the same.
>
> Even this department of ethics, and the subject of moral choice and avoidance, that school handles quite simply, for it frankly identifies the good of man with the good of beasts, but what a vast amount of what minute precision the teachers of our school display is not unknown to you.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.194

ὅθεν καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι δεικνύναι νομίζουσι φύσει αἱρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· τὰ γὰρ ζῷά φασιν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι ἀδιάστροφα ὄντα ὁρμᾶν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνειν δὲ ἀλγηδόνας.

Hence, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choice-worthy; for animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Ethicists, 96

ἀλλ᾽ εἰώώθασί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἱρέσεως πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπορίας ὑπαντῶντες λέγειν ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῷον φεύγει μὲν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα, διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν γεννηθὲν γοῦν καὶ μηδέπω τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν δουλεῦον ἅμα τῷ ῥιπισθῆναι ἀσυνήθει ἀέρος ψύξει ἔκλαυσέ τε καὶ ἐκώκυσεν. εἰ δὲ φυσικῶς ὁρμᾷ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἐκκλίνει δὲ τὸν πόνον, φύσει φευκτόν τέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁ πόνος καὶ αἱρετὸν ἡ ἡδονή.

> Some of those who belong to the school of Epicurus, in answer to these objections {that folly is not evil by nature, and so forth}, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally and without teaching. Thus when it is born, and is not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as soon as it is smitten by first puff of chilly air. But if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a disinclination for toil, it naturally avoids pain and chooses pleasure.

Cf., Maximus of Tyre (fl.c. 190 BCE), Dissertations, 3.2- [p. 30- Reiske]

Marcus Terentius Varro (fl. 46 BCE), On Philosophy,
by way of Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), City of God, 19.1

Quattuor esse quaedam quae hominēs sine magistrō, sine ullō doctrīnae adminiculō, sine industriā vel arte vīvendi… …velut nātūrāliter appetunt, aut voluptātem quā dēlectābiliter movētur corporīs sēnsus, aut quiētem quā fit ut nullam molestiam corporīs quisque patiātur, aut utramque, quam tamen ūnō nōmine voluptātis Epicūrus appellat, aut ūniversaliter prīma nātūrae.

> There are, they say, four things which men, without a teacher, without any aid of learning, without effort or art of living… as it were by nature, seek: either pleasure, by which the sense of the body is agreeably moved; or rest, by which it comes about that one suffers no bodily distress; or both together—which Epicurus nevertheless calls by the single name of "pleasure"; or, taken generally, the primary objects of nature.

> "There are four things that men naturally seek, without a master and without the support of any instruction, without effort and without any art of living … naturally, they seek pleasure, which is an agreeable activity of physical perception, or repose, the state in which the individual suffers no bodily discomfort, or both of these (which Epicurus calls by the single name of pleasure), or taking everything together, the primary wants of nature…"

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 5.5

Ἐπίκουρος μὲν τὴν τοῦ χειρίστου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκείωσιν ἐθεάσατο μόνην.

> Epicurus saw only the kinship {oikeíosis} felt by the worst part of the soul.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 7.86

ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζῴοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφαίνουσιν (οἱ Στωικοί) ἐπιγέννημα γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ, ὃν τρόπον ἀφιλαρύνεται τὰ ζῷα καὶ θάλλει τὰ φυτά.

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Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 2.20

καθόλου γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάθος, ἐπακολούθημα δὲ χρείαις τισὶ φυσικαῖς, πείνῃ δίψει ῥίγει γάμῳ.

For the feeling of pleasure is not at all a necessity, but the accompaniment of certain natural needs – hunger, thirst, cold, sexual union.

Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.15.17; 2.11.33 [Cf. U200]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 5.25.74

Vīdentur etiam ipsī voluptāriī dēverticula quaerere et virtūtēs habent in ōre tōtōs diēs, voluptātemque prīmō dumtaxat expetī dīcunt, deinde cōnsuētūdine quasi alteram quandam nātūram efficī, quā impulsi multa faciānt nullam quaerentēs voluptātem

Even the pleasure-seekers themselves seem to seek retreats, and they have virtue constantly on their lips; they say that pleasure is sought at first only, but afterward, by habit, a kind of second nature is formed, by which they are driven to do many things without seeking any pleasure.

Even the devotees to pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), On the Soul, 2.19

τοῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς, προϊόντων δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονήν φασιν.

The Epicureans held that what is first congenial to us, without qualification, is pleasure. But they say that as we get older, this pleasure articulates itself in many ways.

[U399]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 3.1.3

Ipse etiam dīcit Epicūrus nē argumentandum quidem esse dē voluptāte, quod sit positum iūdicium eius in sēnsibus, ut commonērī nōs satis sit, nihil attineat docērī.

Epicurus himself even says that there is no need to argue about pleasure, since the judgment of it is founded in the senses, so that it is enough for us to be reminded, and there is no need to be taught.

Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.12.36

ait sēnsibus ipsīs iūdicārī voluptātem bonum esse, dolōrem malum

He says that it is judged by the senses themselves that pleasure is good and pain is evil.

{Epicurus} …says that the verdict of the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and pain evil.

[U400]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Academica 2.46.140 (Lucullus)

Audī contrā illōs, quī nōmen honestātis ā sē nē intellegī quidem dīcant, nisi fortē quod glōriōsum sit in vulgus, id honestum velīmus dīcere: fontem omnium bonōrum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc rēgulam, hanc praescrīptiōnem esse nātūrae, ā quā quī aberrāvisset, eum numquam quid in vītā sequerētur habitūrum.

Hear, then, against those who say that they do not even understand the name of "honor," unless perhaps we wish to call that honorable which is glorious among the crowd: that the source of all goods is in the body, that this is the standard, this the rule, this the precept of nature, from which whoever has strayed will never know what to follow in life.

Hear on the opposite side those who say that they do not even understand what the word "virtue" means, unless indeed we choose to give the name "moral" to what looks well with the mob: that the source of all things good is in the body – this is nature's canon and rule and injunction, to stray away from which will result in a man's never having an object to follow in life.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 28.68

Audīstis profectō dīcī philosophōs Epicūreōs omnīs rēs quae sint hominī expetendae voluptāte metīrī.

You have surely heard it said that the Epicurean philosophers measure all things that are to be sought by man by the standard of pleasure.

You have of course heard it said that Epicurean philosophers assess the desirability of anything by its capacity to give pleasure.

[U401]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.6.15

Aristippus nōn dubitāvit summum malum dolōrem dīcere; deinde ad hanc ēneruatam muliebremque sententiam satis docilem sē Epicūrus praebuīt.

Aristippus did not hesitate to say that the greatest evil is pain; afterward Epicurus showed himself quite receptive to this enfeebled and womanish doctrine.

Aristippos the Socratic had no hesitation in pronouncing pain to be the chief evil; next Epicurus lent himself quite obediently to the support of this spineless, unmanly view.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.9.26

Cum dolōrem nōn modo maximum malum, sed sōlum malum etiam dīxerit.

Since he said that pain is not only the greatest evil, but even the only evil.

...after saying that pain is not only the chief evil, but the only evil as well...

[Cf. Ibid., 2.12.28; 19.44-45; V.10.31]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.33

Quīn potiūs efficis, nē dolōr malum sit? "Omnium," inquit Epicūrus, "malōrum maximum est."

Why not rather show that pain is not an evil? "Of all evils," says Epicurus, "it is the greatest."

Why, rather, do you not consider that pain might not be an evil? Because [Epicurus] says it is the greatest of all evils.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.5

Inpatientī ac dēlicātō dolōrem esse omnium malōrum maximum dīcitur (ab Epicūrō): fortī, etiam in tormentīs beātum esse sapientem.

To one who is weak and delicate, pain is said (by Epicurus) to be the greatest of all evils; but to the strong man, even in torments, the wise man is happy.

{Epicurus says} to the impatient and delicate that pain is the greatest of all evils; to the strong, that the Sage is blessed even in torments.

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.195

ἀλγηδὼν ἤ ἐστι κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς φύσει κακόν.

... and pain, according to them, is a natural evil.

[U402]

Lucian (fl. 165 CE), The Double Indictment, 21 (Epicurus portrayed as speaking)

(Epicurus loquitur) πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἄσμενος ἐδραπέτευσεν (Διονύσιος ὁ μεταθέμενος) ὥσπερ δεσμά τινα διακόψας τὰς τῶν λόγων πλεκτάνας, ἀνθρώπινα καὶ οὐ βλακώδη φρονήσας καὶ τὸν μὲν πόνον, ὅ περ ἐστί, πονηρόν, ἡδεῖαν δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰηθείς ---.

Stoa: Κακὸν ἡγεῖ τὸν πόνον;
Epicurus: Ναί.
Stoa: Τὴν ἡδονν δὲ ἀγαθόν;
Epicurus: Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

"{Suppose that Dionysius, the Apostate} ran away to Pleasure of his own free will, cutting the meshes of [Stoic] logic as if they were bonds, because he had the spirit of a human being, not of a dolt, and thought pain painful, as indeed it is, and pleasure pleasant..."

Stoa: Do you consider pain bad?
Epicurus: Yes.
Stoa: And pleasure good?
Epicurus: Certainly so!

[U403]

Plotinus (fl.c. 245 CE), Dissertations, 30 (Aeneids, 2.9), 15

δυεῖν γὰρ οὐσῶν αἱρέσεων τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ τέλους, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς ἡδονὴν τὴν τοῦ σώματος τέλος τιθεμένης, ἑτέρας δὲ τῆς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱρουμένης... ...ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, ὅ περ ἦν λοιπόν, τοῦτο διώκειν παρακελεύεται.

For there are two schools of thought about attaining the [ethical] end. One which puts forward the pleasure of the body as the end, and another which chooses nobility and virtue ... Epicurus, who abolishes providence, exhorts to pursue all that remains: pleasure and its enjoyment.

Scholion on Lucian (fl. 165 CE), The Double Indictment, 20

ὅτι οἱ Ἐπικούρεῖοι ἄθεοι ὄντες ἡδονὴν μόνην ἐπρέσβευον

The Epicureans, being atheists, used to only honor pleasure.

[U404]

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics," p. 9

οὐδ᾽ ἐν οἷς μὴ τὸ οἰκεῖον συμπέρασμα ἐπιφέρεται, ἄλλο δέ τι ἑπόμενον ἐκείνῳ ἢ συμβεβηκός, οὐδ᾽ οὗτοι συλλογισμοί, οὐ γὰρ διὰ τῶν κειμένων οἷον εἰ λαβών τις τὴν ἡδονὴν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αἱρετὸν συμπεραίνοιτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο δείκνυται ἐκ τῶν κειμένων, εἰ καὶ ἕπεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ συναγομένῳ.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 4.4

τὸ γοῦν οἰηθῆναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καθά περ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἡμαρτημένος τε λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ψευδής.

…thus the belief that pleasure is a good, as Epicurus would have it, is a mistaken and false teaching.

[U405]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1087B

δοκεῖς οὖν μοι μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐξαιρεῖν, ὥς φασιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ Ζῆν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως μὴ ἀπολείψεις αὐτοῖς.

So I think you are not "removing the springtime from their year" as the saying goes, but depriving these men of life, if you are not going to leave them the possibility of living pleasurably.

[U406]

Antiochus of Ascalon (fl.c. 95 BCE),
by way of Clement of Alexandria(fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies 2.21

Αἱρετὸν δὲ εἶναί φησιν (Ἐπίκουρος) ὃ πρῶτον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸ ἐπισπᾶται, πάντως δηλονότι ἐν κινήσει ὑπάρχον.

Epicurus also says that the removal of pain is pleasure; and says that that is to be preferred, which first attracts from itself to itself, being, that is, wholly in motion.

[U407]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῇ νοεῖσθαι, τὴν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν· καὶ τὴν [κατὰ τὴν] προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

Two kinds of happiness are conceivable: one being the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be increased; the other subject to increases or decreases of pleasures.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Confessions, 6.16.26

Eī disputābam cum amīcīs meīs Alypiō et Nebridiō dē fīnibus bonōrum et malōrum, Epicūrum acceptūrum fuisse palmam in animō meō, nisi ego crēdidissem post mortem restāre animae vītam et tractūs meritōrum, quod Epicūrus crēdere nōluit. et quaerēbam, sī essēmus immortālēs et in perpetuā corporīs voluptāte sine ullō amissiōnis terrōre vīverēmus, cūr nōn essēmus beātī aut quid aliud quaererēmus.

I was debating with my friends Alypius and Nebridius about the ends of good and evil: Epicurus would have carried the prize in my mind, had I not believed that after death there remains for the soul a life and the consequences of its deeds—which Epicurus was unwilling to believe. And I asked: if we were immortal and lived in perpetual bodily pleasure without any fear of its loss, why should we not be happy, or what else should we seek?

I argued in those days with my friends Alypius and Nebridius concerning the limits of good and evil. Determining, in my judgment, that Epicurus should have won the garland, had I not verily believed that there remained a life for the soul after the body was dead, and the fruits of our deservings, which Epicurus would not believe. And so I put the question: suppose we were to be immortal, and were to live in perpetual enjoyment of bodily pleasures, and that without fear of losing – why should we not then be fully happy, and wherefore should we seek for any other thing?

2. Kinetic Pleasure

[U408]

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 1.20.17

ἂν οὖν ἐλθὼν Ἐπίκουρος εἴπῃ ὅτι ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, πάλιν μακρὸν γίνεται καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀκοῦσαι, τί τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τί τὸ

ὑποστατικὸν καὶ οὐσιῶδες. ὅτι τὸ κοχλίου ἀγαθὸν οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐν τῷ κελύφει, τὸ οὖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰκός; σὺ δ' αὐτός τι κυριώτερον ἔχεις, Ἐπίκουρε. τί ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον, τὸ ἐπισκεπτόμενον ἕκαστα, τὸ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῆς, ὅτι τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν, ἐπικρῖνον**

> If Epicurus should come and say that the good ought to be in the flesh, again the explanation becomes lengthy, and you must be told what is the principal faculty within us, and what our substantial versus what our essential nature is. Since it is not probable that the good of a snail lies in its shell, is it then probable that the good of man lies in his flesh? But take your own case, Epicurus; what more masterful faculty do you yourself possess? What is that thing within you which takes counsel, which examines into all things individually, and which, after examining the flesh itself, decides that it is the principal matter?

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 1.23.1

Ἐπίκουρος... ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν.

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Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.20

εἶτα (ἡ προαίρεσις) τηλικαύτη δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα. οὐδ᾽ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετ᾽ ἄν τις αὐτῆς.

> Therefore, since the faculty of choice is so great, and has been set over everything else, let it come before us and say that the flesh is of all things the most excellent.

[U409]

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 546F

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος δέ φησιν· ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή καὶ τὰ σοφὰ καὶ τὰ περιττὰ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν.

> And Epicurus says, "The principle and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this."

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 280A

Ἐπίκουρος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τούτων διδάσκαλος, ὃς καὶ βοῶν ἔλεγεν ἀρχὴ... ...ἀναφοράν

> The master of these men, indeed, was Epicurus, who loudly proclaimed... ["The principle" etc., cited above].

Metrodorus, Letter to his Brother Timocrates, fr. 13,
by way of Plutarch, Non Posse, 1098D

ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην, ὅτι ἔμαθον παρ᾽ Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι.

> {We are not called to save the nation or get crowned by it for wisdom; what is called for, my dear Timocrates, is to eat and to drink wine, gratifying the belly without harming it.} ... It made me both happy and confident to have learned from Epicurus how to gratify the belly properly. ... {The belly, Timocrates, my man of wisdom, is the region that contains the highest end.}

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1125A

οἱ περὶ γαστέρα τἀγαθὸν ἡγούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους δι' ὧν ἡδονὴ παραγίνεται

For it is the men who look with contempt on all these things as old wives' tales, and think that our good is to be found in the belly and the other passages by which pleasure makes her entry...

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1108C

οἱ περὶ γαστέρα τἀγαθὸν εἶναι βοῶντες

...by those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly...

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1098D

οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ μέγεθος καθά περ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι τῇ γαστρὶ περιγράφουσι.

Indeed these people, you might say, describing a circle with the belly as center and radius, circumscribe within it the whole area of pleasure...

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.66

Sōlet enim in disputātiōnibus suīs oculōrum et aurium dēlectātiōnī abdōminis voluptātēs anteferrē.

For he is accustomed in his discussions to prefer the pleasures of the belly to the delights of the eyes and ears.

It is his habit in all his discussions to attach higher value to the pleasures of the belly than to the delights of the eye and the ear.

Cf. Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B

παπαῖ, εἶπον ἔγωγε γελάσας, εἰς τὴν γαστέρα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔοικας ἐναλεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν κρεῶν ἐπάξειν ἀφαιρούμενος ἡδονήν.

"Oho!" I said laughing. "It looks as if you are going to hop on their belly and make them run for their flesh when you take pleasure away..."

Cf. Hegesippus, by way of Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, VII p. 279D (Com. IV p. 481)

[U410]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1092D

τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ σαρκὶ καὶ σαρκὸς εὐπαθείᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς διαχύσεις, ἐὰν ὦσι μέτριαι, μηδὲν ἐχούσας μέγα μηδ᾽ ἀξιόλογον, ἂν δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλωσι, πρὸς τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἀβεβαίῳ φορτικὰς φαινομένας καὶ θρασείας, οὐδὲ ψυχικὰς ἄν τις οὐδὲ χαράς, ἀλλὰ σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς οἷον ἐπιμειδιάσεις καὶ συνεπιθρύψεις προσείποι τῆς ψυχῆς.

As for the melting away of the mind that occurs in the expectation or on the occasion of pleasure of the flesh, this when moderate has nothing about it that is great or appreciable, and when extreme is not only unfounded and unstable but strikes us course and immodest.

Galen (fl. 170 CE), On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 4.2

ἐν μέντοι δὴ τούτοις τοῖς ὅροις ὁρμὰς καὶ δόξας καὶ κρίσεις ὑπάρχειν οἴεται (Χρύσιππος) τὰ πάθη, κατὰ δέ τινας τῶν ἐφεξῆς Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ δόγμασιν ἀκόλουθα γράφει. τήν τε γὰρ λύπην ὁριζόμενος μείωσιν εἶναί φησιν ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, τήν θ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἔπαρσιν ἐφ᾽ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπάρσεις,. καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις --- καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐνίοτε μέμνηται --- τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεώς ἐστι παθήματα ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιγινόμενα τοιαύτην δέ τινα τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν παθῶν Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ζήνων, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνει.

[U411]

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), *Against Colotes*, 1122E

ἄνευ διδασκάλου γὰρ αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα καὶ λεῖα καὶ προσηνῆ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν οὗτοι, καὶ τὸν πάνυ μὴ φάσκοντα μηδὲ ὁμολογοῦντα κάμπτεσθαι καὶ μαλάσσεσθαι τούτοις.

No teacher is needed. By themselves, these glorious smooth and agreeable movements of the flesh (as they themselves assert) call to action even one who stoutly denies and refuses to acknowledge that he unbends and turns soft in response to them.

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), *Old Men in Public Affairs*, 786C

ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐπινοοῦμεν, ἡλίκας ἡδονὰς αἱ ἀρεταὶ τοῖς χρωμένοις... ...παρασκευάζουσιν· (αἵ γ') οὐ κνῶσιν οὐδὲ θρύπτουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ κατὰ σάρκα λεῖαι καὶ προσηνεῖς γινόμεναι κινήσεις, ἀλλ᾽ αὗται μὲν οἰστρῶδες καὶ ἀβέβαιον καὶ μεμιγμένον σφυγμῷ τὸ γαργαλίζον ἔχουσιν.

In view of these examples, do we not perceive how great are the pleasures the virtues provide, for those who practice them … and that also without tickling or enervating them as do the smooth and gentle motions made on the body? Those have a frantic, unsteady titillation mixed with convulsive throbbing…

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), *Non Posse*, x1087E

τὸ κινούμενον λείως καὶ προσηνῶς.

… you will find that area which experiences a 'smooth and gentle motion' …

[U412]

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), *An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum*, 1129B

ἂν... μέλλω... "τῷ καλῷ προσπτύειν" καὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐν σαρκὶ kai γαργαλισμοῖς τίθεσθαι, ταῦτα δεῖται σκότους τὰ τέλη, ταῦτα νυκτός, ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὴν λήθην καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

If I intend to … "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations" – these rites require darkness, these require night, and for these let us have concealment and oblivion.

Seneca (*fl.* 35 CE), *Letters to Lucilius*, 92.6

Alterum illud, voluptās, bonum pecoris est. adicimus ratiōnālī inratiōnāle, honēstō inhonestum. at beātum facit titillātiō corporīs: quid ergō dubitās dīcere bene esse hominī, sī palātō bene est? et hunc tū nōn dīcō inter virōs numerās sed inter hominēs, cuius summum bonum sapōribus et colōribus sonīsque cōnstat.

That other thing, pleasure, is the good of beasts. We add the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable. And bodily tickling makes a man happy? Why then do you hesitate to say that a man is well off if his palate is well off? And do you count such a one—not even among men, let alone among the brave—whose highest good consists of tastes, colors, and sounds?

The second kind of pleasure is simply animalistic. We are but adding the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable. A pleasant physical sensation affects this life of ours; why therefore, do you hesitate to say that all is well with a man just because all is well with his appetite? And do you rate, I will not say among heroes, but among men, the person whose Supreme Good is a matter of flavors and colors and sounds? {cf. U67}

[U413]

Athenaeus (*fl.c.* 200 CE), *Deipnosophists*, 546E

τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονὴν ἠσπάζοντο... ...καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τούτου. καὶ ἵνα μὴ τοὺς καταιγισμοὺς λέγω καὶ τὰ ἐπεντρώματα, ἅ περ πολλάκις προφέρεται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ τοὺς γαργαλισμοὺς καὶ τὰ νύγματα

{Aristippos and his followers were not alone} in welcoming kinetic pleasure ... Epicurus and his followers did the same. And not to enter on account of his "tempests" and his "transportations" all of which Epicurus cites many times, also the "titillations" and "stimulations" ...

Cf. Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1090B

οὕτως ἐν σώματι ψυχὴν εὐσταθοῦντι καὶ ταῖς περὶ σώματος ἐλπίσι τἀγαθὸν θεμένην οὐκ ἔστιν ἄφοβον καὶ ἄκυμον διεξαγαγεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν μόνον ὥσπερ ἡ θάλασσα χειμῶνας ἴσχει καὶ καταιγισμοὺς τὸ σῶμα, πλείονας δὲ ταραχὰς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μείζονας ἀναδίδωσιν

{the future, like the weather, is always uncertain} so the mind that has stowed the ultimate good in a body that is in a stable condition and in expectations for the body cannot continue to the end without fear and the prospect of tempestuous weather.

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (fl.c. 20 CE), Allegory of the Law, 3.48

ἱκανὸς γὰρ (ὁ προκόπτων) οὐκ ἔστι πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν διώσασθαι, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ ἐὰν τὰ ἐγκοίλια αὐτῆς, τουτέστι τὰ ἐπεντρώματα, ἅ φασιν οἱ φιλήδονοι ἐπιδόσεις εἶναί τινας τῶν προηγουμένων ἡδονῶν, ἃ γίνεται ὀψαρτυτῶν καὶ σιτοπόνων λίχνων περιεργίᾳ.

Indeed, he who finds himself on the way of the moral progress is not in a position to reject every pleasure, but it will still be a wonderful thing that he succeeds rejecting the pleasures of the belly, that is those [???] which the lovers of the pleasure say that the means of increasing the chief pleasure is owed to the skill of cooks and [???].

[U414]

Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy, 2.1

καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν αὐτῷ διεφθορότα ἐστὶ... λέγοντι... καὶ ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα καὶ ζαργαλισμοὺς σώματος καὶ ληκήματα καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κακὰς ἄτας...

On top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. ... [he] speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors. {c.f. above}

...οὐ καὶ σὺ οὖν, ὦ θρασυτάτη καὶ ἀναισχυντοτάτη κεφαλή, ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀποφθαρεὶς οἰχήσῃ ἐπὶ Λεόντιον καὶ Φιλαινίδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἑταίρας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα μετὰ Μινδυρίδου, μετὰ Σαρδαναπάλου καὶ μετὰ πάντων τῶν σεαυτοῦ θιασωτῶν;

So will you not be off, "most brazen and shameless soul" routed from Philosophy, to Leontion, Philainis, and the other whores, and to your "sacred ululations" with Mindyrides, Sardanapalus and all your boon companions?

[U415]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.21.68 (Cicero to Torquatus)

At cum tuīs cum disserās, Torquāte, multa sunt audienda etiam dē obscaenīs voluptātibus, dē quibus ab Epicūrō saepissimē dīcitur.

But when one converses with your friends, Torquatus, many things must be heard even about obscene pleasures, of which Epicurus is very often said to speak.

When one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epicurus is always harping upon them!

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.588b

οὗτος οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐ Λεόντιον εἶχεν ἐρωμένην τὴν ἐπὶ ἑταιρείᾳ διαβόητον γενομένην; ἣ δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὅτε φιλοσοφεῖν ἤρξατο ἐπαύσατο ἑταιροῦσα, πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς

Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις, Ἐπικούρῳ δὲ καὶ ἀναφανδόν· ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνον πολλὴν φροντίδα ποιούμενον αὐτῆς τοῦτ᾽ ἐμφανίζειν διὰ τῶν πρὸς Ἕρμαρχον Ἐπιστολῶν.**

Didn't this Epicurus have as his lover Leontion, who was notorious for being a hetaera? She did not stop being a hetaera when she began to pursue philosophy, but had sex with all the Epicureans in their gardens, even in front of Epicurus, leading him – as he fretted about her often – to divulge the issue in his Letters to Hermarchus.

3. Katastematic Pleasure

[U416]

Olympiodorus the Younger (fl. 540 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Philebus" [p. 274 Stallb.]

καὶ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονήν, καταστηματικὴν αὐτὴν λέγων

Epicurus, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (fl.c. 20 CE), Allegory of the Law, 3.54

τοῖς λέγουσι καταστηματικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

...to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

[U417]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1088C

καὶ πέρας (ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) κοινὸν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦν τος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἐπιτέθεικεν, ὡς τῆς φύσεως ἄχρι τοῦ λῦσαι τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐξούσης τὸ ἡδύ, περαιτέρω δὲ προελθεῖν οὐκ ἐώσης κατὰ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ ποικιλμούς τινας οὐκ ἀναγκαίους, ὅταν γοῦν ἐν τῷ μὴ πονεῖν γένηται, δεχομένησ᾽ ἡ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦτο μετ᾽ ὀρέξεως πορεία, μέτρον ἡδονῆς οὖσα, κομιδῇ βραχεῖα καὶ σύντομος. ὅθεν αἰσθόμενοι τῆς ἐνταῦθα γλισχρότητος ὥσπερ ἐκ χωρίου λυπροῦ τοῦ σώματος μεταφέρουσι τὸ τέλος εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ἰὼς ἐκεῖ νομὰς καὶ λειμῶνας ἀμφιλαφεῖς ἡδονῶν ἕξοντες.

Epicurus has imposed a limit on pleasures that applies to all of them alike: the removal of all pain. For he believes that our nature adds to pleasure only up to the point where pain is abolished and does not allow it any further increase in magnitude (although the pleasure, when the state of painlessness is reached, admits of certain unessential variations). But to proceed to this point, accompanied by desire, is our stint of pleasure, and the journey is indeed short and quick. Hence it is that becoming aware of the poverty here they transfer their final good from the body, as from an unproductive piece of land, to the soul, persuaded that there they will find pastures and meadows lush with pleasures.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 4, 1088D (Zeuxippus speaking)

εἶτ᾽ οὐ καλῶς δοκοῦσί σοι ποιεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀρχόμενοι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον ἐφάνη γένεσις, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς βεβαιοτέραν [μεταίροντες τὴν ἡδονὴν ἕδραν] καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν αὐτῇ τελειοῦντες;

Why, do you not hold that that gentlemen do well to begin with the body, where pleasure first appears, and then pass to the soul as having more stability and bringing everything to perfection within itself?

[U418]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1107B

τοιαύτην χώραν ἡδονῶν τοσούτων Ἐπίκουρος ἐκτέμνεται καὶ (ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐλπίσιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ χάρισιν ἀναιρεθείσαις ἔτι τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ φιλότιμον ἀποτυφλώσας εἰς στενόν τι κομιδῇ καὶ οὐδὲ καθαρὸν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τῆς ψυχῆς χαῖρον συνέστειλε καὶ κατέβαλε τὴν φύσιν ὡς μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν.

It is a space like this, with pleasures so ample, pleasures of such magnitude that the surgery of Epicurus cuts out of our lives. Not content with removing all hope of help from Heaven and all bestowal of grace, as we said, he kills the love of learning in our soul and the love of honor in our heart, and thus constructs our nature and casts it down into a narrow space indeed and not a clean one either, where the mind delights in nothing but the flesh, as if human nature had no higher good than escape from evil.

[U419]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.47

Idem ait nōn crēscere voluptātem dolōre dētractō, summamque esse voluptātem nihil dolēre... ...nunc autem summam voluptātem esse dolōre carēre.

He likewise says that pleasure does not increase by the removal of pain, and that the highest pleasure is to feel no pain. In the same place: now, however, that the highest pleasure is to be free from pain.

Epicurus also says that pleasure does not increase when pain has been removed, and that the highest pleasure is the absence of pain. He says that the highest pleasure is freedom from pain.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.9.28

Ut neget accedere quicquam posse ad voluptātem nihil dolentis.

So that he denies that anything can be added to the pleasure of one who feels no pain.

He asserts that nothing can enhance the pleasure of freedom from pain.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.13.41 (Cicero to Torquatus)

Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem, quod vōs interdum vel potiūs nimium saepe dīcitis, nihil dolēre.

Hieronymus, whose highest good is the same as what you sometimes—or rather, too often—say: to feel no pain.

Hieronymus' Chief Good is the same as that occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves: freedom from pain.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1091B

φεῦ τῆς μεγάλης ἡδονῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μακαριότητος, ἣν καρποῦνται χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ κακοπαθεῖν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ᾽ ἀλγεῖν. ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τούτοις μέγα φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἃ λέγουσιν, ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἰσοθέους ἀποκαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἀκρότῆηταας ἀγαθῶν εἰς βρόμους καὶ ὀλολυγμοὺς ἐκβακχεύοντες ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων περιφρονοῦντες ἐξευρήκασι μόνοι θεῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα τὸ μηθὲν ἔχειν κακόν ;

Oh the great pleasure and blessed state this company {the Epicureans} enjoy, as they revel in suffering no hardship or anxiety or pain! Is this not a thing to make them proud and use the language they do, when they style themselves "imperishable" and "equal to the gods" and from excess and preeminence of blessings explode in their pleasure into wild cries of rapture and ecstasy because they alone, scorning all other blessings, have discovered one as great as it is godlike, to wit, not to suffer an ill?

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.8.10

Prīvātiōnem dolōris summum bonum putāre nōn plānē Peripateticōrum ac Stoicōrum, sed clīnicōrum philosophōrum est. quis enim nōn intellegat ab aegrōtīs et in aliquō dolōre positīs esse hoc disputātum? quid tam rīdiculum quam id habēre prō summō bonō, quod medicus possit dare?

To think that the absence of pain is the highest good belongs clearly not to the Peripatetics or Stoics, but to the sickroom philosophers. For who does not see that this has been argued by invalids and those in some pain? What could be more ridiculous than to hold as the highest good something a doctor can provide?

To think that the highest good is the absence of pain is surely not characteristic of the Peripatetics or Stoics but of the bedridden philosophers. For who would not understand that this is the point discussed by the sick and those placed in some state of pain? What is so ridiculous as to consider that which a physician can give, as the highest good?

[U420]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123A

τὸ δὲ πόνου καὶ ἡδονῆς μηδὲν εἶναι μέσον οὐκ ἀποφαίνεσθε παρὰ τὴν πάντων αἴσθησιν, ἥδεσθαι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν καὶ πονεῖν τὸ μὴ [ἥδεσθαι] λέγοντες;

Do you {Epicureans} not, in defiance of the experience of all mankind, affirm the absence of any mean between pain and pleasure when you say that it is a pleasure to feel no pain, in other words: that not to be acted upon is to be acted upon?

[U421]

Olympiodorus the Younger (fl. 540 CE), Commentary on Plato's "Philebus"

ὅτι ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ οἴεται μίγνυσθαι λύπην ἡδονῇ, μηδὲ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν.

... since Epicurus does not believe that pain is mixed with pleasure, nor indeed the bad with the good.

[U422]

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 17.35 (after fragment 181)

τότε χρείαν ἔχομεν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ἀλγῶμεν᾽ ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πάσχωμεν ἐν αἰσθήσει καθεστῶτες, τότε οὐδεμία χρεία τῆς ἡδονῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἔνδεια τὴν ἀδικίαν ποιεῖ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ περὶ τὰς κενὰς δόξας ὄρεξις

We need pleasure when we are in pain because of its absence; but when we are not in this condition, and are in a stable state of sense-perception, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which produce injustice from without, but the desire based on groundless opinions.

[U423]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1091A

οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἄπιστον καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἀρχὴν λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντάπασιν εὐκαταφρόνητον καὶ μικράν, εἴ περ αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀποφυγὴ τὸ χαρτόν ἐστι καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδὲν διανοεῖσθαί φασιν, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ὅποι τεθήσεται τἀάγαθὸν εἰ μὴ μόνον ὅθεν ἐξελαύνεται τὸ κακὸν αὐτοῖς... ...ὅμοια δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐξ αbτῆς τῆς φυγῆς τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τῆς μνήμης καὶ ἐπιλογίσεως καὶ χάριτος, ὅτι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, γεννᾶσθαι. ὁ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν᾽ καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ θρυλῶν.

Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. ... Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1091E

Ἐπίκουρος – καὶ Μητρόδωρος οὐσίαν τἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀκρότητα τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγὴν τιθέμενοι.

Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

[U424]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 5, p. 1090A

ἀλλ’ ἀξιοῦμεν αὐτοὺς... ...μὴ λαμβάνειν χαρᾶς ἀρχὴν ἁπάσης (τὴν) τῆς σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν.

My judgment is that ... they ought to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" is the source of all delight, ...

[U425]

Epictetus, fragment 52, by way of Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 4.50

τί ποτ’ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθοῖς μικροτέροις οὖσι χαίρει καὶ γαληνιᾷ, ὡς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς αὐτῆς ἀγαθοῖς μεγίστοις οὖσιν οὐχ ἥδεται;

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.6.16

Ut maris igitur tranquillitās intellegitur nullā nē minimā quidem aurā flūctūs commovente, sīc animī quiētus et plācātus status cernitur, cum perturbātiō nulla est quā movērī queat.

Just as the calm of the sea is understood when not even the slightest breeze stirs the waves, so too the quiet and peaceful state of the mind is seen when there is no disturbance by which it can be moved.

Thus, just as the sea is understood to be calm when not even the lightest breath of air ruffles its waves, so too a peaceful condition of the soul is discernible when there is no disturbance of strength enough to be able to ruffle it.

[U426]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1033C

ἣν Ἐπίκουρος ἡσυχίαν ἐπαινεῖ καὶ Ἱερώνυμος.

...that tranquillity (ἡσυχία) which is commended by Epicurus and Hieronymus.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Table Talk, 3.6.4, 655C

τὴν Ἐπικούρου σχολὴν καὶ ῥᾳστώνην

{All men, my friend, do not possess} … Epicurus' leisure and equanimity … {which has been provided in everlasting abundance by reason and philosophy} … [Cf. Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p. 778D]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 68.10

Ōtium, inquis, Sēneca, commendas mihi? ad Epicureās vocēs dēlaberis.

"You recommend leisure to me, Seneca? You are slipping into Epicurean language

"Is it retirement, oh Seneca, that you are recommending to me? You will soon be falling back upon the maxims of Epicurus!"

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), On Shows, 28

Philosophī quidam hoc nōmen (voluptātis) quiētī et tranquillitātī dedērunt; in eā gaudent, in eā vocantur, in eā etiam gloriantur.

Certain philosophers have given this name voluptas ("pleasure") to calm and tranquility; in it they rejoice, by it they are called, and in it they even take pride.

Some philosophers have given the name of pleasure to quietude and tranquillity; in it they rejoice, take their ease in it – yes, glory in it.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 2.16, 1

Ōtium... nōn gemmīs neque purpurā vēnāle neque aurō.

Leisure... is not for sale with gems or purple or gold.

Peace – can purple buy it, Grosphus? Nay,
Nor gold, nor jewel.

Nōn enim gāzae neque cōnsulāris submovet lictor miserōs tumultūs mentis et cūrās laqueāta circum tecta volantis.

For neither treasures nor the consul's lictor drives away the wretched tumults of the mind and the cares that flit beneath paneled ceilings.

No pomp, no lictor clears the way
Amid rabble-routs of troublous feelings,
Nor quells the cares that sport and play
Round gilded ceilings.

[U427]

Baton the Comic,
by way of Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 3, 103C; 7, 279A

ὁ γοῦν Ἐπίκουρός φησιν εἶναι τἀγαθὸν
Epicurus, at any rate, says the good is pleasure

τὴν ἡδονὴν δήπουθεν· οὐκ ἔστιν δ᾽ ἔχειν
pleasure, indeed. But it is not possible to have it...

ταύτην ἑτέρωθεν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν δὴ καλῶς
this [pleasure] from elsewhere, but indeed from living well...

εὔσως ἅπαντας ἂν τυχεῖν δώσεις ἐμοί.
You will easily grant me that all [people] can attain it

"Epicurus, anyhow, says that pleasure is the highest Good; everybody knows that. You cannot have it any other way. By living well, of course, everyone lives happily."

[U428]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν τισὶ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τισὶ δὲ ἀδιάφορον (εἶναι).

{Among Epicurean Sages, they hold that} health is in some cases regarded as a good – for others: something indifferent.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), City of God, 5.20

Nē per immoderātiōnem noxium aliquid valētūdinem turbet et voluptās, quam etiam in corporīs sanitāte Epicūrēī maximam ponunt, graviter offendātur.

Lest through excess something harmful disturb one's health, and the pleasure — which even in bodily health the Epicureans place as the greatest — be seriously impaired.

{The Epicureans say that Pleasure demands Temperance}… lest some harmful consequence of overindulgence should interfere with health – which Epicureans place largely in the health of the body – and seriously hinder Pleasure.

4. Peace of Mind

[U429]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1088E

εἰ δ' ἀκούεις αὐτῶν μαρτυρωμένον καὶ βοώντων, ὡς ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὶ ψυχὴ τῶν ὄν τῶν πέφυκε χαίρειν καὶ γαληνίζειν πλὴν ἐπὶ σώματος ἡδοναῖς παρούσαις ἢ προσδοκωμέναις, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἆρ' οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι διεράματι τοῦ σώματος χρῆσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ (καὶ) καθά περ οἶνον ἐκ πονηροῦ καὶ μὴ στέγοντος ἀγγείου τὴν ἡδονὴν διαχέοντες ἐνταῦθα καὶ παλαιοῦντες οἴεσθαι σεμνότερόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ τιμιώτερον;

But when you hear their loud protest that the soul is so constituted as to find joy and tranquillity in nothing in the world but pleasures of the body either present or anticipated, and that this is its good, do they not appear to you to be using the soul as a decanter of the body, and to imagine that by decanting pleasure, like wine, from a worthless and leaky vessel and leaving it to age in its new container, they are turning it into something more respectable and precious?

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1096C

κατατείναντες δὲ τὸ θεωρητικὸν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατασπάσαντες ὥσπερ μολυβδίσι ταῖς τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιθυμίαις οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσιν ἱπποκόμων ἢ ποιμένων χόρτον ἢ καλάμην ἤ τινα πόαν προβαλλόντων, ὡς ταῦτα βόσκεσθαι καὶ τρώγειν προσῆκον αὐτῶν τοῖς θρέμμασιν. ἢ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἀξιοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναῖς κατασυβωτεῖν, ὅσον ἐλπίσαι τι περὶ σαρκὸς ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μνημονεῦσαι χαίρουσαν, οἰκεῖον δὲ μηδὲν ἡδὺ μηδὲ τερπνὸν ἐξ αὑτῆς λαμβάνειν μηδὲ ζητεῖν ἐῶντες;

They place the contemplative part of the soul right inside body and use the appetites of the flesh as leaden weights to hold it down. In this they are no better than stable hands or shepherds who serve their charges with hay or straw or grass of one kind or the other as the proper food for them to crop and chew. Do they not in similar fashion play swineherd to the soul, feeding it only on this swill of the bodily pleasures, permitting it to delight only in the hope or experience or recollection of some carnal thing, and forbidding it to take or seek from itself any pleasure or gratification of its own?

[U430]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.30.98

Est autem ā tē (Epicūrē) dictum nec gaudēre quemquam nisi pro pter corpus nec dolēre... negās animī ullum esse gaudium quod nōn referātur ad corpus.

It has been said by you, Epicurus, that no one rejoices except because of the body, nor feels pain… you deny that there is any joy of the mind which is not referred to the body.

You {Epicurus}, have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. … your doctrine is that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body..

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.33.107

Dīcitis omnīs animī et voluptātēs et dolōrēs ad corporīs voluptātēs ac dolōrēs pertinēre.

You say that all pleasures and pains of the mind pertain to the pleasures and pains of the body.

The dictum of your school: all mental pleasures and pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the body.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.32.106

Falsum est omnīs animī voluptātēs esse ē corporīs societāte.

It is false that all pleasures of the mind arise from association with the body.

{Cicero disputes that} mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body.

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.7

ἐπὶ τίνι οὖν ἡσθησόμεθα ταύτὴν τὴν ψυχικὴν ἡδονήν; εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς, [ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς] εὕρηται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ δύναται… …τοῦ προὴγουμένου μὴ ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιγέννημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι… …ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μὴ εἴπητε φρένας ἔχοντες· ἀνακόλουθα γὰρ ἐρεῖτε καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμῶν δόγμασιν. ὑπολείπεται λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἥδεσθαι τὴν κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡδονὴν πάλιν, ἵν᾽ ἐκεῖνα γένηται προηγούμενα καὶ οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

For what, then, are we going to feel this pleasure of the soul? If it is for the good of the soul itself, then the essence of the good has already been discovered. For it is impossible, if one thing be good, to justify taking delight in something else; … But you Epicureans ought to deny this, if you are in your right mind – otherwise you will be saying something inconsistent with both Epicurus and the rest of your doctrines. The only thing left for you to say is that pleasure of soul is pleasure in the things of the body, and then they become matters of prime importance, and the true nature of the good.

[U431]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1089D

ὅρα δὴ πρῶτον μὲν οἷα ποιοῦσιν τὴν εἴ τε ἡδονὴν ταύτην εἴ τε ἡδονὴν ἢ εὐστάθειαν ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταίροντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἐκεῖνο, τῷ μὴ στέγειν ἀπορρέουσαν καὶ περιολισθάνουσαν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῇ ἀρχῇ συνάπτειν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον, ὥς φησι, τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντες, αὖθις δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντες.

Now first observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body, compelled, since pleasure is not retained in the mind but leaks and slips away, to attach it to its source, shoring up "the pleasure of the body with the delight of the soul" as Epicurus puts it, but in the end passing once more by anticipation from the delight to the pleasure.

[U432]

Alciphron (fl. fortasse 160 CE), Letters, 3.55.8

(Autocletus to Hetoemaristus, i.e., "Gatecrasher" to "Prompt-to-breakfast")

Ζηνοκράτης δὲ ὁ Ἐπικούρειος τὴν ψάλτριαν ἐνηγκαλίζετο τακερὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν προσβλέπων ὑπομεμυκόσι τοῖς ὄμμασι, λέγων τουτὶ εἶναι τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἀόχλητον καὶ τὴν καταπύκνωσιν τοῦ ἡδομένου

Zenocrates the Epicurean took the harp-girls in his arms, gazing upon them from half-closed eyes with a languishing and melting look, and saying that this was "tranquility of the flesh" and "the full intensity of pleasure."

(Cf. Epicurus, Principal Doctrine 9)

[U433]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1087B

ἀνθρώπων βοώντων... ..."ἀεὶ δ᾽ ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη" καὶ πᾶσα διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιτερπὴς κίνησις ἐφ᾽ ἡδονήν τινα καὶ χαρὰν ψυχῆς ἀναπεμπομένη.

those people who shout, "We ever hold the table dear instead" {Homer, Odyssey, VIII 246, 248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

[U434]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 66.45

Apud Epicūrum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beātumque compōnitur, ut corpus sine dolōre sit, animus sine perturbātiōne.

With Epicurus there are two goods, from which that highest and blessed state is composed — that the body be without pain, and the mind without disturbance.

Haec bona nōn crēscunt sī plēna sunt: quō enim crēscet quod plēnum est?

These goods do not increase if they are full: for how can that which is full grow further?

Dolōre corpus caret: quid ad hanc accēdere indolentiam potest?

The body is free from pain: what can be added to this freedom from pain?

Animus cōnstat sibi et plācidus est: quid accēdere ad hanc tranquillitātem potest?

The mind is self-consistent and calm: what can be added to this tranquility?

Quem ad modum serēnitās caelī nōn recipit maiōrem adhūc clāritātem in sincerissimum nitōrem repurgāta,

Just as the serenity of the sky, once purified into the clearest brightness, admits no greater brightness still,

sic hominis corpus animūmque cūrantis et bonum suum ex utrōque nectentis perfectus est status et summam votī suī invēnit, sī nec aestus animō est nec dolor corporī.

so the state of a man who tends both body and mind and binds his good from both is perfect, and has found the height of his desire — if there is neither turmoil in the mind nor pain in the body.

Sī qua extrā blandīmenta contingunt, nōn augent summum bonum, sed, ut ita dicam, condiunt et oblectant.

If any external charms occur, they do not increase the highest good, but, so to speak, season and delight it.

Absolūtum enim illud hūmānae nātūrae bonum corporis et animī pāce contentum est.

For that complete good of human nature is content with the peace of body and mind.

We find mentioned in the works of Epicurus two goods, of which his Supreme Good, or blessedness, is composed, namely, a body free from pain and a soul free from disturbance. These goods, if they are complete, do not increase; for how can that which is complete increase? The body is, let us suppose, free from pain; what increase can there be to this absence of pain? The soul is composed and calm; what increase can there be to this tranquility? Just as fair weather, purified into the purest brilliancy, does not admit of a still greater degree of clearness, so too, when a man takes care of his body and of his soul, weaving the texture of his good from both, his condition is perfect, and he has found the consummation of his prayers, if there is no commotion in his soul or pain in his body. Whatever delights fall to his lot over and above these two things do not increase his Supreme Good; they merely season it, so to speak, and add spice to it. For the absolute good of man's nature is satisfied with peace in the body and peace in the soul.

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), Περὶ Μετεωρισμοῦ, P.Herc. 831, col. 8

...ἀγαθῶν [καὶ] εἰς φυ[γὰς] ἀναλόγων κακῶν [ἐκπί]πτειι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν [α]ἰωρούμενος ἀδιαλείπτως· ᾧ δ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν πέρατι κατακέκλειται τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κα[κ]όν, τούτῳ πᾶ[σ]α αἰώρα ψυχῆς [ἐ]κπέφευκται. συνεχίζωμέν τε ἐν τῷ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐνεργήματι καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς κατὰ φυσιολογίαν θεωρήμασιν...

...ἀγαθῶν καὶ εἰς φυγὰς ἀναλόγων κακῶν ἐκπίπτειι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν αἰωρούμενος ἀδιαλείπτως· ᾧ δ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν πέρατι κατακέκλειται τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, τούτῳ πᾶσα αἰώρα ψυχῆς ἐκπέφευκται. συνεχίζωμέν τε ἐν τῷ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐνεργήματι καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς κατὰ φυσιολογίαν θεωρήμασιν...

He who keeps goods and evils within natural limits, has already made his escape from every trouble of the soul.

[U435]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Benefits, 3.4.1

Hoc locō reddendum est Epicūrō testimōnium, quī adsiduē queritur, quod adversus praeterita sīmus ingrātī,

At this point testimony must be rendered to Epicurus, who constantly complains that we are ungrateful toward past things,

quod quaecumque percēpimus bona, nōn redūcamus nec inter voluptātēs numerēmus,

that whatever good things we have experienced, we do not recall nor count among pleasures,

cum certior nūlla sit voluptās quam quae iam eripī nōn potest.

since no pleasure is surer than that which can no longer be taken away.

Here I must do Epicurus the justice to say that he constantly complains of our ingratitude for past benefits, because we cannot bring back again, or count among our present pleasures, those good things which we have received long ago, although no pleasures can be more undeniable than those which cannot be taken from us.

[U436]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1099D

ὥσπερ λέγουσι, τὸ μεμνῆσθαι τῶν προτέρων ἀγαθῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν.

{Now suppose that, as they say} the recollection of past blessings is the greatest factor in a pleasant life.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.32.106 (at the beginning)

no text given in usener

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1089C

οὔτε τοὺς μετρίους καὶ σώφρονας εἰκὸς ἐνδιατρίβειν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲ ἅ περ ἔσκωπτεν αὐτὸν Καρνεάδης πράττοντα, οἷον ἐξ ἐφημερίδων ἀναλέγεσθαι, ποσάκις Ἡδείᾳ καὶ Λεοντίῳ συνῆλθον ἢ ποῦ Θάσιον ἔπιον (ἢ) πόσας εἰκάδας ἐδείπνησα πολυτελέστατα

It is also quite unlikely that persons of moderation and temperance should dwell on such thoughts {the memory of pleasures} and on the sort of thing with which Carneades taunted Epicurus – as if from an official journal of statistics how about "how often I had a meeting with Hedeia or Leontion" or "Where I drank Thasian wine" or "what twentieth of the month I had the most sumptuous dinner."]

[Obbink] *Epicurus was in the habit of recording such activities in his writings as though in "official records" (**ἐφημερίδες**) under such headings*

[U437]

St. Jerome (fl.c. 385 CE), Commentary on Isaiah, 11.38, 473E

Unde stulta Epicūrī sententia est, quī asserit recordātiōne praeteritōrum bonōrum mala praesentia mitigārī.

Whence foolish is the opinion of Epicurus, who asserts that present evils are softened by the recollection of past goods.

For this reason, Epicurus' opinion is foolish: he asserts that the ills of the present are mitigated by the memory of blessings of the past.

St. Jerome (fl.c. 385 CE), Commentary on Isaiah, 18.65, 788C

Eō quod in angustiīs constitūtī nequequāquam voluptātibus pristīnīs iuxtā errōrem Epicūrī animō perfruantur.

Because, when placed in difficulties, they by no means enjoy in their mind their former pleasures, contrary to the error of Epicurus.

... for those who find themselves in a state of anxiety cannot in any way rejoice in their souls from past pleasures – regardless of Epicurus' erroneous theory.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Sermon, 348.3, 1344A

Nam et hī fortissimōs sē iactant et nihil omnīnō timēre sē dīcunt,

For these men boast themselves to be very brave and say they fear nothing at all,

quia nec quidquam deum rēs hūmānās cūrāre arbitrantur et cōnsumptā istā vītā nūllam posteā crēdunt futūram,

because they think that no gods care for human affairs, and that after this life is spent, none will follow,

et sī quid eīs adversitātis in hāc ipsā contingit, eō sē mūnītōs existimant,

and if any adversity befalls them in this life itself, they think themselves fortified thereby,

quia corporis voluptātem, cum eam in ipsō corpore tenēre nōn possunt, possunt tamen animō cōgitāre

because, though they cannot hold bodily pleasure in the body itself, they can nevertheless think of it in the mind,

et eā cōgitātiōne sēsē oblectandō corporālis voluptātis beātitūdinem etiam contrā corporālis dolōris impetum custōdīre.

and by delighting themselves with that thought, they preserve the happiness of bodily pleasure even against the assault of bodily pain.

Numquid nōn et apud istōs dīlectiō forās mittit timōrem?

Does not love also cast out fear among these men?

Sed dīlectiō sordidissimae voluptātis, immō dīlectiō turpissimae vanitātis.

But it is the love of the most sordid pleasure, rather the love of the most shameful vanity.

Nam cum ipsam voluptātem dē membrīs corporis irrūēns dolor exclūserit,

For when pain, rushing upon the members of the body, has driven out pleasure itself,

per falsam eius imāginem in animō vanitās remanēbit,

through its false image vanity will remain in the soul,

quae vanitās tantum amātur, ut, cum eam vanus homō totīs vīribus cordis amplectitur, etiam dolōris saevitiā mitigētur.

which vanity is so loved that, when a vain man embraces it with all the strength of his heart, even the rage of pain is softened.

[U438]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.32.104

Illud quale tandem est, bona praeterita nōn effluere sapientī, mala meminisse nōn oportēre?

What sort of notion, pray, is this — that past goods do not slip away from the wise man, and that he ought not to remember evils?

And again, what is the sense of the maxim that the Sage will not let past blessings fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget past misfortunes?

[U439]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.34.95

Tōtumque hoc dē voluptāte sīc ille praecipit,

And this whole doctrine of pleasure he thus lays down,

ut voluptātem ipsam per sē, quia voluptās sit, semper optandam expetendamque putet,

that pleasure itself, for its own sake, because it is pleasure, should always be desired and sought,

eādemque ratiōne dolōrem ob id ipsum, quia dolor sit, semper esse fugiendum,

and by the same reasoning, pain, for the very reason that it is pain, must always be avoided,

itaque hāc ūsum compēnsātiōne sapientem,

and therefore that the wise man will make use of this compensation,

ut et voluptātem fugiat, sī ea maiōrem dolōrem effectūra sit,

so that he will avoid a pleasure if it is going to bring about greater pain,

et dolōrem suscipiat maiōrem efficientem voluptātem,

and will take on pain that produces greater pleasure,

omniaque iucunda, quamquam sensū corporis iūdicentur, ad animum referrī tamen;

and that all enjoyments, though judged by bodily sensation, are yet referred to the mind;

quō circā corpus gaudēre tam diū, dum praesentem sentīret voluptātem,

so that the body rejoices as long as it feels the present pleasure,

animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prōspicere venientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere:

and the mind both perceives the present pleasure together with the body, foresees the coming one, and does not allow the past to slip away,

ita perpetuās et contextās voluptātēs in sapiente fore semper,

so that continual and connected pleasures will always be in the wise man,

cum exspectātiō sperātārum voluptātum cum perceptārum memoriā iungerētur.

since the expectation of pleasures hoped for will be joined with the memory of pleasures already experienced.

The whole teaching of [Epicurus] about pleasure is that pleasure is, he thinks, always to be wished and sought for in and for itself because it is pleasure, and that on the same principle pain is always to be avoided for the simple reason that it is pain, and so the wise man will employ a system of counter-balancing which enables him both to avoid pleasure, should it be likely to ensure greater pain, and submit to pain where it ensures greater pleasure; and all pleasurable things, although judged of by the bodily senses, are notwithstanding transmitted on again to the soul; and for this reason while the body feels delight for the time that it has the sensation of present pleasure, it is the soul which has both the realization of present pleasure conjointly with the body and anticipates coming pleasure, and does not suffer past pleasure to slip away: thus the wise man will always have a perpetual continuation of pleasures, as the expectation of pleasures hoped for is combined with the recollection of pleasures already realized.

5. Proper Measurement of Pleasure and Pain

[U440]

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.20.46

Tū Epicūrum existimās ista voluisse aut libidinōsās eius fuisse sententias?

Do you think Epicurus meant those things, or that his opinions were licentious?

Egō vērō minimē.

By no means.

Videō enim ab eō dīcī multa sevērē, multa praeclāre.

For I see that many things are said by him with seriousness and with excellence.

Itaque ut saepe dixī, dē acūmine agitur eius, nōn dē mōribus.

Therefore, as I have often said, the question concerns his sharpness of mind, not his morals.

Quamvīs spernat voluptātēs eās quās modo laudāvit,

Although he may reject those pleasures which he just now praised,

egō tamen meminerō quod videātur eī summum bonum.

yet I shall remember what seems to him to be the highest good.

Someone will say: "So? Do you think that Epicurus meant that sort of thing – that his views were licentious?" I certainly do not. For I see that many of his utterances breathe an austere and many a noble spirit. Consequently, as I have often said, the question at issue is his intelligence, not his morality. However much he may scorn the pleasures he has just approved, yet I shall remember what it was that he thinks the highest good.

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), *De Finibus*, 2.10.30

Hanc in mōtū voluptātem … interdum ita extenuat, ut M. Curium putēs loquī.

This pleasure "in motion" … he sometimes so tones down that you would think Marcus Curius himself were speaking.

The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure… at one moment he so disparages it that you would think you were listing to Manius Curius!

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 5.33.94

Hoc locō multa ab Epicūrēīs disputantur,

At this point many arguments are made by the Epicureans,

eaeque voluptātēs singillātim extenuantur, quārum genera contemnunt, quaerunt tamen copiām.

and those pleasures, the kinds of which they claim to despise, they individually make light of, yet still seek them in abundance.

Nam et obscaenās voluptātēs, dē quibus multa ab illīs habētur ōrātiō,

For the indecent pleasures too, about which they speak much,

facilēs, commūnēs, in mediō sitās esse dīcunt,

they say are easy, common, and lying open to all,

eāsque, sī nātūra requīrat, nōn genere aut locō aut ōrdine, sed formā aetāte figūrā metiendās putant,

and if nature requires them, they think they should be measured not by kind, place, or rank, but by form, age, and appearance,

ab iīsque abstinēre minimē esse difficile,

and that to abstain from them is by no means difficult,

sī aut valētūdō aut officium aut fāma postulēt,

if health or duty or reputation should require it,

omnīnōque genus hoc voluptātum optābile esse, sī nōn obsit, prōdesse numquam.

and that this class of pleasures is in general to be chosen if it does no harm, but never brings any benefit.

On this point, the disciples of Epicurus enter upon a long argument. Those pleasures belonging to the kinds that they despise, they thoroughly belittle. Yet all the same, they look out for a plentiful supply of them. For obscene pleasures (about which they linger at length) are, as they say, easy to satisfy, common, and within reach of all. Should nature call for them, the standard of value (which they think should not be birth, position or rank, but beauty, age, physical constitution) is by no means difficult to abstain from, even when health or duty or reputation are not at stake. In general this kind of pleasure is desirable – but is never of benefit.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.40.113 (Cotta)

At hās leviorēs dūcis voluptātēs, quibus quasi titillātiō (Epicūrī enim hoc verbum est) adhibētur sensibus.

But you count as “lighter” those pleasures to which a kind of titillation (for this is Epicurus’ own word) is applied to the senses.

Quo usque lūdis?

How long will you play games?

Nam etiam Philo noster ferre nōn poterat, aspernārī Epicūrēōs mollēs et dēlicātās voluptātēs:

For even our Philo could not bear that the Epicureans should reject soft and delicate pleasures;

summā enim memoriā prōnuntiābat plūrimās Epicūrī sententiās hīs ipsīs verbīs, quibus erant scrīptae.

for he used to recite from perfect memory very many sayings of Epicurus in these very words in which they were written.

Perhaps you will say that all these pleasures are merely trifling "titillations of the senses" in Epicurus' words. If so, you must be joking, Our friend Philo would never concede that the Epicureans despised the pleasures of luxury and sensuality. He used to quote from memory many sayings of Epicurus, in the exact words of the written texts.

[U441]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 4.12.29

Quod dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptāte, quae minimae sint voluptātēs, eās obscūrārī saepe et obrui.

> Epicurus also says this about pleasure — that the smallest pleasures are often dimmed and overwhelmed.
>
> Regarding pleasure, Epicurus himself says that the smallest pleasures are often eclipsed and forgotten.

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de libris suis c. 17 t. 19 p. 48 K.

GALENVS scripsit Περὶ τῆς κατ᾽Ἐπίκουρον ἀμαυροῦ ἡδονῆς Β

[U442]

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14.21.3

αὐτοί γέ τοι (οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον) φασὶν οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι ι καὶ πάντα πόνον ἐκτρέπεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ συμβέβηκε καὶ μάλα εἰκότως. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κριτήρια καὶ ἑαυτὰ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ κρινόμενα, τὸ μέντοι πάθος ἑαυτὸ μόνον. ὅτι δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτοί. καί περ γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλγηδόνα κακόν, ὅμως οὐκ ἀεί φασι δεῖν τὴν μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ φεύγειν, μετρεῖσθαι γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιῷ. δῆλον οὖν ὡς τό γε ποσὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ὁ λόγος κρίνει· τὸ γὰρ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὑπομεῖναι τούσδε τινὰς τοὺς πόνους, ὅπως ἡσθῶμεν ἡδονὰς μείζους. καὶ τὸ συμφέρει τῶνδέ τινων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῶμεν ἀλγηδόνας χαλεπωτέρας. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα λόγος ὁ κρίνων ἐστίν.

> It is better to endure these particular pains, so that we might experience greater pleasures; and it is advantageous to refrain from these particular pleasures so that we might not suffer from more burdensome pains.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), On Leisure (to Serenus), 7.3

Ita et haec ipsa voluptāria secta in āctū est.

> Thus even this very pleasure-loving school is active in practice.

Quidnī? Cum ipse dicat Epicurus aliquandō sē recessūrum ā voluptāte,

> Why not? Since Epicurus himself says that he will sometimes withdraw from pleasure,

dolōrem etiam adpetitūrum,

> and even seek out pain,

sī aut voluptātī imminēbit paenitentia aut dolor minor prō graviōre sūmētur.

> if either regret will threaten the pleasure, or a lesser pain will be taken in exchange for a greater one.
>
> Thus, even this pleasure-loving sect is itself committed to action – and why not? Since Epicurus himself declares that he will at times withdraw from pleasure, will even seek pain if he foresees that he will either regret that pleasure, or will be able to substitute a lesser pain for one that is greater.

[U443]

Maximus of Tyre (fl.c. 190 BCE), Dissertations, 3.3

φαῦλόν τι χρῆμα ἡδονή; οὐκ ἂν ἦν ξύμφυτον οὐδὲ τῶν σῳζόντων ἡμᾶς τὸ πρεσβύτατον. τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν θρυλούμενα ἐς αὐτήν, ἡ Σαρδαναπάλου τρυφὴ καὶ ἡ Μηδικὴ χλιδὴ καὶ ἡ Ἰωνικὴ ἀβρότης καὶ τράπεζαι Σικελικαὶ καὶ ὀρχήσεις Συβαριτικαὶ καὶ ἑταῖραι Κορίνθιαι, ταῦτα ἀθρόα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ποικιλώτερα οὐχ ἡδονῆς ἔργα ἀλλὰ τέχνης καὶ λόγου, παρανομησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἡδονὰς δι᾽ εὐπορίαν τῶν τεχνῶν ὀψὲ τοῦ χρόνου. ὥσπερ δὲ οὐδεὶς λοιδορεῖται τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι καλὸν τῇ φύσει, κἂν ἀπάγῃ τις αὐτοῦ

τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ φύσει καλόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῇ ἡδονῇ λοιδορητέον ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδονῇ κακῶς. δύο δὲ ὄντων τούτων ἐν ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ, ἡδονῆς καὶ λόγου, λόγῳ μὲν ἡδονὴ κραθεῖσα μηδὲν ἀφελοῦσα τοῦ ἀναγκαίου προσέθηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγωγότερον, λόγος δὲ ἡδοναῖς προσγενόμενος αὐξήσας αὐτῶν δι' εὐπορίας τὸ μέτριον ἀφεῖλε τοῦ φύσει τερπνοῦ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον

> "Is Pleasure really worthless? In that case, it would not come naturally, nor be the most venerable of all the forces that promote our survival. As for the well-worn reproaches that sophists bring against it – Sarandapallus' luxury, and the extravagance of the Medes, and Ionian decadence, and Sicilian gourmandizing, and Subaritic dances and Corinthian courtesans – all this, and anything yet more elaborate, is not the work of Pleasure, but of artifice and calculation, as men have used their recently acquired abundance of technical resources to break Pleasure's laws. Just as nobody abuses Reason and says that it does not possess natural beauty, even if someone diverts its application to an end that is not naturally noble, so you should not abuse Pleasure either, rather than those who put it to bad uses. Of these two elements in the human soul, Pleasure and Reason, Pleasure when mixed with Reason removes none of Reason's power to compel, but adds pleasures, increases their tendency to moderation by making them easier to come by, while removing the element of compulsiveness from what is naturally pleasant.

[U444]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.13.28

Epicurō placet opiniōnem malī aegritūdinem esse, eā nātūrā ut quīcumque intueātur in aliquod maius malum, sī id sibi accidisse opīnētur, sit continuō in aegritūdine.

> Epicurus holds that the opinion of evil is grief, of such a nature that whoever looks upon some greater evil, if he thinks it has happened to himself, is immediately in distress.
>
> Epicurus holds that the distress which the idea of evil produces is a natural effect, in the sense that anyone who contemplates some considerable evil at once feels distress, should he imagine that it has befallen him.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.15.32

Epicurus censet necesse esse omnīs in aegritūdine esse, quī sē in malīs esse arbitrentur, sīue illa ante prōuīsa et exspectāta sint sīue inueterāuerint.

> Epicurus thinks it necessary that all who believe themselves to be in misfortunes are in distress, whether those misfortunes have been foreseen and expected or have become longstanding.

Nam neque uetustāte minui mala nec fierī praemeditāta leuiōra, stultamque etiam esse meditatiónem futūrī malī aut fortasse nē futūrī quidem.

> For evils, he says, are neither lessened by time nor made lighter by forethought, and the meditation of future evil—or perhaps of what may never even happen—is foolish.

Satis esse odiōsum malum omne, cum uenisset.

> Every evil, when it has come, is sufficiently hateful.

Quī autem semper cogitāuisset accidere posse aliquid aduersi, eī fierī illud sempiternum malum; sī uerō nē futūrum quidem sit, frustra suscipī miseriam uoluntāriam: ita semper angī aut accipiendō aut cogitandō malō.

But whoever has always thought that some misfortune could happen to him makes that an everlasting evil for himself; and if it is not even going to happen, he needlessly takes on voluntary misery — thus always suffering either by undergoing or by thinking of evil.

Leuātiōnem autem aegritūdinis in duābus rēbus pōnit, auocatione a cogitandā molestia et reuocatione ad contemplandās voluptātes: parere enim censet animum ratiōnī posse et quō illa ducat sequī.

He places relief of distress in two things: in distraction from thinking about troubles and in recalling pleasant things; for he believes the mind can obey reason and follow wherever it leads.

Vetat igitur ratiō intuērī molestiās, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem facit aciem ad miseriās contemplandās,

Reason therefore forbids looking upon troubles, draws the mind away from bitter thoughts, and dulls its sharp sight for viewing miseries,

a quibus cum cecinit receptuī, impellit rursum et incitat ad conspiciendās totāque mente contrectandās variās voluptātes, quibus ille et praeteritārum memoriā et spē consequentium sapientis uitam refertam putat.

and when it has sounded the retreat from them, it urges and drives the mind again to behold and handle with full attention various pleasures — with which, through the memory of past and the hope of future ones, he thinks the wise man's life is filled.

Haec nostrō more nōs diximus, Epicuriī dicunt suō; sed quae dicant videāmus: quō modō, neglegāmus.

We have said this in our own manner; the Epicureans say it in theirs. Let us see what they say — as to the manner, let us disregard it.

Epicurus supposes that all men must necessarily feel distress if they think themselves encompassed by evils, whether previously foreseen and anticipated, or long established. For according to him, evils are not lessened by duration nor lightened by previous consideration, and besides, he thinks it folly to dwell upon an evil which has still to come or maybe will not come at all; all evil, he says, is hateful enough when it has come, but the man who is always thinking a mishap may come is making that evil perpetual. But if it is not destined to come at all, he is needlessly the victim of a wretchedness he has brought upon himself; thus he is always tortured either by undergoing or by reflecting on the evil. 33: Alleviation of distress, however, Epicurus finds in two directions, namely in calling the soul away from reflecting upon vexation and in a "recall" to the consideration of pleasures. For he thinks the soul able to obey reason and follow its guidance. Reason therefore (in his view) forbids attention to vexations, withdraws the soul from morose reflections, blunts its keenness in dwelling upon wretchedness and, sounding a retreat from such thoughts, eagerly urges it on again to discover a variety of pleasures and engage in them with all the powers of the mind; and according to this philosopher the wise man's life is packed with the recollection of past and the prospect of future pleasures. This view we have stated in our usual style, the Epicureans state it in theirs. But let us look at their meaning – let us ignore their style.

[U445]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 29

μηδὲ αἰτιώμεθα τὴν σάρκα ὡς τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίαν μηδ᾽ εἰς τὰ πράγματα τρέπωμεν τὰς δυσφορίας, ἐν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας μᾶλλον ζητῶμεν καὶ ἀπορρήξαντες πᾶσαν ματαίαν τῶν ἐφημέρων ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐλπίδα ὅλοι γενώμεθα ἑαυτῶν.

"Let us neither censure the flesh as a cause of great evils nor attribute our distress to external circumstances." Rather, let us seek their causes in the soul, and by breaking away from every vain yearning and hope for fleeting fancies, let us become totally in control of ourselves.

[U446]

Ēnit Epicurus homō minimē malus uel potius uir optimus:

Epicurus, then, is a man not at all bad — or rather, an excellent man.

tantum monet quantum intellegit.

He advises only as much as he understands.

Neglege, inquit, dolōrem.

"Disregard pain," he says.

quis hoc dicit? idem quī dolōrem summum malum.

Who says this? The same man who calls pain the greatest evil.

uix satis constanter.

Hardly with enough consistency.

audiāmus. "Sī summus dolor est," inquit, "breuem necesse est esse...

Let us hear him: "If pain is the greatest possible, it must necessarily be short...

summum (dīcō) quō nihil sit superius, breue quō nihil breuius.

I mean the greatest than which there is nothing greater, and the shortest than which there is nothing shorter.

contemnō magnitūdinem dolōris, ā quā mē breuitās temporis uindicābit ante paene quam uēnerit...

I despise the magnitude of pain, from which the shortness of time will free me almost before it has arrived.

dolor diuturnus habet laetitiae plūs quam molestiae.

Long-lasting pain has more of joy than of distress.

Epicurus steps forward – in no sense an ill-meaning person, but rather a gentleman of the best intentions. He gives advice to the extent of his ability. "Ignore pain" he admonishes. Who says this? The same thinker who pronounces pain the highest evil. This is not quite consistent. Let us listen. "If pain is at its highest" says he, "it must be short." ... "By at the highest I mean that which has nothing higher; by short I mean that which has nothing shorter. I scorn a degree of pain from which a brief space of time will deliver me almost before it has come."

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Duties, 3.33.117

Quamuis enim multis locīs dicat Epicurus, sīcutī dicit, satis fortiter dē dolōre, tamen nōn id spectandum est quid dicat, sed quid consentāneum sit eī dicere, quī bona voluptāte termināuerit, mala dolōre.

For although in many passages Epicurus speaks, as he does, quite bravely about pain, yet it is not what he says that must be considered, but what it is consistent for him to say — he who has defined good by pleasure and evil by pain.

However many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks with proper courage in regards to pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.

Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 45

Sic et Epicurus omnem cruciātum dolōremque dēpretiat, modicum quidem contemptibilem prōnuntiandō, magnum uerō nōn diuturnum.

So likewise Epicurus devalues all torment and pain — declaring the slight kind contemptible, and the great kind not long-lasting.

So indeed Epicurus renders every pain and torment a little less frightening, declaring that a moderate pain is trifling, while a severe one is not long-lasting.

Zeno the Epicurean (Zeno of Sidon), by way of Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.17.38

Eum esse beātum quī praes entibus voluptātibus fruerētur cōnfīderetque sē frūitūrum... dolōre nōn interueniente, aut sī interuenīret, sī summus foret, futūrum breuem, sīn prōductior, plūs habitūrum iūcundī quam malī.

That man is happy who enjoys present pleasures and is confident that he will enjoy them — with no pain intervening; or if it does intervene, if it is greatest, it will be short; but if more prolonged, he will have more of pleasure than of pain.

"Blessed is he who has the enjoyment of present pleasure and the assurance that he would have enjoyment either throughout life or for a great part of life without the intervention of pain, or should pain come, that it would be short-lived if extreme, but if prolonged it would still allow more that was pleasant than evil."

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 78.7

Magnōs cruciātūs habet morbus, sed hōs tolerābilēs interualla faciunt, nam summī dolōris intentiō inuenit fīnem.

Illness brings great torments, but intervals make these bearable, for the intensity of the greatest pain finds its end.

Nēmō potest ualdē dolēre et diū: sic nōs amantissima nostrī nātūra disposuit, ut dolōrem aut tolerābilem aut breuem faceret.

No one can suffer greatly and for long; so our most loving nature has arranged it, that pain should be either endurable or short.

Illness involves considerable physical torments. These are made bearable by their intermittency. For when pain is at its most sever the very intensity finds means of ending it. Nobody can be in acute pain and feel it for long. Nature in her unlimited kindness to us has so arranged things as to make pain either bearable or brief.

[U447]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On How to Study Poetry, 36B

ἐπιρρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου "θάρσει· πόνου γὰρ ἄκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον· ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ παρ' Ἐπικούρου θρυλούμενον, ὡς οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὧν τὸ μὲν εἴρηκεν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ἐναργῶς, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἰρημένῳ παρακείμενόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μέγας καὶ σύντονος οὐ παραμένει πόνος, οὐκ ἔστι μέγας ὁ παραμένων οὐδὲ δυσκαρτέρητος.

Upon the words of Aeschylus, "Fear not! Great stress of pain is not for long" we ought to remark that this is the oft-repeated and much admired statement originating with Epicurus, namely, "great pains shortly expend their force, and long-continued pains have no magnitude."

Marcus Aurelius (fl. 161 CE), Meditations, 7.33

περὶ πόνου· τὸ μὲν ἀφόρητον ἐξάγει, τὸ δὲ χρονίζον φορητόν.

Of pain: "When unbearable, it destroys us, when lasting, it is bearable"

Marcus Aurelius (fl. 161 CE), Meditations, 64

ἐπὶ μέντοι τῶν πλείστων πόνων καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου σοι βοηθείτω, ὅτι οὔτε ἀφόρητον οὔτε αἰώνιον, ἐὰν τῶν ὅρων μνημονεύῃς καὶ μὴ προσδοξάζῃς

With most pains, however, call to your rescue even Epicurus, when he says that a pain is "never unbearable or interminable" so that that you remember its limitations and add nothing to it by imagination.

[U448]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1103D

οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Ἐπικούρειος λόγος ἐν νόσοις δειναῖς καὶ πόνοις ὑπερβάλλουσιν· ἐλπίζεις τι χρηστὸν παρὰ θεῶν δι' εὐσέβειαν; τετύφωσαι "τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτ' ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται" [sent. 1]. βέλτιόν τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὸν βίον ἐπινοεῖς; ἐξηπάτησαι, "τὸ γὰρ λυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς " [sent. 2]. πῶς οὖν ἄνθρωπε φαγεῖν με καὶ χαίρειν κελεύεις; ὅτι νὴ Δία χειμαζομένῳ τὸ ναυάγιον ἐγγύς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβάλλων συνάψει θανάτῳ

This is in fact the Epicurean argument for perilous disease and excruciating pain: you hope for some kind of treatment from the gods for all your piety? You are deluded – "what is blessed and imperishable is neither vulnerable to feelings of anger nor indebtedness." {Principal Doctrine 1} You conceive of something after this life better than what you found in it? You are deceived – "for what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us." {Principal Doctrine 2} So why, poor fellow, do you tell me to eat and rejoice? Why else but because for you, who are laboring in the storm, shipwreck imminent: "excessive pain leads straight to death."

[U449]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 66.47

Dabō apud Epicūrum tibi etiam nunc simillimam huic nostrae dīuīsiōnem bonōrum.

I will grant you that even now in Epicurus there is a division of goods very similar to our own.

Alia enim sunt apud illum quae malit contingere sibi, ut corporis quiētem ab omnī incommodō līberam et animī remissiōnem bonōrum suōrum contemplātiōne gaudentis.

For with him there are some things he would prefer to happen to himself — such as freedom of the body from every discomfort and relaxation of the mind rejoicing in the contemplation of its own goods.

Alia sunt quae quamuis nōlit accidere, nihilō minus laudat et cōnprobat, tamquam illam quam paulō ante dīcēbam, malae ualētūdinis et dolōrum grauissimōrum perpessiōnem, in quā Epicūrus fuit illō summō ac fortunātissimō diē suō.

There are others which, although he would prefer not to occur, he nonetheless praises and approves — like that endurance of bad health and of the most severe pains I mentioned a little earlier, which Epicurus himself experienced on that highest and most blessed day of his life.

Ergō et apud Epicūrum sunt haec bona, quae mallēs nōn experīrī, sed quia ita rēs tulit, et amplectanda et laudanda et exaequanda summīs sunt.

Therefore, even with Epicurus there are these goods, which you would rather not experience — yet since circumstances have brought them, they are to be embraced, praised, and ranked equal with the highest.

I can show you at this moment in the writings of Epicurus a graded list of goods just like that of our own school. For there are some things, he declares, which he prefers should fall to his lot, such as bodily rest free from all inconvenience, and relaxation of the soul as it takes delight in the contemplation of its own goods. And there are other things which, though he would prefer that they did not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves – for example, the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epicurus displayed on his famous "last and most blessed day" of his life. {cf. U138} … We therefore find mentioned, even by Epicurus, those goods which one would prefer not to experience; which, however, because circumstances have decided thus, must be welcomed and approved and placed on a level with the highest goods.

6. Against the School of Aristippos

Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 14:18.31, 763D

Σωκράτους δ’’ ἑταῖρος Ἀρίστιππος ἦν ὁ τὴν καλουμένην Κυρηναϊκὴν συστησάμενος αἵρεσιν, ἀφ’ ἧς τὰς ἀφορμὰς Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τέλους ἔκθεσιν εἴληφεν.

Now Aristippos was a companion of Socrates, and was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epicurus has taken occasion for his exposition of man's proper {ethical} end.

Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 20.13, p. 768C;
Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 4, p. 1089A

οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ – ἐκ μιᾶς οἰνοχόης Ἐπικούρῳ πεπωκότες.

The Cyrenaics … who have drunk from the same jug as Epicurus.

[U450]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.136 (see U2);
Diogenes Laertius, 2.87 (Aristippos)

ἡδονὴν μέντοι (φασὶν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ) τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν καὶ τέλος εἶναι, καθά φησι καὶ Παναίτιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν αἱρέσεων, οὐ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐπ' ἀναιρέσει ἀλγηδόνων καὶ οἷον ἀνοχλησίαν, ἣν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἀποδέχεται, τέλος εἶναί φασιν.

{The Cyrenaics say} that bodily pleasure is the End-Goal, according to Panaetius in his work On the Philosophical Schools, and not the static pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of 'freedom from discomfort' which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 2.89 (Aristippos)

ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ' Ἐπικούρῳ, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονὴ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών — ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερα --, μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις.

The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them {the Cyrenaics} not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one is, as it were, asleep.

Antiochus of Ascalon (fl.c. 95 BCE), by way of Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies 2.21

τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀρχομένων τούς τε Κυρηναϊκοὺς εἶναι καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τούτους γὰρ τέλος εἶναι λέγειν διαρρήδην τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, τέλειον δὲ ἀγαθὸν μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἡδονὴν εἶναι λέγει.

For of those that are ruled by pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epicurus; for these expressly said that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good. Epicurus also says that the removal of pain is pleasure.

[U451]

Antiochus of Ascalon (fl.c. 95 BCE),
by way of Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies 2.21 p. 179.36

οὗτοι οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἡδονῆς Ἐπικούρου, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὴν τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἀθετοῦσι, νεκροῦ κατάστασιν ἀποκαλοῦντες χαίρειν γὰρ ἡμᾶς μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμιλίαις καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοτιμίαις. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶσαν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς οἴεται ἐπὶ πρωτοπαθούσῃ τῇ σαρκὶ γενέσθαι.

These Cyrenaics reject Epicurus' definition of pleasure, i.e., the removal of pain, calling that the condition of a corpse; because we rejoice not only on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while Epicurus thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations of the flesh.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), Lives of Philosophers, 2.89 (Aristippos)

οὐ πάσας μέντοι τὰς ψυχικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας (λέγουσιν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ) ἐπὶ σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀλγηδόσι γίνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψιλῇ τῇ τῆς πατρίδος εὐημερίᾳ ἤ περ τῇ ἰδίᾳ χαρὰν ἐγγίνεσθαι.

{The Cyrenaics assert that} not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity.

[U452]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.137

ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν ψυχικῶν, κολάζεσθαι γοῦν τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας σώματι· ὃ δὲ τὰς ψυχικάς· τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον· οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς.

{Epicurus} further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 2.90 (Aristippos)

πολὺ μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν (ἡδονῶν λέγουσιν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ) τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χείρους τὰς σωματικάς· ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας.

{The Cyrenaics} insist that bodily pleasures are afar better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.7.7

Epicurus summum bonum in voluptāte animī esse cēnset, Aristippus in voluptāte corporīs.

Epicurus holds that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind, Aristippus in the pleasure of the body.

Epicurus thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind. Aristippos holds that it is in the pleasure of the body.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 8.5

Sapiēns ergō nōn fuit quī summum bonum crēdidit animī voluptātem, quoniam illa, sīue sēcūritās sīue gaudium est, commūnis est omnibus.

Therefore, he was not wise who believed the highest good to be the pleasure of the mind, since that — whether it be tranquility or joy — is common to all.

That man was not wise, then, who believed that pleasure of the mind was the highest good, since whether that is security or joy, it is common to all.

[U453]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), Lives of Philosophers, 2.89 (Aristippos)

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν (οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ) ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅ περ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα.

{The Cyrenaics} do not admit that pleasure can be derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. And because of this they assert that movements affecting the mind are exhausted in the course of time.

7. Limits of Desires

[U454]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.9.27 & 28

Illud ipsum nōn nimium probō et tantum patiōr, philosophum loquī dē cupiditātibus fīniendīs.

That very thing I do not much approve, though I tolerate it — that a philosopher should talk about ending desires.

An potest cupiditās fīnīrī?

But can desire be ended?

Sed haec quidem līberius ab eō dīcuntur et saepius.

Yet these things, indeed, are said by him more freely and more often.

Quod equidem nōn reprehendō, est enim tantī philosophī tamque nōbilis audacter sua dēcrēta dēfendere.

Which I for my part do not blame, for it befits so great and so renowned a philosopher to defend his doctrines boldly.

For my own part, I cannot cordially approve – I merely tolerate – a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept with bounds? 28: This classification of the desires is then a subject on which Epicurus is found of enlarging. Not that I find fault with him for that – we expect so great and famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly.

[U455]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 13.4

Quī voluptātem sequitur, uidētur... peruentūrus in turpia, nisi aliquis distīnxerit illī voluptātēs, ut sciāt, quae ex eīs intrā nātūrāle dēsīderium dēsīstant, quae praecēps ferantur, īnfīnītaeque sint et quō magis implentur, eō magis inexplebiles.

He who pursues pleasure seems likely to fall into shameful things — unless someone distinguishes pleasures for him, so that he may know which of them stop within natural desire, and which rush headlong on, being infinite, and the more they are filled, the more insatiable they become.

He who follows pleasure is seen to be weakly, broken, losing his manliness, and on the sure path to baseness unless someone shall establish for him some distinction between pleasures, so that he may know which of them lie within the bounds of natural desire, and which of them sweep headlong onward and are unbounded, being all the more insatiable the more they are satisfied.

[U456]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.33.93

Vīdēs, crēdō, ut Epicurus cupiditātum genera dīuīserit, nōn nimis fortasse subtīliter, utiliter tamen:

You see, I think, how Epicurus divided the kinds of desires — not perhaps very subtly, yet usefully.

partim esse nātūrālēs et necessāriās, partim nātūrālēs et nōn necessāriās, partim neutrum.

Some, he says, are natural and necessary; some natural but not necessary; and some neither.

Necessāriās satiārī posse paene nihilō, diuitiās enim nātūrae esse parābilēs;

The necessary ones can be satisfied with almost nothing, for the riches of nature are easily obtainable.

secundum autem genus cupiditātum nec ad potiendum difficile esse cēnset nec uerō ad carendum;

The second kind of desires, he thinks, are neither hard to obtain nor hard to do without.

tertiās, quod essent plānē inānēs neque necessitātem modō, sed nē nātūram quidem attingerent, funditus ēiciendās putāuit.

But the third — because they are utterly empty and touch neither necessity nor even nature — he thought must be rooted out entirely.

You are, I take it, aware that Epicurus has distinguished different kinds of desire, not perhaps with too much exactness, but nevertheless in a way that is of service. In part, they are, he says natural and necessary, in part natural and not necessary, in part neither one nor the other; scarcely anything is required to satisfy the necessary pleasures, for the stores of nature are available; and the second kind of desires is, he thinks, neither hard to satisfy nor indeed hard to go without; the third kind he thought should be utterly rejected, because they were completely meaningless and so far from counting as necessary, had no relation to nature either.

Scholion on Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.13, 1118B

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὕτω διαιροῦσι· τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μέν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, αἳ δὲ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι οὔτε φυσικαὶ ἀλλὰ κατὰ κενὴν γινόμεναι δόξαν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῆς τροφῆς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος ἀναγκαία᾽ ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων φυσικὴ μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ᾽ ἡ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε σιτίων ἢ τοιᾶσδε ἐσθῆτος ἢ τοιῶνδε ἀφροδισίων οὔτε φυσικὴ οὔτε ἀναγκαία.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Beasts are Rational, 6, 989B

ἡ μὲν οὖν σωφροσύνη βραχύτης τίς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τάξις, ἀναιροῦσα μὲν τὰς ἐπεισάκτους καὶ περιττάς, καιρῷ δὲ καὶ μετριότητι κοσμοῦσα τὰς ἀναγκαίας. ταῖς δ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαις ἐνορᾷς που μυρίαν διαφοράν· [αἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν βρῶσιν] καὶ τὴν πόσιν ἅμα τῷ φυσικῷ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχουσιν ἄλλαις δέ, αἷς ἀρχὰς ἡ φύσις ἐνδίδωσιν, ἔστι δή που καὶ μὴ χρώμενον ἔχειν ἱκανῶς ἀπαλλαγέντα· φυσικαὶ μὲν οὖν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι δ᾽ ἐκλήθησαν. τὸ δὲ τῶν μήτ᾽ ἀναγκαίων μήτε φυσικῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ δόξης κενῆς δι' ἀπειροκαλίαν ἐπικεχυμένων γένος ὑμῶν μὲν ὀλίγου δεῖν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀπέκρυψεν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἁπάσας, ἔχει δὲ καθά περ ξένων ὄχλος ἔπηλυς ἐν δήμῳ καὶ βιαζόμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐγγενεῖς πολίτας.

Temperance, then, is a curtailment and an ordering of the desires that eliminate those that are extraneous or superfluous and discipline in modest and timely fashion those that are necessary. You can, of course, observe countless differences in the desires … and the desire to eat and drink is at once natural and necessary, while the pleasures of love, which, though they find their origin in nature, yet may be forgone and discarded without much inconvenience, have been called natural but unnecessary. But there are desires of another kind, neither necessary nor natural, that are imported in a deluge from without as a result of your inane illusions and because you lack true culture. So great is their multitude that the natural desires are, every one of them, all but overwhelmed, as though an alien rabble were overpowering the native citizenry. But beasts have souls completely inaccessible and closed to these adventitious passions and live their lives as free from empty illusions as though they dwelt far form the sea. They fall short in the matter of delicate and luxurious living, but solidly protect their sobriety and the better regulation of their desires since those that dwell within them are neither numerous nor alien.

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.49

ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν ὅσον εἰς πολυτέλειαν πέπτωκεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαίαν ἔχειν φασὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀλγοῦντός τινος ἀναγκαίως γιγνομένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἢ λυποῦντος ἢ νύττοντος μόνον ἐν τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίροντος, τὴν δὲ ὅλως ἀπὸ τῶν κενῶν καὶ διεψευσμένων δογμάτων, ἣ εἰς οὐδὲν φυσικὸν ἀνάγεται ἔλλειμμα οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὸ διαλῦον τὴν σύστασιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι. ἱκανὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τυχόντα διακρατῆσαι ταῦτα ἦν, ὧν ἀναγκαίως δεῖται ἡ φύσις. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν λιτότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν ὀλιγότητά ἐστιν εὐπόριστα.

But otherwise, insofar as one has fallen into extravagance, they say that one has a desire that is not necessary and does not arise by necessity from something that causes pain, but from something which causes distress or discomfort only by being absent, or else from delight, or wholly from empty and misleading beliefs; and such a desire does not refer back to any natural lack or to something which by its absence ruins our constitution. Ordinary foods suffice to provide what nature necessarily requires, and because they are simple and small in quantity, they are easy to get. Hence, {Porphyry's own inference:} a meat-eater needs inanimate foods as well, but someone satisfied with inanimate food needs half as much, and that easy to get and needing small expense to prepare.

[U457]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 31

ἔρωτι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς πᾶσα ταραχώδης καὶ ἐπίπονος ἐπιθυμία ἐκλύεται.

The love of true philosophy dissolves every anxious and painful longing.

[U458]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.54

παρὰ δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ὁμογενεῖς αἰτίας καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἄπληστος ὄρεξις γίγνεται καὶ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δόξης τῷ συναυξήσειν τε νομίζειν τὸ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν σὺν αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ πλείονος χρόνου καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον δεινὸν ὡς ἀπέραντον φοβεῖσθαι. ἡδονὴ δὲ ἡ διὰ πολυτελείας οὐδὲ ἐγγὺς τείνει τῆς δι' αὐταρκείας τῷ πεπειραμένῳ γιγνομένησ' πολὺ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν τῷ κατανοεῖν ὅσων αὐτὸς χρείαν ἔχει. ἀρθείσης γὰρ πολυτελείας, ἀρθείσης τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια πτοίας, * τῆς ἔξω φιλοτιμίας τίς λοιπὸν χρεία πλούτου ἀργοῦ εἰς μηδὲν ἡμῖν χρησιμεύοντος ἀλλὰ μόνον βαρήσοντος;

ἕως τὸ πεπληρῶσθαι γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου κόρου ἡδονὴ ἀκραιφνής. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπεθίζειν ὡς οἷόν τε τῆς τοῦ κόρου ἡδονῆς διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν πεῖναν πλησμονῆς καταγεύεσθαι, ἵνα [εὖ ἔχων] διὰ πάντων διέλθῃ, καὶ ὅρον θεῖναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, μὴ τὸ ἀόριστον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο εἰληφέναι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἐνέσται διὰ τῆς αὐταρκείας kai ὁμοιώσεως τῷ θεῷ' οὕτως οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ποθήσει οὐδὲ τὸν χρόνον ὡς προσθήσοντα αὐτῷ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. οὕτως δ' αὖ ἀληθινῶς πλουτήσει τῷ φυσικῷ ὅρῳ τὸν πλοῦτον μετρῶν, οὐ δόξαις κεναῖς· οὕτως οὐκ ἐπ' ἐλπίδι κρεμήσεται μεγίστης ἡδονῆς πίστιν οὐκ ἐχούσῃ τοῦ γενέσθαι (θορυβωδεστάτη γὰρ αὕτη), ἀλλ' ἐν αὐταρκείᾳ τοῦ παρόντος καὶ γεγονότος ἤδη μενεῖ οὐδὲ ἀγωνιάσει μὴ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον παραμένῃ

From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for longevity, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit. The pleasure experienced from luxury comes nowhere near the pleasure experienced from self-sufficiency; it is very pleasant to think just how little one needs. Take away luxury, take away sexual excitement and the desire for external recognition, and what further need is there for inert wealth, which is useful to us for nothing but only weighs us down? This is the way to be filled full, and the pleasure from this kind of satiety is unmixed. We must also make the body unaccustomed, so far as is possible, to the pleasures of excess, but accustomed to the fulfillment which comes from satisfying hunger; we must eat in order to get through everything, and must take as our limit not the unlimited, but the necessary. Thus it too, by self-sufficiency and assimilation to the divine, can obtain the good that is possible for it. Thus it will be genuinely rich, measuring its wealth by the natural limit, not by empty beliefs. Thus it will not be suspended on hopes of the greatest pleasure, without being sure of getting it; for that pleasure causes maximum disruption. But it will be self-sufficient in what is present and in what has already happened, and will not be tormented by the thought of not remaining for longer.

[U459]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.34.97

Hīs similia ad uictum etiam transferuntur, extenuāturque magnificentia et sumptus epulārum, quod parvō cultū nātūra contenta sit.

Similar principles are also applied to food, and the splendor and expense of banquets are reduced, because nature is content with little refinement.

Ētenim quis hoc nōn uidet, dēsīderiīs omnia ista condīrī?

For who does not see that all those things are seasoned by desires?

Quamquam sī quaedam etiam suauiora nātūra dēsīderet, quam multa ex terrā arboribusque gignuntur cum copiā facili tum suāuitāte praestantī.

And yet, even if nature desired certain sweeter things, how many are produced from the earth and trees, both easily and with excellent pleasantness!

Adde siccitātem quae consequitur hanc continentiam in uictū, adde integritātem uālētūdinis:

Add the lightness of body that follows this self-restraint in diet, add the soundness of health;

confer sudantīs ructantīs refertōs epulīs tamquam opimōs bouēs:

compare them with those sweating, belching, stuffed with feasts like well-fed oxen;

tum intellegēs, quī voluptātem maximē sequantur, eōs minimē consequī, iūcunditātémque uictūs esse in dēsīderiō, nōn in satietāte.

then you will understand that those who most pursue pleasure achieve it least, and that the enjoyment of eating lies in desire, not in satiety.

Diēs dēficiat, sī uelim paupertātis causam dēfendere: aperta enim rēs est et cotīdiē nōs ipsa nātūra admonet, quam parvīs rēbus egeat, quam uilibus.

The day would fail me if I wished to defend the cause of poverty; for it is a plain fact, and nature herself reminds us daily how few things she needs and how cheap they are.

Similar reasoning [cf. U439] is applied to food, ad the costly splendor of banquets is belittled, because they say nature is contented with little effort. For who does not see that need is the seasoning for all such things? [cf. Horace, Satires, 2.2.70-88] 99: And yet, if nature should feel the need of something yet more savory, what a quantity of things are provided by earth and trees in ready abundance and of excellent savor! Add dryness which follows upon restraint in diet, add unimpaired health; contrast with this, sweating, belching men stuffed with food like fattened oxen – then you will understand that those who are in hottest pursuit of pleasure are furthest from catching it, and that the pleasantness of food lies in appetite, not in repletion. [Cf. Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 132; Cicero, De Finibus, 2.8.22] 35.102: Time would fail me should I wish to maintain the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few, how small her needs, are, how cheaply satisfied.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.9.26

Laudat tenuem uictum Epicurus: philosophi id quidem, sed sī Socrates aut Antisthenēs dīceret, nōn is quī fīnem bonōrum voluptātem esse dīxerit.

Epicurus praises a simple diet — philosophical indeed, but fitting if Socrates or Antisthenes had said it, not the man who declared the end of good things to be pleasure.

He praises pain living – that is indeed worthy of a philosopher, but only in the mouth of Socrates or Antisthenes, not of the man who can say that pleasure is the supreme good.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49

Epicurus tenuem uictum antefert copiōsō.

Epicurus prefers a frugal way of living to an abundant one.

He prefers plain to a rich diet.

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 17.43

ἅπαξ δέ ποτε (Μουσώνιος) τῶν ἄλλων ἀφέμενος λόγων οὓς ἑκάστοτε διεξῄει τοιάδε τινὰ εἶπεν, ὡς χρὴ καθά περ τὴν εὐτελῆ τῆς πολυτελοῦς τροφὴν προτιμᾶν καὶ τὴν εὐπόριστον τῆς δυσπορίστου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν σύμφυλον ἀνθρώπῳ τῆς [μὴ] τοιαύτης.

[U460]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 13.1

In eā quidem ipsā sententiā sum — inuitīs hoc nostrīs populāribus dicam — sancta Epicūrum et rēcta praecipere et, sī propius accesseris, trīstia:

I am indeed of that very opinion — though I say this against the will of my countrymen — that Epicurus gives precepts holy and right, and, if you look more closely, severe.

Voluptās enim illa ad paruum et exīle reuocātur,

For that pleasure of his is brought back to something small and meager,

et quam nōs uīrtūtī legem dīcimus, eam ille dīcit voluptātī: iubet illam pārēre nātūrae.

and the rule we assign to virtue, he assigns to pleasure: he bids it obey nature.

Parum est autem luxuriæ quod nātūrae satis est.

But what suffices for nature is too little for luxury.

Itaque nōn dīcam quod plērique nostrōrum, sectam Epicūrī flagitiōrum ministram esse, sed illud dīcō: male audit, īnfāmis est, et immeritō.

Therefore I will not say, as most of our people do, that the school of Epicurus is the servant of vices — but this I say: it has a bad reputation, is held in disgrace, and undeservedly so.

Personally I hold the opinion – I shall express it though the members of our school may protest – that the teachings of Epicurus are upright and holy and, if you consider them closely, austere; for his famous doctrine of pleasure is reduced to small and narrow proportions, and the rule that we Stoics lay down for virtue, this same rule he lays down for pleasure – he bids that it obey Nature. But it takes a very little luxury to satisfy Nature! What then is the case? … And so I shall not say, as do most of our school, that the school of Epicurus is an academy of vice, but this is what I say – it has a bad name, is of ill-repute, and yet undeservedly.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 12.4

Uitiīs dēditi... eō concurrunt ubi audiant laudārī voluptātem;

Those devoted to their vices rush there where they hear pleasure being praised;

nec aestimant, voluptās illa Epicūrī — ita enim mehercules sentiō — quam sobria ac sicca sit,

and they do not realize how sober and dry that pleasure of Epicurus — for so, by Hercules, I feel — really is,

sed ad nōmen ipsum aduolant quaerentēs libīdinibus suīs patrocinium aliquod ac uelāmentum.

but they flock to the very name itself, seeking for their lusts some kind of defense and disguise.

Those who have plunged into pleasures ... they hide their debauchery in the lap of philosophy and flock to the place where they may hear the praise of pleasure and they do not consider how sober and abstemious the "pleasure" of Epicurus really is – so by Hercules, I think it is – but they fly to a mere name seeking some justification and screen for their lusts.

[U461]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.50

Σὺν φιλοσοφίᾳ τοίνυν ἀπτέον τούτων, καὶ εὐθὺς προσπεσεῖται ὅτι πολλῷ κρεῖττον τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς μεταδιώκειν ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ λιτὸν καὶ κοῦφον· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὀχληρὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου.

Therefore, one must engage in these things along with philosophy, and it will at once occur that it is far better to pursue among them what is smallest, simplest, and lightest — for even what is troublesome is least troublesome when it comes from the least amount.

ὧν δ’ ἂν συνεφελκύσηται ἡ παρασκευὴ ἐμπόδια ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος βαρύτητος ἢ ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρασκευαζομένων πραγματείας ἢ ἐκ τοῦ κωλύειν τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων λογισμῶν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι συνεχῆ ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης αἰτίας, εὐθὺς ἀλυσιτελὴς γίνεται καὶ οὐκ ἀντάλλακτος πρὸς τὰς συνακολουθούσας ὀχλήσεις.

But whatever provision brings with it hindrances — whether from the heaviness of the body, or from the trouble of preparing the things provided, or from obstructing the continual exercise of reasoning about the most important matters, or from any other cause — immediately becomes unprofitable and not worth exchanging for the annoyances that follow along with it.

So when using philosophy one must consider food too, insofar as that school's attentive concern allows; and when something is removed by that school because it will not authorize complete assurance, it should not be added to the provision of wealth and foods. Philosophy, then, should be used to handle such matters, and it will immediately turn out that pursuing a minimal, simple and light diet is far better; for least disturbance comes from least. Preparing food brings many impediments in its wake, from the weighing down of the body, from the trouble of preparation, from disrupting the sustained activity of reason about the most important principles, or from some other cause. So preparation immediately becomes unprofitable, and cannot compensate for the disturbances it entails.

[U462]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.51

ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν τὸ δι’ ἐνδείας πολλῆς ἠπιότητος ἢ τὸ διὰ πληρώσεως μετέχει, ἐὰν μή τις ταῖς κεναῖς δόξαις ἑαυτὸν ἀπατᾷ.

Pain caused by hunger is much milder than pain caused by eating to excess, unless someone deludes himself with empty beliefs.

[U463]

ἥ τε ποικιλία τῶν τροφῶν οὐχ ὅπως τὰς ταραχὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκλύει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡδονὴν συνεπαύξει: πέρας γὰρ ἔχει καὶ αὕτη ἅμα τῇ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος ὑπεξαιρέσει.

> Diversity in one's diet not only fails to relieve the troubles of the soul, it will not even increase pleasure in the flesh. For pleasure has limits, which is the point at which removal of pain is achieved.

[U464]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.51

ὡς τό γε τῆς σαρκοφαγίας οὔτ᾽ ἔλυέν τι ὀχληρὸν τῆς φύσεως οὔθ᾽ ὃ μὴ συντελούμενον ἐπ' ἀλγηδόνα ἠνύετο, τὴν δὲ χάριν βιαίαν εἶχε καὶ ταχὺ τῷ ἐναντίῳ μιγνυμένην. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς ζωῆς συμμονήν, πρὸς δὲ ποικιλίαν ἡδονῶν συνεβάλλετο, ἐοικὸς ἀφροδισίοις ἢ ξενικῶν οἴνων πόσεσιν, ὧν καὶ χωρὶς διαμένειν δύναται ἡ φύσις. ὧν δὲ χωρὶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειεν, βραχέα παντάπασίν ἐστι καὶ δυνάμενα ῥᾳδίως καὶ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐλευθερίας, ἡσυχίας τε καὶ πολλῆς ῥᾳστώνης πορίζεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγείαν τὰ κρέα συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῇ ὑγείᾳ ἐμποδίζει. δι᾽ ὧν γὰρ ὑγεία ἀνακτᾶται, διὰ τούτων καὶ διαμένει ἀνακτᾶται δὲ διὰ τῆς λιτοτάτης καὶ ἀσάρκου διαίτης, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν συμμείνειεν.

> Meat-eating does not remove any trouble from our nature, or any want which, if not satisfied, leads to pain. The gratification it provides is violent, and is quickly mixed with the opposite. For it contributes not to the maintenance of life but to the variation of pleasures: it resembles sex or drinking imported wines, and our nature can survive without these. The things without which nature could not survive are small in very way and can be got easily, with justice and liberal-mindedness, tranquility and the utmost ease. Moreover, meat does not contribute to health either, but rather impedes it. Health is maintained by the same things through which it is acquired; and it is acquired by a very light and fleshless diet, so that must be how it is sustained.

[U465]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.53

καθόλου δὲ ὀρθῶς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἔφασκεν εὐλαβητέον εἶναι τροφήν, ἣν ἀπολαῦσαι μὲν ποθοῦμεν. καὶ διώκομεν, συντελεσθεῖσαν δ᾽ ἐν ἀχαρίστῳ τίθεμεν. τοιαύτη δὲ πᾶσα ἡ δαψιλὴς καὶ παχεῖα. καὶ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ περὶ ταύτην ἐπτοημένοι, ἢ ἀναλώμασιν ἢ νόσοις ἢ πλησμονῇ ἢ ἀσχολίαις περιπίπτοντες. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λιτῶν φυλακτέον τὸ πλήσμιον, καὶ πανταχοῦ σκεπτέον, τί διὰ τῆς ἀπολαύσεως ἢ κτήσεως γίγνεται καὶ πηλίκον ἔχει μέγεθος καὶ τίνος ὀχληροῦ λυτικόν, σαρκὸς ἢ ψυχῆς, μὴ διὰ (κενὴν, χάριν ἡ περὶ ἑκάστου (πράγματος. ἔντασις γίγνηται, ὥσπερ ὁ τῶζν πολλῶν) βίος κεκύηται. ἀοριστεῖν γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ δεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχεσθαι ὅρου: καὶ μέτρου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις.

> Epicurus rightly surmised that we should beware of food which we want to enjoy and which we pursue, but find disagreeable once we get it. All rich, heavy food is like this, and when people are carried away by wanting it, they land in expense, illness, glut, or worry. For this reason we should guard against excess even of simple things, and in all cases we must examine what happens as a result of enjoyment or possession, how big a thing it is, and whether it relieves any trouble of body or soul. Otherwise, in every case, tension, such as life engenders, will arise from gratification. We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things.

[U466]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.48

τῶν γὰρ Ἐπικουρείων οἱ πλείους ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κορυφαίου ἀρξάμενοι μάζῃ καὶ τοῖς ἀκροδρύοις ἀρκούμενοι φαίνονται τά τε συγγράμματα ἐμπεπλήκασι τὸ ὀλιγοδεὲς τῆς φύσεως ἀφηγούμενοι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν λιτῶν καὶ εὐπορίστων ἱκανῶς αὐτῆς τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἰώμενον παριστάντες ... .. (c. 49) τὸ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἐνοχλοῦν τὴν σάρκα ἐξαιρεῖται καλῶς καὶ αὐτάρκως τὰ εὐπόριστα, ἁπλῆν ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑγρῶν τε καὶ ξηρῶν.

For most of the Epicureans, starting with their leader, appear to be satisfied with barley-bread and fruit, and they have filled treatises with arguments that nature needs little and that its requirements are adequately met by simple, available food. Riches in accordance with nature, they say, are limited and easy to get; riches in accordance with empty beliefs are unlimited and hard to get {= Principle Doctrine 15}. Disturbance caused to the body by want is well and sufficiently removed by things which are easy to get, which have the simple nature of fluid and dry.

St. Jerome (fl.c. 385 CE), Against Jovinianus, 2.11

Epicurus voluptātis asser tor omnēs librōs suōs repleuit olēribus et pōmis, et uilibus cibīs dīcit esse uiuendum, quia carnēs et exquisitae epulae ingentī cūrā ac miseriā praeparentur maiōremque poenam habeant in quaerendō quam voluptātem in abutendō.

Epicurus, champion of pleasure, filled all his books with vegetables and fruits, and says that one must live on cheap foods, because meats and rich dishes are prepared with great effort and trouble, and bring more pain in seeking them than pleasure in consuming them.

Corpora autem nostra cibō tantum et potū indigere. ubi aqua et pānis sit et cetera hīs similia, ibi nātūrae satis factum; quidquid suprā fuerit, nōn ad uitae necessitatem spectāre sed ad uitium voluptātis.

Our bodies, however, need only food and drink. Where there is water and bread and other things like these, there nature has been satisfied; whatever goes beyond that does not aim at the necessity of life, but at the excess of pleasure.

Bibere et comedere nōn dēliciārum ardōrem sed sitim famemque restinguere.

To drink and eat should not be to feed the flame of indulgence, but to quench thirst and hunger.

Quī carnibus uescantur, indigere etiam iīs quae nōn sunt carnium; quī autem simplicī uictū abutantur, eōs carnēs nōn requīrere.

Those who live on meat need also things other than meat; but those who use a simple diet do not crave meat.

Sapientiae quoque operam dare nōn possumus, sī mēnsae abundantiam cogitēmus, quae labōre nimiō et cūrā indiget: cito explētur nātūrae necessitās, frigus et famēs simplicī uestitū et cibō expellī potest.

Nor can we devote ourselves to wisdom if we are thinking about the abundance of the table, which requires excessive toil and care: the needs of nature are quickly satisfied; cold and hunger can be driven off with simple clothing and food.

Epicurus, the defender of pleasure, in all his books speaks of nothing but vegetables and fruits; and he says that we ought to live on cheap food because the preparation of sumptuous banquets of flesh involves great care and suffering, and greater pains attend the search for such delicacies than pleasures the consumption of them. Our bodies need only something to eat and drink. Where there is bread and water, and the like, nature is satisfied. Whatever more there may be does not go to meet the wants of life, but are ministers to vicious pleasure. Eating and drinking does not quench the longing for luxuries, but appeases hunger and thirst. Persons who feed on flesh want also gratifications not found in flesh. But they who adopt a simple diet do not look for flesh. Further, we cannot devote ourselves to wisdom if our thoughts are running on a well-laden table, the supply of which requires an excess of work and anxiety. The wants of nature are soon satisfied: cold and hunger can be banished with simple food and clothing.

[U467]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.5

Quī nimium parcus est, discit ab Epicūrō aquā et polentā uitam posse tolerārī.

He who is too frugal learns from Epicurus that life can be sustained with water and barley meal.

One who is too stingy learns [from Epicurus] that life can be endured on water and barley.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 16, 1097D

ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἡ φύσις δεῖται χορηγίας πολυτελοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν μάζῃ καὶ φακῇ τὸ ἥδιστον, ἀλλ᾽ ὄψα καὶ Θάσια καὶ μύρα... ...ζητοῦσιν αἱ τῶν ἀπολαυστικῶν ὀρέξεις... ...ἀφῶμεν.

Now the point that even for the pleasures of the body our nature requires costly provision, and that the most pleasant enjoyment is not to be found in barley-cake and lentil soup, but that the appetite of the sensualist demands succulent viands and Thasian wine and perfumes … and not only this, but young and attractive women … this point let us waive.

[U468]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.28.90

“Age,” inquies, “ista parua sunt. sapientem locupletat ipsa Nātūra, cuius diuitiās Epicūrus parābilēs esse docuit.”

“Come,” you will say, “these things are small. Nature herself enriches the wise man — whose riches Epicurus taught to be easily obtainable.”

"Come" you will say, "these are trivial objections. The Sage is endowed with Nature's own riches, and these as Epicurus has shown, are easy to obtain" {cf. Principal Doctrine 16}

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.28.91

Nātūrālīs diuitiās dīxit parābilēs esse, quod parvō esset nātūra contenta.

He said that natural riches are easy to obtain, because nature is content with little.

He said that natural wealth is easily won, because nature is satisfied with little.

[U469]

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 17.23

χάρις τῇ μακαρίᾳ Φύσει, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐποίησεν εὐπόριστα, τὰ δὲ δυσπόριστα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα.

"Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary."

[U470]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.51

δεῖ μέντοι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ μηδὲν ὑπολείψειν παρεῖναι διὰ βίου ταύτην δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐπόριστα ἱκανῶς διασῴζει, τὰ δὲ πολυτελῆ ποιεῖ δυσέλπιστον. οἱ γοῦν πολλοὶ διὰ τοῦτο καί περ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι dig ὑπολειψόντῶν ἀνήνυτα μοχθοῦσιν. ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορίστοις καὶ λιτοτάτοις ποιεῖ τὸ μνημονεύειν ὅτι πρὸς μὲν (10) τῆς ψυχῆς ἀξιόλογον ταραχὴν λύειν οὐθὲν ἰσχύειν πέφυκεν οὐδ᾽ ὁ πᾶς πλοῦτος συναχθείς, τὸ δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ὀχληρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ καὶ τὰ πάνυ μέτρια καὶ τυχόντα πᾶσάν τε εὐποριστίαν κεκτημένα᾽ ὑπολείποντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ ταράττει τὸν ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶντα.

{c.f. U205}

The hope of lacking nothing must be with the philosopher throughout his life. Things which are easy to get safeguard this hope sufficiently; expensive things make it a vain hope. That is why most people, even though they have many possessions, make endless efforts because they think they will lack enough. We are satisfied with available, simple things if we keep in mind that all the wealth in the world is not strong enough to give the soul a worthy release from disturbance, but the trouble of the flesh is removed by very moderate, ordinary things which are very easy to get. And if even things on this level fall short, that does not disturb the person who rehearses death.

[U471]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 27

σπάνιόν γε εὑρεῖν ἄνθρωπον {πένηταν πρὸς τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος καὶ πλούσιον πρὸς τὰς κενὰς δόξας. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἷς ἔχει ἀρκεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ οἷς οὐκ ἔχει ὀδυνᾶται. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ πυρέττοντες διὰ κακοήθειαν τῆς νόσου ἀεὶ διψῶσι καὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς ἔχοντες διακειμένην πένονται πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

It is rare to find a man who is ‹poor› with regard to the goal set by nature and rich with regard to groundless opinions. For no imprudent man is satisfied by what he has, but rather is distressed by what he does not have. So just as people with a fever are always thirsty and desire the most unsuitable things because of the malignancy of their ‹diseases›, so too those whose souls are in a bad condition always feel that they are totally impoverished and enmeshed in all sorts of desire as a result of their gluttony.

Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), by way of Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.12

τᾶς φύσιος δ᾽ ὁ πλοῦτος ὅρον τινὰ βαιὸν ἐπίσχει,

αἱ δὲ κεναὶ κρίσιες τὰν ἀπέραντον ὁδόν

Oh men, you labor for pernicious ends;
And out of eager avarice, begin
Quarrels and wars. And yet the wealth of nature
Fixes a narrow limit for desires,
Though empty judgment is insatiable.
This lesson the wise child of Neocles
Had learnt by ear, instructed by the Muses,
Or at the sacred shrine of Delphi's God.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On the Desire for Wealth, 524F

τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος ὥρισται καὶ τὸ τέρμα πάρεστι τῆς χρείας καθά περ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι περιγραφόμενον.

… since for men of sense natural wealth does have a limit and boundary, which is drawn around it by utility as by a compass.

Bynzantine Gnomologion [Wachsmuth, Studien zu den griechischen Florilgien, p. 197, n 189]

Ὁ κατὰ φύσιν πλοῦτος ἄρτῳ καὶ ὕδατι καὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ τοῦ σώματος σκέπῃ συμπεπλήρωται᾽ ὁ δὲ περιττὸς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀπέραντον ἔχει καὶ τὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας βάσανον

Wealth in accordance with nature reaches fulfillment with bread, water and ordinary shelter for the body; excess wealth, in accordance with the cravings of the soul, brings this also: afflictions of desire without end.

Juvenal (fl.c. 95 CE), Satires, 14.316

...Mensūra tamen quae
....Yet the measure which

sufficiat cēnsus, sī quis mē cōnsulat, ēdam:
may suffice for wealth, if anyone should ask me, I will say:

In quantum sitis atque famēs et frīgora poscunt,
As much as thirst and hunger and cold demand,

Quantum, Epicure, tibī parvīs suffēcit in hortīs,
As much as, Epicurus, sufficed for you in your small gardens,

Quantum Socraticī cēpērunt ante penātēs.
As much as the Socratic men took before their household gods.

Numquam aliud nātūra, aliud sapientia dīcit.
Never does nature say one thing, and wisdom another.

Yet if any should ask of me what measure of fortune is enough, I will tell him: as much as thirst, cold and hunger demand; as much as sufficed you, Epicurus, in your little garden; as much as in earlier days was to be found in the house of Socrates.

Juvenal (fl.c. 95 CE), Satires, 13.122

Epicurum... ...exiguī laetum plantāribus hortī

Epicurus... ...happy with the small plantings of his little garden.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.12.3

Tolle querellās:
Remove complaints;

Pauper enim nōn est, cui rērum suppetit ūsus.
For he is not poor, to whom the use of things is sufficient.

Sī ventrī bene, sī laterī est pedibusque tuīs,

If it is well with your stomach, your side, and your feet,

Nihil dīvitiae poterunt rēgālēs addere māius.
Royal riches can add nothing greater.

Cease your complaints: no one ever is poor if his needs are supplied, and Once all is well with your stomach, your chest, and your feet, there is nothing More that the treasure of kings could possibly add to your riches.

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cf. Manilius IV 6—11

text not given

[U472]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.32.89

Hic uērō ipse quam parvō est contentus.

This man himself — how little he is content with.

Nēmō dē tenuī victū plūra dīxit.

No one has spoken more about a modest way of living.

Ētenim quae rēs pecūniae cupiditātem adferunt, ut amōrī, ut ambitiōnī, ut cotīdiānīs sumptibus cōpiae suppetant,

For those things which bring desire for money — that means may suffice for love, for ambition, for daily expenses —

Cum prōcul ab hīs omnibus rēbus absit,

Since he is far removed from all these things,

Cūr pecūniam magnō opere dēsīderet uel potius cūr cūret omnīnō?

Why should he greatly desire money — or rather, why should he care about it at all?

Nay, with how little is Epicurus himself contented! No one has said more about plain living. For take the things which make men desire money to provide the means for love, for ambition, for their daily expenditure – as he is far removed from all such things, why should he feel much need of money or rather why should he trouble about it at all?

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.31.89

an ad cetera quae mala putantur, non et Epicurus et reliqui philosophi satis parati uidentur? quis non paupertatem extimescit? neque tamen quisquam philosophorum

Do you think that Epicurus and the rest of the philosophers are not adequately prepared to meet all others things that are considered evil? What man is not sorely afraid of poverty? And yet not a single philosopher is so.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.10.32

Fuge magna. Licet sub paupere tectō
Flee great things. It is permitted under a poor roof

Rēgēs et rēgum vītā praecurrere amīcōs.
to surpass kings and the friends of kings in life.

Flee grand things. A life can be lived in a poor man's
Cottage surpassing the lives of a king or a king's friends

[U473]

Aelian (Claudius Aelianus, fl. 215 CE), Various Histories, 4.13
[Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 17.30]

Ἐπίκουρος ὁ Γαργήττιος ἐκεκράγει λέγων· ᾧ ὀλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν ἱκανόν.

Epicurus, of the burgh of Gargettus, had shouted, saying: "Nothing satisfies the man who is not satisfied with a little."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.2.46

Quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet.

To whom enough has fallen, let him wish for nothing more.

He who happens to have enough does not desire anything else.

[U474]

Et ipse Stilpōnis obiurgātor Epicūrus similem illī vocem ēmisit, quam tū bonī consule, etiamsī hunc diem iam expunxī:

And Epicurus himself, rebuker of Stilpo, uttered a similar saying, which you should take in good part, even if I have already struck out this day:

"Sī cui," inquit, "sua nōn videntur amplissima, licet tōtius mundī dominus sit, tamen miser est."

He said, "If a man's own things do not seem to him most ample, even though he be master of the whole world, still he is wretched."

Vel sī hōc modō tibi melius enuntiārī vidētur (id enim agendum est ut nōn verbīs serviāmus sed sensibus);

Or, if it seems to you better expressed in this way (for our task is not to serve words but meanings);

Miser est quī sē nōn beatissimum iūdicat, licet imperet mundō.

He is wretched who does not judge himself most happy, though he rule the world.

Epicurus himself, the reviler of Stilpo, used similar language. Put it down to my credit, though I have already wiped out my debt for the present day. He says "Whoever does not regard what he has as most ample wealth, is unhappy, even if he was master of the entire world." Or, if the following seems better-worded to you (for we must try to render meaning and not the mere words): "A man may rule the world and still be unhappy, if he does not feel that he is supremely happy."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 1.10.44

Laetus sorte tua uiues sapienter.

Content with your lot, you will live wisely.

[U475]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 2.5

Hodiernum hoc est quod apud Epicūrum nanctus sum:

This is today's saying, which I came upon in Epicurus:

Soleō enim et in aliēna castra trānsīre nōn tamquam trānsfuga sed tamquam explōrātor.

For I am accustomed to cross even into another's camp, not as a deserter but as a scout.

"Honesta," inquit, "rēs laeta paupertās."

He said, "Cheerful poverty is an honorable thing."

Illa vērō nōn est paupertās, sī laeta est.

But indeed, that is not poverty, if it is cheerful.

Nōn quī parum habet sed quī plūs cupit pauper est.

Not he who has little, but he who desires more, is poor.

My thought for today is something which I found in Epicurus (yes, I actually make a practice of going over to the enemy's camp – by way of reconnaissance, not as a deserter!). "A cheerful poverty" he says, "is an honorable state." But if it is cheerful it is not poverty at all. It is not the man who has too little who is poor, but the one who hankers after more.

[U476]

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 6.2

ἀλλ᾽ Εὐριπίδου γράφοντος "ἐπεὶ τά γ᾽ ἀρκοῦνθ᾽ ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν" Ἐπίκουρος ἄντικρύς φησι "Πλουσιώτατον αὐτάρκεια πάντων."

Further, as Euripides wrote: "For the temperate, enough is sufficient" {Fenicie, 554}, Epicurus expressly says, "Sufficiency is the greatest riches of all." {cf. U202}

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 28

διό φασιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐδὲν οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον ὡς τὸ γινώσκειν καλῶς τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον, πλουσιωτάτην δὲ εἶναι πάντων τὴν αὐτάρκειαν καὶ σεμνὸν τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι λαμβάνονται.

Self-sufficiency is the greatest of all wealth

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), On the Utility of Faith, 4, 10

Sī quis Epicūrum, lectō eius in librīs aliquō locō ubi continentiam laudat, in virtūte illum summum bonum posuisse asseveret et ideō nōn esse culpandum...

If anyone, having read in some passage of his books where Epicurus praises self-control, were to assert that he placed the highest good in virtue, and therefore is not to be blamed...

[U477]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 4.10

Sed ut finem epistulae inponam, accipe quod mihi hodierno die placuit.

But to put an end to the letter, take what has pleased me today.

et hoc quoque ex alienīs hortulīs sūmptum est:

Even this too is taken from another's little garden (i.e., from Epicurus).

Magnae dīvitiae sunt lege nātūrae composita paupertās.

Great wealth is poverty arranged according to nature's law.

Lēx autem illa nātūrae scīs quōs nōbīs terminōs statuāt?

And do you know what limits that law of nature sets for us?

Nōn ēsūrīre, nōn sitīre, nōn algēre.

Not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold.

Parābile est quod nātūra dēsīderat et adpositum.

What nature desires is easy to obtain and close at hand.

Ad superuācua sūdātur.

For superfluous things, we toil and sweat.

but I must end my letter. Let me share with you the saying which pleased me today. It too is culled from another man's Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold. ... Nature's needs are easily provided and ready at hand. It is the superfluous things for which men sweat...

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 27.9

Sed accipe iam quod debeō et valē:

But now take what I owe you—and farewell:

“Dīvitiae sunt ad lēgem nātūrae composita paupertās.”

“Wealth is poverty arranged according to the law of nature.”

Hoc saepe dicit Epicūrus aliter atque aliter.

Epicurus often says this, in one form or another.

Sed numquam nimis dicitur quod numquam satis discitur.

But what is never fully learned is never too often said.

But let me pay off my debt and say farewell: "Real wealth is poverty adjusted to the law of Nature." Epicurus has this saying in various ways and contexts; but it can never be repeated too often, since it can never be learned too well.

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 5.1117

Quod sī quis vērā vītam ratiōne gubernet,

But if anyone should guide his life by true reason,

Dīvitiae grandēs hominī sunt vīvere parcē

Great wealth for a person is to live sparingly

Aequō animō, neque enim est umquam penūria parvī.

With a calm mind—for there is never a lack of little.

But if anyone were to conduct his life by reason,
he would find great riches in living a peaceful life
and being contented, one is never short of a little.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 2.16.13

Vīvitur parvō bene.

One lives well with little.

"On little one lives well."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.10.39

Quī pauperiem veritus potiōre metallīs

He who, fearing poverty, prefers wealth to freedom

Lībertāte caret, dominum vehet improbūs atque

Lacks liberty, and as a base man will carry his master

Serviēt aeternum, quia parvō nesciet ūtī.

And be a slave forever, because he will not know how to use little.

Fearful of poverty rather than fearful of riches, he must forfeit Liberty, and in his greed must forever be serving a master.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Satires, 2.2.1

Quae virtūs et quanta, bonī, sit vīvere parvō

What virtue, and how great, my friends, it is to live with little—

nec meus hic sermō est, sed quae praecepit Ofellus

and this is not my own speech, but that which Ofellus taught,

rūsticus, abnormis sapiēns crassāque Minervā—,

a countryman, an irregular sage with coarse wisdom—

discite nōn inter lancēs mensāsque nitentīs,

learn it not among the glittering dishes and tables,

cum stupet īnsānīs aciēs fulgoribus et cum

when the gaze is dazed by mad splendors, and when

adclinis falsīs animus meliora recūsat,

the mind, leaning toward false things, rejects what is better—

verum hīc inpransī mecum disquīrite. cur hoc?

but here, unfed, inquire with me. Why is this so?

"Values of simple and frugal existence, good friends, is my subject."

[U478]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 28

φοβούμενος ὁ πολὺς τὸ λιτὸν τῆς διαίτης διὰ τὸν φόβον ἐπὶ πράξεις πορεύεται τὰς μάλιστ᾽ ἂν τοῦτον παρασκευαζούσας.

Most men fear frugality in their lifestyle and through their fear are led to actions most likely to produce fear.

[U479]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 28

πολλοὶ τοῦ πλούτου τυχόντες οὐ τιν᾽ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν κακῶν εὗρον ἀλλὰ μεταβολὴν μειζόνων.

Many men when they have acquired riches have not found the escape from their problems but have only exchanged them for greater problems.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 17.11

Tibi valē dīcere nōn licet grātīs. Quid istic?

You are not allowed to say farewell without paying for it. What of it?

Ab Epicūrō mūtuum sūmam:

I'll borrow something from Epicurus:

“Multīs parāsse dīvitias nōn fīnis miseriārum fuit, sed mūtātiō.”

“For many, acquiring riches has not been the end of their miseries, but a change of them.”

I cannot say farewell without paying a price. But what of it? I shall borrow from Epicurus: "The acquisition of riches has been for many, not an end, but a change, of troubles."

[U480]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 29

ἐξ ἐργασίας θηριώδους οὐσίας μὲν πλῆθος σωρεύεται, βίος δὲ ταλαίπωρος συνίσταται.

By means of occupations worthy of a beast, abundance of riches is heaped up, but a miserable life results.

[U481]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 28

διὸ καὶ μελετᾶν (οἱ φιλόσοφοι) παρακελεύονται οὐχ ὅπως τι ποριστέον ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως μᾶλλον θαρρήσομεν μὴ πορισθέντος

"Therefore they {the philosophers} exhort us to practice not how we must provide for some necessity, but how we will remain secure when it is not provided."

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), On Abstinence, 1.50

δεῖ δέ, φασὶν (οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι), οὐχ ἑτοιμασάμενον τὰ ἀναγκαῖα προσθήκῃ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευασάμενον τὸ θαρρεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ γνησίως, οὕτως ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν. κακῷ γὰρ φροντιστῇ τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀναγκαῖον συμμετρούμενοι τῆς φύσεως καὶ παρασκευάζοντες

What one must do, the Epicureans say, is not to gather together the necessities of life and add philosophy as an accessory, but to provide for genuine assurance of soul and then deal with daily needs. We entrust our concerns to a bad manager if we assess and provide what nature needs without the help of philosophy.

[U482]

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.15

ὁ πλοῦτος δ᾽ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ποιητικιυτατόν γε τῶν ἡδονῶν. διὰ τί μὴ περιποιήσῃ αὐτόν;

{deriding Epicureanism} Now wealth is a good, and when it comes to pleasures is, so to speak, the thing must productive of them. Why should you not acquire it?

[U483]

Hermias (ob. 450 CE), Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus, p. 76

οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἁπλῶς φαῦλον τὸ ἐρᾶν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ὁρισάμενος αὐτὸν (τὸν ἔρωτα) σύντονον ὄρεξιν ἀφροδισίων μετὰ οἴστρου καὶ ἀδημονίας.

Some, in fact, consider love to be absolutely bad, defining it as an intense craving for carnal pleasure, united with frenzy and disquietude.

Alexander of Aphrodisia (fl. 200 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics," p. 75

τὸ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἔρως ἀστεῖος πρόβλημα καθόλου ὂν ἀποφατικὸν ἀνασκευάσομεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶς ἔρως φαῦλος, διελόντες τὸν ἔρωτα εἴς τε σύντονον ὄρεξιν ἀφροδισίων, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, ὃν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀστεῖον εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ἐπιβολὴν φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς κτλ.

Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax (fl. 130 BCE), The Art of Grammar, [p. 667, 13 Bekk.]

τὸν ἔρωτα οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοί φασιν εἶναι σύντονον ἀφροδισίων ὄρεξιν

The Epicureans define love as an intense craving for carnal pleasures.

[U484]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 18.14

Sed iam incipiāmus epistulam conplicāre.

But now let us begin to fold up the letter.

Prius, inquis, redde quod dēbēs.

“First,” you say, “pay what you owe.”

Dēlegābō tē ad Epicūrum.

I’ll refer you to Epicurus.

Ab illō fiet numerātiō:

The payment shall be made by him:

“Immodica īra gignit insāniam.”

“Excessive anger begets madness.”

Hoc quam vērum sit, necesse est sciās, cum habueris et servum et inimīcum.

How true this is—you must know, when you have had both a slave and an enemy.

It's time I started wrapping up this letter. "Not till you've settled your account" you say. Well, I'll refer you to Epicurus for payment: "Anger carried to excess begets madness." How true this is you're bound to know, since you have had not only slaves, but also enemies.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.2.62

Īra furor brevis est: animum rege.

Anger is a brief madness; rule your mind.

Rage is but madness in shorter duration; your temper must either
Bend to your will or bend you, so control it with chain or with bridle.

Apollonius, by way of Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 20.49

τῆς ὀξυθυμίας τὸ ἄνθος μανία.

The flower of hot-temperedness is folly.

8. Rational Living

[U485]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 29

ἢ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαιμονεῖ ἢ δι᾽ ἀόριστον καὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἅ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἑαυτῷ περιποιῆσαι λογισμόν.

Unhappiness comes either through fear or through vain and unbridled desire: but if a man curbs these, he can win for himself the blessedness of wisdom.

[U486]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 31

οὐκ ἀπορεῖν τούτων πόνος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν μᾶλλον τὸν ἀνόνητον ἐκ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πόνον.

"Pain does not consist in lacking the goods of the masses, but rather in enduring the unprofitable suffering that comes from empty false opinions."

[U487]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 12.10

Quid enim hāc voce praeclārius, quam illī trādō ad tē perferendam?

For what saying is more splendid than this, which I hand over to you to be delivered?

Malum est in necessitāte vīvere, sed in necessitāte vīvere necessitās nūlla est.

It is an evil thing to live under necessity, but there is no necessity to live under necessity.

Quidnī nūlla sit? Patent undique ad lībertātem viae multae, brevēs, facilēs.

Why should there not be none? Everywhere roads lie open to freedom — many, short, and easy.

Epicurus, inquis, dixit; quid tibi cum aliēnō?

You say, “Epicurus said that; what have you to do with another man’s words?”

Quod vērum est, meum est.

What is true is mine.

Perseverābō Epicurum tibi ingerere, ut istī quī in verba iurant nec quid dicātur aestimant sed ā quō, sciant quae optima sunt esse commūnia.

I will keep pressing Epicurus upon you, so that those men who swear by words, valuing not what is said but who says it, may know that the best things are common to all.

What could be more splendid than the following saying which I'm entrusting to this letter of mine for delivery to you: "To live under constraint is a misfortune, but there is no constraint to live under constraint." Of course not, when on every side there are plenty of short and easy roads to freedom there for the taking... You protest: "It was Epicurus who said that! What business have you got with someone else's property?" Whatever is true is my property. And I shall persist in inflicting Epicurus on you, in order to bring it home to people who take an oath of allegiance to someone and never afterward consider what is being said but only who said it, that the things of greatest merit are common property.

Maximus of Tyre (fl.c. 190 BCE), Dissertations, 3.10

τί δὲ ἀνάγκης ἐπιπονώτερον;

What, then, is more painful than necessity?

[U488]

Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115 (Maxims of Epicurus)

ἡ ταπεινὴ ψυχὴ τοῖς μὲν εὐημερήμασιν ἐχαυνώθη, ταῖς δὲ συμφοραῖς καθηρέθη

The crude soul is puffed up by prosperity and cast down by misfortune.

[U489]

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 30

καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης μικρότερα (ἡ φύσις) διδάσκει γομίζειν, καὶ εὐτυχοῦντας μὲν γινώσκειν ἀτυχεῖν, δυστυχοῦντας δὲ μὴ παρὰ μέγα τίθεσθαι ὂν τὸ εὐτυχεῖν, καὶ δέχεσθαι μὲν ἀθορύβως τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθά, παρατετάχθαι δὲ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτῆς δοκοῦντα εἶναι κακά· καὶ ὡς ἐφήμερον μὲν πᾶν τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ κακόν, σοφία δὲ οὐδαμῶς τύχῃ κοινωνεῖ.

"Nature also teaches us to regard the outcomes of fortune of little account and to know how to face misfortune when we are favored by fortune, but not to consider the favors of fortune important when we experience misfortune. And Nature teaches us to accept, unperturbed, the good outcomes of fortune, while standing prepared in the face of the seeming evils which come from fate. For all that the masses regard as good is a fleeting fancy, but wisdom and knowledge have nothing in common with fortune."

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.36.73 [U604]

Huic ergō... obliuiscī licebit suī et tum fortūnam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestāte fortūnae.

To such a man it will be permitted to forget himself and then to despise fortune, since both all her good and her evil are in fortune’s power.

Shall we allow this man ... to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal?

[U490]

Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 474C

οὐ γὰρ μόνον "ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος," ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, "ἥδιστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον," ἀλλὰ καὶ πλοῦτος εὐφραίνει καὶ δόξα καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἥκιστα τἀναντία ταρβοῦντας.

"He who has least need of tomorrow" as Epicurus says, "most gladly rises to greet tomorrow."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.4.13

Omnem crēde diem tibī dīlūxisse suprēmum:

Believe that every day has dawned for you as your last;

grāta superueniēt quae nōn spērābitur hōra.

a welcome hour will come that is not hoped for.

Believe that each day which breaks is your last,
Then you will find your delight in another one's rising unhoped for.

[U491]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 15.10

Ecce īnsigne praeceptum: “stulta uīta ingrāta est et trepida: tōta in futūrum fertur.”

Behold a notable precept: “A foolish life is ungrateful and anxious; it is carried wholly toward the future.”

Quis hoc, inquis, dicit? Īdem quī suprā.

Who says this, you ask? The same man as above.

... a striking maxim that comes from Greece – here it is: "The life of folly is empty of gratitude and full of anxiety – it is focused wholly on the future." "Who said that?" you ask. The same man as before. {Epicurus}

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.18.110

Neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae.

Let me not drift, hanging on the hope of an uncertain hour.

"I do not dangle in air like a leaf with my hopes all uncertain."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 2.16.25

Aetus in praesēns animus quod ultra est
Let the mind, eager for the present, hate to care for what lies beyond,

ōderit cūrāre et amara lentō
and let it despise worrying, and the bitter things, with calmness

temperet rīsū.
moderate with laughter

If the present moment contents you, never
Mind the future, temper unpleasant things with
Quiet smiles...

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 1.11.8

Tū nē quaesieris, scīre nefās, quem mihī, quem tibī
Do not ask — it is forbidden to know — what end the gods have given to me and to you,

fīnem dī dederint, Leuconoë, nec Babyloniōs
Leuconoë, nor test the Babylonian (astrologers') numbers,

temptāris numerōs. ut melius, quidquid erit, patī.
nor consult their calculations — how much better to endure whatever shall be.

seu plūrīs hiemēs seu tribuit Iuppiter ultimam,
Whether Jupiter grants more winters, or the last,

quae nunc oppositīs dēbilitat pumicibus mare
which now weakens the Tyrrhenian Sea against the opposing cliffs,

Tyrrhēnum, sapiās, vīna liquēs et spatiō brevī
be wise, strain the wine, and since our span is short,

spem longam reseces. dum loquimur, fūgerit invida
cut back long hope. while we are speaking, envious time will have fled—

aetās: carpe diem, quam minimum crēdula posterō.
pluck the day that trusts as little as possible in tomorrow.

> Ask not ('tis forbidden knowledge), what our destined term of years,
> Mine and yours; nor scan the tables of your Babylonish seers.
> Better far to bear the future, my Leuconoe, like the past,
> Whether Jove has many winters yet to give, or this our last;
> This, that makes the Tyrrhene billows spend their strength against the shore.
> Strain your wine and prove your wisdom; life is short; should hope be more?
> In the moment of our talking, envious time has ebb'd away.
> Seize the present; trust tomorrow e'en as little as you may.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 2.16.17

quid breuī fortēs iaculāmur aeuō multa?

> Why do we, brave men, hurl many things in a brief lifetime?
>
> Why, in life's brief span,
> Do we bravely fight for man things?

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Odes, 1.4.15

uītae summa breuīs spem nōs vetat incohāre longam
The short span of life forbids us to begin long hope.

> Briefness of lifespan forbids us
> To open a long-range hope's investment.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.38

[carpendī Epicūrī causā] "voluptātibus igitur quōquō modō possumus serviāmus. brevi enim tempore nullī erimus omnīnō. ergō nullum diem, nullum dēnique temporis pūnctum fluere nōbīs sine voluptāte patiāmur, nē quia ipsī quandōque peritūrī sumus, id ipsum quod vīvimus pereat. hoc ille etiamsī nōn dīcit verbō, rē tamen ipsā docet."

> [for the sake of attacking Epicurus] "let us, then, serve pleasures however we can. for in a short time we shall not exist at all. therefore let us allow no day, no, not even a moment of time, to pass for us without pleasure, lest because we ourselves are someday going to perish, that very thing which we live should perish. this, although he does not say it in word, he teaches in the thing itself."
>
> [Epicurus says, in effect:] "Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves are at sometime to perish, the very fact that we live may perish." Although he does not say this in so many words, however, he teaches this is fact.

[U492]

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), Περὶ Μετεωρισμοῦ, P.Herc. 831 col. 6

…[τῶν ἀνθρώ]πων θνησκόντων οὐδείς ἐστιν, ὃς [δ]ύνατα[ι] φυγεῖν θάνατον καὶ μὴν ἑκάστου καθά πέρ φησιν Ἐπίκουρος ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως πρός τινα χρόνον συστάντος ὥστε πλή‹ο›να μ[ὲν μὴ δύν]ασθαι βιῶσαι ἐλάττον[α δὲ δύ]νασθαι, τὴν ‹ἀν›άγκην τὴ[ν] κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οὐκ ἔ[στιν] ἐποχῇ μεσολαβ[εῖ]ν, [ἀλλ]ὰ…

…τῶν ἀνθρώπων θνησκόντων οὐδείς ἐστιν, ὃς δύναται φυγεῖν θάνατον καὶ μὴν ἑκάστου καθά πέρ φησιν Ἐπίκουρος ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως πρός τινα χρόνον συστάντος ὥστε πλήονα μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι βιῶσαι ἐλάττονα δὲ δύνασθαι, τὴν ‹ἀν›άγκην τὴν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐποχῇ μεσολαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ…

> Among mortal men, there is no one who can escape death. And indeed, seeing that everyone, as Epicurus says, from the very moment of birth remain for a certain time…

[U493]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 23.9

possum enim tibi vocem Epicurī tuī reddere et hanc epistulam liberāre:

> for I can indeed give you back your Epicurus's saying and free this letter.

molestum est semper vītam incohāre.

> it is troublesome always to be beginning life.

aut sī hōc modō magis sēnsus potest exprīmī:

> or if in this way the meaning can be expressed better:

male vīuunt quī semper vīuere incipiunt.

> they live badly who are always beginning to live.

Quārē? inquis, dēsīderat enim explānātiōnem ista vōx.

> why? you ask — for this saying needs an explanation.

quia semper illīs imperfecta vīta est.

> because for them life is always unfinished.

> Now is the time for me to pay my debt. I can give you a saying of your friend Epicurus and thus clear this letter of its obligation: "It is bothersome always to be beginning life." Or another, which will perhaps express the meaning better: "They live unwell – those who are always beginning to live." You are right in asking why – the saying certainly stands in need of commentary. It is because the life of such persons is always incomplete.

[U494]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 13.16

sed iam finem epistulae faciam, sī illī signum suum impresserō, id est aliquam magnificam vocem perferendam ad tē mandāverō.

> but now I will make an end of the letter, if I have set his seal upon it — that is, if I shall have entrusted to you some noble saying to be delivered.

"inter cētera mala hoc quoque habet stultitia: semper incipit vīvere."

> "among its other evils, folly has this also — it is always beginning to live."

cōnsīdera quid vōx ista significet... et intellegēs quam foeda sit hominum levitās cotīdiē novā vītae fundamenta ponentium, novās spēs etiam in exitu incohantium.

consider what that saying means... and you will understand how shameful is the fickleness of men who every day lay new foundations for life and begin new hopes even at the point of death.

non adicerem auctōrem vocī, nisi esset secrētior nec inter volgāta Epicurī dicta, quae mihi et laudāre et adoptāre permīsī.

I would not have added the author of the saying, were it not rather little known and not among Epicurus's common sayings — which I have allowed myself both to praise and to adopt.

But now, to close my letter, Have only to stamp the usual seal upon it, in other words, to commit thereto some noble message to be delivered to you: "The fool, with all his other faults, has this also: he is always getting ready to live." Consider what this maxim means ... and you will understand how revolting is the fickleness of men who lay down every day new foundations of life, and begin to build up fresh hopes even at the brink of the grave. ... I should not name the author of this motto, except that it is somewhat unknown and is not one of those popular sayings of Epicurus which I have myself to praise and to appropriate.

[U495]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 22.13

occurrit mihi ecce (vōx) nescio utrum vērior an ēloquentior.

there occurs to me, look, a saying — I know not whether truer or more eloquent.

cuius? inquis. Epicurī, adhuc enim aliēnīs sarcinās adōrnō:

whose, you ask? of Epicurus — for as yet I am packing up others' baggage.

nēmō nōn ita exit ē vītā, tamquam modo intrāverit.

everyone leaves life as though he had only just entered it.

quemcumque vīs occupā, adulēscentem senem medium:

take whom you will — a youth, an old man, one of middle age —

inveniēs aequē timidum mortis, aequē inscium vītae.

you will find him equally afraid of death and equally ignorant of life.

nēmō quicquam habet factī, in futūrum enim nostra distulimus.

no one has anything accomplished, for we have put off our own affairs to the future.

nihil mē magis in istā vōce dēlectat quam quod exprobrātur senibus infantia:

nothing in that saying delights me more than that it reproaches old men with childishness:

"nēmō," inquit, "aliter quam quī modo nātus est, exit ē vītā."

"no one," he says, "leaves life in any other way than one just born."

falsum est, peiōrēs morimur quam nāscimur.

it is false — we die worse than we are born.

> ... and lo, here is [a maxim] that occurs to my mind; I do not know whether its truth or its nobility of utterance is the greater. "Spoken by whom?" you ask. By Epicurus; for I am still appropriating other men's belongings. The words are: "Everyone goes out of life just as if he had but lately entered it." Take anyone off his guard, young, old , or middle-aged; you will find that all are equally afraid of death, and equally ignorant of life. No one has anything finished, because we have kept putting off into the future all our undertakings. No thought in the quotation given above pleases me more than that it taunts old men with being infants. "No one" he says, "leaves this world in a different manner from one who has just been born." That is not true; for we are worse when we die than when we were born; but this our fault, and not that of Nature.

Pseudo-Plato (fort. 100 BCE), Axiochus, 365D

συνάπτεις γάρ, ὦ Ἀξίοχε... ...ἀνεπιλογίστως τῇ ἀναισθησίᾳ αἴσθησιν καὶ σεαυτῷ ὑπεναντία καὶ ποιεῖς καὶ λέγεις, οὐκ ἐπιλογιζόμενος ὅτι ἅμα μὲν ὀδύρει τὴν ἀναισθησίαν, ἅμα δὲ ἀλγεῖς ἐπὶ σήψεσι καὶ στερήσει τῶν ἡδέων ὥσπερ εἰς ἕτερον ζῆν ἀποθανούμενος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰς παντελῆ μεταβαλῶν ἀναισθησίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως. ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς Δράκοντος ἢ Κλεισθένους πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σὲ κακὸν ἦν (ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐκ ἦς, περὶ ὃν ἂν ἦν), οὕτως οὐδὲ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν γενήσεται" σὺ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσει, περὶ ὃν ἔσται.

> Indeed Axiochus, you confound lack of sensation with sensations in an irrational way. You invent and say incoherent things, without thinking that, in the meanwhile, you cause yourself suffering by the lack of sensibility, and you cause yourself sorrow by the despoilment and privation of pleasures, as if you were dying to live another life, and would not change your condition of total insensibility – the same as it was before your birth. How, then, since the time of the rule of Dracon and Cleisthenes have you not suffered a single evil?

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), A Letter to Apollonius, 109E

εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οὖν τάξιν οἱ τελευτήσαντες καθίστανται τῇ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲν ἦν ἡμῖν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν. καὶ καθά περ τὰ πρὸ ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἦν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ μεθ’ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἔσται πρὸς ἡμᾶς... ...ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ κατάστασίς ἐστι τῇ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἡ μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν.

> Those who have died return to the same state in which they were before birth; therefore, as nothing was either good or evil for us before birth, even so will it be with us after death. And just as all events before our lifetime were nothing to us, even so will all events subsequent to our lifetime be nothing to us. ... For the condition after the end of life is the same as that before birth.

[U496]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 24.22

obiurgat Epicurus nōn minus eōs quī mortem concupīscunt, quam eōs quī timent,

> Epicurus rebukes no less those who long for death than those who fear it,

et ait: rīdiculum est currere ad mortem taediō vītae,

> and says: it is ridiculous to run toward death out of weariness with life,

cum genere vītae, ut currendum ad mortem esset, effēceris.

> when by your manner of life you have made it necessary that you should run toward death.

> Epicurus criticizes those who crave, as much as those who shrink from death: "It is absurd" he says, "to run towards death because you are tired of life, when it is your manner of life that has made you run towards death."

[U497]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 24.23

hīs adiiciās et illud eiusdem notae licet:

you may also add this of the same kind,

tantam hominum imprūdentiam esse, immō dēmentiam, ut quidam timōre mortis cogantur ad mortem.

"that there is such folly in men — nay, madness — that some are driven to death by fear of death.

To these thoughts [= U496 & U498] you may add a third, of the same stamp: "Men are so thoughtless, nay, so mad, that some, through fear of death, force themselves to die."

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), A Letter to Apollonius, 110A

τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν οὐδένειαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον διαβολὴν ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνωσι.

As a matter of fact, many people, because of their utter fatuity and their false opinion regarding death, die in their effort to keep from dying.

[U498]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 24.23

Epicurus… item aliō locō dicit:

Epicurus… likewise in another place he says:

“quid tam rīdiculum quam adpetere mortem, cum vītam inquietam tibi fēceris metū mortis?”

“What is more ridiculous than to seek death, when you have made your life restless through fear of death?”

Epicurus says … in another passage: "What is so absurd as to seek death, when it is through fear of death that you have robbed your life of peace?"

[U499]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.40.117

…congerantur in ūnum omnia, ut idem oculīs et auribus captus sit, premātur etiam dol　ōribus acerrimīs corporis, quī prīmum per sē ipsī plērumque cōnfic-iunt hominem.

let all things be heaped together into one, so that the same man be deprived of eyes and ears, and be also pressed by the sharpest pains of the body, which, by themselves alone, for the most part destroy a man.

sin forte longinquitate prōductī vehementius tamen torqueant quam ut causa sit cur ferantur, quid est tandem, dī bonī, quod labōrēmus?

but if by chance, being prolonged through length of time, they still torment more violently than can be borne, what, then, good gods, is the reason we should suffer?

portus enim praestō est, aeternum nihil sentiendī receptāculum.

for the harbor is at hand — the eternal refuge of feeling nothing.

Let everything be piled up on one single man so that he loses together sight and hearing, suffers too the most acute bodily pains – these, in the first place, commonly finish off a man just by themselves. But if, maybe, they are indefinitely prolonged and torture him nevertheless, more violently than he sees reason for enduring, what reason have we, gracious heaven, for continuing to suffer? For there is haven close at hand, since death is at the same time an eternal refuge where nothing is felt.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.41.118

mihi quidem in uītā seruandā uidētur illa lex, quae in Graecōrum conuiuiīs optinetur: "aut bibat," inquit, "aut abeat," et recte.

to me indeed in living life that rule seems to hold which prevails in the banquets of the Greeks: "let him either drink," it says, "or depart," and rightly so.

aut enim fruātur aliquis pariter cum aliīs uoluptāte potandī aut, ne sobrius in uiolentiam uinulentōrum incidat, ante discēdat.

for either let one enjoy along with the others the pleasure of drinking, or, lest being sober he fall into the violence of the drunken, let him leave before.

sic iniuriās fortūnae, quās ferre nequeās, defugiendō relinquās.

thus the injuries of fortune, which you cannot bear, you should leave behind by fleeing.

haec eadem quae Epicurus totidem uerbis dicit Hieronymus.

these same things, which Epicurus says in just as many words, Hieronymus also says.

For my part, I think that in life we should observe the rule which is followed at Greek banquets – "Let him either drink" it says, "or go!" And rightly, for either he should enjoy the pleasure of tippling along with the others or get away early, so that a sober man may not be a victim to the violence of those who are heated with wine. Thus by running away one can escape the assaults of fortune which one cannot face. This is the same advice as Epicurus gives and Hieronymus repeats it in as many words.

[U500]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1103E

τὸ πάνcορον τοῦτο δόγμα καὶ θεῖον — ὅτι τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν πέρας ἐστὶν αὐτῇ (τῇ ψυχῇ) τὸ ἀπολέσθαι καὶ φθαρῆναι καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι.

...this most sage and divine doctrine: that the end of the soul's troubles is to be destroyed and perish and be nothing.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1103C

οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἔχοντες τῆς μὲν εὐτυχίας τὸ ἥδιστον κολούουσι, ταῖς δὲ δυστυχίαις ἀποστροφὴν οὐκ ἀπολείπουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς μίαν καταφυγὴν καὶ λιμένα πράττοντες κακῶς τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἀποβλέπουσιν.

Those who do not experience this {good fortune as divine providence} amputate the greatest pleasure of prosperity, while in misfortune they leave themselves no source of help. They can see but one haven of refuge in adversity: dissolution, and the loss of all sensation.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1105A

τὸ γὰρ ἀναισθητεῖν τὸ διαλυθὲν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ τοῦ θαγάτου δέσς, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προστίθησιν (αὐτὸ

γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ δέδοικεν ἡ φύσις ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε)

> For the doctrine that goes "what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us" {Principal Doctrine 2} does not remove the terror of death, but rather confirms it by adding what amounts to a proof. For this is the very thing our nature dreads: "May all of you be turned to earth and water" {Homer, Iliad, IX 408-409} i.e., the dissolution of the soul into what has neither thought nor feeling. Epicurus, by making the dissolution a scattering into emptiness and atoms, does still more to root out our hope of preservation.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1106B

οἷς δὲ ὁ βίος εἰς ἀναισθησίαν περαίνει καὶ διάλυσιν.

> To those, on the other hand, who hold that life comes in the end to insentience and dissolution…

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1106C

ὁ Ἐπικούρου λόγος τοῖς μὲν ἀθλίως ζῶσιν οὐκ εὐτυχῆ τελευτὴν ἐπαγγέλλεται τὴν ἀναίρεσιν καὶ διάλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν δὲ φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν καὶ βρυόντων ἀγαθοῖς παντάπασι κολούει τὸ εὔθυμον, ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μακαρίως εἰς τὸ μὴ ζῆν μηδ᾽ εἶναι καταστρέφων.

> So the doctrine of Epicurus promises the wretch no very happy relief from adversity, only the extinction and dissolution of his soul. But from the prudent and wise and those who abound in all good things it takes away all cheer by altering their condition from blissful living to not living or being at all.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter 104 Letter to Nectarius, 3

hoc enim potius in illīs litterīs lēgī, quoniam uīta ipsa, quā fruimur, breuis est, in quā tū arbitrāris et frequentātum in litterīs iam monēs aeternam esse posse calamitātem:

> for I read this rather in those writings — that life itself, which we enjoy, is short — in which you think, and now often warn in your writings, that eternal calamity can exist;

mortem autem malōrum omnium esse fīnem habent quidem uestrae litterae, sed nec ipsae omnēs:

> but that death is the end of all evils — your writings indeed hold this, though not all of them do;

Epicureōrum est quippe ista sententia et sī quī aliī mortālem animam putant.

> for that opinion is, of course, Epicurus' — and of any others who think the soul is mortal.
>
> What I have read in your literature is more like this: that the life itself which we enjoy is brief, yet you think and you maintain it as a common saying that there can be eternal loss in this life. It is true that some of your authors consider death as the end of all misfortune, but not all of them; it is chiefly the opinion of the Epicureans and those who think the soul is mortal.

[U501]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 30, p. 1106D

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαύστων καὶ ἀορίστων λυθεῖσαν ὑποψίαν ἀγαθὸν βεβαιότατον καὶ ἥδιστον ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ λελύσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τὸν Ἐπικούρου λόγον ἱστάντα τοῦ θανάτου τὸ δέος ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς ψυχῆς

Nevertheless, they assert that when the foreboding of incessant evils to which no period is appointed is dispelled, they are left with a benefit that is in the highest degree assured and pleasant – the thought of release – and that is done by Epicurus' doctrine when it terminates the fear of death with the dissolution of the soul.

[U502]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 30, 1107A

εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ μετ᾽ ἀλγηδόνος, ὥσπερ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται, τοῖς πλείστοις ἀπόλλυσθαι συμβαίνει, παντάπασιν ἀπαρηγόρητός ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος εἰς ἀγαθῶν στέρησιν διὰ κακῶν ἄγοντος.

And if, as Epicurus imagines, for most people the process of dying is painful, the fear of death is quite beyond any comfort, since death ushers us through misery to loss of every good.

[U503]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 30.14

dicebat quidem ille (homo mihi cārus) Epicurī praeceptīs obsequēns:

he indeed used to say this (a man dear to me), obedient to the teachings of Epicurus:

prīmum spērāre sē nūllum dolōrem esse in illō extrēmō anhelitū:

first, that he hoped there would be no pain in that final breath;

sī tamen esset, habēre aliquantum in ipsā breuitāte sōlācīī:

if there were, he would still have some comfort in its very shortness;

nūllum enim dolōrem longum esse quī magnus est:

for no pain is long which is great;

cēterum succursūrum sibi etiam in ipsā distrāctiōne animae corporisque, sī cum cruciātū id fieret, post illum dolōrem sē dolēre nōn posse:

further, that even in the very rending apart of soul and body, if it should happen with torment, he would come to his own aid by knowing that after that pain he could feel no pain;

nōn dubitāre autem sē, quīn senilis anima in prīmīs labrīs esset nec magnā vī distraherētur ā corpore:

and that he had no doubt the aged soul was already at the very lips, and would not be torn violently from the body;

ignis quī ualentem māteriām occupāvit, aquā et interdum ruīnā exstinguendus est: ille quī alimentīs dēficitur, suā sponte subsidit:

a fire that seizes strong material must be quenched by water or even by collapse; that which lacks fuel dies down of itself;

illud quidem aiebat tormentum nostrā nōs sentīre operā, quod tunc trepidāmus, cum prope ā nōbīs esse crēdimus mortem:

he said, indeed, that torment we feel is of our own making, because we grow agitated when we believe death is near us;

a quō enim nōn prope est, parāta omnibus locīs omnibusque momentīs?

for from whom is it not near — being ready in all places and at all times?

sed cōnsiderēmus, inquit, tunc cum aliqua causa moriendī uidētur accēdere, quantō aliaē propiorēs sint quae nōn timentur:

but let us consider, he said, when some cause of dying seems to come near, how many others are closer and yet not feared;

hostis alicuī mortem minabātur: hanc crūditās occupāuit.

an enemy might threaten someone with death — indigestion forestalled it.

He {Aufidius Bassus, an elderly friend} often said, in accordance with the counsels of Epicurus: "I hope, first of all, that there is no pain at the moment when a man breaths his last; but if there is, one will find an element of comfort in its very shortness. For no great pain lasts long. And at all events, a man will find relief at the very time when should and body are being torn asunder, even though the profess be accompanied by excruciating pain, in the thought that after this pain is over he can feel no more pain. I am sure, however, that an old man's soul is on his very lips, and that only a little force is necessary to disengage it from the body. A fire which has seized upon a substance that sustains it needs water to quench it, or sometimes, the destruction of the building itself; but the fire which lacks sustaining fuel dies away of its own accord."

Bassus kept saying: "It is due to our own fault that we feel this torture, because we shrink from dying only when we believe that our end is near at hand." But who is not near death? It is ready for us in all places and at all times. "Let us consider" he went on to say, "when some agency of death seems imminent, how much nearer are other varieties of dying, which are not feared by us." A man is threatened with death by an enemy, but this form of death is anticipated by an attack of indigestion.

9. Virtues

[U504]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.138

διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι᾽ αὑτάς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ κ̄ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων

{Epicurus maintains that} we choose the virtues too for the sake of pleasure and not for their own sake, as we take medicine for the sake of health. So too in the twentieth book of his Epilecta says Diogenes, who also calls education 'recreation.'

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 9.1

“sed tū quoque,” inquit (Epicurus), “uīrtūtem nōn ob aliud colis quam quia aliquam ex illā spērās uoluptātem.”

“but you too,” says Epicurus, “cultivate virtue for no other reason than because you hope for some pleasure from it.”

prīmum nōn, sī uoluptātem praestātūra uīrtūs est, ideō propter hanc petitur:

first, not because virtue will bring pleasure is it therefore sought for this reason;

nōn enim hanc praestat sed et hanc, nec huic laborat, sed labōr eius, quamuis aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequētur.

for it does not give this alone but also this; it does not strive for it, yet its effort, though it aims at something else, attains this as well.

"But even you" ‹Epicurus› retorted, "cultivate virtue for no other reason than because you hope for some pleasure from it." But, in the first place, even though virtue is sure to bestow pleasure, it is not for this reason that virtue is sought; for it is not this, but something more than this that she bestows, nor does she labor for this, but her labor, while directed toward something else, achieves this also.

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics," 12

ἔστι δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἔνδοξον πρῶτον μὲν τὸ πᾶσι δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς... ...ἢ τὸ τοῖς πλείστοις αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν δι' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπ' ἀρετῆς γίνεσθαι.

There is then, among philosophical opinions, first, those which are shared by all who are wise ... that the virtues are goods; or by the majority of them, such as that virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake – even if Epicurus disagrees – and that happiness comes into being by virtue.

[U505]

Maximus of Tyre (fl.c. 190 BCE), Dissertations, 3.5

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἡ ἐξέτασις γίγνεται, ... τοσοῦτον λέγω, ὡς εἰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρήσει τις τὸ ἡδύ, καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτῆς προσαφήρηκεν οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν αἱρετὸν ἀπογενομένης ἡδονῆς καὶ γὰρ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν πονῶν ἑκὼν φιλίᾳ ἡδονῆς πονεῖ παρούσης ἢ προσδοκωμένης .... ἀμέλει κἀν ταῖς τῶν πόνων ὁμιλίαις οὐδεὶς πονεῖ πόνου ἐρῶν (ἢ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὁ δυσεραστότατος), ἀλλάττεται δὲ τοὺς παρόντας πόνους, ὡς μὲν εἴποι ἄν τις τῶν ἀγροικοτέρων, τοῦ καλοῦ, ὡς δέ τις τῶν ἀληθεστέρων, ἡδονῆς κἂν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν εἴπῃς, ἡδονὴν λέγεις σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ κάλλος κάλλος, εἰ μὴ ἥδιστον εἴη ..... (6) κἀν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀντίδοσις γίνεται πρὸς ἡδονὰς πόνων ἣν σὺ μὲν ἀρετὴν καλεῖς, ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν δίδωμι, ἐρήσομαι δέ σε, εἰ ἄνευ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν φιλίας τὴν ἀρετὴν fj ψυχὴ εἵλετο˙ ἐὰν γὰρ τὴν φιλίαν δῷς, ἡδονὴν δίδως.

Since our task is to compare Virtue with Pleasure, I will not abuse Virtue, but I will say this much: if you deprive Virtue of what is pleasant in it, you will also deprive it of its practicability. No good thing is made the object of choice in the absence of Pleasure; the man who labors virtuously labors willingly because of his affection for Pleasure, present or anticipated. Just as in financial transactions no one willingly exchanges a talent for a drachma, unless "Zeus has stolen his wits" {Iliad, 6.234}, but such exchanges, however evenly balanced, must benefit the giver in a manner consistent with the interest of the receiver; just so in our dealings with hard work, no one labors for love of labor (what could be less desirable, after all), but instead bargains his present labors against what a more urbane commentator might call "the Good" but a more veracious one would call Pleasure – because even if you say 'the Good,' you mean Pleasure; goodness would hardly be goodness were it not also supremely pleasurable. 6: I believe this whole argument can be turned around: these very considerations suffice to prove that Pleasure is more worthy of choice than all other things, since for its sake men are prepared to accept death and injuries and labors and countless other vexations.

Maximus of Tyre (fl.c. 190 BCE), Dissertations, 3.10

σμικρῶν πόνων μεγάλας ἡδονὰς ἀντεισάγεις.

At the cost of trivial pains, you have paved the way for great pleasures.

[U506]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.138

ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ἀχώριστόν φησι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα χωρίζεσθαι, οἷον βρωτά.

Epicurus describes virtue as indispensable for pleasure – the one thing without which pleasure cannot exist. Everything else (food, for instance) are separable – not indispensable to pleasure.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49

negat Epicurus iūcundē posse uīuī nisi cum uīrtūte uīuātur.

Epicurus denies that it is possible to live pleasantly unless one lives with virtue.

Epicurus says a pleasurable life is impossible unless accompanied by virtue.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 6.3

negant posse uoluptātem ā uīrtūte dīduci et aiunt nec honeste quemquam uīuere ut nōn iūcundē uīuat, nec iūcundē ut nōn honeste quoque.

they deny that pleasure can be separated from virtue, and say that no one can live honorably without also living pleasantly, nor pleasantly without also living honorably.

And so they say that it is not possible to separate pleasure from virtue, and they profess that no one can live virtuously without also living pleasantly, nor pleasantly without also living virtuously.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 9.4

quid mihi uoluptātem nōminās? hominis bonum quaerō, nōn ventris, quī pecudibus ac beluīs laxior est.

why do you name pleasure to me? I seek the good of man, not of the belly, which is looser in beasts and animals.

“dissimulās,” inquit (Epicurus), “quid ā mē dicātur. ego enim negō quemquam posse iūcundē vīvere, nisi simul et honeste vīvat.”

“You misrepresent,” says Epicurus, “what I say. for I deny that anyone can live pleasantly unless he also lives honorably.”

“quod nōn potest mūtīs contingere animālibus nec bonum suum cibō metientibus.”

“which cannot happen to dumb animals nor to those measuring their good by food.”

“clārē,” inquit, “ac palam testor hanc vītam, quam ego iūcundam vocō, nōn sine adiectā virtūte contingere.”

“clearly,” he says, “and openly I declare that this life, which I call pleasant, cannot come about without added virtue.”

Why do you recommend pleasure to me? It is the good of man that I am searching for, not that of his belly, which is more insatiable than the belly of domestic or wild beasts. "You are misrepresenting what I say" you retort, "for I admit that no man can live pleasantly without at the same time living virtuously as well, and this is patently impossible for dumb beasts and for those who measure their good by mere food. Distinctly, I say, and openly I testify that the life that I call pleasant is impossible without the addition of virtue."

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 12.3

ille effūsus in uoluptātēs ructābundus semper atque ēbrius, quia scit sē cum uoluptāte uīvere, crēdit et cum uīrtūte.

that man, poured out in pleasures, always belching and drunk, because he knows that he lives with pleasure, believes also that he lives with virtue.

audit enim uoluptātem sēparārī ā uīrtūte nōn posse.

for he hears that pleasure cannot be separated from virtue.

deinde uitiīs suīs sapientiam īnscribit et abscondenda profitetur.

then he labels his vices as wisdom and openly professes what should be hidden.

Let them cease, therefore, to join irreconcilable things and to link pleasure with virtue – a vicious procedure which flatters the worst class of men. The man who has plunged into pleasures, in the midst of his constant belching and drunkenness, because he knows that he is living with pleasure, believes that he is living with virtue as well; for he hears first that pleasure cannot be separated from virtue, then dubs his vices wisdom, and parades what ought to be concealed.

[U507]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.48

ille ā uīrtūte summum bonum sēparāuit. at laudat saepe uīrtūtem.

he separated the highest good from virtue. yet he often praises virtue.

Epicurus has disconnected the highest good from virtue. "Yes, he but often praises virtue."

[U508]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 85.18

Epicurus quoque iūdicat, cum uīrtūtem habeat, beātum esse, sed ipsam uīrtūtem nōn satis esse ad beātam vītam, quia beātam efficiat uoluptās, quae ex uīrtūte est, nōn ipsa uīrtūs.

Epicurus also judges that when a man has virtue, he is happy, but that virtue itself is not enough for a happy life, because it is pleasure — which comes from virtue — that makes one happy, not virtue itself.

idem negat umquam uīrtūtem esse sine uoluptāte.

the same man denies that virtue can ever exist without pleasure.

Epicurus also asserts that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for a happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy.

[U509]

Clement of Alexandria(fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 2.21

Ἐπίκουρος μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖόν φασιν ἡδονὴν εἶναι· ἕνεκα γὰρ ἡδονῆς παρελθοῦσα, φασίν, ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡδονὴν ἐνεποίησε.

Epicurus indeed, and the Cyrenaics, say that pleasure is the first duty; for it is for the sake of pleasure, they say, that virtue was introduced, and produced pleasure.

[U510]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Divination, 1.39.87

Epicurus … nullam cēnset grātuītam esse uīrtūtem.

Epicurus thinks that no virtue is without reward.

... [Epicurus'] view that there is no such thing as disinterested virtue.

[U511]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.73

Epicurō quī … haec nostra honesta turpia inrīdeat dīcatque nōs in uōcibus occupātōs inānīs sonōs fundere.

to Epicurus, who mocks our talk of honorable and shameful things, and says that we are busy with words and pouring out empty sounds.

Epicurus, who … makes a mockery of our notions
of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning…

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.41.119

iī philosophī, quōrum ea sententia est, ut uīrtūs per sē ipsa nihil ualeat, omneque quod honestum nōs et laudābile esse dīcimus, id illī cassum quiddam et inānī uōcis sonō dēcorātum esse dīcant, eī tamen semper beātum cēnsent esse sapientem.

Those philosophers whose opinion is that virtue by itself is worth nothing, and that everything we call honorable and praiseworthy is an empty thing, adorned with the hollow sound of a word — yet they still judge the wise man always to be happy.

The [Epicurean] philosophers hold the view that virtue in and by itself is quite ineffective. Everything that we say is honorable and praiseworthy, they say is mere emptiness – tricked out in a sounding phrase that has no meaning. Nevertheless they think that the Sage is always happy.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.16.51 (Cicero to Torquatus)

cum dīcerēs clāmāre Epicurum nōn posse iūcundē uīuī nisi honēstē … [sent. V], tū ipse mihi glōriārī uidēbāre: tanta uīs inerāt in uerbis.

When you said that Epicurus cries out that one cannot live pleasantly unless one lives honorably … you yourself seemed to me to boast — so great was the force in your words.

ut nōs intuēns quasi testificārēre laudārī honestātem et iūstitiam aliquandō ab Epicurō.

As if, looking at us, you were bearing witness that honor and justice are at times praised by Epicurus.

quam tē decēbat iīs uerbis ūtī.

How fitting it was for you to use such words.

istōrum enim uerbōrum amōre, quae perrārō appellantur ab Epicurō — sapientiae, fortitūdinis, iūstitiae, temperantiae — praestantissimīs ingeniīs hominēs sē ad philosophiae studium contulērunt.

For through love of those very words — wisdom, courage, justice, temperance, which are very rarely named by Epicurus — men of the highest talents devoted themselves to the study of philosophy.

When you informed us that Epicurus proclaims "It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly" {= Principal Doctrine 5}, your words derived potency from the grandeur of the things that they denoted. You drew yourself up to your full height, and kept stopping and fixing us with your gaze, as if solemnly stating that Epicurus does occasionally commend morality and justice. Were those names never mentioned by philosophers, we should have no use for philosophy; how well they sounded on your lips!

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Laelius, or An Essay on Friendship, 23.86

a multīs uīrtūs ipsa contemnitur et uenditātiō quaedam atque ostentātiō esse dīcitur.

By many, virtue itself is despised and is said to be a kind of display and showmanship.

Even virtue itself is regarded with contempt by many, and is said to be mere pretense and display.

Porphyrio, Commentary on Horace's "Epistles" 1.17.41

aut uīrtūs nōmen ināne est … nōmen ināne uānumque esse uīrtūtem Epicurus dīxit ad uoluptātem referēns ūniuersa quae facimus.

Either virtue is an empty name … Epicurus said that virtue is an empty and vain name, since he refers all the things we do to pleasure.

Either virtue is a mere empty name… Epicurus said that virtue is a vain and empty name, as he linked all actions to how well they consummate pleasure.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 9.563

Epicureī sine substantia uīrtūtem esse dīcunt uānumque eī nōmen, et ideō nēminem posse ex praeceptō Stoicōrum sapientem fierī, sed tantum pollicērī.

The Epicureans say that virtue is without substance and that its name is empty, and therefore that no one can become wise by the precepts of the Stoics, but only promise to be so.

The Epicureans say that virtue is devoid of substance and is an empty name and that because of this, no one can become wise conforming to the precepts of the Stoics, but can only make promises.

Lucian, The Double Indictment, 21

[ubī Epicurus ipse Dionysii Metathēmenī causam agit]

[Where Epicurus himself pleads the case of Dionysius the Renegade.]

τὴν παρὰ ταύτης (τῆς Στοᾶς) ἀηδίαν μυσαχθεὶς καὶ ἣν φησιν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ τῶν πόνων εὐδαιμονίαν παραγίγνεσθαι λῆρον οἰηθείς.

"… hating the tedium of life with her {i.e., Stoicism), and considering as nonsense that happiness which, she says, accompanies pain…"

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.25

λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐδέν ἐστι, πῶς ἡ αἰδὼς μωρία ἐστί, πῶς πατὴρ οὐδέν ἐστι, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν.

"Learn now how righteousness is nothing, how reverence is folly, how a father is nothing, how a son is nothing."

Himerius (fl.c. 355 CE), Speeches, by way of Photius 1, library codex 243, 356A, 13

οἴχεται μὲν ἀρετὴ πᾶσα τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις καὶ δόγμασιν, οἴχεται δὲ δικαστήρια καὶ κρίσεις, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν αἱ τιμαί, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ τίμημα.

All virtue is lost, by the reasoning and the doctrine of Epicurus; stop the courts, due process, the rewarding of good people and the punishment of the bad.

[U512]

Aëtius (fl. f. 50 CE), Placita Philosophorum, 12, 547A

κἀν τῷ Περὶ τέλους δὲ πάλιν φησί... ...κἀν ἄλλοις δέ φησι προσπτύω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῶς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ.

And in his work On Fulfillment, he says again: "{=U70}" And in other passages, he says "I spit upon the honorable and those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure."

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 30, 1124E

ὅταν... ...σοφοὺς ἡγῶνται τοὺς τῷ καλῷ προσπτύοντας, ἂν ἡδονὴ μὴ προσῇ.

... and when men take for sages those who "spit on excellence, unless pleasure attends it."

[c.f. 1124E see U368]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129B

Λεοντίῳ συγκαταζῆν καὶ τῷ καλῷ προσπτύειν καὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ γαργαλισμοῖς τίθεσθαι.

... to live together with Leontion and "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations."

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1108C

οἱ περὶ γαστέρα τἀγαθὸν εἶναι βοῶντες, οὐκ ἂν δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁμοῦ πάσας τετρημένου χαλκοῦ πριάμενοι, δίχα τῆς ἡδονῆς πάσας πανταχόθεν ἐξελαθείσας.

... those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly and that they would not give a copper coin with a hole in it for all the virtues in bulk apart from pleasure.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1095F

οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ τῷ καλῷ πολεμεῖν τὸν ἄσπονδον καὶ ἀκήρυκτον πόλεμον; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἡδονὴ πρόσεστι, τί σεμνὸν καὶ καθάριον ἀσπάζονται καὶ ἀγαπῶσιν;

Do they not confess that they are waging war without truce or negotiation on all that is beautiful, so long as it is not pleasurable as well? What holy and pure thing do they welcome and cherish?

[U513]

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.22.21

τοῦτο γάρ μοι συνοίσει, τηρεῖν τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἀνεκτικόν, τὸν ἀφεκτικὸν καὶ συνεργητικόν, φυλάσσειν τὰς σχέσεις. ἂν δ' ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν ἐμαυτὸν θῶ, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ καλόν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς γίνεται ὁ Ἐπικούρου λόγος ἀποφαίνων ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ (εἰ) ἄρα, τὸ ἔνδοξον.

So then, this will be in my interest: to keep my good faith, my self-respect, my forbearance, my abstinence, and my cooperation, and to maintain my relations with other men. But if I put what is mine in one scale, and what is honorable in the other, then the statement of Epicurus assumes strength, in which he declares that "the honorable is either nothing at all, or at best only what people hold in esteem."

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.15.48 [= U69]; ibid., 49

philosophus nōbilis, ā quō nōn sōlum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria commōta est, honestum quid sit, sī id nōn sit in uoluptāte, negat sē intellegere, nisi forte illud quod multitūdinis rūmore laudētur.

A famous philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy but even all barbarian lands were stirred, says that he does not understand what "honorable" is, if it is not in pleasure — unless perhaps it is that which is praised by the rumor of the crowd.

Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what moral worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure – unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude.

[U514]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), On Duties, 3.33.117

sī Epicurum audiām dē continentiā et temperantiā, dīcit ille quidem multa multīs locīs, sed aquā haeret, ut aiunt.

If I listen to Epicurus on self-control and moderation, he indeed says many things in many places, but he "sticks in the water," as they say.

nam quī potest temperantiam laudāre is, quī pōnat summum bonum in uoluptāte?

For how can he praise temperance, who sets the highest good in pleasure?

atque in hīs tamen tribus generibus, quōquō modō possunt, nōn incallidē tergiuersantur.

And yet, in these three kinds, they make excuses with no little cleverness, however they can.

prūdentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem uoluptātēs, depellentem dolōrēs.

They introduce prudence as the knowledge that supplies pleasures and drives away pains.

fortitūdinem quoque aliquō modō expediunt, cum trādunt ratiōnem neglegendæ mortis, perpetiendī dolōris.

They also manage courage in some way, when they teach the reasoning for disregarding death and enduring pain.

etiam temperantiam inducunt, nōn facillimē illī quidem, sed tamen quōquō modō possunt: dīcunt enim uoluptātis magnitūdinem dolōris detractione fīnīrī.

They also introduce temperance — not easily indeed, yet however they can — for they say that the greatness of pleasure is bounded by the removal of pain.

iūstitia uacillat uel iacet potius, omnēsque eae uirtūtēs quae in commūnitāte cernuntur et in societāte generis humānī.

But justice totters, or rather lies fallen, and likewise all those virtues which are seen in human community and fellowship.

neque enim bonitās nec līberālitās nec comitās esse potest, nōn plūs quam amīcitia, sī haec nōn per sē expetantur, sed ad uoluptātem utilitātemue referantur.

For neither kindness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist — any more than friendship — if these are not sought for their own sake, but are referred to pleasure or advantage.

If I should listen to him, I should find that in many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but "the water ill not run" as they say. For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? ... And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, these philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. They even bring temperance in – not every easily, to be sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters, or rather I should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, anymore than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.12.37

uirtūtibus, quās ratiō rērum omnium dominās, tū uoluptātum satellitēs et ministrās esse uoluistī.

The virtues — which reason made the mistresses of all things — you have wished to be the attendants and handmaids of pleasures.

... the Virtues, which Reason would have in charge of all things, but you considered as the handmaids and subordinates of the pleasures.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Moral Dialogs, 7, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 13.5

uirtūtem quidem, excelsissimam omnium, uoluptātī trādere ancillam, nihil magnum animō capientis est.

To hand over virtue — the loftiest of all things — as a slave to pleasure is not the act of one who conceives anything great in spirit.

To hand over virtue, the loftiest of mistresses, to be the handmaid of pleasure is the part of a man who has nothing great in his soul.

[U515]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Stoic Self-Contradictions, 26, 1046E

εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγεῖτο (Χρύσιππος) ποιητικὸν εἶναι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τι ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος

Now if [Chrysippus] held prudence to be a good productive of happiness, as Epicurus did...

Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE), De Anima Mantissa, 2.22, 156

(ἡ ἀρετὴ) περὶ τὴν ἐκλογήν ἐστι τῶν ἡδέων κατ' Ἐπίκουρον.

[U516]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 5.47

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ Ἐπικούρου ἀνδρεία ὑπομένοντος πόνους διὰ φυγὴν πόνων πλειόνων, ἄλλη δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δι᾽ αὐτὴν αἱρουμένου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν κτλ.

And so too the "courage" of Epicurus is one sort of thing, who would undergo some pains in order to escape from a greater number; and a different thing for the philosopher of the Stoa, who would choose all virtue for its own sake.

[U517]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι, λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

{The Epicurean school teaches that} courage is not a natural gift but arises from circumstances.

[U518]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 5.47

ἤδη δὲ ἀποδείκνυται ἄλλη μὲν ἡ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον δικαιοσύνη... ...ἄλλη δὲ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς ἀρνουμένους τὸ τριμερὲς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἰδιοπραγίαν τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φάσκοντας εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

...but righteousness is shown to be one thing according to the view of Epicurus, and another according to the Stoics (who deny the threefold division of the soul), and yet a different thing according to the followers of Plato, who hold that righteousness is the proper business of the parts of the soul.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Sermon 348.3

quā propter inrīrendī sunt huius mundī philosophī, nōn sōlum Epicureī, quī etiam ipsam iūstitiam uenālem habent carnālis pretiō uoluptātis.

For this reason, the philosophers of this world are to be laughed at — not only the Epicureans, who even make justice itself for sale at the price of bodily pleasure.

dīcunt enim proptereā sapientem iūstum esse dēbēre, ut uel adquirat uel teneat ex corpore uoluptātem.

For they say that the wise man ought to be just for this reason — that he may either gain or preserve bodily pleasure.

[U519]

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 6.2

αὖθίς τε Ἀριστοφάνους γράφοντος "βέβαιον ἕξεις τὸν βίον δίκαιος ὤν, χωρίς τε θορύβου καὶ φόβου ζήσεις καλῶς" ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει· Δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

And again, if Aristophanes writes:

"You will have a secure life, being just
and without anxiety nor fear
you will live well"
{Aristophanes, uncertain fragment 19, in Mein., Greek Comics, 2 p. 1181}

... Epicurus says "The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind."

[U520]

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), *Virtue and Vice*, 3, 101B

ποῦ τοίνυν τὸ ἡδὺ τῆς κακίας ἐστίν, εἰ μηδαμοῦ τὸ ἀμέριμνον καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον μηδ᾽ αὐτάρκεια μηδ᾽ ἀταραξία μηδ᾽ ἡσυχία; ταῖς μὲν γὰρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡδοναῖς ἡ τοῦ σώματος εὐκρασία καὶ ὑγίεια χώραν δίδωσι· τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγγενέσθαι γῆθος οὐδὲ χαρὰν βέβαιον, ἂν μὴ τὸ εὔθυμον καὶ ἄφοβον καὶ θαρραλέον ὥσπερ ἕδραν ἢ γαλήνην ἄκλυστον ὑποβάληται, ἀλλὰ κἂν ὑπομειδιάσῃ τις ἐλπὶς ἢ τέρψις, αὕτη ταχὺ φροντίδος ἐκραγείσης ὥσπερ ἐν εὐδίᾳ σπιλάδος συνεχύθη καὶ συνεταράχθη.

Where, then, is the pleasure in vice, if in no part of it is to be found freedom from care and grief or contentment or tranquility or calm? For a well-balanced and healthy condition of the body gives room for engendering the pleasures of the flesh; but in the soul lasting joy and gladness cannot possibly be engendered, unless it provided itself first with cheerfulness, fearlessness, and courageousness as a basis to rest upon, or as a clam tranquility that no billows disturb; otherwise, even though some hope or delectation lure us with a smile, anxiety suddenly breaks forth, like a hidden rock appearing in fair weather and the soul is overwhelmed and confounded.

[U521]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.120

ἁμαρτήματα ἄνισα εἶναι

The school holds that not all sins are equal.

Horace (*fl.c.* 25 BCE), *Satires*, 1.3.96 (criticizing the Stoics)

quis paria esse ferē placuit peccāta, laborant

Those to whom it seemed that sins are almost equal — they struggle

cum uentum ad uērum est. sēnsūs mōrēsque repugnant

when it comes to truth; feelings and moral sense resist,

atque ipsa ūtilitās, iustī prope māter et aequī.

and utility itself — almost the mother of justice and fairness.

People who rate all offences as equally wicked are brought up
Short when they face reality: private and public opinions
Find it abhorrent and hardly useful for the general welfare –
Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

[U522]

Seneca (*fl.* 35 CE), *Letters to Lucilius*, 28.9

tempus est dēsinere, sed sī prius portōrium soluerō.

It is time to stop — but first I must pay the toll.

initium est salūtis notitia peccātī.

The beginning of salvation is the knowledge of one's sin.

egregiē mihi hoc dixisse uidētur Epicurus,

Epicurus seems to me to have said this excellently:

nam quī peccāre sē nescit, corrīgī nōn uult: deprehendās tē oportet, antequam emendēs.

for he who does not know that he sins does not wish to be corrected; you must catch yourself before you can mend yourself.

It is time I left off – not before I have paid the usual duty though! "A consciousness of wrongdoing is the first step to salvation." This remark of Epicurus' is to me a very good one. For a person who is not aware that he is doing anything wrong has no desire to be put right. You have to catch yourself doing it before you can reform.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.1.41

uirtus est uitium fugere et sapientia prīma

Virtue is to flee from vice, and the first wisdom

stultitiā caruisse.

is to have been free from folly.

Virtue begins with avoidance of vice,
And the first rule of wisdom
Is to abstain from one's folly.

10. Human Society

[U523]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.42

dicit Epicurus... ...nullam esse hūmānam societātem: sibi quemque consulere.

Epicurus says... that there is no human fellowship — each person looks out for himself.

[Epicurus maintains that] pleasure is the greatest good; there is no human society – each one takes thought for himself. {Cf. U581}

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Letters to Atticus, 7.2.4

prudentius (Carneades) quam Lucius noster et Patron, qui cum omnia ad se referant, numquam quicquam alterius causa fieri putent et cum ea re bonum uirum oportere esse dicant, ne malum habeat, non quo id natura rectum sit, non intellegant se de callido homine loqui, non de bono uiro.

Carneades spoke more wisely than our Lucius and Patron, who, since they refer everything to themselves, think nothing is ever done for another's sake; and when they say that a man ought to be good so that he may not suffer harm — not because it is right by nature — they do not realize that they speak of a clever man, not of a good man.

...Carneades {spoke} with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron, who in sticking to selfish hedonism and denying altruism, and saying that man must be virtuous for fear of the consequences of vice and not because virtue is an end in itself, fail to see that they are describing a manner not of goodness but of craftiness.

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.6

οὔτω καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, αὐτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ συγχρῆται. τί γὰρ λέγει; μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι μηδὲ παράγεσθε μηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, πιστεύσατέ μοι· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται.

So too Epicurus, when he wishes to abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what does he say? "Don't be deceived, men, or misled or mistaken: there is no natural fellowship of rational beings with each other. Believe me: those who say otherwise are deceiving you and reasoning falsely."

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.20

οὕτω καὶ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ᾽ ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ πολίτου καὶ φίλου, τὰς δὲ προθυμίας τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὐκ ἀπεκόψατο, οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο

So with Epicurus: he cut off everything that characterizes a man, the head of a household, a citizen, and a friend, but he did not succeed in cutting off the desires of human beings; for that he could not do.

[U524]

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Satires, 1.3.98

ipsa utilitās, iustī prope māter et aequī.

Utility itself — almost the mother of justice and fairness.

Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129B

ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν μὲν φυσικοῖς θεὸν ὑμνῇ καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν, ἐν δὲ ἠθικοῖς νόμον καὶ κοινωνίαν καὶ πολιτείαν, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν χρείαν, διὰ τί λάθη βιώσας;

But consider one who in natural philosophy extols God and justice and providence, in ethics: law and society and participation in public affairs, and in political life the upright and not the utilitarian act, what need has he to live unknown?

[U525]

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 1.23.1

ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί· ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτ᾽ ἀποδέχεσθαι, καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ· πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσική ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀτοσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; .... (5) ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν ὅτι ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτό φησιν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα... ...(7) ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὅτι μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα.

[done above] Even Epicurus understands that we are by nature social beings, but having once set our good in the husk which we wear, he cannot go on and say anything inconsistent with this. For, he next insists emphatically upon the principle that we ought neither to admire nor to accept anything that is detached from the nature of the good; and he is right in so doing. But how, then can we still be social beings, if affection for our own children is not a natural sentiment? Why do you dissuade the wise man from bring up children? Why are you afraid that sorrow will come to him on their account? ... 5: Nay, he knows, that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it or to care for it. For the same reason Epicurus says that a man of sense does not engage in politics either... 7: Yet, despite the fact that he knows this, he still has the audacity to say, "Let us not bring up children."

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 4.11.1

ἀμφισβητοῦσί τινες, εἰ ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου περιέχεται τὸ κοινωνικόν.

Some people raise doubts whether the social instinct is a necessary element in the nature of man.

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.19

τὸν θεόν σοι, ἐπινοεῖς Ἐπικουρείων πόλιν; Ἐγὼ οὐ γαμῶ. Οὐδ’ ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. Τί οὖν γένηται; πόθεν οἱ πολῖται; τίς αὐτοὺς παιδεύσει....; τί δὲ καὶ παιδεύσει αὐτούς;

In the name God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean State? One man says, "I do not marry." "Neither do I" says another, "for people ought not to marry." No, nor have children; no, nor perform the duties of a citizen. What will happen then? Where are the citizens to come from? Who will educate them? ... Yes, and what will they teach them?

[U526]

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 2.23

Δημόκριτος δὲ γάμον καὶ παιδοποιίαν παραιτεῖται διὰ τὰς πολλὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀηδίας τε καὶ ἀφολκὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων. συγκατατάττεται δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ὅσοι ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἀοχλησίᾳ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀλυπίᾳ τἀγαθὸν τίθενται.

Democritus repudiates marriage and the procreation of children, on account of the many annoyances arising thereby, and the detraction from more necessary things. Epicurus agrees, as do those who place good in pleasure, and in the absence of trouble and pain.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.5

qui odit uxōrem, huic enumerantur (ab Epicurō) caelibātūs bona; habentī malōs līberōs orbitās praedicātur.

He who hates his wife — to him Epicurus lists the blessings of celibacy; to one who has bad children — he praises childlessness.

One who hates women has enumerated for him [by Epicurus] the benefits of celibacy, and childlessness is proclaimed to one who has bad children.

[U527]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On Affection for Offspring, 495A

εἶτα ταῦτα οἰόμεθα (τὰ) πάθη τούτοις (τοῖς ζῴοις) ἐνειργάσθαι τὴν φύσιν ἀλεκτορίδων ἐπιγονῆς καὶ κυνῶν καὶ ἄρκτων προνοοῦσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡμᾶς δυσωποῦσαν καὶ τιτρώσκουσαν ἐπιλογιζομένους, ὅτι ταῦτα παραδείγματα τοῖς ἑπομένοις, τοῖς δὲ ἀναλγήτοις ὀνείδη περίεστι τῆς ἀπαθείας δι’ ὧν κατηγοροῦσι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως μόνης μὴ προῖκα τὸ στέργειν ἐχούσης μηδ᾽ ἐπισταμένης φιλεῖν ἄνευ χρείας. θαυμάζεται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ὁ εἰπιών "μισθοῦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τίς ἀνθρώπων φιλεῖ;" (εἰ) κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν, (ἡ μήτηρ τὸ τέκνον, οἱ παῖδες τοὺς τεκόντας.

Are we, then, to believe that Nature has implanted these emotions in these creatures because she is solicitous for the offspring of hens and dogs and bears, and not, rather, because she is striving to make us ashamed and to wound us, when we reflect that these instances are examples to those of us who would follow the lead of Nature, but to those who are callous, as rebukes for their insensibility, by citing which they disparage human nature as being the only kind that has no disinterested affection and that does not know how to love without prospect of gain? In our theaters, indeed, people applaud the verse of the poet who sad, "What man will love his follow-man for pay?" {Uncertain comic author, t. V p. 122 Mein.} And yet, according to Epicurus, it is for pay that a father loves his son, a mother her child, and children their parents.

[U528]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 1123A

τὸ δὲ φύσει περιέχεσθαι τὰ τεκόντα τῶν γειναμένων οὐχὶ πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἀναιρεῖτε;

Do you people not dismiss the instinctive love of parents for their offspring – a fact accepted by all?

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Letters to Atticus, 7.2.4

filiola tua tē dēlectārī laetor et probārī tibi φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα.

I am glad that your little daughter delights you, and that you recognize affection toward children to be natural.

etenim sī haec nōn est, nūlla potest hominī esse ad hominem nātūrae adiūnctiō, quā sublātā vītae societās tollitur.

For if this is not so, no natural bond can exist between one human being and another — and, once that is removed, all fellowship of life is destroyed.

"bene eueniat," inquit Carneades.

"Good luck with that," said Carneades —

spurce, sed tamen prudentius quam Lūcius noster et Patrōn.

coarsely, yet more wisely than our Lucius and Patron.

I am glad you take delight in your baby daughter, and have satisfied yourself that a desire for children is natural. For if it is not, there can be no natural tie between people; remove that tie and social life is destroyed. "Heaven bless the consequence" says Carneades, but with more with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron...

[U529]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.5

aduersus parentēs impiō nullum esse vinculum nātūrae (ab Epicurō dicitur).

Epicurus says that for an impious man toward his parents, there is no bond of nature.

For one who is irreverent toward his parents there is [from Epicurus] the idea that there is no bond in nature.

[U530]

Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 43.139

οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται.

"Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent them from inflicting wrong but to secure them from suffering it."

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 CE), Letter to Marcella, 27

οἱ γὰρ ἔγγραφοι νόμοι χάριν τῶν μετρίων κεῖνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται.

"The written laws are laid down for the sake of temperate men, not to keep them from doing wrong but from being wronged."

[U531]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 97.15

illic dissentiamus cum Epicurō, ubi dicit nihil iustum esse nātūrā et crīmina uitanda esse, quia uitārī metus nōn posse:

Let us disagree with Epicurus there — where he says that nothing is just by nature and that crimes are to be avoided only because fear cannot be escaped;

hic consentiamus, mala facinora conscientia flagellari et plurimum illi tormentorum esse eo quod perpetua illam sollicitudo urget ac verberat, quod sponsoribus securitatis suae non potest credere.

but here let us agree: that evil deeds are scourged by conscience, and that the wrongdoer suffers the greatest torments because unending anxiety presses and lashes him, since he cannot trust the guarantors of his own safety.

hoc enim ipsum argumentum est, Epicure, natura nos a scelere abhorrere, quod nulli non etiam inter tuta timor est.

For this very fact, Epicurus, is proof that nature makes us shrink from crime — since everyone feels fear, even when he is safe.

Let us disagree with Epicurus on one point, when he declares that there is no natural justice, and that crime should be avoided because one cannot escape the fear which results therefrom; let us agree with him on the other – that bad deeds are lashed by the whip of conscience, and that conscience is tortured to the greatest degree because unending anxiety drives and whips it on, and it cannot rely upon the guarantors of its own peace of mind. For this, Epicurus, is the very proof that we are by nature reluctant to commit crime, because even in circumstances of safety there is no one who does not feel fear.

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Satires, 1.3.113

nec nātūra potest iustō secernere inīquom,

nor can nature distinguish the just from the unjust,

dīuidit ut bona dīuersīs, fugienda petendīs.

since she allots goods differently — making what some flee from, others pursue.

Nature, however, can not differentiate just things from unjust,
As she distinguishes things to be shunned from the things to be sought for.

[U532]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 6, p. 1090C

ὅτι δὲ ὅλως μοχθηρὰ τὰ πράγματα πρὸς βίον ἄλυπόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, σκόπει καὶ ἀφ’ ὧν πρὸς ἑτέρους λέγουσι· τοὺς γὰρ ἀδικοῦντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ἀθλίως φασὶ καὶ περιφόβως ζῆν τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ὅτι κἂν λαθεῖν δύνωνται, πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν· ὅθεν ὁ [περὶ] τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀεὶ φόβος ἐγκείμενος οὐκ ἐᾷ χαίρειν οὐδὲ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι.

That their general prospects are poor even for a life without mental anguish you may also judge in the light of the remarks they address to others. Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epicurus, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 97.13

eleganter itaque ab Epicurō dictum putō:

I think it was said elegantly by Epicurus:

potest nocentī contingere ut lateat, latendī fīdēs nōn potest,

it may happen that a guilty person hides, but trust in remaining hidden cannot;

aut sī hōc modō melius hunc explicārī posse iūdicās sensum:

or, if you judge the sense better expressed this way:

ideō nōn prōdest latēre peccantibus, quia latendī etiam sī fēlicitātem habent, fīdūciam nōn habent.

therefore it does not benefit wrongdoers to stay hidden, for even if they have the luck of concealment, they lack confidence in it.

ita est, tūta scelera esse possunt, secūra nōn possunt.

So it is: crimes may be safe, but never free from fear.

Hence I hold Epicurus' saying to be most apt: "That the guilty may happen to remain hidden is possible" or, if you think that the meaning can be made more clear in this way: "The reason that there is no advantage for wrong-doers to remain hidden is that (even though they got lucky) they have not the assurance of remaining so."

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea (fl.c. 405 BCE), Preparation for the Gospel, 15.5.5

πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἄν γε ἀνθρώπους δέῃ λανθάνειν· οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκ παντὸς λαθεῖν ζητεῖν, ὅπου γέ τις τῶν πεφωρακότων κρατεῖν δυνατός ἐστιν. ὥστε ἕτοιμόν τι χρῆμα πρὸς ἀδικίαν ἡ τῆς προνοίας ἀπόγνωσις. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ χρηστός ἐστιν, ὅς τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῖν προτείνας ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἐκ θεῶν ἄδειαν παρασχόμενος ἔτι μηχανὴν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν πορίζειν οἴεται, ὅμοιόν τι ποιῶν ἰατρῷ τὴν μὲν ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ κάμνοντος βοήθειαν παρέντι, μετὰ θάνατον δὲ πλέκειν τινὰς μηχανὰς πειρωμένῳ πρὸς σωτηρίαν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος.

It is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man.

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 CE), Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.11

A man acts foolishly {according to Epictetus' derisive portrayal of Epicureanism}, if, when he is a Judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the theft be done secretly, safely, without anybody's knowledge. For even Epicurus himself does not declare the act of theft evil – only getting caught. Only because it is impossible for one to be certain that he will not be detected, does he say, "Do not steal."

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 5.1152

circum rētit enim uīs atque iniūria quemque
for violence and wrongdoing ensnare each man round about,

atque unde exortast, ad eum plērumque reuērtit,
and whence it arose, to him for the most part it returns,

nec facilest placidam ac pācātam dēgere uītam
nor is it easy to lead a calm and peaceful life

quī uiolat factīs commūnia foedera pācis:
for one who violates by deeds the common bonds of peace;

etsī fallit enim diuum genus hūmānumque,
for even if he deceives both gods and men,

perpetuō tamen id fore clām diffīdere dēbet.
yet he must secretly distrust that it will last forever.

Hence, the fear of punishment spoils the {ill-gotten} prizes.
Violence and wrong catch people in their own nets
and those who start such things are most often entangled.
It is not easy to pass a peaceful life
if you act in a way that disturbs the general peace.
Although you elude the gods and the human race
you still must wonder whether your secret will be kept forever.

[U533]

Demetrius Laco, P.Herc. 1012 col. 33 (53)

...ὥσ̣τ̣ε̣ μηδενὸς ἐ̣τ̣ερογενοῦς προσδεῖσθαι, νοο[ῦμ]ε̣ν δὲ τέλος ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ οὖ παρόντος οὐδενὸς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐτ̣ερογενοῦς προσδ[εῖ]ται, δ̣[ι]ὸ τ̣[έ]λος τ̣ῶν ἀγαθῶν [ἐστιν ἡ ἡδο]νή, [φαμὲν] δὲ τὸ̣ [μέγιστ]ο̣ν [τ]ῶν κ̣α̣κ̣ῶν ἀλ[γεῖν ειν]α̣ι· τὰς ἐναντίας [διαθέσεις]...

...ὥστε μηδενὸς ἐ̣τ̣ερογενοῦς προσδεῖσθαι, νοοῦμεν δὲ τέλος ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ οὗ παρόντος οὐδενὸς ὁ κεκτημένος ἑτερογενοῦς προσδεῖται, διὸ τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή, φαμὲν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἀλγεῖν ειναι· τὰς ἐναντίας διαθέσεις...

> The chief of all goods, even if there weren't any other, is that by which he who possesses it advances toward virtue.

[U534]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1104B

οὐ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῆς ἀδικίας οἴεται δεῖν ἀπείργειν ἢ φόβῳ κολάσεων.

> Epicurus supposes that fear of punishment is the only motive to which we can properly appeal in deterring from crime.

[U535]

Origen (fl.c. 225 CE), Against Celsus, 7.63

ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Κιτιέως Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τὰ Ἐπικούρου, τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν παντελῶς ἰδιωτῶν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα ὅση διαφωνία ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ μοιχεύειν ἐκκλίσεως τῶν τοιούτων. Οἳ μὲν διὰ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ (διὰ τὸ) παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ νοθεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων ἑτέρῳ προκαταληφθεῖσαν γυναῖκα καὶ φθείρειν τὸν ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου οἶκον: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μοιχεύουσιν, ὅτε ἀπέχονται τοῦ μοιχεύειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νενομικέναι τέλος τὴν ἡδονήν, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀπαντᾶν κωλυτικὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς τῷ εἴξαντι μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ μοιχεύειν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε φυλακὰς ἢ φυγὰς ἢ θανάτους, πολλάκις δὲ πρὸ τούτων καὶ κινδύνους κατὰ τὸ ἐπιτηρεῖν τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔξοδον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τῶν τὰ ἐκείνου φρονούντων, ὡς εἰ καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν μοιχεύοντα οἷόν τ' ἦν λαθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους πάντας αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς παρ᾽ οἷς τις ἐκ τοῦ μοιχεύειν ἀδοξεῖ, κἂν ἐμοίχευσε διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ Ἐπικούρειος.

For example, the philosophers who follow Zeno of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epicurus do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure.

Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, 3.6, 120B

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς σὺν τῷ ἀθεότητα διδάσκειν συμβουλεύει καὶ μητράσι καὶ ἀδελφαῖς συμμίγνυσθαι, καὶ πέρα τῶν νόμων τῶν τόδε κωλυόντων.

And Epicurus himself, too, as well as teaching atheism, teaches along with it incest with mothers and sisters, and this in transgression of the laws which forbid it

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Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, 120C

πρὸς τί οὖν Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ δογματίζουσιν ἀδελφοκοιτίας καὶ ἀρρενοβασίας ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ἐξ ὧν διδασκαλιῶν μεστὰς βυβλιοθήῆκας πεποιήκασιν; εἰς τὸ ἐκ παίδων μανθάγειῖιν τὴν ἄθεσμον κοινωνίαν.

Why, then, do Epicurus and the Stoics teach incest and sodomy, with which doctrines they have filled libraries, so that from boyhood this lawless intercourse is learned?

St. Justin Martyr, Apology, 2.12, 50E

Διὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν μιμηταὶ γενόμενοι ἐν τῷ ἀνδροβατεῖν καὶ γυναιξὶν ἀδεῶς μίγνυσθαι, Ἐπικούρου νόμον καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν συγγράμματα ἀπολογίαν φέροντες.

And imitating Jupiter and the other gods in sodomy and shameless intercourse with woman, might we not bring as our apology the writings of Epicurus and the poets?

11. Security Among Men

[U536]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.117

βλάβας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἢ διὰ μῖσος ἢ διὰ φθόνον ἢ διὰ καταφρόνησιν γίνεσθαι˙ ὧν τὸν σοφὸν λογισμῷ περιγίνεσθαι.

There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt. These the wise man overcomes by reason.

[U537]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, (Maxims of Epicurus)

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄφοβον εἶναι φοβερὸν φαινόμενον.

It is not possible for he who incites fear upon others to lack fear within himself.

[U538]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.26.84

odium autem et invidiam facile vītābis: ad ēās enim rēs ab Epicūrō praecepta dantur.

> but you will easily avoid hatred and envy, for precepts are given by Epicurus for these matters.

> Hatred and envy will be easy to avoid – Epicurus gives rules for doing so.

[U539]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 1.20.65 (Torquatus to Cicero)

dē amīcitiā... ...Epicūrus quidem ita dīcit, omnium rērum quās ad beātē vīvendum sapientia comparāverit nihil esse maius amīcitiā, nihil ūberius, nihil iūcundius. nec vērō hoc ōrātiōne sōlum, sed multō magis vītā et factīs et mōribus comprobāvit.

> about friendship... Epicurus indeed says this: that of all the things which wisdom has procured for living happily, nothing is greater than friendship, nothing more fruitful, nothing more pleasant. and he proved this not only by speech, but much more by his life, his deeds, and his conduct.

> On the subject of friendship... Epicurus' pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.25.80 (Cicero to Torquatus)

praecepta quae didicistī... ...funditus ēvertunt amīcitiam, quamvīs eam Epicūrus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus.

> the precepts you have learned completely overturn friendship, although Epicurus, as he does, exalts it to the sky with praises..

> The system you uphold... undermines the very foundations of friendship, however much Epicurus may, as he does, praise friendship up to the heavens.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.26.84

licet hīc rūrsus ea commemorēs, quae optimīs verbīs ab Epicūrō dē laude amīcitiae dicta sunt.

> you may here again recall those things that were said by Epicurus, in the finest words, in praise of friendship..

> It does you not good to repeat Epicurus' admirable remarks in praise of friendship – I am not asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes.

[U540]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας (γίνεσθαι Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ)· δεῖν μέντοι προκατάρχεσθαι, καὶ γὰρ τὴν γῆν σπείρομεν· συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινωνίαν μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς ἐκπεπληρωμ[ένὴν].

> {The Epicurean school teaches that} friendship is prompted by our needs. One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as one has to cast seed into the earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life's pleasures.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.42

dīcit Epicūrus... ...nēminem esse, quī alterum dīligat nisi suā causā.

Epicurus says that no one loves another except for his own sake.

Epicurus says... there is no one who loves another but for his own sake.

[U541]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.26.82 (Cicero to Torquatus)

illa videāmus quae ā tē dē amīcitiā dicta sunt. ē quibus ūnum mihi vidēbar ab ipsō Epicūrō dictum cognōscere, amīcitiam ā voluptāte nōn posse dīvellī ob eamque rem colendam esse, quod sī sine eā tūtō et sine metū vīvi nōn posset, nē iūcundē quidem posset.

> let us look at those things you have said about friendship. among them I seemed to recognize one as said by Epicurus himself — that friendship cannot be separated from pleasure, and for that reason it must be cultivated, because if one could not live safely and without fear without it, one could not live pleasantly either.
>
> Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epicurus himself – that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live pleasantly.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.26.84 (Cicero to Torquatus)

ūtilitātis causā amīcitia est quaesīta... ...praesidium amīcōrum.

> friendship has been sought for the sake of advantage... ...the protection of friends.
>
> "Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility." {The Epicureans says} "Friends are protection."

[U542]

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 19.10

ab Epicūrō versūra faciendā est, ante inquit circumspiciendum est cum quibus edās et bibās, quam quid edās et bibās. nam sine amīcō viscerātiō leōnis ac lupī vīta est. hoc nōn continget tibi, nisi secesseris: alioquin habēbis convīvās quōs ex turbā salūtantium nōmenclātor digesserit. errat autem quī amīcum in ātriō quaerit, in convīviō probat.

> a loan must be taken from Epicurus: he says, “you should look around first at those with whom you will eat and drink, rather than at what you will eat and drink.” for without a friend, feasting is the life of a lion or a wolf. this will not happen for you unless you withdraw; otherwise you will have dinner guests chosen for you by the name-caller from the crowd of greeters. but he is mistaken who looks for a friend in his hall and tests him at a banquet.
>
> Epicurus says "you should be more concerned about inspecting whom you eat and drink with, than what you eat and drink. For feeding without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf." This privilege will not be yours unless you withdraw from the world. Otherwise, you will have as guests only those whom your slave-secretary sorts out from the throng of callers. It is, however, a mistake to select your friend in the reception-hall or to test him at the dinner-table.

[U543]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.11

τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον (Διοκλῆς φησι) μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθά περ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα· ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ᾽ ἀπιστούντων, οὐδὲ φίλων.

{Diocles} further says that Epicurus did not think it right that their {the Epicureans'} property should be held in common, as required by the doctrine of Pythagoras regarding the goods of friends; such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust, and without confidence there is no friendship.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Letters to Friends, 7.12

indicāvit mihi Pansa meus Epicūreum tē esse factum... ...quod iūs statuēs commūnī dīvidundō, cum commūne nihil possit esse apud eōs, quī omnia voluptāte suā metiuntur?

my Pansa has informed me that you have become an Epicurean... ...but what law will you establish for dividing common property, when nothing can be common among those who measure everything by their own pleasure?

{February, 53 BCE} My dear friend Pansa {Caius Vibius Pansa} has informed me that you {Caius Trebatius Testa} have become an Epicurean ... What will be your legal ruling on Communi Dividundo {dividing what is held in common}, when nothing can be held in common among those whose one standard of conduct is their own pleasure?

[U544]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, 778E

Ἐπίκουρος τἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ βαθυτάτῳ τῆς ἡσυχίας ὥσπερ ἐν ἀκλύστῳ λιμένι καὶ κωφῷ τιθέμενος, τοῦ εὖ πάσχειν τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν οὐ μόνον κάλλιον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥδιον εἶναί φησι. χαρᾶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω γόνιμόν ἐστιν ὡς χάρις.

And yet, Epicurus, who places happiness in the deepest tranquility, as in a sheltered and landlocked harbor, says that it is not only nobler, but also pleasanter, to confer than to receive benefits.

[U545]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 55

...κα[ὶ διδ]όναι παρρησίαι τὰ ̣περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων, τίθεσθ[α]ι παρ’ Ἐπικούρωι καὶ χάριṿ διορθώσεως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἴ τῳ φίλον, λεγέσθω⟦ι⟧· διὰ τί τῶν μ̣ὲ̣ν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης ἁμαρτημάτων χάριν διορθώσεως ὁ παντὸς ἁγ̣νεύων ⟦οὐδ’ ἂν⟧ οὐδ’ ἓν ἂν προσενέγκ[αιτο;]...

...καὶ διδόναι παρρησίαι τὰ περὶ αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων, τίθεσθαι παρ’ Ἐπικούρωι καὶ χάριν διορθώσεως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἴ τῳ φίλον, λεγέσθωι· διὰ τί τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης ἁμαρτημάτων χάριν διορθώσεως ὁ παντὸς ἁγνεύων οὐδ’ ἂν οὐδ’ ἓν ἂν προσενέγκαιτο;...

... and they present for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students, to be put before Epicurus and for the sake of correction. Nevertheless, if it is pleasing to someone, let it be said: "Why is it that the purifier of everyone {i.e., Epicurus} for the sake of correction of the errors arising from foolishness, would not present even one ..." {sc., perhaps, "...of his errors as an example"}

[U546]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 8, 1111B

καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα τὴν φιλίαν αἱρούμενος (λέγει Ἐπίκουρος) ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων τὰς μεγίστας ἀλγηδόνας ἀναδέχεσθαι.

Epicurus chooses friends for the pleasure he gets, but says that he assumes the greatest pains on their behalf.

[U547]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471, fr. 45

...[με]τὰ πολλῆς πεπ[ο]ιθήσεως ἄλλους νουθετήσομεν καὶ νῦν καὶ διαπρέψαντες οἱ καθ[ηγη]τῶν οὕτως ἀπότομοι γενηθέντες. καὶ τὸ συνέχον καὶ κυριώτ[α]τον, Ἐπικούρ̣ωι, καθ’ ὃν ζῆν ἡ‹ι›ρήμεθα, πειθαρχήσομεν, ὡ̣ς καὶ παρ[ρης]...

…μετὰ πολλῆς πεποιθήσεως ἄλλους νουθετήσομεν καὶ νῦν καὶ διαπρέψαντες οἱ καθηγητῶν οὕτως ἀπότομοι γενηθέντες. καὶ τὸ συνέχον καὶ κυριώτατον, Ἐπικούρωι, καθ' ὃν ζῆν ἡ‹ι›ρήμεθα, πειθαρχήσομεν, ὡς καὶ παρρης…

> @@ And the overall and most important thing is, we shall obey Epicurus, according to whom we have chose to live, as even….

12. Honor & Glory

[U548]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On How to Study Poetry, 14, 37A

προακηκοότες γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι καὶ προανεγνωκότες... ...ἧττον ταράττονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκούοντες ὡς… …[Epic. sent. 2. 15] καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδ' ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.

> "It is not great sums of money nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor offices of authority which produce happiness and blessedness, but rather freedom from pain and calmness and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations in accordance with nature."

John Chrysostom (Ἰωάννης ὁ Χρυσόστομος) "John the Golden-Mouthed" (fl. 389 CE), Homily I on the Epistle to the Romans, volume 9, page 485 [Bernard de Montfaucon edition]

εὐθυμίαν γὰρ καὶ χαρὰν οὐκ ἀρχῆς μέγεθος, οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος, οὐ δυναστείας ὄγκος, οὐκ ἰσχὺς σώματος, οὐ πολυτέλεια τραπέζης, οὐχ ἱματίων κόσμος, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ποιεῖν εἴωθεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατόρθωμα μόνον πνευματικὸν καὶ συνειδὸς ἀγαθόν καὶ ὁ τοῦτο κεκαθαρμένον ἔχων κἂν ῥάκια περικείμενος ᾖ καὶ λιμῷ παλαίων, τῶν σφόδρα τρυφώντων ἐστὶν εὐθυμότερος.

[U549]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 18, 1100A

καὶ μὴν ἀπὸ δόξης γίνεσθαι τινὰς ἡδονὰς Ἐπίκουρος ὡμολόγει.

> Epicurus admitted that some pleasures come from fame.

[U550]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.12.28

rogā hoc idem Epicūrum: maius dīcet esse malum mediocrem dolōrem quam maximum dedecus: in ipsō enim dedecore malī nihil esse, nisi sequantur dolōrēs. quis igitur Epicūrum sequitur dolōr, cum hoc ipsum dīcit, summum malum esse dolōrem? quō dedecus maius ā philosopho nullum exspectō.

> ask this same question of Epicurus: he will say that a moderate pain is a greater evil than the greatest disgrace; for in disgrace itself there is no evil, unless pains follow it. what pain then follows Epicurus, when he himself says that the greatest evil is pain? from a philosopher I expect no disgrace greater than this.

> Put the same question to Epicurus: he will say that a moderate degree of pain is worse evil than the deepest disgrace, for no evil is involved in disgrace alone, unless it should be attended by painful circumstances. What pain then does Epicurus feel when he actually affirms that pain is the greatest evil? And yet I cannot look to find any worse disgrace than such a sentiment in the mouth of a philosopher.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.65

dolor enim est malum, ut tū disputās: existimātiō, dēdecus, īnfāmia, turpitūdō verba atque ineptiae.

pain, in fact, is an evil, as you argue; reputation, disgrace, infamy, shame are words and foolishness.

Pain is an evil, according to your view. Reputation, infamy, disgrace, degradation – these are mere words, mere trifles.

[U551]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1128F

Εἰ καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ Λάθε βιώσας

"Live unknown."

Emperor Julian the Apostate (obit. 363), Letter to Themistius the Philosopher, [p. 471 Pet., 330.15 Hertlein]

ἄρ᾽ οἴει τούτων ἀκούσαντα τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνον .... οὐχὶ .... σοφὸν dmoφανεῖν τὸν τοῦ Νεοκλέους, ὃς κελεύει λαθεῖν βιώσαντα; καὶ σὺ δὲ ἔοικας τοῦτο καταμαθὼν προκαταλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς ταῖς εἰς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λοιδορίαις καὶ προεξαιρεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην· φῂς γάρ που σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν ἀπράγμονα καὶ διαλέξεις ἐν περιπάτοις προσήκειν ἐκείνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι μὲν οὐ καλῶς Ἐπικούρῳ ταῦτα ἐδόκει, πάλαι καὶ σφόδρα πείθομαι.

Do you think that such a man, upon hearing these arguments … would he not … approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles, who bid us to "live unknown?" Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, {but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration.}

Emperor Julian the Apostate (obit. 363), Letter to Themistius the Philosopher, [p. 478 Pet., 335.19 Hertlein]

τὴν Ἐπικούρειον θαυμάζειν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τοὺς κήπους

To admire the Epicureans' lack of engagement in political life, and their gardens…

Themistius, Discourses, 24

ἐξελαύνειν Ἐπίκουρον τὸν Νεοκλέους καὶ ἐκβάλλειν τοῦ καταλόγου, ὅτι Ἐπίκουρος λάθρα βιώσας ἐπηνεῖτο καὶ ἔθετο δόγμα μὴ φύσει εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον κοινωνικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον.

In theory, we expel Epicurus, son of Neocles, and exclude him from our list [of philosophers] because he approved of the injunction "live unnoticed" and was responsible for the doctrine that human beings are not sociable and civilized by nature; but in reality we approve of his opinion…

Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana, 8.28

πάντα τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐβίω (Ἀπολλώνιος) λέγεται θαμὰ ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι· "Λάθε βιώσας· εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναιο, λάθε ἀποβιώσας"

All through his life, [Apollonius] is said often to have exclaimed: "Live unobserved, and if that cannot be, slip unobserved from life."

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.18.102

quid pūre tranquillēt, honōs an dulce lucellum
what purely brings calm — honor, or sweet little profit?

an secrētum iter et fallentis semita vītae
or a hidden path and the by-way of a life that deceives (i.e., slips past notice)?

Is serenity found amid honors and neat little profits
Or does it wait on the untraveled road and the hidden byway?

Horace (fl.c. 25 BCE), Epistles, 1.17.10

nec vīxit male quī nātus moriēnsque fefellit
nor did he live badly, the one who — having been born and dying — escaped notice

(i.e., the man who came into life quietly and went out quietly was not unhappy)

Nor is a life badly spent, which from birth until death goes unnoticed.

Ovid (fl. 3 BCE), Tristia, 3.4.25

crede mihi, bene quī latuit, bene vīxit
believe me: he who has lived hidden has lived well.

Believe me, he who keeps himself well-hidden has lived well.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Thyestes, 390-406

nihil ullīs opus est equīs
there is no need of any horses

nihil armīs et inertibus
no need of arms and sluggish weapons

tēlīs quae procul ingerit
missiles which the Parthian hurls from afar

Parthus, cum simulāt fugās
the Parthian when he feigns flight

admōtīs nihil est opus
there is no need of engines brought near

urbēs sternere machīnīs
to level cities with machines

longē saxā rotantibus
hurling stones from far

Rex est quī metuet nihil
he is a king who fears nothing

rex est quī cupiet nihil
a king is he who desires nothing

hoc rēgnum sibi quisque dat
each person grants this kingdom to himself

Stet quīcumque volet potēns
let whoever wishes stand powerful

aulae culmine lubricō
on the palace's slippery height

mē dulcis saturēt quiēs
may sweet rest fill me

obscūrō positus locō
placed in an obscure place

lēnī perfruar ōtiō
I will enjoy gentle leisure

nullīs nōta Quīritibus
known to no Roman citizens

aetās per tacitum fluat
let my lifetime flow silently

> Let me be filled with sweet repose
>
> In humble station fixed.
>
> Let me enjoy untroubled ease, and
> To my fellow citizens, unknown.
> Let my life's stream flow in silence,
> So when my days have passed noiselessly away,
> Lowly may I die and full of years.
> Death lies heavily on he,
>
> Who is too well known by all,
> And dies to himself unknown.

[U552]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Life of Pyrrhus, 20.3

πολιτείαν δὲ φεύγοντες ὡς βλάβην καὶ σύγχυσιν τοῦ μακαρίου.

> They {Epicurus and his school} would have nothing to do with civil government on the ground that it was injurious and the ruin of happiness.

Saint Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Against the Academicians, 3.16.35, 290F

nam sī ex aliēnō probābilī vīvimus, nec tū dēbuistī administrāre rem pūblicam, quia Epicurō vīsum est nōn esse faciendum

> for if we live by something plausible from someone else, then you also ought not to have managed the state, because it seemed to Epicurus that it should not be done
>
> {Rhetorically addressing Cicero} If we are to live according to what is plausible to another, then you shouldn't have governed the Roman Republic, since it seemed to Epicurus that one ought not do this.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 2, 1087B

…ἀνθρώπων βοώντων· "Οὐ γὰρ πυγμάχοι εἰμὲν ἀμύμονες " οὐδὲ ῥήτορες οὐδὲ προστάται δήμων οὐδ᾽ ἄρχοντες, "ἀεὶ δ᾽ ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη" καὶ πᾶσα διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιτερπὴς κίνησις ἐφ᾽ ἡδονήν τινα καὶ χαρὰν ψυχῆς ἀναπεμπομένη.

...the people who shout "No manly boxers are we" or orators, or champions of the commonwealth, or magistrates; "We ever hold the table dear instead." {Homer, Odyssey, VIIII 246-248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

Lucretius (fl.c. 59 BCE), On the Nature of Things, 5.1127

ut satius multō iam sit pārēre quietum
that it is by far better now to obey quietly

quam regere imperiō rēs vellē et rēgna tenēre
than to wish to rule things by command and to hold kingdoms

It is indeed much better to obey in peace
Than to desire to hold the world in fee and to rule kingdoms.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 8, 336F

ἀρχαὶ δὲ πρεσβεῖαί τε καὶ στρατηγίαι

κόμποι κενοὶ ψοφοῦσιν ἀντ᾽ ὀνειράτων.

"Ethics, embassies, military tactics – fine pretenses that sound hollow, like dreams."

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), Vol. Herc. (2) VII.176

[U553]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.3

Epicūrī disciplīna apposita singulīs quibusque mōribus loquitur, auarum populārī largītiōne līberat, ignāvum prohibet accēdere ad rem pūblicam, pigrum exercērī, timidum mīlitāre.

the discipline of Epicurus, fitted to each individual character, speaks: it frees the greedy man by popular largesse, prevents the lazy man from approaching public affairs, makes the sluggish man train, [and] makes the timid man serve as a soldier

The teaching of Epicurus ... speaks according to the natural bent of each individual. ... He prohibits the cowardly from an advance to public life, the lazy form exercise, the timid from engaging in military service.

[U554]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 31, 1125C

καὶ γράφοντες αὐταῖς λέξεσιν, ὅτι λέγειν δεῖ πῶς ἄριστα τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος συντηρήσει, καὶ πῶς τις ἑκὼν εἶναι μὴ πρόσεισιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πληθῶν ἀρχάς.

...who write in these very words: "We must proceed to tell how a person will best uphold the purpose of his nature and how of his own free will he is not to present himself for public office at all."

[U555]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), On Peace of Mind, 465F
[Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 29.79]

οὐδὲ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι πολιτευομένους καὶ πράσσοντας τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι πεφυκότας, ἂν ὧν ὀρέγονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν.

For this reason not even Epicurus believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.

[U556]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 31, 1125C

ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ (πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν) συγχέοντες καὶ καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ πολιτείας ἀφιστάντες αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας; οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες;

But who are the men that nullify these things, overthrowing the state and utterly abolishing the laws? Is it not those who withdraw themselves and their disciples from participation in the state? Is it not those who say that the crown of an untroubled spirit is a prize beyond all comparison with success in some great command? Is it not those who say that to be king is a fault and a mistake?

[U557]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.6

quī clāritātī ac potentiae studet, huic (ab Epicūrō) praecipitur rēgēs colere: quī molestiam ferre nōn potest, huic rēgiam fugere

whoever strives for fame and power, to him (by Epicurus) it is prescribed to court kings; whoever cannot bear trouble, to him to flee the court.

He who is eager for fame and power is instructed [by Epicurus] to cultivate kings and royal acquaintances; he who cannot bear annoyance to shun the palace.

[U558]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 34, 1127D

τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες (Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος).

Epicurus and Metrodorus ... speak spitefully of the earliest and wisest lawgivers.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Against Colotes, 21, 1119C

ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ τυφών ἐστιν, ὃν πολὺν ὑμῖν ἐνεποίησεν ὁ καθηγεμών, καὶ θεοῖς πολεμῶν καὶ θείοις ἀνδράσι.

For this is what Typhon {a mythological monster} signifies, and your master has implanted plenty of him in you with his war against the gods and godlike men.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 8, 336F

ἕξεις δ᾽ ὅσ'ἂν φάγῃς τε καὶ πίῃς μόνα·

σποδὸς δὲ τἆλλα, Περικλέης Κόδρος Κίμων

"You will only have what you eat and drink. All the rest is dust – Pericles, Codrus, Cimon"

[U559]

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), Non Posse, 15, p. 1097C

ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν οὐδὲ βουλόμενον ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρελθεῖν, τὰς μὲν Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Μιλτιάδου πράξεις ὑπὸ πόδας τιθεμένου καὶ κατευτελίζοντος, ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ δὲ... ...γράφοντος [fr. 183] κτλ.

But even if one wished, one could not pass over the man's absurd inconsistency: He treads underfoot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades, and yet writes this to his friends about himself... "{=U183}"

[U560]

Plutarch (*fl.* 80 CE), Against Colotes, 33, p. 1127A

τοὺς δὲ πολιτικοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ γέλωτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσι μόνον, τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἐσχηκέναι τι λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ μικκόν, οὑτωσὶ τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες, αὐτὸν δὲ σιδηροῦν σπλάγχνον ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι, τί παθὼν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἴκοι καθῆτο, δηλαδὴ περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ὅλος καθεστώς.

They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epaminondas, who they say had but one good thing about him, and even that 'mikkon' {Boeotian dialect for 'micron' = 'small'; i.e., the one good thing about him, his abstention from unnecessary pleasures, was an example of the Boeotian insensibility} for this is their expression, and dubbing the man himself 'iron guts' and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head {his campaign took place in winter}, wholly concerned – we must suppose – with the care and feeding of his belly.

1. Studies of the Wise Man

[U561]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

οὐ κινεῖσθαί τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον

It is not possible for one Sage to be wiser than another.

[U562]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

δογματιεῖν τε (τὸν σοφὸν) καὶ οὐκ ἀπορήσειν (Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ)

He will formulate beliefs and not be a pure skeptic.

[U563]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

καὶ συγγράμματα καταλείψειν (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

He will leave written words behind him.

[U564]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

καὶ σχολὴν κατασκευάσειν (τὸν σοφόν), ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὥστε ὀχλαγωγῆσαι. καὶ ἀναγνώσεσθαι ἐν πλήθει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἑκόντα.

He will found a school.

[U565]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.118

οὐδὲ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

The Sage will not give rhetorical speeches.

[U566]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

οὐ πανηγυριεῖν δὲ (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

He will not compose panegyric {a formal public speech delivered in high praise of someone or something}.

[U567]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

χρηματίσεσθαί τε (τὸν σοφόν), ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα.

He will earn money, if he should be in poverty, but only for his wisdom.

[U568]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

ποιήματα δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ (τὸν σοφὸν) οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι.

{...the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry} without however actually writing poems himself.

[U569]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

μόνον τε τὸν σοφὸν ὀρθῶς ἂν περί τε μουσικῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς διαλέξεσθαι.

Only the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry.

[U570]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

φιλαγρήσειν (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

He will be fond of the country.

[U571]

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.5

fugientī turbam solitūdō laudātur (ab Epicūrō).

to the one fleeing the crowd solitude is praised.

For one fleeing the crowd, solitude is praised [by Epicurus].

2. Duties

[U572]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

καὶ κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

{The Sage, according to Epicurus,} will mind his property and plan for the future.

[U573]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.120

εὐδοξίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προνοήσεσθαι (τὸν σοφόν), ἐφ᾽ ὅσον μὴ καταφρονήσεσθαι.

He will pay only as much regard to his reputation as needed to be not looked down upon.

[U574]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.118

ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν οὐ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς... ...οὐδὲ θεόπεμπτον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, ὡς Διογένης ἐν τῷ...

The Epicureans believe the Sage should not fall in love; ... according to them, love does not come by divine inspiration – so Diogenes says in his twelfth book.

Chrysippus, by way of Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 63.31

εἰπόντος τινός "οὐκ ἐρασθήσεται ὁ σοφός· μαρτυρεῖ γοῦν Μενέδημος Ἐπίκουρος Ἀλεξῖνος" "τῇ αὐτῇ" ἔφη "χρήσομαι ἀποδείξει᾽ ἢ γὰρ ᾽Αλεξῖνος ὁ ἀνάγωγος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὁ ἀναίσθητος καὶ Μενέδημος [ὁ λῆρος] οὔ φασιν; ἐρασθήσεται ἄρα"

[U575]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

The Sage will set up votive images.

[U576]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.119

καὶ δικάσεσθαι.

He is willing to take a suit to court.

[U577]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν.

He will pay court to a king if need be.

[U578]

Demetrius Laco, P.Herc. 1012, col. 18 (40) fin. – col. 19 (41)

…[καὶ Ἐπικούρου διαπορίαν νομίσει]εν ἄν τις· 'εἰ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ [τρ]οφῆς φροντιεῖ,' καίτοι {δ'} ο[ὔ]τως ἔχουσαν· 'εἰ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ ταφῆς φροντιεῖ,' τάχα περιπεσὼν ἀν[τιγ]ράφοις ἐν οἷς, ἐκτετρωγμέν[ο]υ τοῦ ἄλφα, τε̣[λέσ]αι τὸ ῥ[ῆμα] θέλων, τ̣ὸ̣ [ῥ]ῶ [καὶ τὸ ὃ γ]ρ̣αφεὺ̣ς ἐνέω[σ]ε̣[ν]. [δῆ]λ̣ον οὔτως κ̣αὶ τὸ κε[λεύειν Ἐ]πίκο[υρον μὴ φιλονικῆσαι, ποῖον ἂν ἐκδ]οχεῖον [μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τὸ] σῶμα [δέχοιτο]…

…καὶ Ἐπικούρου διαπορίαν νομίσειεν ἄν τις· "εἰ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ τροφῆς φροντιεῖ," καίτοι δ' οὔτως ἔχουσαν· "εἰ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ ταφῆς φροντιεῖ," τάχα περιπεσὼν ἀντιγράφοις ἐν οἷς, ἐκτετρωγμένου τοῦ ἄλφα, τελέσαι τὸ ῥῆμα θέλων, τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ ὃ γραφεὺς ἐνέωσεν. δῆλον οὔτως κ̣αὶ τὸ κελεύειν Ἐπίκουρον μὴ φιλονικῆσαι, ποῖον ἂν ἐκδοχεῖον μετὰ τὸν θάνατον τὸ σῶμα δέχοιτο…

3. Attitude of the Sage

[U579]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 4, 1089A

οἱ δὲ τούτῳ μάλιστα τὸν σοφὸν ἡγούμενοι διαφέρειν, τῷ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς καὶ συνέχειν ἐν αὑτῷ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς φάσματα καὶ πάθη καὶ κινήσεις, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἄξιον σοφίας παρεγγυῶσιν ὥσπερ σαρώματ' ἐν οἰκίᾳ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ σοφοῦ τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐκκλύσματα μένειν ἐῶντες, μὴ λέγωμεν· ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τούτων ἡδέως ζῆν, αὐτόθεν πρόδηλον.

Whether the other set {i.e., the Epicureans, in contrast with the Cyrenaics} who hold that the superiority of the Sage lies above all in this: vividly remembering and keeping intact in himself the sights and feelings and movements associated with pleasure – are thus recommending a practice unworthy of the name of wisdom by allowing the slops of pleasure to remain in the soul of the Sage as in the house of a spendthrift, let us not say.

[U580]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23

(philosophos P. Clodius) eōs laudābat maximē, quī dīcuntur praeter cēterōs esse auctōrēs et laudātōrēs voluptātis…

he used to praise especially those philosophers who are said above the rest to be promoters and praisers of pleasure…

…eōsdemque praeclārē dīcere aiēbat, sapientis omnia suā causā facere, rem pūblicam capessere hominem bene sānum nōn oportēre; nihil esse praestabilius ōtiōsā vītā plēnā et confertā voluptātibus…

…and he used to say that they spoke excellently, that a wise man does everything for his own sake, that a sane man should not take up public life; that nothing is more excellent than a life of leisure full and packed with pleasures…

…eōs autem, quī dīcerent dignitātī esse serviendum, reī pūblicae cōnsulendum, officiī ratiōnem in omnī vītā, nōn commodi esse dūcendam, adeunda prō patriā perīcula, vulnera excipienda, mortem oppetendam, vāticinārī atque īnsanīre dīcēbat.

…but he said that those who claimed that dignity must be served, the state must be cared for, the rule of duty rather than advantage must be followed in all life, dangers must be faced for the fatherland, wounds received, death met—were raving like prophets and insane.

He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.

[U581]

Lactantius (fl. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.39

cum disputat (Epicurus) omnia sapientem suā causā facere, ad ūtilitātem suam refert omnia quae agit.

when he argues that the wise man does everything for his own sake, he refers everything he does to his own advantage.

For when [Epicurus] holds that a Sage does all things for his own sake, he considers his own advantage in everything he does.

Lactantius (fl. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 17.4

inhumānus et suīs commoda servlēns iubētur (ab Epicūrō) nihil cuiquam tribuere, omnia enim suā causā facere sapientem.

inhuman and serving his own interests is ordered (by Epicurus) to give nothing to anyone, for the wise man does everything for his own sake.

[Epicurus] counsels the Sage to bestow nothing on any man, for all things that are his own concerns make him wise.

[U582]

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 4.22

καὶ ὅ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἀδικεῖν ἐπὶ κέρδει τινὶ (μὴ) βούλεσθαί φησι τὸν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν σοφόν· πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν οὐ δύνασθαι. ὥστε εἰ πεισθήσεται λήσειν, ἀδικήσει κατ᾽ αὐτόν.

Even Epicurus says that a man who he esteemed wise "would not do wrong to anyone for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So then, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accordingly, do evil.

[U583]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.118

γυναικί τε (δοκεῖ Ἐπικούρῳ) οὐ μιγήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ᾗ οἱ νόμοι. ἀπαγορεύουσιν, ὥς φησι Διογένης ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ τῶν Ἐπικούρου ἠθικῶν δογμάτων.

In regards to women, he will obey legal restrictions, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines.

[U584]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.120

τύχῃ τε (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ) ἀντιτάξεσθαι φίλην γὰρ οὐδένα κτήσεσθαι.

He will guard himself against chance.

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49

negat (Epicūrus) ullam in sapientem vīm esse fortūnae

Epicurus says that fortune has no power at all over the wise man.

Epicurus says ... that fortune has no power over the Sage.

[U585]

Seneca (*fl.* 35 CE), On the Integrity of the Sage (to Serenus), 16.1

quod sī Epicūrus quoque, quī corporī plūrumum indulsit, adversus iniūriās exsurgit, quī id apud nōs incrēdibile vidērī potest aut suprā hūmānae nātūrae mēnsūram? ille ait iniūriās tolerābilēs esse sapientī, nōs iniūriās nōn esse

But if even Epicurus, who indulged the body most of all, rises up against injuries, who can seem incredible among us or beyond the measure of human nature? he says injuries are tolerable for the wise man, we say injuries do not exist.

Even if Epicurus, who most of all indulged the flesh, is up in arms against injury, how can such an attitude on our part seem incredible or to be beyond the bounds of human nature? He says that injuries are tolerable for the Sage; we {Stoics} say that injuries do not exist for him.

[U586]

Cicero (*fl.* 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.36.103

num igitur ignōbilitās aut humilitās aut etiam populāris offēnsiō sapiēntem beātum esse prohibēbit?

Will therefore low birth or humility or even public disfavor prevent the wise man from being happy?

intellegendum est igitur, nec glōriam populārem ipsam per sēsē expetendam nec ignōbilitātem extimēscendam.

We must understand therefore that popular glory is not to be sought for its own sake, nor low birth to be feared.

uēnī Athēnās, neque mē quisquam ibi adgnōuit.

I came to Athens, and no one there recognized me.

constantem hominem et gravem, quī gloriētur ā glōriā sē afuisse.

A steady and serious man, who takes pride in having been absent from glory.

an tibicīnēs iīque quī fidibus utuntur suō, nōn multitūdinis arbitrīō cantūs numerōsque moderantur?

Do flute-players and those who use stringed instruments not regulate their melodies and rhythms by the judgment of the crowd?

vir sapiēns multō arte maiōre praeditus nōn quid vēris-simum sit, sed quid velit vulgus exquīret?

Will the wise man, endowed with far greater skill, seek out not what is most true, but what the crowd wants?

an quicquam stultius quam quōs singulōs sicut operāriōs barbarōsque contemnās, eōs aliquid putāre esse ūniversōs?

Is anything more foolish than to think that those whom you despise individually like laborers and barbarians amount to something when taken all together?

ille vērō nostrās ambitiōnēs levitātēsque contemnet honōrēsque populī etiam ultrō dēlātōs repudiābit.

That man will truly despise our ambitions and frivolities and will even reject honours offered by the people of their own accord.

quantīs igitur molestīs vācant quī nihil omnīnō cum populō contrahunt.

How free, then, from troubles are those who have no dealings at all with the crowd.

quid est enim dulcius otiō litterātō?

For what is sweeter than learned leisure?

iīs dīcō litterīs, quibus īnfīnitatem rērum atque nātūrae et in hōc ipsō mundō caelum terrās maria cognōscimus.

I mean those studies by which we learn the infinity of things and of nature, and in this very world the sky, the lands, the seas.

contemptō igitur honōre, contemptā etiam pecuniā quid relinquitur quod extimescendum sit?

Therefore, when honor is despised and money despised too, what is left to be feared?

exilium, crēdō, quod in maximīs malīs dūcitur.

Exile, I suppose, which is counted among the greatest evils.

ad omnīs cāsūs facillima ratiō est eōrum, quī ad voluptātem ea referunt quae secuntur in vītā, ut quō cumque haec locō suppeditētur, ibi beāte queant vīvere.

For all situations there is an easiest method for those who refer the events of life to pleasure, namely that wherever these things are supplied, there they can live happily.

patria est ubicumque est bene.

The homeland is wherever it is well.

Will obscurity, insignificance, or unpopularity prevent the Sage from being happy? … 104: It must be understood that popular acclaim is neither to be coveted for its own sake, nor is obscurity to be sorely feared. "I came to Athens" said Democritus, "and no one knew me." What dignified resoluteness for a man to glorify having no glory! As flute-players and harpists follow their own tastes – not the tastes of the multitude – in regulating the rhythm of music, should not the wise man, gifted as he is with a far higher art, seek out what is truest, rather than the pleasure of the populace? Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively? The wise man will in fact despise our worthless ambitions and reject the distinctions bestowed by the people even if they come unsought. … 105: What anguish they escape who have no dealings whatever with the people! For what is more delightful than leisure devoted to literature? That literature I mean which gives us the knowledge of the infinite greatness of nature, and I, in this actual world of ours, of the sky, the lands, and the seas. 106: Now when honors are despised, and money also despised, what is there left to be dreaded? Exile, I suppose, which is reckoned among the greatest evils. … 108: In facing all mishaps, the easiest is the method of those who refer the aims they follow in life to the standard of pleasure, and this means that they can live happily wherever this is provided; Teucer's saying can be fitted to every condition: "One's county is wherever one's happy."

[U587]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.117

(Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ) οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν.

{susceptibility to emotion} will be no hindrance to exercising his wisdom {the wisdom of the Sage}.

[U588]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.121

εἰ ἔχοι, ἀδιαφόρωχ`ς ἂν σχοίη (ὁ σοφὸς κατ᾽Ἐπίκουρον).

Whether or not he is well off will be a matter of indifference to him.

[U589]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.118

μόνον τε χάριν ἕξειν τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ἐπὶ φίλοις καὶ παροῦσι καὶ ἀποῦσιν ὁμοίως διά τε λόγου

He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 81.11

nēmō ergō scit praeter sapiēntem referre grātiam?

So then, does no one know how to show gratitude except the wise person?

ne nōbīs fiat invidia, scitō idem dīcere Epicūrum, Metrōdorus certē ait sōlum sapiēntem referre grātiam scīre.

So that envy not fall upon us, know that Epicurus says the same; Metrodorus certainly says that only the wise person knows how to show gratitude.

"Do you maintain then that only the wise man knows how to return a favor?" … In order not to bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epicurus says the same thing. At any rate, Metrodorus remarks that only the wise man knows how to return a favor.

[U590]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.121

καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλου ποτὲ τεθνήξεσθαι (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

For the sake of a friend, on such occasion, he is prepared to die.

[U591]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.119

αἱ διατραπήσεσθαι τινὰς (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

Some he will try to dissuade {from marriage}.

[U592]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.121

καὶ ἐπιχαρήσεσθαί τινι ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι (τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ).

He will be grateful to anyone when he is corrected.

[U593]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.120

μᾶλλόν τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι (τὸν σοφὸν) τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις

He will be more delighted than others at festivals.

[U594]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.118

(τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ) οὐδὲ κολάσειν τοὺς οἰκέτας, ἐλεήσειν μέντοι καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἕξειν τῶν σπουδαίων.

Nor will he punish his servants; rather, he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character.

[U595]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.121

καὶ καθ᾽ ὕπνους δὲ ὅμοιον ἔσεσθαι (τὸν σοφόν)

He will be like himself even while asleep.

[U596]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.117

πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι (τὸν σοφόν).

He will be more susceptible to emotion than other men.

[U597]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.119

καὶ λυπήσεσθαι δὲ τὸν σοφὸν (Ἐπικούρῳ δοκεῖ), ὡς Διογένης ἐν τῇ ε̄ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων

The Sage will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.

[U598]

Diogenes Laertius (*fl.c.* 220 CE), 10.118

ὅτε μέντοι στρεβλοῦται (ὁ σοφός), ἔνθα καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει.

When tortured, he will give vent to cries and groans.

[U599]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.38.110 – 117

mōtūs animī, sollicitūdinēs aegritūdinēsque oblīviōne leniuntur trāductīs animīs ad voluptātem.

The disturbances of mind, worries, and griefs are softened by forgetfulness when the minds are led over to pleasure.

nōn sine causā igitur Epicūrus ausus est dīcere semper in plūribus bonīs esse sapientem, quia semper sit in voluptātibus: ex quō efficī putat ille, ut sapiēns semper beātus sit.

Not without reason therefore did Epicurus dare to say that the wise man is always in many good things, because he is always in pleasures; from which he thinks it follows that the wise man is always happy.

"etiāmne sī sensibus carebit oculōrumCC, sī aurium?"

"Even if he will lack the senses of the eyes and of the ears?"

etiām, nam ista ipsa contemnit.

Yes, for he despises those very things.

prīmum enim horribilis ista caecitās quibus tandem caret voluptātibus?

For first, of which pleasures does that dreadful blindness finally deprive?

cum quidam etiam disputent ceterās voluptātēs in ipsīs habitāre sensibus, quae autem aspectū percipiantur, ea nōn versārī in oculōrum ullā iucunditāte, ut ea quae gustēmus olfaciāmus tractēmus, in eā ipsā ubi sentīmus parte versentur: in oculīs tale nil fit, animus accipit quae vidēmus.

Since some even argue that the other pleasures dwell in the senses themselves, and that the things perceived by sight do not reside in any delight of the eyes, but just like the things we taste, smell, and touch are located in the very part where we feel them: nothing of that sort happens in the eyes, the mind receives what we see.

animō autem multis modīs variīsque delectārī licet, etiam sī nōn adhibeātur aspectus: loquor enim de doctō homine et erudītō, cui vīvere est cogitāre, sapientis autem cogitātiō nōn ferme ad investigandum adhibet oculōs advocātōs.

But it is possible for the mind to take delight in many and various ways, even if sight is not applied; for I speak of a learned and educated man, for whom to live is to think, and the wise man's thinking hardly ever employs the eyes as summoned helpers for investigation.

etenim sī nox nōn adimit vītam beātam, cur diēs noctī similis adimat?

For if night does not take away a happy life, why should a day resembling night take it away?

Democritus luminibus amissis alba scilicet discernere et atra nōn poterat: at vērō bona mala, aequa iniqua, honesta turpia, ūtilia inūtilia, magna parva poterat, et sine varietāte colōrum licebat vīvere beāte, sine notiōne rērum nōn licebat.

Democritus, having lost his sight, could of course not distinguish white and black; but he could distinguish good and bad, fair and unfair, honorable and shameful, useful and useless, great and small, and it was possible to live happily without the variety of colors, but not possible without the understanding of things.

atque hic vir impedīrī etiam animī aciem aspectū oculōrum arbitrābātur et cum aliī saepe quod ante pedēs esset nōn vidērent, ille in īnfinitātem omnem peregrinābātur, ut nulla in extrēmitāte consisteret.

And this man even thought that the sharpness of the mind was hindered by the sight of the eyes; and while others often did not see what was in front of their feet, he wandered through the whole infinity so that he stopped at no boundary.

In surditāte vērō quidnam est malī?

But in deafness, what evil is there?

omnēs nōs in iīs linguīs quās nōn intellegimus, quae sunt innumerābilēs, surdī profectō sumus.

We are all, in the languages we do not understand — which are countless — certainly deaf.

“at vocem citharoedī nōn audiunt.”

“But they do not hear the voice of the lyre-player.”

ne strīdōrem quidem serrāe tum cum acuitur, aut grunditum cum iugulātur suīs nec cum quiēscere volunt, fremitum murmurantis maris.

Nor even the screech of a saw when it is sharpened, nor the grunt when a pig is slaughtered, nor the roaring of the murmuring sea when they want to rest.

et sī cantūs eōs forte delectant, prīmum cogitāre debent, ante quam hī sint inventī, multōs beāte vīxisse.

And if songs perhaps delight them, they must first consider that before these were invented, many lived happily.

sapientis, deinde multō maiōrem percipī posse legendīs hīs quam audiendīs voluptātem.

And that a much greater pleasure can be taken by a wise man from reading these than from hearing them.

tum, ut paulō ante caecōs ad aurium trādūcēbāmus voluptātem, sic licet surdōs ad oculōrum: etenim quī secum loquī poterīt, sermonem alterīus nōn requīret.

Then, just as a moment ago we transferred pleasure for the blind to the ears, so we may transfer it for the deaf to the eyes; for anyone who can speak with himself will not require another’s speech.

Emotions of the soul, anxieties and distresses are alleviated by forgetfulness when the thoughts of the soul are diverted to pleasure. Not without reason therefore, Epicurus ventured to say that the Sage always has more of good than evil because he always has pleasures; and from this he thinks there follows the conclusion we are in search of: that the Sage is always happy.

"Even if he is to go without the sense of sight, or of hearing?" Even then – for he doesn't love such things for themselves. For to begin with, what pleasures, pray tell, does the blindness you dread so much have to go without? Seeing that some even argue that all the other pleasures reside in the actual sensations, while the perceptions of sight do not go along with any delight felt in the eyes, in the same way as the perceptions of taste, smell, touch, hearing are confided to the actual organ of sensation – nothing of the sort takes place with the eyes. It is the soul which receives the objects we see. Now the soul may have delight in may different ways, even without the use of sight; for I am speaking of an educated and instructed man with whom life is thought; and the thought of the wise man scarcely ever calls in the support of the eyes to aid his researches. For if night does not put a stop to happy life, why should a day that resembles night stop it?

Democritus lost his sight – he could not, to be sure, distinguish blank from white; but all the same he could distinguish good from bad, just from unjust, honorable from disgraceful, expedient from inexpedient, great from small, and it allowed him to live happily without seeing changes of color; it was not possible to do so without true ideas. And this man believed that the sight of the eyes was an obstacle to the piercing vision of the soul and, while others often failed to see what lay at their feet, he ranged freely into the infinite without finding any boundary that brought him to a halt.

Is there any evil really in deafness? ... all of us ... are assuredly deaf in so many foreign languages which we do not understand. "But the deaf do not hear the voice of a good singer." No, nor the screech of a saw either, when it is being sharpened, nor the grunting of a pig when its throat is being cut, nor the thunder of the roaring sea when they want to sleep. And if, perhaps, music has charms for them, they should first reflect that many wise men lived happily before music was invented, secondly, that far greater pleasure can be derived from reading than hearing verse. Next, as a little while ago we diverted the blind to the pleasure of hearing, so we may divert the deaf to the pleasure of sight; for the man who can converse with himself will not need the conversation of another.

[U600]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 3, 1088B

τὸ δὲ ἡδέως ζῆν... ...ἂν ἅπτωνται, πλείονα περὶ τούτου λέγειν οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἡμᾶς, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὶ μικρὸν εἶναι τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡδύ, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀκαρές, εἴ γε δὴ μὴ κενολογοῦσι μηδ᾽ ἀλαζονεύονται... ...Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ γελᾶν φησι ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματος πολλάκις κάμνοντα τὸν σοφόν.

> By attaching the pleasurable life to painlessness they preclude us from dwelling longer on the point, since they admit themselves that pleasure of the flesh is a slight or rather an infinitesimal thing – that is, if this in not mere empty and pretentious talk ... Epicurus asserts that in illness the Sage often actually laughs at the paroxysms of the disease.

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 5, 1090A

ἀλλ᾽ ἀξιοῦμεν αὐτούς, εἰ τοῖς πάθεσι βούλονται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ μὴ "κεναῖς φωναῖς " θρασυνόμενοι καὶ δημαγωγοῦντες ἀλαζονείαν προσοφλισκάνειν, ἢ μὴ λαμβάνειν χαρᾶς ἀρχὴν ἁπάσης [τὴν] τῆς "σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν" ἢ μὴ φάναι χαίρειν καὶ βρυάζειν τοὺς ἐν πόνοις ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ νόσοις [δειναῖς] γινομένους.

> My judgment is that if they would take a tone more in keeping with their own bitter experience {of terrible diseases} and not incur in addition the odium of ranting, by courting applause with a bold display of hollow words, they ought either to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" {cf. U424 & U68} is the source of all delight, or from asserting that persons in the throes of an excruciating disease feel delight and treat the affliction with insolent contempt.

[U601]

Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.118

κἂν στρεβλωθῇ δ᾽ ὁ σοφός, εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα.

Epicūrus uerō ea dīcit, ut mihi quidem rīsus captāre uideātur.

But Epicurus says such things that he seems to me, at least, to be angling for laughter.

adfirmat enim quōdam locō, sī ūrātur sapiēns, sī cruciētur — exspectās fortasse dum dīcat: patietur, perferet, nōn succumbet: magna me Hercule laus et eō ipsō per quem iūrāuī digna.

For he asserts in a certain passage that if the wise man should be burned, if he should be tortured — perhaps you expect him to say: "he will endure it, he will bear it, he will not give in," a great praise by Hercules and worthy of the very one by whom I swore.

sed Epicūrō hominī asperō et dūrō nōn est hoc satis.

But for Epicurus, a harsh and tough man, this is not enough.

in Phalaridis taurō sī erit, dīcet: quam suāue est, quam hoc nōn curō.

If he will be in the bull of Phalaris, he will say: "how pleasant this is, how little I care about this."

At id quidem illī ipsī quī dolorem malum esse negant, nōn solent dīcere, cuiquam suāue esse cruciārī: asperum difficile odiōsum contrā nātūram dīcunt, nec tamen malum.

But even those who deny that pain is an evil are not accustomed to say that it is pleasant for anyone to be tortured: they call it harsh, difficult, hateful, against nature, yet not an evil.

hic quī sōlum hoc malum dīcit et malōrum omnium extrēmum, sapientem cēnset id suāue dictūrum.

But this man, who calls pain the only evil and the extreme of all evils, thinks that the wise man will call it pleasant.

ego ā tē nōn postulō, ut dolorem eīsdem verbīs adficiās quibus Epicūrus, homō ut scīs voluptārius.

I do not demand from you that you treat pain with the same words as Epicurus — a pleasure-lover, as you know.

ille dīxerit sane idem in Phalaridis taurō, quod sī esset in lectulō: ego tantam uim nōn tribuō sapientiae contrā dolorem.

He may indeed say the same thing in the bull of Phalaris as if he were on a couch; but I do not assign such great power to wisdom against pain.

As for Epicurus, however, he speaks in a way that makes him seem laughable to my mind. For in one passage he asserts that if the wise man be burnt, if he be tortured – you are waiting perhaps for him to say, "he will submit, will endure, will not yield." High praise, by Hercules! – and worthy of the great god Hercules whose name I invoked. But this is not enough for Epicurus – that hard stern spirit. If the wise man finds himself inside Phalaris' bull {description}, he will say "How sweet; how indifferent I am to this!" ... And yet those philosophers {the Stoics} who deny that pain is an evil do not generally go so far as to say that it is sweet to be tortured; they say that it is unpleasant, difficult, horrible, contrary to nature, and yet that it is not an evil. Epicurus, who says that pain is the only evil and the worst of all evils, thinks that the Sage will call it sweet. For my part I do not require you to describe pain in the same words as Epicurus, that devotee, as you know, of pleasure. Let him, if he likes, say the same inside the bull of Phalaris as he would have said, had he been in his own bed; I do not consider wisdom so wonderfully powerful against pain.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.10.31

Epicūrus exorītur, cui etiam, sī dīs placet, uidētur semper sapiēns beātus.

Epicurus comes forward, to whom — if the gods permit — it even seems that the wise man is always happy.

hic dignitāte huius sententiae capitur, sed numquam id dīceret, sī ipse sē audīret.

He is captivated by the grandeur of this doctrine, but he would never say it if he listened to himself.

quid est enim quod minus conueniat quam ut is, quī uel summum uel sōlum malum dolōrem esse dicat, idem censeat “quam hoc suāue est” tum cum dolōre cruciētur dictūrum esse sapiēntem?

For what is more inconsistent than that someone who says pain is either the greatest evil or the only evil should also think that a wise man, while being tortured by pain, will say, “how pleasant this is”?

Epicurus too, note well, insists that the Sage always happy. He is caught by the grandeur of the thought; but he would never say so if he paid attention to his own words – for what is less consistent than for the man who says that pain is either the highest or the only evil, to suppose also that the Safe, at the moment he is tortured by pain, will say "How sweet this is!"

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.75

mē quidem auctōre etiam Peripatēticī ueterēsque Acadēmici balbutīre aliquandō desīnant apertēque et clārā uōce audeant dīcere beātam uitam in Phalaridis taurum dēscēnsūram.

With me as guarantor, let even the Peripatetics and the old Academics at last stop babbling, and dare to say openly and with a clear voice that the happy life will climb down into the brazen bull of Phalaris.

For my part, I should say, let the Peripatetics also and the Old Academy make an end some time or other of their stuttering and have the courage to say openly and loudly that happy life will reach down even into the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.27.88 (Cicero to Torquatus)

(dolōrem) nihili facit; ait enim sē, sī ūrātur, “quam hoc suāue” dictūrum.

He counts (pain) as nothing; for he says that, if he is burned, he will say, "how pleasant this is."

{Epicurus} thinks nothing of pain; for tells us that if he were being burnt to death, he would claim, "how delightful this is!"

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 5.28.85

sitne tantum in uīrtūte, ut ea praediti uel in Phalaridis taurō beātī sint

whether there is so much in virtue, that those furnished with it are happy even in the bull of Phalaris.

{it is doubtful} whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 18.42

sed dicunt istī ipsī, quī mala dolōre, bona uoluptāte dēfīniunt, sapiéntem etiam sī in Phalaridis taurō inclūsus succēnsīs ignibus torreātur, dictūrum tamen suaue illud esse sēque nē tantulum quidem commovērī; tantam virtūtis vim esse voluērunt, ut nōn posset esse umquam vir bonus nōn beātus

but those very men who define evils by pain and goods by pleasure say that even if the wise man were enclosed in the bull of Phalaris and roasted with fires set alight, he would nevertheless say that it is pleasant and that he is not even moved the slightest bit; they wished virtue to have such force that a good man could never fail to be happy.

Well, these same philosophers who define evil as pain and good as pleasure assert that the wise man, even were he to be shut up in the bull of Phalaris and roasted above a fire, would assert that he was happy and felt perfect calm of mind. What they meant as that the power of virtue is so great that the good man can never be otherwise than happy.

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 66.18

Epicurus quoque ait sapiéntem, sī in Phalaridis taurō perūrātur, exclāmātūrum: dulce est et ad mē nihil pertinet.

Epicurus also says that the wise man, if he is being burned in the bull of Phalaris, will cry out: "it is sweet and it concerns me not."

quid mīrāris, sī ego paria bona dīcō ūnīus in convīviō iacentis, alterīus inter tormenta fortissimē stantis?

why do you wonder if I say equal goods belong to one lying at a banquet and to another standing very bravely amid torture?

cum quod incrēdibilius est, dicat Epicurus, dulce esse torrērī

since — what is more unbelievable — Epicurus says that it is sweet to be roasted.

{I might say} "Epicurus even maintains that the wise man, though he is being burned in the bull of Phalaris, will cry out 'This is pleasant, and concerns me not at all.'" Why need you wonder, if I maintain that he who reclines at a banquet and the victim who stoutly withstands torture possess equal goods, when Epicurus maintains a thing that is harder to believe, namely, that it is pleasant to be roasted in this way?

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 67.15

torqueor, sed fortiter; bene est.

I am being tortured, but bravely; it is well.

occīdor, sed fortiter: bene est.

I am being killed, but bravely; it is well.

audī Epicūrum, dīcet et dulce est.

listen to Epicurus — he will even say "it is sweet."

ego tam honestae rēi ac sevērae numquam molle nōmen impōnam

I, for something so honorable and severe, will never place a soft name upon it.

"If I am tortured, but bear it bravely, all is well; if I die, but die bravely, it is also well." Listen to Epicurus – he will tell you that it is actually pleasant. I myself shall never pronounce an unmanly word to an act so honorable and austere.

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.27.5

Epīcurus multō fortius sapiēns inquit semper beātus est et uel inclūsus in Phalaridis taurō hanc vocem ēmittet "suāue est et nihil cūrō".

Epicurus says much more boldly that the wise man is always happy, and even shut inside the bull of Phalaris will utter this statement: "it is pleasant, and I do not care."

quis eum nōn inrīserit, maximē quod homō voluptārius persōnam sibi virī fortis inposuit et quīdem suprā modum?

who would not laugh at him — especially because a pleasure-seeker has placed upon himself the role of a brave man, and beyond all proper measure?

Epicurus was much more strong in saying "The Sage is always happy, and even enclosed in the bull of Phalaris, he will utter this pronouncement 'It is pleasant and I care nothing.'" Who would not mock him, especially because a voluptuary placed upon himself the character of a strong man, and beyond measure at that!

Lactantius (f. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.17.42

mortem nōn esse metuendam fortī virō nec ullum dolōrem:

that death is not to be feared by a brave man, nor any pain.

quī etiam sī torqueātur, sī ūrātur, nihil sē cūrāre dicat

who, even if he is tortured, even if he is burned, says that he does not care at all.

[Epicurus says] death should not be feared by a strong man, nor any pain, because even if he is tortured, if he burns, he may say that he cares not al all about it.

[U602]

Aelian (Claudius Aelianus, fl. 215 CE), Various Histories, 4.13

[Johannes Stobaeus (fl.f. 450 CE), Anthology, 17.30]

ὁ αὐτὸς ἔλεγεν ἑτοίμως ἔχειν καὶ τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας διαγωνίζεσθαι μᾶζαν ἔχων καὶ ὕδωρ.

Epicurus said that he was ready to rival Zeus for happiness, as long as he had a barley cake and some water.

Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellanies, 2.21

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ἐν τῷ μὴ πεινῆν μηδὲ διψῆν μηδὲ ῥιγοῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τιθέμενος τὴν ἰσόθεον ἐπεφώνησε φωνήν, ἀσεβῶς εἰπὼν ἐν τούτοις κἂν Διὶ

πατρὶ μάχεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑῶν σκατοφάγων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων τὴν μακαρίαν νικᾶν δογματίζων.

Epicurus, in placing happiness in not being hungry, or thirsty, or cold, uttered that godlike word, saying impiously that he would thereby vie even with Father Jove; teaching, as it were, that the life of pigs devouring rubbish and not of rational philosophers, was supremely happy.

Emperor Julian the Apostate (obit. 363), Orations, 6, "To the Uneducated Cynics"

ἆρά σοι μικρὰ φαίνεται ἀνὴρ "ἄπολις ἄοικος πατρίδος ἐστερημένος" οὐκ ὀβολόν, οὐ δραχμήν, οὐκ οἰκέτην ἔχων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μᾶζαν; ἧς Ἐπίκουρος εὐπορῶν οὐδὲ τῶν θεῶν φησιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας λόγον ἐλαττοῦσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἐρίζων, τοῦ δοκοῦντος δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμονεστάτου (εὐδαιμονέστερον) ζῶν καὶ ἔλεγε ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον.

Then does he {Diogenes of Sinope} not seem to you of no importance, this man who was "cityless, homeless, a man without a country, owning not an obol, not a drachma, not a single slave" nay, not even a loaf of bread – while Epicurus says that if he have bread enough and to spare he is not inferior to the gods on the score of happiness.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 2.27.88

voluptātem nōn optabiliōrem diūtūrnitās facit?

does length of time not make pleasure more to-be-desired?

quid est igitur cūr ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beātum et aeternum?

what is, then, the reason why Epicurus always calls god blessed and eternal?

demptā enim aeternitāte nihilō beātior Iuppiter quam Epicurus, uterque enim summō bonō fruitur id est voluptāte, quā igitur rē ab deō vincitur, sī aeternitāte nōn vincitur?

for with eternity removed Jupiter is by nothing happier than Epicurus, for each enjoys the highest good, that is, pleasure. by what thing, then, is he surpassed by god, if he is not surpassed by eternity?

in quā quid est bonī praeter summam voluptātem et eam sempiternam?

in which (i.e., in eternity) what good is there besides the highest pleasure — and that everlasting?

Isn't pleasure more desirable the longer it lasts? On what ground then does Epicurus speak of a deity (for so he always does) as happy and immortal? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus. Each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. Wherein then is he inferior to a god, except that a god lives forever?

Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, 25.4

ad lēgem nātūrae revertāmur: dīvitiae parātae sunt, (aut gratuitum est quō egēmus aut vīle: pānem et aquam nātūra dēsīderat. nēmō ad haec pauper est.)

let us return to the law of nature: riches are prepared, (either what we need is free or cheap: nature desires bread and water. no one is poor with respect to these.)

intra quae quisquis dēsīderium suum clūsit, cum ipsō Iove dē fēlicitāte contendat, ut ait Epicūrus.

whoever has shut his desire within these bounds contends with Jupiter himself for happiness, as Epicurus says.

Let us return to the law of nature; for then riches are laid up for us. The things which we actually need are free for all, or else cheap; nature craves only bread and water. No one is poor according to this standard; when a man has limited his desires within these bounds, he can challenge the happiness of Jove himself, as Epicurus says.

[U603]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Finibus, 5.31.93

istī ipsī quī volūptāte et dolōre omnia metiuntur, nonne clāmant sapientī plus semper adesse quod velit quam quod nolit?

those very people who measure everything by pleasure and pain say that the wise man always has more of what he wants than of what he does not want

cum tantum igitur in virtūte ponant iī quī fatentur sē virtūtis causā, nisi ea volūptātem creāret, ne manum quidem versūrōs fuisse, quid facere nōs oportet?

since therefore those who place so much in virtue admit that unless it produced pleasure they would not even have moved a hand for the sake of virtue what should we do?

The very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain – do they not cry aloud that the Sage always has more things that he likes than that he dislikes? Thus when so much importance is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it did not produce pleasure, what are we to do?

[U604]

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.73

an Epicurō, quī tantum modo induit persōnam philosophi et sibi ipse hoc nōmen inscripsit, dīcere licebit...

will it be allowed to Epicurus, who merely put on the mask of a philosopher and wrote this name on himself...

...nullum sapientī esse tempus, etiam sī ūrātur torqueātur secētur, quīn possit exclāmāre "quam prō nihilō putō", cum praesertim omne malum dolōre dēfīniat, bonum volūptāte, haec nostra honesta turpia inrideat dīcatque nōs in vocibus occupātōs inānīs sonōs fundere, neque quicquam ad nōs pertinēre nisi quod aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiātur huic ergō...

...that there is no time for the wise man, even if he is burned, tortured, cut, when he cannot cry out "how I count this as nothing," since he defines every evil by pain and good by pleasure, mocks our honorable and dishonorable things and says that we are occupied with words pouring out empty sounds, and that nothing concerns us except what is either smooth or rough felt in the body therefore to this man...

...oblīvīscī licebit suī et tum fortūnam contemnere, cum sit omne et bonum eius et malum in potestāte fortūnae, tum dīcere sē beātum in summō cruciātū atque tormentīs, cum cōnstituerit nōn modo summum malum esse dolōrem sed etiam solum?

...will it be permitted to forget himself and then despise fortune, when both all her good and all her evil are in fortune's power, and then to say that he is happy in the highest agony and torments, when he has decided that not only is pain the greatest evil but also the only one?

Is Epicurus, who merely puts on the mask of a philosopher and has bestowed the title on himself, to be allowed to say ... that there is no circumstance in which the Sage, even if burnt, racked, cut into pieces, cannot cry out: "I count it all as nothing" – particularly as Epicurus restricts evil to pain and good to pleasure, makes a mockery of our notions of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning, and that nothing interests us except the bodily sensation of either rough or smooth. Shall we allow this man .... to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal?

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.75

cum is dīcat semper beātum esse sapientem

when he says that the wise man is always happy

...he maintains that the Sage is always happy.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49

negat ullum esse tempus, quō sapiēns nōn beātus sit

he says that there is no time at which the wise man is not happy

He says that there is not time when the wise man is not happy.

Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.27.80

dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beātum esse sapientem: quod quidem solet ebullīre nōn numquam: quem quidem, cum summīs dolōribus cōnfīciātur, ait dictūrum: quam suāve est, quam nihil cūrō

he would say this same thing, that the wise man is always happy; which indeed sometimes bursts out: and him, when he is being worn down by the greatest pains, he says will say: "how sweet it is, how I care nothing"

[U605]

Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 16, 1098B

ἀλλ' ἡδέως τε βεβιωκέναι καὶ βρυάζειν καὶ καθυμνεῖν τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἐκκραυγάζοντες λέγουσι.

But, it is objected, they shout that "they have had a pleasant life" "revel in it" and "hymn the praises" of their own "way of living." {c.f., U181 & U600}

[U606]

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), P.Herc. 1005, Ad [contubernales] 1, col. 14 [(17)]

...[τὰ Ἑλλη]νικά, ὧ[ν] ἔχο[μεν]... ...[ἐπι]καλήσας ἡμ[ετέραν], ού λέγω τῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐμ μέσω[ι, τὴ]μ πρὸς ἰδιώ[τας] συνήθ[εις ὑ]πὸ τῶν καθη[γ]εμόνων γεγ[ρα]μμένη[ν] ἐπιστολήν. εἰ δὲ καταψευδόμεθ' ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν, ἐλεγ[ξ]άτωσαν ἕν τι ποιήσαντες ὧν εἴπομεν, ἀλλά· "δυνάμεθα μέν, ού βουλόμεθα δέ," καθάπερ ἔλεγέ τις περὶ ἐμοῦ τάχα μωκώμενος· καί πως ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑπαρκτόν ἐστι ὅ φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἀδιανόητον εἶναι τὸ τἀγαθὰ κατ[ὰ φύσιν δύσκτη]τα βλέ[πεσθαι]...

...τὰ Ἑλληνικά, ὧν ἔχομεν... ...ἐπικαλήσας ἡμετέραν, οὐ λέγω τῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐμ μέσωι, τὴμ πρὸς ἰδιώτας συνήθεις ὑπὸ τῶν καθηγεμόνων γεγραμμένην ἐπιστολήν. εἰ δὲ καταψευδόμεθ' ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν, ἐλεγξάτωσαν ἕν τι ποιήσαντες ὧν εἴπομεν, ἀλλά· "δυνάμεθα μέν, οὐ βουλόμεθα δέ," καθάπερ ἔλεγέ τις περὶ ἐμοῦ τάχα μωκώμενος· καί πως ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὑπαρκτόν ἐστι ὅ φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἀδιανόητον εἶναι τὸ τἀγαθὰ κατὰ φύσιν δύσκτητα βλέπεσθαι...

Apollonius Dyskolus (fl.c. 130 CE), The Adverb [p. 566.3 Bekk.]

καὶ ἔτι παρὰ Ἐπίκουρον τὸ ἀμῶς γέ πως, σημαῖνον κατά τινα τρόπον, ἀπὸ ὀξυτόνου τοῦ ἀμός.

Profiles (Epicureans)

Metrodorus

Μητρόδωρος
"Mother's Gift"

- Wrote books about the absurdities in Homer
- Brother of the troublesome Timocrates
- Husband of Leontion, with whom he had a son Little Epicurus I

Leontion
Λεόντιον
"Little Lioness"

- Wife of Metrodorus
- Wrote a book against Theophrastus
- Theorus the painter produced a well-known picture of her called "Leontion In contemplation"

Leonteus
Λεοντεύς
"The Lion" of Lampsacus

- Tended towards atheism for a while, but was a devoted pupil of Epicurus
- Had Mammárion as a courtesan
- Husband of Themista, with whom he had a son Little Epicurus II

Themista
Θεμίστα
"Order-keeper"

- Wife of Leonteus
- Epicurus wrote her letters and dedicated at dedicated least one book "On Neocles" to her
- She was famous in antiquity for being praised by Epicurus for her character and wisdom
- She and Leonteus together had a son little Epicurus II

Anniceris
Ἀννίκερις

The Suda says (alpha,2466):

> "A Cyrenean, a philosopher, who became an Epicurean despite being an acquaintance of Paraebatus, the student of Aristippus. Anniceris also had a brother by the name of Nicoteles, [sc. also] a philosopher, and his student [was the] famous Posidonius. The sect called Annicerean [sc. originates] from him. He lived at the time of Alexander [sc. the Great]."

Diogenes Laertius says this (2.96-7):

> "The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them [sc. The school of Hegesias], but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him.
>
> The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first.
>
> A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility – for, if that fails, we should then no longer associate with him – but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love to our friend."

Timeline

Lamian War Military Service
323–322 BCE – Athens (Attica)

(18–19 years old)

The Lamian War was an unsuccessful attempt by Athens (along with a large coalition of Greek states) to end the hegemony of Macedonia over Greece just after the death of Alexander the Great.

> Epicurus was likely completing his obligatory military service in Athens during the Lamian War. While it is not specifically documented that Epicurus fought in any battles, being in Athens at the time means he was involved in some form of military service, possibly in support roles or as part of the city's defense efforts.

The Mytilene Misadventure
311 BCE – Mytilene, Lesbos

(30 years old)

Mytilene was probably under Cassander's or Lysimachus' overall control during this period, but they were now being challenged by Antigonus I Monophthalmus' territorial expansion.

> Epicurus was forced to leave Mytilene due to conflicts with the local authorities.

Founding the Garden
306 BCE

(35 years old)

Athens was now…

> Epicurus….

Death
270 BCE
(72 years old)

SETTING THE SCENE.

Epicurus.

x
x BCE
(x years old)

SETTING THE SCENE.

Epicurus.

TESTIMONIA

CERTORUM LIBRORUM VESTIGIA

U1 – U218

INCERTAE SEDIS FRAGMENTA OPINIONUMQUE TESTIMONIA

U219 – U607

PROLEGOMENA PHILOSOPHIAE

U219 – U241

CANONICA

U242– U265

PHYSICA

U266 – U395

ETHICA

U396 – U607

Tetrapharmakos

Τετραφάρμακος

ἄφοβον ὁ Θεός

God is not dreadful

ἀνύποπτον ὁ Θάνατος

Death is without [*a reason for*] suspicion

καὶ Τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον

what is Good is well procurable

τὸ δὲ Δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον

what is Awful is well endurable

ἄφοβος (ος, ον)	not dreadful	**ΑΦΟΒΟΣ** *not fleeing [in fear]*
ὁ θεός **οἱ θεοί**	god	**ΘΕΟΣ** *[divine entity]*
ὑποπτεύειν	to suspect	**ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ** *looking [suspiciously] under*
ἀνύποπτος (ος, ον)	without [a reason for] suspicion	**ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ** *not looking [suspiciously] under*
ὁ θάνατος **οἱ θάνατοι**	death	**ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ** *dying*
τὸ ἀγαθόν **τὰ ἀγαθά**	what is good	**ΑΓΑΘΟΝ** *great*
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	**ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ** *acquiring*
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	**ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *acquired*
εὔκτητος (ος, ον)	well procurable	**ΕΥΚΤΗΤΟΣ** *acquiring easily*
δεινός (ή, όν)	awful	**ΔΕΙΝΟΣ** *fearing*
τὸ δεινόν **τὰ δεινά**	what is awful	
εὐεκκαρτέρητος (ος, ον)	well endurable	**ΕΥΕΚΚΑΡΤΕΡΗΤΟΣ** *fully easily enduring*

The Tetrapharmakos is found in P.Herc. 1005.

1. Entrepreneurial Epicureans

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 1/2

…πα[ρά]γουσίṿ [τ]ι γόν[ιμ]ọṿ [κα]ὶ γινώṣκουσιṿ π̣λεῖσ[τα] πιθα[νῶν], τ[ότε δὴ] π̣αρανακάμ̣[ψομ]ẹν· ὁμολογῶ τοί[νυ]ν, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔφην, τὸ τῶν χρηματιζόντων τινὰς Ἐπικουρείων πολλὰ μὲν συμφορητὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν, πολλὰ δ' αὐτῶν ἴδια τοῖ̣ς κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν ἀσύμφωνα, τ̣ινὰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἐσπαραγμένα φλοιωδῶς καὶ ταχέως, χω̣ρίσω [δὲ τῶν] [ὑπ' αὐτῶν]…

…Παράγουσίν τι γόνιμον καὶ γινώσκουσιν πλεῖστα πιθανῶν, τότε δὴ Παρανακάμψομεν – Ὁμολογῶ, τοίνυν, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔφην, τὸ τῶν χρηματιζόντων τινὰς Ἐπικουρείων πολλὰ μὲν συμφορητὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν

¬ πολλὰ δ' αὐτῶν ἴδια τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν ἀσύμφωνα, τινὰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἐσπαραγμένα φλοιωδῶς καὶ ταχέως, Χωρίσω δὲ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν...

...They introduce something productive and they know a lot about what is persuasive, then indeed We will turn away [from this topic] – I agree, therefore, as I said from the beginning, that some of the business-minded Epicureans say and write many things that are suitable ¬ but many of their idiosyncratic [sayings] are inconsistent in the things related to [their business] efforts, while some of these [sayings] are superficially and quickly ripped out from [the writings], but I will separate those [writings] made by them...

2. Hermarchus with Experience and Followers

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 2/3

...ἀλλ' ἔ̣[στα]ι δυ̣ν̣[ατὸν ἐὰν τοῦτ]ο̣ καὶ ἃ μ[ὲν εἰρ]γάσαν̣[το πάντες οἱ] μεθ' Ἕ̣[ρ]μαρχο̣ν [ἐ]μ̣βάντες εἰς [τ]ὴν αἵρε̣σ̣ιν, ὁμοιότρο[π]ά τις παρ[α]στήσηι καὶ βε[βο]υλη[μ]ένους καὶ πεπραχότας, ὅπερ οὐ πρότερον οἴομαι τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπους μέλανα[ς] εἶναι καὶ μικροὺς καὶ δι̣[εσ]τραμμένους· ε̣ἰ [δὲ] μὴ π̣ρ̣[ο]σ̣ηγόρευσα[ν α]ὐ̣τοὺς ἀνα[λό]γως τ[οῖς]...

...ἀλλ' ἔσται δυνατὸν ἐὰν τοῦτο καὶ ἃ μὲν εἰργάσαντο πάντες Οἱ μεθ' Ἕρμαρχον ἐμβάντες εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ὁμοιότροπά Τις παραστήση: καὶ βεβουλημένους καὶ πεπραχότας, ὅπερ οὐ πρότερον Οἴομαι – τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπους μέλανας εἶναι καὶ μικροὺς καὶ διεστραμμένους – εἰ δὲ μὴ Προσηγόρευσαν αὐτοὺς ἀναλόγως τοῖς...

...but it will be possible if Someone were to present this in a similar way and also those things that all the [Epicureans] accomplished who entered into [our] school along with Hermarchus : [presenting them] as those who had intended [to do something] and also as those who had accomplished [that thing], which I do not think [was the case] in times before [them] – with all humanity [before then] being obscure [in their expressions], small [minded], and corrupted [in their actions] – but if They did not address them in proportion to the...

3. Inexperienced "Helmsman Navigating from the Book"

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 3/4

...τῶν Ἐπικουρεί[ων] προ̣σαγο̣[ρευ]ομένων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγνωσμένος ἢ καὶ διιστορημένος ὑ̣φ' ἡμῶν, ὃς καί φησι εἶν̣[α]ι̣ ὁ̣ γνήσιος ἀναγνώ̣[στης] ἐ̣π̣ὶ γραφὰς [ἐγλεκτὰς] κα[ὶ πλ]ήθη συγγρα̣[μμάτων], κἂν βάλ̣ηι [γ]ε̣ [φαύλως], ἀνείληφε πολ[λὰ]ς ἐγλογὰς καὶ τῶν μ[ὲ]ν̣ ἐπὶ μέρους διανο[η]μάτων ἀπειρότατός ἐστιν. ἃ δὲ προστάττεται ποι̣εῖν, ἐπὶ κεφάλαι[α βλέπει], καθάπερ ὃν λ[έγουσιν] ἐκ βυβλίου κυβ[ερνήτην] καὶ διὰ παντ[ὸς]...

...τῶν Ἐπικουρείων προσαγορευομένων· Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγνωσμένος ἢ καὶ διιστορημένος ὑφ' ἡμῶν, Ὃς καί φησι εἶναι "ὁ γνήσιος ἀναγνώστης" ἐπὶ γραφὰς ἐγλεκτὰς καὶ πλήθη συγγραμμάτων – κἂν βάλη γε φαύλως, ἀνείληφε πολλάς ἐγλογὰς ¬ καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους διανοημάτων ἀπειρότατός ἐστιν! ἃ δὲ Προστάττεται ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ κεφάλαια Βλέπει – καθάπερ ὂν λέγουσιν "ἐκ βυβλίου κυβερνήτην" καὶ διὰ παντὸς...

...of those who are called Epicureans. while Someone known or even described in detail by us, Who also claims to be "the authentic reader" on select writings and on a multitude of compositions – even if he performs poorly, he has selected many passages ¬ but in individual mental perceptions he is the most inexperienced! in fact, for what He must do, He looks only at the main points – just like [someone] whom they say is "a helmsman [navigating] from the book" and always...

τὸ διανόημα	[mental]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑ**
τὰ διανοήματα	perception	*seeing through*

4. "The Fourfold Remedy"

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 4/5

...μνη[σθεὶς τῶν λόγων δεδειγ]μέν[ω]ν καὶ τῶν [σοι] εὖ γε[γ]ονότων τόδε π[άλιν] ἐπιλογίζου καὶ κ[ενὰ] περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντο[ς νό]μιζε καὶ... καὶ πανταχῆι παρειρ[ημένο]ν ἡ τετραφάρμακος· 'ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ]ποπτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ]τέρητον.' οὓς δ' ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων φησὶν ἐκφέρειν ἀν[α]λογισμούς, ταύτας εἴσει τὰς λέξεις ἀνταποδόσεις δώδ[ε]κ' [ἢ] πεντ[ε]καίδεκα...

...μνησθεὶς τῶν λόγων δεδειγμένων καὶ τῶν σοι εὖ γεγονότων – τόδε πάλιν Ἐπιλογίζου καὶ κενὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος Νόμιζε καὶ... καὶ πανταχῇ παρειρημένον "ἡ Τετραφάρμακος" "ἄφοβον ὁ Θεός, ἀνύποπτον ὁ Θάνατος – καὶ Τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, τὸ δὲ Δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον." οὓς δ' ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων Φησὶν ἐκφέρειν ἀναλογισμούς, ταύτας Εἴσει τὰς λέξεις ἀνταποδόσεις δώδεκ' ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα...

...remembering the reasonings that have been demonstrated and those good things that have happened to you – You should even reflect upon this again and You should even consider [your concerns] about what is going to happen to be void [*i.e., having no content, and therefore "meaningless"*]... [*about three words missing*] ...and everywhere "The Fourfold Remedy" is mentioned, that "God is not dreadful, Death is not concerning – and while what is Good is well attainable, what is Awful is also well endurable." as for those reflections He claims to extract from the books, You will know these phrases as responses [in] twelve or fifteen [words]...

[*alternative*] You will find those words as responses twelve or fifteen [times]...

5. Clarity vs. Gossip

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 5/6

...τῶν βαθυτέρων ὡς ἐν [δέ]χεται φανότατα πέφρασ[θαι] καὶ νοεῖ ταὐτὸ παν[ταχῆ]ι. ὧδε ποῦ δυνησό[μεθ' ἐκ βυβλί]ων σοφώ[τατ' ἐ]ξενεγκεῖν; ἐ[π]ιδεί[κνυ]ται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν [ὅλων ἐν το]ῖς βυβλίοις, τα[ράττων καὶ] θρυλῶν ὅτι Λε[ό]ντιον καὶ ἑτέρα ‹ἑταίρα› τις ἐν τῆι πραγματείᾳ μνημονεύεται – καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαμμά[ρι]ον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημη[τρ]ία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθο[κλ]έους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ[αινος]...

...τῶν βαθυτέρων, ὡς Ἐνδέχεται φανότατα πέφρασθαι – καὶ Νοεῖ ταὐτὸ πανταχῇ: ὧδε, ποῦ Δυνησόμεθ' ἐκ βυβλίων σοφώτατ' ἐξενεγκεῖν; Ἐπιδείκνυται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν ὅλων ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις, ταράττων καὶ θρυλῶν ὅτι Λεόντιον καὶ ἑτέρα Ἑταίρα τις ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ μνημονεύεται, καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαμμάριον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημητρία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθοκλέους παιδαγωγὸς Πολύαινος...

...regarding deeper matters, how They are able to have been expressed most clearly – He also perceives this everywhere: so, where will We be able to extract the wisest [insights] from books? while He displays [his mental] retention of everything within the books, he [also] stirs up and chatters that Leontion and some other Courtesan are mentioned in the work, and that the lover of Idomeneus was Nikídion, and of Leonteus was Mammárion, and of Hermarchus was Dēmētría – and such a kind also was Pythocles' tutor Polyaenus ...

6. Experience vs. Titles

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 6/7

...[εἰ μὲν τοῖς] ὅλον σ[οφῶν ὀνόμ]ασιν προσαγορεύ[ονται] οὔτ' ἐσμὲν ἡμε[ῖ]ς ὑπ[ό] γε τῶν \ἀξίων/ μνήμης [καὶ χάριτο]ς οὔ τινι [γ]εγονότ[ων ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ο]ὔτε τῶν φίλων τινὶ συνευχόμεθα γενέσθαι, τρέπομεν [πρὸ]ς τὰς λεγομένας αἶγας ἀγρίας τὸ κακόν· εἰ δέ τις – καλεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις [τ]ὸν δεδιδαγμένον μεθοδικῶ[ς] συνιέναι τὰν τοῖ[ς] βυβλίοις τῶν καθη[γε]μό[ν]ων ὥστε [κ]αὶ προφέρεσθ[αι]...

...εἰ μὲν τοῖς "ὅλον σοφῶν" ὀνόμασιν Προσαγορεύονται – οὔτ' ἐσμὲν Ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ, γε, τῶν "ἀξίων μνήμης καὶ χάριτος" οὔ τινι γεγονότων ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ¬ οὔτε τῶν φίλων τινὶ Συνευχόμεθα γενέσθαι, Τρέπομεν πρὸς τὰς λεγομένας "αἶγας ἀγρίας" τὸ κακόν· εἰ δέ Τις καλεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις τὸν δεδιδαγμένον μεθοδικῶς συνιέναι τὰν τοῖς βυβλίοις τῶν καθηγεμόνων, ὥστε καὶ προφέρεσθαι...

...if They are addressed by the names "of the wholly wise" – We are not, in any case, under the influence of those "deserving remembrance and thanks" nor has it happened to anyone but us ¬ nor do We pray together with any of our friends for this to happen, We divert the bad towards the so-called "wild goats." but if Someone addresses by these names and similar [titles], the person who has been methodically taught to understand the things in the books of [our] leaders, so that he may also bring forward...

Φιλωνίδης Λαοδίκειας

"the Son of the Friendly One" from "the City of Public Justice"

Philonides was active in Seleucid court and friendly with King Seleucus IV Philopator. During this time, Philonides also interacted with Heliodorus, the king's treasurer.

When Seleucus IV Philopator was assassinated (175 BCE), Demetrius I Soter (Seleucus' older son) was in Rome, so Antiochus (Seleucus' younger son) was proclaimed king – with Heliodorus a regent.

Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Seleucus' brother) soon arrived in Syria, displaced Heliodorus and made himself a co-ruler with Antiochus (who died a few years later).

Philonides continued to be active in the Seleucid court through the 11 year reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes ($_{r.}$ 175 BCE – $_{ob.}$ 164 BCE).

The Jewish revolt saw a key success against the Seleucid monarchy with the rededication of the Temple (164 BCE) – but the Seleucids still held power over Judea and conflict continued.

After the natural death of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, his son Antiochus V Eupator and regent Lysias took control for only a few years.

With the help of the historian Polybius (who was also a Roman political detainee) Demetrius I Soter escaped from Rome and made his way to the Seleucid capital in Antioch.

Demetrius, the reigned as king for 12 years ($_{r.}$ 162 – $_{ob.}$ 150 BCE). Philonides lived in the court of Demetrius I Soter and educated the king.

Demetrius was the great^5-grandson of Epicurus' contemporary DEMETRIUS I POLIORCETES:

DEMETRIUS I POLIORCETES → Stratonice I → Antiochus II Theos → Seleucus II Callinicus → Antiochus III the Great → Seleucus IV Philopator → Demetrius I Soter}

Philonides lived for around another twenty years after Demetrius' death.

1. The Gift of His Teaching, Rising Schools

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 2

…{[Φιλωνί]δης τοίνυν Λαοδι[κεὺς]} ὁ αἰτιολογούμεν[ος κατα] τὴ[ν] προγεγενημέ[νην πρὸς α]ὐτὸν δόσιν τῆς [ἐκείνου] θεωρίας ἀσμέν[ωςσυ]νηκολούθει. Καὶ γὰ[ρ]… …ταῖς γε[γενημέναις σχο]λαῖς περ[ὶ]…

Φιλωνίδης, τοίνυν, Λαοδικεὺς, ὁ αἰτιολογούμενος κατα τὴν προγεγενημένην πρὸς αὐτὸν δόσιν τῆς ἐκείνου θεωρίας – ἀσμένως συνηκολούθει. καὶ γὰρ… …ταῖς γεγενημέναις σχολαῖς περὶ…

> …Philonides, then, of Laodicea, who was investigating in accordance with the gift previously granted to [*the teacher*] of that man's [*i.e., Epicurus*] theory – followed [*this teacher*] eagerly. for indeed… …for the schools that had arisen concerning…
>
> [Assante] So Philonides of Laodicea, who was investigating causes according to the doctrine previously granted to him as a gift, was a most eager follower. And indeed… at the lessons held concerning…

[Gallo] **αἰτιολογέω** *is characteristic of Epicurean language and may suggest a specific reference to philosophical training.*

[Assante] *"to him"* ***πρὸς αὐτὸν*** *likely refers to a teacher of Philonides, probably mentioned earlier.*

It is plausible to think that this concerned the education of Philonides, in which his zeal and aptitude for research were praised.

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 3 fin.

Λέγει δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆι συμ[βι]ώ{ι}σει τῆι μετ' ἀλλήλων [εὐ]δοκεῖν τόν τε πατέρα [φιλεῖν] αὐτὸν οὕτως ὡς καὶ πολλῶν προ[τρεπ]όν[τ]ων εἰς γάμ[ον]...

Λέγει δὲ καὶ τὸ τῇ συμβιώσει τῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων εὐδοκεῖν – τόν τε πατέρα φιλεῖν αὐτὸν οὕτως ὡς, καὶ πολλῶν προτρεπόντων εἰς γάμον...

He also says that he favored the cohabitation together – and that he loved his father so much that, even though many urged him toward marriage...

[Assante] He also reports his satisfaction with their mutual life together and his affection for his father in particular, such that, although many urged him to marry...

[Nicolardi] *We may here be informed that Philonides did not marry – nor presumably have children; because, as seen below, his brother younger Brother Dicaearchus was his legal heir – and this might also be the reason why Philonides needed him to consent to any alienation of property.*

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 50

...[τῆς χο]ρηγίας τῆς... ...[π]ρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῆς ὑ[γιοῦς] διαθέσ[ε]ως...

...τῆς χορηγίας τῆς... ...πρὸς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῆς ὑγιούς διαθέσεως...

...of the support provided of... ...for the recovery of a healthy condition...

[Assante] ...for the recovery of sound condition...

3. Freeing his Slaves

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 59, 5

...{[α]ὐτά, τὰ λ[οιπὰ]/ μ[ετὰ] δὲ ταῦτα τἆλ[λα]} κατ[α]λεί[π]ων ὑπ[άρ]χοντα κα[ὶ] ἀδελφῶι κοινά. ὅμως πρὸς το[ῖ]ς ἀπηλευθε[ρω]μένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σώ[μασ]ιν ἤθελέν τι καὶ {τοὺς [λοιποὺ]ς / τὸ γέ[ν]ος} ἀπελευθερῶσαι. Καὶ [τὸν] ἀδελφὸν ἐρωτήσας {[εἴ τι] δοκεῖ προσγράψαι, [ἐβο]υλεύσατο· καὶ Χρυ...προαπε[λευθερωθεῖσ]ι καὶ Πεισ/[εἰ εὐ]δοκεῖ προσγράψαι, [διεκ]ελεύσατο· καὶ χρη... ...ἀκόλουθον}...

...μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, τἆλλα καταλείπων – ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀδελφῷ κοινά. ὅμως, πρὸς τοῖς ἀπηλευθερωμένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σώμασιν,"Ηθελέν τι καὶ – τὸ γένος ἀπελευθερῶσαι

...beyond these things, he was leaving behind the other things – which were also shared with his brother. nevertheless, in addition to the slaves [*lit. bodies*] freed by him, He wanted something else – to free their kin

[Assante] ...for these things; setting aside the other goods, because they were shared also with his brother. Moreover, beyond the slaves he had already freed, he also wanted in some way to free their children

[Nicolardi] after this, leaving the other goods behind, as they were shared with his brother too, nevertheless, in addition to the slaves previously freed by him [*scil. his brother Dicaearchus*], he somehow wanted to free also their offspring

καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐρωτήσας, εἰ Εὐδοκεῖ προσγράψαι, Διεκελεύσατο· καὶ Χρὴ... ...ἀκόλουθον...

and after asking his brother, if He approves to adding [*additions to the manumissions*] in writing, He gave instructions; and Chre[]... ...an attendant...

[Assante] and after consulting his brother about the appropriateness of making additions to the list, he arranged...

[Nicolardi] and after having asked him if he gave his consent, he ordered to add to the list also... ...attendant...

[Assante] It may be that Philonides consulted his brother about the possibility of drawing up an additional list of manumissions.

*Or Philonides (after choosing not to involve himself with the slaves jointly owned with his brother so as not to interfere with his relative's management of property) wished to grant his own previously freed slaves a kind of hereditary right of freedom, so that their descendants (**τὸ γένος**) too might enjoy a similar privilege.*

[Nicolardi] This passage would lead us to presume that the ownership of these slaves was shared between the two of them, just like the ownership of the goods also mentioned.

It seems that, although Philonides did not determine anything specific about the other goods (as they were shared with his brother), he nevertheless wanted to make an addition to the manumissions previously performed by him.

It is probable that the properties that are the object of these lines had been transmitted to the two brothers by inheritance. Collective ownership and collective manumissions of slaves are quite frequently attested.

4. Departure from Family

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 58

...{[καταλ]ιπὼν / [προσε]ιπὼν} καὶ πατẹ́[ρα καὶ ἀ]δ̣ελφόν, ᾧ καὶ [συνακολ]ο̣ṳθῶν οὐδενὸς... ...μηαι νοήση<ι>. Φι[λωνίδης μὲ]ν̣ αὐτὸς ἀκο[λουθεῖν οὐκ ἔ]λεγεν, οὐδ'...

...καταλιπὼν καὶ πατέρα καὶ ἀδελφόν – ᾧ, καὶ συνακολουθῶν, οὐδενὸς ἂν Νοήσει. Φιλωνίδης, μὲν, αὐτὸς ἀκολουθεῖν οὐκ ἔλεγεν, οὐδ'...

...having left behind {[or], having addressed} both father and brother – and, with whom, when following alongside, He would conceive of nothing. Philonides himself, however, did not say that he followed [*them*], nor even...

[Assante] ...having called him father and brother, and following him... ...he himself says [that he follows]...

[Assante] There is an allusion to the Philonides' departure from home, compelled to leave his loved ones in view of an important journey. It is known from other sources (see inscriptions below) that Philonides undertook several journeys and embassies in the company of his father (of the same name) and his younger brother Dicaearchus, but in this case, it is possible that he had decided to depart alone, for reasons not specified.

5. Geometry and Astrology

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 49 | 3 sup.

...γεωμετρίαι τε καὶ ἀσ̣[τρο]λογίαι· καὶ ἰδίως πως τὰς ἐν ταύτηι περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀπεδέδεκτο. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴ̣ν φιλοτεκνίαν [ζήλου] λαλῶν· ἔτι παιδίων – φησίν – ἡμῶν ὄντων, {προσέ[σχομε]ν / προσε[δοῦμε]ν} | μηδὲ̣[ν] ἀπόκρυφον [πεπο]ῆσθαι π[ρὸ]ς αὐτούς, [ἀλλὰ π]άντα κ[αὶ] λόγον καὶ [πρᾶ]γμα ἐν μέ[σ]ω<ι> τεθεικέ[ναι].

...Γεωμετρίαι τε καὶ Ἀστρολογίαι – καὶ ἰδίως πως, τὰς ἐν ταύτῃ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων Ἀπεδέδεκτο. περὶ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φιλοτεκνίαν ζήλου λαλῶν:

...Geometries and Astrologies – and in particular, [*Philonides*] had adopted those [*teachings of Epicurus*] in this [*topic*] dealing with meteorological phenomena. and speaking of zeal regarding the fondness of children:

[Assante] ...To geometry and astrology. And in particular, [*Philonides*] had in some way accepted the opinions [*of Epicurus*] in this [*discipline*] relative to celestial phenomena. Speaking then of... in relation to love for children:

*[Gallo] **αἰτιολογέω** is characteristic of Epicurean language and may suggest a specific reference to the philosophical training.*

[Assante] *"in particular" (**ἰδίως**) could serve to introduce a clarification, in relation to a rather generic title mentioned in the previous lines: perhaps it was stated that the Epicurean doctrine of celestial phenomena was taken up within a broader treatment of astronomy.*

These lines probably referred generally to the scientific field, perhaps in connection with the topic of a teacher's lessons.

It seems, moreover, that the philosopher adopted Epicurus' theory on the meteōra, discussed in several passages of the On Nature and in the Letter to Pythocles; all the more reason to think of a Dionysodorus [of Kaunos the Younger] as Philonides' teacher, inclined toward the Epicurean creed and particularly devoted to scientific studies.

[Assante] *It seems possible to discern a reference to a work of ethical content. We know from the testimony of Demetrius Lacon (P.Herc. 1012, col. LXVI 5 ff. Puglia) and other sources that the Epicurus likely considered love for offspring to be natural.*

"ἔτι παιδίων" Φησίν " ἡμῶν ὄντων Προσεδοῦμεν μηδὲν ἀπόκρυφον πεποιῆσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς ¬ ἀλλὰ πάντα – καὶ λόγον καὶ πρᾶγμα – ἐν μέσῳ τεθεικέναι."

> "while we were still children" [*Philonides*] says "We felt the need to do nothing hidden from them ¬ but [*to place*] everything – both word and deed, out in the open."
>
> [Assante] He says: "When we were still children, it never occurred to us (**προσέσχομεν**) / we never felt the need (**προσεδοῦμεν**) to do anything in secret toward them, but rather to reveal every word or action…"

[Assante] *We recover an explicit reference to Philonides' clear and upright behavior toward his family from an early age.*

6. Teachers of Philonides, Commentaries On Epicurus Works

[Assante] *The papyrus merely mentions a "sixth book," without indicating the title of the work or the name of the author; nevertheless, no scholar has questioned that in these opening lines is a reference to Epicurus' principal work. At first, the absence of the title in this passage might suggest that Epicurus' work had already been cited earlier in this biography – but On Nature (**Περὶ Φύσεως**) is mentioned explicitly later on in this biography (along with the reference to the 8th book).*

*Based on the division of On Nature (**Περὶ Φύσεως**) into three distinct sections – physics, logic, and ethics – it is likely that the commentary on the sixth book of the famous treatise concerned Epicurean physics. It is also probable that in the sixth book Epicurus dealt with questions of physics somehow connected to geometry and mathematics – whose traditional foundations we know Epicurus rejected.*

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 7

…[Φιλωνί]δης τοίνυν Λαοδιφει διακηκοένα[ι· ἐν μέν]τοι̣ βυβλίοις ὑπ[ο]μ̣ν[ήμα]τα φέρει {δύ' ἀρχαῖοι / δύ' ἀρχαῖα} τῶν παρ' Εὐδήμωι καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἕκτον, καὶ πε[ρὶ τ]ῶν ἐ̣πιστημονικῶν δ̣[ι]α̣νοήσε̣ων καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἀρτέμωνι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον μέχρι πρὸς τὸ τρίτ[ον] καὶ <τρι>[α]κοστόν, ἐκλ̣[ι]π̣όν[των τ]ινῶν, καὶ σ[χολ]ῶν τῶν [π]αρὰ Διονυ[σοδ]ώρωι. φέρε[ι δὲ] καὶ σύντ[αγμα] π̣[ρὸς τὸ]ν Παταρέ[α]…

…Φιλωνίδης, τοίνυν, Λαοδίκεια φησὶ διακηκοέναι· ἐν, μέντοι, βυβλίοις ὑπομνήματα φέρει: δύ' ἀρχαῖα, τῶν παρ' Εὐδήμῳ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἕκτον – καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπιστημονικῶν διανοιήσεων – καὶ τῶν παρ' Ἀρτέμωνι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον μέχρι πρὸς τὸ τρίτον καὶ τριακοστόν, ἐκλιπόντων τινῶν (καὶ σχολῶν τῶν παρὰ Διονυσοδώρῳ). Φέρει δὲ καὶ σύνταγμα πρὸς τὸν Παταρέα…

> …Philonides, then, says he become a disciple in Laodicea. indeed, in his books, he includes commentaries: two ancient [*sources*], those from Eudemos [*of Pergamon*] indeed those [1] up to the sixth [*book of Epicurus on Nature*] and concerning epistemological perceptions – and those of Artemon [*"of Laodicea"*] [2] from the first up to the thirty-third [*book of Epicurus on Nature*], with some missing (as well as lectures from Dionysodorus). He also includes a treatise addressed to the man from Patara…

[Assante] ...he writes that he had listened to. Among the books, he mentions two ancient commentaries: that of Eudemos – both the one on the sixth book [On Nature by Epicurus] and the one concerning scientific representations –and that of Artemon, from the first book up to the thirty-third [book], with the exception of some [books]. Among the lectures, he refers to those of Dionysiodorus. He also mentions a work against the Patarean...

[Assante] There appears to be a general reference to certain writings and teachings of mentors who must have been particularly significant for Philonides. This passage also sheds light on the history of the exegesis of Epicurus' work in antiquity, attested by an active intellectual life even in distant Syria. *It is reasonable to presume that Philonides' initiation into Epicureanism had already occurred under the guidance of Artemon "of Laodicea." In my view, it is clear that we are not dealing here with commentaries by Philonides on those already written by others, but rather with the commentaries of his teachers.*

From this passage, it seems both Eudemos [of Pergamon] and Artemon "of Laodicea" were Epicureans that wrote commentaries on Epicurus' work On Nature. We also learn below that Philonides was educated by Eudemos and Dionysodorus [of Kaunos the Younger].

ἡ ἐπιστήμη **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι**	understanding	**ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ** *standing upon*
ἐπιστημονικός *(ή, όν)*	epistemological	**ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΟΣ** *characteristic of standing upon*
τὸ διανόημα **τὰ διανοήματα**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing through*

7. First Study with Mathematicians: Eudemos and Dionysodorus

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 25 sup.

...ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοῖς. Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὰ σημειώματα ποήσας ταῦτ' ἐπισεσήμανται· Φιλωνίδης ἤκουσε μὲν Εὐδήμου πρώτου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Διον[υσο]δώρου τοῦ Διον[υσοδώρ]ου Καυνίο[υ]...

...ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοῖς. Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὰ σημειώματα ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐπισεσήμανται: Φιλωνίδης ἤκουσε μὲν Εὐδήμου πρώτου – μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Διονυσοδώρου, τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου Καυνίου...

...to agree with them. now He who composed these notes has especially marked: Philonides first studied under Eudemos [*of Pergamon*] – and after that, under Dionysodorus, the son of Dionysodorus of Kaunos [*in Caria*]...

[Assante] ...to be in agreement with them. So the one who made the annotations highlighted these facts: Philonides first listened to Eudemos [*of Pergamon*], then to Dionysiodorus [*of Amisus*], son of Dionysiodorus of Caunus...

[Assante] Eudemos of Pergamon was the dedicatee of Book 2 of Apollonius of Perga's Conics.

I believe Dionysodorus [of Kaunos the Younger] was a significant figure aligned with Epicurean doctrine and not unfamiliar with scientific interests.

(1) the Dionysodorus mentioned here was from Caunus

(2) he had a father of the same name, who is also mentioned – unusual, since patronymics do not appear for other figures in this biography

(3) Philonides probably published his lectures

Rather than claiming that Eudemos was definitively Philonides' "first teacher" (though I do not rule out that he attended his lectures), I think the passage simply says that among Eudemos and Dionysodorus, (likely grouped together because both were mathematicians), Philonides happened to listen first to the one and then the other, without specifying when exactly his "apprenticeship" took place.

[Philippson] The biographer was providing an additional detail about the nature of his source, probably a set of written notes (perhaps by a student of Philonides), already reviewed by others.

*The philological work done on the text (i.e., the source from which our biographer draws his information) is attributed to another hand – "**Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὰ σημειώματα ποιήσας**" – who, within a larger body of data, performed a selection, highlighting (**ἐπισεσήμανται**) the most relevant points.*

8. Study with Epicureans: Timasagoras – Basileides & Thespis – Old Iolaus

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[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 11

...{φιλοσόφων... ...καὶ Τιμασαγ[όρ]ου} Β[ασιλείδ]ου κα[ὶ] Θέσπιδος, {[οἷς συγγένο]νẹ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, *[ἀπολιπὼν δ]ὲ πάλιν {βασιλέ[α συνῆ]ν* / [ὧν ἀκουστ]ὴς μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, [ἐσχόλασε δ]ὲ πάλιν βασιλε[ίδηι κ]αὶ} Θ[έσ]πιδι μῆνας ἕξ. Σ[υνέτ]υχεν δὲ καὶ Ἰολάωι [μέχρι εἰ]ς ποσὸν [χρό]νον καί [πολλοῖ]ς ἄλλοις [φιλ]ọσόφοις...

...φιλοσόφων... ...καὶ Τιμασαγόρου – Βασιλείδου καὶ Θέσπιδος, ὧν Ἀκουστὴς μὲν ἐνιαυτόν ¬ Ἐσχόλασε δὲ πάλιν βασιλείδῃ καὶ Θέσπιδι μῆνας ἕξ.

...of the philosophers... ...and of Timasagoras – of Basileides and of Thespis, [*he was*] a Student of them for a year ¬ and He studied again with Basileides and Thespis for six months.

[Assante] ...among the philosophers... and Timasagoras, Basileides, and Thespis: having listened to them for a year, he was then again a pupil of Basileides and Thespis for six months.

Συνέτυχεν δὲ καὶ Ἰολάῳ μέχρι εἰς ποσὸν χρόνον καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις...

He also met with Iolaus [*grandfather of the Antiphanes*] for some time and with many other philosophers...

[Assante] He later also met Iolaus for a certain period and many other philosophers...

[Assante] Timasagoras is associated with Nikasikrates of Rhodes and is mentioned only by Philodemus – and always in a polemical tone. It is therefore plausible (as Philippson argued) that he was a dissident Epicurean, at odds with the official line represented in Athens by Basileides and Thespis.

The mention of Timasagoras immediately before Basileides and Thespis does not necessarily reflect complete ideological association, but rather a "geographical" and "occasional" one – that is, tied to the period of education Philonides spent in Athens, during which he had the opportunity to encounter and engage with various schools of thought, even those opposed to one another.

Such an observation by the biographer is certainly in keeping with his encomiastic intent: the aim is to emphasize how Philonides ultimately arrived at Epicurean belief.

[Assante] *Nothing certain can be said about Iolaus, besides the fact that the was the grandfather of the Antiphanes, also mentioned in this biography. It is not to be ruled out that Iolaus was himself an Epicurean philosopher.*

The overall sense of this section would be as follows: just as, after hearing first Eudemos and then Dionysodorus among the 'mathematicians,' Philonides chose to adopt the principles of the latter (presumably in the scientific sphere), openly declaring himself his disciple – so too, in the same way, only after interacting over the span of a year with various philosophers (who, though belonging to different currents of thought, must have circulated in Athens at the same time), did he incline toward the official line of the Epicurean school, deciding to attend the lectures of Basileides and Thespis as a student (no longer merely as a listener) for another six months.

In both the case of the mathematicians and the philosophers, it seems the intention is to allude to a kind of preliminary survey of the different schools by Philonides before making a more deliberate and conscious choice.

9. Joined the School, Multitude of Philologists

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 12

...ἀνέβαιν' ἔτου[ς τοῦ] αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνέβαιν' ἐς [σχο]λ̣ὴν ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυ[του] φ̣ι̣λο[λόγ]ων πλῆθος, ὧ̣[ν προσ]ώ̣πω<ι> [μό]ν̣ον διαλλάσσ[ει]. Ὁ δὲ ἐ[ξῆς] τῆς σχολῆς περ̣[ιέχ]εσ[θαι] ἤδη κ̣αὶ. προ{σ}κ[οπὴ]ν̣ [μεγίστ]ην ποι[εῖσθαι]...

...Ἀνέβαιν' ἔτους τοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Ἀνέβαιν' εἰς σχολὴν, ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ φιλολόγων πλῆθος – ὧν προσώπῳ μόνον Διαλλάσσει.

...[*Philonides*] advanced in that same year and advanced into the school [*of Basileides and Thespis*], having with him a multitude of philologists [*i.e., lovers of reasoning*] – from whom He differed only in appearance.

[Assante] ...[*Philonides*] ascended in the same year and went up to the residence with a retinue of knowledge-lovers, from whom he differed only in manner.

Ὁ δὲ, ἐξῆς, τῆς σχολῆς περιέχεσθαι ἤδη καὶ προσκοπὴν μεγίστην ποιεῖσθαι...

but He, from that point on, [*said that he*] was enthralled with the school already and was making it his greatest consideration... [*sc. f. with the Epicureans Basileides and Thespis*]

[Assante] He then [*sought*] regularly to stay in contact with the school and to make very great progress...

[Assante] *It seems to me that the subject remains Philonides, and that this still concerns Philonides' period of training in Athens.*

I have preferred to translate [**αὐλ**]**ὴν** *(correction for* [**σχο**]**λὴν***) generically as "residence," though I believe it referred to an open space – some kind of courtyard within a building, used as the location of a philosophical school (perhaps specifically the Athenian school of Basiliedes and Thespis).*

*Rather than "philosophers" (***φιλοσοφοῖ***), the reference seems to be to "philologists" (***φιλόλογοι***), in the positive sense of the term. I believe the reference is to the other students who, like Philonides, regularly came to attend the lectures in large numbers.*

The term **σχολὴ** *here clearly means "philosophical school," while elsewhere it appears in the plural to refer to "lessons."*

10. Eighth Book On Nature, Geometry of the Minima

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 13, 14 (29)

...διαστικ[ὰ]... ...[ποι]κίλα. Καὶ γὰρ πρὸ[ς τους δο]ξάζοντας διεν̣[έγ]κα̣[ι πο.]κίλως γεωμετρίας δ[ια]λεκτικ[ὴν] ῥήτορας δ̣[υσφ]η[μεῖ]... ...[φ.λ]ο̣νικοῦν̣[τ]ες... ...[λ]ε̣λ̣υ̣κέναι ὑπὲρ... ...[δε τοῦ ὀγ]δόου περὶ φύσεως καὶ ἄλλας παντοδα|πὰς εἰς τὰ

δόγματ' α[ύτοῦ] γεωμετρικὰς περὶ ἐλα[χίσ]του πολλάς. Πεπόηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους καὶ [τ]ὰς ἐπιτομὰς τ[ῶν]

ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρ[ου,] Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου καὶ τῶν σ[υνηγ]μέ[νω]ν κατὰ γένος ἐπ[ι]στο[λῶν]...

...διαστικὰ... ...ποίκιλα. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς δοξάζοντας διενέγκαι ποικίλως: γεωμετρίας, διαλεκτικὴν, ῥήτορας Δυσφημεῖ· ...Φιλόνικούντες... ...Λελυκέναι ὑπὲρ... ...δὲ τοῦ ὀγδόου *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἄλλας παντοδαπὰς εἰς τὰ δόγματα αὐτοῦ – γεωμετρικὰς, περὶ ἐλαχίστου πολλάς.

> ...punctuated... ...diverse things. for indeed, to respond to those who holding opinions in various ways: [*Philonides*] is disparaging of geometry, dialectic, rhetors... ...Quarrelers... ...He had refuted on behalf of... ...and of [*Epicurus'*] eighth *On Nature* and many other assorted ones among his doctrines – many of them related to geometry, concerning the minimum.
>
> [Assante] ...various kinds. And in fact, he debated with the rhetoricians who believe that dialectic... in various respects... geometry... then to [*Epicurus'*] eighth book *On Nature* and many other works of various kinds according to his geometrical principles concerning the minimum.

Πεπόηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους – καὶ τὰς ἐπιτομὰς τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρου, Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου, καὶ τῶν συνηγμένων κατὰ γένος ἐπιστολῶν...

> He produced useful works for idle youths – including abridgments of the letters of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, Hermarchus, and [*abridgments*] of those letters collected by type...
>
> [Assante] He also composed epitomes – useful for lazy youths – of the letters of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus, Hermarchus, and the letters... by type...

[Sedley] Philonides is said by his anonymous biographer in PHerc. 1044 to have solved [difficulties] concerning [Epicurus'] On Nature Book VIII, and various others relating to his doctrines, and many geometrical ones concerning the minimal unit.

[Assante] Overall it seems that the biographer repeatedly refers to his activity as a writer. I would connect this textual section to the contribution Philonides made to the exegesis and dissemination of the work of Epicurus and his disciples, always with particular attention to the scientific field.

It seems reasonable to me that the biographer was referring generically to Philonides' writings, which were useful for communicative purposes and varied in content.

[Assante] Reference is made to Philonides' exegetical work on the canonical text of Epicurus and more generally to scientific topics – notably, the doctrine of "minima."

This also confirms an interesting reference to Book 8 of Epicurus' On Nature, a book not attested elsewhere – but likely (like Book 6) to have dealt with physics, assuming the work was divided into the usual three sections: physics, logic, and ethics.

This is followed by the biographer alluding to the epitomes composed by Philonides of the letters of the **Καθηγεμόνες** *(Epicurean Scholarchs).*

The main issue concerns the meaning of the term **ἐπιτομή** *(epitomē) in this specific context. In the Epicurean school, the epistle was already considered a kind of didactic-compendious form, designed to transmit key doctrines concisely and accessibly. It is therefore strange that Philonides would feel the need to create summaries of texts already so 'condensed,' unless we interpret the* **ἐπιτομαί** *as "excerpts from letters" or "selections"*

We also have here the use of the adjective **ὠφέλιμος** *(useful) again in reference to the writings of Philonides, whose usefulness for future generations is emphasized above all – once again within a eulogistic framework aimed at highlighting the profound and lasting contribution made by the philosopher to the dissemination of the Epicurean creed.*

11. Artemon the Epicurean & the Establishment of the Laodicean School

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 33

...{προστίθησ[ιν] ὅτι} ἠχαρίστησεν Ἀρτέμ[ω]νι τῶι καθηγητεῖ κα[ὶ] σ[υνεσ]τήσατο ἐ[ν] τ[ῆι] αὐτῆ[ι] πόλ[ει σ]χολὴν [ἐ]πί κ[α]ταλύσει τοῦ κ[αθηγητοῦ]... ...Καὶ Φιλωνί[δης]... ...δ' ὅλου βυ[βλίου]...

...Προστίθησιν ὅτι Ἠχαρίστησεν Ἀρτέμωνι, τῷ καθηγητῇ, καὶ Συνεστήσατο ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει σχολὴν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ καθηγητοῦ... ...καὶ Φιλωνίδης... ...δ' ὅλου βιβλίου...

> ...He adds that He 'expressed gratitude' to [*the Epicurean*] Artemon, his teacher, and He established in the same city a school for the [*forced*] retirement of the teacher... ...and Philonides... ...of an entire book...
>
> [Assante] ...he adds that he was ungrateful toward his teacher Artemon and established a school in the same city to the ruin of the teacher...

[Assante] This concerns the relationship between Philonides one of his earliest teachers, the Epicurean Artemon "of Laodicea." From the text, it appears that Philonides may not have shown gratitude to his former teacher – instead founding a rival school in the same city.

12. Seleucus IV Philopator friendly with Philonides

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 6 | 6a

...περιπλεκῆναι δι[α][να]στάντα(*) καὶ τὰς ἀλλήλ[ω]ν προσεκτίθεται φιλοφροσύνας. γέγονε δὴ φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ Φιλοπ|άτωρ ἦν εὐ... ...[Φι]λωνίδ[ης]...

[Gallo] ...π[ω]ς ἐκτιθέ[ναι... ...μνη]μο[σύνας... ...Ἔστιν δὴ] φανερὸν ὅτ[ι ἐπεὶ ὁ Φιλοπ]άτωρ ἦν ε[ὐνούστατος Φι]λωνίδ[ει]...



...περιπλεκῆναι διαστάντα, καὶ τὰς ἀλλήλων Προσεκτίθεται φιλοφροσύνας. Γέγονε δὴ φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ Φιλοπάτωρ ἦν εὐνούστατος Φιλωνίδει...

> ...to have become entangled after parting ways, and He extended mutual courtesies. so It has become clearly evident that even [*Seleucus IV*] Philopator was very well-disposed toward Philonides...
>
> [Nicolardi] ...to read the memorandae [**μνημοσύνας**] publicly. It is clear that since [*Seleucus*] Philopator was most friendly towards Philonides...
>
> [Assante] ...reciprocally... to express... ...it is evident that Philonides was also justly affectionate toward his father.

[Nicolardi] Gera's new interpretation was essentially based on the adjective **φιλοπάτωρ***, which he did not read as a reference to Philonides and his relationship with his father, with Crönert and Gallo, but which he rather capitalized and understood as the epithet of the king Seleucus IV.*

13. Letter of Recommendation to Heliodorus of Antioch

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 20 fin., 21

...{κατὰ τὰ [τῆς ἡμέ]ρας ἐσχάτης} [τὴν ἡμ]έραν ὅλην ἔμ[εινε]. Καὶ τῶν [συμ]βιούντων [παρα]γενόμεν[ος]... ...Ἡλιόδωρε, ὡς ἀπὸ τύχης, γενναῖον καὶ ἄπλαστο[ν τὸ] πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἦθος [καὶ] ἱλαρότητος τῆς πρὸ[ς πάντας] <μετα>ποι<ού>μενον... ...[δελ]φῶι ον... ...ἀκριβοῦ[ν]... ...[Δικαι]άρχου τραχύ[τητα]... ...βασιλέω[ς]... ...βασιλεῖ... ...[Χρησιμώ]τατος δ' ἐκεῖνος ἦν, [οὐκ ἐ]πινοητὴν ἔχω[ν τὴν φύσιν]...

"...κατὰ τὰ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐσχάτης τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην Ἔμεινε. καὶ τῶν συμβιούντων παραγενόμενος... ...Ἡλιόδωρε, ὡς ἀπὸ τύχης, γενναῖον καὶ ἄπλαστον τὸ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους Ἦθος – καὶ ἱλαρότητος τῆς πρὸς πάντας μεταποιούμενο... ...ἀκριβοῦν... ...Δικαιάρχου τραχύτητα... ...βασιλέως... ...βασιλεῖ... ...χρησιμώτατος δ' Ἐκεῖνος ἦν ¬ οὐκ ἐπινοητὴν ἔχων τὴν φύσιν..."

"...as concerns the last day, He stayed the whole day. and being present among those living with him... ...Oh Heliodorus, as if by chance, his Disposition toward his friends was noble and unfeigned – being transformed with cheerfulness toward everyone... ...to make precise... ...the harshness of Dicaearchus... ...of the king... ...to the king... ...and that Man [*i.e., Philonides*] was most useful ¬ having a nature not contrived [*lit. 'overthought'*]..."

[Assante] "...during the events of the last day... ...the whole day... ...and of those who lived with him... {Heliodorus, as it happened, [had] a generous and sincere character toward his friends...} ...harshness of Dicaearchus... ...of the king... ...to the king... ...this man was extremely useful, not having a speculative nature..."

Heliodorus of Antioch (fl.c. 175 BCE) was a treasurer of Seleucus IV Philopator. Due to his efforts related to the 2nd temple, he is mentioned as a villain in 2 Maccabees and (alluded to) in the Book of Daniel.

[Assante] We are informed by Appian (Syr. VIII 45) of the episode in which Seleucus IV Philopator was assassinated by Heliodorus of Antioch, who had vainly attempted to seize power on behalf of Seleucus IV's young son, the future Demetrius I Soter – a plan that failed due to the ascension of the king's brother, Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Heliodorus would later be readmitted to the Syrian court and was eventually reintegrated politically.

Possibly the biographer is quoting a letter addressed to Heliodorus of Antioch, in which the amiable character of Philonides was praised. I would think the author of the letter must have been a political figure of some importance – perhaps even a king.

[Assante] It seems plausible that this section alludes to the practical character of Philonides' younger brother, Dicaearchus, who was not at all inclined toward speculative activity, but was undoubtedly of great help in other affairs – especially if, as suggested, a comparison between the two brothers follows shortly after, highlighting their contrasting traits: the gentleness of one and the harshness of the other.

14. Heliodorus removed from Seleucid Court

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 28.1,

...α̣ὐ̣τ̣ο̣ῦ̣ Ἡ̣λ̣ι̣ό̣δωρον ἀποξε[νο]λ̣ο̣γ̣ή̣σ̣αντα καὶ συναπά[ραντα]...

...αὐτοῦ Ἡλιόδωρον, ἀποξενολογήσαντα καὶ συναπάραντα...

...with him Heliodorus [*of Antioch*], having been denounced as a stranger and carried off along...

[Assante] ...of him... Heliodorus, who completed the enlistment and departed together...

[Assante] The minister of Seleucus IV Philopator already mentioned in the biography. Here, his identification with the political figure known from historical sources seems secure, since the passage alludes to a military action, presumably in some way involving Philonides himself.

[Philippson] Philonides may have dissuaded Seleucus IV Philopator's military commander (to whom **αὐτοῦ** *above would refer) from recruiting Carian mercenaries near Kaunos.*

15. Antiochus IV Epiphanes the Epicurean, 125 Brief Synopses of Philonides

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[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 30

...τοῦ Ἐπιφανοῦς ἠλλοτριωμένου πρὸς τὴ[ν] αἵρεσιν, Φιλωνίδης αὐτὸ[ν] αἱρετιστ̣ὴν τῶν λόγων ἐ̣π̣όησεν, συντ̣ά̣γματα ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι πέντε ἐκδεδω̣[κώς, καὶ ἐνί]ους ὑπομνημ[ατισμ]ο̣ὺς [τοῖ]ς γνωρίμο̣[ις ἀπέλι]π̣ε. Διὰ <δὲ> τὴν ἑαυτο̣[ῦ χρηστ]ό̣τητα θράσει...

...τοῦ Ἐπιφανοῦς ἠλλοτριωμένου πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν – Φιλωνίδης αὐτὸν αἱρετιστὴν τῶν λόγων ἐποίησεν – συντάγματα ἑκατὸν-εἴκοσι-πέντε ἐκδεδωκώς, καὶ ἐνίους ὑπομνηματισμοὺς τοῖς γνωρίμοις ἀπέλιπε. διὰ δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρηστότητα θράσει...

> ...when [*Antiochus IV*] Epiphanes had turned away from the choice [*sect, i.e. the Epicurean School*] – Philonides made him [*i.e., Epiphanes*] one who chooses [*i.e., an Epicurean*] in thinking – having published 125 treatises, and left behind some commentaries for his acquaintances. and because of his own goodness, with boldness...
>
> [Assante] ...while [*Antiochus IV*] Epiphanes had been hostile to the school, Philonides persuaded him to embrace the doctrine, having published one hundred twenty-five works, and he also left some note-books for his students out of his benevolence... with courage...

[Assante] *These lines mention King Antiochus IV's early reluctance toward Epicurean doctrine – an attitude he later overcame thanks to the philosopher's persuasive efforts and the many writings Philonides produced, which had already been referenced several times in earlier columns.*

[Assante] *As for the philosopher's 125 works – since this statement is independent within the larger list of the philosopher's merits, there's no need to assume the unlikely claim that his entire corpus was completed by the end of Antiochus IV's reign (164 BCE).*

These student notebooks may be connected in some way to Philonides' epitomes of the letters of the masters – both aimed at a fast, condensed learning style suited to the intellectual demands of the era.

16. Philonides writes about Epiphanes

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 29 | 32

...{[Ἀν]τιφάνη[ς] / Ἐπιφανῆ} βασι]λέα Φιλωṿίδου γράψανṭος ἐν οἷς παρεθέμεθα πρότερον ὑπὸ... | {...*καὶ πέπερι μόνον*}

Δ[ι]ονυσοδώρου, παῖδα ὄντα τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἐστοιχειῶσθαι, ὃν πιστεύω μὴ ἠλλοτριῶσθαι πρ[ὸς] τὴν αἵρεσιν. Εἰ δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ

Φιλωνίδου ṗαρη[τ]ημέ[νο]ν ὅπως μὴ διαφ[θείροι τὴν] Λαọδ[ί]κειαṿ...

...Ἐπιφανῆ βασιλέα, Φιλωνίδου γράψαντος, ἐν οἷς Παρεθέμεθα πρότερον – ὑπὸ Διονυσοδώρου παῖδα ὄντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐστοιχειῶσθαι – ὃν Πιστεύω μὴ ἠλλοτριῶσθαι πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν.

> ...King [*Antiochus IV*] Epiphanes, as written by Philonides, in the [*passages*] We previously set forth – was given elementary instruction by [*the Epicurean*] Dionysodorus while still a child in age – [and] whom I believe was not alienated from the choice [*sect, i.e. the Epicurean School*].
>
> [Assante] ...the King [*Antiochus IV*] Epiphanes, as Philonides wrote, in the passages we cited earlier, had learned the basic teachings from Dionysodorus when he was still a boy – whom [*i.e., Epiphanes*] I am convinced was not hostile to the school...

εἰ δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ Φιλωνίδου παρητημένον, ὅπως μὴ Διαφθείροι τὴν Λαοδίκειαν...

> but if the one who was advised by Philonides, so that He [*f. Demetrius I Soter*] might not fully ruin Laodicea...
>
> [Assante] If he was the one who was implored by Philonides not to destroy Laodicea...

Assante] *The information about Antiochus IV is presented by the biographer as a direct testimony of Philonides – confirming that many details in the biography were supported by direct quotes (mostly epistolary excerpts, it seems) or indirect references to his writings.*

[Assante] *King Antiochus IV may not have been so hostile to the Epicurean school after all. As the biographer himself remarks, Antiochus, in his youth, had been a student of Dionysodorus, as attested by Philonides, thus by the most credible source the author could cite. Dionysodorus son of Dionysodorus, of Caunus is also mentioned in this biography.*

Though the chronology of Philonides remains quite uncertain, it seems plausible that he was significantly younger than Antiochus IV – especially if his peak is placed under Demetrius I.

Therefore, rather than positing a shared teacher (considering that the king is said to have been "a child in age"), I would suggest that Antiochus IV had studied under "Dionysiodorus the Elder" (likely the one from Caunus) – while Philonides studied under "Dionysiodorus the Younger" (possibly the mathematician mentioned in other sources)

In any case, whether it refers to one Dionysiodorus or the other, this passage confirms that his teaching aligned with Epicurean doctrine, which also explains his frequent appearance in the biography.

This passage confirms that Antiochus IV was once a pupil of Dionysiodorus (likely the elder of Caunus), and this fact is used by the biographer to support the idea that the king was not truly hostile toward the Epicurean school.

[Assante] *Another issue arises the "one who was advised by Philonides" which refers to a king being implored by Philonides not to destroy Laodicea. According to Gallo, this was almost certainly Demetrius I.*

17. Demetrius I Soter & The Romans

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 9

...Δημ[ήτριον]... ...Ῥωμα[ι]ọ[υ]ς, Ἀντιόχου [Σε]λεύκου δ[θ]έλοντος αὐṭὴν ἀνάστ[α]ṭον ποιεῖν, ὑπουργ[ί]ας ἐξαισịου...

...Δημήτριον... ...Ῥωμαίους, Ἀντιόχου Σελεύκου δὲ θέλοντος αὐτὴν ἀνάστατον ποιεῖν, ὑπουργίας ἐξαισίας...

> ..Demetrius [*I Soter*]... ...the Romans, while Antiochus [*son*] of Seleucus [*IV Philopator*] wished to render her [*i.e., Laodicea*] destroyed, through extraordinary assistance...
>
> [Assante] ...Romans... Antiochus... Seleucus... wanting to destroy it... ...of an extraordinary service...

When Seleucus IV Philopator was assassinated (175 BCE), Demetrius I Soter (Seleucus' older son) was a political prisoner in Rome, so Antiochus (Seleucus' younger son) was proclaimed king – with Heliodorus a regent.

Antiochus IV Epiphanes (Seleucus' brother) soon arrived in Syria and proclaimed himself a co-ruler with Antiochus. Therefore, the "wishes of Antiochus [son] *of Seleucus" probably refers to the policy of Heliodorus or* [more likely] *Antiochus IV which were in effect before the policies of Demetrius I Soter.*

[Assante] *The reference to a destruction of a city may align with events following the assassination of Gnaeus Octavius (c. 163 BCE).*

Octavius was sent (with two colleagues, Spurius Lucretius and Lucius Aurelius) as both an ambassador to uphold the Peace of Apamea and as an enforcer of Roman dominance on the weakened Seleucid regime. In this capacity, Octavius had the Syrian war elephants hamstrung and the Seleucid fleet set on fire, actions carried out under the pretext of enforcing the treaty.

Octavius' destruction of the war elephants and fleet – allowed by Lysias, then regent for the young Antiochus V Eupator (son of Antiochus IV Epiphanes) to keep his peace with Rome – sparked outrage in Syria and prompted Octavius' assassination (by a man named Leptines) in Laodicea.

The attempt by Lysias to promptly offer the king's apologies in hope of a painless reconciliation proved futile.

Soon after (162 BCE), Demetrius I Soter ascended the throne; after eliminating both his cousin Antiochus V and Lysias, he sought to win Roman favor by handing over Octavius' murderer and ordering the destruction of Laodicea.

It can be most confidently hypothesized is that Philonides had interceded with the king to prevent the destruction of his native city – a mission undertaken by the philosopher in that emergency situation.

18. Ambassadors of Demetrius I Soter

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 56.1

…ὑμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ ἀποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέ[ως] {Δημητρίο[υ]}…

…ὑμῖν οἱ Πρέσβεις οἱ ἀποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Βασιλέως Δημητρίου…

…the Ambassadors sent off to you all by King Demetrius [*I Soter*]…

[Assante] …to you, the ambassadors sent by King Demetrius…

[Assante] Philonides lived under the reign of five or six different kings of Syria: from Antiochus III the Great (r. 223 – ob. 187 BCE) to Demetrius I Soter (r. 162 – ob. 150 BCE), and perhaps even under one of his two successors (Alexander Balas and Demetrius II).

Philonides seems to have carried out political and diplomatic activity on behalf of Antiochus IV – activity which certainly continued under Demetrius I Soter.

19. Diplomacy. Diogenes of Babylon, Embassy

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 53

…ὁμοδόξ[ο]ις τε καὶ ἀ[π' ἄ]λλων ἀ[νδρ]ῶν, ὑφ' ὧν ἀποδοχῆς [ἔ]τυχε πάντω[ν,] ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτευόν[των μάλιστα τιμᾶ]σθαι, καθάπερ φασὶ καὶ ὑπὸ Διογένους τοῦ Βα[βυλωνίου]…

…ὁμοδόξοις τε καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλων ἀνδρῶν, ὑφ' ὧν ἀποδοχῆς Ἔτυχε πάντων: ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτευόντων μάλιστα τιμᾶσθαι – καθάπερ Φασὶ καὶ ὑπὸ Διογένους τοῦ Βαβυλωνίου…

…with those of the same opinion and also from other men, by all of whom He was received with approval: so as to be especially honored even by the magistrates – just as They say [*he was also honored*] also by [*the Stoic Scholarch*] Diogenes of Babylon…

[Assante] …[*among the*] companions in doctrine and also from other people, from all of whom he is said to have received a warm welcome – so much so that he was exceptionally honored even by political men, as they say, even by Diogenes of Babylon...

We learn here that Philonides enjoyed excellent reputation among fellow Epicureans, political figures, and even intellectuals opposed to Epicureanism. We know from inscriptions that he was also given Athenian citizenship and honors.

[Assante] *There is no doubt that this refers to the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (fl.c. 190 BCE), mentioned here more for his political activity than his philosophical one. Diogenes of Babylon was scholarch of the Stoic school in Athens and part of the embassy to Rome (155 BCE).*

This biography also mentions Carneades (fl. 174 BCE), the scholarch of the Academy, and another one of three philosophers sent to Rome.

The Peripatetic Critolaus was the final member. The Epicureans were excluded from the embassy. The association of the Epicurean Philonides with thinkers from rival schools is not without significance.

Alongside the clear diplomatic and negotiating talents of Philonides, which must have earned him widespread respect and admiration, it is possible there was some "transformation of the original attitude of hostility and polemic between competing and rival philosophical schools." [Gallo]

20. Mission, Counsel, and Difficulty

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 62, 16

...μη π̣ε̣[ρὶ] ὧ̣ν δεησόμ[ε]νος ὑπὸ Λαοδικέων ἐξαπέσταλται, περὶ ὧ[ν αὐ]τὸς συμβ̣ουλεύ̣σων παραγέγονεν· μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶι γεγονέναι λυπερότερ̣ον το<ῦ> τοιοῦτον εὑρῆσθαι πρὸς ἔντευξιν πρόσωπ[ον, δ]ιὰ τὸ τιμᾶν μέν, ἀ[λλὰ] μηδὲν ἧ̣σ̣σ̣ον πατρ{ὸς\ῳως}...

...μὴ περὶ ὧν δεησόμενος ὑπὸ Λαοδικέων Ἐξαπέσταλται ¬ ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν Αὐτὸς συμβουλεύσων παραγέγονεν·

> ...not concerning those [*issues*] which He was sent by the Laodiceans after a request ¬ but about those [*issues*] which He had come intending to give advice.
>
> [Assante] ...not [matters] about which he was sent by the Laodiceans to make requests, [but] about which he himself took the initiative to offer advice.

[Assante] *A contrast between being prompted by the Laodiceans, who – as in past cases – must have "brought forward" Philonides, as if playing their winning card (hence the figurative sense of (**ἐξαποστέλλω**) vs. being promoted on his own initiative.*

Μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γεγονέναι λυπερότερον τοῦ τοιοῦτον εὑρῆσθαι πρὸς ἔντευξιν πρόσωπον – διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν μέν ¬ ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἧσσον πατρῴως...

> for Nothing had happened to him more grievous than to have found such a person for an audience – because he respected [*him*] ¬ yet who nonetheless in a fatherly [*way*]...
>
> [Assante] In fact, nothing had been more painful for him than finding himself face to face with such a person for the meeting, since he honored him no less than a father...

[Assante] *In continuity with being sent by his fellow citizens on a diplomatic mission, this passage alludes to the active involvement of Philonides in resolving the issue at hand (which remains unknown to us), as well as to a very painful – or at least embarrassing – episode: an unexpected encounter with a rather prominent figure, very dear to Philonides, who happened to be there as a "negotiator" himself.*

21. "They Struggle Against, We Examine Together"

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 63, 52a

...ἀγωνί[ζον]ται. Ἀνάπαλιν μὲν σ̣υ̣ζητῶ... ...αὐτοῦ τῆ[ς] Λαοδικείας ἐπιστα<τ>ευθείς, ἧς κ[αὶ]...

"...Ἀγωνίζονται ¬ ἀνάπαλιν, μὲν Συζητῶ... ...αὐτοῦ τῆς Λαοδικείας ἐπιστατευθείς, ἧς καὶ..."

> "...They contend ¬ on the contrary, I am examining with... ...having been called into service in Laodicea itself, of which also..."

[Assante] "...they struggle. By contrast, I seek together how to..."

[Assante] *It is plausible to think that even in this brief surviving fragment, the biographer, fully in line with the encomiastic aim of his work, once again included an autobiographical insert (as suggested by the use of the first-person singular:* **Συζητῶ**) *to highlight the philosopher's balance and wisdom in knowing how to assess the best behaviors to adopt in difficult circumstances:*

*While others were likely busy quarreling (***Ἀγωνίζεσθαι***) to impose one opinion or another, without leaving room for constructive dialogue, Philonides himself proposed an alternative path – the only one universally valid – that of seeking together (***συζητεῖν***) the solution, in line with a practice already well-tested in Epicurus' time.*

His political activity, far from being an expression of impatience with the genuine teachings of the master, should be understood as consistent with the same lifestyle, appearing as a natural continuation of philosophical practice.

In this sense, it is easy to suppose that, alongside the inevitable diachronic evolution of any philosophical thought, Epicurean doctrine reached its fullest development in political realms thanks to the efforts of exceptional adherents like Philonides – undoubtedly a prominent figure, deemed worthy of being the sole protagonist of an encomiastic biography.

22. Full Collection of Epicurus' Books

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 65, 66

..αὐ̣τ̣ὰ̣ς [ἔοι]κεν ὁ πεποηκὼς παρε[ι]λῆφθαι χάριν τοῦ κοσ[μίου]... ...σπουδ[ὴν ἔχων τῆς] συ̣[να]γωγῆς τῶν Ἐπ[ι]κού[ρο]υ̣ βυβλίων, ὑπὲρ ἧ̣ς καὶ...

...αὐτὰς ἔοικεν Ὁ πεποιηκὼς παρειλῆφθαι χάριν τοῦ κοσμίου... ...ἔχων τῆς συναγωγῆς τῶν Ἐπικούρου βιβλίων – ὑπὲρ ἧς, καὶ...

...He who made them seems to have received them for the sake of decorum... ...with possession of the collection of Epicurus' books – on account of which, also...

[Assante] ...he persuaded... ...even if... ...the author seems to have undertaken them for... ...having care for the collection of the books of Epicurus, for which also...

[Assante] *The small portion of text preserved in this column contains an interesting reference to the collection of Epicurus' books – which, according to Diogenes Laertius X 26, must have exceeded 300 scrolls.*

23. Epicurean Community at the Seleucid Palace in Antioch

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 19 fin. part 1

...φιλοσοφίας [ἕ]νεκα συ[νε]ζητηκότων εὐδοκητῶς. Ἡ διατριβὴ δ' ἦν ἐ̣ν [ταύτῆ]ι̣ ἀντὶ τῶν βασιλείων οἰκίαν κατὰ...
...[βα]σ̣ιλέως...

...φιλοσοφίας ἕνεκα συνεζητηκότων εὐδοκητῶς. ἡ̣ δὲ Διατριβὴ ἦν ἐν ταύτῃ, ἀντὶ τῶν βασιλείων – οἰκίαν κατὰ...

...with them having discussed together for the sake of philosophy with goodwill. the Time spent [*i.e., their residence*] was in the same [*building*], across from the palace – a house according to...

[Assante] ...of those who, out of love for philosophy, carried out shared investigations in a manner worthy of approval. The discussion took place in... a house located across from the royal residence...

[Assante] The biographer returns to the idea of shared practiced by Philonides and his disciples – among whom, it seems, King Demetrius I Soter stood out for his natural inclination toward philosophical practice. The notion of a school, organized with the king's support right near the royal residence, appears confirmed by what is written later, where the author seems to deliberately return to what must have been one of the central themes of the biography, namely the relationship between philosophy and power.

24. Success with King Demetrius I Soter

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 19 fin. part 2 | 20 sup

...[βα]σιλέως... ...κατὰ φιλο[σοφίαν]... διαρθρώσας... ...δ' εἰς τὴν τ[οῦ] ἤθους χρηστότητα παραινέσας καὶ τὸ | πρόθυμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκτενὲς ἀποδεξ[ά]μενος... ...κατὰ τὰ [τῆς ἡμέ]ρας ἐσχά[της]... ...ὡς ἂν ἑνὸς τῶ[ν] μάλιστα ἐμπαθέστατα [π]αρεστηκότων πρὸς φιλ[οσ]οφίαν· καὶ ἑαυτὸν νεανικῶν ἀπελύετο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν οὔτ[ε] συνεδρείας ἧστινος οὖν οὔ[τε συ]μβουλῆς <ἐνδεὴς> ἦν, τῆς [δ' αὐτῆ]ς ἡμερότ[ητος], κα[ὶ] ἅ[τιν]α γίνοιτ' α[ὐτ]ῶι συνεργῶ[ι ἐχρῆτο]...

...βασιλέως... ...κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν διαρθρώσας...

...of the king... ...having structured it according to philosophy...

...ἔπειτα δὲ, εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους χρηστότητα παραινέσας – καὶ τὸ πρόθυμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκτενὲς ἀποδεξάμενος... ...ὡς ἂν Ἑνὸς τῶν μάλιστα ἐμπαθέστατα παρεστηκότων πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν·

...then, having urged [*him*] into kindness of disposition – and having welcomed his eagerness and friendly [*character*]... ...as though [*he was*] One of those who had stood most passionately near to philosophy.

[Assante] ...to encourage other things toward kindness of character, welcoming both his eagerness and his zeal, as one of those who had turned to philosophy with extreme passion.

καὶ ἑαυτὸν νεανικῶν Ἀπελύετο – καὶ Αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν· οὔτε συνεδρείας ἧστινος οὖν οὔτε συμβουλῆς ἐνδεὴς Ἦν ¬ τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἡμερότητος, καὶ ἅτινα γίνοιτο αὐτῷ συνεργῷ Ἐχρῆτο...

He released himself from youthful concerns – and He himself [*turned*] to the care of the body. He was lacking neither a gathering of any kind nor in advice ¬ but [*sharing*] in that same gentleness, He also employed whatever could be of use for him...

[Assante] and he freed himself from youthful impulses and, as for bodily care, he himself had no need of any kind of consultation nor ever of advice, but of... gentleness... collaborator...

*[Assante] Here, the biographer likely shifts focus to the personality of Demetrius I Soter , one of the central figures of the work, who appears repeatedly to testify to the philosopher's success in attracting new adherents to the school, even of considerable importance. It is therefore possible to suppose a change of subject, where the one "freeing himself from youthful impulses (**ἑαυτὸν νεανικῶν Ἀπελύετο**)" would be none other than Demetrius I Soter, to whom the "his eagerness (**τὸ πρόθυμον αὐτοῦ**)" and "he himself" (**Αὐτὸς**)" all refer.*

25. "Preservation of A Free Man Zealous for Philosophy"

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 23

...[τ]αῖς ἀρεταῖς προστίθη[σιν, ἀλ]λ' ὑποστέλλεται μᾶλ[λον τ]ότε, εἰ διαμένει...

"...ταῖς ἀρεταῖς Προστίθησιν ¬ ἀλλ'Ὑποστέλλεται μᾶλλον τότε, εἰ Διαμένει..."

"...He adds to his virtues ¬ but He withdraws more at such times, if He remains..."

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 24 fin. | *fr. 22*

...ἐλε[υθ]έρου κ̣αὶ φ[ιλ]οσοφίαν ζηλοῦντος ἐπὶ σωτη[το]...ρίαν τ̣[οιούτων κακ]ῶν πο[λ]λῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν ἀπάντων ἀποσ̣[τ]ρα|φείη{ι}, ἀλλ' ούκ ἂν δέη<ι> καὶ πάσχειν τι δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν... ...σ̣υπ̣ενο̣ς τοῦ μάλιστ' ἀγαπωμένου τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ τῶν φίλων παραβάλοι ἂν ἑτοίμως τὸν τράχηλον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀποθανεῖν ἦν ἐμοὶ καθῆκον, πῶς ού καὶ τὸ ὑπὲ[ρ ἀ]ναγ[κ]α̣[ίου] μέλλ̣[ω;]... ...[Δι]καίαρχον ἔχω τ̣[ὸν ἀδελφ]όν· ού μάλα γὰρ...

"...ἐλευθέρου καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ζηλοῦντος: ἐπὶ σωτηρίαν, τοιούτων κακῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν ἀπάντων Ἀποστραφείηι ¬ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν Δέῃ καὶ πάσχειν τι δι' ἑαυτοῦ... ...τοῦ μάλιστ' ἀγαπωμένου τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ τῶν φίλων Παραβάλοι ἂν ἑτοίμως τὸν τράχηλον."

> "...of a free man and of one zealous for philosophy: for the sake of preservation, He would turn away from such great evils and nearly from all the others ¬ but It would not be fitting also to suffer something on one's own behalf... [*because*] ...He would readily risk his neck for that which is most dearly loved among obligations or among friends"
>
> [Assante] "[*in a manner worthy*] of a free man and one who ardently seeks philosophy for the sake of salvation, from many such evils and from nearly all others he would keep himself away but not (do so) if it were also necessary for him to suffer willingly, since (even) for a single relative or friend to whom he was deeply attached he would readily offer his neck."

"εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος Ἀποθανεῖν ἦν ἐμοὶ καθῆκον – πῶς οὐ καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀναγκαίου μέλλω; ...Δικαίαρχον ἔχω τὸν ἀδελφόν – οὐ μάλα γὰρ..."

> "for if to Die for the fatherland was a duty for me – how should I not also be ready [*to die*] for the sake of obligation? ...I have Dicaearchus as my brother – for not greatly..."
>
> [Assante] "If indeed it was my duty to die for my country, how could I not (die) for a relative?"

[Assante] I understood the overall meaning of the entire passage as follows: the good philosopher (or anyone aspiring to become one), for the sake of preservation, would avoid nearly every kind of harm – unless it became necessary to sacrifice himself voluntarily for the good of someone very dear to him. Indeed, for such a person, he would be willing even to give his life.

After all, asks Philonides – and here we certainly have another excerpt from a letter – if in other cases he deems it a duty to die for his homeland (a clear reference to his political-diplomatic activity on behalf of Laodicea, repeatedly recalled in earlier columns), how could he then shirk a moral obligation toward a relative?

26. Antiphanes

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 24 sup.

...{[εἰ γὰρ] ὑπ' αυτοῦ γέγραπ[ται πίστ[εωσς]} ἄξια τυγχάνε̣[ι, ὡς] οἱ π̣ερὶ τὸν Ἀντιφά̣νην [ἐκ]τ̣εθήκασ̣ι, πιστότερα νομ[ί]σ̣ειεν ἄν τις εἶναι τά γε π[λεῖ]σ̣τα τῶν περὶ ὅτου δήποτ' ε̣[ἰ]ρ̣ημένων. Κ̣αὶ γὰρ Ἀντιφάνην αὐτὸν [εἰ]κ̣ὸς [ῆ]ν καὶ πάππον ἔχοντα Ἰό̣[λαον] κατὰ φιλ[ο]σοφίαν κ̣αὶ [θαυ]μαστ[ῶς] ἀ[ποδεδεγμένον] καὶ...

...εἰ γὰρ ὑπ' αυτοῦ Γέγραπται, πίστεωσς ἄξια τυγχάνει – ὡς Οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀντιφάνην ἐκτεθήκασι: πιστότερα νομίσειεν ἄν Τις εἶναι τὰ γε πλεῖστα τῶν περὶ ὅτου δήποτ' εἰρημένων. καὶ γὰρ Ἀντιφάνην αὐτὸν, εἰκὸς Ἦν – καὶ πάππον ἔχοντα Ἰόλαον, κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ θαυμαστῶς ἀποδεδεγμένον, καὶ...

> ...for if It is written by him, it is worthy of trust – as Those around Antiphanes have recorded: One would consider most of the things said about whatever [*subject*] whatsoever more trustworthy. for Antiphanes himself, It was fitting – he, too, having Iolaus as a grandfather, in accordance with philosophy and wonderfully approved and...
>
> [Assante] ...[if indeed] it was written by him that these are trustworthy things, as the followers of Antiphanes have maintained, one might think that most of what is said on any subject is more believable. And in fact, it was natural that Antiphanes himself, also because he had Iolaus as a grandfather, who had been received according to philosophy and with full honors...

[Assante] *The first twelve lines of the column are largely preserved, providing a portion of text that is quite significant from an exegetical perspective, especially because the name "Antiphanes" appears twice.*

Philodemus, in his works, also polemicized against an "Antiphanes," along with Timasagoras, and Nikasikrates. these were dissident Epicureans, at odds with the mainstream school.

The official, more open-minded and public direction of the school – initiated in Athens by Basileides and Thespis (both confirmed to be among Philonides' teachers in this biography) – was later continued by Demetrius Lacon and Zeno of Sidon.

[Assante] *It is possible that this mentioned an encounter between Philonides and Antiphanes in positive terms, within the eulogistic tone of the biography – that is, aiming to highlight the philosopher's qualities of affability and diplomacy, being capable of maintaining cordial relations and exerting a certain charm even on unorthodox Epicureans (like Iolaus, Antiphanes, Timasagoras, and Nikasikrates) and on philosophers of other schools (like Diogenes of Babylon and Carneades).*

27. Friendly Community

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 25 fin.

...οἰκίας... ...τῶ̣ι̣ γυμνασί̣ω̣ι̣, ε̣ἰ̣ ν̣ὴ Δ̣ί̣[α]νῦν πάντες ο̣ἰκουμένω̣ν φίλοι καὶ κτήματος ἀξίου...

...οἰκίας... ...τῷ γυμνασίῳ – εἰ, νὴ Δία! νῦν Πάντες οἰκουμένων φίλοι καὶ κτήματος ἀξίου...

...of a house... ...at the gymnasium – yes, indeed by Zeus! now All of those inhabiting [*there*] are friends and [*it is*] of something worthy of possession...

[Assante] {...of the household... ...at the gymnasium... in which... ...all living together as friends and of a worthy good... ...he adds to the virtues, but yields especially then, if he persists...}

[Assante] *A house (**οἰκία**) and a gymnasium (**γυμνάσιον**) are mentioned, followed shortly by a reference to those who dwell there, likely in a communal context. It is plausible to think this concerns the location of Philonides' school and its members – topics that appear elsewhere in this biography.*

28. Living in the Court of Demetrius I Soter, Carneades

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 27

...ὁ βασιλεὺς Δημήτριος ἐχαρίσατο Φιλωνίδει, ἐφ' ᾧ συνδιατρίψει αὐτοῦ καὶ συ[σ]χολάσει. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις καλῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως καὶ ἐνδόξως ἀνεστράφη. Εἰς μὲν γὰρ συμβούλιον καὶ πρε̣σ̣β̣ε̣ί̣α̣ν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἀπ̣λ̣ῶ̣ς αὐ̣τ̣ὸν οὐκ ἔδωκεν...

...πάντων, Κ̣α̣ρ̣νεάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, πα[τρ]ίδι χρήσιμος ἐγένετο...

...ὁ Βασιλεὺς Δημήτριος ἐχαρίσατο Φιλωνίδῃ – ἐφ' ᾧ συνδιατρίψει αὐτοῦ καὶ σχολάσει. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις καλῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως καὶ ἐνδόξως ἀνεστράφη. εἰς μὲν γὰρ συμβούλιον καὶ πρεσβείαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁπλῶς αὑτὸν οὐκ Ἔδωκεν...

...King Demetrius [*I Soter*] granted [*favor*] to Philonides – so that [*Philonides*] would spend much time together with him and study ¬ but under these circumstances as well, [*Philonides*] conducted himself nobly, philosophically, and with distinction. He did not simply give himself over to council, embassy, and such matters...

[Assante] ...[a house that] King Demetrius offered to Philonides in his own interest, with the aim of attending his lessons there and becoming his disciple. But even in these circumstances, he conducted himself well – as a philosopher and with honor. In fact, he did not devote himself merely to duties as a counselor and ambassador and such things, but...

...πάντων – Καρνεάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων – πατρίδι χρήσιμος Ἐγένετο...

…among all – Carneades and among the others – He proved useful to his fatherland…

[Assante] …of all, of Carneades and the others, he was useful to the fatherland…

[Assante] This passage sees the biographer return to the positive relationship between Philonides and Demetrius I Soter. It appears the king offered Philonides a venue to conduct his teaching, and the philosopher – far from limiting himself to a diplomatic career – consistently demonstrated deep loyalty to Epicurean doctrine.

The "fatherland" here is probably Laodicea.

[Assante] I do not rule out that the preceding lacuna may have alluded to the good relationship between Carneades and Philonides – in keeping with the biographer's encomiastic tone, which had already emphasized how Philonides' natural affability and skill as a negotiator earned him prestige and fame at court.

These traits helped him win the favor of many prominent figures, including philosophers from other schools.

Carneades (fl. 174 BCE) was the scholarch of the Academy, and one of three philosophers sent to Rome in 155 BCE.

This biography also mentions Diogenes of Babylon (fl.c. 190 BCE), the scholarch of the Stoic school (who was another one of three philosophers sent with the same embassy).

29. Zenodorus, Athenian Aspiration

Zenodorus (fl. 160 BCE) was an astronomer, geometer, and engineer. He is known to have written a book On Isoperimetric Figures. He and Philonides were about the same age.

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 31

…γ' ἐλπιεῖν [τῆς ἀπο]δοχῆς εἰς Ἀθη[νᾶς ἐν]εγκεῖν ἀδυσκό[λως, ὠ]ς καὶ τὸν Ζηνόδω[ρο]ν αὐτὸν, ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἄστυ. Καὶ ἀπέθανεν δὲ [γ]ενναίως. Δήμ[η]τρος γὰρ ἑορτῆς οὔσ[η]ς… …ἐπεύχεσθαι ἐ[θέλ]ων μ[ὲ]ν [κ]ατ' οἶκον…

…γ' ἐλπιεῖν τῆς ἀποδοχῆς εἰς Ἀθῆνας ἐνέγκεῖν ἀδυσκόλως, ὡς καὶ τὸν Ζηνόδωρον αὐτὸν, ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἄστυ. καὶ Ἀπέθανεν δὲ γενναίως: Δήμητρος γὰρ ἑορτῆς οὔσης… …ἐπεύχεσθαι ἐθέλων μὲν κατ' οἶκον…

…at least to expect to carry the reception into Athens without difficulty, just as even Zenodorus himself, having arrived in the city [*had done*] – and He died nobly: for while the festival of Demeter was going on… …wishing to pray at home…

[Assante] …to raise hope… of a welcome in Athens… he endured it willingly… even Zenodorus himself, having arrived in the city. And he died nobly. For it was the festival of Demeter…

[Assante] Although the fragmentary context of this list does not allow confirmation, I would hypothesize that this final event was deliberately placed at the end – as if to say that not only did the philosopher distinguish himself in many varied moments of his life (hence the recall of seemingly unrelated events), but that his very death proved equally worthy.

The mention of the festival of Demeter and the reference to a final prayer are unsurprising, as they fit well within the ritual practices typical of the Epicurean school. (cf. Gallo, p. 158 = Studi, p. 197)

30. Zenodoros, Timasagoras, & Philologists

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 34.1

...ἔδωκε καὶ Ζ[ην]όδωρον [αὐ]τῶι παράγειν ἐν... ...τι μνᾶν, καὶ διότι παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἀθήνας αὐτὸν [ὑπ]έταξε Τιμασαγόρ[αι κ]αὶ [πα]ρέβαλε... ...[ἐ]νιαυτόν... ...φ[ι]λολόγους ἔχων παραπ[λησίους]...

...Ἔδωκε καὶ Ζηνόδωρον αὐτῷ παραγεῖν ἐν... ...τι μνᾶν, καὶ διότι, παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἀθήνας αὐτὸν Ὑπέταξε Τιμασαγόρᾳ καὶ Παρέβαλε... ...ἐνιαυτόν... ...φιλολόγους ἔχων παραπλησίους...

> ...He also instructed Zenodoros to come along with him in... ...a certain mina [*i.e., for some price*], and because, upon arriving in Athens, He placed himself under Timasagoras and He brought with him... ...for a year... ...philologists [*i.e., lovers of reasoning*] he had of a similar sort...
>
> [Assante] ...he also granted to Zenodorus himself to take with him... for one mina, and because, having arrived in Athens, he submitted himself to Timasagoras and turned... for a year... ......having near him people who loved knowledge...

[Assante] Zenodorus and Timasagoras, both previously cited but in similarly fragmentary and uncertain contexts. The only point I could establish with some certainty is that both are connected to the city of Athens.

31. Quotation of Philonides: Return to Laodicea

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 57

...αὐτοῦ [μετὰ τ]ῶν φίλω[ν ἔ]τη πλείονα. Καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς [Ἀτθί]δος ἀνακομιδὴν [ἔμεν]ον, ἀκροτε[λ]εύτιον ἐμαυτῶι τοῦ γήρως ὑποστησάμενος π[ρον]οούμενός τε ἐν Λ[αοδ]ικείαι διατρίψειν, οὐκ ἐν τῆι...

"αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἔτη πλείονα. καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀτθίδος ἀνακομιδὴν Ἔμενον: ἀκροτελεύτιον ἐμαυτῷ τοῦ γήρως ὑποστησάμενος – προνοούμενός τε ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ διατρίψειν ¬ οὐκ ἐν τῇ..."

> "...[*I was*] there with friends for many years. and I awaited the return from {Attica}: reserving for myself the conclusion of old age – and intending to pass the time in Laodicea ¬ not in the..."
>
> [Assante] "[*I stayed*] there with friends for several years. And [*I was waiting*] for the return from { }... promising myself and planning to spend the final part of my old age in Laodicea, not in the [*foreign land*]..."

*[Assante] It is clear that these must have contained an autobiographical quotation from Philonides, as shown by the use of the first person. It refers to a long stay of the philosopher with friends in a previously mentioned place, as suggested by "there" (**αὐτοῦ**), and to his intention to return to Laodicea to spend his final years there.*

32. Voyage Back to Syria, Detour to Home

[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 45

...[κατ]ὰ τὸν εἰς Συρίαν Φι[λωνίδ]ου πλοῦν, εἰς Καρία[ν ἐνοεῖτ]ο περιστὰς οἴκαδ[ε ἀπ]ελθεῖν, ὅπως ἂν μηδὲ [ἔξ]ω τῶν γονέων ἀπέχη[ι, μηδ'] ἐν...

...κατὰ τὸν εἰς Συρίαν Φιλωνίδου πλοῦν – εἰς Καρίαν Ἐνοεῖτο περιστὰς οἴκαδε ἀπελθεῖν – ὅπως ἂν μηδὲ ἔξω τῶν γονέων Ἀπέχῃ, μηδ’ ἐν...

> ...[*after leaving Athens*] during Philonides’ voyage to Syria – having detoured homeward, He was planning to return into Caria – so that he might not be away from his parents, nor in...
>
> [Assante] ...During Philonides’ sea voyage to Syria, having passed through Caria, he was thinking of returning home, so that he would not remain away from his parents...

*[Gallo] During the sea voyage bound for Syria, perhaps departing from Athens (where we know he had been several times), or perhaps from Ephesus, on the coast of Lydia (where it is recorded that he met Eudemos), Philonides passed through Caria (**περιστάς** can have no other meaning; with **εἰς** it is mostly used figuratively), probably to Caunus (the hometown of Dionysiodorus), which lay on the maritime route leading south from the north into Syria. He then decided to continue on to Syria, that is, to his native city, so as not to remain far from his parents.*

Inscription from Athens

Athenian Citizenship and Honors for the Family

Philonides of Laodicea the Elder and his sons, our Philonides and his younger brother Dicaearchus, helped Athens in some way. They were granted Athenian citizenship, crowned with wreaths, given a statue, welcomed to a public meal, and praised for their piety.

Attica, IG II2 1236 = I.Eleusis 221, part 1

...[καὶ τοῖς παραγενομένοις π]αρὰ τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τοὺς βασιλε[ῖς πρεσβευταῖς συνήργει μετὰ σπουδῆς] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας εὐεργεσίας ἃς πο[ιῶν διατετέλεκε τὸν δῆμον ἐτίμη]σεν ὁ δῆμος πολιτείαι αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ὑοὺς αὐ[τοῦ Φιλωνίδην καὶ Δικαίαρχ]ον καὶ ἐστεφάνωσεν θαλλοῦ στεφάνωι καὶ πάλιν χρυσῶι [στεφάνωι καὶ ἔστησ]εν ἐν τῶι τεμένει τοῦ Δήμου καὶ τῶν Χαρίτων βουληθέντο[ς καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἔ]σωισεν ἐκ τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ποιησάμενος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐλθόντος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῶν ὑῶν Φιλωνίδου προσήγαγον αὐτοὺς οἱ πρυτάνεις πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἐν ἱεροῖς καὶ διαλεγέντος αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς εὐνοίας ἧς ἔχουσι πρὸς πάντας Ἀθηναίους φιλανθρώπως προσεδέξατο ὁ δῆμος ἀξιῶν καλέσαι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἑστίαν τοῦ δήμου·

...[*because Philonides the Elder*] eagerly assisted the envoys [*sent*] by the people to the [*Seleucid*] Kings. And because of this – and because of the other benefactions which he has continually performed – the people honored him: both Philonides himself and his sons Philonides and Dicaearchus – with citizenship, and crowned them with a wreath of laurel and again with a golden wreath, and set up [*a statue of Philonides the Elder*] in the precinct of the Dēmos and of the Charites, with his consent. And furthermore, he rescued [*his son Philonides*] from captivity, making every effort on his behalf. And when he entered the city with his elder son Philonides, the Prytaneis [*i.e., the executive committee of the Athenian Boule*] brought them before the people in the temples, and when he had spoken about the goodwill they have toward all Athenians, the people received him kindly, deeming it proper to invite them to the Prytaneion [*i.e., the official building in Athens where the Prytaneis worked and dined*] for the common meal of the people [*i.e., a state-sponsored civic meal*]

Spondophoroi: the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes

Attica, IG II2 1236 = I.Eleusis 221, part 2

It appears that this inscription was issued by the Eumolpidai and Kerykes, two hereditary priestly families of Athens central to the Eleusinian Mysteries.

ἵνα οὖν καὶ Εὐμολπίδαι καὶ Κήρυκες αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους αὐτοῦ... [εὐσεβοῦντας] τὰ περὶ τὼ ⟦ι⟧ θεὼ ⟦ι⟧ {τὼ θεὼ} φαίνωνται τιμῶντ[ες καὶ] φιλοτιμούμενοι περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰς τοὺς ἐκπεμπομένους ἐξ ἑαυτῶ[ν ἀγαθούς]. vvvv ἀγα[θεῖ τύχει δεδόχθαι τοῖς γένε]σιν ἐξ ὧν οἱ σπονδοφόροι ἐκπέμποντ[αι, ἐπαι]νέσα[ι Φι]λ[ωνίδην Λαοδικέα καὶ τοὺς ὑοὺ]ς αὐτοῦ Φιλωνίδην καὶ Δικαίαρχον καὶ στεφανῶσα[ι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μυρρίνης στεφά]νωι ὧι πάτριόν ἐστιν στεφανῶσαι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ε[ὐεργέτας· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ τ]οῖς ἐκγόνοις αὐτοῦ διατηροῦσιν τὴν αὐτὴν [εὔνοι]αν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὑρέσθ]αι καὶ ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν ὅτου ἂν δοκῶσιν ἄξιο[ι εἶναι]. [ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν ἄρ]χοντα τῶν γενῶν ἐν στήλει λιθίνει [τὸ δὲ] ἀν[άλ]ωμ[α λ]ογίσασθαι [τοῖ]ς γένε[σι]...

Therefore, so that both the Eumolpidae and the Kerykes [*i.e., the two hereditary priestly families in charge of the Eleusinian Mysteries*] may see that he and his descendants honor the things concerning the goddesses, behaving reverently and showing ambition toward those men sent from among themselves as noble [*for dispatch, i.e., as envoys or officials*]– it has been decreed, with good fortune, by the gene from which the Spondophoroi [*i.e., official truce-bearers for sacred festivals*] are sent out, to praise Philonides of Laodicea and his sons Philonides and Dicaearchus, and to crown each of them with a wreath of myrtle, which it is customary to use when crowning their own benefactors. And that he and his descendants, so long as they continue in the same goodwill toward the people, shall obtain whatever other good thing they may seem to deserve. The archon of the gene shall inscribe this decree on a stone stele… and the expense shall be accounted among the gene [i.e., *the clans of the Eumolpidae and Kerykes*]…

Inscription from Delphi

Praise from Delphians for Philonides' younger Brother Dicaearchus

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Delphi, SGDI II 2677 = OGIS 241, part 1

ἀγαθὰ τύχα. ἄρχοντος <Ξέν>ων[ος]· ἐπειδὴ Δαμοκράτης καὶ TIMAΣNI κα<ὶ Ἀ>θαμβο<ς> ὁ ἱε<ρε>ὺς ἐξαποσταλέντες θεωροὶ ποτὶ τὸν <β>ασ<ιλῆ Ἀν>τ<ίο>χ<ον> ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν ἀνάγγειλα[ν] περὶ Δικαιάρχου τοῦ Φιλωνίδα Λαοδικέος, ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς <δια>τε[λεῖ ὢν ποτί τε] τὸ <ἱερ>ὸν καὶ τὰν πόλιν τῶν Δελφῶν καὶ περὶ πλείστου ποιείμενος τὰν ποτὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν εὔ<χρ>η<στον> α<ὐ>σω<τὸ>ν παρασκευάζει ἐν παντὶ καιρῶι καὶ κοινᾶι τᾶι πόλει καὶ ἰδίαι τοῖς ἐ<ν>τυγχανόντοις, <εἰς ἅ> κα τις αὐ<τ>ὸν παρακαλῆ, καὶ τοῖς ἀφικνουμένοις Δελφῶν ποτὶ τὸν βασιλῆ {A} Ἀντίοχοος συνεργεῖ μετὰ πάσ<α>ς προθυμίας, <ἐν οἷς> κα {ι} τυγχάνων<τι> χρεί<α>ν ἔχοντες, καὶ λέγει καὶ πράσσει <τὰ συμφέροντα> διὰ παντὸς παρὰ τῶι βασιλεῖ Ἀντιόχωι περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τᾶς πόλιος τῶν Δελφῶν, ἀγαθᾶι τύχαι,

Good fortune. In the archonship of [Xen]on:

Since Democrates, Timasni, and Athambos the priest, having been sent as Theoroi to King Antiochus [*IV Epiphanes*], reported to the assembly concerning Dicaearchus, son of Philonides of Laodicea [*i.e., and younger brother of Philonides the Epicurean*], that he is a good man, continually acting for both the Sanctuary [*of Delphi*] and the city of the Delphians, and regarding piety toward the gods as of the highest importance, he makes himself useful in every circumstance, both for the public good of the city and privately for those he meets, in whatever way anyone may call upon him.

And for those arriving at Delphi to see King Antiochus [*IV Epiphanes*], he assists with all eagerness, in whatever matters those in need happen to require. He both speaks and acts helpfully at all times before King Antiochus [*IV Epiphanes*] regarding the sanctuary and the city of the Delphians.

With good fortune.

Privileges for Dicaearchus from Laodicea by-the-sea

Delphi, SGDI II 2677 = OGIS 241, part 2

δεδόχθαι <τ>ᾶι πόλει τῶν Δελφῶν <ἐν> ἀγορᾶι <τελείωι σὺμ ψ>άφοις ταῖς ἐννόμοις ἐπαινέσαι Δικαίαρχον Φιλ<ω>νίδα Λαοδικέα τῶν ποτὶ θαλάσσαι ἐ<π>ὶ τᾶι εὐσ<εβε>ίαι καὶ ἐπ<ὶ> τᾶι λοιπᾶι προ<α>ιρέσει ἃ<ι> ἔχων τυγχάνει ποτί τε τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὰν πόλιν τῶν <Δελφῶν καὶ ὑπάρχειν> αὐτῶι <κ>[αὶ ἐγγόνοις παρὰ τᾶς πόλιος] θεωροδοκίαν τῶν <τ>ε Πυθίων καὶ Σωτηρίων. εἶμεν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέταν {ιον} τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τᾶς πόλιος τῶν Δελφῶν, καὶ ὑπά<ρχε>ιν αὐτῶι προμαντείαν, προδικίαν, ἀσυλίαν, ἀτέλειαν πάν<των, προεδρ>ίαν ἐμ π<άντο>ις τοῖς ἀγώνοις, <οἷς> ἁ π{ρ}όλις {πόλις} <τίθητι> καὶ τἄλλα τ<ίμ>ι<α ὅ>σα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προξένοις καὶ ε<ὐ>ερ<γέτα>ις <ὑπ>ά<ρχ>ει παρὰ τᾶς πόλιος.

It has been resolved by the city of Delphi, in the full assembly with lawful vote, to praise Dicaearchus, son of Philonides, a Laodicean of those [dwelling] by the sea, for his piety and his other commitments, which he is seen to possess both toward the Sanctuary [*of Delphi*] and the City of Delphi.

And that there be granted to him and to his descendants by the city the right of Theorodokia [i.e., hosting sacred envoys] for the Pythian and Soteria festivals.

Let him also be Proxenos [*i.e., host of ambassadors*] and Benefactor of the Sanctuary [*of Delphi*] and the City of Delphi, and let the following privileges belong to him:

– Promanteia [*i.e., right of first consultation of the oracle*]
– Prodikia [*i.e., priority in legal matters*]
– Asylia [*i.e., right of sanctuary*]
– Ateleia [*i.e., exemption from all taxes*]
– Prohedria [*i.e., front-row seating*] in all the contests which the city sponsors
– and all other honors which are granted to other proxenoi and benefactors by the city.

Antiochus IV Epiphanes was the son of Antiochus III the Great, and he "was given elementary instruction by [the Epicurean] Dionysodorus while still a child in age" ¬ but at one point "Epiphanes had turned away from the choice [sect, i.e. the Epicurean School]" – but ultimately he "was not alienated from the choice [sect, i.e. the Epicurean School]" and that "Philonides made him [i.e., Epiphanes] one who chooses [i.e., an Epicurean] in thinking."
("The Life of Philonides," section 15, 16)

He is therefore an example of someone born into Epicurean instruction – as well as an example of a politically powerful Epicurean.

Epiphanes was the maternal great-great-grandson of Demetrius Poliorcetes, through Stratonice – and thus is an example of the family's continued interest in philosophy.

This section begins with King Antiochus VII Sidetes – but looks back at the history of Antiochus IV Epiphanes.

Diodorus Siculus, Book 34, part 1

Negotiation

ὡς Ἀντίοχος ὁ βασιλεύς, φησίν, ἐπολιόρκει τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα: οἱ δὲ Ἰουδαῖοι μέχρι μέν τινος ἀντέσχον ¬ ἐξαναλωθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἁπάντων – ἠναγκάσθησαν περὶ διαλύσεως διαπρεσβεύσασθαι

when King Antiochus [*VII Sidetes*], he says, was besieging Jerusalem: the Jews held out for some time ¬ but when all their provisions had been used up – they were forced to negotiate for a truce

Advice from Friends

οἱ δὲ Πλείους αὐτῷ τῶν φίλων συνεβούλευον κατὰ κράτος αἱρήσειν τὴν πόλιν – καὶ τὸ γένος ἄρδην ἀνελεῖν τῶν Ἰουδαίων

but more of his friends advised him to take the city by force – and to utterly destroy the race of the Jews

Enemies of All

μόνους γὰρ ἁπάντων ἐθνῶν ἀκοινωνήτους εἶναι τῆς πρὸς ἄλλο ἔθνος ἐπιμιξίας ¬ καὶ πολεμίους ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντας

for they alone of all nations are unsociable toward intermixing with another nation ¬ and regard all people as enemies

From Egypt, From Sickness

ἀπεδείκνυον δὲ καὶ τοὺς προγόνους αὐτῶν ὡς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς Αἰγύπτου πεφυγαδευμένους.

and [*the friends of Antiochus VII Sidetes*] also pointed to their ancestors as impious and hated by the gods, having been driven out from all of Egypt

τοὺς γὰρ ἀλφοὺς ἢ λέπρας ἔχοντας ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καθαρμοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐναγεῖς συναθροισθέντας ὑπερορίους ἐκβεβλῆσθαι

for those having white spots or leprosy on their bodies were, for the sake of purification, gathered together to be thrown out beyond the borders as polluted

Cultural Misanthropy

τοὺς δὲ Ἐξορισθέντας καταλαβέσθαι μὲν τοὺς περὶ τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα τόπους – συστησαμένους δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος: παραδόσιμον ποιῆσαι τὸ μῖσος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους˙

but Those who had been exiled settled the regions around Jerusalem – and having formed the Jewish nation: making hatred toward other people their tradition

Exclusionary Traditions

διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νόμιμα παντελῶς ἐξηλλαγμένα καταδεῖξαι: τὸ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔθνει τραπέζης κοινωνεῖν, μηδ' εὐνοεῖν τὸ παράπαν ¬ Ὑπέμνησαν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ τοῦ προγενομένου μίσους τοῖς προγόνοις πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ ἔθνος

and for this reason also inventing customs that are completely different: that they shared a table with no other nation, nor were well inclined at all ¬ they also reminded him about the previous hostility from their ancestors toward this nation

Epiphanes in the Holy of Holies

Ἀντίοχος γὰρ ὁ, προσαγορευθεὶς Ἐπιφανὴς, καταπολεμήσας τοὺς Ἰουδαίους – εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν ἄδυτον τοῦ θεοῦ σηκόν: οἷ νόμιμον εἰσιέναι μόνον τὸν ἱερέα

for Antiochus [*IV*], called Epiphanes, after warring against the Jews – entered into the innermost sanctuary of the god: into which it is lawful for only the priest to enter

Moses & His Legacy

εὑρὼν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λίθινον ἄγαλμα ἀνδρὸς βαθυπώγωνος, καθήμενον ἐπ' ὄνου, μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχον βιβλίον – τοῦτο μὲν ὑπέλαβε Μωυσέως εἶναι, τοῦ κτίσαντος τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα καὶ συστησαμένου τὸ ἔθνος – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, νομοθετήσαντος τὰ μισάνθρωπα καὶ παράνομα ἔθη τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις

and finding within it a stone statue of a long-bearded man, seated on a donkey, holding a document in his hands – he supposed this to be [*a statue of*] Moses, the one who founded Jerusalem and organized the nation – and in addition to these things, who legislated the misanthropic and lawless customs for the Jews

Resolution of Antiochus IV

Αὐτὸς δὲ – στυγήσας τὴν μισανθρωπίαν πάντων ἐθνῶν – ἐφιλοτιμήθη καταλῦσαι τὰ νόμιμα

but [*Antiochus IV Epiphanes*] himself – abhorring their misanthropy for all nations – strove to abolish their laws

Normalization Efforts

διὸ τῷ ἀγάλματι τοῦ κτίστου καὶ τῷ ὑπαίθρῳ βωμῷ τοῦ θεοῦ μεγάλην ὗν θύσας, τό τε αἷμα Προσέχεεν αὐτοῖς – καὶ τὰ κρέα σκευάσας: Προσέταξε τῷ μὲν ἀπὸ τούτων ζωμῷ τὰς ἱερὰς αὐτῶν βίβλους (καὶ περιεχούσας τὰ μισόξενα νόμιμα) καταρρᾶναι

therefore, having sacrificed a large swine to the statue of the founder and to the open-air altar of the god, [*Antiochus IV Epiphanes*] sprinkled its blood on them – and having prepared the meat: he ordered [*his agents*] to sprinkle their sacred books (which also contain their nation-hating laws) with the broth from that [*swine*]

τὸν δὲ ἀθάνατον λεγόμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς λύχνον καὶ καιόμενον ἀδιαλείπτως ἐν τῷ ναῷ κατασβέσαι – τῶν τε κρεῶν ἀναγκάσαι προσενέγκασθαι τὸν ἀρχιερέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἰουδαίους

[*Antiochus IV Epiphanes ordered his agents*] to extinguish the lamp called "immortal" among them and burning unceasingly in the temple – and to compel the high priest and the other Jews to offer the meat [*from the sacrificed swine*]

Indecisiveness of Antiochus VII Sidetes

ταῦτα δὴ διεξιόντες, οἱ Φίλοι τὸν Ἀντίοχον παρεκάλουν μάλιστα μὲν ἄρδην ἀνελεῖν τὸ ἔθνος ¬ εἰ δὲ μή, καταλῦσαι τὰ νόμιμα – καὶ συναναγκάσαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς μεταθέσθαι

recounting these things in detail, his Friends urged Antiochus [*VII Sidetes*] especially either to utterly destroy the nation ¬ but if not, to abolish their laws – and to compel their way of life to be changed

ὁ δὲ Βασιλεὺς, μεγαλόψυχος ὢν καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἥμερος – (λαβὼν ὁμήρους) ἀπέλυσε τῶν ἐγκλημάτων τοὺς Ἰουδαίους – φόρους τε τοὺς ὀφειλομένους πραξάμενος, καὶ τὰ τείχη περιελὼν τῶν Ἱεροσολύμων

but the King, being magnanimous and mild in character – (after receiving hostages) acquitted the Jews of their offenses – having collected the tribute owed, and dismantled the walls of Jerusalem

Mishneh Torah on ʾEpikōrsīm

The Mishneh Torah is the first full systematic code of Jewish law. It was written by Moses Maimonides (c. 1178CE) while he was living in Fustat (Old Cairo), Egypt.

The Mishneh Torah is treated as a foundational legal authority, studied as sacred text alongside the Talmud, cited in rabbinic decisions across all Jewish traditions, and used to derive practical law – forming the basis for many later legal systems and influencing broader legal thought.

Mitzvah to Kill an ʾEpikōrōs

"The term Epicurus, or Apiqoros as it is more often pronounced, is alive and well in contemporary Jewish culture. When used by members of the Orthodox Jewish community, it means simply a heretic… …an Apiqoros is someone who rejects the Jewish religion for ideological or philosophic reasons."

– Gabriel Danzig (Chair of Classics, Bar Ilan University, Israel), 'The Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism,' pg. 549

Moses Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah – Rotzeah uShmirat Nefesh, 4.10 sup.

הָאֶפִּיקוֹרְסִים: וְהֵם עוֹבְדֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אוֹ הָעוֹשֶׂה עֲבֵרוֹת לְהַכְעִיס, אֲפִלּוּ אָכַל נְבֵלָה אוֹ לָבַשׁ שַׁעַטְנֵז לְהַכְעִיס – הֲרֵי זֶה אֶפִּיקוֹרוֹס – וְשֶׁכּוֹפְרִין בַּתּוֹרָה וּבַנְּבוּאָה, הָיְתָה מִצְוָה לְהָרְגָן

HāʾEpikōrsīm: vəhēm ʿōvdēi ʿavōdā zārā, ʾō hāʿōseh ʿavērōt ləhakhʿīs, ʾăfīllū ʾākhal nəvēlā ʾō lāvash shaʿatnēz ləhakhʿīs – harēi zeh ʾEpikōrōs – ušekōfrīn bā-Tōrāh ūvannəvūʾāh, hāytā mitzvāh ləhargān

The Epicureans [**אֶפִּיקוֹרְסִים**]: these are idol worshippers, or those who commit transgressions deliberately to provoke [God], even if he ate non-kosher meat or wore a Shatnez [*forbidden mixture of wool and linen*] to provoke – behold, this is an Epicurean – and those who deny the Torah and prophecy: it is a mitzvah to kill them [**לְהָרְגָן**]

[Rabbi Eliyahu Touger] It is a mitzvah to kill minim and Apikorsim. The term minim refers to Jewish idolaters or those who perform transgressions for the sake of angering God, even if one eats non-kosher meat for the sake of angering God or wears sha'atnez for the sake of angering God. The term apikorsim refers to Jews who deny the Torah and the concept of prophecy.

Epicureans (here broadly defined as those who do not follow Jewish customs) are regarded by Jewish law as deserving death – with their killing considered a mitzvah (a religious commandment).

Moses Maimonides (Rambam), Mishneh Torah – Rotzeah uShmirat Nefesh, 4.10 fin.

אִם יֵשׁ בְּיָדוֹ כֹּחַ לְהָרְגָן בְּסַיִף בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא, הוֹרֵג. וְאִם לָאו – הָיָה בָּא עֲלֵיהֶן בַּעֲלִילוֹת עַד שֶׁיְּסַבֵּב הֲרִיגָתָן. כֵּיצַד? רָאָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁנָּפַל לִבְאֵר, וְהַסֻּלָּם בַּבְּאֵר – הָיָה מְסַלְּקוֹ וְאוֹמֵר "הֲרֵינִי טָרוּד לְהוֹרִיד בְּנִי מִן הַגַּג, וַאֲחֲזִירֶנּוּ לְךָ" – וְכַיּוֹצֵא בִּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ

ʾIm yēsh bəyādō kōaḥ ləhargein bəsayif bəfarhesyā, hōrēg. vəʾim lāv – hāyā bā ʿălēihen baʿălīlōt ʿad sheyyəsabbēv harīgātān. kēyṣad? rāʾā ʾeḥād mēhen shenāfal libəʾēr, vəhassullām babəʾēr – hāyā məsalleqō vəʾōmēr "harēnī ṭārūd ləhōrīd bənī min haggāg, vəʾaḥazīrēnnū ləkhā" – vəkhayyōṣēʾ bidəvārīm ʾēllū

If one has the power to kill them with the sword [סַיִף] publicly, he should kill. And if not – one should approach them with schemes [עֲלִילוֹת] until he brings about their death. In what manner? If one saw one of them fall into a well, and a ladder was in the well – he may remove it and say "I need it to bring my son down from the roof, and I will return it to you" – similar things like this

[Rabbi Eliyahu Touger] If there is the possibility, one should kill them with a sword in public view. If that is not possible, one should develop a plan so that one can cause their deaths. What is implied? If one sees such a person descend to a cistern, and there is a ladder in the cistern, one should take the ladder, and excuse oneself, saying: "I must hurry to take my son down from the roof. I shall return the ladder to you soon." Similarly, one should devise other analogous plans to cause the death of such people.

Here we see that the instruction according to Jewish law is to make killing Epicureans legal.

*When changing the law is not yet possible, the commandment is to break the existing law and kill Epicureans through plots / contrivances (**עֲלִילוֹת**, uh-lī-lōt).*

The Oxyrhynchus Consolation

Incorrect Perspective

P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11

...γίν[ε]σ[θ]αι ὅταν καθ[ή]κ[η] [τ]ὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἔλεγον, [οἰ]κεῖον, μηδ' ὅταν γε [ν]ὴ Δία οὕτω λέγηται πά[λι]ν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ["δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πάν[τας οὓ]ς σέ[βο]μαι [κ]αὶ τού[τοι]ς βο[ύ]λ[ο]μαι πάντα κα[τ]αθύειν καὶ τούτοις [ἀν]ατιθέναι.

...Γίνεσθαι ὅταν καθήκῃ τὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἔλεγον, οἰκεῖον, μηδ' ὅταν γε – νὴ Δία! – οὕτω λέγηται πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων "δέδοικα τοὺς θεοὺς πάντας οὓς σέβομαι καὶ τούτοις βούλομαι πάντα καταθύειν καὶ τούτοις ἀνατιθέναι."

[col. 1, lines 1-11] ...to happen whenever what aligns with nature, as I mentioned, is suitable, nor whenever – by Zeus! – it is spoken like this again by the common people "I fear all the gods whom I revere and to them I wish to sacrifice all things and to dedicate to them."

on suitable occasions may be, as I have said, in keeping with nature – nor is it, by Zeus, when someone or other goes about repeating, "I fear all the gods, and honour them, and want to spend all my money in making sacrifices and consecrating offerings to them."

[Grenfell] Nor, indeed, even when this further statement is made by the ordinary man, "I fear all the gods and worship them, and to them I wish to make every sacrifice and offering."

Infirm Basis

col. 1, lines 11-16

χαπιέστε[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω[τῶ]ν ἐστιν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ[δὲ] ταύτῃ πω τὸ βέβαιον [εὐ]σεβείας ὑπάρχει

Χαριέστερος μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν ἐστιν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτῃ πω τὸ βέβαιον εὐσεβείας ὑπάρχει.

[col. 1, lines 11-16] Indeed, possibly such a person at times is more refined than other laymen, but still not in this way at all does the firmness of piety exist.

[Chilton] Such a man is perhaps more praiseworthy than other individuals, but still it is not thus that a solid foundation for piety is laid.

[Grenfell] It may perhaps imply more taste on his part than the average, nevertheless by this formula he has not yet reached the trustworthy principle of religion.

Fear of the gods is an infirm basis for piety

Correct Perspective

col. 1, lines 16-26

σὺ [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ[τα]τον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ [διε]ιληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι [δια]νοηθῆναι δυνάμε[θα], κα[ὶ θ]αύμαζε ταύτην [τὴ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου [ἀδ]ε[ί]α τοῦτο, ἔπε[ι]τα...

Σὺ δ', ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώτατον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ διειληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ πανάριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διανοηθῆναι δυνάμεθα, καὶ θαύμαζε ταύτην τὴν διάληψιν καὶ σέβου ἀδείᾳ τοῦτο, ἔπειτα...

[col. 1, lines 16-26] And you, Sir, should consider it something most blessed to have rightly grasped what is best of all among what exists that we are able to conceive [for ourselves] – and you should marvel at this understanding and you should revere it with freedom from fear.

[Chilton] You, my friend, must know that the most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things; that is absolutely the best thing that we can conceive of here below. Admire this clear apprehension of the spirit, revere this divine gift.

[Grenfell] But do you, sir, consider that the most blessed state lies in the formation of a just conception concerning the best thing that we can possibly imagine to exist; and reverence and worship this idea.

Reason for our Reverence

col. 1, lines 27-35

...σέ[βεσ]θα[ι νο]ῶσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον [μὴ] ὀλ[ιγ]ωρῶν τηλικού[του] σεμνώματος κατὰ [τὴ]ν θ[ε]ωρίαν πρὸς τὴν [σε] [αυ]τοῦ εὐ[δαιμ]ονίαν. κ[αὶ] [νὴ] Δία πε[ρὶ ταύ]την τὴ[ν] [ἐν]τεῦθε[ν...

...σέβεσθαι νοῶσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μὴ ὀλιγωρῶν τηλικούτου σεμνώματος κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ, νὴ δία, περὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐντεῦθεν...

[col. 1, lines 27-35] ...they intend to worship, but only that you are not neglectful of such great reverence according to the study for your own happiness. And, by god, concerning this which from here...

[Chilton] *[After that you should not honour the gods because you think thus to gain their favour],* as people will think when they see you performing acts of piety, but only because, in comparison with your own happiness, you see how the condition of the gods *[is infinitely more august, according to our doctrine]*

Honoring Yourself

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col. 2, lines 1-8

{[πε]υτικὸ̣ν} καὶ κεχα[ρισ]μένον, ἐὰν εὐκαιρῇ, τιμ[ᾶ]ν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἵ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν, ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾷ χρωμένου σοῦ.

...Καὶ κεχαρισμένον. ἐὰν εὐκαιρῇ: τιμᾶν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἵ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν – ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾷ χρωμένου σοῦ.

[col. 2, lines 1-8] ...and was grateful. If there is an opportunity: honor this very study of yourself with the innate pleasures of the flesh, whenever they may be appropriate – but also whenever by you acting in accordance with the laws.

[Chilton] *[And certainly, by Zeus, {when you practice} this doctrine – the doctrine most worthy of belief, {as your reason should tell you – it is of course open to you to offer sacrifices to the gods. By doing so you perform]* an act which gives confidence] and is a pleasure to see, if it is done at the proper time, because you honour your own doctrine by enjoying those pleasures of the senses which befit such occasions and besides you conform in some sense to religious traditions.

Fearlessness

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col. 2, lines 8-16

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσα[γε] ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς, ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς Διός, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, δ[έ]δοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖ[ν] ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἐλλατῶν.

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσαγε ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, "ὦ πρὸς Διός" (τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον) δέδοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖν ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἐλλατῶν!

[col. 2, lines 8-16] Do not introduce fear in this respect nor the assumption of grace from the gods because you do these things. For why "oh by Zeus" (as it is said) were you afraid? Perhaps by thinking they act unjustly? Therefore, it is clear that how you are belittling [them]!

[Chilton] Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus (as men affect to say) what have you to fear in this matter? Do you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them?

[Grenfell] But let there be no question of fear in this, nor any assumption that your action will buy the favour of the gods. For why, 'by Zeus,' to use the vulgar phrase, do you fear them? Is it because you think that you do them an injury? Is it not plain in that case that you are making them inferior? Are you not then regarding the divine power as something mean, if it is inferior to you?

Fearing the divine denigrates the divine.

Comparison

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col. 2, lines 16-24

πῶς οὖ[ν] οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμ[ό]νιον δοξάζε[ι]ς, εἴπερ ἐ[λατ]το[ῦ]ται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χ[άριν] ἀδ[ικήματο]ς ὑπείλ[ηφας] ἐὰ[ν τοιαῦτα] πράττῃ[ς πρα]ϋν[εῖν θεόν; ἢ] τὸν τα[ῦτα] λογ[ιζόμενον ἐ]νίοτ' ἀνή[σειν] βλά[βας πρὸς] ἀνθρώ[πους;]

Πῶς οὖν οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμόνιον δοξάζεις, εἴπερ ἐλαττοῦται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χάριν ἀδ[ικήματος] ὑπείληφας ἐὰν τοιαῦτα πράττῃς, πραϋνεῖν θεόν; ἢ τὸν ταῦτα λογιζόμενον ἐνίοτ' ἀνήσειν βλάβας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους;

[col. 2, lines 16-24] How then do you not consider the divine as something lowly, if indeed it is belittled in relation to you? Or have you assumed that, because of [your wrongdoing], if you do such things, you appease a god? Or [have you assumed] that the one considering these things sometimes will forgive harms towards men?

[Chilton] How then will you not regard the Divinity as a miserable creature if it appears inferior in comparison to yourself? Or will you rather be of the opinion that by sacrificing [thousands of oxen] you can appease God if you have committed some evil deed? Can you think that he will take account of the sacrifice and, like a man, remit at some time or another a part of the penalty?

Fear

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col. 2, lines 25-27

κ[α]ὶ γὰρ οἴ[ον]ται δεῖν α[ὐτῶν] δεδοικέναι [καὶ] τιμᾶν τ[ινὰς] ἵνα κατεχό[μεν]οι τῷ...

Καὶ γὰρ οἴονται δεῖν αὐτῶν δεδοικέναι καὶ τιμᾶν τινάς ἵνα κατεχόμενοι τῷ...

[col. 2, lines 25-27] And indeed, they think it necessary to have been fearful of them and to honor certain ones in order that they are held...

[Chilton] No doubt men tell each other that they should fear the gods and honour them with sacrifices so that, restrained by the tribute they receive, the gods will not attack them

Fear's gamble

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col. 2, lines 28-32

μὴ ἐπιθ[ῶν]ται αὐτοῖ[ς· ὡς] εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τ[οῦ]το οἰομέ[νων] καθόλου μὴ βλαβήσεσθ[αι] [εἴ]τ' ο[ὐ]κ ὀρθ[ῶς] τὸ δυνα[μικὸν θε]ῶν τ[ιμ]ώντων

...Μὴ ἐπιθῶνται αὐτοῖς: ὡς εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τοῦτο οἰομένων, καθόλου μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι – εἴτ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς, τὸ δυναμικὸν θεῶν τιμώντων...

[col. 2, lines 28-32] ...Do not rely on them: whether thinking this rightly, not to be harmed at all – or not rightly, by honoring the power of the gods...

[Chilton] as a result they think that if their surmise is correct they will altogether escape injury and if it is not, all will be well because they pay homage to the power of the gods.

Fearful Expectations

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col. 3, lines 2-4

καιηται. τὸ γὰρ κατα[θῦσαι] βλάβην ἔφερεν ἂν [εἴ τις] προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπ[ιτίμιον.]

...καίηται. τὸ γὰρ καταθῦσαι βλάβην ἔφερεν, ἂν εἴ τις προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.

[col. 3, lines 2-4] ...would be set on fire. For sacrificing would have brought harm, if [someone] expected the penalty.

[Chilton] *[But if these close relations between gods and men were really to exist it would be a great misfortune, for the effect would make itself felt even beyond the grave after the funeral ceremonies, as soon as a man]* was cremated. For then men would suffer injury even beneath the earth and [everyone] would have to expect punishment.

A fearful mindset invites problems.

Expectations of Providence

col. 3, lines 5-10

καὶ χωρὶς τούτω[ν οἱ παραι]τούμενοι, μὴ παρ[ορῷντο, τὰ] σημεῖα τῆς χάριτ[ος καὶ νομί]ζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥᾳ[δίως πρὸς] ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς [ἄλλους] ἀφικέσθαι καὶ…

καὶ χωρὶς τούτων, οἱ παραιτούμενοι μὴ παρῷντο τὰ σημεῖα τῆς χάριτος, καὶ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥᾳδίως πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ἀφικέσθαι καὶ…

[col. 3, lines 5-10] …and apart from these, those who pray so that they would not pass by the signs of grace and thinking that they easily arrive for themselves and for others…

[Chilton] Moreover, I need not describe how men would have to beg for signs of favour from the gods in their fear of being neglected by them (for they would think to induce the gods in this way to communicate with them more readily and come down into their temples).

Many people incorrectly expect direct help from the gods.

Acting out of Fear

col. 3, lines 11-16

…ὅσους δήποτε τρόπ[ους πάν]τες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλά[βης ὑπό]πτευμα καὶ τὴν τ[ιμωρίας] προφυλακὴν ἐγγ[υῶνται, λογι]στέον, πρὸς

…ὅσους δήποτε τρόπους πάντες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλάβης ὑπόπτευμα καὶ τὴν τιμωρίας προφυλακὴν ἐγγυῶνται. λογιστέον πρὸς…

[col. 3, lines 11-16] …at any time as many as all the manners for the suspicion of harm and the prevention of punishment are guaranteed – then they give pledges. It must be calculated towards…

[Chilton] any more than I can tell of the diversity and number of the methods they would employ because of their fear of harm and so as to guard against punishment. For to speak the truth ‹*all this seems a pure illusion of these people when compared with the doctrine of those who think that a life of happiness exists for us in this world and do not admit that the dead live again – a marvel not less unlikely than those which Plato imagined*›.

Many people pray to avoid harm and not be punished.

List: Against the Professors, Sextus Empiricus

Against the Professors (Adversus Mathematicos)	
1	Against the Grammarians
2	Against the Rhetoricians
3	Against the Geometers
4	Against the Arithmeticians
5	Against the Astrologers
6	Against the Musicians
Against the Dogmatists (Adversus Dogmaticos)	

1, 2	7, 8	Against the Logicians 1, 2
3,4	9, 10	Against the Physicists 1, 2
5	11	Against the Ethicists

⁂ SANDBOX [REMOVE] ⁂

CONCEPTION LIST

νοεῖν	to conceive	**ΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing*
ἡ νόησις **αἱ νοήσεις**	concept	**ΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *seeing*
τὸ νόημα **τὰ νόηματα**	conception	**ΝΟΗΜΑ** *seeing*
νοηθείς *(εῖσα, έν)* **νοηθέντες** *(εῖσαι, έντα)*	conceived	**ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ** *seeing*
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	**ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing upon*
ἐπινενοηκώς *(υῖα, ός)*	having objectively conceived	**ΕΠΙΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ** *saw upon*
ἐπινοηθείς *(α, έν)*	[objectively] conceived [already]	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ** *seeing upon*
ἡ ἐπίνοια **αἱ ἐπινοίαι**	[objective] concept	**ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ** *seeing upon*
τὸ ἐπίνόημα **τὰ ἐπινοήματα**	[objective] conception	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΜΑ** *result of seeing upon*
τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν **τὰ ἐπινοηθέντα**	what is objectively conceived	**ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΝ** *seeing upon*
ἐπινοούμενος *(η, ον)*	objectively conceived	**ΕΠΙΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing upon*
προσεπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive additionally	**ΠΡΟΣΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ**
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	**ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing within*
τὸ ἐννόημα **τὰ ἐννοήματα**	internal conception	**ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ** *result of seeing within*
ἐννοῶν *(ἐννοοῦσα, ἐννοοῦν)* **ἐννοοῦντες** *(ἐννοοῦσαι, ἐννοοῦντα)*	internalizing	**ΕΝΝΟΩΝ**
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	**ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ** *seeing through*
ἡ διάνοια **αἱ διάνοιαι**	[mental] perception	**ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ** *seeing through*
ἀδιανόητος *(ον)*	[mentally] imperceptible	**ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ** *not capable of seeing through*
τὸ ἀδιανόητον **τὰ ἀδιανόητα**	what is imperceptible [mentally]	**ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΝ** *not seeing through*
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *seeing thoroughly*

κατανοούμενος	fully conceived	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ** *seeing thoroughly*
ἡ κατανόησις αἱ κατανοήσεις	full conception	**ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *thoroughly seeing*
προσκατανοεῖν	to additionally conceive fully	**ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ** *addition to seeing thoroughly*
ἡ προσκατανόησις αἱ προσκατανοήσεις	additional full conception	**ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ** *addition to thoroughly seeing*
ἀπερινόητος *(ον)*	not completely conceivable	**ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ** *not seeing around*
ἐνπεριvενοημένος *(η, ον)*	completely conceived within	**ΕΝΠΕΡΙΝΕΝΟΗΜΕΝΟΣ** *having seen around in*

KNOWLEDGE LIST

γινώσκειν = γιγνώσκειν	to come to know	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ** *having distinguished*
γιγνώσκων *(ουσα, ον)*	knowing	**ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΩΝ** *having distinguished*
γνωστός *(ή, όν)*	known	**ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ** *distinguishing*
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	**ΓΝΩΣΙΣ** *distinguishing*
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	**ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ** *not distinguishing*
γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	**ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ** *distinguishing [transformation]*
γνωρίζων *(ουσα, ον)*	acknowledging	

Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Frank Criticism, Fr. 45:

...[με]τὰ πολλῆς πεπ[ο]ιθήσεως ἄλλους νουθετήσομεν – καὶ νῦν καὶ διαπρέψαντες οἱ καθηγητῶν ὅτως ἀπότομαι γενηθέντες. Καὶ τὸ συνέχον καὶ κυριώτατον – Ἐπικούρωι καθ' ὃν ζῆν ἡρήμεθα, πειθαρχήσομεν...

With great confidence we will instruct others – both presently and [later] as distinguished leaders who have thus become strict. And the continuous and most important thing – to Epicurus, according to whom we have chosen to live, we will be obedient."

summa vero Vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est – in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.

the greatest Power of infinity is indeed most worthy of great and diligent contemplation – in which it is necessary to understand that nature is such that all things correspond as equals to all things. This Epicurus calls "isonomía," that is, equal distribution. Therefore, from this it follows that, if the multitude of mortals is so great, the number of immortals must not be smaller, and if those that destroy are innumerable, those that preserve must also be infinite.

x	*x*	**x**	**x**	*x*

x	x	x
x		x

ф	z	ф

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Sandbox

Subject	ctrl U
Subject modifier	ctrl alt U
Object	ctrl shift D
Object modifier	ctrl alt D
Oblique	ctrl shift /
Oblique modifier	ctrl alt /
Prepositional/absolute	ctrl shift \
Prepositional modifier	ctrl alt \

*** = ⁂

&&& = ※

working/extras

DRN 3.245 **sēnsíferōs** **mṓtūs quae dī́dit** **prī́*ma* *per* ā́rtūs**	*"[the fourth nature of the soul] which first distributes the sense-giving motions through the limbs."*

Plato, Timaeus [47B/C] God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries.

We need practical observation of the consequences of actions. ὁ τοῦ τέλους ἐπιλογισμός explains what the 'hedonistic calculus' is, but in just one word, we also have ἡ Συμμέτρησις ("measuring by comparison")

ὁ τοῦ Τέλους Ἐπιλογισμός	The Inductive Consideration of Fulfilment	*the "hedonic calculus"*

ATTESTATION		CONTESTATION	
[M] **ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον** attested	∧ and	[W] **ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον** contested	(O) **προσμένον** pending *(conflicting evidence → more observation needed)*

[¬M] **οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον** not attested	∧ and	[¬W] **οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον** not contested	(O) **προσμένον** pending *(no evidence → unknown)*
[¬M] *non-attestation alone is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment as long as there continues to be no attestation*	∨ or	[W] *contestation alone is sufficient to establish thefalsity of a judgment long as there continues to be no attestation*	(¬α) FALSE
[M] *attestation alone is sufficient to establish truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation*	∨ or	[¬W] *non-contestation alone is sufficient to establish truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation*	(α) TRUE

Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), P.Herc. 831

καὶ μὴν ἑκάστου, καθά φησιν Ἐπίκουρος: "ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως πρός τινα χρόνον συστάντος, πλείω μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι βιῶσαι, ἐλάττω δὲ δύνασθαι, τὴν ἀνάγκην τὴν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐποχῇ μεσολαβεῖν."

And indeed, for each [thing], as Epicurus says: "from its first generation, once it has come together for a certain time, it cannot live longer, but it can live shorter; it is not possible for any pause to intervene in the necessity according to that time."

x BAD VOWELS

bad vowel	good vowel
ά	ά
ί	ί
ὶ	
ύ	ύ
ώ	ώ
	ό
ή	ή
έ	έ

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